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A B S T R A C T
MEDIA FREEDOM IN AN AFRICAN STATE:
NIGERIAN LAW IN ITS HISTORICAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Freedom of the media, a subject of wide-ranging current 
international debate, is of vital contemporary impor­
tance in developed and developing countries alike. 
International and national guarantees of media freedom 
illustrate the increasing recognition of its importance: 
but demonstrate also the difficulty of balancing media 
freedom against competing interests.
Nigeria, arguably the most influential of the new 
African states, is a richly revealing subject for the 
study of media freedom, for it combines a legacy of 
English colonial law with the recent adoption (in 1979) 
of a constitution loosely patterned on that of the 
United States of America: and which accords continued 
recognition to guarantees of fundamental rights (includ­
ing freedom of expression) which were originally intro­
duced before Nigerian independence (in 1960) and which 
served thereafter as a model for similar guarantees 
adopted by many of the new states of the Commonwealth.
The thesis provides a brief overview of the laws which 
govern the media in Nigeria, and then examines selected 
rules in their constitutional context, considers their 
defects and analyses the extent to which they impose
unjustifiable restrictions on freedom of the media. 
Recommendations are made for the reform of the law: in 
some cases, but certainly not all, by following English 
developments and - more generally - by adopting the 
approach taken in the United States of America to 
analogous problems of media freedom.
The laws examined are those governing media licensing 
and regulation; sedition; defamation (civil and crimi­
nal) ; and contempt of court (especially the sub judice 
rule, publications 'scandalising* the court, the report­
ing of judicial proceedings by the media and the obli­
gation of journalists to disclose the identity of their 
sources).. Within each topic, the relevant Nigerian 
rules are described (with reference to both legislation 
and case law), important developments in the United 
Kingdom are analysed, and the approach of the United 
States of America to these questions is contrasted.
In conclusion, it is submitted that Nigeria should 
adopt the various reforms suggested: and the significance 
of such development for other Commonwealth countries 
(with similar laws governing media freedom) is considered.
PREFACE
I should like to explain, in more personal terms, my 
reasons for embarking on this study. I grew up in 
another African state in which scant regard has been 
accorded human rights and in which freedom of the 
media (though much vaunted) lies always subject to 
the heavy hand of government control. The majority 
of people are illiterate and are still struggling 
to attain the skills demanded in modern industrial 
society. From an early age I was struck by the im­
portance with which many regarded the radio: and by 
the vital role this medium is capable of playing in 
education and development. I also felt deeply dis­
turbed at the impact of government propaganda on 
broadcasting services; and by the need for free media 
to explore alternatives to government policies and 
to promote understanding and good will between diffe­
rent groups within the population. Hence, when I em­
barked on what I originally hoped would be an exposi­
tion of a full range of human rights (both political 
and social) and quickly realised that constraints of 
time and space demanded further specialisation, I 
chose to concentrate on the laws which restrict and 
restrain the media freedom I had long considered so 
important.
I was struck by the harshness of the common law 
within this sphere in a number of respects, and at
its departure from generally accepted principles of 
civil and criminal liability - to impose a heavy burden 
of rebuttal on the defendant in both categories of pro­
ceedings. I was greatly encouraged to note that the 
United States of America - beginning from essentially 
the same common law foundation - had constructed a 
system (primarily through decisions of its Supreme Court) 
in which media freedom is strongly supported; and many 
rules of the common law militating against it have been 
rejected or restricted. I felt profoundly conscious of 
the fact that these same common law rules have been 
carried to many areas of the world through Britain's 
former position as a colonial power: and that they 
presently govern (subject, of course, to local modifi­
cation) some one quarter of the world's population.
I decided, therefore, to embark on a comparative analysis 
with the aim of drawing together some of the more impor­
tant common law rules as they affect the media, of identi 
fying their shortcomings and (in the light of United 
States' experience) of suggesting reforms which (it is 
hoped) will serve to promote greater media freedom to the 
ultimate benefit of all whom the present rules affect.
The project I have attempted is thus ambitious indeed: 
and I hope that I have achieved at least some small part 
of my aim.
I should like to express my thanks to my supervisor, 
Professor James S Read, of the School of Oriental and
-v-
African Studies, for whose stimulation, encouragement 
and help I will always be endebted. I should also like 
to convey my gratitude to the British Council and the 
trustees of the Freda Lawenski Scholarship, without 
whose financial assistance this study would not have 
been possible. I should also like to thank the trustees, 
staff and inmates of William Goodenough and London 
Houses for the stimulating social environment in which 
I have spent the last two years. I should also like 
to express my sincere appreciation to the staff of 
the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, for according 
me facilities without which this study could not have 
been completed within this two-year period. I should 
like to thank Mrs Tashnin Chaudhary and Ms Clare Savaryn 
for their hours of labour in typing this final version.
I should like to record a special vote of thanks to 
Professor Robert C Cole who, despite many demands on 
his own time, has proof-read the entire work. I should 
also like to thank my parents and my sister, Margie, for 
their constant encouragement and support. And, last but 
by no means least, I should like to thank all the friends 
who have stood by me in times of difficulty, especially 
Mella Keohane, Bill Moodie and Debbie Weinrauch.
I have endeavoured to describe the law in accordance with 
my understanding of the sources available to me as at 
1 January 19 83; and all errors and omissions are, of 
course, entirely my own.
Anthea J Jeffery London, 31 July, 19 83
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APPENDIX I
MAPS OF NIGERIA SHOWING ITS INTERNAL 
DIVISIONS AS AT 1963, 1967 AND 1976
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The map above reflects the present division of 
Nigeria into nineteen states.
The line drawn in red marks the division between 
the northern and southern states. It is thus 
readily apparent that the northern states com­
prise the bulk of both land-area and population.
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APPENDIX II
NEWSPAPER PRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION 
IN NIGERIA
Details of the production and circulation of some of 
the principal newsp’apers in Nigeria are reflected 
in the following table.
Publication
Town
Published
Day o f  | 
Publica­
tion
Printing
Process
Total 
Circulation 
(in Nigeria)
DAILIES
Daily Times Lagos M on-Sat. Letter-Press 225,000
New Nigerian Kaduna/
Lagos 99 Litho 80,000
Nig. Observer Benin 99 Litho 80,000
The Punch Lagos 99 Litho 120,000
Daily Sketch Ibadan 99 Litho 150,000
Daily Star Enugu 99 Litho 60,000
Daily Express Lagos 99 Litho 30,000
Nigerian Tribune Ibadan 99 Litho 60,000
Evening Times Lagos 9 9 Letter Press 65,000
W. A. Pilot Lagos 99 99 5,000
Nigerian Standard Jos 99 Litho 22,000
Nigerian Herald Ilorin 99 Litho 68,250
Nigerian Chronicle Calabar 99 Litho 30,000
Nigerian Tide P. Harcourt 99 Litho 40,000
Sunday Express Lagos Sunday Litho 74,000
Sunday Times Lagos Sunday L. Press 420,000
Sunday Observer Benin * 99 Litho 100,000
Sunday Sketch Ibadan 99 Litho 140,000
Sunday Star Enugu Sunday Litho 85,000
.Sunday Punch Lagos 9 9 Litho 150,000
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(Continued from previous page):
Publication
Town
Published
Day o f  
Publica­
tion
Printing
Process
Total 
Circulation 
(in Nigeria)
Lagos Week End Lagos Friday Letter Press 235,000
Times Inter­
national La^os Monday )* 29,000
Nigerian Business 
Guardian Lagos Thursday Litho 30,000
Sporting Record Lagos Wednesday Letter Press 65,000
Sporting Observer Benin Thursday Litho 40,000
Sunday Standard Benin 99 Litho
WKL Pools Guide Ibadan 99 Litho 10,000
Business Times Lagos Tuesday Letter Press 50,000
Ogene Enugu Weekly Litho 30,000
Gbohungboun Ibadan V/ednesday Litho 55,000
Imole Owuro 99 Saturday Letter Press 40,000
Irohin Yoruba 99 Wednesday Litho 86,000
liana Yoruba 99 Monday Letter Press 35,000
Akede Yoruba Lagos Tuesday 9 ) 20,000
Gaskiya Tafi 
Kwabo (Hausa) Kaduna 99 Litho 52,000
WEEKLY 
GENERAL 
West Africa Lagos Weekly Litho 4,500
Lagos This Week Lagos 99 99 10,000
•The Circulation figtires as at 1977.
(The table above is derived from Dayo Duyile, Media 
and Mass Communications in Nigeria/ Ibadan, 1979)
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APPENDIX III
FULL TEXT OF CRIMINAL CODE1 
PROVISIONS ON DEFAMATION
Chapter 33. Defamation
Definition of Defamatory Matter
373. Defamatory matter is matter likely to injure the 
reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule, or likely to damage any person in 
his profession or trade by an injury to his reputation.
Such matter may be expressed in spoken words or in 
any audible sounds, or in words legibly marked on any sub­
stance whatever, or by any sign or object signifying such 
matter otherwise than by words, and may be expressed either 
directly or by insinuation or irony.
It is immaterial whether at the time of the publi­
cation of the defamatory matter, the person concerning 
whom such matter is published is living or dead:
Provided that no prosecution for the publication of 
defamatory matter concerning a dead person shall be instit­
uted without the consent of the Attorney-General of the 
Federation.
Definition of publication
374. For the purposes of this Code the publication of de­
famatory matter is -
(1) in the case of spoken words or audible sounds, the 
speaking of such words or the making of such sounds 
in the hearing of the person defamed or any other 
person;
(2) in other cases, the exhibiting it in public, or caus­
ing it to be read or seen, or showing or delivering 
it, or causing it to be shown or delivered, with 
intent that it may be read or seen by the person 
defamed or by any other person.
Publication of defamatory matter
375. Subject to the provisions of this chapter, any person 
who publishes any defamatory matter is guilty of a mis­
demeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for one year;
1 Cap 42, (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos,
1958)
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and any person who publishes any defamatory matter knowing 
it to be false is liable to imprisonment for two years.
Publishing defamatory matter with intent to extort
376. Any person who publishes, or threatens to publish, 
or offers to abstain from publishing, or offers to prevent 
the publication of defamatory matter, with intent to extort 
money or other property, or with intent to induce any 
person to give, confer, procure, or attempt to procure, 
to, upon, or for, any person, any property or benefit of 
any kind, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprison­
ment for seven years.
The offender cannot be arrested without warrant.
Publication of truth for public benefit
377. The publication of defamatory matter is not an 
offence if the publication is, at the time it is made, 
for the public benefit, and if the defamatory matter 
is true.
Cases in which publication is absolutely privileged
378. The publication of defamatory matter is absolutely 
privileged, and no person is criminally liable in respect 
thereof, in the following cases: -
(1) if the matter is published by the President, 
Minister, or a Governor or by order of the 
President, Minister or a Governor in any 
official document, Gazette, or proceeding; 
or
(2) if the publication is made in a petition to 
the President, Minister, or a Governor; or
(3) if the publication takes place in any pro­
ceeding held before or under the authority 
of any court, or in any inquiry held under 
the authority of any Act, Law, Statute, or 
Order in Council, or under the authority of 
the President, Minister, or a Governor; or
(4) if the publication takes place in an official 
report made by a person appointed to hold an 
inquiry under the authority of any Act, Law, 
Statute, or Order in Council, or of the Presi­
dent, Minister, or a Governor; or
(5) if the matter is published concerning a person 
subject to military discipline for the time 
being, and relates to his conduct as a 
person subject to such discipline, and is 
published by some person having authority 
over him in respect of such conduct, and to 
some person having authority over him in 
respect of such conduct.
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Cases in which publication is conditionally privileged
379. The publication of defamatory matter is conditionally 
privileged, and no person is criminally liable in respect 
thereof, in the following cases: -
(1) if the defamatory matter consists of an 
extract from, or an abstract of, a petition 
to, or a Gazette or document published by 
or under the authority of, the President, 
or a Governor of a State, or a Minister, 
and the publication is made without ill- 
will to the person defamed; or
(2) if the defamatory matter constitutes, in 
whole or in part, a fair report, for the 
information of the public, of any proceed­
ings of any court, whether preliminary or 
final; or of any public proceeding of any 
body, constituted or authorised to hold 
such proceeding, by any Act, Law, Statute 
or Order; or of any public meeting so far 
as the public is concerned in the matter 
published; if in every such case the publi­
cation is made without ill-will to the 
person defamed; or
(3) if the publication is for the information 
of the public at the request of any Govern­
ment department or peace officer, or if the 
defamatory matter is any notice or report 
issued by such department or officer for 
the information of the public, and if in 
every such case the publication is made 
without ill-will to the person defamed; or
(4) if the defamatory matter consists of fair 
comment either on any matter the publication 
of which, or on any report which, is herein­
before in the preceding or this section 
referred to; or
(5) if the defamatory matter consists of fair 
comment upon the public conduct of any 
person in public affairs, or upon the 
public conduct of any person employed in 
the public service in the discharge of 
his public duties, or upon the character 
of any of such persons so far as it appears 
by such conduct; or
(6) if the defamatory matter consists of fair 
comment on any published book or other lite­
rary production, or any composition or work 
of art, or performance publicly exhibited, or 
any other communication made to the public on 
any subject; or on the character of the author 
of such book, production, composition, work
of art, or the person exhibiting such per­
formance, so far as their characters may appear 
therefrom respectively; or
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(7) if the publication is in good faith for the 
purpose of seeking remedy or redress for any 
private or public wrong or grievance from a 
person who has, or is reasonably believed 
by the person publishing to have, the right 
to remedy or redress such wrong or grievance; 
or
(8) if the publication is made in good faith by 
a person having any lawful authority over 
another, and is made by him in the course of 
a censure passed by him on the conduct of 
that other, in matters to which such lawful 
authority relates; or
(9) if the publication is made on the invitation 
or challenge of the person defamed; or
(10) if the publication is made in order to answer 
or refute some other defamatory matter pub­
lished by the person defamed, concerning the 
person making the publication or some other 
person; or
(11) if the defamatory matter constitutes an 
answer to inquiries made of the person pub­
lishing it, relating to some subject as to 
which the person by whom or on whose behalf 
the inquiry is made, has, or on reasonable 
grounds is believed by the person publishing 
to have, an interest in knowing the truth, 
and if the publication is made in good faith 
for the purpose of giving information in 
respect of that matter to that person; or
(12) if the defamatory matter constitutes infor­
mation given to the person to whom the 
defamatory matter is published, with respect 
to some subject as to which he has, or is on 
reasonable grounds believed to have, such an 
interest in knowing the truth, as to make the 
conduct of the person giving the information 
reasonable in the circumstances;
Provided that as regards paragraphs (7), (8), (9), (10) 
and (11), the person making the publication honestly believes 
the matter published to be true, the matter published is 
relevant to the matters the existence of which may excuse 
the publication of defamatory matter, and the manner and 
extent of the publication do not exceed what is reasonably 
sufficient for the occasion; and as regards paragraph (12) 
that the defamatory matter is relevant to the subject there­
in mentioned, and that it is either true, or is made without 
ill-will to the person defamed and in the honest belief, 
on reasonable grounds, that it is true.
Publication in a periodical
380. (1) In this and the next succeeding section the term 
"periodical' includes any newspaper, review, magazine, or 
other writing or print, published periodically.
-xxix-
(2) The criminal responsibility of the proprietor, editor 
or publisher of any periodical for the publication of any 
defamatory matter contained therein, may be rebutted by 
proof that such publication took place without his know­
ledge and wihtout negligence on his part.
Protection of innocent sellers of books and newspapers
381. The sale by any person of any book, pamphlet or other 
printed or written matter, or of any number or part of any 
periodical, is not a publication thereof for the purposes 
of this chapter, unless such person knows that such book, 
pamphlet, printed or written matter, or number or part, 
contains defamatory matter; or, in the case of any part 
or number of any periodical, that such periodical habi­
tually contains defamatory matter1,.
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APPENDIX IV
FULL TEXT OF PENAL CODE1 
PROVISIONS ON DEFAMATION
Chapter XXIII
Defamation defined
391. (1) Whoever by words either spoken or reproduced by 
mechanical means or intended to be read or by signs or by 
visible representations makes or publishes any imputation 
concerning any person, intending to harm or knowing or 
having reason to believe that such imputation will harm 
the reputation of such person, is said, save in the cases 
hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.
Explanation 1. It may amount to defamation to impute any­
thing to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm 
the reputation of that person if living and is intended to 
be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near 
relatives•
Explanation 2. It may amount to defamation to make an 
imputation concerning a company or an association or 
collection of persons as such.
Explanation 3. An imputation in the form of an alter­
native or expressed ironically may amount to defamation.
Explanation 4. No imputation is said to harm a person's 
reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly 
in the estimation of others lowers the moral or intellec­
tual character of that person or lowers the character of 
that person in respect of his calling or lowers the credit 
of that person or causes it to be believed that the body of 
that person is in a loathsome state or in a state generally 
considered as disgraceful.
Illustrations. (a) A says - "Z is an honest man, he never
stole B's watch", intending to cause it to be believed that 
Z did steal B's watch. This is defamation, unless it falls 
within one of the exceptions.
(b) A is asked who stole B's watch. A points to Z, in­
tending to cause it to be believed that Z stole B's watch. 
This is defamation unless it falls within one of the excep­
tions.
L
1. Cap 89, (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 196 3)
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(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B's watch, in­
tending it to be believed that Z stole B's watch. This is 
defamation, unless it falls within one of the exceptions.
Exceptions
(2) It is not defamation -
Imputations of truth which public good requires to be pub­
lished
(i) to impute anything which is true concerning any 
person, if it be for the public good that the 
imputation should be made or published: whether 
or not it is for the public good is a question 
of fact;
Illustrations. (a) Z opens a school at Kaduna.
The fact is that Z has fled from Europe to escape 
punishment for gross acts of swindling. A is 
protected by this exception if he publishes that 
fact.
(b) But if the swindling had occurred twenty 
years ago and in the meantime Z had been carrying 
on a school in Zaria and had been living an up­
right life, A would not be protected by this excep 
tion if he raked up the facts and published them.
Public conduct of public servant
(ii) to express in good faith any opinion whatever re­
specting the conduct of a public servant in the 
discharge of his public functions or respecting 
his character so far as his character appears in 
that conduct and no further;
Conduct of any person touching any public question
(iii) to express in good faith any opinion whatever
respecting the conduct of any person touching any 
public question and respecting his character so 
far as his character appears in that conduct and 
no further;
11lustration. It is not defamation in A to express 
in good faith any opinion whatever respecting Z's 
conduct in petitioning Government on a public ques­
tion, in signing a requisition for a meeting on a 
public question, in presiding or attending at 
such a meeting or in forming or joining any 
society which invites the public support.
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Publication of reports of proceedings of courts
(iv) to publish a substantially true report of the
proceedings of a court of justice or of the result 
of any such proceedings;
Merits of case decided in court or conduct of witnesses and 
others concerned
(v) to express in good faith any opinion whatever
respecting the merits of any case civil or crimi­
nal which has been decided by a court of justice 
or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, 
witness or agent in any such case or respecting 
the character of such person as far as his charac­
ter appears in that conduct and no further;
Illustrations. (a) A says - "I think Z's
evidence is so contradictory that he must be 
stupid or dishonest". A is within this exception 
if he says this in good faith, inasmuch as the 
opinion which he expresses respects Z's character 
as it appears in Z's conduct as a witness and no 
further.
(b) But if A says - "I do not believe what Z 
asserted at the trial, because I know him to be 
a man without veracity", A is not within this 
exception, inasmuch as the opinion which he 
expresses of Z's character is an opinion not 
founded on Z's conduct as a witness•
Merits of public performance
(vi) to express in good faith any opinion respecting 
the merits of any performance which its author 
has submitted to the judgment of the public or 
respecting the character of the author so far as 
his character appears in such performance and 
no further;
Explanation. A performance may be submitted to 
the judgment of the public expressly or by acts 
on the part of the author which imply such sub­
mission to the judgment of the public.
Illustrations. (a) A person who publishes a 
book submits that book to the judgment of the 
public.
(b) A person who makes a speech in public submits 
that speech to the judgment of the public.
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(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public 
stage submits his acting or singing to the judg­
ment of the public,
(d) A says of a book published by Z - "Z's book 
is foolish, Z must be a weak man. Z's book is 
indecent, Z must be a man of impure mind", A is 
within this exception, if he says this in good 
faith, inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses 
of Z respects Z's character only so far as it 
appears in Z's book and no further.
(e) But if A says - "I am not surprised that Z's 
book is foolish and indecent for he is a weak man 
and a libertine", A is not within this exception, 
inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses of Z's 
character is an opinion not founded on Z's book.
Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority 
over another
(vii) in a person having over another any authority ei­
ther conferred by law or arising out of a lawful 
contract made with that other to pass in good 
faith any censure on the conduct of that other 
in matters to which lawful authority relates;
Illustration. An alkali censuring in good faith 
the conduct of a witness or of an officer of the 
court? a head of department censuring in good faith 
those who are under his orders; a parent censuring 
in good faith a child in the presence of other 
children; a schoolmaster, whose authority is 
derived from a parent, censuring in good faith a 
pupil in the presence of other pupils? a master 
censuring a servant in good faith for inefficiency 
in service? a banker censuring in good faith the 
cashier of his bank for the conduct of such cashier 
as such cashier - are within this exception.
Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person
(viii) to prefer in good faith an accusation against any 
person to any of those who have lawful authority 
over that person with respect to the subject matter 
of the accusation?
Illustration. If A in good faith accuses Z 
before a magistrate; if A in good faith complains 
of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z's master? if 
A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a 
child, to Z's father - A is within this exception.
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Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of 
his or other's interests
(ix) to make an imputation on the character of another, 
provided that the imputation be made in good faith 
for the protection of the interests of the person 
making it or of any other person or for the public 
good;
Illustrations. (a) A, shopkeeper, says to B, who
manages his business - "Sell nothing to Z unless 
he pays you ready money, for I have no opinion of 
his honesty". A is within the exception if he 
has made this imputation on Z in good faith for 
the protection of his own interests.
(b) A, a District Officer, in making a report to 
his superior officer, casts an imputation on the 
character of Z. Here, if the imputation is made 
in good faith and for the public good, A is 
within the exception.
(c) A, in giving evidence before a court of jus­
tice, identifies Z as the person he saw committing 
a robbery. Although Z proves that A is mistaken,
A is protected by this exception. If he is giving 
false evidence, he can be proceeded against under 
section 518.
Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for 
public good
(x) to convey a caution in good faith to one person 
against another, provided that such caution be 
intended for the good of the person to whom it is 
conveyed or of some person in whom that person is 
interested or for the public good.
Punishment for defamation
392. Whoever defames another shall be punished with imprison­
ment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine 
or with both.
Injurious falsehood
393. (1) Whoever, save as hereinafter excepted, by words 
either spoken or reproduced by mechanical means or intended 
to be read or by signs or by visible representations makes 
or publishes any false statement of fact, intending to harm 
or knowing or having reason to believe that such false state 
ment of fact will h a m  the reputation of any person or class
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of persons or of the Government or of any native authority 
in Northern Nigeria or of any local government authority in 
Northern Nigeria shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to two years or with fine or with 
both.
Explanation 1. A statement is false unless it is substanti­
ally true and proof that a statement is substantially true 
shall lie on the accused.
Explanation 2. Whether a statement is a statement of fact 
or a mere expression of opinion is a matter for the decision 
of the court.
(2) It is not an offence under this section to make 
or publish in good faith a false statement of fact which the 
accused had reasonable grounds for believing to be substan­
tially true and proof that he had such reasonable grounds 
shall lie on the accused.
Illustrations. (a) A newspaper publishes a false statement
that the proceeds of a recent increase in a tax were shared 
amongst the Ministers of the state personally. This is a 
false statement of fact.
(b) A says that Z's bakery is unhygienic. This is a state­
ment of opinion; but if A says that he saw Z take a dead 
mouse out of the dough before baking this is a statement of 
fact.
Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory
394. Whoever prints or engraves any matter or prepares or 
causes to be prepared any record for the purpose of mechani­
cal reproduction of any matter, knowing or having good reason 
to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, 
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to two years or with fine or with both.
Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory 
matter
395. Whoever sells or offers for sale any printed or en­
graved substance containing defamatory matter or any record 
prepared for the purpose of the mechanical reproduction of 
defamatory matter, knowing that such substance or record 
contains such matter, shall be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or 
with both.
xxxvi
ABBREVIATIONS
Nigerian
All N.L.R. All Nigeria Law Reports
Cap. Chapter
C.C.H.C.J. Certified copies of High Court
Judgments
E.C.S.L.R. Law Reports of East-Central
State of Nigeria 
E.N.L.R. Law Reports of Eastern Nigeria
E.R.L.R. Law Reports of the Eastern Region
of Nigeria
E.R.N.L.R. Eastern Region of Nigeria Law
Reports
F.N.L.R. Federal Law Reports
F.S.C. Selected Judgments of the Federal
Supreme Court 
L.L.R. Law Reports of the High Court
of the Federal Territory of 
Lagos (1956-19 66); Law Reports 
of the High Court of Lagos 
State (1967-date)
L.N. Legal Notice
L.R.N. Law Reports of Nigeria
N.C.R. Nigerian Criminal Reports
N.C.L.R. Nigerian Constitutional Law
Reports
N.L.R. Nigeria Law Reports
N.M.L.R. Nigerian Monthly Law Reports
N.R.N.L.R. Law Reports of the Northern Region
of the Federation of Nigeria 
S.C. Reserved Judgments of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria 
U.I.L.R. University of Ife (Nigeria) Law
Reports
W.A.C.A. Selected Judgments of the West
African Court of Appeal (1930- 
1956)
W.N.L.R. Western Nigeria Law Reports
United Kingdom
A.C. Appeal Cases
All E.R. All England Law Reports
App. Cas. Appeal Cases
Atk. Atkyns' Chancery Reports
B. & Aid. Bamewell and Alderson's King's
Bench Reports
Beav.
Bing.
Bos. & P.
C.A.
Camp.
Ch.
Ch. D.
Co • Rep• 
Cox C.C.
C.P.D.
D.C.
E. & B.
E • B • & E .
E. & E. 
E.R.
Fam.
H.L.C.
H.L.(E.)) 
H. & Tw.
K.B.
L.J . Ch.
L.J.Q.B.
L • R. P • C . 
L.T.
L.T . Jo.
M & W.
My. & Cr.
N.I.
N.I.L.R.
Q.B.
Q.B.D.
S.L.T.
Sol. Jo.
Stra.
St. Tr.
T.L.R.
T.R.
Ves.
Wilm.
W.L.R.
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Beavan
Bingham's Common Pleas Reports 
Bosanquet and Puller's Common 
Pleas Reports 
Court of Appeal 
Campbell's Nisi Prius Reports 
Chancery Law Reports 
Law Reports, Chancery Division 
Coke's King's Bench Reports 
Cos's Criminal Cases 
Law Reports, Common Pleas 
Division 
Divisional Court 
Ellis and Blackburn's Queen's 
Bench Reports 
Ellis, Blackburn and Ellis
English Queen's Bench Reports 
Ellis and Ellis 
English Reports 
Family (Division Reports)
Clark's House of Lords' Cases 
House of Lords (England)
Hall and Twell's Chancery 
Reports 
Law Reports King's Bench 
Law Journal Reports, Chancery, 
New Series 
Law Journal Reports, New Series, 
Queen's Bench 
Law Reports Privy Council 
Law Times Reports 
Law Times
Meeson and Welsby's Exchequer 
Reports 
Mylne and Craig's Chancery 
Reports 
Northern Ireland Reports 
Northern Ireland Law Reports 
Law Reports Queen's Bench 
Queen's Bench Division Reports 
Scots Law Times, 189 3-
Scots Law Times Reports, 1950- 
Solicitors* Journal (and 
Reporter)
Strange's King's Bench Reports 
Howell's State Trials 
Times Law Reports 
Durnford and East's Term Reports 
Vesey Junior's Chancery Reports 
(1789-1817)
Vesey Senior's English Chancery 
Reports (1747-1756)
Wilmot's Notes and Opinions 
King's Bench 
Weekly Law Reports
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III Commonwealth and Miscellaneous Other
1. Australian
C • L • R.
L.R. (N.S.W.) 
N.S.W.L.R. 
N.S.W. Sup. Ct, 
S.R. (N.S.W.) 
V.L.R.
W.A.R.
Commonwealth Law Reports 
Law Reports, New South Wales 
New South Wales Law Reports 
New South Wales Supreme Court 
New South Wales State Reports 
Victorian Law Reports 
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of 1963) 95, 101, 120, 173, 174-175,
200, 231, 232, 242, 417, 424,
704, 725, 726, 727 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree,
1966 (No 1 of 1966) 74, 98, 101, 139, 173, 174
;
c
;
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (No 5)
Decree, 1966 (No 34 of 1966) 98, 139
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (No 9)
Decree, 1966 (No 59 of 1966) 98
Copyright Act, 1970 (No 61 of 1970) 130, 256-260
Criminal Code Act, Cap 42*
396, 601, 608, 702, 703, 704,
705, 743, 778, 1001, 1019
Schedule: Criminal Code
General references 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145,
228-229, 395-397, 660-661, 664, 642
ss. 50-52
s • 50 393,
411-
397-398, 402, 408-409,
413, 414, 416, 417, 418,
439, 454
s. 51 399-400, 412-413, 417, 418
s. 52 400
Defamation: ss. 373- 381
General references 598-600, 601, 603
s. 373 608, 610, 612-613, 614A, 616,
663, 684
s. 374 617, 661, 684
s. 375 661, 663-669, 684, 686
s. 376 661, 664, 677
s. 377 622, 623-624, 625-626, 628,
629, 662, 664, 684, 6 85
s. 378 641-642
s. 379 598-599, 600, 631, 632-633, 634
s. 380 656A-656B , 662
s. 381 657, 662
Contempt of Court : s 133
General references 699, 700, 702, 704, 709, 722,
728, 742
s. 133(4) 700, 755, 897, 901, 1000,
1017-1019, 1085
s. 133(5) 700, 1000, 1039, 1069, 1085
s. 133(9) 700, 901
(No 56 of 1933! 
Criminal Code On 
Nigeria, 1923)
1933;
140
141
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Criminal Procedure Act, Cap 43*
603, 669 . 1000, 1007- 
Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 20, (Laws 
of Nigeria, 1923)
Defamatory and Offensive Publications Act, 1966.
(No 44 of 1966) 620-621, 678
Deposed Chiefs Removal Ordinance> Cap 78,
(The Laws of Nigeria, 1948)
Economic Stabilization (Temporary Provisions)
Act, 1982 (No 2 of 1982)
Electoral Act, 1977 (No 73 of 1977)
107, 108, 109, 110, 764,
774, 777,
Electoral Act, 19 82
Electoral (Amendment) (No 3) Act, 19 79,
(No 32 of 1979) .
Evidence Act, Cap 62*
Federal Court of Appeal Act, 19 76 (No 43 of 19 76) 
Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforce­
ment of Powers) Decree, 19 70 (No 28 of 19 70)
100, 101, 174,
Federal Revenue Court Act, 19 73, (No 13 of 1973) 149
Finance Act, 1981, (No 2 of 19 81)
Interpretation Act, Cap 89*
Interpretation Act, 1964 (No 1 of 1964) 131, 157,
Land Use Act, 1978 (No 6 of 1978) 107,
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Cap 89*
(formerly known as the Interpretation Act)
131, 136, 157-160, 
Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Act,
Cap 102*
Magistrates' Courts (Appeals) Ordinance, Cap 
123 (The Laws of Nigeria, 19 48)
News Agency of Nigeria Act, 19 76, (No 19 
of 1976)
News Agency of Nigeria (Amendment) Act, 19 78 
(No 10 of 1978)
Newspaper Ordinance, 190 3, No 10 of 190 3 
Newspapers Act, Cap 129*
Newspapers (Prohibition of Circulation) Decree,
(No 17 of 1967)
Newspaper (Prohibition of Circulation) Vali­
dation) Decree, 19 78 (No 12 of 19 78)
Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Act, Cap 133*
326,
Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment)
Act, 1961, (No 35 of 1961) 333,
Nigerian Press Council Act, 19 78, (No 31 of 19 78)
269
Nigerian Television Authority Act, 1977, (No 24
of 1977) 237, 333-337, 346-347, 385
Official Secrets Act, 1962 (No 29 of 1962)
240-242, 246
743,
263
248,
252
1008
626
-679
913
272
778
272
110
167
157
291
150
272
157
611
176
164
634
744
267
264
340
307
255
253
345
345
272
386
248
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Penal Code (Northern Region) Federal Provisions 
Act, 1960, (No 25 of 1960)
General references 141, 228, 229, 396
s. 416 400-401, 430-431, 454, 701, 742, 901
s. 417 401, 403, 427-430, 431-433, 439
s. 418 228-229, 231-232, 400
s. 419 410, 434
s. 420 401-402, 434-435
s. 421 402
Public Complaints Commission Act, 1975 (No 31 of 1975)126 
Public Order Act, 1979 (No 5 of 1979) 110
Public Officers (Protection from False Accusation)
Act, 1976 (No 11 of 1976) 261-262
States (Creation and Transitional Provisions)
Act, 1967 (No 14 of 1967) 99
States (Creation and Transitional Provisions)
Act, 1976, (No 12 of 1976) 104
Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment)
(No 2) Act, 1969, (No 53 of 1969) 255-256
West African Court of Appeal Ordinance, Cap 229,
(The Laws of Nigeria, 1948) 743, 744
Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1961, (No 31 of 1961)
321-326, 343-344, 370, 375-381
i. Subsidiary legislation
Biafra Sun (Prohibition of Circulation) Order,
1967, (L.N. 51 of 1967) 252
Emergency Powers (Misleading Reports) (Amendment)
Regulations, 1962 (L.N. 107 of 1962) 435, 437
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Rules, 19 79
(S.I. 1 of 1979) 181-182, 1159
Prohibition of Circulation ("Newbreed") Order,
1978 (L.N. 46 of 1978) 253
2. State Legislation
(a) Eastern Nigeria (comprising Anambra, Cross River, 
Imo and Rivers States)
*Chapter numbers are those of the 196 3 edition of 
the Laws of Eastern Nigeria
Abolition of the Osu System Law, Cap 1* 2 72
Criminal Code, Cap 30* 234, 396, 399, 778, 779
Defamation Law, Cap 33*
General references 463, 600
s • 2 466
s. 4 468
s. 5 468
s. 7 517
lxvi
s. 8 488
s. 9 493
s. 11 502, 503
s. 12 510, 511
s. 14 521
s. 17 542
s. 19 656, 669
Schedule 512-514
High Court Law, Cap 61* 131
Newspaper Law, Cap 86* 249, 306, 313-316, 604, 605, 607
Publications Law, Cap 109* 319
(b) Northern Nigeria (now comprising Bauchi, Benue, 
Gongola, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Niger, Plateau 
and Sokota States)
♦Chapter numbers are those of the 1963 edition 
of the Laws of Northern Nigeria
Criminal..Procedure Law, Cap 30*
High Court Law, Cap 49*
Newspapers Law, Cap 80* .31
Penal Code Law, 1959, (No 18 of 1959 
Penal Code Law, Cap 89*
Schedule: Penal Code
General references 140-141, 142,
39 7, 59 8-600, 
657, 658-659,
1000, 1009-1010 
131
3, 316, 604, 605, 607 
) 141
141, 702
Defamation: ss
s. 391(1)
s. 391(2) (i)
s. 391(2) (ii)
s. 391 (2) (iii)
s. 391(2) (iv)
s.391 (2) (v)
s. 391(2) (vi)
s. 391(2) (vii)
s. 391 (2) (viii)
s. 391(2) (ix)
s. 391(2) (x)
s • 39 2
s. 393
s.394
s. 395
s. 396
s. 399
391-395
609, 610, 611- 
615, 618-6
145, 233, 395- 
642-643, 656, 
669-670, 1000,
1019 ,
i12, 614-614A,
.9, 620, 670-671,
1039
6
19 b/U b/1, 
622, 629-631, 684 
635- 
635, 637 
656, 
635, 638 
635, 640 
645, 
645, 646 
645, 647-648, 651 
645, 648,
672-675, 
621, 656C, 672, 
657-658, 672, 
675, 677 
675-676,
684
-685
-637
-638
671
-639
-641
646
-647
-655
651
676
677 
677
677 
-678
678
Printing Presses (Regulation) Law, Cap 99* 
Publications Law, 1964 (N.N. 13 of 1964)
321
319
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ii. Subsidiary legislation
Preservation of Copies of Books published in 
Northern Nigeria (Exception Order), 1964 
(N.N.L.N. 106 of 1964) 318
(c) Western Nigeria (now comprising Bendel,
Ogun, Ondo and Oyo States)
♦Chapter numbers are those of the 1959 edition 
of the Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria
Constitution of Western Nigeria Law, 1963 (WN 26
of 1963) 156
Court of Appeal Law, 1967, (WN 15 of 1967) 156
Criminal Code, Cap 28* 234, 396, 399, 422, 600, 634
Defamation Law, Cap 32*
General references 46 3, 600
s. 3 466
s. 4 468
s. 5 468
s. 8 542
s. 10 517
s. 11 488
s. 12 493
s. 14 521
s. 15 502, 503-504
s. 17 511
s. 19 656, 669
Schedule 512-514, 515
High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap 44* 131
Law of England (Application) Law, Cap 60* 131, 234
Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law,
Cap 63* 634
Morning Post and Sunday Post (Prohibition) Edict,
1967 (WN 12 of 1967) 253
Newspapers Law, Cap 81* 317, 604, 605, 607
Newspapers (Amendment) Law, 1964 (WN 26 of 1964) 250
Newspapers (Amendment) Law (Repeal) Law, 1967,
(W.S. 29 of 1967) 250
Printing Presses Regulation Law, Cap 9 7* 321
Publications Law, Cap 109* 319
ii. Subsidiary legislation
Court of Appeal (Commencement of Provisions) Notice,
1967 (W.S.L.N. 19 of 1967) 156
lxviii
(d) Lagos State
♦Chapter numbers are those of the 19 73 edition 
of the Laws of Lagos State
Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications)
Law, 1961 (No 52 of 1961) 238
Criminal Code, Cap 31* 235,
High Court Law, Cap 52* 131, 160,
High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules,
Cap 211 (The Laws of Nigeria, 1948)
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, Cap 65*
Newspapers Law, Cap 86*
248, 307-313, 316, 339, 604, 607, 
Obscene Publications Law, 1961 (No 51 of 1961) 235
Printing Presses Regulation Law, Cap 101* 319
Publications Law, Cap 107* 318
-239
396
167
523
131
1178
-237
-321
-319
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B. Legislation of the United Kingdom
Administration of Justice Act, 1960 
(8 & 9 Eliz. 2 c. 65)
s. 11 834, 839, 862
s. 12 1044, 1045, 1059-1062, 1068, 1069
s. 13 752
Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Viet. c. 52) 135
Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 to 1891, 130
comprising Bills of Sale Act 1878 (41 & 42 Viet, 
c. 31), Bills of Sale Act (1878) (Amendment)
Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Viet. c. 43), Bills of Sale 
Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Viet. c. 53) and Bills of 
Sale Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Viet. c. 35)
Broadcasting Act, 1980 (1980 c. 64)
Contempt of Court Act, 19 81 (19 81 c. 49)
General references 59, 695, 740, 753, 972, 985,
999, 1092
s. 1 801, 952, 956-958, 959, 960
s. 2 772, 777, 801, 827-828, 844,
845, 855, 859, 896
s. 3 834, 862-865, 1064
s. 4 1021, 1022, 1050-1051, 1053-
1056, 1058, 1064-1065, 1081 
s. 5 773, 878-882, 883, 896-897
s. 6 1061
s. 7 716, 767-768
s. 9 1081-1082
s. 10 1144-1145, 1189-1190
s. 11 1054, 1057-1058, 1065-1066, 1067
s. 13 740
Schedule 1 844, 845, 855, 859, 896
Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Viet. c. 41) 134
Copyright Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46) 130, 257, 260
Copyright Act, 1956 (4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c. 74) 260
Criminal Appeal Act, 190 7 (7 Edw. c. 23) 751
Criminal Justice Act, 1967 (1967 c. 80)
1028, 1046, 1047, 1048
Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 1981 (1981 c. 27)
1048-1049
Defamation Act, 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 &
1 Eliz. 2 c. 66) 463
s. 1 466, 608
s. 4 517, 520, 656
s. 5 488, 681
s. 7 511
s. 9 502
Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 1973
(1973 c. 19) 303
-lXX‘
Industrial Relations Act, 19 71 (19 71 c. 72)
Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Viet.
c. 64) 502, 604,
Libel Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Viet. c. 96)
521, 592, 622-626, 629, 665, 667, 
Licensing Act, 1662 300
Magistrates Courts' Act, 19 80 (19 80 c. 43)
823, 1028, 1046-1047, 1048, 1049, 1052, 
Mental Health Act, 1959 (1959 c. 72)
Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881
(44 & 45 Viet. c. 60) 301-302, 313
Nigeria Independence Act, 1960 (8 & 9
Eliz. 2 c. 55) 92,
(
Nigeria Republic Act, 1963 (1963 c. 57)
Obscene Publications Act, 1857 (20 & 21
Viet. c. 83) 233,
Obscene Publications Act, 1959 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2
c. 66) 233, 235,
Official Secrets Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5
c. 28) 240, 242-246,
Official Secrets Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5 
c. 75)
Race Relations Act, 1965 (1965 c. 73) 770,
Race Relations Act, 19 76 (19 76 c. 74)
Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Viet. c. 71)
Slander of Women Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Viet. c. 51)
Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29 Car. 2 c. 3)
Supreme Court Act, 19 81 (19 81 c. 54)
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 (41 &
42 Viet. c. 73)
Theatres Act, 1968 (1968 c. 54)
Subsidiary legislation
Antigua (Constitution) Order in Council, 1967 
(S.I. 1967 No 225)
Carriage by Air (Parties to Convention) Order,
1958 (S.I. 1958 No 1252)
Malta (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961 
Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order in Council,
1922 (S.R. & 0. 1922 No 1446)
Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order in Council,
1946 (S.R. & O. 1946 No 1370) 7
Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951
(S.I. 1951 No 1172) 79-82
Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954
(S.I. 1954 No 1146) 8
Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1957 
(S.I. 1957 No 1363)
Nigeria (Constitution)(Amendment No 3) Order in 
Council, 1959 (S.I. 1959 No 1172)
971
679
969
348
1063
1059
314
130
95
234
239 
247
240 
864
24
134
468
134
717
130
608
367
130
203
72
4-78 
, 84
5-87 
88
173
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Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1960 
(S.I. 1960 No 1652)
92, 173, 193, 199, 215, 231, 232, 417, 704 
Fourth Schedule - Constitution of the
Western Region of Nigeria 9 3
Tivalu Independence Order, 19 78 53-54
Trinidad and Tobago (Constitution) Order in 
Council, 1962 (S.I. 1962 No 1875)
734-735, 738, 746, 747-748, 749 
West African Coinage Order, 19 38, (S.I. 1938
No 763) 130
C. Legislation of Other Commonwealth States
Administration of Justice (Contempt of Court) Act,
19 79 [Bermuda] 59
Newspaper Registration Act, Cap 318, Laws of
Antigua, 1962 [Antigua] 339-340
Newspaper Registration Act (Amendment) Act,
1971 (No 8 of 1971) [Antigua] 365, 366, 369
Newspaper Surety Ordinance, Cap 319, Laws of
Antigua, 1962 [Antigua] 365
Newspaper Surety Ordinance (Amendment) Act,
1971 (No 9 of 1971) [Antigua] 365-370, 378-379
Penal Code, 1860 (No 45 of I860)
[India] 142, 396, 402, 427, 430, 599, 609, 619, 674
Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951 [India] 375
Press and Registration of Books Ordinance,
19 39 [Aden] 342
Printing Presses Ordinance, 1948 [Federation
of Malaya] 342
Queensland Criminal Code, 1899 [Australia] 140, 395
D. Legislation of Miscellaneous Other States
Constitution of Argentina of 1853 51
Constitution of Japan of 1946 52
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic of 1960 52
Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark Act
of 1953 52
Constitution of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh 51
Political Constitution of Peru of 19 79 52
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E. Legislation of the United States of America
1• Federal Legislation
Alien Registration Act, 1940 
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976) 
Communications Act, 1934
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) 353,
Constitution of the United States 
America, 1789 
I Amend. (1791)
354,
of
356
14, 39, 40, 350, 353 
361,
573,
988,
447,
359,
449,
355,
450-451
377-378
452,
360,
687
V Amend.
VI Amend. 
IX Amend. 
XIV Amend
(1791)
(1791)
(1791)
(1868)
>» , W  , JDU JDD  JbU
442, 447, 449, 452, 565, 
586-587, 686, 885-886, 889, 
995, 1072, 1080, 1147-1148,
11 40 I K n  1 1 71  11 7*3 11149, 1150,
1071,
350, 353, 452, 565,
1171,
1078,
686, 1072,
1173,
447,
1079,
1189
1149
1081
1080
1078
'Contempt of Court Act', 1831
18 U.S.C. c. 21 § 401 (1976) 884, 986
Espionage Act, 1917, c. 30 Title 1 § 1,
40 Stat. 217, now repealed. See 50 U.S.C.
§ 31 (1976) 441, 442, 443
Radio Act, 1927 (now repealed and
incorporated within Communications Act,
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)) 353
Sedition Act, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 443
(repealed in 1921: see 41 Stat. 1359-1360)
2. State Legislation
Ala. Code Tit. 7 8 370, 1960 (Alabama) 
Criminal Anarchy Act, c. 371 of 1902 
(New York) New York Code, Book 39,
Penal Law, § 240.15 
Criminal Syndicalism Act, Stats. 1919, p 281 
(California) California Code Vol 51C 
§ 11400
Criminal Syndicalism Act, Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann § 2923.13
1142, 1153-1154
444
446
451
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE VALUE AND MEANING OF MEDIA FREEDOM
1.1 The Significance of Freedom of the Media
The fundamental rights of the individual are essentially
inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing; and any attempt
to rank them in a hierarchy of importance must always be
arbitrary. It is nevertheless apparent, in the words of
Sir Zelman Cowen, that '[o]ne of the great historic claims
to liberty in democratic societies, and one given a special
emphasis in contemporary debate, is the claim to speak, to
publish, to know and make known: the claim to freedom of
speech and of the press and the media"1. The importance
of media freedom has also been strongly emphasised by
Lord Simon of Glaisdale, in the House of Lords, in the con-
2
troversial "thalidomide" case . He points out that '[p]eople
cannot adequately influence the decisions which affect
their lives unless they can be adequately informed on the
3
facts and arguments relevant to the decisions' ; and 
stresses that '[m]uch of such fact-finding and argumenta­
tion has to be conducted vicariously, the public press
4
being a principal instrument' in this regard.
Sir Zelman Cowen, Cowen's Individual Liberty and the Law, 
Tagore Law Lectures, Calcutta, -19 77, p 5.
Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1973] 3 All
E.R. 54 (H.L.(E.)). This important decision is further 
discussed in Chapter Nine.
Ibid, at 77. 
Ibid.
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The importance of the media stems thus - in large measure - 
from the unique means they have at their disposal to 'gather, 
process and disseminate ... [important] information to large, 
heterogenous and wide-dispersed audiences'1. The ordinary 
individual in modern society, by contrast, has few such 
resources; and must accordingly rely to a very considerable 
extent upon the media to provide the knowledge necessary for 
informed decision-making.
The media's unique capacity for the collection and dissem­
ination of information also gives it a much-needed means - 
through investigative journalism - of guarding against 
abuse of power at all levels of society. The importance of 
investigative journalism has been graphically demonstrated 
by the Watergate scandal, in which revelations of abuse of 
public office - brought to the attention of the world by 
the Washington Post - led ultimately to the resignation of 
President Nixon. Less dramatically - but no less signifi­
cantly - the media have, in addition, been able to draw 
attention not only to other abuses in the political and 
economic corridors of power, but also - at a lower but 
equally important level - to other sharp practices and fraud, 
against which the ordinary individual generally has little 
protection.
A further vital concomitant of the media's unique informa­
tion resources lies in the educative role the media are 
capable of fulfilling. Education has immense importance
The Nigerian Sunday Observer, 23 January, 19 77.
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in any society: but is particularly crucial in many Third 
World states still grappling with the problems of under­
development; and with the need to assimilate the changes 
that have rocked their societies and to forge effective 
political and social institutions to promote the well-being 
of their peoples and meet the difficulties posed by the modem 
world. The media are capable of playing a vital role in this 
process. They can articulate the benefits and disadvantages 
of different development strategies; help to relieve the pres­
sures on strained formal educational facilities; spread skills 
and knowledge throughout society; warn of the dangers of over­
population and the need to conserve resources; and stress the 
common humanity which unerlies ethnic and cultural differences.
The media have other important roles as well: in providing 
entertainment, promoting the arts, fostering interest and 
participation in sports - to name but a few further examples. 
Analysis of these functions lies outside the scope of this 
study, however, and - for present purposes - the most impor­
tant functions of the media may be summarised as being to 
inform, to investigate, to expose abuse and to educate.
All these functions are of crucial significance to society: 
but - it is submitted - can only be fulfilled by media 
that are "free" from "unnecessary restraint"1. The meaning 
of these terms thus calls for some examination.
It is axiomatic that freedom of expression cannot be 
absolute: that it must be subject to certain restraint 
in order to safeguard other legitimate and competing 
interests within society. The difficulty lies in draw­
ing the line between appropriate and excessive restraint: 
and this conundrum will be further examined throughout 
this study.
-4-
1.2 The Meaning of Media Freedom
The philosophical dilemma surrounding the question of what 
constitutes "unnecessary restraint" upon the media is further 
examined below, but - before proceeding to this analysis - 
it is important to attempt some definition of media freedom. 
This is by no means easy: for media freedom has been given 
a wide and confusing diversity of interpretations.
This is particularly evident in a study conducted by the 
Indian Press Commission, which indicated that :
1(1) some people understood freedom of the press 
to mean freedom from legal restraint - liberty, that is 
to say, to publish any matter without legal restraint or 
prohibition; (2) some understood it to mean freedom from 
prejudicies and preconceived notions; (3) some thought 
it meant freedom from the executive control of government;
(4) some thought it consisted in freedom from the influence 
of advertisers, or proprietors and pressure groups; and, 
finally, (5) some thought it consisted in freedom from 
want - freedom frOm dependence on others for financial 
assistance' .
All these factors are important facets of media freedom; 
and all five should no doubt be satisfied before media 
freedom can be said to have real significance. It may be, 
however, that all five cannot be achieved in practice: and 
it has been warned that 1 attempts to secure freedom from 
bias, from proprietors, advertisers and pressure groups, 
and from want ((2), (4) and (5) above) may ... lead to
See Denys C. Holland, 'Freedom of the Press in the 
Commonwealth', (1956) 9 Current Legal Problems, pp 
184 - 207, p 184.
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attempts to impose undue legal restraints and executive 
control ((1) and (3)) as a remedy1 .^
If a choice must thus be made between the first and second 
categories of freedoms, then - it is submitted - the former 
should be preferred. Bias and economic pressure are likely 
to continue in any event; and it is far preferable that 
a choice of publications and broadcasts motivated by such 
factors should be available than that society should be 
left with the rigid uniformity and "thought control" imposed 
by excessive legal constraint and executive domination.
Freedom of the media may therefore be defined (in terms
derived in part from the European Convention on Human Rights
of 1950 and now reiterated in the national constitutions 
2
of many states ) as the right enjoyed by the press (through
See ibid, p 185. Holland submits th&t this 'is well- 
illustrated by the Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Press in the U.K, /Cmnd. 7700, 1949/ /which/... was set 
up to inquire into the control/ management and ownership 
of newspapers /'following/... allegations... that freedom 
of the press was being endangered by monopoly control and 
the influence of advertisers being used to suppress opinion 
and distort facts'. The Report found the complaints totally 
unjustified; and concluded that no prohibition should be 
placed on private ownership of newspapers, as had been 
demanded. The Commission clearly believed that a choice of 
bias (accepting that this does indeed result from private 
ownership, of which the Commission was not convinced) is 
preferable to government monopoly and control.
The process by which this has occurred is explained further 
in this study at p 173 below. It is interesting to note that 
Nigeria has played a vital role in this development, as she 
was virtually the first Commonwealth country to adopt a 
detailed Bill of Rights. This was modelled on the European 
Convention and has served, in turn, to provide a basis for 
similar Bills of Rights introduced thereafter in most of 
the new Commonwealth states.
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both print and electronic media) to 1 receive and impart 
ideas and information without interference*. The concept 
'without interference* connotes/ ideally/ the fulfillment 
of all five aspects of media freedom described above; but 
refers principally to the absence of undue legislative 
constraint or executive control. This raises in acute 
from the question of what is "undue" legislative and exec­
utive restraint; and the answer is by no means easy to 
find: for the value of freedom of expression and the extent 
to which it may be curtailed to promote other interests 
of society, such as public order and state security, the 
due administration of justice, and the rights of individuals 
to reputation and privacy raise some of the most complex
i
issues in the modern world.
1.3. The Value of Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression has been both extolled and denigrated in
different times and contexts: and the object of this section
is to trace in brief outline the benefits and disadvantages
which have been said to pertain to it.
-  -  -
As Sir Zelman Cowen has warned, the modern world is one of 
'rising prices, falling incomes, a new distribution of power 
and impotence, threats of war and starvation, crime and 
disorder, and declining confidence in the capacity of those 
who govern or even the institutions of government': See 
Cowen's Individual Liberty, op cit, p 2. The old certainties 
are vanishing; and the decline of confidence in established 
political institutions in particular throws the proper relat' 
ionship between competing interests (especially those of 
state and citizen) into a spotlight of attention which 
serves mainly to highlight its complexity and uncertainty.
-7-
1.3.1. The Benefits of Freedom of Expression
The arguments in favour of freedom of expression include 
the following:
(i) The accepted wisdom in any society is never complete 
and may well be false; and truth is only ascertained through 
the unrestricted clash of ideas.
This broad head incorporates a number of different elements 
which have been variously expressed by different writers.
i
It is supported by Milton in his celebrated Areopagitica 
in which he eloquently pleads for the abolition of licensing 
restrictions on the printing of books/ pointing out that 
'all the invention/ the art, the wit, the grave and solid
judgment which is in England... can/not/ be comprehended in
2 3any twenty capacities how good soever* . His confidence
in the capacity of truth to triumph overall is unbounded;
and is expressed in the following ringing terms:
'/T/hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to 
play upon the Earth/ so Truth be in the field/ we do injur­
iously/ by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. 
Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the 
worse, in a free and open encounter?'4
A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the 
Parliament of England (1644), reproduced in Dorsen, Bender 
and Neuborne, Political and Civil Rights in the United States. 
4th ed., 1976, Vol. 1, p 1 . ~
In other words, the minds of the licensors.
Milton, supra.
Ibid, p 3.
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Mill, writing On Liberty in 1859, emphasises the lacunae
in society's conventional wisdoms. He submits that 'until
mankind shall have entered a stage of /far higher/ intell-
ectual advancement' , it is a fallacy to assume that society's
"truth" represents the whole. Far more likely is that the
conflicting doctrines (the conventional and the "heretical")
'share the truth between them: /so that/ the nonconforming
opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth,
2
of which the received doctrine embodies only a part'.
For those in authority to suppress such nonconforming 
opinion implies an assumption, on their part, of infallib-
3
ility: that they know, with absolute certainty, what is
true and what false. To Mill, this is unacceptable - both 
because the conventional wisdom cannot be complete (at this 
point in intellectual advancement) and because the assump­
tion undermines the individual's own capacity to form a
4
view on what is right or wrong (as further explained below) .
A similar viewpoint has been expounded by Mr. Justice Brandeis 
1
Mill, On Liberty, 1859, reproduced by Dorsen, Sender and 
Neuborne, op cit, p 6.
2
Mill, in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, op cit, p 6.
3
See ibid, p 5. Mill's statement in this regard, that 'All 
silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility' 
has been criticised for factual inaccuracy. See G. Marshall, 
Constitutional Theory, Oxford, 1971, pp 157-159 who points 
out that the suppressors may be motivated by self-interest 
rather than belief in the truth of their assertions. Mill's 
attempts to counter this criticism are discussed by C.L.
Ten, Mill On Liberty, Oxford, 1980, pp 131-132.
4
See p 11 below. In addition, he believed that no opinion 
can be rationally held unless its foundation has been 
fully explored. See p 12 below, and Ten, j hi H/ P 126.
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in the United States1 Supreme Court in Whitney v California^.
In his graphic terms:
'Those who won our independence... believed that freedom 
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them/ discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and 
that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government'^.
It is submitted that these declarations are all the more
relevant and compelling in the hazardous conditions of the
modern world. Freedom of expression is essential to enable
informed evaluation of the risks and benefits of new tech- 
2nologies; is crucial to the proper assessment of issues
A
that threaten the existence of life itself; and is vital 
to the effective challenge of prevailing ideologies which 
threaten to lock the world into irreconcilable conflict 
and competition.
Furthermore, once it is accepted that certain ideas and 
information may legitimately be suppressed, this raises a 
difficulty of enormous proportions. Who, in society, is to 
be entrusted with that decision? And who is to guard the 
guardians of information thus established? An elected leg­
islature, by definition, reflects majority views and is not
' 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
 ^ ibid, at 375.
3
Obvious examples of such new technology are provided both 
by the growth of the nuclear power industry: and by burgeoning 
computerisation in the developed world.
 ^ Examples of such issues include the nuclear arms race and
increasing threats of environmental destruction through, inter 
alia, industrial pollution and massive deforestation.
5 These include not only capitalism and communism but also the
contrasting viewpoints of developed and developing countries
in the North:South debate.
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likely to be sympathetic to the opinions of the minority 
(which may, nevertheless, hold a kernel of truth)* An 
independent judiciary, even if steeped in a liberal tradit­
ion, nevertheless constitutes a small elite, with its own 
prejudices and predilections and with the same human suscep­
tibility to national hysteria as others - as the conviction 
of Communist party leaders in the United States in the
i
early 1950s arguably demonstrates.
Moreover, the assertion that certain information may be
entrusted to "the people", whilst other views may not, is
fundamentally paternalistic - as emphasised by Milton in
Areopagitica. To quote his memorable words:
'Nor is it /the licensing system/ to the common people 
less than a reproach; for if we be so jealous over them, 
as that we dare not trust them with an English pamphlet, 
what do we but censure them for a giddy, vicious, and 
ungrounded people; in such a sick and weak state of faith 
and discretions, as to be able to take nothing down but 
through the pipe of a licensor? That this is care or love 
of them we cannot pretend...
(ii) Freedom of expression is essential to the development 
of man as a rational being; and as a being capable of self- 
government and social interaction.
Echoing Milton's suspicion of paternalism and his own doubts 
as to the assumption of infallibility implicit in the 
suppression of certain information, Mill emphasises that
7 ‘ ~
See Dennis v United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) discussed
in further detail below.
2
Milton, Areopagitica, in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne op cit,
p 2.
1- 1 1 -
those in power 'have no authority to decide /a/ question 
for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the
i
means of judging* . This notion is particularly inimical
to Mill who believes that one of the greatest advantages
of freedom of discussion lies 'in what it can do for the
2
average human being' . He thus declares:
'Not that it is solely, or chiefly/ to form great 
thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the 
contrary, it is as much and even more to enable average 
human beings to attain the mental stature which they are 
capable of. There have been, and may again, be, great 
individual thinkers in a general atmosphere of mental 
slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in 
that atmosphere an intellectually active people'3.
The faculties of intellect, of weighing conflicting views, 
of discernment and judgment must be exercised if they are
4
not to atrophy. Accordingly, there is no benefit to the 
individual in imbibing the conventional wisdom of society 
as 'dead dogma'Furthermore, unless the individual has 
come to accept a particular view through his own intellec­
tual assessment of its merits, he will neither 'appreciate 
to any considerable degree what he is committed to /in/
g
accept/ing/ /it/' , nor be able to discern the value of
Mill, On Liberty, in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, op cit, p 5. 
Ten, op cit, p 130.
Mill, On Liberty, p 94, (cited by Ten, ibid, pp 130-131), 
emphasis supplied.
See Ten, ibid, p 127. The same view is also expressed 
by Milton in Areopagitica, in which he asserts: 'Well 
knows he who uses to consider, that our faith and knowledge 
thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and complexion'.
See Milton, op cit, in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne.
Mill, On Liberty, in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, ibid, 
p 5. Mill states: 'fljf. it /an opinion/ is not fully, 
frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will' be held as 
a dead dogma, not a living truth'.
6 Ten, supra, p 126.
  ,
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any alternative opinion: and will be unnecessarily suspicious
of new concepts. Thus, in Mill's view, it is the process
of reaching particular opinions - for which uninhibited
discussion is essential - that is important; and the fact
that an opinion, received and held as 'dead dogma', may
be true,is largely irrelevant. In Mill's graphic phrase:
'Assuming that fej true opinion abides in the mind, 
but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and 
proof against, argument - this is not the way in which 
truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not 
knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one super­
stition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which 
enunciate a truth'.1
Thus, '/f/or Mill, it really is important not only what
beliefs men hold, but also what manner of men they are
?
that hold them' ; and the highest goal for man - as a 
rational and social being - lies in developing the capacity 
to 'giv/e/ merited honour to every one, whatever opinion 
he may hold, /and to have the/... calmness to see and 
honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions 
really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping 
nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in
3
their favour'.
A similar belief in the importance of freedom of expression 
to the development of the individual has been expressed by 
others on a number of occasions. Thus, for example, Mr.
1
Mill, supra, in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, supra.
2
Ten, supra, p 127.
3
Mill, On Liberty, in Dorsen, Bender, and Neuborne, supra 
P 7.
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Justice Brandeis has asserted^ that, 'Those who won /the
United States'/ independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties
and that in its government the deliberative forces should
2
prevail over the arbitrary'.
Professor Haiman3 points out social order is not an end in
itself but simply a 'means to maximising individual liberty
and security': to which goal the 'self-expression and self-
fulfillment of the individuals who compose a society' is
crucial. He believes that individuals 'are capable of
free choice and are responsible for the behaviour which 
5
they choose' ; and that the suppression of information 
precludes the autonomous decision-making of which man is
g
capable and therefore 'violates /his/ integrity' . He 
acknowledges that 'some individuals may be more intelligent,
7
more mature or better educated than others' , but stresses 
that 'every informed person is ultimately the best judge
Q
of his or her own interests'.
The renowned jurist, Meiklejohn, emphasises the further 
factor that free expression is essential not only to indiv­
idual choice and the development of man's rational faculties
 ^ In Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
2
Ibid, at 375, emphasis supplied.
o
Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech and Law in a Free Society, Chicago 
and London, 1981.
 ^ P 6.
8 Ibid, p 7.
6 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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but is also crucial to effective self-government: the pro­
claimed ideal of democracy. He thus declares:
'When men govern themselves, it is they - and no one 
else - who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness 
and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a 
hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, 
dangerous as well as safe... Just so far as, at any point, 
the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaint­
ance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or 
criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the 
result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for 
the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking 
process of the community against which the First Amendment 
to the Constitution is directed.1 The principle of the 
freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program 
of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason 
in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic... agree­
ment that public issues shall be decided by universal 
suffrage'
A further relevant consideration is the need for the devel­
opment and maintenance of trust amongst the individual 
members of society. Man, as a social being, requires 
interaction with other individuals in an atmosphere of 
mutual trust and confidence; and freedom of expression has 
a vital role to play in this regard . Without it, a 
community is likely to be characterised by the mistrust
3
and suspicion so often born of ignorance and incomprehension.
In addition, the implementation of restrictions requires
its own apparatus of repression, whether by way of ' sur-
4
veillance, searches and seizures /or/ secret informers'
The content of the First Amendment is discussed further 
at p 39 below.
A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, 1960, pp 26-28, (reproduced 
in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, op cit) p 9.
See T.I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 1970 
(reproduced in Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, ibid, p 13).
4 Ibid.
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and these are not only fearful in themselves, but are also 
disturbingly open 'to distortion and to use for ulterior
i
purposes'.
(iii) Freedom of expression is an essential check on the 
abuse of power. The free flow of information is essential 
not only to prevent abuse of the kind mooted above / but all 
other excesses of authority as well. As the complexities 
of modern society have increased/ so too have the opport­
unities for abuse; and so long as there remains some kernel 
of truth in the aphorism that 'all power corrupts, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely' freedom of expression
will continue to constitute a vital check against this.
2
The lesson of Watergate is clear. Freedom of expression 
must thus be regarded as one of the most crucial of human 
rights; for 'the preservation of our liberties/ the scrutiny 
of our laws and the maintenance of justice all demand
3
constant vigilance' - and only the free flow of information 
can enable this.
(iv) Freedom of expression provides a safety-valve for 
the release of destructive emotion.
Discontent cannot be removed by restricting its expression. 
On the contrary, such repression 'will only serve to sharpen 
the sense of injustice and provide added arguments and
 ^ Ibid.
2
See p 2 above.
3
Sir Norman Anderson, Liberty, law and Justice, The Hamlyn 
Lectures, Thirtieth Series, London/ 1978, p 104.
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rationalizations for desperate# perhaps reckless, measures^
Suppression can only confer a false sense of temporary
security; whereas 'freedom of utterance# even though it
be rebellious, constitutes a safety valve that gives timely
2
warning of dangerous pressures in our society' . The
admonition of Mr. Justice Brandeis in this regard# in
3
Whitney v California , is again salutary:
'/O/rder cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction... repression breeds hate;
/"and/ hate menaces stable government'.
It must always be remembered that where discontent and its 
repression are equally strong# violence may seem to offer 
the only solution to the impasse; and that it is a fundamental 
requirement for the maintenance of democracy that channels 
be kept open for the replacement - by peaceful means - of
3a government no longer capable of commanding popular support.
(v) Expression is 'self-regarding' conduct and its regul­
ation lies outside the province of law.
It is part of Mill's general theory that 'society is not 
entitled to suppress acts which can be considered self- 
regarding in that they do no assignable harm to others'.**
1 /Henry J. Abraham# Freedom and the Court# 4th ed. # Nlcw
9 1982, p 219.
Z Ibid.
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
5 at 375.
The military coups d'etats which have been so prevalent in many 
parts of the world in the past few decades graphically demon­
strate the dangers of power becoming so firmly concentrated 
in the hands of a small elite that there seems no effective 
way of breaking this control, save by toppling the entire 
political structure and establishing a new military government 
in its wake.
Ten, op cit, p 155; Marshall# op cit, p 155. 'Collected Works 
of John Stuart Mill, Vol III# Toronto and London 1965# p 947.
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Hence, freedom of expression - which gives to 'persons of
ordinary intellect /"the opportunity/ to strive to know the
truth and thereby to attain the 'dignity of thinking beings'
- falls outside the proper ambit of suppression - at least
2
in so far as it causes no harm to others. Essentially
3
the same view is expressed by Emerson who submits that
(notwithstanding the difficulties this may involve) a line
should be drawn between expression and action, with freedom
4of expression being entitled to absolute protection.
The above are some of the main arguments advanced in support 
of freedom of expression. It now remains to consider the 
countervailing views.
1.3.2. The Disadvantages of Free Expression
(i) The conventional wisdom may be true; and it may be 
misconceived to expect truth to emerge through the clash 
of ideas.
It may be argued that - if the accepted view of society is 
true-then the failure to suppress any conflicting opinion
 ^ Ten, op cit, p 136, citing 'Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, Vol. Ill, Toronto and London/ 1965, p 947.
2
Mill gives brief consideration to this problem, indicating 
for example, that incitement to tyrannicide may be punished 
if the causal connection between expression and conduct can 
be shown. This conundrum is discussed further at p 21 below.
3
Op cit, supra, p 19, (reproduced by Dorsen, Bender and 
Neuborne, op cit, p 59 n c).
4 Ibid.
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is a weakness and a foolish risk. It is submitted, however, 
that this contention falls at the first hurdle. In the 
current state of human development, there can be no absolute 
certainties: not even in relation to the laws of the physical 
universe, let alone as regards the delicate question of 
the way society should be constituted and governed. The 
truth - as Mill pointed out - is indeed likely to be divided 
between conventional and heretical views (to say nothing 
of those not yet formulated by man).
The second element of this contention is however, perhaps 
more valid. Is the confidence of Milton and Mill in the 
power of truth to emerge through the clash of conflicting 
ideas over-optimistic? It has been submitted that '/w/ide- 
spread discussion, freely engaged in, may... lead to no 
settlement of issues; /*that/ /e/ven scholars and social 
scientists, supposedly trained in coming to conclusions 
on the basis of evidence, find it hard to get agreement
i
among themselves' - and that the task must be infinitely
more difficult for the ordinary individual. This may be
so; but it does not seem an adequate reason for denying
the individual the opportunity to meet this challenge to
2
human potential.
Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed., New 
York, 1978, p 4.
The fact that decision-making is considered so difficult 
is surely an indictment of the extent to which individuals 
have surrendered their autonomy to officialdom in the past. 
If we are out of the habit of thinking, there seems all the 
more reason to start cultivating it. If decision-making 
seems hard, it is either because we lack sufficient inform­
ation to weigh in the balance or dislike the conclusion to 
which the evidence points. What is needed in both instances 
is a different perspective; and this is most likely to be 
achieved through maximising the flow of information.
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(ii) Freedom of expression places too heavy an onus on 
the individual. Linked with the argument above, is the 
contention that '/people/ in general... are not really 
disposed to engage in the difficult process of hammering 
out serious issues, for they find mental effort the most
i
onerous of work'. Likewise, it has been submitted that
some individuals are 'too ill-informed or emotional to
2
make political decisions'; and that the great bulk of the 
population are incapable of resisting 'modern techniques 
of propaganda and subtle manipulation of the social envir­
onment ' ^ .
It is submitted, in refutation, that these arguments are
4
fundamentally paternalistic and commensurately unacceptable; 
that their corollary - viz, that the power of decision be 
given to those more "capable" of handling it - carries 
incalculable dangers of abuse) and that the best way to 
counter propaganda and indoctrination is through the unrest­
ricted flow of information, opinion and ideas.
(iii) Exposure of abuse of power may be inimical to larger
5
interests. 'Muldergate' , in South Africa, provides a 
classic illustration of this argument. Certain newspapers
in the country exposed large-scale, secret misapplication
_  “  -  -  -  -
Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 4.
2
Haiman, op cit, p 5.
3
Ten, op cit, p 129.
4
See the discussion on the dangers of such paternalism at 
p io above.
5
This term was coined as a combination of 'Watergate' and 
Mulder - the surname of the Minister of Information, at the 
time, who was one of the principal participants in the scheme 
outlined in the text below.
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of public funds to finance propaganda for the Nationalist 
government. It was contended that this exposure was more 
harmful than beneficial to South African society as it 
tended to undermine legitimate security interests which 
the propaganda had been intended to promote.
Similar arguments have been raised in relation to Watergate 
itself (it weakened the United States in her conduct of 
foreign relations); or to revalations regarding United
i
States* involvement in Vietnam ; or the activities of the
2
Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) .
In rejecting the validity of this argument, it is submitted
that 'Muldergate* is also a classic illustration of yet
another point: the principle mooted above that 'a.ll power
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely'. Those
in power are apt to guard it jealously; and there may be
a very wide divergence in view between the government and
the individual citizen as to whfct is appropriate in the
promotion of such 'larger interests'. The free flow of
information is essential to enable the individual to know
what has been done on his supposed behalf and for his
supposed benefit. At the same time, it must, however, also
be acknowledged tnat a line may have to be drawn somewhere
as to what the citizen can legitimately be told without 
_ -
See the celebrated Pentagon Papers Case: The New York Times 
v United States/ 403/ U.S. 713 (1971) and United States v 
The Washington Post/ 403 U.S. 713 (1971), discussed, inter 
alia, in Abraham, op cit, pp 169-170.
 ^ See United States v Victor L. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th 
Cir. 1972), discussed, inter alia, by Nelson & Teeter, op 
cit, pp 53-54.
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undermining state security; and the publication of inform­
ation of direct benefit to an enemy - such as troop deploy­
ment in time of war - thus raises somewhat different consider
i
ations/ (as further discussed below ).
(iv) Freedom of expression may serve to incite discontent.
An example drawn from Mill may serve as a convenient starting
point for examination of this contention. Notwithstanding
his wide-ranging support for freedom of expression/ Mill
acknowledges that*one may prevent the opinion that corn-
dealers are starvers of the poor from being delivered orally
to an excited crowd assembled in front of the corn-dealer's 
2
house' . Likewise# Mill is prepared to concede that the
instigation of tyrannicide may, 'in a specific case/...
be a proper subject of punishment/ but only if an overt act
followed, and at least a probable connection can be estab-
3
lished between the act and the instigation'.
Two points may immediately be made. The first is that the
discontent (whether against the corn-dealer or the tyrant)
mooted in these examples must inevitably have preceded the
expression of the particular opinions: it was not created
thereby. The plea by governments that "agitators" are
stirring up dissension where otherwise there would be none
is seldom borne out by the facts. To name but two examples,
the French and Russian Revolutions resulted from real and
hard-felt grievances. And where discontent exists, it is 
_
See p 23 below.
2
See Mill, On Liberty, cited by Ten, op cit, p 132.
3 Ibid.
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far better that it should be aired and a solution sought? 
than that a false security should be obtained through its 
repression.
The second point is that - in either of Mill's illustrations-
it is not the speech which is harmful: but the subsequent
conduct. It may be countered that speech and conduct are
so closely linked in such circumstances that speech itself
must rank as destructive. This point - so long as violence
remains current in human society-is difficult to meet.
Emerson attempts to do so (as previously described) by
'drawing a line in all cases between "expression" and 
2
"action"? insisting on absolute protection for expression 
simpliciter ? and requiring that where a governmental 
regulation "affects both conduct consisting of action and 
conduct consisting of expression,... the regulation be drawn 
in such a way as to restrict only the action, leaving the
3
expression uncurtailed'. The difficulty of distinguishing 
between the two may, however, be severe - as Emerson himself 
acknowledges? and in some instances the speech itself may 
seem so clearly harmful that the case for its suppression 
may seem virtually irresistible. Thus, there may appear 
no other conclusion but that 'a group of white racists who 
march through a predominantly coloured neighbourhood,carrying
4
racist placards and shouting racist slogans, may be stopped'.
Op cit, p 19, (cited by Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne op cit 
p 59, n c) .
 ^ Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4
Ten, op cit, p 140.
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However, if racist emotion continues to operate - and only
its expression is checked - little of concrete value can
be achieved. The cauldron of hostility will continue to
bubble: and may explode into far greater violence than if
the safety valve of free speech were allowed to dissipate
some of the most highly charged tension. in addition/ it
must also be remembered that freedom of expression is
indeed a seamless web: that its destruction in one context
(no matter how laudable the aim) may ultimately lead to
its elimination in others; and that there is considerable
force in Mill's earnest enjoinder that:
'If all mankind minus one were of one opinion/ and 
only one person were of the contrary opinion/ mankind would 
be no more justified in silencing that one person/ then he/ . 
if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.'
(v) Speech may be the very antithesis of 'self-regarding' 
conduct and must be restricted in such instances.
This argument is closely linked to the preceding contention/
but carries it several steps further. Thus, it is submitted
that freedom of expression may cause harm to others in a
number of different ways. It may result in violence/ as
mooted above; or undermine vital security interests (through
for example, the disclosure to the enemy of troop movements 
2
in time of war ); it may injure the reputation/ or impinge
T~ “ “ *" “
Mill, On Liberty, supra, p 79/ (reproduced by Ten, op cit/
p 1-24) .
2
See p 21 above. The Falklands War of 1982/ provides a 
recent illustration of this problem. Much controversy has 
centred around the role of the English media in depicting 
the conflict, it being alleged by the British armed forces 
that premature disclosure of information relating to the 
proposed landings of troops in the Islands exacerbated the 
loss of life.
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upon the privacy, of the individual; it may prejudice fair
trial or undermine public confidence in the administration
of justice? it may offend against religious convictions or
moral standards? it may cause needless panic (as illustrated
by Mr. Justice Holmes' famous example of shouting 'Fire'
m  a crowded theatre when/ in fact, there is no blaze ).
In addition, it is contended that certain opinions - such
as racist prejudices - are so divisive that they cannot
2
be allowed free rein. Problems of this kind undoubtedly 
admit of no easy solution? and have generated a consensus
3
that freedom of expression cannot be absolute - that some
restriction is essential for the proper protection of
interests of equal or greater importance. Accordingly, a
number of attempts have been made to formulate appropriate
criteria for determining when freedom of expression may
legitimately be restricted - and these are considered in
due course. Before turning to examination of the various
tests suggested, however, it remains to consider a further
objection to freedom of expression that may be considered
4particularly valid in 'developing' countries.
See Schenckv United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) at 52.
Thus, in the United Kingdom, for example, the Race Relations 
Act of 1976 has created the offence of 'incitement to racial 
hatred'.
Thus, even ‘Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, who often 
asserted that when the Founding Fathers said "no law" /in 
the First Amendment, as further explained below/ they 
meant literally that,... himself made many exceptions'. See 
Haiman, op cit, p 4.
A 'developing country' is defined in the McGraw-Hill Diction­
ary of Modern Economics, 2nd., ed., 1973, as 'a nation whose 
people are beginning to utilize available resources in order 
to bring about a sustained increase in per capita production 
of goods and services. In general, a developing nation is 
a country that is capable of greater substantial improvements 
in its income level and is in process of achieving this 
improvement.'
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1.3.3. Th.e Special Significance of 'Development Journalism1
A convenient starting point for examination of this difficult 
issue is provided by Emerson - a highly committed proponent 
of free speech - who nevertheless submits that 'an effective
i
system of freedom of expression' depends upon the fulfill­
ment of a number of criteria. He identified these as 
follows:
'There must be a substantial consensus on the values 
and goals of the society - some minimum area of agreement 
or acquiescence. The economic structure must provide a 
certain standard of material welfare, shared broadly by 
all elements of the population. Political institutions 
must have some basis in the traditions of the people, must 
receive some degree of acceptance, must prove reasonably 
effective in meeting the problems of the society, and must 
remain capable of adjustment and change... There must be 
some feeling of security in relation to other nations or 
societies. The education system, the media of communication, 
and similar institutions molding public opinion must have 
some capacity to produce mature and independent members of 
the local and national community. The general philosophy, 
attitudes and mental health of the citizenry must be 
favourable. In short, basic conditions for a viable 
democratic society must be present.'2
The first point which should be noted is that Emerson 
describes these factors as important conditions for 'an
3
effective system of freedom of expression' . He does not 
suggest that - in the absence of these conditions - freedom 
of expression should be rejected. Yet this is the contention 
which is increasingly being propounded by Third World states 
facing major development problems. The question is not an
T.I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 
1966, reproduced by Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, op cit, 
p 17.
Ibid.
Supra, emphasis supplied.
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easy one - and the issues involved are perhaps best apprec­
iated in the light of a concrete example. The illustration 
below is drawn from Tanzania/ but is equally apposite to 
the majority of developing countries.
Shortly after the inception of the policy of ujamaa villages/ 
'involving /'the resettlement ofJ peasants in communal
1 tagricultur/al/ /projects/ */ reports reached journalists
in Tanzania of a particular village settlement scheme which
had badly failed: with */l/arge sums of money ha/ving/
been lost and villagers who had been brought to the scheme 
2ha/ving/ left' . The journalists were in a dilemma as to 
how they should report this failure - if at all. Many 
people were suspicious of the ujamaa concept and the report 
of the failure of this settlement 'would reinforce existing
3
doubts and might well sway the undecided against the policy' . 
Furthermore/ the report would 'only spread "confusion" at 
a time when the government was launching a political 
education campaign through the party and the mass media to
4
encourage positive attitudes towards living in villages'.
On the other hand/ was it not the press's duty to report 
the failure in full? Not only because public resources 
had been wasted (and investigation was needed to prevent 
this recurring); but also - and perhaps even more importantly - 
because '/g/ood policies and appropriate decisions /can only
 ^ Graham Mitten/ 'A Third World News Deal? Tanzania - a case 
study'. /1977/ 6 Index on Censorship/ pp 35-46/ p 35.
2
Tbid. The particular settlement was not in fact organised 
on an ujamaa basis/ but this might not have been fully 
appreciated by the general population.
3 Ibid. 
 ^ Ibid.
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bej based on knowledge 6f the facts /and/ /i/f newspapers
did not report /the/ facts, then how could policy makers
or the people make good decisions?1 Was a "compromise"
possible, in which the failure should be reported, but
2
with 'great care' - bearing in mind that the elected 
government was entitled to cooperation from the press, that 
the ujamaa policy was designed to help the poor and under­
privileged and that 'the press could help in /itsJ imple­
mentation by making sure that Tanzanians understood what
3
was involved and what was expected of them'?
The first and third of these possible approaches to the 
problem of reporting reflect different degrees of 'develop­
ment journalism'. This concept was first developed - through
4
inter alia the Phillipine Press Institute - during the 
1960s. 'Those who conceived /the concept/ believed that 
because national development depends so heavily upon economics 
there should be better trained and informed economic 
specialists among journalists, to cover and report fully, 
impartially and simply the myriad problems of a developing
5
nation' . During the 19 70s, however, as Third World govern­
ments realised that development journalism could be used
1 .Ibid, P 35.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4
Developments in other parts of Asia were also significant; 
and an important role was played, in addition, by the Press 
Institute of India and the Asian Programme of IPI, and, 
particularly, by the Press Foundation of Asia, established 
in 1967, to promote development journalism. See John A. 
Lent; 'A Third World news deal? The guiding light', /1977_7.
6 Index on Censorship pp 17-26, p 17.
3 Lent, ibid, p 17.
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to promote particular development strategies, 'the term 
was transformed into commitment journalism systematically
i
applied to a nation's problems'.
1.3.3.1. The Arguments in Favour of 'Development Journalism'
The principal arguments in favour of development journalism 
- so defined - include the following:
(i) 'Because Third World nations are newly emergent, they 
need time to develop their own institutions. During this 
initial period of growth, stability and unity must be 
sought; criticism must be minimised and the public faith
2
in governmental institutions and policies must be encouraged.'
(ii) The priorities of a developing nation are immediate 
material needs such as food, shelter, energy and health.
Freedom of communication ranks below these imperatives and - 
indeed - the duty of the media is to promote the satisfact­
ion of these requirements by reporting positively on steps
3
taken in the process, rather than by voicing negative criticism.
(iii) In a society in which the great majority of the pop­
ulation has no formal education, the publication of con­
flicting policies or of criticism of existing policies is 
confusing to the people and hinders the attainment of
4
development goals. This difficulty is exacerbated by the 
tendency of people to whom literacy is a new phenomenon to
 ^ Ibid.
2 Ibid, p 18.
3 See Lent, op cit, p 18.
4 See Mitten, op cit, p 42.
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i
take everything they read as 'gospel truth'.
(iv) Investigative and critical journalism/ as practised
in the West, has no counterpart in traditional culture
and may cut across long-held values (such as respect for
elders); and also provoke a far more volatile reaction
than would be the case in societies more accustomed to this
2
role of the media. Linking this difficulty with the first
3
argument for 'development journalism' described above ,
a Nigerian editor /lias/ explained /*that/:
'A news item or editorial concerning government that 
would raise eyebrows in London can incite inter-tribal 
riots or violent anti-government demonstrations in an 
African country. It may bring down a government, and when 
there is no organised opposition party, or when it is not 
ready to be the alternative government, there will be 
anarchy:.
(v) Certain values are of overriding importance in society 
and the media's proper task is to promote them at all times. 
This contention is perhaps best described in the words of
5
Julius Nyerere as follows:
'If these principles (of love, sharing, unselfishness, 
hard work, cooperation etc.) are to be preserved and adapted 
to serve the larger societies which ha/ve/ now grown up, 
the whole of the new modern educational system must also 
be directed towards inculcating them. They must underlie 
all the things taught in the schools , all the things broad­
cast on the radio, all the things written in the press. And 
if they are to form the basis on which society operates, 
then no advocacy of opposition to these principles can be 
allowed'.^
See Frank Barton, The Press of Africa, London, 1979, p 4.
He submits that the press of Africa still has a mystique 
which the greater marvels of radio and television do not 
rival. If something is 'in the paper', it has a status of
its own - a condition still largely true even in much
more sophisticated societies.'
2 Lent, supra, p 17.
3 See p 2 8 above.
4 See Derek Ingram, 'Commonwealth Press: The Years of Challenge
in the New Framework of World Information' F e b - M a r .1976, 
Commonwealth, p 7, cited by Lent, ibid, p IS.
5 Julius Nyere, Freedom and Unity, London and Dar es Salaam, Oxfor< 
University Press, 19 67, cited by Mitten, op cit, p 36.
6 Ibid, p 14.
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(vi) Privately-owned and independent media cannot be trusted 
to serve the interests of the voiceless majority. Pfivately- 
owned media inevitably devolve into the hands of a wealthy 
few, who 'by their very nature/ represent only commercial, 
sectional or foreign interests' , and have less concern
for promoting the welfare of the people than has the 
national government.
(vii) Development journalism does not necessarily derogate 
from press freedom and it is typically western arrogance 
towards the Third Wotrld to assume that it does. Just as 
the 'existence of a Ministry of Education does not necess­
arily mean that we are on the road to Orwellian control
2
of education or brain-washing' , so too, the desire to 
provide news directly relevant to the needs and aspirations 
of developing societies /does not/ necessarily involve
3
suppression of press freedom' . The West,however, in 
'ethnocentric arrogance' assumes that press freedom is 
its particular prerogative and views the Third World as 
'incapable of self-regulatory freedom... in the field of
4
communications /as elsewhere/ .
So much, then/ for the main arguments in favour of 'devel­
opment journalism'. It remains to consider the opposing 
view.
1
Mitten, op cit, p 44.
2 Phil Harris: A Third World news deal? Behind the Smokescreen', 
/1977/ 6 Irfdex on Censorship, pp 27-34, p 28.
 ^ Ibid, at p 29. 
 ^ Ibid, p 28.
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1.3.3.2. The Arguments Against Development Journalism
The arguments against development journalism include the 
following:
(i) "A house built on shale cannot stand". Whilst it is 
true that Third World nations are yet young, that their 
unity - within the artificial boundaries devised by the 
colonial powers - is precarious/ and that their political 
institutions in many instances lack the support of trad­
ition and sit somewhat uneasily upon their newly formed 
societies, it does not follow that the dampening of criticism 
and the suppression of a free flow of information are the 
best means of ensuring unity and stability in the long
term. The repression of dissent may create the appearance 
of security; but if the schisms remain present/ they will 
ultimately re-appear. The best way to formulate lasting 
policies and to develop political institutions suited to 
the particular society is to do so on the basis of all 
relevant information - and the suppression of certain facts 
or ideas in the interests of development journalism (or any 
other goal) inevitably militates against this.
(ii) There is no evidence that development goals are best 
served by the suppression (or slanting) of information.
It is submitted - echoing the argument above - that viable 
and effective policies for the resolution of the grave 
and intractable problems of development can only be form­
ulated in the light of all relevant information and by 
taking due account of every failure and setback. Furthermore,
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even it it is accepted that freedom of expression must 
take second-place to development goals, the question remains 
as to '/w/ho /is to/ decide that a nation has reached that 
goal? /Moreover/ /a/ssuming it has reached its desired 
stage of development, will that nation's ruling clique/ 
which has become accustomed to hearing only good things 
said abotit itself/ be willing to allow the media to criticise 
constructively? And even if the rulers do allow this 
criticism, will the media/ after years of guidance and 
self-restraint, be trusting/ prepared and bold enough to 
accept the challenge?' In the long run, therefore/ will 
not development itself be the loser?
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that it is only in the 
long term that effective development may be impeded. The 
development policies adopted by a particular government 
may not be the best - objectively - for the society: as, 
arguably, illustrated by the decision of a number of Third 
World governments to introduce nuclear power at a time 
when the United States/ for one, is curtailing its own 
nuclear power programme in favour of other options. This 
change of policy in the United States is undoubtedly the 
result of a combination of many different factors: but 
public concern regarding the risk of nuclear accident must 
surely rank as one. Are the people of the Third World to 
be deprived - through the principle of 'development journ­
alism' - from being fully acquainted with the dangers involved 
and from being given an opportunity to make their views known?
T TLent, op cit, p 26.
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A further complicating factor is the suspicion with which
the general population may regard media messages extolling
a particular development policy. 'In many Third World
societies... people are generally suspicious of officialdom/
having witnessed so much government inefficiency/ corrup-
ticn and insincerity in the past' ; and 'if the critical
o
function of... the media /*is/ stifled' , how is public 
confidence to be restored?
Persistent outpouring of 'good1 development news may also 
engender a sense of frustration amongst people in fact 
experiencing considerable difficulties. In this regard/
3
the experience of Mitten m  Tanzania is salutary. He 
reports:
'On my travels in Tanzania I frequently had the view 
expressed to me by people who were in no way anti-govern­
ment, that they felt no one knew about their particular 
problems. If the news media, and in particular the radio, 
reported people's real problems and concerns more often, 
they might have allayed the frustration that some people 
felt. When the press and radio reported news from the 
regions and districts, they mostly reported happy events, 
nation-building activities, speeches of leaders and so on.
To some people this must have given the news media an air 
of unreality; more likely it gave them the unhappy feeling .
that they were the only people who were suffering difficulties'.
Ibid.
 ^ Ibid,
3 Mitten, op cit, 
 ^ Ibid, at p 46.
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(ii) Development journalism is arrogant, elitist and 
paternalistic. In assuming that the general population 
will be "confused" by being offered a choice of policies 
or by being informed of the difficulties encountered in 
particular projects, the principle of development journ­
alism evinces a contempt for the ordinary individual.
Common sense and the capacity to distinguish good from bad 
do not depend on formal education, as Third World support 
for the advantages of traditional culture implicitly 
acknowledges. Whilst some government guidance may well 
be required in the complexities of the modern world, it 
should also be recalled that man - over centuries - has 
shown himself well capable of absorbing new technologies of 
demonstrated superiority. And if there is doubt as to 
the utility of particular development policies, the solu­
tion lies not in coercion but rather in persuasion: and 
the latter - to be effective - must be based upon as com­
prehensive a review as possible of all the risks and benefits 
entailed. It must always be remembered that the ordinary 
individual is well capable of discerning any discrepancy 
between his own experience and the view put forth by the
1
media - as Mitten's report from Tanzania (described above ) 
graphically demonstrates.
(iv) Corrupt and selfish leadership deserves no respect 
and its exposure is required in the best interests of society 
as a whole. Moreover, any attempt to "paper over the cracks"
See p 33 above.
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is likely - in the end - to result in far greater violence 
and attendant anarchy; whilst, the view that the ordinary 
people cannot be trusted with bad news about government 
is - again - fundamentally paternalistic.
(v) Critical and investigative journalism does not under­
mine the importance of love, sharing or cooperation. On 
the contrary, such journalism is premised !6n high moral 
standards and may help to promote these values by exposing 
selfishness or corruption which might otherwise flourish 
undetected. Moreover, whilst the "sharing" ethic of social­
ism may well have greater intrinsic value thafc the "compet­
ition" of "self-reliance" ethic of capitalism, the interests 
of society are best served - not be promoting one and 
denigrating the other - but by examining (in full) the 
advantages and disadvantages of both ideologies; and 
attempting to develop a system which incorporates the best 
of both.^
(vi) Privately owned media are dependant on sales and
advertising revenue and can never, therefore, entirely
2
ignore the interests and wishes of their customers. On
- -  -  -  “
See Raphael Mergui 'UNESCO; The state and the media', /1981J 
1 Index on Censorship, pp 23-26, p 24. See also Mitten, 
op cit, p 44, who points out that Nyerere's statement (reprod­
uced above) should be read in the light of the importance 
attached by him to winning over the 'vitally important class 
of entrepreneurs, middle managers and other professional 
and executive people' to the cause of socialism. This aim 
of Nyerere seems implicitly to acknowledge the advantages 
of 'marrying' these ideologies.
2
See Mergui, ibid, p 26.
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the other hand, many Third World governments are not demo­
cratically elected; and there can be no guarantee that 
news media - in obeying their directives - are any more 
responsive to the interests of the majority.
(vii) Freedom of expression is a value which transcends
geographical, ideological and cultural boundaries and is
an important check on the abuse of power in any society.
'It is a general rule, in all societies, that power rests 
1
on knowledge' ; and if government is permitted to obtain a 
monopoly on the dissemination of information, there is a 
grave danger that it may degenerate into Orwellian dictat­
orship. 'Developmental journalism' has a far more attrac­
tive ring than 'thought control' but the difference - in 
practice - may not be great. Moreover, the value of indep­
endent media in exposing abuse of power and in compelling 
re-examination of government policies has been graphically
demonstrated by the role of the press both in the Water-
2
gate Scandal and in promoting the end of the Vietnam War 
(to name but two examples). The message from these exper­
iences is clear; and is applicable throughout the world.
In conclusion, it is submitted that - compelling though the 
arguments in favour of developmental journalism may seem - 
they cannot override the objections described above. The 
countervailing arguments are not easily summarised but - 
at the risk of gross oversimplification - may perhaps be
Mergui, op cit, p 26. 
2 Ibid.
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marshalled together as follows: Development journalism
is intrinsically autocratic, ultimately inefficient, and 
fundamentally paternalistic; and it leaves little room for 
the ideal of self-determination, which has been proclaimed 
throughout the world as an aim of all societies.
1.3.3.3. Further Ramifications of Developmental Journalism 
and its Proper Place vis-a-vis Free Expression
Before leaving the topic of development journalism, it 
should be noted - in passing - that it is closely related 
to increasing Third World demands for a New World Inform­
ation Order^ Third World governments - having adopted the 
policy of development journalism as regards their national 
media - are concerned that the international news media 
should be governed by the same principle; and that 'commun-
3
ication should be considered a major development resource'.
The question here raised lies outside the scope of this study.
As further explained below, this demand centres principally 
around the need to temper the present dominant position of 
Western news agencies in collecting and disseminating inter­
national news. As such, it falls beyond the ambit of this 
dissertation and cannot be examined in full. For further 
information, however, see the 1980 Report of the UNESCO 
Commission established to examine the question, entitled 
'Many Voices, One World1; and for comment on the origins 
and significance of the debate see Lent, op cit, Harris/ 
op cit, Mergui, op cit, Frank Barber, 'UNESCO: Threat to 
Press Freedom', /*1981_/ 1 Index on Censorship, pp 15-22; 
and Rosemary Righter, Whose News? , London, 1978.
Many Voices, One World, Report of the UNESCO Commission for 
the Study of Communication, 1980, p 258.
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The heart of their concern centres/ however/ around the 
present domination of the flow of international news by 
four major Western agencies - Associated Press and United 
Press International in the United States/ Agence France
i
Press and the British agency/ Reuters. This/ the Third
World asserts - with considerable legitimacy - results in
a 'one-way* flow of information in which the developed
world receives little information regarding the Third
2
World and that usually of the "crisis" variety/ whilst 
Third World countries are unable to obtain information about 
each other except through the distorting medium of the
3
Western agencies. Detailed consideration of the complex 
issues raised by Third World complaints lies outside the 
scope of this study/ however; and it is instead proposed 
to return to the major question of present concern - the 
extent to which freedom of expression may properly be 
limited (if at all) through the aims of development journalism.
See Righter/ supra, pp 23-24.
2
Thus reports regarding Third World countries tend to centre 
around crises, such as a coup/ flood or famine/ rather 
than progress in the development battle. See Harris, 
op cit, who points out that '/'t/he Third World rarely 
surfaces into Western consciousness, and when it does it 
is a world plagued by catastrophe, whether this be natural 
(floods, earthquakes, etc.,), mechanical (plane and train 
crashes) or political (coup d'etat, assassinations, kidnaps, 
terrorism and guerilla warfare.)'
3
Thus, one obvious distortion is seen as being the "crisis" 
reports described above. In addition, the Third World claims 
that it 'is entitled to hear African journalists talking 
about Africa, Latin American journalists talking about 
Latin America and Asian journalists talking about Asia'.
See Harris, ibid.
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It has already been submitted that freedom of expression 
should not be sacrificed in toto, to development journalism 
as an overriding policy. However/ it is certainly arguable 
that the promotion of development is an interest which
i
ranks equally with those previously identified as deserving 
protection (such as the state's interest in security and 
the individual's concern with privacy and protection of 
reputation); and that development journalism should,there­
fore, be treated in the same way. Thus, freedom of express­
ion may be obliged to yield to the interests of develop­
ment journalism, as to other concerns/ in certain circum­
stances: whenever the occasion is "appropriate". But when 
is the occasion "proper"? What criteria should be applied 
to determine this? The question is of immense importance 
and equal difficulty - and no complete solution to it has 
yet been found. Considerable attention has/ however/ been 
given to the problem by the United States' Supreme Court; 
and the tests suggested by that Court accordingly provide 
a convenient starting point for further discussion.
1.4. The Criteria for Restricting Freedom of Expression in 
The United States
The First Amendment to the United States' Constitution
guarantees freedom of expression in a way which is strikingly
wide. It states - in short/ sharp terms - the sweeping
principle that: 'Congress shall make no law... abridging
2
freedom of speech, or of the press...' . The uncompromising
~ “ “
See p 23 above.
2
See Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 8.
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nature of this guarantee which/ prima facie/ 'admits of
1
no exceptions' has been emphasised by Meiklejohn and has
led Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black to declare:
'It is my belief that there are "absolutes" in our 
Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by 
men who knew what words meant and meant their prohibitions 
to be "absolutes"*.. It /"the First Amendment/ says "no law"/ 
and that is what I believe it means **2
Notwithstanding the clear terms of the First Amendment (or 
the view of Mr. Justice Black described above), the Supreme 
Court has - in general - taken the approach that freedom 
of expression cannot be an absolute right; and that it 
must indeed yield to competing interests in certain circum­
stances. The attempt to formulate suitable guidelines for 
restriction (in the absence of any statutory criteria) has 
however, presented the Court with intractable difficulty -
as illustrated by the following brief survey of some of
3the principal tests evolved by it over the years.
(i) Prior Restraint.
4
Derived from the writings of Blackstone , this principle 
affirms that expression must always be permitted in the
Alexander Meiklejohn, Testimony of November 14, 1955, U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Sub-Committee on Constit­
utional Rights, "Security and Constitutional Rights", pp 
14-15, (cited by Nelson & Teeter, ibid).
Black, 'Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": a 
public interview*, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev 548 (1962), (cited by 
Nelson & Teeter, ibid).
For brief description of these and other tests utilised
by the Court, see Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, op cit, pp 51-59.
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries, 1765-1769, in which 
he asserts: 'The liberty of the press... consists in laying 
no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matter when published'. See 
Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 7.
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first instance, even though it may subsequently be punished 
if it is found to contravene a recognised interest, such 
as protection of individual reputation. Thus, no "prior 
restraint" may be placed on publication - even though the
i
media may subsequently be "damned" therefor. The operat­
ion of the principle is illustrated by the case of Near v 
2
Minnesota , in which the Supreme Court declared invalid
an injunction prohibiting publication of a Minneapolis
3 41 smear sheet' ; and by the Pentagon Papersr case in which
the Court similarly discharged injunctions precluding the 
Nd^ y York Times and Washington Post from publicising a 
confidential Pentagon report on United States' involvement
5
in Vietnam. In neither case, however, was the Court 
prepared to concede that the prohibition of "prior restraint" 
against publication is absolute. Thus, in Near v Minnesota, 
the Court acknowledged that prior restraint might well be 
justified to uphold security and to protect against
g
obscenity ; and in the 'Pentagon Papers' case, the majority 
decision was based on the government's failure, in the 
particular circumstances, to show that restriction on
1
Hence, the well-known aphorism: 'Publish and be damned'.
The media may say what it pleases, but must suffer the con­
sequences. The crucial element of the principle, however, 
it that the media cannot be precluded from having its say 
in the first instance.
2
Near v Minnesota, ex re. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), discussed 
in further detail below.
3
The case is discussed in further detail below; and suffice 
it therefore for present purposes to note that the language 
of the newspaper was extreme, that it laid severe charges 
of dereliction of duty against law enforcement agencies and 
that it vilified Catholics and Jews.
 ^ New York Times Co.v United, States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
5 * '
The Court's reasoning is further explained in the text below.g
Near v Minnesota, ex rel. Olson, supra, at 716.
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publication was indeed necessary in the interests of 
security - the implication being that if the government had 
been able to provide stronger evidence of risk to national 
safety, the injunction against publication would have been 
upheld.^
In summary therefore, the Supreme Court has emphasised the 
general principle that there should be no prior restraint 
on publication - but has also acknowledged that this prin­
ciple is not absolute, and has provided little guidance 
as to the circumstances in which it may be obliged to yield 
to competing, overriding public interests.
(ii) Clear and Present Danger
2
First formulated in Schenck v United States, this principle 
provides that freedom of expression may not be restricted 
except where there is a clear and present danger that it 
will result in substantive evil to society. In assessing 
the risk of this, the courts are enjoined to consider 
whether 'the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improb­
ability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is nec-
3
essary to avoid the danger' . Attractive though this
1
Only two of the Supreme Court Justices - Black and Douglas - 
expressed firm opposition to any system of prior restraint, 
in the interests of 'uninhibitedrrobust and wide-open 
debate'. See New York Times Co v United States, supra, at 724.
2
249 U.S. 47, (1919), discussed further below.
3 Dennis v United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), at 510. In 
this case, as further discussed below, the Supreme Court 
attempted to give further meaning to the test, as propoun­
ded in Schenck v United States, by adopting this additional 
principle.
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principle may seem, its practical application is fraught
with difficulty - as the experience of the Supreme Court
itself graphically demonstrates. Thus, in Dennis v United
States, the doctrine 'was so variously interpreted by the
five opinions /delivered in the case/ that its usefulness 
2
was eroded' ; and it stood revealed as a most uncertain 
yardstick.
(ii) Bad Tendency.
According to this principle, enunciated in Gitlow v New
York freedom of expression may be restrained where it
would.have a tendency to bring about some social evil, such
as the corruption of public morals or the disturbing of
public peace. It needs no emphasis that a principle of
this kind leaves a very wide margin for the suppression
of publication; and it seems that this test has now been
4
rejected in the United States as being too wide.
(iv) Preferred Freedom.
This principle affirms that freedom of speech and of the 
press are rights of particular importance, being the 'indis-
5
pensable condition of liberty*. It follows that any law 
prima facie restricting these freedoms must be subjected 
to special scrutiny, the onus lying on the state to show
* Ibid.
2
Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 4T.
 ^ 268 U.S. 652 (1925), discussed further below.
4
See Dorsen, Bender & Neuborne, op cit, p 57.
5
See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 11.
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that 'the speech or print under challenge... endangers a
i
major social interest'. The value of the principle is
2
illustrated by the 'Pentagon Papers' case / in which the 
Supreme Court held that the Government had failed to dis­
charge the heavy onus of establishing that restriction of 
publication was required in the interests of state security. 
Apart/ however/ from thus shifting the burden of proof on 
to the state/ the principle provides minimal guidance as 
to how - in practice - the onus should be held to have been 
discharged; and it therefore does little to resolve the 
dilemma.
(v) Incitement to Action.
3
This principle/ articulated in Brandenburg v Ohio/ affirms 
that the advocacy of force of civil disobedience to obtain 
redress of grievances cannot be restricted except where 
'such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immin­
ent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
4
action'. Again/ however/ the test is inherently uncertain 
for the concept of 'imminence' is intrinsically vague; and 
prophecies of what is 'likely' are notoriously inaccurate. 
Moreover/ the principle is also open to criticism in that 
'it is capable of being manipulated by the courts to cut
c
off speech just when it becomes close to being effective.'
 ^ Ibid.
2 New York TiSies Co v U.S. 403 U.S. 713 (1971)/ discussed 
briefly above at p 41 - 42.
 ^ 395 U.S. 444 (1969)/ discussed further below.
4
Ibid, at 447, emphasis supplied.
5
Dorsen, Bender & Neuborne, op cit, p 59.
-45-
1.5. The Risk of Excessive Restriction
From the above brief survey alone, the difficulties endemic 
in attempting to formulate suitable guidelines for deter­
mining when freedom of expression may legitimately be rest­
ricted in order to protect other interests are readily 
apparent. From its attempts to grapple with the problem, 
the Supreme Court has wrested a number of principles - but 
none is particularly satisfactory and all suffer from the 
defect of uncertainty. The danger is always that the net 
of restriction will be thrown too wide: with the result 
that ' freedom of expression will become the exception and 
suppression the rule.' To avoid this happening, the 
permitted derogations from the principle of free expression 
must be formulated with clarity and precision. However, 
this is easier said than done, as 'the infinite varieties 
and subtleties of language and other forms of communication
make it impossible to construct a limitation upon express-
2ion in definite terms'. Moreover, the risk of excessive 
restriction being imposed is compounded by the fact that 
limitations imposed to protect certain interests are essent­
ially aimed at prevention; and 'like all preventive measures, 
/*they7 cu/t/ far more widely and deeply than is necessary'^
- in reality - to preclude the threatened danger. Further­
more, the repression of free expression generates its 
own momentum: being likely to contribute to the atmosphere
1
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 1970, reproduced 
by Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, op cit, p 13.
2 Ibid. 
 ^ Ibid.
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of fear and insecurity which prompted the imposition of 
controls in the first instance, and so prompting further 
calls for yet more stringent restriction. There is, accord­
ingly, good reason for concluding that 'the limitations 
imposed on discussion, as they operate in practice, tend 
readily and quickly to destroy the whole structure of free
i
expression1. Maintaining freedom of expression is thus
no easy task; and there is,accordingly, much force in the
following observations of the renowned Professor Emerson,
that 'the problem of maintaining a system of freedom of
expression in a society is one of the most complex any
2
society has to face; ' and that it calls for a high degree 
of self-restraint and self-discipline; and a willingness 
- despite the pulls of emotion - to sacrifice immediate 
interests to longer term and more nebulous goals.
1.6. The Increasing Recognition of the Importance of Free 
Expression
Given all the difficulties of maintaining freedom of express­
ion in practice, it is both interesting and encouraging to 
note the increasing recognition being accorded to the imp­
ortance of freedom of expression in both international 
covenants and municipal legal systems. On the international 
plane, the twentieth century has witnessed a burgeoning 
awareness of the importance of respect for human rights in
Ibid. 
 ^ Ibid.
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general, - as reflected, inter alia in the Preamble to the 
Charter of the United Nations, which identifies two of the 
principal aims of the organisation as being:
1... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights 
£ and/ in the dignity and worth of the human person... /and/ 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom'.1
Since the adoption of the Charter in 1945, the importance
of promoting human rights has been affirmed in a number
of international convenants: and freedom of expression is
one of the principal rights which has been emphasised as
needing protection. Thus, the Preamble to the Universal
2
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 declares that 'the 
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy free­
dom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want 
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
3
people' ; and Article 19 of the Declaration asserts that 
'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
/and that/ this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart inform­
ation and ideas through any media and regardless of
4
frontiers'.
This, and other provisions of the United Nations Charter 
which are relevant to the protection of human rights are 
reproduced in Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human 
Rights, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1981, pp 3-14.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. 
The Declaration is not a legally binding instrument as such, 
but, in the view of Brownlie, ibid, p 21, it 'has its own 
importance and cannot be regarded as having merely an historical 
significance'. For further analysis of its effects, see 
Brownlie, ibid, and the further texts cited by him.
See Brownlie, ibid, p 21 for a reproduction of this provision. 
See Brownlie, ibid, p 25 for a reproduction of this provision.
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
i
which was adopted in 19 66 , also guarantees freedom of
2
expression (though in more detailed (and possibly ) more 
restrictive terms). Thus Article 19 provides:
'1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions 
without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of express­
ion; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardlesssof 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in para­
graph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights and reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of _ 
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.'
Regional treaties also confirm the need to protect freedom 
of expression. Thus, the European Convention on Human 
Rights of 1950 guarantees freedom of expression in the 
following terms:
'Article 10
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interfer­
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing 
of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
Brownlie, op cit, p 128.
This provision which clearly authorises a number of derog­
ations from the rights, contrasts considerably, prima facie, 
with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration which does not 
expressly authorise any exceptions. However, some restrict­
ion must nevertheless be permitted under the latter provis­
ion to protect competing interests in appropriate circum­
stances as has been held in relation to the far more robustly 
phrased First Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America (as discussed abov^.
See Brownlie, supra, p 135, for a reproduction of this 
provision.
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2. The exercise of these freedoms/ since it carries 
with it duties and responsibilities/may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health of morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 1 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.'
In addition, the American Convention of Human Rights of 
1969 guarantees 'Freedom of Thought and Expression' in the 
following manner:
'Article 13
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought 
and expression. This right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of 
one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the fore­
going paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship 
but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, 
which shall be expressly established by law to the extent 
necessary in order to ensure:
(a) respect for the rights or reputations of others? or
(b) the protection of national security, public order, 
or public health or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by 
indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of governmefit 
or private controls over newsprint, radio, broadcasting 
frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of 
information, or by any other means tending to impede the 
communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, 
public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censor­
ship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for 
the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, 
racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to 
lawless violence or to any other similar illegal action 
against any person or group of persons on any grounds includ­
ing those of race, color, religion, language, or national  ^
origin shall be considered as offenses pubishable by law.'
See Brownlie, op cit p 246 for a reproduction of this provision. 
See Brownlie, ibid, p 397.
-50-
A related important provision of the American Convention 
is Article 14 which states:
1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive state­
ments or ideas disseminated to the public in general by
a legally regulated medium of communication has the right 
to reply or make a correction using the same communications 
outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish,
2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit 
other legal liabilities that may have been incurred,
3. For the effective protection of honor and reput­
ation , every publisher/ and every newspaper/ motion picture/ 
radio/ and television company/ shall have a person respon­
sible/ who is not protected by immunities or special priv­
ileges . '
Furthermore/ the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, adopted by Heads of State at the Organisation of 
African Unity Summit held in Nairobi in 1981/ and which
2
will become effective upon its ratification by 26 states, 
contains a brief guarantee of freedom of expression in 
the following terms:
'Article 9
1. Every individual shall have the right to receive 
information.
2. Every individual shall have the right to express 
and disseminate his opinions within the law'.3
At the level of municipal law/ a great number Of states 
guarantee freedom of expression in their constitutions, 
as illustrated by the following brief survey:
See Brownlie, ibid, p 398.
See (1981) Vol 7 Commonwealth Law Bulletin, p 1058. 
Ibid.
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The Constitution of Argentina of 1853 (as amended) guar­
antees, in Article 14, that '/a/ll inhabitants of the 
Nation enjoy /certain/ rights, in accordance with the laws 
that regulate their exercise, /including the right OfJ 
publishing their ideas through the press without previous
i
censorship'.
The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh of 
1972, as amended, guarantees freedom of expression, in 
Article 39, as follows:
'1. Freedom of thought and conscience is guaranteed.
2. Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by 
law in the interests of the State, friendly relations with 
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in 
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement 
to an offence -
(a) the right of every citizen to freedom of speech 
and expression; and
(b) freedom of the press
are guaranteed.'^
The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
of 1960 provides in Article 28:
'1. Freedom of expression in all fields of public life, 
in particular freedom of speech and of the press, consistent 
with the interests of the working people, shall be guaranteed 
to all citizens. These freedoms shall enable citizens to 
further the development of their personalities and their 
creative efforts, and to take an active part in the admin­
istration of the state and in the economic and cultural 
development of the country. For this purpose freedom of 
assembly, and freedom to hold public parades and demonstrat­
ions, shall be guaranteed.
2. These freedoms shall be secured by making publishing 
houses and printing presses, public buildings, halls, assembly 
grounds, as well as broadcasting, television and other
1 See Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, Constitutions 
of the Countries of the World, New York, 1982, Vol. I.
2
Blaustein & Flanz, op cit, Vol. II.
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facilities available to the working people and their 
organisations' 1.
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark Act of 1953 
affirms in brief terms in section 77:
'Any person shall be entitled to publish his thoughts 
in printing, in writing and in speech/ provided that he may 
be held answerable in a court of justice. Censorship and 2 
other preventative measures shall never again be introduced'.
The Constitution of Japan of 1946 also guarantees free 
speech in Article 21, as follows:
'Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, 
press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.
No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the 
secrecy of any means of communication be violated'.
The Political Constitution of Peru of 1979 also affirms, 
in Article 2.4. the individual's right:
'To the freedom of information, opinion, expression, 
and diffusion of ideas through words, writings, or visual 
means, by any mass medium, without previous authorization, 
censure or impediment of any kind subject to sanctions 
under the law.
Crimes committed through books, the press, and other 
mass media are detailed in the Criminal Code and are adjud 
icated in ordinary courts.
Also considered a crime is any measure that suspends 
or closes any organ of expression or hinders its free 
circulation.
The rights to inform and express an opinion include 
those of establishing communications media.'
Ibid, Vol. V.
Ibid, Vol. V..
Blaustein & Flanz, op cit, Vol. IX. 
Ibid, Vol. XII.
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In addition, the great majority of "new" states within 
the Commonwealth, (those which have attained independence 
since 1960) have included within their constitutions Bills 
of Rights which are modelled on that of Nigeria (the first
i
British colonial dependency to incorporate such provisions )
and which reflect the terms of Article 10 of the European
2
Convention on Human Rights . Thus, to take one of the 
more recent examples, the Constitution of Tuvalu of 1978 
provides, in section 12, th&t:
'1. Except with his own consent, no person shall be 
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, and 
for the purposes of this section the said freedom includes 
the freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom 
to receive ideas and information without interference, 
freedom to communicate ideas and information without inter­
ference and freedom from interference with his correspon­
dence.
2. Nothing contained in or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in con­
travention of this section to the extent that the law in 
question makes provision -
(a) inrthe interests of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality or public health;
(b) for the purpose of protecting the reputations, 
rights and freedoms of other persons or the privacy of per­
sons concerned in legal proceedings, preventing the dis­
closure of information received in confidence, maintaining 
the authority and independence of the courts, or regulating 
the administration or the technical operation of telephony, 
telegraphy, posts, wireless, broadcasting or television;
or
(c) for the imposition of restrictions upon public 
officers.
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, 
the thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to
The reason such a Bill of Rights was adopted in Nigeria 
and the effect which this had on other British dependencies 
as they reached independence is further discussed below.
See p 173, below.
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be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'.
The above survey is, of course, by no means comprehensive.
It serves to illustrate/ however, the recent awakening of 
concern for human rights in general - including freedom 
of expression - and thus to demonstrate that there is indeed 
an increasing recognition of the importance of free express­
ion throughout the world. However/ these national and
international guarantees also serve to underline - once 
2
again - the fundamental dilenma which surrounds the right 
to freedom of expression. Oh the one hand/ free expression 
is clearly recognised as a right of great importance/ which 
merits special protection. On the other hand, however/ 
it is equally acknowledged that it is a right which cannot 
be absolute and which must yield - in certain circumstances - 
to other interests/ considered more important by society 
in these instances. Whilst so much is apparent, however/ 
the difficulty of determining what those circumstances are - 
and of defining where the line between freedom and restrict­
ion should be drawn - appears almost entirely insoluble.
1.7* The Dilemma of Free Expression and its Practical 
Resolution
The dilemma surrounding freedom of expression lies thus in 
the intractable difficulty of attempting to reconcile interests
1
Blaustein & Flanz, op cit, Vol XV; Tivalu Independence Order 19 78.
2
The difficulty of determining appropriate tests for restrict­
ion has, of course/ previously been described in the context 
of United States' experience.
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which are fundamentally at odds. Moreover, factual circum­
stances vary too greatly for hard-and-fast rules to be 
laid down; and little guidance can therefore be obtained 
from detailed prescriptions of limitations which go further 
than is either necessary or appropriate to protect society's 
legitimate interests. It is submitted, however, that - 
in practice - it is indeed possible to recognise excessive 
restriction and limitation when this phenonemon occurs.
The practical resolution of the dilemma lies thus in pro­
moting a sense of vigilance against unnecessary retraint; 
and in developing a firm, clear commitment to individual 
liberty and media freedom, founded on courage, objectivity, 
self-restraint and maturity.
It is accordingly proposed to move away from the theoretical 
debate at this stage; and to focus instead on freedom of 
the media as experienced in one particular society, in 
order to determine whether the legal limitations in fact im­
posed upon the press go beyond the bounds of what is nece­
ssary to protect competing interests. It is further pro­
posed to conduct this examination in the context of Nigeria: 
a country which - for a number of reasons, as further ex­
plained in Chapter Two below - provides a rich and instruc­
tive backdrop for this inquiry.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTRODUCTION T O NIGERIA
A1. The Significance of this African State
Nigeria is the largest, most populous and - by virtue of 
her oil resources - the wealthiest of the black African 
states. She is also a leader in many other respects. She 
was one of the first states in Africa to attain independence
-j
from Britain ; and - although she has suffered a number
of vicissitudes since (including a brutal civil war and
thirteen years of military government) - she has recently
2
returned to civilian rule under a constitution which 
breaks new ground within the Commonwealth, being modelled 
on a "Washington" rather than a "Whitehall" pattern^. It 
thus represents a significant step in the attempt to develop 
political institutions which marry democratic principles 
with strong effective leadership; and thus provides an 
example which many other Third World states may find well 
worth the studying. Moreover, the civilian government has 
been in office for close on four years; and this in itself 
is a remarkable achievement - given the difficulty a number 
of other states have experienced in keeping the military 
out of government when once they have assumed this role.
1
This was in 19 60.
2
This was in 1979,
3
See James S. Read, ‘The New Constitution of Nigeria, 1979: 
"The Washington Model"?, (1979) 23 Journal of African Law, 
pp 131-174.
L
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Nigeria has thus provided an important lead in this regard 
as well. These recent events should not, however, be 
allowed to obscure the importance of the lead provided by 
Nigeria in the more distant past. In 1959, Nigeria also 
broke new ground within the Commonwealth by incorporating 
within her constitution a Bill of Rights, based upon the 
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, and which has 
served as a model for the great majority of new states 
within the Commonwealth, which have incorporated similar 
provisions within their constitutions on their attainment 
of independence.
From the viewpoint of the media, Nigeria was one of the
i
first African states (south of the Sahara and north of the
2 3Limpopo ) to establish a viable local newspaper . Its
4
press is widely regarded as the freest in Africa ; and 
appears to take considerable pride in its educative and 
'watchdog' role^, being quick to denounce any curtailment
The first newspapers in Egypt were established after 
Napoleon's occupation of the country in 1797. See Frank 
Barton, The Press of Africa, London, 19 79, p 5.
2
Newspaper publication commenced in the Cape in 1800 with 
the production of the Cape Town Gazette. See Barton, ibid.
3 The first successful daily in West Africa was the Lagos 
Daily News, founded by Herbert Macaulay in 19 25. For 
further details of the beginnings of newspaper production 
in Nigeria see p217 below.
4 This claim is discussed further in Chapter Three below.
5
This emerges strongly from the collected opinions of Nigerian 
journalists, published in W.I. Ofonagoro, A. Ojo and A. Jinadu 
(eds.), The Great Debate; Nigerian Viewpoints on the Draft 
Constitution, 1976/77, Lagos, 1977. This debate was largely 
concerned with the need for a stronger guarantee of media 
freedom, as further discussed below.
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'l
of its liberty . As regards radio and television/ Nigeria
was also one of the first African states to introduce these 
2
media ; and now has twenty radio services (one for the
Federation as a whole and one for each of its nineteen 
3
states ) # whilst '/c/ountrywide colour /television/ coverage
4
is now virtually complete'.
As regards the law governing these media# Nigeria provides 
a highly instructive framework for study. Many of the 
relevant rules are of post-independence origin; but a con­
siderable proportion derive from English legislation# 
common law and doctrines of equity: which apply within the 
country by virtue of her past history as a British dependency.
Of these# the most significant by far are the common law 
rules: and these are an important subject of study for two 
principal reasons. First, they have developed in piece­
meal fashion over time; and stand in considerable need of 
reform to meet the changed conditions of the modern world# 
as has been tacitly acknowledged in the United Kingdom
itself through the recent establishment of various commissions
-  —
Thus, for example# the Nigerian press protested vigorously 
against the maltreatment of one of its number# the journalist 
Amakiri; and has also compaigned vigorously against the 
establishment of a government-controlled Press Council# 
and the introduction of restrictions on the reporting of the 
elections to be held in August 1983. These illustrations 
are discussed further in Chapter Three below.
2
See the section oh the growth of the Nigerian media below.
3 See The Times# (of London)# Special Supplement on Nigeria#
3 February 1982. The process whereby the country has become 
divided into 19 states is further described below# in the 
section on the history of Nigeria.
4 The Times, ibid.
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*1
of inquiry ; and by the enactment of remedial legislation
2
in one particularly troublesome sphere. Secondly/ these 
common law rules apply not only in Nigeria/ but also in a 
great many other Commonwealth states whose legal systems 
are likewise/ in large measure/ the product of their British 
colonial past. In many of these states/ as in Nigeria itself/ 
however, little attention has been given to the need for
3
reform of the law: a circumstance readily understandable
in the light of the development problems faced by many.
It is submitted therefore that - although Nigeria's experience 
is clearly unique to her - it may nevertheless be instructive
Thus, for example, as further described in the course of 
this study, commissions have been established to inquire 
into the law of defamation and contempt of court. Consider­
able concern has also been expressed in the United Kingdom 
at the need for new rules of privacy and freedom of inform­
ation? whilst the law of obscenity continues to present 
great difficulty. Full analysis of the various studies 
made lies outside the scope of this dissertation, however: 
though those of particular importance (relating to defam­
ation and contempt of court) will be further discussed in 
due course.
Thus, certain aspects of the common law offence of contempt 
of court have now been reformed and modified through the 
enactment of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
Thus, for example, in the context of contempt of court, it 
is apparent that the Commonwealth states have done little 
to reform the law: such amendment as has either been imple­
mented (in Bermuda, through the Administration of Justice 
(Contempt of Court) Act, 1979) or recommended (in Canada 
and New Zealand, for example), being largely based on United 
Kingdom recommendations and leaving many problem areas 
untouched and unresolved. For additional details of these 
reforms, see the Memoranda of the 1980 Meeting of Commonwealth 
Law Ministers, published by the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
at pp 277-300. Further analysis of these proposals and 
amendments lies outside the scope of this study; but it is 
hoped to show the insufficiency of the United Kingdom 
recommendations (on which they are based) in the course of 
this dissertation.
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for other Commonwealth jurisdictions as well to examine the 
difficulties which have arisen in the Nigerian context in 
the application of these laws: and to consider what reforms 
are required to strike a more appropriate balance between 
freedom and restriction.
In this regard/ it is submitted that the United States of 
America provides a salutary contrast and example: for her 
law relating to freedom of the media is likewise of common 
law origin; and yet has been considerably modified (largely 
through decisions of the Supreme Court) to give freedom of 
expression a practical significance sadly lacking in many 
other common law jurisdictions. It is accordingly proposed 
to contrast various Nigerian laws governing the media with 
their counterparts in the United States: and - against this 
background - to review the constitutionality of Nigerian 
law (in terms of the guarantee of freedom of expression 
contained within the Nigerian Bill of Rights): and the need 
for reform of the law to bring it closer into line with 
the proclaimed ideal of freedom 'to receive and impart 
ideas and information without interference'.
Before embarking on this analysis/ however/ some understand­
ing of the country/ its legal system and its media/ is 
required; and it is accordingly proposed to devote the 
balance of this Chapter to brief description of Nigeria's
i
This is the right guaranteed by s 36t Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria/ 1979/ discussed in further 
detail below.
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socio-cultural framework, history, legal structure, and 
Bill of Rights: and to conclude by analysing the guarantee 
of freedom of expression (which provides the yardstick for 
assessing the constitutionality of the laws in issue); 
and by sketching the growth and present distribution of : 
the media in the country.
2.2. Historical Socio-Cultural Divisions Within Nigeria
1
Modern Nigeria incorporates within its boundaries (largely 
the arbitrary result of the "scramble for Africa" by the 
European powers during the nineteenth century) a multiplicity 
of different linguistic and ethnic groups, 'rang/ing/ in 
size from 5,000 to groups numbering more than five million.' 
In broad outline, however, the population was divided, 
historically, into three major groups, each centred in a 
different part of the country, which it dominated to a 
considerable extent, at the cost of other ethnic groups 
within the area. Some analysis of this important tripartite 
division is thus necessary for a proper understanding - not 
only of the development of the modern state - but also of 
the forces at play in it today. The three major groups in 
question are, of course, the Hausa (in the North), the 
Yoruba (in the West) and the Ibo (centred in the East).
The name 'Nigeria' was apparently coined by the Africa 
correspondent of The Times, Flora Shaw, who subsequently 
married the first governor-general, Lord Lugard. The first 
official recognition of the name appeared in the House of 
Commons Debate on the Royal Niger Company Bill in July 
1897. See O.I. Odumosu, The Nigerian Constitution: History 
and Development, London, 1963, p 5, n 5.
2 Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria, Cambridge, 
1964, p 2. For further details see also p 3, Table 1, where 
the population of Nigeria according to linguistic group is 
set out. There are 15 major groups, of which the most import­
ant are the Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo, as explained below.
The latter tri-partite division is reflected in the three 
Regions into which the country was divided for many years:
See Appendix I, Map Ao
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2.2.1. The Northern Hausa
The Hausa constitute the largest linguistic group/ not only
in the North but also in Nigeria as a whole . The dry/
open savannah of the Northern regions in which they live
facilitated the early development of major cities and also
exposed their communities 'to the penetration of Islam/
.../which was/ carried... across the Sahara from the
2
Mediterranean region'; and has had an immeasurable impact
3
on their social and political institutions. In character/ 
the Hausa people have been described as conservative in 
outlook/ disdainful of non-Muslims/ and unquestionably
4
obedient to authority/ with a strong sense of cultural
5
identity and considerable skill in trading. Their world
is totally different - scenically and culturally - from
the green south and/ historically/ was characterised by
the incidence of:
'an apparently docile peasantry grouped around large/ 
well-built cities of red clay/ with their mosques/ their 
law-courts and their palaces housing the Emirs - /all/ 
served by numerous officials/ attendants and mailed horse­
men * . 6
Ezera/ supra/ p 4.
Marjory Perham/ 'Nigeria's Civil War'/ /1968-69/ Africa 
Contemporary Record/ p 3.
T.O. Elias/ Nigeria: The Development of its Laws and Constit­
ution/ London/ 1967. Elias also submits/ however/ that/
'the indigenous Hausa States have retained much of their 
own characteristics'. (Note that Elias' work comprises 
Vol 14 in G.W. Keeton/ ed., The British Commonwealth: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitutions).
Ezera/ supra/ pp 4-5. 
 ^ Perham/ supra.
6 Ibid.
-63-
2.2.2. The Western Yoruba
The Yoruba/ the largest group in the West/ were characterised
first by their sophisticated political organisation and
'tradition of constitutional monarchy/ with the Alafin of
Oyo /and/ his council ruling a kingdom of more than a
million people.' Their second outstanding feature was
their high degree of urbanisation - one of their cities
(Ibadan) being 'one of the largest indigenois towns of negro 
2
Africa.' Sophisticated city-dwellers/ their '/t/rade and 
industry were highly developed: /and/ there were numerous 
crafts /and/ a highly complex religion'. Their geographical
situation - in drier and more open country than in the forested
4 5East - exposed them to a modicum of Hausa influence
and also ensured that they were the first of Nigeria's
g
inhabitants to come into contact with Europeans. The 
latter factor (coupled with a keen interest in education 
and trade) quickly ennabled the Yoruba to play an active 
and leading role in the professional and commercial life
7
of Nigeria.
Ezera/ op cit/ pp 6-7. 
Pferham, op cit/ p 2. 
Ibid.
See ibid.
See ibid.
See Ezera, supra, p 7. 
See, ibid, pp 7-8.
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2.2.3. The Eastern Ibo
The dense equatorial forests of the East moulded a very 
different form of society for the Ibos. Isolated from 
contact with the Nofrth and West - and even from much inter­
action with each other - the Ibo developed no equivalent 
large-scale, hierarchical political organisation. On the 
contrary, the 'largest political unit was normally the 
village group'1; and this perhaps contributed to both their 
egalitarianism and belief in open competition. Other 
characteristics of the Ibo have been described as their
ready adaptability to new ideas, their industry, humour and 
2
vitality. These factors - coupled with over-population 
and poverty in the East - contributed to their large-scale 
migration to other parts of the country; and, in the 1940s 
and '50's especially, the Ibo 'forged ahead... to become 
the most active and westernised group in Nigeria; and they 
streamed out of their poor and overcrowded land to employ 
their energies and their newly-gained skills and education
3
m  other parts of the Protectorate'.
Fiiirther consideration of the complexities of socio-cultural 
divisions in traditional Nigerian society lies outside the
Ibid, p 8.
See, ibid, pp 9-10, especially the quotation from John 
Gunther, Inside Africa, New York, 1955, p 760, reproduced 
at p 10.
Perham, op cit, p 3.
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1 2 scope of this study . The thumb-nail sketch of the three
major groups provided above is intended to serve primarily
as a foundation for the following brief analysis of major
developments in the history of Nigeria - from the inception
of colonial rule in the nineteenth century - to the present
day.
2.3. Outline of Nigerian History; From 1861 to Date
The evolution of modern Nigeria from the beginning of colonial
3
rule in 1861 is perhaps best understood by focusing on key 
dates in its development.
For further detail/ see Ezera/ op cit# pp 1-12/ Elias/ op 
cit/ pp 1-4; T.O. Elias, The Nigerian Legal syfctem, 2nd 
ed./ London/ 1963/ pp 7-9/ and B.O. Nwabueze/ Machinery of 
Justice in Nigeria, London, 1963/ pp 45-46 / and see also 
Odumosu/ op cit/ pp 3-4/ where the author points out that 
these divisions are by no means the only ones in Nigerian 
society and that the situation would be very much simpler 
if, in fact/ it did comprise only three homogeneous groups.
In reality/ however, there are a number of other sizeable 
ethnic groups within each of these three regions. 'For 
example/ in the /North/ there are the Kanuris/ the Nupes, 
and the Tivs; in the /East/... the Ibiobios and the Efiks; 
/whilst/ /t/he West includes the Itsekiris/ the Urhobos 
and the Ijaws'.
It is acknowledged that the picture of each group presented 
in the text above constitutes the barest outline. More 
detailed analysis does not, however/ seem warranted in a 
study concerned mainly with laws of English origin and in 
relation to a country in which every effort is being made 
to submerge consciousness of ethnic differences in an 
overriding national unity.
As early as 1849, a British Consul had been appointed for 
the Bights of Benin and Biafra, but this did not entail 
any assertion of British jurisdiction over this area. See B.O. 
Nwabueze/ Constitutional Law of the Nigerian Republic/
London/ 1964, at p 6.
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2.3.1. 1861 ~ The Annexation of Lagos Colony
In 1861/ prompted by concern that "'the permanent occupation
of this important point in the Bight of Benin is indispen-
sable to the suppression of the slave trade"'/ Britain
2
entered into a treaty with the ruler of Lagos whereby 
'absolute dominion and sovereignty' over 'the port and
3
island of Lagos' were transferred to the Crown. (In addition/ 
a number of additional treaties were gradually concluded
with various Yoruba rulers as Britain sought further to
, . 2
achieve its avowed aim of suppressing the slave trade).
2.3.2. 186 6 ~ The Incorporation of Lagos in the West 
African Settlements
This was effected pursuant to a recommendation of the Parl­
iamentary Committee in 1865 that Britain's four West African
colonies should be amalgamated 'to reduce United Kingdom
5responsibility for overseas territories'. Accordingly/
1
Papers relating to the occupation of Lagos/ 1862/ p 5/ 
quoted in Odumosu/ op cit/ pp 5-6.
2
There appears to be some confusion as to the name of this 
ruler. Thus Odumosu/ ibid/ refers to him as 'Dosumu'/ 
whilst Nwabueze/ supra/ p 9 reflects his name as Docemo. 
Nwabueze's version (since derived from the treaty itself) 
is presumably correct.
3
For the full text of the vital Article 1 of this Treaty/ 
see Nwabueze, ibid.
4
Tlfe terms of these treaties are described by Nwabueze, ibid 
pp 10-11. In general, jurisdiction over natives was not 
initially ceded; but this was effected by new agreements 
concluded in 1904.
5 Odumosu, op cit, p 6.
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'in 1866 Lagos became part of the West African Settle­
ments under a Governor-in-Chief stationed at Sierra Leone.
In place of the Governor, Lagos had an administrator but 
retained its Legislative Council.*1
2.3.3. 1874 - 1886: Miscellaneous Developments
In 1874, 'a separate single government was established for
the British settlements of Lagos and the Gold Coast both
2
of which were together called the Gold Coast Colony*.
From 1885/ the "scramble for Africa" intensified (following 
the Berlin Conference) and, in the same year, Britain,
(having previously established a consulate in the area to 
the east of Lagos) proclaimed it a British protectorate. 
Effective administration, however, was introduced only in
4
189T ; and in 1893, the 'protectorate was extended to include
5
the hinterlands and renamed the "Niger Coast Protectorate".
The next major development came in 1886, when Lagos Colony 
was separated from the Gold Coast, and was established as 
a separate colony, with its own governor, and councils (both 
legislative and executive)^.
 ^ Ibid.
2
A.O. Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System, London 1979, p 19.
3
Odumosu, supra, p 7. This was known as the Oil River Pro­
tectorate*
4
Ibid. Thus, 'Consuls and Vice-Consuls were /then/ appointed 
to the various rivers under a Commissioner and Consul- 
General resident at Calabar'.
5 Ibid.
g
Obilade, supra, p 20. See also Nwabueze, op cit, p 45.
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2.3.4* 1900 ~ 1906 » The Separate Protectorates of Southern
and Northern Nigeria
Britain*s claim to the Niger Basin having been accepted 
at the Berlin Conference of 1885, the Royal Niger Company 
obtained its Charter in 1886, with power to "administer, 
make treaties, levy customs and trade in all territories
i
on the basin of the Niger and its affluents". Exercising 
these powers, it gained - by treaty with traditional rulers - 
wide-ranging control over a large part of the North. Follow­
ing criticism of the Company's 'combin/ing/ administrative
2
powers with commercial monopoly* , its Charter was revoked 
in 1899 and its 'rights and administrative functions...
3
were transferred to the Imperial Government' . Accordingly,
'in 1900 the administration of the somewhat indefinite 
area on the Niger which had been under the Royal Niger 
Company was joined to the Niger Coast Protectorate* and 
the whole area was renamed the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria*•5
On the same date (1 January 1900), the remaining territories 
formerly under the control of the Company were constituted
as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (with Sir Frederick
6 7Lugard ) as the first High Commissioner . The vast hinter­
lands were brought under British control by conquest during 
- -
Cited in Odumosu, op cit, pp 7-8.
2
Ibid, p 8 where the criticism of the Company is explained 
more fully.
3 Ibid.
4
The formation of this Protectorate is of course, described 
above.
5
Odumosu, supra, p 8.
c
Lugard was responsible for introducing 'Indirect rule', 
as further explained below, and had a great impact on 
the history of the country.
7
Odumoso, supra, p 9.
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1902 to 1903 and incorporated within the Northern Protect­
orate. ^
Finally, in 1906, 'the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos and
the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were amalgamated to
2
form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.
2.3.5. 1914 ~ The Establishment of the Colony and Protect­
orate of Nigeria
The merger of the Northern and Southern Protectorates into 
the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria (which took place 
in 1914) was- based upon the realisation that 'the total 
isolation of the North from the South could not continue
3
indefinitely'. The North was land-locked and poor, its 
revenues requiring annual supplement from the South (and 
hence the Imperial Treasury) and it was hoped that unific­
ation would relieve the latter from this burden as well as
4
facilitate the development of communications. Accordingly 
North and South were brought together in the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria, which came into being on 1 January 
1914.5
Legislative power was vested in the Legislative Council of 
1
Ibid, See also Sir Alan Burns, History of Nicreria# London, 
1929, Chap. 15.
2
Obilade, op cit. p 24.
3
Odumosu, supra , p 10.
4
Odumosu, op cit# p 10.
5
Ibid. Thus modern Nigeria came into existence as a political 
unit only in the twentieth century, and less than fifty 
years before her attainment of independence in 19 60.
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1 2 Lagos (whose powers were/ however/ confined to the Colony)
and in the Governor who was given power to make laws for
3
the Protectorate. In practice/ however/ laws were jointly
4
rather than separately enacted for both areas. In addition/ 
a body with purely advisory functions/ the Nigeria Council/ 
was established for the whole country in order to canvass 
local opinion.^
Executive power was vested in the Governor and an Executive 
Council - this being the Executive Council previously est-
g
ablished in the Lagos Colony - the jurisdiction of which
7
was now extended to the entire Protectorate.
A three-tier court system was introduced for the country 
as a whole: this comprising the Supreme Court/ the provin-
Q
cial courts and the native courts-.
As explained above/ this was introduced when Lagos again 
became a separate Colony on separation from the Gold Coast
2
This was because it was considered inequitable that a 
Council situated in the South should have power to make 
laws for the remote northern areas of the country/ without 
adequate knowledge of the needs of these regions. See 
NwabuezeV op cit, citing a speech of the Governor-General, 
Sir Frederick Lugard/ to this effect.
3
See Nwabueze/ ibid/ p 45.
4 Ibid , pp 45-46.
5
The Council was composed of 30 members and had an "official" 
majority of 17:13. For further details of its composition 
and powers/ see Nwabueze/ ibid/ pp 46-47 and Odumosu/ supra/ 
p 13.
g
This was introduced in 1866 when Lagos again became a 
separate Colony/ as explained above.
7
See Nwabueze/ supra/ p 47.
p
See Obilade/ op cit/ p 28. The present structure of the 
Nigerian Courts is described below.
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The establishment of the Legislative and Executive Councils 
was significant in that they removed sole legislative and 
executive authority from the Governor. However/ their 
impact/ in practice/ was minimal: as both consisted pre-
i 2
dominantly or exclusively of officials; and the consent 
of either body to measures proposed by the Governor was
3
accordingly a 'mere formality' . The courts in Nigeria
4
were also 'subject to supervision by the Crown' through 
a system of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council.^
2.3.6. 1914 ~ 1920: The Rise of the West African National
Congress ,
Educated Nigerians objected to this undemocratic system and 
voiced their dissatisfaction through the West African 
National Congress/ which (in 1920) petitioned the colonial 
authorities in London for, inter alia, greater African 
participation in government and the strengthening of 
judicial independence.^ Their request was rebuffed/ how­
ever: the prevailing British response perhaps being summar­
ised by Lord Lugard, who objected to the notion of the
1
The composition of the Legislative Council varied from time 
to time, but the majority were always officials. See 
Odomuso, op cit, p 12; Nwabueze, op cit, p 48; and C.O. 
Okonkwo, Introduction to Nigerian Law, London, 1980, p 194.
2
The Executive Council consisted of the Governor and ten 
officials. See Okonkwo, ibid, p 197.
3
NWabueze, supra, p 48. Nwabueze here is concerned with the 
Legislative Council specifically, but the same holds true 
for the Executive Council.
4
See Nwabueze, ibid, p 51.
5
See Nwabueze, ibid. Control wds perhaps even more effectively 
exercised through the fact that those appointed to judicial 
posts were essentially colonial administrators.
6
See Odumosu, supra/ PP ‘14-15.
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'large native population' becoming subjected to the will 
'either of a small European class or of a small minority 
of educated or Europeanised natives who have nothing in 
common with them, and whose interests are often opposed
i
to theirs1.
2.3.7. 1922 - The Clifford Constitution
The efforts of the West African National Congress may not 
have been entirely in vain, however, for 1922 saw the 
abolition of the existing Legislative and Nigerian Councils
and their replacement by a new Legislative Council with
2 3increased unofficial representation and four elected members.
4
Official members still held the majority, however, Member­
ship of the Executive Council remained exclusively official.^
Ibid, pp 15-16.
2
The number of nominated non-officials varied in number from 
13 to 17 (see Nwabueze, supra, p 48). At its inception, 
the number was 15. (See Odumosu, supra, p 23 and Okonkwo, 
supra, p 195). For subsequent slight variations in its 
composition, see Odumosu, ibid, p 25. For further details 
regarding its powers, see also Odumosu, ibid, pp 22-27.
3
Of the four elected members, three were elected from 
Lagos and one from Calabar on a franchise limited to adult 
British subjects or protected persons satisfying certain 
residence and income requirements. 'In the result out 
of an estimated population of 40,000 in Lagos and 10,000 
in Calabar only 3,000 and 1,000 respectively qualified 
to exercise the franchise'. See Nwabueze, supra, p 49, 
citing Wheare, The Nigerian Legislative Council, (1949), 
p 56. For further details regarding the qualifications 
to vote and to stand for election, see Odumosu, supra p 23.
4
The number of officials was 27 (per Odumosu, ibid, p 23?
and Okonkwo, supra, P 195) and 26 per Nwabueze, supra, p 48.
 ^ See Oknokwo, supra, p 197, who gives its composition as
the Governor and nine officials.
For further information regarding the important new Legis­
lative Council, see Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order 
in Council, 1922 (S.R. & O. 1922 No 1466)•
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2.3.8. 19 22 - 1946: The Growth of Nigerian Nationalism
The holding of elections to the Legislative Council in 
Lagos and Calabar fuelled political consciousness and led 
to the emergence of a major political party - the Nigerian 
Democratic Party, which aimed (inter alia) at *Africanis- 
ation of the civil service, educational development in
i
Nigeria and fair treatment for native traders*. Through­
out its long history, the party did not, however, succeed
2
in making its influence felt outside Lagos. Of greater
significance, accordingly, was the formation of the Nigerian
Youth Movement, originally founded in 193^ , concerned
particularly with the encouragement of unity and national
4consciousness amongst Nigerians and vocal on certain
5
economic issues. Although it declined steadily after
1941,, it. had great significance as the *first Nigeria-wide
£
multi-tribal political party in Nigeria*.
Nigerian nationalism was further fostered by the country* S 
participation in the Second World War. This generated 
resentment against government control over the economy, cws wei( qjs
1
Odumosu, op cit, p 29, who gives a relatively full account 
of the party and its significance.
2
Odunvpsu, ibid. He speculates that this may have reflected 
the determination of its founder - Herbert Macauley - to 
keep it under his control.
3
See Odumosu, ibid, p 30.. At its inception, the party was 
called the Lagos Youth Movement.
See Odumosu, ibid, who describes some of the aims reflected 
in its "Nigerian Youth Charter".
5
In particular, the N.Y.M. protested against the "Cocoa Pool" 
monopoly in 1938. See Odumosu, ibid, p 31.
® Odumosu, ibid.
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rapid urbanisation, increased trades-union activity and a 
reservoir of skilled Nigerian ex-servicemen, highly confid
i
ent of their ability to take charge of Nigeria's affairs. 
The war years were also significant for their effect on 
British attitudes to the prolongation of colonial rule; 
and Britain's views were particularly influenced, inter 
alia, by United State's criticism (especially following the 
Atlantic Charter) - and by 'the opposition to Empire 
expressed by the British Labour Party*. ^
These factors, coupled with a perception of the need for
constitutional reform on the part of the war-time Governor of
3Nigeria, Sir Bernard Boudillon, resulted in the adoption 
of the Richards Constitution* in which - for the first 
time in Nigerian history - unofficials held the majority.
2.^,9. 1946 - The Richards Constitution
A new Nigerian Legislative Council was established, with
For further details regarding these factors, see Odumosu, 
ibid/ pp 37-40.
See Odumosu, ibid, pp 33-35.
See Odumosu, ibid, p 41. Bourdillon was concerned at the 
frustration inevitably engendered in the non-official 
members of the Legislative Council by the official majority 
but was also aware of the dangers posed by allowing an 
unofficial majority to become coupled with an 'irremovable' 
executive? for this would represent 'that political 
anathema, power without responsibility*. (Bernard 
Bourdillon/ "Nigeria's New;Constitution"; Hnited Empire# 
March - April, 1946/ p 78/ cited by Odumosu/ p 41).
So called after Sir Arthur Richards, the then Governor 
of Nigeria.
Certain key innovations are described in the text below; 
but, for further information, see Nigeria (Legislative 
Council) Order in Council, 1946 (S.R. & 0. 1946 No 1370).
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i
power to enact laws for the entire country and composed
of the Governor, as President, 16 officials and 28 unofficials
2
(24 nominated and 4 elected ). The Governor/ however, 
reserved 'the power to veto legislation initiated other- 
wise than with his previous approval1•
Regional legislatures were created for the first time in
4 5 6the North, West and East with, broadly speaking , a narrow
7
unofficial majority in each and 18 of the unofficial 
members of the central Legislative Council were nominated
o
by these regional legislatures-. A significant percentage 
of the members of each Regional House of Assembly was
The 1922 Constitution had not changed the position (est­
ablished in 1914 on the amalgamation of North and South) 
whereby the Legislative Council had power to legislate 
for Lagos Colony alone, the Protectorate remaining subject 
to the legislative authority of the Governor as described 
above.
2
Provisions regarding the elected members from Lagos and 
Calabar remained essentially the same, save for a slight 
reduction in the income requirement for the franchise.
See Nwabueze, op cit, p 53.
3
Nwabueze, ibid.
4
The North had two chambers - the House of Chiefs and the 
House of Assembly. For details of its composition, see 
Nwabueze, ibid, and Odomosu, op cit, p 44.
5
The West had a single chamber - the Western House of 
Assembly. For details of its composition, see Nwabueze, 
ibid, and Odomuso, ibid.
 ^ The East had also a single chamber - the Eastern House of 
Assembly. For details of its composition, see also 
Nwabueze, ibid and Odomuso, ibid.
7
For details, see Nwabueze, ibid, p 53. The unofficial 
majority in the Northern House of Assembly was 2; whilst 
in the Western and Eastern Houses it was 1, respectively.
p
See Nwabueze, ibid. 4 were nominated by the House of 
Chiefs from amongst its members; and 5, 4 and 5 respectively 
by the unofficial members of the Northern, Western and 
Eastern Houses of Assembly from among their numbers.
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i
selected by native authorities , pursuant to the ostensible
aim of forging a link between the latter and the central 
Z
legislature. The Regional Councils had no independent
legislative power, but were entitled to make recommendations
regarding proposed enactments, including the annual Approp- 
3
nation Bill .
4
The Executive Council remained as before in composition
and function and 'had no effective connection with the
Legislative Council since none of the unofficial Executive
i 5
Councillors was a member of the Legislative Council.
g
The Richards Constitution was intended to meet three goals: 
first, "to promote the unity of Nigeria" (hence the new
See Odumosu, supra, p 44. In the North, 14-18 members 
of the House of Assembly were selected by native authorities 
from among their own members; in the West, 7-11 were 
selected by native authorities; and in the East, 10-13.
This was out of total unofficial membership of 20-24,
15-19 and 15-18, respectively.
2
See Odumosu, ibid, p 45 who describes this as the 'primary 
aim' of the Regional Assemblies. If the nationalists 
were correct in their contention that the native authorities 
could usually be counted upon to support the Imperial 
government (as described below) the true motive may have 
been somewhat different.
3
See Nwabueze, supra, p 54.
4
See Nwabueze, ibid, p 56.
5
Odumosu, supra, p 48.
g
See the Governor's dispatch to the Secretary of State 
dated December 6, 1944, quoted by Odumosu, op cit, p 43.
-77-
Legislative Council with membership and jurisdiction extended 
to all parts of the country); secondly, "to provide adequat­
ely within that unity for the diverse elements which make 
up the country" (hence the establishment of the Regional 
Assemblies to take account of the wide differences in custom 
and outlook between the North, West and East); and thirdly
"to secure greater participation by Africans in the discuss-
1 2ion .[and management ] of their affairs" - (hence both the
additional fora provided by the Regional Assemblies and 
the introduction of unofficial majorities).
Whether the Constitution succeeded in fulfilling these aims
is a moot point. It was strongly criticised by the newly
3
emergent National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, 
formed in 1944 'to work in unity for the realisation of 
/the/ ultimate goal of self-government within the British
4
Empire' and 'the only country-wide political party at the 
time the Richards Constitution was introduced'. Objection 
was voiced, in particular, to the absence of any form of
g
ministerial responsibility for Nigerians , to the composition
7 ~ “
This word was apparently added to the constitutional
proposals after objection by Nigerian nationalists, notably 
H.O. Davies, that Africans were to be allowed no more than 
to discuss. See Odumosu, ibid, pp 50-51.
2 See Odumosu, ibid, p 43, where these 3 goals are quoted.
 ^ This was commonly known as the N.C.N.C.. It should be
explained that in 1924, part of the Cameroons was entrusted 
to Britain under the League of Nations Trusteeship system 
and was administered as an integral part of Nigeria for 
a considerable time. See Odumosu, ibid, p 27, as well as 
his further references to the fate of this territory - 
examination of which falls outside the scope of this study.
4
See Odumosu, ibid, p 49.
5 Ibid. '
 ^ Ibid, at p 50.
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i
of the unofficial membership (especially "the designation
2
of chiefs as "unofficials"' ), and to the limited provisions
3
for election to the Legislative Council • The N.C.N.C., 
organised a protest tour of the country^ (more successful 
in the East than elsewhere^) and, in 1947, sent a delegation 
to London to demand fundamental constitutional changes.**
Following the appointment of a new Governor (Sir John
7
Macpherson) in 1948 and in response to these nationalist
8
objections, a comprehensive review of existing constitutional
1
The nationalists pointed out how small were the unofficial 
majorities and submitted that, given the number of unofficials 
nominated by the Governor himself, 'government measures 
could always expect a majority support'. See Odumosu, ibid, 
p 51 .
2
'It was contended that since the chiefs and emirs owed their 
positions to the government under the indirect rule system, 
they should be correctly described as "officials'". See 
Odumosu, ibid, p 51 (who explains the "indirect rule" system 
at pp 9 and 11).
3
See Odomasu, ibid, p 52.
4
Protest was voiced not only against the Constitution, but 
also against proposed legislation whereby the government 
sought to declare its title to all Nigerian minerals. For 
further details regarding these Ordinances, see Odumosu, 
ibid, pp 53-54.
5
Thus, notwithstanding its country-wide support, it seems 
that the N.C.N.C. was already becoming identified with the 
East. The significance of this is further examined below, 
but - in essence - it presages the difficulty experienced 
by the three major ethnic groups in submerging their own 
partisan interests in the larger concerns of Nigeria as a 
whole.
c
See Odumosu, supra, p 55.
 ^ See Odumosu, op cit, p 56.
8
The new Governor was, apparently, determined not to repeat 
his predecessor's mistakes and took pains to canvass as 
fully as possible all shades of Nigerian opinion on con­
stitutional reform. See Odumosu, ibid, pp 56-57.
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arrangements was launched. A Select Committee of the
1
Legislative Council was established ; regional recommend-
2 3ations were obtained and submitted to a drafting committee
which prepared a Draft Constitution for consideration by a
4
General Conference , whose recommendations, accompanied by
5
four minority reports , were ultimately approved by the
g
Legislative Council and the Regional Legislatures and 
submitted to the Governor, who, in turn, forwarded them to
7
the Secretary of State. These recommendations, with
8
some modification were accepted by him; and formed the
g
basis for the promulgation of the Macpherson Constitution ; 
which constituted a major advance on the road to represent­
ative and responsible government.
See Odumosu, ibid, p 57.
2 Ibid, pp 57-^8,
3 Ibid, p 58.
4
Ibid, pp 59-62, and pp 64-65.
5 ~Ibid, pp 62-63. Particularly interesting are the minority 
recommendations for the division of Nigeria (not into three 
Regions) but into a number of states based on ethnic group­
ings; and for the introduction of universal (rather than 
male) adult suffrage.
g
See Odumosu, ibid, p 62.
7 Ibid, p 63.
o
These are described below.
9
So called after the then Governor of Nigeria, and adopted 
under the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951,
S.I. No. 1172 of 1951.
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2.3.10. 19.51. - THe„Macpherson gonstitution
One major innovation of this constitution was the intro­
duction of elected majorities in both the regional and the 
central legislatures. With the exception of the Northern
and Western^ Houses of Chiefs (composed primarily, as their
2
name suggests, of chiefs ), representative members (elected
3
on general adult male suffrage under a complex system of
4
direct and indirect elections ) formed large majorities in
5
each of the Regional Houses of Assembly ) as well as in 
the central legislature, now termed the House of Represent­
atives . ®
Federalism was strengthened by giving the regional legis-
7
latures power to legislate on specified subjects but this
o
power was not exclusive and all regional legislation
This was another change, the Western Region having had only 
one chamber in the past.
2
For details of their composition, see Odumosu, supra, p 68.
3
Subject to certain qualifications, such as residence, income, 
and due payment of tax.
4
For details, see Odumosu, supra, pp 66-69 and NWabueze, op 
cit# pp 57-60. The latter summarises the position graphically 
by stating that 'the Nigerian voter was under the 1951 Con­
stitution separated from his legislator by two removes in 
the East, three in the West and five in the North' (p 59) 
and he submits (citing Mackenzie, Free Elections, 19 58, p 47) 
that '/e/lections of this kind... have '‘perhaps more to do 
with political education than with political power"'.
5
For details of their composition, see Odumosu, supra, pp 68-69, 
and Nwabueze, supra, p 57 who points out that the ratio of 
elected to non-elected members in the North was 90:14; in 
the West 80:7; and in the East 80:8.
6 For details of its composition, see Nwabueze, op cit, p 60.
Here the ratio of elected to non-elected members was 136:13.
7 See Odumosu, op cit, p 66, for illustrations.
8 See Odumosu, ibid, who points out that the 'centre could
legislate on all subjects including those on the Regional 
list'. See also his detailed analysis of Regional powers at 
pp 478-81 , on the basis of which he concludes that the 
Macpherson Constitution, despite federal elements, was essen­
tially unitary by virtue of the powers it concentrated at the 
centre.
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required the consent of the central Executive Council before 
it could be sent to the Lieutenant-Governor of that Region 
for his assent.
Some progress towards responsible government was made in 
that the autocratic executive power of the Governor was
2
superceded by Executive Councils (Central and Regional) 
in which representative members (styled Ministers), elected
by secret ballot by the central and regional legislatures
3 ^respectively , held the majority . Furthermore, 'the
appropriate House might also, by resolution supported by
the votes of two-thirds majority of its members taken by
secret ballot, request... /the revocation of] a Minister's
appointment'^ and such request had obligatory effect.^
Executive Council decisions were taken by majority vote, the 
Governor (or Lieutenant-Governor in the case of the Regional
See Odumosu, ibid, p 66.
2
See Nwabueze, supra, p 61.
3
See Nwabueze, ibid. The appointment was formally made by 
the Governor (or Lieutenant-Governor) but required the prior 
approval of the appropriate Assembly by resolution adopted 
by secret ballot.
4
For details of the composition of the various Executive 
Councils, see Nwabueze, ibid. The ratio of officials to 
representative members was 6:9 in the Regions, and 7:12 
at the Centre.
5 Nwabueze, ibid, The 'two-thirds' requirement reflected the 
modification to the General Conference recommendations 
suggested by the Secretary of State. See above, and Odumosu, 
supra, p 64. This provision came into prominence in the 
subsequent Eastern Regions crisis , further described below.
6 See Nwabueze, supra, p 61. Ministers could also be dismissed 
for failing to carry out any policy or decision of their 
Executive Council.
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Executive Councils) having only a casting vote . The
Governor (and Lieutenant-Governors) were in general enjoined
2
to act on the advice of the Executive Councils, but never­
theless enjoyed certain overriding powers to disregard their 
advice if 'expedient in the interests of public order/
3
public faith and good government*.
1951 was significant not only for the introduction of this 
constitution/ but also because it marked the birth and the 
resurgence of two^political parties which - together with 
the N.C.N.C., (previously discussed above) - were to play 
a dominant role in Nigerian politics and whose rivalry was
5
to tear the country apart in the years following independence.
The first was the Action Group (A.G.) which was founded in 
19 51 *with the specific objective of capturing power in the 
Western Region under the electoral system of the new Con-
c
stitution* . It was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo (a Yoruba)
and its aims included the strengthening of 'ethnical organ-
isations in the Western Region' and the exploration of
possibilities for co-operation with other nationalists so
as to 'work as a united team towards the realisation of 
-
See Nwabueze, ibid.
2 Ibid, p 62.
3 Nwabueze, op cit, p 64. It should, be noted, however that 
this was only one of a number of limitations on the powers 
of the legislative and executive councils. For further details 
regarding these, see Nwabueze, ibid, pp 62-65.
4 See Odomuso, op cit, p 67; also the text seq.
 ^ This was particularly evident in the 1962 Western Region crisis 
as well as in the elections of 1964 and 1965 as further 
explained below.
g
Odumosu, supra, p 66. 
 ^ Ibid.
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i
immediate self-government for Nigeria1 . Notwithstanding 
the latter goal, however, the A.G's election campaign 'was 
hostile to Dr. Azikiwe (an Ibo) /and/... emphasised the
2
threat of Ibo domination under a unitary system of government'.
The second party was the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.) 
which had been formed in 1949 '"to save the North for the 
Northerners"'j and in response to fears of domination by 
the more developed South. It became moribund to some extent 
after its formation, but - following the surprise victory 
of a rival radical party in the earlier part of the election
of 1951 - the N.P.C. was 'hastily revived to fight the
3 4elections'? and succeeded in winning all the seats.
The elections in the Western Region were won by the A.G.
(with the N.C.N.C. in opposition); and those in the East 
by the N.C.N.C. (which faced a 'rather weak opposition made
5
up of the eight members of the United National Party' ) •
These results marked the beginning of party politics dominated 
by ethnic and regional rivalries. The N.P.C. reflected 
the conservative Hausa, the A.G. the Yoruba and the N.C.N.C. 
the Ibo - and all had great difficulty in putting traditional 
differences behind them in the interests of Nigerian unity.
 ^ Ibid.
2 Ibid, p 67.
3 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid, p 70.
5
Ibid. This party lacked the stature of the 'Big Three'.
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The dangers of this division became increasingly apparent 
in the years before &hd after independence. The crisis
i
in the Eastern Region in 1953 in which Ministers elected
by the N.C.N.C. majority in the Eastern House of Assembly
2
lost the confidence of the House but refused to resign 
cast a shadow over the operation of the 1951 Constitution. 
The position was exacerbated by a motion tabled in the 
House of Representatives in March 1953, calling for "self-
3
government in 1956" - a proposal bitterly resented by
Northern representatives who feared that early independence 
would lock the North into perpetual subordination to the 
more developed South. Riots in Kano increased North-South
4
tension and the Colonial Secretary thereupon reported to 
the House of Commons that 'Her Majesty's Government... 
consider that the /Nigerian/ Constitution will have to be 
redrawn to provide for greater regional autonomy and for 
the removal of powers of intervention by the Centre in 
matters which can, without detriment to other Regions, be
5
placed entirely within regional competence*.
For a full account of this, see Odomuso, q p cit, pp 82-88; 
and for its general outline, see Nwabueze, ibid/ pp 62-63.
Thus earning for themselves the name 'the sit-tight Ministers' 
(see Nwabueze, ibid, p 63)« The Lieutenant-Governor refused 
to dismiss them on the motion of 'no confidence' passed in 
the Eastern House of Assembly by 60 votes to 13, as voting 
had not been by secret ballot as required by the Constitution, 
but by a show of hands. The N.C.N.C. members of the Assembly 
retaliated by using its majority to defeat every government 
measure introduced in the House, with the result that the 
Lieutenant-Governor was eventually compelled to use his 
residuary legislative powers to enact the Appropriation Bill. 
See Odomuso and Nwabueze, ibid.
For a full account of this crisis 'at the Centre', see 
Odumosu, ibid, pp 88-90.
See Odumosu, ibid, p 90.
House of Commons Debates, Vol. 515, cols, 2263-2264 (May 
1953), (cited by Odumosu, ibid, p 91).
-85-
A Constitutional Conference was accordingly convened in
1 2 London in 1953 and continued its deliberations in Lagos ?
and the result of this was the enactment of a new constit-
3
ution m  1954 .
2.3.11. 1.95A ~ The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria
The major innovation of this constitution was the increase 
in regional powers/ in accordance with the policy announced
4
by the Colonial Secretary. Regional legislation no longer
5
required the approval of the central executive; and 
residual legislative powers were conferred on the Regional 
Assemblies.^. Certain matters, however, (reflected in the 
Exclusive List ) were placed under the exclusive law-making 
competence of the central legislature of the Federation/ 
whilst others were reserved for the concurrent jurisdiction 
of both regional and federal legislatures, subject to the 
condition that - in the event of conflict - the latter
Q
should prevail-. In line with the increased responsibilities
assigned to the Regions, Lieutenant-Governors were re-styled 
- “
For a full account of the deliberations of the London Con­
ference, see Odumosu, ibid, pp 92-101.
2 — —
For a review of the Lagos Conference, see Odumosu, ibid,
pp 102-108. — ~
3
This was contained in the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in 
Council, 1954, S.I. No. 1146 of 1954.
4
As reflected in the text above.
5
See Odumosu, ibid, p 95.
6 — —
See Odumosu, op cit, p 95.
7
See Part I of First Schedule to the 1954 Order in Council, supra
8 These matters were reflected in the Concurrent List, as to 
which see Part II of the First Schedule, .Ibid. Federal supre­
macy in the event of a conflict was provided by s 58, ibid.
.9 These increased powers, of course, had the effect of convert­
ing Nigeria into a true federation, in which the units enjoy 
certain powers to the exclusion of the centre. See Odumosu, 
supra, p 81; and compare the power of the Regions in 1954 
with that conferred on them by the 1951 Constitution.
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'Governors*, with a Governor-General for the whole Federation.^
The number of elected members to the central legislature
2
was increased to 184 and ex-officio members were reduced
3
to three . All official members were withdrawn from the
4
Eastern and Western Houses of Assembly . Separate elections
5
to the federal and regional legislatures were provided for.
The number of official members of the regional and federal
g
executive councils was also reduced/ but the major inno­
vation in this sphere lay in the further progress made 
towards responsible government. Provision was made 1 for 
the appointment in the Regions of an elected Minister as 
Chief Minister with the title of Prenier /'and/ /'t/he Governor 
was to appoint as Premier a member of the House of Assembly 
who appeared to him to be the leader of the party command-
7
ing a majority in that House* . Once appointed, the Premier 
could be removed by the Governor 'only if it appeared that
g
he no longer enjoyed the confidence of that majority.'*
* Central Ministers were to be appointed from the body of
See Odumosu, ibid, p 95.
See Odumosu, ibid. Recommendations for a bicameral federal 
legislature were rejected at this stage, as explained by 
Odumosu.
These were the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and 
the Attorney-General: see Odumosu, ibid, p 96.
See Nwabueze, op cit, p 66.
See Odumosu, supra, p 96.
See Nwabueze, supra , p 69. All official members disappeared 
in the West and East, while a limited number were retained 
in the North and at the Centre.
Nwabueze, ibid, p 70.
Ibid.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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the Federal legislature by the Governor-General . on 
the recommendation of the leader in that House of a party
i
having an overall majority1 and ’confirmation by affirm-
2
ative vote of the legislature was dispensed with*. In 
addition, Ministers were given 'direct and general control 
over departments within their portfolios,... at /both/ the 
centre /and/... in the Regions^
Nigeria was still far from independence, however, as a number 
of reserve and discretionary powers were retained by the
4
Governor-General and Regional Governors.
In the Federal elections under the 1954 Constitution, the 
N.C.N.C., attained a majority in both Eastern and Western
5
Regional Assemblies. In the North, the N.P.C. won an over­
whelming majority and since fifty percent of seats in the 
central House were allocated to the Northern Region^, it 
thus, by sheer numbers, controlled the House of Representatives.
Odumosu, op cit, p 96. In the absence of such a party, 
the appointment was to be made 'on the recommendation of 
the leader in that House of the majority party in the 
House from each Region'.
2
Odumosu, ibid.
3
Odumosu, ibid, pp 96-97. This was a significant advance 
from their previous position in which they had merely 
enjoyed authority over certain matters but were unable to 
control civil service department heads. See Odumosu, ibid, p
4
See Odumosu, ibid, pp 99-101.
5 Ibid, p 108.
6 "
See Odumosu, pp 58, 61 and 65. During the review preceding 
the adoption of the Macpherson Constitution, the North had 
insisted on parity of representation (at the centre) with 
the West and East; and in the face of total Northern intrans­
igence on the point, the Legislative Council (on 16 September 
1950) had accepted this.
7
82.
7 See Odumosu, ibid, p 108.
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The N.P.C. and N.C.N.C. formed a coalition government ,
reflecting less a unity of viewpoint than a determination to
2
neutralise Lagos and ’for the first time a Parliamentary
3
Opposition appeared in the Federal House1 , this comprising
4
the A.G. and the few U.N.I.P. members .
5
In response to continued pressure for full independence, a 
further Constitutional Conference was convened in London 
in 1957, at which further important advances towards self- 
government were made.^
2.3.12. 1957 - Full Internal Self-Government in the Wgst and
East
The London Conference of 1957 recommended a fundamental change 
in the structure of the federal legislature, through the
Thus resolving the difficult question (on which the 19 54 
Constitution provided little guidance) as to whether the 
N.C.N.C. could nominate central Ministers in a House 
controlled by the N.P.C. The agreement reached was that 
the N.P.C. would nominate three, and the N.C.N.C. six, 
(three from the West and three from the East).
2
See Odumosu, ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5
This culminated in a motion, unanimously passed, by the 
Federal House, calling for independence for Nigeria by 
1959. This motion was passed on 26 March, 1957 - at which 
point, preparations for the next constitutional conference 
were already well under way.
These were reflected in the Nigeria (Constitution) (Amend­
ment) Order in Council, 1957, S.I. No. 1363 of 1957.
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introduction of a second chamber, the Senate , with power
to delay the passing of Bills (other than money Bills)
2
by a maximum of six months. The membership of the House
3
of Representatives was increased to 320 , with universal 
adult suffrage in the West and East, and the continuation
4
of male suffrage only in the North .
The office of Prime Minister of the Federation was created, 
the Governor-General being empowered to appoint to this post 
'the person who appeared to him to command a majority in
5
the House of Representatives'. Ministers were to hold office 
at the discretion of the Prime Minister and automatically 
vacated their posts on his resignation.^ The Governor- 
General continued to preside over the central Executive 
Council and remained responsible for defence and the conduct 
of any external relations entrusted to Nigeria by the United
7
Kingdom.
See Odumosu, op cit, p 116. The London Conference also 
recommended the creation of an Upper House in the Eastern 
Region, notwithstanding the difficulties entailed - 
especially the absence of traditional chiefs in the area. 
See Odumosu, ibid, pp 114-115.
2
See Odumosu, ibid, p 117.
3 Ibid.
4
Ibid. For further details of changes in franchise require­
ments over the years, see Nwabueze, op_cit, pp 66-68.
5
See Odumosu, supra, p 118.
 ^ Ibid. The three former official members (as d<£jscribed
above) thus no longer sat in the central Executive Council.
7
Ibid. For further details regarding the powers reserved 
to the Governor-General from 1954 to independence, see 
Nwabueze, supra, pp 70-76.
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Internal self-government was conferred on the Eastern 
and Western Regions in 1957 - the North preferring to wait
i
in this regard until 19 59 . In response to a demand for
2the creation of more states (prompted by minority fears 
of oppression by the majorities in each of the Regions) 
a Commission of Inquiry was established to examine minority 
fears and recommend appropriate safeguards.
Alhadji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was appointed to the office 
of Prime Minister*; and he, in August 1957, was responsible 
for the formation of a National Government, aimed at leading 
the country to independence by April 1960^'
2.3.13. 1958 A Further Constitutional Conference and the 
Minorities Commission Report
A number of important decisions were taken at the 19 58 
Constitutional Conference. The Northern Region was to
7
attain full internal self-government in March 1959 ; elaborate 
provisions for changing regional boundaries and creating
See Odumosu, supra.
2 Ibid, p 115.
3
Only as a last resort, however, was the creation of new 
states to be recommended. See Odumosu, op cit p 115-116.
The Commission's terms of reference and its recommendations 
are discussed in further detail below. These were 
of vital importance for the introduction of the Bill of 
Rights with its guarantee of freedom of expression.
* See Odumosu, ibid, p 122.
** See Odumosu, ibid. Since the two main political parties 
were already in coalition, (as explained above), the only 
party to be brought in was the Action Group.
 ^ See Odumosu, ibid. This date had been suggested by the 
Nigerian delegation to the 1957 Constitutional Conference.
See, ibid, p 119.
7 See Odumosu, ibid, p 124. This reflected a considerable change 
of heart on the part of the Northern leaders, who apparently
feared their conservative stance might result in loss of 
support for the N.P.C.
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i
new regions were formulated ; the composition of the Eastern
2
House of Chiefs was agreed ; rules for constitutional amend-
3
ment after independence were devised and it was accepted 
by the Colonial Secretary, on behalf of Her Majesty's Govern­
ment, that Nigeria should attain full independence on 1 
October I960.4
5
The Minorities Commission reported the extent of minority 
fears of possible oppression following independence and 
recommended, inter alia, the adoption of a comprehensive
g
Bill of Rights to protect all individuals. It considered
7
the creation of new states unwarranted. Some Nigerian 
delegates were unwilling to accept the latter view; and 
the Colonial Secretary warned that the creation of new
o
states would inevitably delay the grant of independence ,
1
These complex provisions are described in detail by 
Odumosu, ibid, pp 127-128. They were designed to ensure 
maximum agreement for the creation of new regions, 
especially by those in the area concerned.
2
See Odumosu, ibid, pp 129-130.
3 Ibid/ P 130.
4 Ibid, pp 131-132.
5
Report of the Minorities Commission, Cmnd. 505, 1958.
 ^ Modelled on the European Convention of Human Rights, 1950.
7
This is hardly surprising, given its terms of reference, 
as further explained in the section on the Bill of Rights 
below.
o
See Odumosu, supra, p 126. The final decision reached - 
to incorporate a Bill of Rights - is discussed further below. 
This development is of great significance for this study, 
as the Bill of Rights contains a guarantee of freedom of 
expression which has important ramifications for the laws 
in Nigeria governing media freedom.
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2.3.14. 1959 - The Adoption of a Bill of Rights and Miscella­
neous Other Developments
The Northern Region achieved full internal self-government
i
on 15 March 1959 ; a Bill of Rights was incorporated within
the Constitution, pursuant to the Minorities Commission
2 3Report ; and Federal elections (to choose a government
4
for the next five years ) were held in December 1959. No 
single party obtained a majority; and the N.P.C. and N.C.N.C. 
formed a coalition government, with the A.G. in official 
opposition.^
2.3.15. 1960 - The Attainment of Independence
Following a final Constitutional Conference in London in 
May 1960, Nigeria attained independence on 1 October 1960,
c
by virtue of the Nigeria Independence Act of 1960 . The 
independence constitution (under which Her Majesty remained 
Head of State, but was represented by a Governor-General) 
was contained in the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 
1960 . The country also became a member of the Commonwealth.
1
See Odumoso, op cit , p 124.
2
See p 9] above. The vital Bill of Rights is discussed 
further at p 170 below.
3
This was to the enlarged House of Representatives. See 
Odumosu, supra, p 132. (The Ser^e had been created in 1958).
4
The last federal elections had thus been held in 1954; and 
the next were scheduled for 1964.
5
See Odumosu, ibid, p 132.
6 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c 55.
7
S.I. No. 1652 of 1960. For details of the provisions of
the Constitution (other than Chapter III/ on Fundamental
Rights, discussed below), see Nwabueze/ op cit, especially 
Chapters Four to Eight; and Odumosu, supra,/ especially
Chapters Four to Six.
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2.3.16* 1962 - The Western Region Crisis
Following the election of Chief Awolowo (the leader of the
A.G.) to the federal legislature in 1959 , his deputy within
the party - Chief Akintola - became premier in the Western.
2
Region. Subsequently/ however/ Chief Akintola was deposed 
from the deputy leadership of the party; and 66 A.G. members 
of the Western House of Assembly then wrote to the Regional 
Governor stating that they had lost confidence in Chief
Akintola and asking the governor to remove him from the
3 4premiership. The governor did so and appointed Chief
Adegbenro (the new deputy leader of the A.G.) as premier
in his place. Chief Akintola refused to accept his dismissal
and took up his normal place in the House of Assembly when
5
it convened to approve the new government. An uproar 
ensued in the House/ which was ultimately cleared and locked
g
by the police. The federal government thereupon declared
See B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States/ 
London, 1973/ p 133.
3 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4
The Governor was the Oni of Ife, and had previously attempted 
to effect a reconciliation between the two factions. See 
Odumosu, op cit, p 277. It is suggested by Odumosu, (see 
p 304) that to some extent his position as a leading Yoruba 
Oba was incompatible with his role as Governor and led 
him to assume too active an involvement in these internal 
party differences.
5
See Odumosu, ibid, p 278. It should be noted that there 
was some doubt as to the legitimacy of the Governor's action 
under section 33(10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria 
(under which the Governor had purported to dismiss him) as 
it was contended that a motion of no confidence should have 
been passed on the floor of the House in order to show that 
he 'no longer command/ed/ the support of a majority of the 
members of the House of Assembly1. Ultimately, however, 
the legitimacy of the dismissal was confirmed by the Privy 
Council: see Adegbenro v Akintola and another /1966/ 3 W.L.R.63.
6 See Nwabueze, op cit, above, p 133.
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a state of emergency in the Western Region and assumed
i
administration of the area under emergency powers. This
2
sequence of events - though constitutionally legitimate 
had profound repercussions on the future of Nigeria; for 
'/i/t... opened the region to the floodgates of political 
unrest and violence/ which culminated in the debacle of 
1965-66'.3
After the Federal Government took control/'immense defal­
cations of regional revenues into party funds and private 
hands were revealed. Awolowo was tried for treason add 
imprisoned with Erirahoro (the celebrated fugitive offender) , 
and his rival restored to power in alliance with the 
northern party in a bitterly divided region.1 See Perham, 
op cit/ p 5.
2
The Privy Council (overturning the prior decision of the 
Nigerian Supreme COurt) held that the Governor did have 
power to dismiss Chief Akintola in the circumstances: 
see Adegbenro" v Akintola and another/ supra/ and the 
Nigerian Supreme Court- indicated/ whilst not expressly 
ruling on the point/ in Williams v Mai ekodunmi, /1962/ 1 
All- N.L.R. 324 and Adegbenro v The Prime Minister and 
Attorney-General (5f the F&deration /1962/ 2 all N.L.R. 338, 
that the declaration of emergency was indeed constitutional 
and that the need for such a declaration was a matter 
for Parliament/ not the courts/ to decide. See Elias/ 
Nigeria: Development of its Laws and Constition, suprar 
p 287.
3 Nwabueze, supra/ p 133. For a full account of the crisis, 
see Odumosu, supra. Chapter Nine. See algo Nwabueze, 
supra , pp 132-133, who suggests that the federal govern­
ment used the internal party dissension as a convenient 
excuse for breaking the- power of the A.G. which had been 
vigorously campaigning for the creation of more states 
(particularly a Middle Belt State in Tivland and a new 
state in the East) which - if brought into being - would 
have threatened 'Northern hegemony'.
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2.3.17. 1963 - Transition to Republican Status
On the third anniversary of Nigeria*s independence# the link 
with the British monarchy was severed and Nigeria became
i 2
a republic/ but remained a member of the Commonwealth •
The constitutional changes effected were minimal/ the fun­
ctions previously exercisable by the Queen (through the 
Governor-General) devolving instead upon a new titular
3
head of state - the President. In addition/ judicial
4
service commissions were abolished and so too was the right
5
of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
A further important change effected in 1963 was the creation
g
of the Mid-Western Region out of the Western Region/ pursuant 
to pressure which had been mounting in this regard since 
1955.7
See Nwabueze/ Constitutional Law of the Nigerian Republic/ 
supra# p 85 ; and Nigeria Republic Act, 1963 (1963 c. 57) .
2 Ibid/ p 96.
3
For details of these changes# see Nwabueze# ibid# pp 85-89.
4
The significance of these Commissions is discussed further 
below# in relation to the independence 6f the judiciary# 
in the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights below.
 ^ This is discussed further in relation to the Sources of 
Nigerian Law# below.
g
See Nwabueze# supra# p 130. For a discussion of the diff­
iculties attendant upon its formation# see NWabueze, ibid# 
pp 429-434.
7
See Nwabueze# ibid# p 130. *A motion for the creation of 
the state had in June 1955 been passed unanimously by the 
Western House of Assembly and in 1961 by the Federal House 
of Representatives*. The underlying reason-is further 
explained by L.S. Wiseberg# 'Humanitarian Intervention: 
Lessons from the Nigerian Civil War'# (1974) 7 Revue des 
Droits de L*Homme, pp 61-98# at p 63# on the basis that 
'The Yoruba# weakened by inter-regional conflict# were 
unable to resist the demands of their Edo minority for their 
own state'. He further points out that 'with a large Igbo 
population and the NCNC in power# the Mid-West was# in many 
respects# a protege of the East*.
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2.3.18. 1964 - 1965; Federal and Western Region Elections
The first federal elections since independence and the
subsequent Western Region elections were characterised by
electoral malpractices of a proportion 'perhaps unequalled
anywhere else in the world' • The stage for this had been
2
set partly by the 1962 census controversy/ partly by the
3
earlier Western Region crisis ? and primarily/ perhaps/ 
by the factor underlying both these events: the North-South 
rivalry which had bedevilled the country since its creation. 
The elections were contested by two alliances - the N.N.A.^ 
and U.P.G.A.'*. The latter complained that it was precluded
g
from campaigning in the North and therefore boycotted 
the elections? and this resulted in an overwhelming victory 
for the N.P.C. in the North and for its ally/ the N.N.D.P.
7
in the West. The U.P.G.A. was then persuaded/ 'to accept 
a further opportunity to vote early in 1965/ which gave them
o
about half the number of seats held by their opponents'-.
Nwabueze/ Constitutionalism in the Emergent States/ supra# p 148
 ^ See Perham/ op_jcit, p 5/ who explains that/ shortly after 
independence/ it became 'dangerously clear that control of 
the federal centre and its finances would fall to the... 
region with the majority of members;' and that 'the census 
of 1962 not only recorded a population of 55.6 millions (a-n 
astonishing advance on the 30.4 millions of the 1953 census)# 
but placed 29.8 of these in the north# thus endowing it with 
a built-in majority over the other regions.' The Eastern and 
Mid-Western Regions rejected the result# whilst the Western 
Region became split - Chief Akintola's party joining the north 
in the N.N.A. as described below# and the remaining Yoruba 
joining the N.C.N.C.
3 See p 93 above.
4 The Nigerian National Alliance# comprising the N.P.C. and 
Chief Akintola's N.N.D.P.
5 The United Progressive Grand Alliance# comprising the N.C.N.C. 
and the A.G.
6 Thus# permits for campaign meetings were refused# the party 
was precluded from filing nomination papers for candidates
and its members subjected to general harassment and persecution. 
For further details# see Nwabueze# supra# pp 148-149.
7 See Nwabueze# ibid.
8 Perham, op cit, p 5.
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The Western Region elections of 1965 were marred by electoral
malpractices even more brazen. The regional premier/
Chief Akintola/ had declared his determination that his
party would be returned to power 'whether the people voted
2
for them or not' and the election "results" reflected 
this. '/T/he people of Western Nigeria /rebelled/... and
3
launched a regime of violence and arson' that continued 
until the military coup.
2.3.19. 1966 - The Beginning of Military Rule
A group of army officers decided that the only solution 
lay in military intervention. A coup d'etat was initiated
4
on 15 January 1966 in which the Prime Minister/ amongst
5
others was murdered / and the 'remaining Federal Ministers
g
handed their powers to the senior soldier/ the Ibo General 
7Ironsi' who formed the first military administration under
1
Again/ opposition candidates were precluded from filing 
nomination papers,? there was a wholesale 'trafficking in 
ballot papers? and election results were blatantly subverted 
by the government-controlled radio. For full details/ 
see Nwabueze/ supra/ pp 149-150.
2 Nwabueze/ ibid/ p150.
3 Ibid.
4
See Perham/ supra/ p 6.
3 Those killed/ in addition to the Prime Minister (Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa), were the finance minister/ Chief Akintola/ 
and the premier of the North/ the Sardauna of Sokoto.
c
The legitimacy of this 'transfer' became a matter of consi­
derable controversy/ following the Lakanmi case, discussed below
7
Perham/ op cit/ p 6. For a more detailed account/ see 
Nwabueze/ A Constitutional History of Nigeria/ London/
1982/ pp 161-162 and p 169.
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i
a significantly amended Constitution . Although the initial
public reaction to the coup was generally one of relief/
suspicion soon began to grow that it reflected Ibo determin-
2
ation to dominate the remainder ; and when - in May 1966 -
3
Ironsi announced the dissolution of the regions in favour 
of a unitary state (in which/ it was feared/ the sophisticated
4
Ibos would quickly gain the ascendancy ) a further coup was
5
launched by northern soldiers. Ironsi was murdered/ together 
with a number of others0on 29 July 1966; and 'after some
7
confusion the young Chief of Staff/ Colonel Gowon/ took over'.
2.3.20. 1967 - The Outbreak of Civil War
Although Gowon repealed the decree establishing a unitary 
a
Nigeria0 and called a 'meeting of notables from all regions
This was effected under the Constitution (Suspension and 
Modification) Decree No 1 of 1966. These, and other Constit­
utional decrees (with the exception of those affecting the 
regional/state structure/ discussed below) are discussed 
further below in relation to the Lakanmi case,decided in 
1970; and in the context of the Nigerian Bill of Rights.
2 See Perham/ supra# p 6.
3
This was effected in Decree No. 34 of 1966.
4
See Perham/ supra.
5 Ibid.
6 "
Including the military governor of the Western Region and 
a number of Ibo officers.
7
Perham/ supra/ p 6. Perham points out he reflected some­
thing of a compromise choice/ for '/h/e had the advantage 
not only of a good reputation/ but/ as a northerner who 
yet came from a Middle Belt tribe, and was also a Christian, 
he seemed to bridge the fissures which had split Nigeria'.
o
See the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (No•9) 
Decree, no 59 of 1966.
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to discuss the future of /the country/ 1, Northern fear and
anger against the Ibo had already been aroused; and this
resulted in a wave of violence against the Ibo in which
thousands were massacred and millions streamed back to the 
2
East. The governor of the Eastern Region 'became convinced 
that Gowon was either unable or unwilling to safeguard
3
Eastern life and property throughout the Federation* and 
demanded greater regional autonomy. The meeting of the 
two leaders at Aburi in January 1967 produced little satis-
4
faction. . Gowon pressed on with his solution - the splitting
5
of the three Regions into 12 states - which 1 the Igbo 
elite viewed... as a ploy to undermine the power of the
g
Igbo and the unity of the Eastern Region' On 30 May 1967 
the East seceded from Nigeria as the independent Republic of
See Perham, supra, p 7.
2
See Perham/ ibid/ pp 6-7 and Wiseberg, op cit, p 64.
3
Wiseberg, ibid. He points out that the 'last of these 
pogroms (in which soldiers played a part) occurred in 
October 1966/ at a time when Gowon was already in power.'
4
See P’erham, supra, pp 7-8/ who points out the Ojukwu/ 
particularly, felt that Gowon had not kept his word.
5
See the States (Creation and Transitional Provisions)
Act, No 14 of 1967.g
Wiseberg, op cit, p 65. Wiseberg points out that by 
splitting the Eastern Region into three states, not only 
was ‘political power weighted in favour of /the minorities 
in the Region/ - but so too were the economic spoils.
The East Central State (Igboland) got none of the oil- 
rich areas; it was cut off from access to the sea; and 
both the Igbo town of Port Harcourt (with Nigeria's 
main oil refinery) and the oil terminal at Bonny, went 
to Rivers state*.
The division of Nigeria into twelve states at this point 
in time is reflected in Map B, Appendix I.
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1
Biafra, and the civil war began.
2.3.21. 1970 - The End of the Civil War and the Promise
of Return to Civilian Government; the 'Lakanmi' Case and 
Decree No. 28 of 1970•
The Biafran rebellion ended in January 1970/ and a general
2
amnesty - with certain exceptions - was granted to the
3
rebels by the Federal Military Government • The Federal 
Military Government also 'produced a time-table for a return
4
to civilian rule by 1976 but with no clear indication as 
to what 'constitutional arrangements /could/ be made to 
ensure political unity once the artificial supervision of 
the military /was/ withdrawn.'
The secession was effected by Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu 
Ojukwu/ 'acting on a mandate given to him three days before 
by a joint resolution of the consultative assembly for the 
region and the advisory council of chiefs and elders'.
See Nwabueze/ A Constitutional History of Nigeria/ supra/ 
p 179. FOr further details regarding the conduct of the 
civil war, see /1968-69/, /1969-70// and /1970-71/ Africa 
Contemporary Record; and see also Perhamr op cit/ pp 9-12/ 
and Wiseberg/ p 65 et seg. For analysis of the legal 
implications of the attempted secession/ see Nwabueze/ 
ibid/ Chapter Eight and see also Nwabueze/ Constitutionalism 
in the Emergent States/ supra/ Chapter Nine.
A Thus Ojukwu/ for example/ was sent into exile - and remained 
so for twelve years until his return to Nigeria in 1982.
3
See Nwabueze/ A Constitutional History of Nigeria/ supra,/
p 200.
4
/1970-71/ Africa Contemporary Record/ p B 411.
 ^ Ibid.
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1 2 In the Lakanmi case (discussed further below in relation
to the constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights),
the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the federal military
government had come to power - under the 1963 Constitution
- and on the basis of necessity generated by the events of
3
15 January 1966 ; and that its powers to amend the Constit­
ution were accordingly limited to those 'that could properly
4
be justified by the doctrine of necessity*. The Federal 
Military Government responded by the promulgation of the 
Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of
5
Powers) Decree 1970 which nullified the Lakanmi judgement 
and declared that the military authorities had assumed
g
power by revolutions which 'effectively abrogated the 
whole pre-existing legal order in Nigeria except /as/... 
preserved under the Constitution (Suspension and Modific-
7
ation) Decree 1966... and established a new government known 
as the 'Federal Military Government' with absolute powers 
to make laws for the peace/ order and good government of 
Nigeria-' ® •
1
Lakanmi v Attorney-General (West), SC 58/69 of 24 April 1970.
2
See pl73 below/ where the effect of the military take­
over on the guarantees of fundamental rights is reviewed.
3
This/ of course/ is the date of the first military coup/ 
described above.
4
Nwabueze/ A .Constitutional History of Nigeria# supra/ p 172.
5 No. 28 of 1970.g
That is/ those of 15 January 1966 and 29 July 1966.
 ^ Decree No. 1 of 1966.
o
Preamble/ Decree No. 28 of 1970. 'By s 1/ this recital 
was declared to be part of the decree*. See Nwabueze/ op 
cit/ p 175. The significance of this Decree is considered 
further below/ in relation to the guarantees of fundamental 
rights and the effect - on these - of military rule.
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2.3.22. 1975 - A Further Coup and the Appointment of the
Constitution Drafting Committee
i
In an Independence Anniversary Broadcast on 1 October
1974/ General Gowon had announced an indefinite postpone- 
Z
ment of the return to civilian rule/ which had previously 
been promised for 1976. Dismay at this, coupled with doubts 
as to Gowon's capacity to solve Nigeria's economic problems 
or to eradicate corruption/ (together with resentment of
3
his increasing inaccessibility ) resulted in a bloodless
4
coup on 29 July 1975 in which Brigadier Murtala Muhammed
5
succeeded Gowon as Chief of the Supreme Military Council 
and Head of State.
For the text of important excerpts from this broadcast/ 
see /1974-75y Africa Contemporary Record/ pp C 82-84.
Gowon stressed that this did not mean that the military 
government had abandoned the idea of returning to civil­
ian rule/ but gave no indication as to when this would 
be effected. All he stated was that a panel to draft 
a new constitution would be appointed'in due course'.
See p C 84/ supra. He also emphasised that the reason 
for the postponement was that Nigeria had not yet achieved 
sufficient stability; and that there was reason to fear 
that the return of civilian rule in 1976 would usher in 
'the old cut-throat politics that once led /Nigeria/ into 
serious crisis.
See /"1975-76J Africa Contemporary Record/ p B 782. As 
regards the last factor/ it seems that Gowon/ had 'ceased 
to consult his - colleagues or to heed advice from his 
countrymen/ however eminent'.
See /1975-76y Africa Contemporary Record/ p B 781.. The 
coup occurred whilst Gowon was leading Nigeria's delega­
tion at the O.A.U. summit in Kampala.
For further information regarding the composition and 
powers of this Council/ see Nwabueze/ supra/ p 226.
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1 2 On 1 October 1975 , Muhammed announced a five-stage plan
for the return to civilian government by 19 79. Pursuant
to this proposal, he appointed a Constitution Drafting 
3
Committee which - within the framework of certain guide-
4
lines - was to prepare (by September 19 76) a draft 
Constitution for further consideration by an especially
5
formed Constituent Assembly .
This was in the course of the 15th Independence Anniver­
sary Broadcast. See /19 75-76/ Africa Contemporary Record, 
p B789.
The first stage would be the creation of new states and 
the preparation of a draft constitution; the second would 
be the reorganisation of local government and the holding 
of local elections (in which candidates would be judged 
on personal merit, without regard to party politics), and 
the formation of a Constituent Assembly (partly elected - 
through the local government elections - and partly nom-r 
inated) to draw up a constitution; and the third stage 
would be the lifting of the ban on party politics; and 
State and Federal elections would form the fourth and 
fifth stages. See /1975-76./, Africa Contemporary Record, 
supra.
This comprised fifty members - two appointed from each 
state and the rest chosen for their knowledge of history, 
law, economics and political science. Its chairman was 
Chief Rotimi Williams.
See /1975-76/ Africa Contemporary Record, pp B789 - 791. 
For example, the Committee was urged to consider ways of 
promoting consensus decision-making, 1depoliticizing* the 
importance of the census, limiting the number of political 
parties (or abolishing them altogether), and to examine 
the possibilities of establishing a presidential system 
of government which would reflect the country*s federal 
character and stress the principle of accountability to 
the people. See also James S. Read, *The New Constitu­
tion of Nigeria, 19 79: "The Washington Model"?, supra, 
pp 134 - 135. The work of the Committee is discussed 
further below.
See n 2 above, and the further discussion of the Con­
stituent Assembly below, in the context of Nigeria's 
legal system and new Constitution.
-104-
2.3.23. 1976 - An Attempted Coup; The Creation of Seven
New States; and the Report of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee
General Murtala Muhammed was assassinated on 13 February
1976 in an abortive coup and was succeeded by Lieutenant-
General Olusegun Obasanjo. The country 'recovered sur-
2
prisingly quickly from this crisis' and the Federal 
Military Government pressed on with its five-point plan 
for the return to civilian rule. Shortly before the 
abortive coup, it created seven new states, raising the
3
total to nineteen , but resisted pressure for the creation 
of more. In August 1976, it 'announced sweeping local
4
government reforms' involving the establishment of Local 
Government Councils with responsibility, inter alia, for
See /"I975-76/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 783. The 
attempted coup was over within two hours. Its leaders 
(General Bisalla and Colonel Dimka) together with 38 
other officers and civilians were publicly executed after 
having been convicted in secret by a military tribunal.
See Africa Contemporary Record, ibid, pp B 784-785.
2
/1 976-77/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 661. Consider­
able controversy, however continued to surround the alleged 
involvement in the abortive coup of General Gowon, now 
living in the United Kingdom.
3
See States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Act,
No. 12 of 1976. The Panel on the Creation of States had 
received the largest number of petitions with regard to 
the division of the South-Eastern State into two new 
States. The Panel recommended that this be done, but 
the government disagreed. Agitation for such division 
continued in the area; and Obasanjo firmly stated in 
August 1976 that 'no more States would be created'. See 
/1976-77/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 666.
The division of the country into nineteen states at this 
point in time is reflected in Map C, Appendix I.
4
/1976-77/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 668. See also 
Read, op cit, p 144.
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agriculture and primary education. Elections to these
i
Councils were held in December 1976 and provided (despite
continuing bans on political parties and public speech-
2 3making ) 'the first exercise of the sort since 1965* .
In September 1976/ the Constitution Drafting Committee 
completed its work and presented a draft constitution to 
the Federal Military Government/ which 1"launched" /it/
4
for public debate on 7th October 1976' . The Committee's
5
accompanying Report is considered further below.
2.3.24. 1977 - The Establishment of the Constituent Assembly
The local councillors chosen at the end of 1976 formed 
electoral colleges for the election (in September 1977)
g
of members of the Constituent Assembly which was given:
'"full powers to deliberate upon the draft Constit­
ution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria drawn up by the 
Constitution Drafting_Committee appointed by the Federal 
Military Government"' .
1
Ibid/ p B 668. 'Voting rights for women became a contro­
versial issue in the northern states... /and/ women were 
enfranchised for the first time in Plateau/ Benue and 
Kwara States'.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid/ p B 669.
4
Read/ supra/ p 144.
5
See below/ in the section on Nigeria's new constitution. 
 ^ See Read, supra.
7
Constituent Assembly Decree, 1977, no 50, cited by Read, 
op cit, p 144.
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The Constituent Assembly was composed of 203 members elected
1
by the local governments of the states/ the Chairman of
the Constitution Drafting Committee and the Chairmen of
its Sub-Committees and twenty other members nominated by
the Supreme Military Council? and it was chaired by Mr.
2
Justice Udoma. It met for the first time on 6th October 
1977 and was given one year to complete its task. 'It 
conducted its proceedings according to the Standing Orders
3
of the Old House of Representatives' ; and thus the draft
prepared by the Constitutional Drafting Committee was
put through all the processes employed for the passing of
legislative proposals in a legislative assembly - first
and second readings/ committee stage and final passage on
4
a third reading.
2.3.25. 1978 - The Promulgation of the Presidential Con­
stitution and Lifting of the Ban on Political Parties.
Little substantive change was effected by the Constituent 
Assembly to the draft prepared by the Constitutional Draft­
ing Committee and 'on many sections the Assembly debated 
various amendments only to return to the Committee's draft/
The number elected per State varied from 16 members (Kano 
State) to 7 (Niger State).
See Read/ supra.
Ibid, p 145.
See Nwabueze, A Constitutional History of Nigeria, supra 
p 256. Its proceedings were cut short on 5 June 1978/ when 
'the Chairman adjourned the Assembly indefinitely after 
accepting a motion for the formal third reading of the Draft 
Constitution* (see Read, supra) and this despite the protests 
of some 101 members that its work was not yet complete. See 
further /1978-79/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B724. 'It 
worked in public until January 19 78 when it decided to bar 
observers and the press after the Daily Times had criticised 
the standard of debate.' /1 977-78./ Africa Contemporary Record 
p B 733. --------------------- ----
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i
with perhaps minor variations' . The Constitution agreed 
by the Constituent Assembly was presented in August 1978 to 
the Supreme Military Council? and the Federal Military
2
Government - having made certain further amendments to it - 
then proceeded to enact it as an 'ordinary Decree: the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment)
Read/ supra. One of its most 'striking decisions'/ how­
ever/ was the deletion of the provisions for an "ombudsman" 
(restored/ however/ by the Federal Military Government as 
explained below). The significance of its contnbuJ'io^
r e d c u l e c i -  -j-dXCt 1_rv\p<L>f t o - A b  i w v f - h s - r s
removed in toto from its ambit; notably provisions for 
elections and the regulation of political parties/ enacted 
by the F.M.G. in the Electoral Act of 1977 (No 73 of 19 77), 
based upon the recommendations of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee. The most controversial question dealt with 
by the Constituent Assembly was the proposed establishment of 
a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. This proposal of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee was ultimately rejected 
in favour of providing for 'appeals from State Sharia 
Courts of Appeal to... the Federal Court of Appeals/ 
specially constituted /for the purpose/ by three justices 
versed in Islamic law1. (See Read/ ibid/ p 146). For 
a further summary of the changes effected by the Assembly 
see /1978-79_7 Africa Contemporary Record/ p B 724.
See Read, ibid/ pp 146-147. A particularly interesting 
change was the restoration by the Federal Military Govern­
ment of the "ombudsman" provisions deleted by the Cons­
tituent Assembly. The Federal Military Government further 
entrenched the Land Use Act of 19 78 (No 6 of 19 78) as well as 
provisions governing the Public Service Commission (or 
"ombudsman")/ the National Youth Service Corps and the 
Nigerian Security Organisation. See also /1978-79_/
Africa Contemporary Record/ pp B 724-725. Seventeen 
amendments were made/ Obasanjo asserting that these were 
'imperative' to ensure the 'attainment of good government.'
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1 2 [Act ], of which the new Constitution forms the Schedule* .
The provisions of this Constitution are sketched in outline
3
below and suffice it therefore, for present purposes, to 
note that its most significant innovation was the intro­
duction of a directly-elected executive president with 
powers which clearly reflect the influence of the
4
•Washington* constitutional model.
On the same day the Constitution was enacted (21 September 
1978), the twelve-year prohibition on the activities of
5
political parties was lifted; and */p/olitical associat-
g
ions proliferated to over 50 by the end of 1978* . Nine­
teen sought registration by the Federal Election Commiss­
ion in December 1978, but only five succeeded in meeting
7
the stipulated criteria, particularly as regards the
No. 25 of 1978.
Read, op cit, p 146. Read points out that * Section 1 
of the Act - gives the force of law to the Constitution 
and section 2 authorises the future reprinting of the 
Constitution alone, without the enacting provisions.*
The Federal Military Government further provided (by 
transitional Decrees) for the new Constitution to come 
into effect as a whole on 1st October 1979. See Read, 
ibid, p 147.
See p 112 below.
See Read, supra, p 155; and see also p 131, where Read 
submits that what *has given /the return to civilian 
rule/ quite exceptional importance is the fact that 
Nigeria, turning its back on Westminster, has chosen 
to adopt a new constitutional structure which can aptly 
be regarded as a version of "the Washington model"*.
See Read, ibid, p 165.
See /1979-80/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 583.
See the Electoral Act of 1977 (No. 73 of 1977).
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1
requirement of wide-ranging national support*
2.3.26. 1979 - The Return to Civilian Rule
In January 1979/ the Federal Election Commission (F.E.D.E.C.O.)
announced the five parties which qualified for registration —
these being the National Party of Nigeria (N.P.N.)/ the
Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N.)/ the Nigeria People’s
Party (N.P.P.)/ the Great Nigeria People's Party (G.N.P.P.),
2
and the People's Redemption Party (P.R.P.) . It also 
screened some 8/728 candidates and disqualified over 1/000
3
mainly because of tax defaults. It also 'launched a 
'public enlightenment campaign* on voting procedures 
through'radio jingles/ T.V. and newspaper advertisements 
and films'^ whilst power 'to control public meetings and
See ^1978—79/ Africa Contemporary Record,p B 730. See also 
L.A. Jinadu/ 'The Federal Electoral Commission' in O. Oyediran 
(ed./) The Nigerian 1979 Elections/ London and Lagos, 1981 
pp 17-39/ P 33/ for a description of the controversy provoked 
by the Commission's decision.
For a summary of information regarding these parties/ see 
/"1978-79/ Africa Contemporary Record/ pp B 730-731 . The 
parties reflected, to a considerable degree/ the political 
divisions pre-dating the assumption of power by the military 
in 1966/ the U.P.N./ for example/ being 'fashioned after 
the old Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.)' See /1979-80/ 
Africa contemporary Record/ p B 583/ and see also Jinadu, 
supra/ p 33 and L. Anise, 'Political parties and Election 
Manifestoes', in The Nigerian 1979 Elections/ supra, pp 67-90.
See /1979-80/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 583. Two 
party leaders, including Dr. Azikiwe, were disqualified but 
appealed successfully against this ruling. The disqualif­
ication was effected under s 72 of the Electoral Act, 19 77, 
which prescribes the various requirements which must be 
satisfied by candidates for election. The disqualification 
of Azikiwe and the reversal of this by the Enugu High Court 
are further described by Jinadu, supra, p 36.
4 /1979-80/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 582.
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1
processions, the display of party flags, etc..,' was
provided by the Public Order Act of 1979. After some six
months of electoral campaigning, voting took place on
2
successive Saturdays for the Senate, the House of Repre-
3 4sentatives, the State House of Assembly and the State
5
Governors . Finally, on 11 August, the presidential
g
election was held; and the winner was declared to be
7
Alhaju Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria.
Read, op cit, p 165.
2 On 7 July 1979.
3 On .14 July.
4
On 21st July.
5 On 28 July.
This followed a challenge that Shagari had, in fact, 
failed to secure the degree of support required of a 
Presidential candidate by section 34A(1) of the Electo- 
Act of 1977 (No. 73 as amended by the Electoral (Amend­
ment) Act of 1979, No. 32). The dispute was resolved 
by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Shagari's favour. For 
commentary on the case, and extracts from the judgment 
of the court, see James S. Read, 'Note:“Justice in 
Mathematics?" in (1979) 23 Journal of African Law, pp 
175-182.
7
The^breakdown of state support for the five political 
partiesAwas as follows:
National Party of Nigeria: Sokota, Niger, Kwara, Bauchi,
Benue, Cross River, Rivers.
Nigerian People's Party: Plateau, Anambra, Imo
Great Nigeria People's Party: Borno, Gongola
United Party of Nigeria: Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Bendel
People's Redemption Party: Kaduna, Kano
(See the Economist, 23 January, 1982, Nigeria Survey,
P 21).
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Ch 1 October 1979, the Second Republic was born; and Shagari 
assumed office as President under the new Constitution, 
assured - through an alliance with the Nigeria People's
i
Party - of a 'workable majority' in the federal legislature.
Notwithstanding this, however, the period since 1979 has
witnessed considerable difficulty in getting legislation 
2
passed. The period has also been characterised by a 
series of challenges to the constitutionality of a variety 
of governmental actions and this has generated an unprec-
3
edented flood of judicial decisions on the proper inter­
pretation of the Constitution. It is still difficult, 
accordingly, to assess the degree of success the Constitution 
has enjoyed in helping to solve Nigeria's 'deep-seated
4
political problems' . At present, the country is in the 
throes of preparing for fresh elections, for the four- 
year terms of office provided by the Constitution are due 
to expire in October 1983. President Shagari has won wide­
spread respect since his election, and there seems little 
doubt that continuity in the presidential incumbent will 
at least be assured - though it still remains to see how
See Read,'The New Constitution of Nigeria, 1979*, supra, p 165.
2
For example, the enactment of new formula for allocation 
of federal revenue between the centre and the various states 
was one of the first tasks facing the federal assembly - as 
the constituent Assembly had been unable to reach agreement 
on this point. It took until January 1981 for an Act to be 
passed, and as this was immediately challenged for failure 
to comply with s 58(3) of the Constitution (in Attorney- 
General, Bendel State v Attorney General, Federation and 
others,(1982) 3 N.C.L.R.1)and found unconstitutional by the 
court, it was not until January 1982 that legislation on 
this question was finally enacted. Revenue allocation is trad­
itionally a sensitive issue - but (even so) this appears an 
inordinately long period. (Source: Seminar address by Professor 
J.S. Read, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, 6 
March 1982).
3 Thus the newly instituted Constitutional Law Reports of 
Nigeria list over 150 cases involving constitutional issues 
which have come before the courts since 1 October 1979.
4 See Read, supra, p 166.
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the "Washington" Constitution will develop further in future 
1years.
2.4. Outline of Nigeria's Legal, System
Having thus covered the major events in Nigeria's history, 
it is now appropriate to devote some attention to outlining 
Nigeria's legal system; and in this section it is proposed 
briefly to examine the Presidential Constitution of 1979 
and the sources of Nigerian law (including the structure 
of the country's courts).
2
2.4.1. The Presidential Constitution of 1979
Detailed consideration of the 1979 Constitution, contained 
in 279 sections and 6 schedules, lies outside the scope 
of this study. Instead, it is proposed to concentrate on 
the various principles underlying its formulation - and 
to examine, in brief outline only, the manner in which 
those principles have been given expression in its provisions.
3
According to Nwabueze, the 1979 Constitution is premised
In particular, it will be interesting to see whether 
Nigeria (having adopted a constitution loosely modelled 
on that of the United States of America) will also - in 
future - begin to follow the approach adopted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to constitutional 
issues: particularly as regards the guarantees of fund­
amental rights. The advantage of so doing (in the context 
of freedom of expression especially) is a major theme of 
this study; and will be further elaborated in due course.
Although this Constitution was enacted in 1978, it came 
into effect only in 19 79 and is commonly known as the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 19 79.
(It may also be recalled - from p 108, n 2 above - that 
the enacting Act (Act no 25 of 1978) authorised the future 
reprinting of the Constitution alone, without the enacting 
provisions).
T 1.___________________________  -n’  T-i ! J  j : _  n n   I : -1_  1 : ____ _____  r  i n  J -  1 Q  O O
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upon the following concepts and needs:
(i) 'The need for principle and probity in government
i
and politics'.
In the view of Nwabueze/ principle and probity are required 
to counteract the self-interest and narrow regional concern 
which underlay the failure of the First Republic. One of 
the major shortcomings of the 1963 Constitution was its 
failure to emphasise the responsibilities that accompany 
power or to cast any positive duties upon those in auth­
ority (other than the negative obligation not to infringe
2
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution ). 
This defect was acknowledged by the Constitution Drafting
3
Committee which accordingly recommended the inclusion in 
the 1979 Constitution of 'a statement of fundamental obj-
4
ectives and directive principles 1. These would not only 
'defin/e/ the goals of society^ and prescrib/e/ the inst-
g
itutional forms and procedures for pursuing them1 , but 
would also serve to unite Nigerian society into one nation, 
bound together by common values and goals, to 'se/t/ the
7
parameters of government' and 'to remind those in author-
Q
ity that their position is one of trust'-.
1 Ibid, p 20.
2
See ibid, pp 20-22.
3
Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, /1976/ 
Vol. 1, pp v - vii.
4
Ibid, at para., 3.2-3, p vi.
5
Ibid. The Committee pointed out that, without these, 'a 
new nation is likely to find itself rudderless'.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy thus recommended by the Constitution Drafting 
Committee are embodied in Chapter II of the 1979 Constit-
i
ution. Its provisions are non - j is tic i able but it is never­
theless declared to be 'the duty and responsibility of
2
all organs of government' to observe and apply the polit­
ical/ economic/ social/ educational and foreign policy
3 4objectives described in the Chapter. These include the
5
active encouragement of national integration / the prom-
g
otion of planned and balanced economic development, the
7
provision of adequate medical facilities and of public
See section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution. This reflects 
the recommendation of the Committee, reached after consid­
erable controversy, that the provisions should not be 
justiciable for fear of provoking conflict between the 
judicial and other branches of government* See the Report 
of the Committee, op cit, p vii, Read, op cit, p 136 and 
Nwabueze, op cit, p 23.
2
s 13, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979
3
In addition, the Chapter includes a directive on Nigerian 
culture, a statement of the rights of the mass media, and 
a description of the national ethic.
4
The choice of provisions deserving express mention in a 
survey as brief as this is inevitably arbitrary. For 
further detail regarding the content of the Chapter, see 
Nwabueze, supra, pp 22-23 and Read, supra, pp 136-139.
 ^ s 15(3), supra.
g
s 16(2)(a), ibid. The State is to control 'major sectors 
of the economy', as determined by the National Assembly, 
every citizen having the right to engage in any economic 
activities outside the major sectors of the economy: ss 
16(1) and(4). This was one of the most controversial 
issues considered by the Committee. See Read, supra, p 137
7 s 17(3)(d), ibid.
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1
assistance in deserving cases , the promotion of science
2 3and technology , the eradication of illiteracy and the
promotion of 1African Unity1 and the total liberation of
Africa . Furthermore, the media are enjoined^ to uphold
these objectives at all times as well as 'the responsibility
£
and accountability of the Government to the people'.
In further keeping with the need for principle and probity 
in politics as well as government, political parties are 
obliged to ensure that their programmes, aims and objects 
comply with Chapter IIJ and '/t/he use of organised coer­
cion or any other form of organised violence for political
2purposes is prohibited.*'
In addition, the maintenance of 'principle and probity'
s I o
is encouraged through the inclusion of an enforceable
s 17 (3) (g), ibid.
2 s 18(2), ibid.
3 s 18(3), ibid.
 ^ s 19, ibid.
5
This may be too strong a word. The precise formulation 
(in s 21) is that the media 'shall at all times be free' 
to do so. This is further discussed at p 213 below.
g
s 20/ supra.
7 s 204, ibid.
8 — — —
Nwabueze, supra, p 23. This is provided by s 207, ibid.
9
This was introduced on the recommendation of the Consitu- 
tion Drafting Committee and brings Nigerian law into line 
with developments in other Commonwealth states in this 
regard. See Read, op cit, p 161.
10 Thus, a Code of Conduct Tribunal has been established, with 
power to punish public officers for contravention of the 
Code by, inter alia, vacation of office or seat, disqual­
ification from office for up to ten years, and forfeiture 
of property acquired through abuse of office. see ss 17-20, 
Fifth Schedule, Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979.
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Code of Conduct/ contained in the Fifth Schedule, which
is designed to 'ensure that persons who are entrusted with
public authority do not abuse their trust to enrich them-
\
selves or to defraud the nation'. The 'public officers'
2
to whom the Code applies are broadly defined and all are
prohibited from placing themselves in a position where
3
public and private interests conflict or 'from accepting
4
any property or benefit for the discharge or non-discharge
5
of their duties' . All public officers are obliged to 
declare their assets at the commencement of their appoint-
g
ment and '/a/ check on corrupt acquisitions by public 
officers is... maintained through /further/ declaration 
and verification of assets... at intervals of four years 
during tenure and at the end of the appointment!,
Q
(ii) 'The Centrality of Man's humanity*'
Man has innate needs, more fundamental than the needs of 
the society he creates in order to serve his interests; and
Report of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, op cit, 
para. 7.5, p xxxiii.
2
See Part II of the Fifth Schedule. The list ranges from 
the President and Vice-President to the staff of local 
government councils, para-statal corporations and State- 
owned universities and colleges.
3
s 1, part I, Fifth Schedule, supra.
4
Benefits are broadly defined and extend, for example, to 
'private' loans.
5
Nwabueze, op cit, pp 23-24.
g
s 11, Part I, Fifth Schedule, supra.
 ^ Nwabueze, supra, p 24.
* ® Ibid.
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the overriding importance of these human needs is recognised 
in the 1979 constitution by the provision (In Chapter IV) 
of guarantees of certain fundamental rights such as the 
rights to life, liberty, to freedom of thought, expression 
and movement. Since the full exercise of these rights 
by every individual may cause conflicts within society, 
the Constitution further attempts to balance the competing 
interests of man and society by permitting derogation 
from the guaranteed rights in certain circumstances.
These guarantees - particularly the vital protection given 
to freedom of expression which is of fundamental importance 
to the law governing the media - are further examined in 
due course in the section on Nigeria's Bill of Rights.
2
(iii) 'National unity and stability' in the midst of 
diversity.
The need for unity - and hence stability - in the country 
whose borders are the arbitrary and artificial product of 
the colonial "scramble for Africa", in which there are 
traditionally more than 250 ethnic groups of fundamentally
3
different culture and outlook , and which has been administered 
1
See Nwabueze, ibid, p 25.
2
See Nwabueze, op cit, p 25. It is submitted, that Nwabueze's 
formulation does not go far enough; and that the reality 
of diversity must be recognised as well as the need of 
'unity and stability'. It is submitted, further, that 
this reality (largely the product of Nigeria's colonial 
past) is indeed reflected in the Constitution, as further 
explained in the text below.
3
Reference has already been made to the traditional divis­
ions between three especially important groups: the Hausa, 
Yoruba and Ibo.
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i
as a unit for less than 70 years t is strong. It is
reflected as a dominant theme in the Constitution/ in the
2 3preamble; in the Political Objectives in Chapter II
(including 'the general requirement that the composition
of the Federal Government shall "reflect the federal
character of Nigeria" with no predominance of persons from
a few States, ethnic or other sectional groups'^; in the
provisions regarding the appointment of Ministers which
must reflect not only this general requirement but also
ensure that there is 'at least one Minister from each
5
State# who shall be an indigene of such State' ; in the 
requirement that the President (even if the sole candidate)
g
must command a considerable measure of support in at least
7
two-thirds of all the States ; in the criteria for the
It may be recalled that North and South were unified only 
in 1914/ as explained in the section on the History of 
Nigeria above.
2
This recites the resolve of the people of Nigeria/ 'to 
live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissol­
uble Sovereign Nation'. The same principle is reiterated 
in s 2(1) of the Constitution/ supra.
3
s 15/ ibid, which requires, inter alia, the active encour­
agement of national integration.
4
See Read, op cit, p 158/ citing s 14(3)/ ibid. Similar 
provisions with regard to State and local governments are 
contained in s 14(4).
5 s 135(3)/ ibid.
g
This being 'not less than one-quarter of the votes cast 
at the election': ss 125 and 126/ ibid/ (the latter reflect­
ing the same requirement where there are two or more 
Presidential candidates).
7
ss 125 and 126/ ibid. See also Nwabueze/ supra/ p 26/ who 
explains that these requirements are designed to ensure 
that the President is able to identify with the country 
as a whole and hence to 'serve as a focal point of loyalty 
in the nation'.
-119-
recognition of political parties, only those commanding
broad-based support being entitled to registration1 and
in the provisions giving every state representation in
2
the federal legislature , in 'some of the more sensitive
3 4federal commissions' and in the armed forces .
At the same time, the reality of diversity within Nigeria
is accorded appropriate recognition in the division of
powers between the centre and the component states of
the Federation. Thus the State legislatures retain resi-
5
dual authority to legislate on all matters other than those
See s 202, ibid, especially (b) and s 203(1)(b) and
(2) (b) .
2
Thus, the Senate consists of five members from each 
State (s 44, ibid,) with one in due course from the 
Capital Territory. '/T/he number of seats per State 
in the House of Representatives varies from 10 in 
Niger State to 46 in Kano State'* See Read, supra, 
p 152. This is because constituencies are defined 
by reference to 'the population quota'.
3
See Nwabueze, supra, p 26 and Read, supra, pp 158 - 
159. These include the Council of State, the National 
Population Commission and the Federal Electoral Com­
mission.
4
See Nwabueze, ibid.
5
This was a feature of the first federal constitution 
of Nigeria, in 1954, as explained in the section on 
the history of Nigeria, above. The Constitution 
Drafting Committee considered reversing this division 
to give residual powers to the centre, but was not 
persuaded to make the change. See its Report, op 
cit, para. 6.2, p xxii.
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i
expressly reserved for exclusive federal competence or
expressly made subject to concurrent federal and state 
2
jurisdiction. Instead/ of providing - as regards the 
latter category - that federal law will always take prec-
3
edence over state legislation/ the new Constitution has
4
a number of more detailed provisions which effectively 
preclude the overlap of federal and state powers in relat-
5
ion to many matters on the Concurrent List/ and which are 
designed to ensure that the ’Federal Government /cannot/
These items are listed in the Exclusive List/ contained 
in Part I of the Second Schedule. The List now contains 
66 Items (as opposed to 44 under the 1963 Constitution) 
and significant items which have moved to the Exclusive 
List include 'census? arms and ammunition; labour? quar­
antine /and/ prisons'. See Read/ op cit, p 153. Part­
icularly important is Item 61 which gives the Federal 
legislature exclusive competence to establish authorities 
to promote and enforce the observance of the fundamental 
objectives and directive principles contained in the 
Constitution. The Constitution Drafting Committee recog­
nised that this might conceivably result in a whole-scale 
usurpation of state powers by the centre? but thought 
the difficulty could be avoided by maintaining strict 
scrutiny of any federal measures in this regard to ensure 
that they were geared to a specific purpose/ failing 
which they should be considered void. See the Report/ 
supra, 6.4/ p xxii.
These matters are listed on the Concurrent List, contained 
in Part II of the Second Schedule.
As provided by the 1963 Constitution (Act no 20 of 1963).
See/ for example/ Item 16 on the Concurrent List. Thus, 
both 'Federal and State legislatures may set up bodies 
to censor films, and although Federal law normally pre­
vails, it is provided that nothing authorises the showing 
of a film which has not been approved by such State 
authority'. See Read, supra, p 153, who points out that 
this reflects the still contrasting cultural milieux of 
/the/ different States'.
5 See Read, ibid.
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... insist on uniformity /where/ diversity in no way con- 
flicts with national unity*.
(iv) Need for effective government
This was considered a cardinal requirement by the Constit­
ution Drafting Committee which emphasised that */t/he
separation of the Head of State from the Head of Govern- 
2
ment involves a division between real and formal authority 
... /which/ is meaningless in the light of African political
3
experience and history* • It cited the experience of 
Nigeria/ Uganda/ Lesotho and Swaziland as evidence that 
the division results *in a conflict of authority and an 
unnecessary complexity and uncertainty in governmental
4
relations* ; and recommended the introduction of an •exec­
utive president* who should be Head of State and Head of 
Government as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces. This would promote unity/ energy and despatch
5
in the fulfillment of executive responsibilities, and
g
would preclude any dilution of executive responsibility 
and would entail the additional advantage that the holder
See the Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, 
para. 6.4., p xxii.
2
This, of course, reflects the Westminster constitutional 
model, in which the Head of State has only titular author­
ity, and executive power resides in the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet who are responsible to the elected legislature.
3
See the Report of the Committee, supraj paras. 7.1-3, p xxiv.
4 Ibi<3 •5
See ibid, paras. 7.1-5, p xxx.
6 Ibid, paras, 7.1-6. The Committee pointed out that a 
plural executive may make it difficult to determine on 
whom any blame should properly fall. This problem is 
particularly acute when the prime minister is unable to 
control his cabinet.
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of the presidential office would be the direct choice of
the people. The need for a strong executive has been
2
reflected in the Constitution by the provisions for a 
directly-elected President/ who combines all three roles
3
reflected above/ in whom the executive powers of the
4
Federation are vested and whose * assent is normally required
5
for Federal legislation*.
(v) Need for limitations on government
In the words of Nwabueze/ '/t/he Nigerian is intensely
individualistic and resentful of any arbitrary or auto-
g
cratic impositions upon his freedom of action*. The need 
for limitations on the exercise of governmental power was 
accordingly considered imperative - and this is reflected 
in a number of provisions of the Constitution. It is 
thus evident in the constraints surrounding the President
7
who may hold office for a maximum of two termsf who 
requires legislative approval for certain acts and appoint-
1
Ibid. Under the Westminster system/ by contrast/ there 
is only one popular election - that for members of the 
legislature; and it is the legislature which then *makes 
and unmakes* the executive. (This view is the Committee's, ibid
2
See especially sections 122-134 of the Constitution, supra.
 ^ See s. 122(2), ibid.
4
s 5(1), ibid, which (in sub-section (a)) specifies that 
such powers may be 'exercised by him either directly or 
through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Govern­
ment*. See also s 136 which makes it clear that respon­
sibilities are assigned to the Vice President and Ministers 
at the discretion of the President.
5
Read, op cit, p 151; and see s 54(1), ibid.
6 ""
Nwabueze, op cit, p 30.
7
s 128(1) (b) , supra« A term lasts for four years: see s 
127(2) , Ibid.
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1
ments , whose veto of proposed legislation may be overriden
by a two-thirds majority of all members of each federal
2
House , who must consult various independent executive bodies
3
before taking certain actions and who may be impeached
4
and removed from office for abuse of power.
In addition to the specific constraints on the President 
(such as the limitation on his tenure in office or the 
provisions for impeachment), the need for limitation of 
governmental power is also reflected in the division of 
authority between the three different branches of government 
- legislative, executive and judicial - and in the checks 
and balances that characterise their relations inter se.
The legislative checks on executive power have already been
Thus for example, Senate confirmation of Ministers appointed 
by the President is required under s 135(2), ibid; and al­
so for Presidential appointments to various Commissions, 
under s 141(1), ibid.
 ^ s 54(5), ibid.
3
Thus, for example, the President must hold regular meet­
ings with the Vice President and Ministers under the 
terms of s 137(2), ibid; and the Council of State has 
power to advise the President in the exercise of his 
powers in relation to the census, the prerogative of 
mercy, and the appointment of members of the Federal 
Election Commission, the Federal Judicial Service Comm­
ission and the National Population Commission: see s 2 
Part I, Third Schedule, ibid. In addition, the Natiqnal 
Defence Council advises the President on defence, the 
National Security Council advises him on public security; 
the National Economic Council advises him on .economic 
affairs, the Judicial Service Commission advises him on 
appointments to the Bench,and the National Population 
Commission advises him on population problems, etc.
See Read, supra, p 159.
* s 132, ibid.
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1
noted and the judicial (and other) constraints on the
2
executive are described further below. As regards the 
legislature, its lawmaking power is curbed, inter alia, 
through the division of legislative competence between the
3
federal and state legislatures, by the general require-
4
ment that legislation requires the assent of the executive 
and by the rule that the legislature may not usurp the
5
functions nor oust the jurisdiction of the courts. The 
latter provision is particularly important, for it prohib­
its the legislature from enacting ad hominem legislation - 
and thus from punishing named individuals without the
7
safeguard of proper trial by a duly constituted court.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the division of
power is the authority given to the judiciary (whose independence
1
. .See p 123 above* where reference is made to the need f o r  
the President to obtain legislative approval for certain 
acts and appointments.
2
See pl25 below.
3
See p 119 above.
4
See p 122 above, and section 54 of the Constitution, supra.
As regards state legislation, the assent of the State 
Governor is normally required, under s 94, ibid.
5 See section 4(8), ibid.
 ^For example, by ordering the imprisonment, or the confiscation 
of the property, of particular individuals - as occurred 
on a number of occasions during the period of military rule. 
For illustrations of such ad hominem decrees, see Nwabueze,
A Constitutional History of Nigeria, supra, pp 210-212.
7
As pointed out by Nwabueze, in The Presidential Constitution 
of Nigeria, supra, p 34, 'If... the legislature were to be 
able to make laws to pronounce a named individual guilty 
of an offence and to punish him by, say, imprisonment..., 
the door is left wide open for arbitrariness and for victim­
isation.
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-j
is safegaurded in a number of ways ) to declare void and of
no effect any legislative enactment or executive conduct
2
which is inconsistent with the Constitution - which thus
3
constitutes the supreme law of Nigeria and provides a
1
Thus appointments to the bench are made on the advice of 
the Judicial Service Commissions (see, for eg., s 211 and 
s 235, supra, - except that the Chief Justice of Nigeria 
is appointed at the discretion of the President, subject 
to confirmation by a simple majority of the Senate). In 
addition, those appointed must be legal practitioners of 
ten (in the case of State High Court) to fifteen years 
(in the case of the Supreme Court, for example) standing. 
See s 211(3) and s 235(3) ibid. Extremely important in 
this regard is the safeguard against arbitrary dismissal 
of judges contained in s 256, ibid, which provides, in 
outline, that judges may be dismissed only for inability 
or misconduct (including contravention of the Code of 
Conduct) and then only on the recommendation of either 
the Federal or a State Judicial Service Commission. ThGS 
Chief Justice may be removed from office by the President 
only 'on an address supported by two-thirds majority of 
the Senate' (s 256(1 ) (a) (i), ibid).
2
Thus, section 1(3), ibid states categorically: 'If any... 
law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constit­
ution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other 
law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void*.
The courts' power to determine the legality of executive 
action derives principally from s 6 (6) which confirms 
that judicial power extends 'to all matters between persons 
or between government or authority and any person in 
Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating 
thereto, for the determination of any question as to the 
civil rights and obligations of that person'. These 
provisions are buttressed by the guarantees of constit­
utional rights contained in Chapter IV and the power 
given to the courts under s 42 to secure the enforcement 
of the guaranteed protections. These provisions are 
discussed further below.
 ^ See s 1(1), ibid, which declares: 'This Constitution is 
supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on 
all authorities and persons throughout the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria'.
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standard with which all governmental action must conform.
Further protection is provided by the entrenchment of a 
number of key provisions of the Constitution - especially
i
those relating to fundamental rights; and to the Public
2
Complaints Commission which provides further important
3
safeguards against administrative abuses.
Finally/ the need for limitations on governmental power 
is clearly reflected in the guarantees of fundamental rights
4
themselves (discussed in further detail below ) and in 
the provisions for periodic elections which provide (at 
four-yearly intervals) 'an opportunity for the people to 
express their needs/ and to turn out /of office/ a 
government whose performance fails adequately to provide 
for them'.^
See s 9(3)/ ibid/ which provides that neither Chapter 
IV (containing the 'Bill of Rights') nor s 8 (dealing 
with the creation of new states/ as further explained 
below) may be amended save with the approval of at least 
four-fifths of all the members of the Senate and National 
Assembly/ plus the approval of at least two-thirds of 
the State Houses of Assembly. (The normal requirement - 
for the amendment of other provisions of the Constitution 
- is the same degree of State approval coupled with the 
approval of at least two-thirds of the members of the 
National Assembly: see s 9(2)/ ibid.)
2
See s 274(5)/ ibid/ which provides that the requirements 
of section 9(2) must be met in order to amend the Public Com­
plaints Commission Act, 19 75, as well as various others. See 
Read, op cit/ p 147.
3
The importance of this 'tmbudsman " is illustrated by the 
fact that - in the 1977 calendar yearf for example - 
the Commission received 8/357 complaints. See Read/ 
supra, p 145.
4
See p 170, below.
Nwabueze, op cit, supra, p 31 .
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(vi) Need for economic development
Economic development is a ’paramount need' and its sat­
isfaction calls for 'effective leadership/... able to 
mobilise the nation and its resources' .. Hence the Constitution 
not only provides for strong central leadership (in the 
provisions for the office of President/ described above) 
but also facilitates the satisfaction of the differing 
development needs of the diverse parts of the country by 
providing for 19 state governments/ with strong executive
3
powers similar to those enjoyed by the President . How­
ever/ since the creation of yet further states 'would 
operate as a drag on development by stretching the resources 
of the country [too far/... and by diverting resources 
needed for development to the payment and maintenance of 
an unduly proliferated apparatus of state government*^/ 
the Constitution imposes requirements for the creation 
of new states which are not only stringent but may/ indeed,
Ibid, p 29.
2 Ibid.
3 These are vested in the State Governors. See ss 162-174 
and s 5(2)/ supra.
* Nwabueze/ supra/ p 30. It must be acknowledged that
Nwabueze does not expressly link these arguments against 
the creation of new states with the difficulties placed 
in the path of so doing by the Constitution. However/ 
the requirements for the creation of new States are 
remarkable for their stringency (as further explained 
below); and it seems reasonable to surmise that the 
framers of the Constitution - for these and other 
reasons of a more political nature - were indeed deter­
mined that no new states should be created; and so set 
about ensuring this by making the procedure required 
extremely difficult - if not impossible - to fulfill.
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i
be impossible to fulfill.
Finally, the need for development is reflected in the con­
tinuation of the local government machinery established
2
by the military government 1 which guarantees to... local 
communities /*the/ administrative machinery and financial
3
resources needed for their development1 ; and is further 
evidenced by the duty enjoined upon local government councils
4
'to participate in economic planning and development' 
of their areas of jurisdiction.
5
Further analysis of the provisions of the 1979 Constitu­
tion lies outside the scope of this study. Instead, some 
consideration must now be given to the important question 
of the sources of Nigerian law.
See Read, op cit, pp 163-164 who submits: 'If the drafts­
man was instructed to produce a section which would 
effectively prevent any future tampering with the present 
States, then he has succeeded admirably. A section 
which cannot be understood can hardly be implemented'• 
(The relevant section is s 8 of the Constitution, supra 
which is indeed remarkably obscure).
2
It may be recalled, from the section on the History of 
Nigeria, that the federal military government in 1976 
published Guidelines for the establishment of local 
government councils. See p 104 above, and see also Read, 
ibid, p 144.
3
Nwabueze, op cit, supra, p 30.
* See s 7(3)v ibid.
5
For further information regarding the provisions of the 
Constitution, see the lengthy and detailed account in 
Nwabueze, op cit, supra, and the concise and highly 
useful summary in Read, supra, pp 147-165. For brief 
commentary on each of its provisions, see Dr Jadesola O. 
Akande, Introduction to the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 19 79, London, 1982.
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2.4.2. The Sources of Nigerian Law
Detailed consideration of this complex topic falls outside
i
the scope of this study. Some examination of certain 
fundamental principles is/ however necessary for a proper 
understanding of Nigerian law - especially as regards its 
relationship with English, law today.
2
The sources of Nigerian law are four-fold:
(i) English law;
(ii) Nigerian legislation;
(iii) Nigerian case law; and
(iv) Customary law:
and each must now be considered in turn.
2. 4.2.1. English law
This topic may be further sub-divided into English legis-
3
lation of direct application, and English laws which have
4
been received into Nigerian law by local enactment. Prior to
5
Nigerian independence in 1960 , a number of 'United Kingdom 
Acts, Orders in Council and Letters Patent were /expressly/
For further information/ see A.E.W. Park, The Sources of 
Nigerian Law, Lagos and London, 1963; G. Ezejiofor, 'Sources 
of Nigerian Law', pp 1-53 and D.I.O. Ewelukwa, 'Admin­
istration of Justice', pp 54-163, in C.O. Okankwo, (ed.) 
Introduction to Nigerian Law, London, 1980; Obilade, The 
Nigerian Legal System, supra, Part 3, especially Chapters 
Three to Seven; A.N. Allott, New Essays in African Law, 
London, 1970, Chapter Two, J. Cottrell, 'An end to 
slavishness? A note on Alii v Qkulaja', (1973) 17 Journal 
of African Law, pp 247-251 .
2
See Ezejiofor, supra.
 ^ See ibid.
4 See obilade, supra, p 69.
5 For further information, see the section on the History 
of Nigeria above.
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extended to Nigeria as part of her law'^ , including - for 
example - the Bills of Sale Acts 1878 to 1891/ the Copy­
right Act 1911/ the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act
1878/ the Carriage by Air (Parties to Convention) Order
2
1958 and the West African Coinage Order 1938 • During 
Nigeria's dependency/ none of these could be altered by
3
local legislation . On the attainment of independence
4
it was provided that no further United Kingdom legislation 
should extend to Nigeria/ that Nigerian legislatures
5
could repeal or amend English statutes previously extended
g
to Nigeria/ and that 'existing British Acts extending to 
Nigeria were to continue in force until or unless /so/
7
repealed or amended' •
Ezejiofor/ supra/ p 3. For details of the distinction 
between United Kingdom legislation in the colony of Lagos 
and in the remaining Protectorate/ see p 2.
2
For further illustrations/ see ibid. Those in force in 
1958 and subsidiary legislation made under them have been 
set out in Vol. XI of the 1958 revised edition of the Laws 
of Nigeria.
3
See Ezejiofor/ ibid.
4
By the Nigeria Independence Act 1960. For details of the 
changes made/ see Ezejiofor/ op cit/ pp 3-4.
5
The word 'statutes' is used for the sake of convenience, 
but it should be noted - as explained above - that Orders 
in Council and Letters Patent are included within the 
United Kingdom legislation in question. For further details 
regarding these, see Nwabueze, Constitutional Law of the 
Nigerian Republic, supra, Chapter Two.
g
Again, the word 'Acts' must be taken as a term of convenience 
for the reason explained above.
7
Ezejiofor, supra, p 4. Thus the Bills of Sale Acts 1987- 
1891 continue to apply, whilst the Copyright Act 1911 no 
longer does so, having been repealed and replaced by the 
Copyright Act, no 61 of 1970. (This Act is further exami­
ned in Chapter Three).
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The second major category of English law is that which 
applies in Nigeria through locally enacted 'reception' 
provisions. An example of such a provision is s 45 of the 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, which states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, and 
except in so far as other provision is made by any Federal 
Law, the common law of England and the doctrines of equity, 
together with the statutes of general application that 
were in force in England on the 1st day of January 1900, 
shall be in force in Lagos and, so far as they relate to 
any matter within the exclusive legislative competence of 
the Federal legislature, shall be in force elsewhere in 
the Federation.
(2) Such Imperial laws shall be in force so far 
only as the limits of local jurisdiction and local circum­
stances shall permit and subject to any Federal law.
(3) For the purpose of facilitating the application 
of the said Imperial laws they shall be read with such 
formal verbal alterations not affecting the substance as
to names, localities, courts, officers, persons, moneys, 
penalties and otherwise as may be necessary to render the 
same applicable to the circumstances.'
Substantially the same reception provision is to be found
2
in the legislation of the various states, except that the
3
Law of England (Application) Law of the former Western
4
Region, does not apply any English statutes and the High
Originally known as the Interpretation Act, 1.its name was 
changed by s 28 of the Interpretation Act No. 1 of 1964.
See the Lav; (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, Lagos State,
Cap 65 (Laws of Lagos State, 1973); the High Court Law,
Lagos State, Cap 52, ibid; The Law of England (Applic­
ation) Law (Western States) Cap 60 (Laws of Western Region 
of Nigeria, 1959), and the High Court (Civil Procedure)
Rules (Western States)., Cap 44, ibid, Ord. 35, r.10> 
in force in Bendel, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo States; the High 
Court Law, (Northern States),Cap 49, (Laws of Northern 
Nigeria, 1963) ss 28, 29 and 35; and the High Court Law 
(Eastern States), Cap 61, (Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963), 
s 15, in force in Anambra, Cross River, Imo and Rivers States.
(Western States) Cap 60 (Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 
1959).
Obilade, op cit, p 69; and see s. 4 ibid.
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Court Law of the northern states does not specify that the
common law received is that of England, though there is
2
little doubt that this is what is meant.
Some controversy surrounds the question whether the cut­
off date (1 January, 1900) applies to English statutes 
alone, or to English common law and equity as well. The 
wording seems clearly to support the former interpretation;
3
and, despite the contrary view expressed by Allott , it 
appears to be more generally accepted that the cut-off 
date does not apply to the latter category of law; and 
that it is the modern English common law and doctrines of 
equity - as they may be from time to time - which have
4
been received in Nigeria by virtue of these provisions.
This raises the important question of the extent to which 
English decisions on common lav/ principles are binding 
upon Nigerian courts. Nigerian commentators are divided
1
Cap 49 (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963).
2
See Obilade, op cit, p 70 who submits that '/h/aving regard 
to Nigeria's historical links with England, the term 
could not, without more, have been intended to mean 
anything other than the common law of England'.
3
Op cit .
4
See Park, op cit, pp 20-24# where the author disposes in 
(it is respectfully submitted) convincing fashion of the 
various arguments propounded by Allott in support of his 
interpretation. See also Ezejiofor, op cit, p 8 and 
Obilade, supra, p 71.
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on this point ; but it is certainly strongly arguable
that House of Lords" decisions, at least, do have binding 
2
force. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the words 
"of England' qualifying the common law in most reception 
provisions should be deleted so as to enable 'the develop-
3
ment of a uniquely Nigerian common law and equity.'
Thus, Allott (in keeping with his overall view) believes 
that post-1900 decisions are not binding, whilst Obilade, 
ibid, asserts that 'the decisions of the courts of England 
are a mere guide to the Nigerian courts'. However,
Obilade cites as authority for this proposition the case 
of Alii v Okulaja,(1971) 1 U.I.L.R. 72, which is open 
to criticism in a number of respects, as pointed out 
by Cottrell, op cit. On the other hand, Ezejiofor,su£ra, p 31 
submits that Nigerian courts are bound by decisions of 
the House of Lords on principles of common law and equity; 
and so too does Park, supra, pp 62-63, who further submits 
that there is some authority for extending binding force 
to decisions of the Court of Appeal and Court of Criminal 
Appeal as well.
See Ezejiofor and Park, supra. Thus, both Ezejiofor and 
Park have no doubt but that House of Lords' decisions 
are binding on Nigerian courts. Neither particularly 
welcomes such a conclusion, but both believe it to be 
unavoidably dictated by the present wording of the recep­
tion provisions. The only limitation for which they 
contend is that binding force should be restricted 
(essentially for policy reasons) to decisions of the 
House of Lords alone. The reason suggested by Ezejiofor 
for this proposed limitation is that 'since the most 
authoritative statement on English law can be made only 
by the House of Lords, it is only those decisions that 
should bind the Nigerian courts': Ezejiofor, p 31.
Park considers that 'it would be unduly incompatible 
with the status of Nigeria as an independent nation' 
to hold her courts bound by the decisions of subordinate 
courts in England': Park, p 63. The significance of these 
views are further examinea in due course.
Park, ibid, p 19.
-134-
As regards statutes of general application in force in 
England before 1 January 1900, it is clear that these 
continue to apply in Nigeria - unless repealed or replaced 
by local legislation - and that their repeal in England 
itself by United Kingdom legislation passed after the cut-
i
off date is irrelevant. Some controversy surrounds the
criteria for determining whether a given statute is one
2
of 'general application' in England; and it has been 
suggested that, at minimum, it must (in order to do so)
3
have 'applied to all classes of the community in England* 
at that particular point in time. Examples of statutes 
which have been 'pronounced by the courts to be of general 
application and, as such in force within /the/ jurisdiction 
... /include/ the Conveyancing Act 1881,... the Statute
4
of Frauds 1677... /and/ the Sale of Goods Act 1893.'-
Subsection 45(2) of the Law (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, above, recognises - and attempts to cater for - the
5
difficulty that not all English law may be suitable for 
application in Nigeria, by virtue of different conditions
1
See Ezejiofor, op cit, p 5.
2
Various judicial formulations have been attempted. See 
Attorney-General v John Holt & Co., (1910) 2 N.L.R. 1, 
per Osborne. C.J.; Lawal v Younan, /1961/ 1 All N.L.R.
245; Brannwaite v Folarin, (1938) 4 W.A.C.A.76; and 
Young v Abina, (1940)6 W.A.C.A.180. Although the first has 
been quite extensively quoted, it is open to a number of 
objections, as explained by Obilade, op cit, pp 72-74, 
and Park, op cit, pp 26-29.
3
Obilade, supra, p 74.
4
Ezejiofor, op cit, pp 5-6.
5
The sub-section refers to 'Imperial laws' and there is some 
controversy as to whether this refers only to statute, or 
extends to common law and equity as well.
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in the two countries. It is thus clear, for example,
that an English statute cannot apply in Nigeria if some
pre-condition for its enforcement is not met; - and thus
the Bankruptcy Act 1883, for example, has not been received
in Nigeria, by virtue of the absence of the necessary
machinery for its application1. It is also clear, however,
that mere difficulty in the application of an English
2
statute which satisfies the primary test will not preclude 
3
its reception . More difficult, however, is the question 
whether the 'local conditions' qualification applies also
4
to principles of common law and equity . It is submitted
5
by Obilade that it does not ; and, from the wording of
sub-section 45(3), it does seem clearly intended to apply
to received legislation only. As for the extent of modi­
fication authorised, it is apparent that amendment should
be purely formal: and should not affect the substance of
. .  . . 6 the provisions.
See Obilade, supra, p 78.
ie., one that was 'of general application' and in force 
in England on 1 January 1900.
See Lawal v Younan, /1961/ 1 All N.L.R. 245.
See Obilade, supra, pp 79-80 and Park, op cit, pp 36-40.
See Obilade, ibid, p 80. Park also supports this con­
clusion (supra, p 38) but Allott takes the opposite view­
point, contending that courts in Nigeria (as in any other 
ex-colony) must have an inherent power 'by virtue of 
their general duty to administer justice* to modify all 
English laws (including those derived from common law 
and equity) in order to meet local conditions.
See, however, Park, supra, p 33, who explains that 'judges 
take a strict view of the direction that the verbal 
alterations must be formal only, and should not affect 
the substance of the enactment'; and warns that the 
courts should be careful not to adopt too narrow an 
approach, as seems to have occurred in Adeoye v Adeoye, 
/1962j N.R.N.L.R. 63.
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Apart from these general 'reception* provisions/ English 
statutes have also been brought into operation in Nigeria 
in other ways: for example/ by local legislation 'incor­
porating by reference the provisions of an English statute 
as part of Nigerian law: /or] by a local legislature 
re-enacting in part or in full/ as part of Nigerian law, 
the provisions of an English statute'.
The extent to which English precedent interpreting English
legislation applicable in Nigeria has binding force in the
country varies according to whether the legislation in
2
question had been directly extended to Nigeria/ or has 
been received in the country (by general or specific local
3
enactment), It is submitted by Ezejiofor that English 
cases interpreting the former category of legislation (or,
4
at least decisions of the House of Lords in this regard) 
are binding on the Nigerian courts. By contrast/ however, 
statutes received under general provisions such as s 45 
of the Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act^ are expressly 
made subject to modification to meet local conditions; 
and, in Ezejiofor's view, both this category of legislation 
- and English statutes specifically incorporated or re­
enacted in local legislation - should be seen as Nigerian 
enactments, in relation to which English precedent is merely
Ezejiofor, op cit, p 30. An example of the latter category
of legislation is provided by the Defamation laws applicable
m  the southern states, as further explained in Chapter Six
below.
2 . , .As explained anove.
3
As explained above.
4
The reasons for according special significance to the House 
of Lords have previously been explained.
5
See p 131 above.
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1persuasive.
It remains to note that all received English law, as well
as English legislation extended directly to Nigeria, is
2
subject to amendment and repeal by Nigerian statute ; 
and this principle may serve as a convenient starting 
point for examination of this second source of Nigerian law.
2.4.2.2. Nigerian legislation
Following the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria
3
in 1914 , all... pre-existing legislation in the two former 
units /was/ brought together /in 1916/, revised and re-
See Ezejiofor, supra, pp 31-33. He refers to the 'rule' 
in Trimble v Hill, 0  879) 5 App. Cas. 342, where the 
Privy Council held that 'where a colonial legislature 
has passed an Act in the same terms as an Imperial 
Statute, and the latter has been authoritatively construed 
by the Court of Appeal in. England, such construction 
should be adopted by the courts of the colony' - but 
also made it clear that this rule should remain subject 
to local conditions. Ezejiofor submits that Nigerian 
independence is a sufficient 'local condition' to render 
the rule inapplicable. It must, however, be pointed out 
that Ezejiofor's conclusions are not entirely clear; and 
appear to reflect some ambivalance as to the binding 
force of English precedent in this context.
2
See Obilade, op cit, P 77, in relation to received 
English law. Obilade cites a number of examples of where 
this has occurred, either directly or by implication - 
through the subsequent enactment of legislation incon­
sistent with the earlier law.
3 See the section on the History of Nigeria, above.
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1
enacted as "Ordinances"'. In 1954, the country became a
federation, with a central and three regional legislatures,
subsequently increased to four in 1963, with the creation
2
of the Mid-Western Region . Enactments of the federal leg­
islature were termed 'Ordinances'; and those of the regional 
legislatures were called 'Laws'. Pre-existing legislation was 
assigned to central and regional legislatures according to 
its subject matter (laws relating to items on the exclusive 
list, for example, being deemed to have been enacted by the
3
federal legislature) . On the attainment of independence in
4
1960, federal enactments were re-designated 'Acts'.
Following the assumption of power by the military govern­
ment in 1966, the country was divided into 12 states in
5
the following year. At the federal level, enactments 
of the military government were called 'Decrees', whilst 
at the state level they were designated 'Edicts'. Whilst 
the federal structure was retained, the balance of legis­
lative power shifted significantly towards the centre, 
and it was expressly provided that in the event of incon­
sistency between a Decree and an Edict - irrespective of
1
Ezejiofor, op cit, p 8.
2
See the History of Nigeria, above.
o
See Ezejiofor, supra, p 9. The reason was to facilitate 
repeal or amendment of such legislation, which could 
only be effected by the legislature with competence on 
the particular topic.
4
See Ezejiofor, ibid, who explains that - at this point in 
time - there were six streams of legislation - federal 
laws applying to the entire federation? federal laws 
governing the Federal Territory of Lagos; and regional 
laws in each of the (then) three Regions, increased to 
four in 1963.
5 See the History of Nigeria, above.
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1 2 their subject-matter - the former was to prevail.
3
In 1976, the country was divided into 19 states ; and in 
1979, Nigeria returned to civilian rule, under a Constit­
ution which retains its federal structure and divides 
legislative power between the federal legislature (Senate 
and National Assembly) and the various state Houses of
4
Assembly, in the manner explained above. Enactments of
5
the central legislature are now again termed 'Acts* and 
state statutes are called 1Laws' , and this nomenclature 
applies also to former Decrees and Edicts of the military
7
government.
As previously pointed out, Nigerian legislation is capable 
of amending or repealing any principle of English law - 
whether this is derived either from statute or from common 
law. Whilst this principle is clear, it may, however, be 
extremely difficult in practice to ascertain the extent to 
which local legislation has in fact, replaced (and excluded) 
English law. Of particular importance in this regard is 
the effect on the common law of the adoption of the Criminal
Thus, even if an Edict was passed on a residuary matter which 
(in terms of the earlier 1960 and 1963 Constitution) would 
have been exclusively within Regional competence, it would , 
still be subject to abrogation by an inconsistent Decree.
2 See s 3(4), Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree,
no 1 of 1966. The same provision was retained through sub­
sequent constitutional amendments effected by the military 
government (bar, of course, the swiftly repealed decree 
constituting Nigeria into a unitary state).
3 See the History of Nigeria above.
4 See the section on the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria above.
5 See s 277(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1979,
6 Ibid.
7 s 274(1), ibid .
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and Penal Codes, applicable in Southern and Northern Nigeria 
respectively. *
The Criminal Code was first introduced in Northern Nigeria
2
in 1904, and was extended in 1916 to the whole country.
3
It was closely modelled on the Queensland Code which/ in 
turn, was 'based mainly (though by no means entirely) on 
a Criminal Code drafted by one of the most eminent English 
criminal lawyers, Sir James Fitzstephen in 1878, and 
proposed to replace the common law /in England/ but never
4
enacted by the British Parliament.'
The application of the Code in the North was severely 
limited until 1933 by a provision entitling 'native tri­
bunals' (which dealt with the great majority of criminal
5
cases) to apply 'native law and custom' , instead of the 
rules laid down by the Code. For these purposes, the
g
highly developed Moslem Law was regarded 'merely as a
7 8special variety of native law and custom'. In 1933,
These are important not only because - as Codes - they 
theoretically purport to state the entire law on the 
matters with which they deal (and therefore pose particular 
problems in ascertaining the relationship between them 
and the prior law); but also because many of the provisions 
affecting the media which form the main subject of this 
study are derived from either the Criminal or the Penal Codes.
2 See C.O. Okonkwo (ed. ), Okonkwo and Naish on Criminal Law 
in Nigeria, 2nd ed., London, 1980, pp 4-5.
3
Introduced in the State of Queensland, Australia, in 1899.
4
Okonkwo and Naish, supra, p 5.
 ^ See s 4 of the 1904 Proclamation.
£
Moslem Law, as interpreted by the Maliki School in particulart 
was, of course, firmly entrenched amongst the Moslem comm­
unities in Northern Nigeria.
 ^ Okonkwo and Naish, op cit, p 5.
D
This was by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 19 33,
(No 56 of 1933).
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following pressure for the abolition of customary criminal 
law, the Criminal Code Ordinance was amended to provide 
(in section 4) that no person could be tried or punished 
by any court except under the express provisions of the 
Code or other applicable legislation. However, the effect 
of this amendment was open to some doubt, as other legis­
lation of 1933, especially the Natrve Courts Ordinance,
•saved' customary criminal law by entitling native courts
to continue to administer it (subject to certain prov-
2
isions as to punishment). Hopes that Mohammedan Courts
3
would gradually assimilate the Criminal Code proved futile 
and - in the face of mounting difficulty as to the proper
4
ambit of the Code and bustomary criminal law - the North­
ern Government set up, in 1958, a Panel of Jurists to con­
sider the problem. As a result, the Criminal Code was, u\ SoudW,
5
(in 1959) displaced by the Penal Code Law , 'based on a 
Code which had been working successfully in a Moslem comm-
c
unity, namely the Code of the Sudan'. This, in turn,
For the full text of this provision, see Okonkwo and Naish, 
ibid, p 6* See also Criminal Code Ordinance, Cap 21 (19 23 Laws
2 See, ibid, pp 6-7.
3 Ibid, p 7.
4 See Gubba v Gwandu N.A., (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 141 and the 
cases following it, listed by Okonkwo and Naish at p 8
n 16. The matter was settled in 1957 by the leading case 
Of Maizabo v Sokoto N.A., /'1957/ N.R.N.L.R. 133 (F.S.C.) 
but with considerably unsatisfactory results, as it meant 
that two sets of law had to be canvassed - customary 
criminal law, to ascertain guilt? and the Criminal Code, 
to ascertain sentence.
 ^ N.N.No 18 of 1959. The present provisions (as regards matters 
of state competence) are now contained in the Penal Code Law 
and its Schedule, (containing the Code itself), Cap 89,
(Laws of Northern Nigeria* 1963), whilst matters of federal 
competence are contained in the Penal Code (Northern Region) 
Federal Provisions Act, 1960, (No. 25 of 1960).
g
Okonkwo and Naish, supra, p 9.
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was modelled on the 1860 Indian Penal Code, which was based
upon a draft prepared by Lord Macaulay • The Northern
Penal Code - though clearly derived from common law roots
2
- also reveals strong Moslem Law influence. As regards 
the relationship between the two Codes, it is clear that 
'/e/ach Code covers offences committed within the territory
3
to which it applies and only within that territory* and 
both Codes contain identical provisions catering for diff­
iculties arising from various elements of an offence being
4
committed in different areas. The relationship between 
the Codes and English common law is/ however, more diff­
icult to establish.
A convenient starting point for discussion of this complex 
question is the * well-known dictum of Bairamian, J, in 
Ogbuago v Police  ^ : "We have in Nigeria a Criminal Code 
which is meant to be complete and exhaustive"'^. This 
is not intended to indicate (as would be patently false ) 
that the Criminal Code is the only source of criminal law 
in Nigeria*! Instead, *what it appears to mean is that,
 ^ Ibid.
2
For example, 'traditional Moslem crimes such as adultery, 
drinking alcohol, or insults to the modesty of a woman, 
are preserved*. See, ibid, p 10.
3 Ibid, p 11.
4
See, ibid. In general, the application of one Code or 
the other will be determined by reference to the area in 
which the initial act was committed.
5
(1953) 20 N.L.R. 139, discussed in further detail below.
0
Okonkwo and Naish, supra.
7
See Okonkwo and Naish, ibid., who point out that there are 
many other enactments creating criminal offences.
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with regard to the matters dealt with by the Code, the 
Code is self-sufficient and subject only to the process of
i
judicial interpretation*. Thus, where a provision in
2
the Code *is fully comprehensive in its details*, the 
courts will be slow to add further elements to the offence
as defined, as illustrated by the Privy Council decision
3 4in R v Wallace Johnson. Here, as further explained below,
it was held that the common law requirement of an 'intention 
to incite to violence* could not be considered an element 
of the offence of sedition, as it was not included within 
the exhaustive definition of the crime contained in the 
Criminal Code of the Gold Coast Colony (which is so sub­
stantially similar to that of Nigeria, that the interpre­
tation placed upon its provisions is highly persuasive in
5
Nigeria as well ).
However, not all provisions in the Code are equally com­
prehensive, and *the more laconic the section, the more 
the courts are driven back on English cases to assist in
g
interpretation*. For example, in s 230 of the Criminal
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
3 /1 940/ A.C. 231 (P.C.).
4
See Chapter Five below.
5
The interpretation of the Nigerian Criminal Code would, 
prima facie, be the same. The decision, and its significance 
for the law of sedition in Nigeria, are further analysed, 
in some detail, in Chapter Five.
6 Okonkwo and Naish, supra, p 15.
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Code, it is an offence Unlawfully to procure anything 
for anyone, knowing that it is to be used unlawfully to
i
procure an abortion*• As the Code itself gave no indic­
ation of the meaning of the word *unlawfully *, the West
2
African Court of Appeal in R v Edgal, turned for aid to
3
the English case of R v Bourne , which confirms that it 
is * lawful* to procure an abortion to save the mother's 
life. Likewise, in relation to section 516 of the Code, 
which deals with conspiracy but omits to define it, re­
course was had to the common law for guidance in R v
4
Nwanjoku.
In other instances, the Nigerian courts appear to have 
ignored relevant provisions of the Code altogether, pre­
ferring to base their decisions upon the common law.
This is particularly marked in relation to section 24 of 
the Code, which is 'the leading section in the Code on
5
criminal responsibility* - but which has 'never been
g
discussed in any reported case'. Instead, the courts have 
relied on the common law concept of mens rea.
1 Ibid, p 15.
2 (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 133.
 ^ /’1939_/ 1 K.B. 687. The West African Court of Appeal had
before it the report from The Times, of July 19, 1938.
An abortion in good faith to preserve the mother's life 
is lawful under C.C. s. 297, a section overlooked in 
Edgal.' Okonkwo and Naish, supra/ n 52.
4 (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 208.
5
Okonkwo and Naish, ibid, p 16.
 ^ Ibid. see also n 3 above, for another example of the
court overlooking a relevant provision of the Criminal Code.
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It follows that - even in relation to enactments intended 
to be as comprehensive as the Criminal and Penal Codes - 
the incidence of Nigerian legislation by no means renders 
the common law irrelevant. The position is succinctly 
summarised by Park as follows:
'So /w7hile it is beyond dispute that Nigerian leg­
islation can override English common law, equity and statutes, 
it does not automatically follow that such an enactment 
removes from the law any English rule on the same or a 
related subject. In each case it is necessary to examine 
the enactment and decide from its contents and the surround­
ing circumstances whether it was intended to supplant or 
merely to supplement the comparable portion of the received 
English law.'*
2.4.2.3. Nigerian Case Law
Nigerian case law is the third important source of Nigerian
law; and is growing in significance as the volume of judicial
decisions increases and as law reporting becomes more
2
rapid and more comprehensive. Past decisions constitute
a source of law by virtue of the common law doctrine of
precedent, under which - in broad principle - a court is
3
obliged to follow the ratio decidendi, of the judgment of 
a court higher than itself in the hierarchy, unless the
Park, op cit, p 50.
For further details regarding the system of law reporting, 
see Ezejiofor, op cit, pp 38-41 and Obilade, op cit, pp 
136-144. An important recent innovation has been the 
introduction of the Constitutional Law Reports of Nigeria, 
which - since inception in 1981 - have reported some 150 
cases, interpreting aspects of the 1979 Constitution.
The reason for, or principle established by, the particular 
judgment. For further exposition of this fundamental 
concept, see Obilade, ibid, pp 112-114 and Ezejiofor, 
ibid, pp 37-38.
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-j
earlier decision can be distinguished or arguably , was 
rendered per incuriam.^
Under the precedent system/ the hierarchy of courts is of 
the utmost importance. In Nigeria/ it may be presented 
diagrammatically as follows:
Supreme Court 
of Nigeria
Federal Court 
of Appeal
State Federal Sharia Courts
High Courts High Court of A p p e a l 3
Magistrates' Courts^ 
and District Courts
See Ezejiofor/ ibid, pp 33-37. He submits that lower courts 
should be entitled to reject a clearly erroneous decision 
of a higher court, so as not to perpetuate bad law. He 
acknowledges/ however/ that this is contrary to the view 
of the Supreme Court/ expressed (per Jibowu, Ag C.J.) in 
Tsamiya v Bauchi N.A./ /1957/ N.M.L.R. 350 at 352. Object­
ion to a lower court refusing to follow a decision given 
per incuriam by a higher court was also strongly voiced 
by Thompson/ J in Board of Customs and Excise v Bolarinwa,
/1 968/ N.M.L.R. 350 at 352.
2
See Ezejiofor, ibid, p 33/ who explains that a decision 'is 
said to be reached per incuriam if it was given in ignorance 
of a statute or a rule having statutory effect, such as a 
rule of court, which would have affected the decision if 
the court had been aware of it'.
3
All states are given the option of establishing Sharia 
Courts of Appeal under s 240 of the Constitution of 1979. 
Even before this, there were Sharia Courts of Appeal in 
each of the n-orthern states.
4
All states are given the option of establishing Customary 
Courts of Appeal under s 245 of the Constitution of 1979.
5
The District Courts mentioned here are district courts of 
the northern states. See Obilade, supra, p 116 n 2.
Customary.Courts 
of Appeal
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In addition to the above/ there are also other specialised
i
courts/ such as the National Industrial Court , the Courts
2 3of Resolution and the Code of Conduct Tribunal , to which
different rules apply; and which lie outside the scope of
this study.
4The Supreme Court of Nigeria has original jurisdiction m  
disputes between States or between the Federation and a
5
State and appellate jurisdiction 'to hear and determine
g
appeals from the Federal Court of Appeal '. It is the
7
highest court in Nigeria and its decisions 'are binding 
on all other courts to which the common law doctrine of
g
binding precedent applies-' . Its own past decisions are
Appeal from this court lies directly to the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria. See Obilade/ ibid, p 116; and for further 
detail regarding its composition and functions, see 
Obilade, pp 220-222.
2
Provision is made for courts of resolution in the ten 
northern states in which sharia law applies; and their 
function is to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between 
the High Ccrurt and the Sharia Court of Appeal. However,
'/n/o occassion has ever arisen for the convening of any 
of the Courts of Resolution'. See Obilade, ibid, p 183.
3
The Code of Conduct Tribunal is a recent innovation, 
having been introduced under the 1979 Constitution, as 
described above. Appeal from the Tribunal lies to the 
Federal Court of Appeal. See s 20(4), Schedule Five.
4
For details of the composition and quorum of the court, 
see Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria, 
supra, pp 300-301.
5
See s 212, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
g
See, s 213, ibid.
7
This has been the position since 1963 when appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was abolished. The 
status of Privy Council decisions prior to that date is furthei 
considered below.
g
Obilade, op cit, p 123. The doctrine of precedent does not 
apply in customary or sharia courts, as further explained 
at p 154 below.
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no t binding upon it/ but will normally be followed unless 
there is strong reason for departing from them: for example, 
the fact that the earlier decision was given per incuriam.
i
Further, in Johnson v Lawanson, the Supreme Court confirmed
that it will reverse its previous decision if the earlier
ruling 'would perpetuate uncertainty in the law and cause
2
hardship to the individual'.
3
The Federal COurt of Appeal has appellate jurisdiction 
'to hear and determine appeals from the Federal High Court, 
/State/ High Court/s/, Sharia Court/s/ of Appeal... and
4
Customary Court/'s/ of Appeal' The court is the second 
highest in the country and it binds all State High Courts
5
as well as the Federal High Court . In turn, it is bound 
by decisions of the Supreme Court, but is 'free to choose 
between two or more conflicting decisions of the Supreme 
C o u r t ' I t s  own past decisions are not binding, but
/1972/ 1 All N.L.R. 56.
Ezejiofor, op cit, p 18. The decision is also significant 
for confirming that the Supreme Court is entitled to treat 
pre-1963 Privy Council decisions in the same way as its 
own; and this aspect of the case is discussed further 
below. The decision is discussed at some length by Obilade, 
supra, pp 123-126; who criticises the sufficiency of the 
reasons advanced by the Court for overruling its previous 
decisions.
For details of the composition and quorum (in sharia and 
other cases) of the court, see Nwabueze, supra, p 301.
s 219, Constitution, supra.
It does not, of course, bind sharia and customary courts, 
which are not subject to the precedent system, as explained 
below.
Ezejiofor, supra, p 19, citing Oliko and others v Okonkwo, 
(unreported) FCA/B/3/77, delivered at Benin on~October 27, 
1977. The extent to which it is bound by the decisions 
of courts no longer part of the hierarchy - the Privy 
Council and West African Court of Appeal - is considered 
further below.
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should not lightly be overturned? and it has been suggested 
that the court should follow the guide-lines established
by the English Court of Appeal in Young v Bristol Aeroplane
1 2 Co Ltd , and adopted by the West African Court of Appeal
3
in Osumanu v Seidu . This approach would not entitle the 
Court to depart from decisions it merely considered inequit­
able; and it has been further suggested that (in criminal 
cases, at least) it should be given the power to do so to
4
prevent the perpetuation of injustice.
5
The Federal High Court is essentially the erstwhile Federal
c
Revenue Court/ established by decree in 1973 . It has 
original civil and criminal jurisdiction in matters relating
to federal revenue? company taxation and company law in
7 8general ? customs and excise duties; barking ; foreign
exchange, currency or other fiscal measures; copyright,
patents, designs, trade marks and merchandise marks; and
9
admiralty cases. . It also has appellate jurisdiction m
/19447 K.B. 718. The criteria laid down by the Court of 
Appeal are reproduced by Ezejiofor, op cit, p 19, n 98.
2
The status of the West African Court of Appeal in the
hierarfchy of Nigerian courts is further described below.
3 (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 437.
4
See Ezejiofor, supra, p 20, citing the dictum of Lord Goddard, 
C.J., in R v Taylor /~195Q7 K 2 K.B.368 at 371. Criminal cases 
seem to call for special treatment because they have such 
direct impact on the liberty of the subject.
5
For the composition of the court, see ss 228 and 231, Con­
stitution, supra.
c.
See Nwabueze, op cit, p 299.
 ^ For further details see s 7(1)(2)(b)(i) and (c)(i), of the
Federal Revenue Court Act 1973, (No 13 of 1973)* reproduced 
by Obilade, op cit, p 186.
Q
In Jammal Steel Structures Ltd v African Continental Bank Ltd 
^1973/ 1 All N.L.R. (Part 2) 208? (1973) 11 S.C.77, the 
Supreme Court held that 'banking did not include ordinary 
1banker-customer transactions'.
9 See s 7(1)(2) Federal Revenue Court Act, supra.
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relation to decisions of Appeal Commissioners (under Companies
and Personal Income Taxes Acts ); of the Board of Customs
and Excise; and of Magistrates' courts in respect of civil
2
or criminal causes or matters transferred to such courts.
The Federal High Court is bound by the decisions of the
3
Supreme Court and Federal Court of Appeal . Since other 
State High Courts have no jurisdiction in respect of the 
matters entrusted to it for adjudication/ the question of
4
State High Courts being bound by its decisions cannot arise. 
However/ insofar as cases may be transferred to magistrates' 
courts in the manner explained above, the previous decisions
5
of the Federal High Court are binding on these lower courts.
As regards its own past decisions, it is submitted (in keeping 
with general principle) that the Federal High Court should 
be slow to overturn its earlier rulings, but may do so where 
a prior decision was given per incuriam and (arguably) in
g
criminal cases where the previous ruling was clearly unjust.
See § 27 , ibid
2
See 27(c), ibid. Generally State High Courts have no juris­
diction on matters for which the Federal High Court has been 
givencresponsibility. However, a State High Court may trans­
fer such a matter to a magistrate's court for hearing if 
this would be more expeditious, and appeal will then lie 
from that court directly to the Federal High Court by virtue 
of this provision. See Nwabueze, op cit, pp 299-301.
3
The extent to which the court is also bound by the decisions 
of higher courts no longer part of the Nigerian hierarchy 
is considered further at p. 154.
4
Interestingly enough, neither Ezejiofor, op cit, nor Obilade 
op cit,give specific attention to the.-doctrine of precedent 
as it applies to the Federal High Court (or, as it was at 
the time of their writing, the Federal Revenue Court). Accord­
ingly, this and the following propositions are submitted on 
the basis of general principle.
5 Ibi(3-
6 Ibid.
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i
The State High Courts have - in general - unlimited original
2
civil and criminal jurisdiction* though in certain instances
3
their jurisdiction is excluded or restricted. They also
have appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals
'from magistrates' courts* district courts and some customary
T 4and area courts within /their/ area/s/ of authority. They 
also have power to 'exercise supervisory jurisdiction over 
inferior courts by orders of mandamus * prohibition and 
certiorari'.^
All the High Courts are bound by the Supreme Court of Nigeria
For the establishment and composition of the State High 
Courts* see ss 234* 235 and s 238* Constitution, supra 9 
In general, a State High Court is constituted by a single 
judge.
2
See s 236, ibid. Original jurisdiction to determine whether 
any person has been validly elected to any office, or 
whether the term of office of any person has ceased is further 
conferred on State High Courts by s 237, ibid.
3 — —
Thus, for example, the High Coarts have no jurisdiction in
disputes between states or between the Federation and a 
state; or, as noted above, in relation to matters reserved 
to the Federal High Court. For further details of instances 
where jurisdiction is excluded, see Ezejiofor, supra, p 122. 
Jurisdiction may also be restricted in a number of ways.
For example, under s 259, supra* a High Court may be obliged 
to refer a question relating to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and which 'involves a substantial question of 
law' to the Federal Court of Appeal.
4
Ezejiofor* supra, p 123. Detailed consideration of the 
provisions for appeal lies outside the scope of this study, 
but further information can be obtained from Ezejiofor, 
ibid et seg. and Obilade, supra, pp 188-192.
Obilade, ibid, p 191, who further explains the nature of 
these orders in brief outline.
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i
and the Federal Court of Appeal . When interpreting State
law, the High Court of a particular state 'does not form
2
part of the hierarchy of courts for any other state', and 
its decisions are not binding on the courts of any other 
state. When interpreting federal law, however, or principles 
of common law and equity, state High Courts bind 'all 
magistrates' courts in the country and all district courts
4
in the northern states.'
When constituted by a single judge, a High Court's decision 
is not binding on any other High Court, in accordance with
5
the practice of the High Court of England as clarified by
g
Lord Goddard in Police Authority for Huddersfield v Watson. 
It is submitted that this is so irrespective of whether the 
single judge is exercising original or appellate jurisdict-
The extent to which they are also bound by the decisions 
of other courts, no longer part of the Nigerian hierarchy^ 
is considered further below.
2
Obilade, op cit, p 129.
3
All these types of law apply throughout Nigeria, as opposed 
to state laws which apply only within the geographical area 
of the state itself. It is submitted, however, that an 
interpretation by one State High Court of a state law sub­
stantially the same as the law of another state, will be 
of persuasive authority in the latter. This is undoubtedly 
desirable in the interests of uniformity.
4
Obilade, supra, p 129.
5
See Obilade, ibid, p 130, who points out that '/t/he various 
local High Court enactments which receive the English rules 
of practice provide that the practice of the local High 
Courts is to be in substantial conformity with the practice 
of the High Court of England.'
6 /1947/ K.B. 842,at 848. Here Lord Goddard emphasises that a judgt 
'is not bound to follow the decision of a judge of equal 
jurisdiction.1
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i
ion . When/ however, a state High Court is constituted
2
by two or more judges, it may be equated with a Divisional
Court of the High Court of England, so that its decision
3
binds a single judge and should be followed by itself in
future except in the circumstances enumerated in Young v
4
Bristol Aeroplane Co. A single judge is not bound by 
any of his own previous decisions. ^
Magistrates' and District courts are divided into differ­
ent grades and have original civil and criminal jurisdiction
limited, in general, by the amount of the sum in dispute
7
or by the nature of punishment that may be imposed. Mag­
istrates' courts have certain appellate jurisdiction in 
relation to customary courts. Both types of court are
bound by the decisions of all higher courts in accordance
9
with the rules discussed above-. Their own decisions, how­
ever are not reported^and are not binding in any way.
See Obilade, supra, p 131 n 64, who contends that Agbalaya v 
Bello /196Q7 L.L.R. 109 must accordingly be considered as 
wrongly decided. Here the Lagos High Court held that a decision 
of the court given in the exercise of its appellate jurisdict­
ion is binding on the court when sitting as a court of first 
instance. However, if the 'appeal* court were constituted by 
a single judge, this would contradict the principle established 
in Police Authority for Huddersfield v Watson, supra.
2 For examples of legislation providing for this, see Obilade, 
supra, p 131 n 65.
3 See Obilade, ibid, p 132.
4 /19447 K.B. 718, noted also above. Whether this submission
has been accepted by Nigerian courts is open to some doubt,
however. See Ezejiofor, op cit, pp 23-24.
5 See Obilade, supra, p 132.
6 District Courts are to be found in the northern states.
7 For further detail, see Obilade, op cit, pp 192-206; and 
Ezejiofor, op cit, pp 102-113.
8 See Ezejiofor, ibid, p 95.
9 The binding force of decisions of courts no longer part of
the Nigerian hierarchy is considered further below.
10 See Obilade, supra, p 133.
11 Ibid. — --
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Courts applying customary and sharia law (including the Sharia 
and Customary Courts of Appeal) are not subject to the prec-
i
edent system. Accordingly, their own decisions are not
binding on other courts/ nor are they obliged to follow the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria nor the Federal
2
Court of Appeal • It is submitted, however, that 'by virtue 
of the appellate system , the Sharia and Customary Courts 
of Appeal should follow the decisions of these highest courts 
in Nigeria.
It remains to consider the position of courts which once - 
but now no longer - formed part of the Nigerian hierarchy.
Until 1963, when Nigeria became a Republic within the Common-
4
wealth, appeal lay from the Nigerian Supreme Court to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council/ whose opinions-in 
cases emanating from Nigeria - were binding on all courts 
in the country, including the Supreme Court. Since 1963, 
however, the Supreme Court 'has taken the place of the Privy 
Council as the highest court of Nigeria... /and/ regards
1
See Ezejiofor, supra, pp 16-17 and Obilade, ibid, p 133.
2
See Ezejiofor, ibid, p 18, who points out that this is some­
what anomalous, but is nevertheless the present law.
3
See Obilade, supra, p 134, who does not - however - explain 
why the mere Tact""that appeal lies to the Federal Court of 
Appeal (and hence to the Supreme Court of Nigeria) from the 
Sharia Courts of Appeal (see s 223, Constitution, supra) 
and from the Customary Courts of Appeal (see s 224, ibTd) 
should, in itself, be sufficient to bring the system of prec 
edent into operation in relation to these courts.
4 See the section on the History of Nigeria, above.
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i
the latter as co-ordinate with itself* . The Supreme Court
2
has, accordingly/ in Johnson v Lawanson, *overruled a decision 
of the Privy COuncil in circumstances where it would overrule
3
its own.* Privy Council decisions on Nigerian law remain
4
binding/ however/ on all other courts.
The position as regards the West African Court of Appeal is 
more complex. This court was given jurisdiction in relation
5
to Nigeria in 1933 and/ from it/ appeals lay directly to 
the Privy Council. Appeals to the West African Court of 
Appeal from Nigeria ceased in 19 54/ when the Supreme COurt
g
was created. Until the abolition of appeals from Nigeria
to the Privy Council in 1963/ the Supreme Court accordingly
had co-ordinate jurisdiction with the West African Court of
Appeal and was entitled to treat its decisions as it would
its own. Since 1963/ however/ the Supreme Court has enjoyed
*
a status higher than that ever enjoyed by the West African
Ezejiofor/ op cit, p 27.
2
/"1971/ 1 All N.L.R. 56. Detailed consideration of the Supreme 
Courts* reasons for overruling the earlier Privy Council 
decision lie outside the scope of this study/ but may be 
gleaned from Obilade, op cit, pp 123-125. In essence, it 
seemed that the Court considered that perpetuation of the 
rule would create confusion and injustice. It is also inter­
esting to note that the Court believed the earlier decision 
to have been given per incuriam - but did not canvass the 
question whether this, in itself, would entitle it to refuse 
to follow it.
3
Ezejiofor, supra.
4
See Obilade, supra, p. 128 and p. 133. This, of course, is 
only in relation to those courts in which the precedent system 
applies.
5
The Court had been established earlier in 1928 - and heard 
appeals from the Gold Coast, Gambia and Sierra Leone, as 
well. See Ewelukwa, 'Administration of Justice', op cit, 
pp 79 - 80. --------------------------  ---
6 See Ezejiofor, supra, p 27.
-156-
Court of Appeal (whose decisions always remained subject to 
appeal by the Privy Council) and it therefore seems approp­
riate that the Supreme Court should now regard decisions of 
the West African Court of Appeal as having subordinate status
i
to its own . The Federal Court of Appeal must now be regarded
as having jurisdiction co-ordinate with that of the West
African Court of Appeal; and is therefore entitled to treat
2
its decisions in the same way as its own. Decisions of the
West African Court of Appeal on Nigerian law continue to
3
bind all courts lower in the hierarchy.
The Western Court of Appeal, established in 1963 for the
4 5Western Region and brought into operation in 1967 heard
appeals from the former Western Region (excluding the Mid-West^)
7
and subsequently, from the Ogun, Ondo and Oyo States. It was
See Ezejiofor, ibid, p 28/ who cites, furthermore, a number 
of cases in which the Supreme Court has had no hesitation 
at all in overruling decisions of the West African Court of 
Appeal - thus confirming that it considers it a court of 
subordinate jurisdiction.
See Obilade, supra, p 128. He further points out that the 
Federal Court of Appeal is also entitled to treat decisions 
of the former Federal Supreme Court in the same way as its own.
S£]e Obilade, ibid, p 133. Again, this principle must be read 
as being limited in ambit to those courts in which the doctrine 
of precedent is applied.
By s %  Western Constitution of 1963. See Ewelukwa, op cit p 134.
By the Court of Appeal (Commencement of Provisions) Notice 
1967 and the Court of Appeal Act of 1967. It was deemed to 
have come into being on 1 April, 1967. See Ewelukwa, ibid.
For further information regarding the creation of the Mid-West 
Region, see the section on the History of Nigeria, above.
In 1967, the former Regions were divided into twelve states, 
as explained in the section on the History of Nigeria above.
The Western States were as above.
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i
abolished in 1976 . Its jurisdiction must be regarded as
co-ordinate with the present Federal Court of Appeal, est-
2
ablished for the whole country in the same year.
It remains to consider whether the decisions of other English 
courts have binding force in Nigeria. This difficult question
3
has previously been briefly alluded to , but now requires 
more detailed examination. In attempting this, it is impor­
tant - first of all - to distinguish between English cases 
interpreting principles of common law and equity; and those 
dealing with English legislation. It is proposed to conc­
entrate first on the former category of decision.
4
It may be recalled that Nigeria has received 'the common 
law of England and the doctrines of equity' under s 45 of
5
the Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act and its various state
6 7counterparts . It has been contended by Allott that the
principles so received are limited to those which were in
g
force in England on the 1st day of January 190(1. However, 
it seems clear from the wording of the statute that this
By s 3(1), Constitution (Amendment) (No 2) Act, no 42 of 1976. 
By the Federal Court of Appeal Act, no 43 of 1976.
See p 133 above, especially notes 1 and 2.
See p 131 above.
Previously known as the Interpretation Act, as explained above. 
See p 131 n 2.
Op cit.
This, of course is the date referred to in the Law (Miscell­
aneous Provisions) Act/ supra.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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cut-off date applies to English statutes alone; and this
is certainly the interpretation accepted by the majority of 
1
commentators. . If, however, Professor Allott were correct 
in his initial contention, there would, of course, be con­
siderable cogency in his further submission that decisions
of the English courts/ from the High Court to the House of 
2
Lords , dating from before 1900/ are binding on all Nigerian 
courts, whereas those after the * cut-off date" are persuasive
3
only (though entitled to the highest respect) . Accepting, 
however, that the cut-off date does not apply to common law 
and equity (as must surely be the correct interpretation), 
the matter becomes considerably more complex. Nigeria has 
received 'the common law of England' without limitation as 
to time: and it is crucial to determine whether present-day
4
decisions of the English courts interpreting the common 
law are automatically binding in Nigeria.
Obilade trenchantly asserts that all English decisions - 
whether of the House of Lords or not - are persuasive only 
in Nigeria. He points out that '/n/o English court forms
 ^ See p 132 n 4.
2
Allott, despite the dictum, of1 Lord Dunedin in Robins v 
National Trust Co, 321 j A.C. 515 (P.C.), suggesting that 
only House of Lords' decisions on English law are binding on 
colonial courts, submits that there is ground for contending 
that decisions of the Court of Appeal, Court of Criminal Appeal 
and High Court are also of binding force - and that the latter 
submission is undoubtedly in keeping with general practice 
in Africa.
3
Allott further adds the caveat that if the common law has 
subsequently been modified by statute, then subsequent decisions 
would not even be persuasive.
4
The question is posed in general terms at this point, and 
an attempt will later be made to distinguish between decisions 
of the various English courts.
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*1
part of any Nigerian court hierarchy and concludes, there­
fore, 'that no Nigerian court is bound by a decision of any
2
English court under the doctrine' of precedent. As regards 
the problem posed by the reception statutes, he brushes this 
aside by stating:
'/T/he local law-reception enactments nowhere provide 
that the Nigerian courts are to apply the common law of England 
or the English doctrines of equity as stated by the English 
courts. Nigerian courts are to apply rules which in their 
opinion constitute the correct rules of the common law or of 
equity, not necessarily rules stated as common law or equity 
rules by any particular English court. A Nigerian court may 
state that the correct common law or equity rule on a part­
icular matter is that stated in the decision of a lower English 
court which has been overruled by the House of Lords.'3
This, with respect, cannot be correct in principle. Nigeria 
has received the common law of England; and it is beyond 
question that House of Lords' pronouncements on the common 
law have ultimate and overriding authority.
Obilade further cites with approval the decision of the High
4
Court of the Western State in Alii v Okulaja in which Beckley, 
J. asserted that:
'/T/his court can/not/ be held bound by /a/ decision 
of the Court of Appeal of England, this country now being an 
independent sovereign state, but judgement of an eminent 
Judge like Lord Justice Denning (sic), Master of the Rolls, 
would certainly be of the most persuasive authority and would 
be followed except where the court feels otherwise strongly 
about the ratio decidendi of the decision.
1 Obilade, op cit, p 134.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 (1971) 1 U. I.L.R. 72.
5 Ibid, at 77.
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However, Obilade fails to take into account the criticisms
i
which have been levelled against this judgment - which
(much as it may reflect an understandably popular viewpoint
in Nigeria) is difficult to reconcile with clear statutory
provisions. In the circumstances of the case, these included
2
not only the Lato (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act , but also -
since the matter in issue was a procedural one - the High
Court of Lagos Law^ which states that 'the jurisdiction of
the court shall be exercised in substantial conformity with
the practice and procedure for the time being of Her Majesty's
i 4
High Court of Justice in England. Under English rules of 
practice and precedure, any decision of the Court of Appeal 
would undoubtedly be considered binding upon a High Court 
in England: and should therefore (in principle) have been 
considered binding by the Nigerian High Coiirt as well. The 
reason given by Eeckley, J. for refusing to regard himself 
as bound by the Court of Appeal - the fact that Nigeria is 
now an independent state - is irrelevant in the light.:;of 
these statutory provisions.
In summary, therefore, attractive as Obilade's submission may 
be to those who wish Nigeria to develop her own unique system 
of law, it is difficult to support his conclusion in principle 
in the light of the 'reception' statutes as presently framed.
1
See Cottrell, op cit.
2
Ms. Cottrell refers to this under its former name, the 
Interpretation Act.
3
See s. 12, High Court Law, Cap 52 (Lagos Laws, 1973).
4
See Cottrell , supra, p 248.
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A fundamentally different view of the binding force of English
decisions is taken by Park. He submits that:
'As long as the Nigerian courts are directed to 
apply the common law and equity "of England"/ the conclusion 
is inescapable that they must be bound by decisions of at 
least some of the English courts.'2
In his view/ the decisions of a single judge at first instance 
or of a Divisional Court are persuasive only/ whilst decisions 
of the House of Lords are 'the conclusive expositions of
3
English law' / so that it is not 'open to the Nigerian courts
4
to depart from them.'
The status of decisions of the Court of Appeal and Court of 
Criminal Appeal is more doubtful/ however. He points out
5
that the Privy Council has, in Trimble v Hill, ruled that 
colonial courts should follow Court of Appeal decisions in 
order to promote uniformity in the interpretation of English 
law throughout the Empire. This contrasts sharply/ however/ 
with a later dictum of the Judicial Committee in Robins v 
National Trust Company/ indicating that only House of Lords' 
decisions have binding effect on colonial courts/ since the 
House of Lords alone/ is the 'supreme tribunal to settle
7
English law'. Park suggests that the latter viewpoint is 
more in keeping with Nigeria's status as an independent nation,
 ^ QP cit.
3 Ibid, p 62.
3 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
3 (1879) 5 App. Cas. 342 (P.C.) (New South Wales).
6 /’1927/ A.C. 515 (P.C.) (Ontario).
7 Ibid.
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and concludes^ accordingly/ that 'the only English decisions
i
binding in Nigeria are those of the House of Lords'; and
that this is so irrespective of the status of the Nigerian
2
court hearing the particular case.
3
Essentially the same view is taken by Ezejiofor who agrees
4
that House of Lords' decisions are binding (and accordingly 
disapproves the statement by Thompson/ J./ in Akinsemoyin v
5
Akinsemoyin . 'that he was not bound by a decision of the
c
House of Lords on an issue involving a principle of equity' ). 
He goes further than Park/ however/ in suggesting that House 
of Lords' decisions are not always binding and that 'if a 
decision of the House of Lords is manifestly wrong the Supreme
7
Court should feel free to modify or ignore such a decision'.; 
and submits that this course should be taken / for example/ 
where 'an erroneous decison of the House remains uncorrected
Park, supra/ p 63.
2
See Park, ibid, pp 63-64. Accordingly/ he would agree with 
Beckley, J's conclusion in Alii v Okulaja, supra/ that the 
decision of the Court of Appeal was not binding on the High 
Court, but for very different reasons.
3 Op cit.
4
Ibid, p 31. In essence, he too appears to believe that so 
long as the reception statutes refer to the common law and 
equity of England, the courts are obliged to apply the "real" 
English law: ie/ English law as interpreted by its most 
authoritative tribunal/ the House of Lords. The decisions of 
lower English courst are not binding in Nigeria/ in his view, 
as they lack final authority.
5
Suit No AB/54/70 (High Court of Western State) (unreported). 
See, ibid, n 59. It is interesting to note that Thompson, J. 
apparently believed that House of Lords' decisions, as well 
as those of the Privy Council, ceased to be binding in 1963. 
Ezejiofor points out that this is misconceived.
See Ezejiofor, supra, p 31. 
Ibid.
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because of the now discarded rule according to which the court
i
cannot overrule its previous decisions!, Attractive as this 
proposition may be, it is difficult to reconcile with principle. 
If decisions of the House of Lords are binding - as seems 
indeed the only tenable conclusion on the present terms of 
the reception statutes - then that concludes the matter: 
unless (possibly) the House of Lords' decision was given per 
incuriam.2
So far, discussion has been confined to English decisions 
interpreting principles of common law and equity. Some 
consideration must also be given to English decisions inter­
preting English legislation. In this regard, it is submitted 
that Ezejiofor - as previously discussed - is correct in 
distinguishing between English legislation of direct applic-
3
ation in Nigeria ; and that which has been received into 
the country, either by general enactments such as the Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisons) Act or by specific local legislation. 
Ezejiofor submits that the former category of legislation 
comprises 'unalloyed enactments of the United Kingdom Parlia-
4
ment' ; and that, accordingly, English decisions interpreting 
their provisions should be binding in Nigeria to the same 
extent as decisions on the common law or equity. By contrast,
 ^ Ibid.
2
See p 146 above, where it is suggested that lower courts may 
be entitled to depart from decisions manifestly given per 
incuriam - overlooking, for example, relevant statute or 
other binding precedent. This submission should be accepted 
in order to prevent the perpetuation of bad law.
3
See p 136 above.
4
Ezejiofor, op cit, p 31.
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the latter category of legislation (even though identical 
in terms, in many instances/ to English legislation), is 
essentially Nigerian: and English cases interpreting equiv­
alent provisions in United Kingdom legislation should be con-
i
sidered persuasive only. There is some force in this arg­
ument, but it is somewhat difficult to accept in relation 
to one particular category of English statute - viz., 'statutes 
of general application that were in force in England on the
1st day of January, 1900*. These statutes/ as previously 
2
discussed , are received in Nigeria under/ inter alia, the 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, in the same way as the 
common law and equity of England. It seems, therefore, in 
principle, that English decisions interpreting these parti­
cular statutes should indeed be entitled to the same status 
as English decisions on common law and equity. On the other 
hand, it is also true - as pointed out by Ezejiofor - that 
these statutes are received subject to modification approp­
riate to meet local conditions (a qualification which does 
not apply to principles of common law and equity^); and there 
is some cogency in his further submission that the attain­
ment of independence in Nigeria is a sufficient 'local con­
dition' to free Nigerian courts from rigid adherence to 
interpretations adopted by the English courts.^
1
See ibid.
2
See p 131 above.
3
See p 135 above. This seems apparent on the clear wording of 
the statute, but is not accepted by Allott, as earlier indicated, 
who believes that Nigerian courts must be free to modify 
common law and equity as well in order properly to fulfill 
their role of dispensing justice.
4 See Ezejiofor, supra, p 32.
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In summaiyy thenf it appears that decisions of the House of 
Lords interpreting English principles of common law and 
equity are indeed binding on all Nigerian courts - and will 
remain so until such time as the various reception statutes 
are amended to delete reference to the common law and equity 
of England. It is further submitted that this amendment 
should now be made/ so as to enable and to encourage the 
development of a uniquely Nigerian system. It is futher 
submitted (as will be discussed at some length below) that 
this is particularly important in relation to the laws govern­
ing freedom of expression; for English courts in many instances 
have continued to adopt a narrow approach to this fundamental 
right - whilst other jurisdictions/ notably that of the 
United States of America - are far more liberal in attitude.
It is suggested - and will be further advocated in the course 
of this study - that Nigerian courts should move away from 
English precedent in favour of the more freedom-oriented 
approach of the United States; and the first step in this 
direction must plainly consist in the repeal of the provis­
ions which give binding force in Nigeria to decisions of the 
House of Lords.
2.4.2.3. Customary Law
It remains to examine in brief outline the fourth - and
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perhaps the most important - source of Nigerian law. 'Custom­
ary law consists of customs accepted by members of a community
2
as binding upon them'. In Nigeria, it falls into two broad
3
categories - ethnic customary law, which varies widely from
4
community to community and is still largely unwritten; and 
Moslem law, which applies to members of the faith, and is 
to be found 'principally in written form... /in/ the Holy 
Koran, the practice of the Prophet (the sunna), the consensus 
of scholars, and analogical deductions from the Holy Koran
5
and from the practice of the prophet.' It is termed either 
'Islamic Law' or 'the Shari'a' (the sacred law of Islam): 
and the 'version... in force in Nigeria is Moslem Law of 
the Maliki School'.^
The courts are, in general, 'directed to observe and enforce 
the observance of native law and custom, but only if the
It is submitted that customary law is far more generally 
known amongst Nigeria's 80 million or so inhabitants; and 
still exerts a far greater influence on the day-to-day 
life of the majority than law derived from the sources 
considered above. However, this study is concerned with 
laws of colonial and post-independence origin, affecting 
freedom of expression in Nigeria; and customary law accord­
ingly falls outside its ambit.
2
Obilade, op cit, p 83.
3
See Obilade, ibid.
4
Ezejiofor, op cit, p 42. He points out that the Anambra 
Ministry of Justice has recently published a Customary Law 
Manual recording the customary law of Anambra and Imo states.
5
Obilade, supra, p 83. 
 ^ Obilade, ibid.
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particular rule is not repugnant to natural justice, equity
and good conscience, nor incompatible either directly or
by implication with any law for the time being in force.'
A further qualification is added by the Evidence Act, to
the effect that a custom 'shall not be enforced as law if
2
it is contrary to public policy*.
A customary rule which is 'repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience* is void. No hard and fast
test has been developed by the courts in this regard, each
rule being treated on its merits as occasion arises. An
example of a rule held void was one entitling 'the former
owner of a slave to administer the latter's personal prop-
3
erty on his death'.
The criterion that the rule in question must not be cont-
4
rary to public policy is less often invoked as, in general, 
the first and third qualifications are sufficient to dis­
pose of the matter.
1
Ezejiofor, op cit, p 43, n 3, citing, for example, 
the High Court of Lagos Law, Cap 52, s 27(1).
2
See 14(3). In addition, the rule must be 'in accordance 
with natural justice, equity and good conscience' - 
essentially the same as the first requirement under the 
High Court legislation above.
3 See Ezejiofor, supra, pp 43-44.
4
It was, however, invoked in Cole v Akinyele (1960) 5 F.S.C. 
84. Here the alleged customary law rule was considered 
contrary to public policy because the acceptance that a 
child of parents not married to each other could be 
legitimated by acknowledgement of paternity might have 
had the effect of encouraging promiscuity.
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Some doubt attaches, as regards the principle that customary
law must not be incompatible with any 1 law1, as to whether
the word 'law' comprises 'received English rules of common
1
law and equity as well as statutes'. The matter has not
2
yet conclusively been resolved by the courts, but Ezejiofor 
submits that the word should be interpreted to mean '"any
3
local enactment"' . He further points out that '/’t/his 
criterion has brought about considerable modifications in
4
the rules of customary law' ; and has, for example, limited
5
the amount payable by way of dowry to N60.Q0. The most 
significant local enactment in this regard is perhaps the 
principle - which has now become incorporated in the Con­
stitution - that:
' fAj person shall not be convicted of a criminal 
offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty 
therefor is prescribed in a written law',6
The only exception made is in relation to the unwritten law
7
of contempt of court (as further discussed below ). For
1
Ezejiofor, supra, p 45.
2
See for example/ Malomo v Olusola, (1954) 21 N.L.R. 1;
(1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 12, discussed by Ezejiofor, op cit,p 45, 
who points out that final determination of the point was 
unnecessary on the particular facts of the case.
3
Ezejiofor, ibid, p 46.
4
Ezejiofor, ibid.
5
See ibid.
6 — —
See s 33(12) Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, 1979, 
replacing earlier constitutional guarantees in this regard. 
This followed the decision taken at the 1958 Constitutional 
Conference (discussed above) to abolish customary criminal 
law in Nigeria altogether. See Okonkwo and Naish, op cit,
P 10.
7 See Chapter Eight below.
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the rest, the * effect of this rule /was/ to abolish virtually
i
all customary law offences'.
2
Further analysis of customary law lies outside the scope 
of this study. So, too, does more detailed examination of
3
the structure of the Nigerian courts. Instead, having thus 
outlined both Nigeria's history and its general legal 
system, it is now proposed to move closer to the main 
object of this study; and to focus attention on a topic 
of tfital importance in this regard: the Nigerian scheme 
for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in 
general - and freedom of expression in particular.
2.5. The Nigerian Bill of Rights
The Nigerian Bill of Rights is of major importance in this 
study, as it incorporates a guarantee of freedom of express­
ion which provides a significant yardstick for the assess­
ment of the constitutionality of the many laws which govern 
the media in the country. Some understanding of the Bill 
as a whole and of the scheme provided for its enforcement 
is accordingly essential: and it is proposed to canvass 
these issues in brief outline, before proceeding to analyse 
the terms of the guarantee of freedom of expression itself.
1
Ezejiofor, supra, p 46.
2
For further information, see Ezejiofor, ibid, pp 46-53; 
Obilade, supra, Chapter Six; and Park, op cit, Chapter©
Fiverto Nine.
3
For detailed expositions, see Obilade, ibid, Chapter Ten 
and Ewelukwa, 'Administration of Justice', supra, pp 54-163.
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2.5.1. The Incorporation and Development of the Bill of Rights
The idea of incorporating a Bill of Rights into the Nigerian 
Constitution was first mooted at the Constitutional Con-
i
ference of 1953 and was prompted by 'the unpleasant exp-
2
erience of the A.G. leaders and those of the N.E.P.U. in 
their attempt to organise support for their parties in the
Northern Region, which was then an exclusive preserve of
3 4the N.P.C. , the ruling party in the region*. At the
1954 Conference, 'two memoranda... /were submitted/ from 
minorities who demanded to be constituted into separate
g
states' ; and when the Conference reconvened in 1957, it
was decided to establish a Minorities Commission, with
the following terms of reference:
'(1) to ascertain the facts about the fears of 
minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of 
allaying those fears, whether well or ill-founded;
(2) to advise what safeguards should be included 
for this purpose ihi.the Constitution of Nigeria.
(3) if, but only if, no other solution seem/ed/ 
to the Commission to meet the case, then as a last resort 
to make detailed recommendations for the creation of one 
or more new states.
See the History of Nigeria, above.
See the History of Nigeria, above for a brief description
of this party.
See the History of Nigeria, above, for a brief description 
of this party.
M.I, Jegede, 'The Supreme Court's Attitude towards some 
Aspects of Individual Freedom and the Right to Property', 
in A.S. Kasunmu, (ed.) The Supreme Court of Nigeria,
Ibadan, 1977, pp 107-132, p 110.
See the History of Nigeria, above.
Odumosu, Nigerian Constitution: History and Development, supra, 
p 241 .
See the Report of the Minorities Commission, (Villinck Report') , 
Cmnd. 505, 1958, pp 1-2.
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Having toured Nigeria and ’received evidence and represent­
ations from individuals and parties in addition to the
1 2 Federal and Regional Governments' , the Commission reported
back to the Constitutional Conference convened in 1958.
The Commission found that there were minorities with fears
of majority domination in each of the regions and were
satisfied that the solution did not lie in the creation
3
of more states as '/t/hat step in itself would create 
further minorities and there would be no end to the
4
process'. Instead, in addition to specific proposals 
relating to the police and the creation of certain 'special* 
and 'minority' areas,^ the Commission recommended that 
minority fears be met through the introduction of guarantees 
of fundamental human rights in the Nigerian Constitution.
It stated:
'Provisions of this kind in the Constitution are 
difficult to enforce and sometimes difficult to interpret. 
Nevertheless, we think they should be inserted. Their 
presence defines beliefs widespread among democratic 
countries and provides a standard to which appeal may be 
made by those whose rights are infringed. A government 
determined to abandon democratic courses will find ways 
of violating them, but they are of great value in prevent­
ing a steady deterioration in standards of freedom and 
the unobtrusive encroachment of a government on individual 
rights'
Odumosu, supra, p 125.
2
See the Willinck Report, supra.
3
This is hardly surprising, given the Commission's terms 
of reference, as described above, which made it clear 
that the creation of new states was only to be recommended 
in the very last resort.
4
Odumosu, op cit, p 242.
 ^ See, ibid, pp 242-243.
Willinck Report, supra, p 9 7.
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The Bill of Rights introduced into Nigerian law in 1959 
pursuant to this recommendation (the terms of which are 
further considered below) broke new ground in the devel­
opment of law within the Commonwealth. Britain itself 
set little store by such provisions/ believing - in 
essence - that the common law provided effective remedies 
which were more important than abstract declarations of 
principle. This attitude was reflected also in the con­
stitutions of the older members of the Commonwealth/ such
2 3as Canada and Australia . *Malaya was the first Common­
wealth country to receive from Britain a Constitution in
4
which fundamental rights are provided in some detail*,
The attitude of the United Kingdom to the introduction of 
an entrenched bill of rights has been canvassed by, inter 
alia/ Michael Zander, A Bill of Rights?, 2nd ed., London, 
1979. Notwithstanding her ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights of 19 50, Britain still seems 
to have a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards an entrenched 
Bill of Rights, seeming to believe, in broad outline, 
that this is unnecessary in the United Kingdom, as 
English law ’already provides effective remedies (which 
are far more important than resounding (but empty) declar­
ations of principle]b : and that the introduction of a 
Bill of Rights would create more difficulties than its 
benefits would warrant. See, however, Leslie Scarman, 
English Law - The New Dimension, London, 1974, who points 
to the new pressures facing law and society and submits 
that a Bill of Rights may now be needed.
2
A Bill of Rights was first enacted in Canada in 1960.
3
The Australian Constitution contains no formal bill of 
rights. See Odumosu, op-, cit, p 245.
 ^ Odumosu, ibid, p 245. The United Kingdom had earlier, 
in 1930, accepted the recommendations of the Simon Comm­
ission that no fundamental rights should be written 
into the Indian Constitution; and a Bill of Rights was 
introduced in India only in 1950, after the attainment 
of independence.
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but the Nigerian Bill of Rights went considerably further 
fby spelling out fundamental human rights in an elaborate
i
fashion1 . Since its introduction, the Nigerian Bill of 
Rights has provided a model for a great number of the new 
states within the Commonwealth, which have adopted guarantees 
of fundamental rights closely paralleling those of Nigeria.2
In terms, the Nigerian Bill of Rights is based upon the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights of 
19 50, to which the British Government had previously adhered 
on behalf of Nigeria, but which required local enactment
3
to acquire binding force. The rights guaranteed were 
enshrined in Chapter III of the 1960 Independence Constit­
ution and were repeated, without substantive modification, 
in Chapter III of the 1963 Constitution, adopted when 
Nigeria became an independent republic within the Common-
4
wealth. On the assumption of power by the military govern­
ment in 1966^, it passed the Constitution (Suspension and
g
Modification) Decree which suspended a number of provisions 
of the 1963 Constitution (particularly those relating to
the legislature and executive) but not the guarantees of
7 8fundamental rights • However, the Decree also provided
1
Odumosu, op cit, p 245.
2
James S. Read, Seminar, address given at the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, London, March, 1982.
3
See Odumosu, supra, p 244; and Order in Council, S.I. 1959, 1172. 
 ^ See the History of Nigeria, above.
5
See the History of Nigeria, above.
6 No. 1 of 1966.
 ^ Nwabueze, A Constitutional History of Nige3~ia, supra, p 217.
8
See s 6, supra.
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that 1No question as to the validity of this or any other
Decree or of any Edict shall be entertained by any court
of law in Nigeria*; and this provision was repeated in
a number of decrees which prima facie contravened the Bill
of Rights, but could not - accordingly - be ruled uncon-
stitutional by the courts. In 1970, the supremacy of the
military government over the constitution was made express
in the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforce-
2
ment of Powers) Decree 1970 which declared *that what 
was saved or preserved from the 1963 Constitution remained 
in operation only by the permission and at the sufferance
3
of the F.M.G.' * The 1963 Constitution (subject to substan 
tially the same suspensions and modifications as had been
4
effected under the first military decree of 1966 ) did, 
however, continue in force, as re-affirmed in the Constit-
5
ution (Basic Provisions) Decree enacted after the third
See Nwabueze, supra, p 217. He cites a number of examples 
of such decrees: decrees providing for the arrest and 
detention of named persons, for the dissolution of named 
associations, authorising restrictions on the circulation 
of newspapers, prohibiting the formation of political 
parties, etc.
Decree No 28 of 1970. This was passed in response to the 
Lakanmi case, noted above, in the section on the History 
of Nigeria. Detailed analysis of this case and of the 
significance of the notorious Decree No 28 lies outside 
the scope of this study, especially as this is now princ­
ipally of academic interest following Nigeria's return 
to civilian rule. For further information, see A. Ojo, 
'Public Law, the Military Government and the Supreme Court', 
m  Kasunmu (ed.) The Supreme Court of Nigeria, p 90-106.
See also Nwabueze, supra, Chapter Seven, especially pp 
170-174.
3
Nwabueze, ibid, p 205.
4
See p 173 above.
5 No. 32 of 1975.
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i
coup on 29 July of that year - but always subject to the 
supremacy of the military governments decrees. Even under 
these restrictions/ however/ the Bill of Rights was by no 
means rendered nugatory. It continued to operate 'as a 
limitation upon executive action in cases where its applic­
ation had not been expressly excluded in relation to a
2
particular decree'; and could also still be used to measure
3
the constitutionality of the law of the pre-military era.
In terms/ the Bill of Rights remained precisely the same 
throughout the period of military rule. With the prospect 
of return to civilian government/ however/ a Constitutional 
Drafting Committee (the C.D.C.') was established to draft 
a number of changes to the Bill of Rights. Apart from 
changes to the guarantee of freedom of expression - consid-
4
ered further below - the C.D.C. recommended that the
5
guarantee of personal liberty be strengthened; that the 
right to fair hearing be modified to oblige those exercising
See Nwabueze/ supra.
Nwabueze, ibid, p 218# emphasis supplied.
The courts' power of judicial review was ousted only in 
relation to legislation of the military government - not as 
regards pre-existing laws.
See p 2l0 below.
Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee/ 1976/ 
para. 4.4, p xviii.
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1 2 administrative functions and hearing chieftaincy questions
to observe the rules of natural justice and to enable
3
legal representation in customary and area courts; that 
further limitations be imposed on the assumption and
4
exercise of emergency powers; and that illegitimate
5 6children should not be subject to disabilities. These 
and other changes have been introduced in the 1979 Cons­
titution, which incorporates the Bill of Rights in Chapter 
IV. Thus, by way of further illustration, the right to
7
privacy is now guaranteed, as is freedom from sex discrim-
Q
ination , whilst guarantees of property rights have been
9
revised to take into account the new Land Use Act, 19 78 .
Further examination of the detailed provisions of the Bill
10of Rights lies outside the scope of this study ; and it 
is instead proposed to focus now on the general constitut­
ional scheme for the protection and enforcement of the 
guaranteed rights.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ibid, para 4.5-1, p xvii.
Ibid, para 4.6, p xvii.
Ibid, para 4.5-2, p xvii.
Ibid, para 4.7, p xviii.
Ibid, para 4.8, p xviii.
The provision incorporated on the last point is considerably 
more ambiguous than that recommended by the C.D.C. See 
Read, 'The New Constitution of Nigeria1, supra, p 149.
s 34, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
s 39(1), i-bid. gee Read, supra, who points out that '/t/he 
potential impact of this provision especially on personal 
laws, including customary laws, in Nigeria could be 
considerable'.
s 40, ibid, and see Read, ibid.
For further information, see Read, ibid, pp 148-150, Nwabueze, 
The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria, supra, especially 
Chapters 22-27, and A.S. Fadlalla, 'Fundamental Rights and 
the Nigerian Draft Constitution', (1977) 10 V.R.U. pp 543- 
553.
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2,5.2.» . The General Scheme for_the Enforcement of the Bill 
of Rights
The general scheme for the enforcement of the Nigerian Bill 
of Rights rests on four fundamental principles: entrench­
ment of the Bill so that it cannot easily be amended; the 
justiciability and supremacy of its provisions; the right 
of access to the courts to obtain relief against its infri­
ngement; and the independence of the judiciary to whom 
the task of its interpretation and enforcement is entrusted. 
Each of these aspects of the general enforcement scheme 
must now briefly be examined.
2.5.2.1. The Entrenchment of the Bill of Rights
The first point to note is that the guarantees contained
within the Bill of Rights are entrenched provisions of
the Constitution. Thus, under section 9(3)*
'An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose 
of altering the provisions of /"section 9(3) itself/... 
or Chapter IV of /the/ Constitution shall not be passed 
by either House of the National Assembly unless the prop­
osal is approved by the votes of not less than four-fifths 
majority of all the members of each House, and also approved 
by resolution of the Houses o^Assembly of not less than 
two-thirds of all the States'.
It needs no emphasis that so high a standard of approval 
will not easily be met, especially as the requisite per­
centage must be based on the number of members of each
s 9(3), Constitution, supra.
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House provided by the Constitution/ irrespective of any
i
vacancies that exist in fact. Accordingly/ the Bill of 
Rights cannot lightly be set aside or changed: and this is 
a vital factor in the protection it provides.
2.5.2.,2_._ The Justiciability and Supremacy of^the Bill of Rights
The second important safeguard lies in the justiciability 
and supremacy of the Bill of Rights. The first important 
provision in this regard is s 6 (6) of the Constitution/
which makes it clear that the Fundamental Objectives and
2 3Directive Principles of State Policy are not justiciable,
but includes no such caveat in relation to the Bill of
Rights. On the contrary/ it affirms, instead/ that the
Nigerian courts have full power to determine all legal
disputes which may arise: whether these are between private
4
parties, or between the individual and the state.
The second vital provision in establishing the justiciab­
ility of the Bill or Rights (as well as the crucial 
machinery for obtaining access to the courts, as further
5
explained below ) is s 42 of the Constitution. This provides:
s 9(4), ibid.
2
The content of these has previously been discussed at p 114 
above.
3
Thus, s 6 (c), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1979, provides that the authority of the courts shall not 
extend to any issue or question as to whether any act or 
omission by any authority or person, or as to whether 
any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy set out in Chapter II.
4 Thus s 6 (b) declares that judicial powers /of the courts./ shall 
extend to all matters between persons, or between governments 
or authority and any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and 
proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any 
question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.
5 See p 180 below.
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1(1) Any person who alleges that any of the prov­
isions of this Chapter has been, is being or is likely to 
be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply 
to a High Court in that State for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, 
a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any application made to it in pursuance of the 
provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue 
such writs and give such directions as it may consider 
appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the 
enforcement within that State of any rights to which the 
person who makes the application may be entitled under this 
Chapter'.1
Also of significance in this regard is section 259 of the
Constitution which provides, in broad outline, for 'any
question as to the interpretation or application of this
Constitution' which arises in any proceedings and involves
'a substantial question of law' to be referred to a higher
2
court for its decision.
As regards the supremacy of the Bill of Rights, this is 
provided by section 1 of the Constitution, which applies 
to the provisions of the Constitution in general; including, 
therefore, the guarantees of fundamental rights in Chapter 
IV. Its most important provisions are subsections (t) and
(3) which provide as follows:
s 42(1), Constitution, supra.
See s 259, ibid. Thus, for example, if the question 
arises in the High Court, which considers that it 
involves a substantial question of law, the Court may, 
(and must if any party so requests) refer the question 
to the Federal Court of Appeal for decision. The High 
Court must then dispose of the case in accordance with 
the latter's ruling.
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f(1) This Constitution is supreme and its provisions 
shall have binding force on all authorities and persons 
throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria;1...
(3) If any law is inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and 
that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency 
be void'.2
This provision thus makes it clear that any law which is 
inconsistent with the guarantees enshrined within the 
Bill of Rights is pro tanto void. It needs no emphasis 
that this is of the utmost importance in guarding against 
erosion of the freedoms thus protected: and that it is
this provision primarily which enables the Bill of Rights 
to be used as a yardstick for assessing the validity of 
laws which seem to encroach upon its guarantees.
2.5.2.3. The Right of Access to Court
The most important provision in this regard (though s 259 
above also has significance) is s 42 of the Constitution, 
the terms of which have previously been reproduced in full 
and will not be reiterated here. The1 provision is espec­
ially significant in conferring a right of access to court 
for the sole and specific purpose of obtaining clarification 
and redress of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The 
section also has the great advantage of conferring unrest­
ricted latitude on the courts in deciding what type of
s 1(1), ibid. 
 ^ s 1(3), ibid.
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order should be made. Thus, it seems that the courts have 
power not only to order damages or an injunction or to 
issue a declaration - but may also invoke the remedies of
i 2
certiorari , prohibition and mandamus . Moreover, not
only may the courts adopt either category of relief, they
may also issue a combination of both in the same action,
3thus eliminating the common law 'wall of demarcation1 
between the two.
The procedure to be followed in applying to court under 
s 42 is now laid down by the Fundamental Rights (Enforce 
ment) Rules 1979, which 'permit application to be made
See Nwabueze, Thg Presidential Constitution of Nigeria, 
supra, p 356. Nwabueze suggests, however, that the 
courts may only grant certiorari in circumstances in 
which this could, historically, be done: ie., where 
there is a duty to act judicially. It should liverc- 
e. be noted that this duty does not always apply? 
and that, accordingly, the ordinary administrative deci­
sion of an official cannot be the subject of certiorari: 
as confirmed in Arzika v Governor, Northern Region, /~1961/
1 All N.L.R. 379, where theT High Court refused certiorari 
in relation to an order for the removal of a native chief 
made by the Governor of the Northern Region, on the ground 
that the Governor's decision had been primarily one of 
policy; and that he was therefore not obliged to act 
judicially in making the order for removal. Nwabueze 
accordingly submits that this may provide some limitation 
to the relief obtainable under s 42. See ibid, pp 355 - 
356.
See Nwabueze, ibid.
See, ibid, p 354, where Nwabueze emphasises the importance 
of this innovation.
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i
either by notice of motion or originating summons' . One
complicating factor, however, (now introduced under the
1979 Rules) is the need to obtain prior leave to apply
to court in this way. The application for leave is made
ex parte , and must be brought within twelve months of
the date of the matter or action complained of, unless an
2
extension of time is granted. The imposition of the 
requi^neJit for leave is somewhat disturbing; and its validity 
is open to some doubt, as it seems highly questionable 
whether 1leave of the court or judge can /legitimately/ 
be attached as a condition for the exercise of a right 
(ie., the right to apply to the court for the enforcement 
of a fundamental right) which the Constitution itself 
guarantees, unless leave is to be granted as a matter of
3
course with no discretion... to refuse it1.
2.5. 2. 4. The Independence of the Judiciary
One further aspect of the general scheme for the enforce­
ment of the Bill of Rights remains to be considered. As 
previously noted, the Bill is entrenched and justiciable - 
and the judiciary has a vital role to play in ensuring that 
it is not undermined by the other branches of government.
To perform this role adequately, the independence of the 
judiciary must be ensured: and the Constitution attempts
__ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ ___________     3 _ _
1 Ibid/ p 353.
2
Nwabueze, ibid, pp 353-354.
3 Ibid, p 354.
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to secure this by laying down strict conditions regarding 
the removal from office of judges. Thus section 256 
provides, in general, that a judicial officer may only 
be dismissed for 1 inability to discharge the functions 
of his office or appointment (whether arising from infirm­
ity of mind or of body) or for misconduct or contravention
i
of the Code of Conduct'. In addition, the Chief Justice
may only be removed by the President, 'acting on an address
2
supported by /"a/ two-thirds majority of the Senate'; 
whilst the Chief Judge of the High Court of a state, the 
Grand Kadi of a Sharia Court of Appeal or the President of 
a Customary Court of Appeal may be removed only by the 
Governor 'acting on an address supported by /a/ two-thirds
3
majority of the House of Assembly of the State'. In all 
other cases, the President (or Governor) may act only on 
the recommendation of the Federal (or State) Judicial
4
Service Commission .
The significance of this latter requirement lies in the 
fact that the Judicial Service Commissions are essentially 
independent bodies. Thus, the Federal Judicial Service 
Commission, for example, is composed of the Chief Justice 
of Nigeria, as Chairman, the President of the Federal Court
of Appeal, the Attorney-General of the Federation, two
persons (who have been qualified to practise as legal 
practitioners in Nigeria for not less than 15 years) from
See s 256(1)(a) and (b), Constitution, supra.
 ^ s 256 (1 ) (a) (i), ibid.
3 s 256 (1 ) (a) (ii), ibid.
4 s 256(1)(b), ibid.
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a list of four recommended by the Nigeria Bar Association, 
plus two "other persons, not being legal practitioners, 
who in the opinion of the President are of unquestionable
i
integrity'•
Thus, it is clear that a judge in Nigeria cannot arbitrarily 
be dismissed from office at the whim of the executive? and 
therefore need not fear this in giving a ruling upholding 
the fundamental rights and contrary to the presumed wish 
of the other branches of government.
Judicial independence is protected not only in this way, 
but also by the manner of appointment to the bench. Again, 
this does not depend on executive wish alone. Instead, 
all judicial appointments (except that of the Chief Justice 
of Nigeria who is appointed by the President in his disc­
retion but subject to the confirmation by simple majority 
2
of the Senate ) are made on the advice or recommendation 
of the appropriate Judicial Service Commission (either 
Federal or State)• In addition, the appointment of the 
President of the Federal Court of Appeal, of the Chief 
Judges of the State High Courts, of the Grand Kadis of 
Sharia Courts of Appeal and of the Presidents of Customary
3
Courts of Appeal require legislative endorsement.
1
See s 7(e), Third Schedule, ibid.
2 s 211(1) , ibid.
3 See ss. 211, 217, 218, 229, 235, 240 and 246, ibid.
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Thus, in this way too, the independence of the judiciary 
is promoted by guarding against 'political* appointments 
to the bench.
2.5.3. The Two Categories of Rights Contained Within the Bill
Within the Bill of Rights as a whole, a clear distinction
is drawn between two categories of fundamental liberties.
The first category is stated in terms which are "relatively"
absolute, in the sense that, in general, the rights thus
protected are subject to derogation only in the circumstances
specifically enummerated in each guarantee? Thus, for
example, s 31 of the Constitution guarantees that 'no person
2
shall be compelled to perform forced or compulsory labour', 
but then further qualifies this declaration by explaining 
that 'forced or compulsory labour' does not include 'any 
labour required in consequence of the sentence or order of
3
a court'. As regards this category, however, the rights 
to life and personal liberty are "unusual" in that they 
are subject - in addition to derogations expressly mentioned
4
in the sections which proclaim the right to both - to 
further (and unspecified) derogation, during a period of 
emergency, through 'measures reasonably justifiable for 
the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during
5
that period of emergency.'
The rights to life and liberty are subject to additional 
derogation, as further explained in the text below.
2
s 31(1)(b), Constitution, supra.
3 s 31 (2) (a) , ibid.
4
The sections in question are ss. 30 and 32, ibid.
5
s 41(2), ibid, and see also p 190 below.
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By contrast, the rights included within the second category,
are "qualified"; and may validly be curtailed by laws
'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' in order
to protect or promote a number of recognised interests
such as 'public order', 'public safety' and 'public 
2
morality'.
The first category includes the rights to life, dignity of 
the human person, personal liberty, fair hearing, freedom 
from discrimination and (in broad outline) compensation
3
for property compulsorily acquired. THe ambit of these 
rights is, as explained above, subject to certain limit-
4
ations as expressly provided by the guarantees themselves ; 
but no further derogation is permitted, save in a state 
of emergency when further exceptions to the rights to life 
and personal liberty may be permitted, as further explained
5
in due course.
The second category of rights includes the rights to 'private 
and family life', 'freedom of thought, conscience and religion',
Tfefe meaning of this important phrase is considered further 
below.
2
The nature of these recognised interests and the extent 
to which derogation is authorised in order to uphold them 
will be examined, with specific reference to freedom of 
expression, in the general course of this study.
 ^ See ss. 30, 31, 32, 33, 39 and 40, Constitution, supra.
4
See, for example, s 30(1), ibid, which qualifies the right 
to life by the proviso that a person may intentionally be 
put to death 'in execution of the sentence of a court in 
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found 
guilty in Nigeria1.
5 See p 190 below.
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'freedom of expression and the press I, 'peaceful assembly 
and association' and 'freedom of movement'.^ These rights 
are likewise subject to derogation in terms of the specific 
provision which confers each right. Thus/ for example/ the 
right to freedom of movement may legitimately be circum­
scribed by a law 'imposing restrictions on the... movement 
of any person who has committed or is reasonably suspected
to have committed a criminal offence in order to prevent
2
him from leaving Nigeria*.
In addition (and this clearly divides this second category 
of rights from those earlier discussed)/ these "qualified" 
rights are subject to additional limitation in terms of 
s 41 of the Constitution (irrespective of whether any 
emergency is in force). Thus/ s 41(1) authorises derog­
ation from these rights by any law that:
'is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society ■
(a) in the interest of defence/ public safety/ 
public order/ public morality or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of other p e r s o n s '.3
The way in which these guarantees and their authorised 
derogations have been (and should be) interpreted by the 
courts is of the utmost importance; but/ before turning 
to this vital question/ some consideration should be given
1
See ss 34/ 35/ 36/ 37 and 38/ Constitution/ supra,
2 s 38(2)(a), ibid.
3 s 41 (1) , ibid.
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to the effect of a declaration of emergency on the 
guaranteed rights: for the experience of the First Republic 
graphically reveals how important this may be in practice.
2.5.4. The Declaration of Emergency and its Effect on the 
Guaranteed Rights
The circumstances in which an emergency may be declared 
have been more rigorously defined under the 1979 Constit­
ution - in keeping with the recommendation of the Constit-
2
ution Drafting Committee in this regard. The matter is 
governed by section 265 which is clearly aimed at circum­
scribing both the assumption and duration of emergency 
powers to a greater degree than obtained during the era
3
of the First Republic. The President is accordingly 
empowered to declare a state of emergency only in seven 
specified circumstances - viz., in time of war; when the 
Federation is in imminent danger of invasion or involve­
ment in war; when public order and safety have broken down 
to an extent requiring 'extraordinary measures to restore
4
peace and security* ; when there is a 'clear and present
5
danger' of such breakdown in public order and safety;
See the section on the history of Nigeria, where the 
declaration of emergency in the West and its ramifications 
for Nigeria's further difficulties are described.
2
Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, para. 6.7. 
p xxiii.
3
The framers of the 1979 Constitution were clearly concerned 
to guard against a recurrence of events such as those which 
occured in western Nigeria in 1962.
4
See s 265(3)(c), Constitution, supra.
5 See s 265(3)(d), ibid. It is interesting to note the use of 
this phrase, usually associated with the jurisprudence of the 
United States' Supreme Court in the context of fundamental 
rights. The origin and ambit of the 'clear and present danger' 
doctrine in this context is further described below.
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when imminent danger of a disaster or natural calamity
threatens the community; when ‘there is any other public
danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the existence
of the Federation' ; and when a State Governor requests
the declaration of a state of emergency in his State. The
circumstances in which such a request may be made are
prescribed by section 265(4) which provides that the
Governor's action must be supported by a two-thirds majority
of all members of the State House of Assembly: and that there
must be a 'breakdown in public order and safety (or the
danger thereof) or an imminent danger of disaster confined 
2
to the State' . If such circumstances exist/ and the Governor 
fails to request the declaration of an emergency within a 
reasonable time/ the President may act on his own initiative. 
The President's declaration must/ however/ in all cases be 
confirmed by resolution (passed by two-thirds majority of 
all members) of each Federal House; and this must be done 
within two days (or ten days if the National Assembly is
3
not in session at the time). Any proclamation of emergency 
expires after six months/ unless extended by similar res-
4
olutions for a further six months. The National Assembly 
may end the proclamation at any time 'by a simple majority
5
of all the members of each House'.
1
See s 265(3) (f)# ibid. This presumably encompasses any 
threat of secession/ as occured in 1967 with the declaration 
of independence by Biafra (as discussed above). The prov­
ision is/ however, broad enough to cover a multiplicity of 
situations; and seems disturbingly wide.
2
Read, op cit, p 150.
3
See s 265(6)(b), supra.
4
See s 265(6)(c), ibid. It seems that successive resolutions 
may be passed extending the proclamation for a further six 
months on each occasion.
5 See s 265(6)(d), ibid.
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As for the effect of a declaration of emergency on the free­
doms guaranteed by Chapter IV, express mention is made in 
the Constitution of only two rights: the rights to life and 
personal liberty. During a period of emergency (declared 
in accordance with the provisions described above), both 
these rights are subject to further derogation, on the 
following conditions:
(i) the measures taken must be limited to those
‘reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with 1
the situation that exists during the period of emergency* 
and
(ii) the right to life may only be limited *in
respect of death resulting from acts of war*.
It should be noted that the Constitution expressly provides
that all retrospective penal legislation - even in a period
3
of emergency - is prohibited.
No further specific mention of the effect of a declaration 
of emergency on the guaranteed rights is made, but it seems 
clear that this circumstance would affect the determination 
of whether particular laws (aimed at promoting 'public order' 
and 'public safety') were indeed reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society.
The interpretation of this important phrase remains to be 
considered, but before doing so, it should be placed in 
context by brief reference to a doctrine frequently (and,
 ^ s 41(2), ibid.
2
s 41(2), proviso, ibid.
 ^ s 41(2), read with s 33(8), ibid.
it is submitted, unfortunately! invoked in the interpret­
ation of laws prima facie inconsistent with the guaranteed 
rights: viz., the doctrine of constitutionality.
2.5.5* The Dogtrine of Constitutionality
According to this doctrine, or 'presumption of constitut­
ionality', legislation enacted by the duly elected repre­
sentatives of the people is presumed to be valid: and should 
not lightly be overturned by the judiciary - which is, after 
all, 'an unelected or oligarchic body' . As declared by 
Chief Justice Marshall of the United States' Supreme Court:
'It is not on slight implication and vague conjecture 
that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended 
its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The 
opposition between the constitution and the law should be 
such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of 
their incompatibility with each other 1.2
The matter is even more crisply put by Mr. Justice Washington,
also of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
following terms:
'It is but a decent respect due to the... legislative 
body by which any law is passed to presume in favour of 
its validity, until its violation of the constitution is 
proved beyond all reasonable doubt'.3
In the United States, however, this presumption is by no 
means uniformaly applied. On the contrary, certain fund­
amental rights are considered 'preferred freedoms*; and
1
Nwabueze, A Constitutional History of Nigeria, supra, p 28.
2
Fletcher v Peck (1819) 6 Cfanch, 87,128 , cited by Nwabuez
ibid, pp 281-282.*
3
Ogden v Saunder (1827) 13 Wheat, 213, 270, cited by Nwabuez 
ibid, p 282.
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*where a law on its face restricts these freedoms, the
court /will/ not grant it the normal presumption that laws
reaching the court for its scrutiny are valid. /Instead/,
/t/he government must prove that the law under question is
constitutional*. Thus, in the context of freedom of the
press, for example, the Supreme Court has declared that
*any system of prior restraint... comes to the... Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity, and a party who seeks to have such a restraint
upheld thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification
2
for the imposition of such a restraint.*
Cogent as the dicta first cited are, it is submitted that 
the guaranteed rights should all be recognised as "preferred 
freedoms", so that - far from being subject to the doctrine 
of constitutionality - they should instead enjoy particular 
protection: and any law pfrima facie inconsistent with them 
should come before the Nigerian courts * bearing a heavy
3
presumption against its constitutional validity* . It
is accordingly submitted that the onus should lie firmly
on the state to prove not only that there is some rational
connection between the law impugned and the particular 
*
interest - such as public order - it is designed to promote;
Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass. Communications, 3rd ed.,
New York, 1978, p 11.
 ^ New York Times Co v United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3
See New York Times Co v United States, ibid, emphasis 
supplied.
4
The extent of connection which must be shown is discussed 
further below.
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but also that the law is indeed 'reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society' (as further discussed in due course).
It is submitted further that Nwabueze is wrong to assert 
that a distinction should be drawn in this regard between 
'absolute1 and 'qualified' rights, only the first category 
being entitled to such firm eschewment of the presumption 
of constitutionality. It is vital that the onus be placed 
upon the state in the manner proposed above: for otherwise 
there is grave danger that the substance of the rights 
may be drained away, leaving only empty husks.
Unfortunately, however, the Nigerian courts have tended to
apply the doctrine of constitutionality in its full rigour -
without regard to any potential prejudice to the guaranteed
rights, as graphically demonstrated by the case of Cheranci 
2
v Cheranci . Here, the validity of legislation prohibiting 
children of the age of 15 and under from participating in 
politics was challenged for inconsistency with the constit­
utional guarantees of freedom of expression, peaceful 
assembly and association (as provided by the Independence
3
Constitution of 1960 ). The case is noteworthy for the
1
Thus Nwabueze, op cit, supra, p 285, submits that in 
relation to the qualified rights (the second category 
identified above), the onus should lie on the state only 
to the extent of showing that the law in question is 
connected with the recognised interest. Thereafter, the 
court should infer that it is indeed justifiable in that 
interest; and the burden should then fall upon those 
impugning it to show that it is not reasonably justifiable.
2 /1960/ N.R.N.L.R. 24.
3
These provisions are substantially the same as under the 
1979 Constitution.
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fact that the trial judge 'started from the rather question- 
able premise* that:
'/T/here must be a presumption that a Law is con­
stitutional and that its provisions are reasonably justifiable 
and necessary'.2
He further emphasised that the further consequence, of this 
presumption is to 'throw the burden of proof on the person 
who alleges that the legislature has infringed a fundamental 
human right',3 to show that this is indeed so. In the 
result, this burden of proof was not discharged; and the 
validity of the restriction was accordingly upheld.
4
In addition, in Arzika v Governor, Norther Region , it was 
contended by a deposed chief that an order that he leave 
his own area for another part of Nigeria was void for incon 
sistency with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
5
movement, as was the legislation under which the order
had been made. The court held, however, that:
'There is a presumption that the Legislature has 
acted constitutionally and that the I h w s  which they have 
passed are necessary and reasonably justifiable. The same 
presumption must also apply where the Governor, acting, as
Nwabueze, supra, p 395.
2
Cheranci v Cheranci, at 28. In adopting this premise, 
the court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the 
legislature represents the majority of the people.
3
Ibid, at 29. In the circumstances, the court did not think 
that the onus of proving the unconstitutionality of the 
law had been discharged, for the susceptibility of youth 
to indoctrination and the easy excitability of juveniles 
meant that public morality and public order could indeed 
be undermined by allowing their participation in politics.
4 /"1961/ 1 All N.L. R. 379.
5
As provided by the 1960 Constitution, but substantially 
the same as the present guarantee of freedom of movement.
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he is and was bound to do/ upon the advice of his Executive 
Council/ makes a legislative order in exercise of powers 
conferred upon him by the Legislature.'
Not surprisingly/ accordingly/ the application for relief 
was rejected.
The same approach is also evidenced in a number of cases 
involving the media as further discussed in due course; 
and the result is very clearly to cast an unduly heavy burden 
on any person who seeks to impugn the validity of laws which, 
prima facie# are undoubtedly at odds with the constitutional 
guarantees. This situation is most unfortunate, as graphic­
ally explained by Nwabueze:
'/T/he bill of rights was meant primarily as a 
protection for minorities against the majority that dominated 
the legislature. To allow the judgment of the legislature 
to prevail in /cases such as Cheranci/ would be to impair 
the efficacy of that protection. In relation to human rights 
therefore the presumption of constitutionality would appear 
to be repugnant to the primary purpose for which those rights 
were guaranteed in the constitution.'3
It is submitted, accordingly, that the doctrine of constit­
utionality must be firmly rejected; and the onus placed 
fairly and squarely on the state to prove the validity of all 
laws which prima facie are inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights.
Arzika v Governor, Northern Region, supra, at 382.
2
See especially, Chapter Five, on sedition, and the discussion 
of the notorious Chike Obi case.
3
Nwabueze, oft cit, supra, p 288. It is submitted that Nwabueze 
is correct in this assessment, and it is unfortunate that 
he is not prepared to cast the onus in full upon the state 
in relation to all the guaranteed rights, as explained at 
p 193 n 1, above.
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2._5.6. The Requisite Connection Between the Law Impugned 
and the Recognised Interest
A further point of controversy in the interpretation of
the constitutional guarantees and the validity of laws
allegedly inconsistent with them is the 'kind of relation-
ship' which must exist between the impugned law and the
interest {such as public order or morality) it is designed
to serve. As Nwabueze points out:
'The Constitution itself provides no guidance on 
what the relationship should be/ whether any kind of relat­
ionship or connection/ no matter how tenuous/ unsubstantial, 
irrational/ indirect or remote, is sufficient; whether the 
danger to public order, public safety etc., should be clear 
and present or probable or merely likely'.2
3
If the decision of the Privy Council in the Antigua Times 
case is any guide, however, it seems that the connection 
need not be particularly substantial. Here, the validity 
of legislation imposing (inter alia) an annual licence fee 
on newspapers (as further explained below ) was upheld on 
the basis that it constituted a tax which was reasonably re­
quired to further interests such as public order. If this approach 
were to be followed in Nigeria, a very tenuous connection
5
indeed would suffice.
1
Nwabueze, ibid, p 250.
2 Ibid.
 ^ Attorney General v Antigua Times Ltd /1976/A.C.16 (P.C.).
4
See Chapter Four below.
 ^ Note, however, the contrasting approach of the Zambian Court 
in Patel v Attorney General for Zambia, /1968/ Z.L.R. 99, 
where the court held that 'exchange control is /not/ suffic­
iently proximate to public safety to warrant /exchange control^ 
legislation being adopted in the interest of public safety'.
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2.5.7. The Meaning of the Phrase 'Reasonably Justifiable 
in a Democratic Society*
A further important question is the meaning of the phrase
^reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'. This
expression is found not only in the general derogation
provision contained in section 41(1) but also in a number
of the specific guarantees, including the guarantee of
freedom of expression, as further explained below. The
word 'justifiable' is inherently vague: though some attempt
to give it a more objective meaning is to be discerned in
2
Cheranci v Cheranci where the court stated:
'/A7 restriction upon a fundamental human right 
must before it may be considered reasonably justifiable -
(a) be necessary in the interest... of public morals 
or public order /or whatever other interest is in issue/ ; 
and
(b) must not be excessive or out of proportion to 
the object which it is sought to achieve.3
There is also considerable controversy as to whether the 
notion of 'democratic society! imports certain absolute 
values which must be respected in any society which aspires 
to democracy, irrespective of its state of development.
The difficulty is well illustrated by the opposing view­
points expressed in the Zambian case of Kachasu v Attorney
4
General for Zambia. Here, Chief Justice Blagden expressed 
the view that 'democracy in a newly emergent nation like
 ^ See the section on the guarantee of freedom of expression, csp. 
at p 201 below.
2 /1960/ N.R.N.L.R. 24.
3 Ibid, at 29.
4 /I 96^/ Z .L.R. 145.
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Zambia cannot be judged by the standards of the long-estab-i 
lished democracies*. By contrast, Mr. Justice Magnus 
believed that:
'/I/t is necessary to adopt the objective test of 
what is reasonably justifiable/ not in a particular democ­
ratic society/ but in any democratic society... /Although/ 
some distinction should be made between a developed society 
and one which is still developing... there are certain 
minima which must be found in any society/ developed or 
otherwise, below which'it cannot go and still be entitled 
to be considered as a democratic society*.
The viewpoint of the Nigerian courts in this regard is Still
ambivalent, though certain decisions (especially in the
3
context of sedition/ as discussed below ) suggest that the 
courts will fairly readily accept that particular restrict­
ions are indeed * reasonably justifiable* in Nigeria. It 
will, however, be submitted, in the course of this study, 
that many of the laws governing the media should not be 
accepted as 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.' 
It is accordingly proposed to postpone further consideration 
of this criterion until its application in the context of 
freedom of expression has been noted and then to examine it
4
more closely in relation to specified laws.
The next step, accordingly, is to gain some understanding of 
the important provisions of Nigeria's guarantee of freedom 
of expression: and it is to this topic that attention must 
now be directed.
See Nwabueze, op cit, p 251, and the judgment, supra, at 167.
2 See Nwabueze, ibid, pp 251-252.
3 See Chapter Five below.
4 Brief mention is, however, made below to the difference 
between this formula and that provided by the European 
Convention on Human Rights of 1950. See p 209 below.
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2.6. The Guarantee of Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression is one of a number of fundamential 
rights guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution. The 
guarantee of this right was introduced - together with the 
other guarantees comprised within the Nigerian Bill of 
Rights - in 1959, for reasons which have previously been 
described and need not be repeated here. Like the remainder 
of the Bill of Rights, its terms bear marked resemblance 
to those of the European Convention of Human Rights of
2
1950, which served as the model for the Nigerian provisions. 
The content of the guarantee has remained substantially 
the same since its inception, but certain changes have 
now been introduced under the 1979 Constitution; and it 
is accordingly as well to reproduce both "old" and "new" 
guarantees in juxtaposition so as to point the differences 
between them.
2.6.1. The Terms of the Guarantee of Freedom of Expression
The guarantee of freedom of expression contained within
the Independence Constitution of 1960 provided as follows:
freedom of expression:
24 - (1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom 
of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart ideas and information without interference.
See p 171. In essence, the rationale was the protection 
of the numerous minorities in Nigerian society.
See above, at p 173 especially.
The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1960, (S.I. 
No. 1652 of 1960) .
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(2) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any 
law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society -
(a) in the interest of defence# public safety# 
public order# public morality or public health;
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights# 
reputations and freedom of other persons# preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence# maintaining 
the authority and independence of the courts or regulating 
telephony# wireless broadcasting# television# or the 
exhibition of cinematograph films; or
(c) imposing restrictions upon persons holding 
office under the Crown, members of the armed forces of the 
Crown or members of a police force.'
When Nigeria became an independent republic within the
1 2 Commonwealth in 1963 # a new "Republican" Constitution
was adopted: but only minor consequential amendments were 
made to the guarantee of freedom of expression - the ref­
erences to 1 the'Orown' in s 24(1) (c) being replaced by ref-
3
erences to the 1 state' and the 'Federation1.
4
When Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1979# the new
5
"Presidential" Constitution came into operation. This 
now guarantees freedom of expression in the following terms:
See the section on the History of Nigeria# above.
2
This was the Constitution of the Federation# Act no 20 
of 1963.
3
The guarantee was re-numbered s 25# and the only change 
made in its terms was in s 25(1)(cj which referred to the 
'imposing /of] restrictions upon persons holding office 
under the state# members of the armed forces of the 
Federation or members of a police force.'
4
It will be recalled# from the discussion above# that no 
changes were made to the terms of the Bill of Rights during 
the period of military rule, although its "sphere of 
influence" was reduced in the manner described.
5
This is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria# 
1979.
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’Right to freedom of expression and the press;
36.—  (1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of
expression# including freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart ideas and information without interference.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection
(1) of this section# every person shall be entitled to own#
establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of 
information# ideas and opinions:
Provided that no person# other than the Government 
of the Federation or of a State or any other person or body 
authorised by the President# shall own# establish or operate 
a television or wireless broadcasting station for any purpose 
whatsoever.
(3) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any
law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society -
(a) for the purpose of preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence# maintaining the au­
thority and independence of courts or regulating telephony# 
wireless broadcasting# television or the exhibition of 
cinematograph films; or
(b) imposing restrictions upon persons holding 
office under the Government of the Federation or of a State# 
members of the armed forces of the Federation or members
of the Nigeria Police Force.'
This provision# must however# be read together with s 41 
of the 1979 Constitution which states; in sub-section (1):
i
'Nothing in sections 34# 35# 3!6# 37 and 38 of this 
Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society -
(a) in the interest of defence# public safety# 
public order, public morality or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of other persons.'
Before proceeding to examine the differences between these 
provisions# as well as the impact on the media of a further
i
s 41(1)# ibid# emphasis supplied.
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innovation in the 1979 Constitution - the introduction of 
non-justiciable Fundamental Objectives and Directive
regarding the guarantees are in order.
2.6.2. No_Express Reference to the Freedom of the Press 
or other Media
A striking feature of the guarantee of freedom of expression
in both its original and present form is that no express
mention is made of freedom of the press (except, of course,
in the marginal note to the 1979 provision which does not
form part of the substantive guarantee). The provision
(for this, as well as other reasons - as further explained
in due course) thus Stands in marked contrast with the
guarantees contained in other constitutions: notably that
2
of the United States of America, which declares in robust 
terms that 'Congress shall make no law... abridging the
3
freedom of speech, or of the press'. The Nigerian guarantee 
is thus premised upon the notion that the freedom of express­
ion to which it declares every person to be entitled extends 
also to those involved in the publication of newspapers 
and propagation of radio and television broadcasts.
These are contained in Chapter II of the Constitution, 
and the reason for their introduction has previously been 
examined in the section on the Nigerian Constitution. The 
significance of these objectives and principles for the 
media in Nigeria is further discussed below.
2
The other principal difference between the Nigerian and 
United States' guarantees lies, of course, in the emphatic 
terms in which the latter is couched, as further emphasised 
at p 20 7 below.
3 U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1. This First Amendment was 
adopted in 1791. See Nelson and Teeter, Law of Mass Comm­
unications, supra, p 5♦
1
Principles of State Policy - some general observations
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Confirmation of this assumption - that the broadly framed 
guarantee of freedom of expression confers protection on 
those involved in the media - has been provided by the 
opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
proceedings emanating from Malta: which nevertheless have 
significance for Nigeria because of the close similarity
between the Nigerian and Maltese guarantees of freedom of
1 2 expression. In this case - Olivier v Buttigieg - the Privy
Council confirmed that a partial ban on the circulation of
a weekly newspaper constituted an unlawful infringement
of the editor's constitutional right to impart ideas and
3
information without hindrance or interference. The sig­
nificance of the decision, for present purposes, is that 
the Judicial Committee reached this conclusion without 
questioning in any way whether the guarantee - couched in 
general terms - extended also to newspaper editors and 
others involved in the mass media. Instead the Committee
This similarity is the result of the fact that the Maltese 
Bill of Rights, like those of many other new states in the 
Commonwealth, is modelled on the Nigerian Bill of Rights.
2 See the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights above.
3 /1966/ 3 W.L.R. 311 (P.C.).
The respondent was the editor of a weekly newspaper, the 
'Voice of Malta', published by the Malta Labour Party. The 
newspaper was condemned by the Archbiship of Malta who, in 
a circular dated 26 May 1961, declared it to be a 'mortal sin 
to print, write, sell, buy, distribute or read /it/'• fcee ibid} .
Thereafter, on 25 April 1962, the Government forbade 'the 
entry /"into7 the various hospitals and branches of the /Med­
ical and Health/ Department of newspapers condemned by the 
Church authorities' (ibid). This prohibition directly affected 
some 2,660 employees of the Department. The respondent 
challenged the constitutionality of the ban under section 14 
of the Maltese Constitution (Malta(Constitution) Order in 
Council 1961), which guarantees freedom of expression in sub­
stantially the same terms as the Nigerian Independance Con­
stitution. The Civil Court of Malta found in his favour; and 
this decision was confirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeal 
of Malta and, subsequently, to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council. In their Lordships' view, the 'strict prohib­
ition imposed by the circular, while not preventing the respon­
dent from... imparting ideas and information /didJ "hinder" 
him and was an "interference" with his freedom to do so' (at
312) .
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tacitly assumed this to be the case; and its view (though 
not binding on Nigerian courts) would no doubt be considered 
persuasive.
Whilst it is thus clear that the Nigerian guarantee of free­
dom of expression extends to those involved in the media as 
to others in Nigeria and secures to the media the right 'to
i
receive and impart ideas and information without interference,'
it may nevertheless be queried whether this is sufficient
protection for the media, given the special and vital
function which they perform within society. It is accordingly
interesting to note that one of the major issues in the
vigorous debate which preceded the enactment of the present 
2
Constitution was the need-asserted by the press itself - 
for the guarantee of freedom of expression to be amended by 
the introduction of a separate and explicit guarantee of 
freedom of the press. A number of commentators emphasised 
the vital role of the media in informing, educating and 
upholding democracy/ and stressed the extent to which press
3
freedom had been undermined since independence. They thus 
forcefully contended that freedom of the media could not 
adequately be safeguarded if subsumed in a general guarantee 
of freedom of expression.
1
See s 36(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
2
See the section on the History of Nigeria above.
3
The vicissitudes suffered by the press during the period of 
the First Republic and under the military government are 
further described in Chapter Three below.
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Notwithstanding this cogent contention, however, the Con­
stitution Drafting Committee decided against incorporating 
a specific guarantee of freedom of the press. It did so 
on two main grounds, the first of which is particularly 
relevant for present purposes. The Committee thus stressed 
that freedom of expression should be enjoyed by everyone - 
not simply by those involved in the media. Hence, it would 
be wrong to single out editors and reporters and accord 
them special privileges; and the Committee accordingly 
concluded:
'/T/here are no grounds for giving any Nigerian 
citizen a lesser right to freedom of expression than any 
other person or citizen who happens to be a newspaper 
editor or reporter1.^
Thus, the opportunity to include a specific guarantee of 
freedom of themedia was lost. It is submitted that this 
was unfortunate, and that the Committed adopted an unduly 
narrow view, failing to appreciate that a specific guarantee 
would not have detracted in any way from the freedom of 
expression enjoyed by others: and overlooking the vital 
importance of the role performed by the media and the con­
comitant need for the press to be shielded from oppression
3
at the hands of government.
1
The second ground is examined further below.
2
Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee , 1976, Vol 
1, para 4.2, p xvi.
 ^ It is interesting to note in this regard that the UNESCO
Commission which reported on Mass Communications in 1980 (as 
previously explained atp 37) also saw no need for specific 
guarantees of protection for journalists; and that its chair 
man, Sean Macbride, dissented vigorously from the majority 
on this issue, emphasising the extent to which journalists 
around the world were subjected to harrassment (or worse) at 
the instance of various governments.
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2.6.3. Wide-Ranging Derogation Authorised
The second striking feature of the guarantee in both its 
original and present form is the number of derogations it 
permits from the right to 'receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference'; and the broad terms in 
which these are cast. Derogation is thus authorised to
i
prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence,
2
to maintain the authority and independence of the courts, 
to regulate telephony, broadcasting and the exhibition of
3
films , and to impose 'restrictions' (undefined) on persons
4
holding government office . It is also permitted 'in the 
interests of' (a phrase which is notoriously wide) 'defence,
5
public safety, public order, public morality or public health; 
as well as for the purpose of protecting 'the rights and
g
freedoms of other persons'. It needs little emphasis that 
the list of exceptions permitted is long, and that each is 
cast in extremely broad terms: and thus has the potential 
to cover a multiplicity of different situations. Particu­
larly disturbing are the broad concepts of 'public order' 
and 'public safety', 'in the interests of' which derogation 
is authorised under s 41 . The contrast in terms between 
the Nigerian guarantee and that of the United States is
1
See s 36 (3) (a), Constitution, supra.
2 See ibid.
 ^ See ibid.
 ^ See s 36 (3) (b), ibid.
 ^ See s 41(1)(a), ibid.
® See s 41(1)(b), ibid.
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stark, the latter asserting in simple and emphatic terms
that 'Congress shall make no law.... abridging the freedom 
-|
of the press'. In practice, however, the difference is
more a matter of degree, as even the strongest proponents
of free speech and press in the United States acknowledge
that certain restrictions are required to uphold essentially
the same interests as are accorded specific recognition in
the Nigerian guarantee. The main distinction between the
two jurisdictions is, therefore, to be found in the extent
of restriction permitted in the service of these interests:
and here the United States comes down firmly on the side
of freedom of expression, as will be further explained in
the course of this study. Thus, in essence, the Supreme
Court of the United States regards free speech as a 'pref-
2
erred freedom' (as previously explained ) so that any law
which infringes this right comes before the Court bearing
a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. By
contrast, in Nigeria, the key criterion - as provided by
the Constitution - is whether a particular law (the object
3
of which is prima facie, to uphold a recognised interest )
A
is'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'. If 
so, then the rule must be acknowledged as constitutional, 
even though it diminishes the guaranteed right 'to receive 
and impart ideas and information without interference.'
United States Constitution, Amendment 1, supra, emphasis 
supplied.
2
See p 191 above.
3
See section 41(1) (a) and s 36 (3) (a), Constitution, supra, 
for details of these interests (previously identified also 
in the text above!
4
This is the criterion specified in both s 36(3) and s 41(1) 
ibid.
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If it cannot be so justified/ however, then the law in 
question is void to the extent of its inconsistency with
i
the guarantee of freedom of expression . Considerable 
importance thus attaches to the phrase "reasonably justif­
iable' in a democratic society"; and this must now briefly 
be examined.
2.6.4. The Criterion; "Reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society"
This criterion provided by the Nigerian Constitution to
determine the validity of a law prima facie inconsistent
with the guarantee of freedom of expression is intrinsically
vague and uncertain. The controversy as to whether the
standards of a "democratic society" are absolute or vary
depending upon the degree of development of the particular
2
nation has previously been discussed, and will not be 
further analysed here. The "doctrine of constitutionality' 
frequently invoked in applying this test has also been exam-
3
ined in an earlier section of this study ; and the warnings 
previously sounded as to the danger presented by this doctrine 
will not be reiterated. Suffice it, therefore, for present 
purposes to focus on the words "reasonably justifiable"; and 
to contrast these with the provisions of the guarantee of 
freedom of expression contained in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 19 50, on which the Nigerian Bill of Rights
See the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights above, where 
the significance of inconsistency with any constitutional 
provision is further explained.
See the general discussion of the Nigerian Bill of Rights, 
above, especially at p 19 7-198.
3
See p 191 above.
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is modelled1. Though substantially similar to the Nigerian
guarantee of freedom of expression in asserting a right to
the unrestricted communication of ideas and information
(subject, however, to derogation in order to protect other
important interests of society), the European guarantee
2
(contained in Article 10 ) is markedly different in declaring 
that derogation is permitted only to the extent that it is 
•necessary' in a democratic society. It needs little 
emphasis that this term intrinsically imports a stricter 
requirement; and this prima facie impression has been streng­
thened by the interpretation which has been placed on the
word by the European Court cf The Court has thus
3 4ruled that the term connotes 'a pressing social need' ;
and no restriction on freedom of expression is valid under
Article 10 unless it corresponds with such need. The
Nigerian criterion of 'reasonably justifiable' is clearly
far more flexible? and may therefore be more easy to
satisfy (although it will be submitted, in the course of
this study, that many of the laws which govern the media
in Nigeria do not meet even this less rigorous standard).
See p. 199 above.
The provisions of Article 10 are reproduced at pp 48- 
49 above.
See Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government, [1979] 2 
E.H.R.R. 245, further analysed in the section on sub 
judice publication, in Chapter Nine below.
See para. 59, ibid.
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2.6.5. The Difference between the Original and Present 
Guarantees
When the present guarantee (contained in s 36 of the 19 79 
Constitution) is read together with s 41, it is apparent 
that there is little substantive difference between it and 
the original safeguard of freedom of expression. The most 
striking difference lies in the specific further guarantee 
(first introduced in 19 79) of the right to 'own, establish 
and operate' any medium for the dissemination of information,
X
ideas and opinions' . This is subject, however, to signifi­
cant exception as regards television and wireless broad­
casting stations: for which the authority of the President 
is required. It should be noted, however, that the require­
ment of Presidential consent does not apply to the State 
Governments - and the result has been to facilitate the 
establishment of separate radio and television stations
in each of the 19 states. The practical significance of
2
this is considerable (as further explained below )• In
brief, it precludes a monopoly over broadcasting from arising
- and since many of the State Governments do not support
3President Shagari's National Party of Nigeria , it means 
that the ordinary Nigerian citizen is provided with some
s 36(2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
19 79.
See Chapter Four (on the licensing and regulation of 
the media), especially at p 380.
See the section on the History of Nigeria, where the 
breakdown of votes between the five political parties 
in the 1979 election is briefly described, at p. 110.
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variety in reports and interpretations of events. The 
requirement for consent (at the sole and unregulated dis­
cretion of the President) for the establishment of a private 
broadcasting station detracts in large measure from the
right proclaimed by s 36(2)r and is further examined in due 
2course.
2Jq . 6. The Role of the Media vis-a-vis the Fundamental 
Obj ectives
The 1979 Constitution has broken new ground in a number of 
ways, including the introduction - in Chapter II - of a
3
number of non-enforceable but nevertheless significant 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy to guide both the State and the citizen in their 
relations inter se. The reasons for introducing these
4
provisions have previously been canvassed, and will not be 
repeated here. Some further consideration of the nature
The significance of this has been reduced to some extent, 
as further explained at p 332 below, by legislation requiring 
state radio broadcasting services to limit their broadcasts 
to the confines of the particular state. All television 
broadcasting stations have a limited reception area, and 
hence the diversity of programmes which separate state 
services would seem to promise is not as great as it might 
be. This new restriction has struck particularly hard at 
Radio Kaduna whose shortwave transmitters were previously 
able to broadcast to all Nigeria.
See p 338 below.
Even though these provisions are non-justiciable (this 
being recommended by the Constitution Drafting Committee on 
the ground that there would otherwise be constant confront­
ation between the judiciary and the other branches of govern­
ment) , this does not mean that they may not be taken into 
account by the courts in order to resolve ambiguities.
4 See p 113 above.
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of the provisions is required, however, in order to assess 
the duties placed upon the media in relation to both Fun­
damental Objectives (the ultimate goals of Nigerian society) 
and Directive Principles of State Policy (fthe paths which 
might lead to those objectives' ). The terms and spirit 
of these provisions is best appreciated by reproducing cer­
tain of the sections within the Chapter.
Thus, s 15(1) provides that:
'The State shall foster a feeling of belonging and 
of involvement among the various peoples of the Federation; 
to the end that loyalty to the Nation shall override sect­
ional loyalties';
and s 16(1) states:
'The State shall... control the national economy 
in such a way as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and 
happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice 
and equality of status and opportunity.'
Not all the provisions of this Chapter are so generalised, 
however, and thus, section 18(1), by contrast, provides that
'The Government shall direct its policy towards 
ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opp­
ortunities at all levels'.
These Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles are, 
of course, far removed, in strict legal terms, from the 
guarantee of freedom of expression itself. Nevertheless, 
they may have considerable significance in guiding the 
media in performing their important role within society and
Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, supra, p v
-213-
may also (if this is necessary ) be taken into account in 
instances where the constitutionality of a given law (in 
the light of the guarantee of freedom of expression) is 
uncertain* It is therefore important to note that the 
media have been assigned specific responsibility in relat­
ion to the provisions of Chapter II: and s 21 thus states:
'The Press, Radio and Television and other agencies 
of the mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the 
Fundamental Objectives contained in this Chapter fie., 
Chapter II/ and /to/ uphold the responsibility and account­
ability of the government to the people*.
The media are thus encouraged to play a special role in 
promoting public awareness of the duties imposed upon Federal 
and State Governemnts in terms of the Fundamental Objectives
It will be submitted in the course of this study that many 
laws governing the media are unconstitutional in that they 
are not 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'. 
If there is doubt as to this, however, then reference to 
the media's obligations under Chapter II may serve to 
buttress the contention. Thus, for example, it will be 
contended that the present strict liability in the civil 
law of defamation is unconstitutional, at least as regards 
public officials and figures who should be obliged (as in 
the United States) to prove express malice on the part 
of the publisher in order to succeed in any claim for 
damages. If there is doubt as to whether the strict 
liability rule is unconstitutional, then it would be sal­
utary to bear in mind that under s 21 (as described in 
the text below), the media are free to uphold the respon­
sibility of the government to the people: and this means 
that the media should not be liable in defamation if they 
publish criticism of those involved in government (unless, 
of course, their criticism is malicious). Thus, s 21 
affords additional reason for concluding that the strict 
liability rule is bad; and that the law should be changed 
to follow the United States' pattern (as will be further 
explained in due course).
s 21, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
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and Directive Principles - and in reminding those in posit­
ions of power that their primary responsibility is not to 
promote their own aggrandisement but to ensure the welfare 
of the people whom they represent.
2«6.7. Shortcomings in the Present Guarantee
In addition to the criticisms previously directed at the 
failure of the guarantee to make express mention of the 
media, at the number and width of the derogations it permits 
and at the inherent uncertainty of the formula ’reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society*, it remains to note 
certain other fundamental shortcomings in the present 
guarantee of freedom of expression. In this regard, it is 
salutary to refer, once again, to the debate which preceded 
the adoption of the "Presidential" Constitution; and to 
the demands for reform of the guarantee of freedom of expr­
ession then vociferously voiced by a great many Nigerian 
journalists. In particular, it was urged that a new prov­
ision governing press freedom should be adopted; and that it 
should include specific guarantees of:
- unrestricted access to information ;
- absolute privilege against disclosure of sources of 
information^;
1
The extent to which access to information is restricted 
under the News Agency of Nigeria is further examined at 
p 263 below.
2
Interestingly enough, there are moves towards according 
such absolute privilege even under the terms of the present 
guarantee, as further described at p 1157, et seq.
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- protection against detention and harassment (includ- 
ing forced resignation)?
2
- prohibition of the banning or closure of newspapers;
- insulation against government control through owner­
ship3 .
The extent to which media freedom has been eroded through 
restrictions on access to information (and so forth) is 
further considered in the course of study. Suffice it 
therefore for the present to state that there are good 
grounds for the concern thus expressed by representatives 
of the media during the course of the constitutional debate.
It is accordingly disappointing to note the view of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee (now reflected in the limited 
terms of the present guarantee of freedom of expression), 
that the existing provision (s 25 of the Republican Con-
4
stitution ) contained sufficient protection against banning 
or other restrictions. The Committee referred to the ban­
ning orders imposed on newspapers in the erstwhile Western
5
Region during 1965 and indicated, in essence, that the 
press had only itself to blame for failure to obtain redress
The record of detention and harassment of journalists is 
further examined at p 276 below.
2
The extent to which newspapers have been banned is described 
at p 251 below.
3
The present, almost universal, government ownership of the 
media and its significance for media freedom is further 
discussed at p 285 below.
4
The terms of this guarantee are the same as those in s 24 
of the Independence Constitution, reproduced at p 199above.
5
These- were imposed in the course of the disturbances which 
attended and followed the elections of that year, as pre­
viously explained in the section on the History of Nigeria.
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under the then guarantee. In the words of the Committee,
'the failure of the Press to take action against the Govern­
ment to vindicate their rights in no way detracts from the 
efficacy of the clear provisions of the Constitution, nor 
can it justify the argument that additional provisions are 
required to protect the Press.'
The attitude thus manifested by the Constitution Drafting
Committee seems extremely short-sighted. It fails to take
adequate account of the very real difficulties experienced
2
by the media throughout Nigerian history and overlooks 
the fact that the inclusion of guarantees of the kind 
requested (particularly as regards ownership of the media 
and protection against harassment and detention of journal­
ists) would have released the Nigerian media from what are, 
perhaps, the most serious restraints in practice. The 
inclusion of the specific guarantees requested would also 
have served to remind those in power of the importance - 
in the interests of society as a whole - of preserving a 
free flow of information, ideas and opinions; and (even if 
the guarantees were not always observed) they would, at
1
Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, supra, para
4.3., p xvi.
2
In this regard, reference is, of course, confined (with 
due apology) to the history of the country from the 
colonial period onwards; and more particularly to events 
in the twentieth century, for only since 1900 have the 
media played any significant role in Nigeria.
3
It is always difficult to quantify different types of 
restriction, but these two undoubtedly have had a major 
impact on the operation of the media in practice, as 
further explained in Chapter Three below.
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least, by their presence in the Constitution have had the sal 
utary effect of 'defin/ing/ beliefs widespread among demo­
cratic countries and provid/ing/ a standard to which appeal 
/mighty be made by those whose rights /were/ infringed,1
One further vital point of introduction to Nigeria now remains 
to be examined: the growth to their present status of the 
print and electronic media within the country.
2.7. The Growth of the Media in Nigeria to Date
It has earlier been noted that Nigeria was one of the first
2
countries in Africa to establish a viable newspaper. 
Nigeria's very first newspaper was begun by missionaries in 
1859 and started as a vernacular in the Yoruba language, 
'but soon became Africa's first bi-lingual newspaper when
3
English was added'. The Anglo-African was founded in
4
Lagos in 1863, but lasted for only three years ; and the 
most significant development was the establishment of the 
Lagos Dail^ News in 1925. This newspaper was not only the 
first daily, but also 'the first political party paper, 
trumpeting the calls of Macaulay's National Democratic
1
This is, of course, to use the words of the Minorities 
Commission who originally recommended the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights as a whole for this very reason. See the 
section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights at p 171 above, and 
see also the Report of the Minorities Commission, Cmnd.
505, 1958.
2
See the section on the significance of Nigeria, at p 5 7.
3
Barton, op cit, 18. Called Iwe Thorin, it sold for thirty 
cowrie shells.
4 See Barton, ibid, who points out that it is suprising it 
lasted so long, as it carried material far more suitable to 
British readership and thus, eg., carried a series which began
('and this in fetid, humid, tropical Lagos'), 'Hills and 
dales were deeply sleeping beneath a well-frozen covering 
of snow*'.
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Party* . This evoked the creation of a competitor , the 
Daily Times, which *was to become the most important and 
easily the biggest newspaper in tropical Africa* and which 
*/T/rom its first issue on 1 June 1926,... towered above 
all... others in West Africa in professionalism*.
Other papers were not long in following; but the next *major 
landmark in the development of the press of Africa was the 
appearance on the morning of 22 November 1937 of the West 
African Pilot, a new daily launched in Lagos by Nnamdi 
Azikiwe*. Highly professional in its standards and prod­
uction and strongly nationalistic, its circulation reached 
12,000 copies a day within three years, and *with a reader­
ship of between ten and twenty to each newspaper, its
£influence was phenomenal*.
Ibid, p 21. This was especially significant in the light 
of the fact that the franchise (albeit limited) had 
been given to residents of Lagos in 1922, as explained 
in the section on the history of Nigeria, above.
2
See, ibid. Barton submits that this was prompted by 
European (and conservative African) nervousness at the 
emergence of Macaulay's strongly nationalistic paper.
The money needed to start the Daily Timers. was thus put 
up by white businessmen, through the Lagos Chamber of 
Commerce; but the paper was nevertheless *no pussy-foot­
ing, imperialist mouthpiece* (ibid, p 22), largely as 
a result of the influence of its first editor, Ernest 
Ikoli.
3 Ibid, p 22.
4 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid, p 25.
6 Ibid, p 26.
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Newspaper production also began to spread around the country
- largely through the Associated Newspapers of Nigeria
(also founded by Azikiwe and known as the Zik Group),
which established the Eastern Nigerian Guardian at Port
Harcourt in 1940, the Nigerian Spokesman at Onitsha in 1943
and the Southern Nigeria Defender at Warri, whilst the
Comet was transferred from Lagos to Kano in 1949, 'giving
Nigeria's northernmost centre on the edge of the Sahara
2
its first /ever/ daily'.
A number of government-sponsored newspapers were also begun 
in the mid-1940s, including the English language Nigerian 
Citizen. A rival private group, the Amalgamated Press of 
Nigeria was also formed, incorporating the Daily Service 
and Nigerian Tribune, and (in time) 'a string of small
3
provincial dailies' ; and this group became the mouthpiece
4
of the Action Group, 'in opposition to Zik's... N.C.N.C.' 
'Nigeria had thus three developed newspaper chains, two
5
serving political parties and one virtually government-run'.
A further major development was the aquisition of the Daily 
Times by the Daily Mirror group, for this gave the paper 
an unprecedented boost, involving the acquisition of new 
presses and other plant, the employment of some of the best
1
See, ibid, p 27.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, p 29.
4
Ibid. For further detail as to these political parties, 
see the section on the History of Nigeria, above.
3 Ibid.
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journalists in the country, the establishment of '/a/ news 
service covering pretty well the whole of Nigeria#., on
i
a scale never attempted before or since', and the devel­
opment of an efficient distribution service for the first
2
time in the history of the country.
Further description of the establishment and practical 
operation of Nigeria's newspapers lies, unfortunately, out­
side the scope of a study concerned primarily with the law
3
governing their publication. The most important of the 
papers presently in production should, however, be noted.
4
Today, Nigeria has over fifteen daily newspapers; of which 
the most important are the Daily Times (and its sister paper,
5
the Sunday Times ) with circulation figures, in 1976 of 
over 230,000 and 400,000 respectively;  ^the New Nigerian,
'one of the most serious and intellectually independent of
7 8the papers'. , the Tribune, 'the voice of Chief Awolowo's0
Unity Party of Nigeria, published in Ibadan and unrestrain-
9
edly... critical ... of the ruling party'; the National
Ibid, p 33.
2 See ibid, pp 33-34. This was through the establishment of a 
special bus service, still fondly remembered to the present day.
3 For further fascinating details and keen insight into the 
practial difficulties besetting the press in Nigeria (and in 
the rest of Africa), see Barton, op cit,esp., Chapters 2 & 3.
4 The Times (of London), Special Supplement on Nigeria, 3.2.1982.
5 This marks the year when both newspapers were brought under 
government ownership, as further explained in Chapter Three 
below. Since then, the papers have lost circulation: see 
The Times, ibid.
6 /1975-76/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 794.
7 The Times, supra.
8 Chief Awolowo is a major figure in Nigerian politics, and founder 
of one of the country's earliest and most important political 
parties, the Action Group, as explained above in the section
on the History of Nigeria.
9 The Times, supra.
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Concord , established in 1980 (and now also highly critical
of President Shagari's government), which'employ/s/ many
of the stars of Nigerian journalism and is most intelligently 
2
produced' ; and finally, the Punch, one of the few independ­
ently owned papers and 'very bright and popular with
3
scantily clad girls on page three'.
In addition, there are also a number of newspapers which 
appeal primarily to the regions in which they are published, 
of which the most notable are 'the Daily Sketch of Ibadan, 
the Daily Star of Enugu, the Chronicle of Calabar, the 
Herald of Ilorin, the Observer of Benin City, the Standard
4
of Jos, the Statesman of Owerri and the Tide of Port Harcourt'.
Radio and television broadcasting have also grown immeasur­
ably since their first small beginnings. Radio broadcasting 
in Nigeria began in the early 19 30s when a wired wireless 
distribution service (piping programmes by landline to loud­
speakers in subscribers' homes) was established at Lagos.
The spread of the wired wireless service was slowed by the 
Second World War, but - by approximately 19 48 - distribution
5
centres had been established in virtually every major city.
Plans were then made to convert these stations into a 'fully
c
fledged system of national and regional broadcasting ;
This newspaper was originally 'totally committed to the
ruling party' - see The Times, ibid, but has now changed 
its stance completely, as further explained in Chapter Three.
2 Ibid.
3 See The Times, ibid; and see also /1 975-76/ Africa Contemp­
orary Record, supra.
4 Tke Times, ibid »
5 See Ian K. Mackay, Broadcasting in Nigeria, Ibadan, 1964, p 4.
6 Op cit, p 10.
-222-
and, by 1954, these proposals were brought to fruition and 
the Nigerian Broadcasting Service (the predecessor of the
i 2
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria ) was established.
Today, in addition to the national service provided by this 
Corporation (known as Radio Nigeria, with headquarters in
3
Lagos ), 'state broadcasting stations are operated in each 
of the states /and/ /t/here is also an... external service 
which broadcasts to Europe, Africa and the Middle East in
4
English, French, Hausa and Arabic1.
As regards television broadcasting, the former Western 
Region was the first to establish a television service 
which was not only the first in Nigeria but also the first 
in the continent as a whole.^ The erstwhile Eastern Region 
followed suit by October 1960 and the North by April 1962.^
The National Broadcasting Service lagged far behind the 
Regions in the introduction of television and commenced 
transmission (confined initially to Lagos) only in April
1
The structure and functions of the Federal Radio Corporation 
of Nigeria (and the extent of government control over it) 
are further described in Chapter Four below.
2
Mackay, supra, pp 6-25r This involved the implementation 
of the Turner-Byron Reports and Chalmers plan, which 
Mackay describes in fascinating detail.
3
The Times, (of London), supra.
4 Ibid.
5
Mackay, supra, p 61. W.N.T.V., with its slogan, FIRST IN 
AFRICA, is thus the oldest television service operating on 
the continent.
6 Ibid, p 62.
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19621.
Today, all television broadcasting services are operated
2
by the National Television Authority , ('NTA') established
3
at the end of 1975 . As noted above/ '/c/ountry wide colour 
coverage is virtually complete with an N.T.A. ... Station...
4
now in every state1. Moreover/ '/s/everal state govern-
5
mentS/ mainly those opposed to the present Government , 
are now also establishing their own TV stations'.*’
Mackay, pp 63-64/ points out that this duplication in 
services - the result of Regional insistence on autonomy 
and the capacity to broadcast matters of particular inter­
est to their own peoples - had, in fact, unfortunate 
consequences for the development of an efficient broad­
casting service in Nigeria - particularly in the field 
of television. It meant that scarce resources of funds, 
equipment and skilled personnel had to be spread over 
four separate services - instead of being concentrated 
in one, and used to the best advantage of the country 
as a whole. Nor was there any compensating benefit in 
the form of an increased range of programmes - for the 
regions broadcast substantially the same material, merely 
differently slanted to reflect the interests of the 
particular area. For further details of the growth of the 
Nigerian broadcasting media, see Christopher Kolade, 
'Nigeria', in Sydney W Head (ed.,), Broadcasting in Africa; 
A Continenal Survey of Radio and Television/ Philadelphia, 
1972, pp 78-89.
2
The structure and functions of the National Television 
Authority (and the extent of government control over it) 
are further discussed in Chapter FOur.
3
The Times, supra.
5
The break-down of support for the ruling party amongst 
the different states has previously been noted at p 110above.
** The Times, supra.
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Accurate figures of the number of people having access to
1the different media are hard to obtain, but some indica-
2
tion may be gleaned from Barton , who states that Nigeria, 
in 1975/76, had 11 dailies , 65 non-dailies, 1,280,000
4
radio sets and 76,000 television sets. Despite the large 
number of newspapers, however, the printed press is not, 
in Barton*s view, the *true mass media*; for, in a country 
where '/m/illions... will live out their lives as illiter­
ates'^, the radio - at present at least - has the greatest 
significance. THe importance of newspapers should not be 
discounted, however, for as Barton also points out, it is 
the print media which 'reac/h/ that relative handful of 
people in every /African/ state who really matter - the 
politicians, the urban elite, the rising tide of well- 
educated students, the businessmen and, possibly the most 
important of all, the officer corp of Africa's armies'.
This is not only because of the paucity of recent studies, 
but also because it is difficult to gauge the number of 
people who, in practice, may have access to a newspaper, 
radio, or television set acquired by a single individual.
2 Op cit.
3
The discrepancy between this number and that cited by 
The Times, in 1982, no doubt reflects the 'boom in news­
paper growth since the return to civilian rule in 1979's 
The Time^, supra.
4
Barton, supra, p 11.
 ^ Ibid, p 4. Barton here speaks in general terms of the 
continent's population as a whole; but the comment is 
equally applicable to Nigeria, specifically.
6 Ibid.
For further information regarding newspaper circulation 
in Nigeria, see Dayo Duyile, Media and Mass Communications 
in Nigeria, Ibadan, 19 79, pp 62 - 6 3. The table provided 
by the author has been reproduced in Appendix II.
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Against the background of this brief sketch of salient 
aspects of Nigerian experience, it now remains to examine 
the laws governing the media in this African state: and 
it is proposed to begin by providing a brief overview of 
legal and other restrictions on the media in Nigeria; and 
then to focus on those laws which are of particular signif 
icance.
-226- 
CHAPTER THREE
AN OVERVIEW OF MEDIA FREEDOM IN NIGERIA 
3*1. Introduction
The laws governing freedom of the media in Nigeria are many: 
and space does not permit detailed examination of all. 
Accordingly, it is proposed to devote this chapter to a 
brief overview of the principal restraints and controls 
affecting the media in Nigeria - before turning to detailed 
analysis of the laws selected for more comprehensive study.
In conducting this overview, an attempt will be made (so
far as practicable) to distinguish between (1) laws of
'colonial' origin (in the sense that they either form part
of the body of English law received into Nigeria pursuant
2
to the general process previously described, or are cont­
ained in Nigerian legislation adopted before the attainment 
of independence in 1960); (2) legislation enacted during
3
the period of the First Republic from 1960 to 1966 ; (3) 
laws promulgated by the military government between 19 66 and 
1979; and (4) legislation introduced since the return to 
civilian rule. The constitutionality - in terms of the
These are briefly enumerated in the following section, 
at p 227 below.
See the section on the Sources of Nigerian law, at p 131 
above.
See the section on the History of Nigeria, at p 92, et seq.
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guarantee of freedom of expression in s 36 - will briefly
be reviewed: subject, however, to the caveat that in-depth 
analysis lies beyond the scope of this general overview.
An attempt will also be made to assess the impact of 'extra- 
legal' factors, such as the detention and harassment of 
journalists and the effect of large-scale government owner­
ship of the media. Finally, the validity of the claim that 
Nigeria's press is the "freest" in Africa will be examined*
3.2. Laws of 'Colonial1 Origin
It is principally the laws of 'colonial' origin (in the 
sense previously described) which have been selected for 
comprehensive study. These include registration require­
ments relating to newspapers, and other licensing and
regulatory laws affecting the media in general, which are
2
described in Chapter Four below. Also of colonial origin 
is the law of sedition, described in Chapter Five; the law
s 36, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979. It will be recalled from the section on the 
Guarantee of Freedom of Expression, that laws which are 
inconsistent with this guarantee (and do not fall within 
the ambit of one of the permitted derogations) are void, 
to the extent of such inconsistency, under the terms of 
s 1(2) of the 1979 Constitution.
These laws are brought together in one chapter for the 
sake of convenience: and because they reflect different
facets of essentially similar control. It must, how­
ever, be acknowledged that this treatment does not fit 
altogether easily into the classification of laws 
described above, since the law governing the electronic 
media is of post-colonial origin, unlike the law regul­
ating the print media.
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of defamation (in both its civil and criminal aspects) 
described in Chapters Six and Seven; and the law of contempt 
of court, which affects the media in four major respects/ and is 
further discussed in Chapters Eight to Twelve.
Another law of colonial origin (less important by reason
of its more limited ambit and the apparent paucity of
2
instances in which it has been invoked ) is the provision 
prohibiting the publication of 'false news' which is 'likely 
to cause fear and alarm'; and this is briefly examined 
below.
3.2.1. The Publication of False News 'Likely to Cause 
Fear and Alarm*
3
The law against sedition is reinforced by section 59 of the 
Criminal Code (and the equivalent section 418 of the Penal 
Code^) which renders it an offence to publish or reproduce 
'any statement, rumour or report which is likely to cause 
fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace/ 
knowing or having reason to believe that such statement/
The civil law of defamation/ like the regulation of the 
media/ does not fit neatly into the category of laws of 
'colonial' origin in that some provisions were incorporated 
after independence, such as the Defamation Law 1961/ 
applicable in Lagos State. In general/ however/ it is 
true to say that the law of defamation is 'colonial' law.
2
The decision discussed below appears to be the only reported 
instance of the invocation of the law: though it has also 
been the basis of criminal prosecution in at least two 
instances in 1981, as further explained below.
3
Sedition law is further discussed in Chapter Five.
4 \ Medlar cl
See s 418, Penal Code (Northern fVovisAct 1960, no
25 of 1960.
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rumour or report is false1 . Under sub-section 59(2)/
'It /is/ no defence to a charge under /this provision/
that /the accused/ did not know or did not have reason
to believe that the statement/ rumour or report was
false unless he proves that/ prior to publication/ he
took reasonable measures to verify the accuracy of such
2
statement/ rumour or report'.
The relevant provision of the Penal Code (s 418) is 
essentially similar, and provides that '/w/hoever cir­
culates/ publishes or reproduces any statement/ rumour 
or report which he knows or has reason to believe to 
be false with intent to cause or which is likely to 
cause fear or alarm to the public whereby any person may 
be induced to commit an offence against the public peace, 
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend
3
to three years or with fine or with both' . Liability 
thus depends either on the accused's subjective intent 
to cause fear or alarm, or on the objective likelihood 
of this condition resulting. The provision is silent 
as to the question of onus, but it would seem - in keep­
ing with general principles of criminal liability - 
that the burden lies on the prosecution to prove all 
elements of the offence.
i
Section 59(1), Criminal Code, Cap 42, (Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, T958)• The differing 
history and areas of application of the Criminal and 
Penal Codes are discussed further in Chapter Five.
 ^ Section 59(2), ibid.
3
Section 418, Penal Code (Northern Region) Federal Pro- 
sions Act, supra.
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There appears to be only one reported case on this topic, 
as further discussed below. It is clear, however, that 
the law is by no means a dead-letter, as graphically 
demonstrated by recent events. Thus, in August 19 81, the 
editor and editor-in-chief of the Nigerian Standard were 
charged with reproducing and publishing false information, 
following the publication of a front-page story in the 
issue of 24 July, which 'quoted charges by the Gongola 
State chairman of the Great Nigeria People's Party ... 
that the President's National People's Party ... was plot­
ting to assassinate its political opponents in the state'1. 
Moreover, the mere fact that the law has not frequently
been invoked in the past provides no guarantee that this
2
may not occur at some time in the future • These provisions 
are accordingly of considerable significance: and it should 
be noted that the burdens they place on the media are ex­
tremely onerous. Not only is it difficult to define or 
predict what type of statement is 'likely to cause fear 
and alarm' or to 'disturb the public peace', but s 59 
of the Criminal Code also casts the onus upon the accused
/1981/ 6 Index on Censorship, Notes. The journalists 
were also detained for more than 48 hours and their 
offices raided, as also described below in the section 
on the harassment of journalists, at p 281 . In 
addition, in December of that year, the editor and pro­
prietors of the Sketch newspaper were summoned to appear 
before a Kaduna Chief Magistrate's Court over a charge of 
publishing a false statement. See /1982/ 1 Index on 
Censorship, Notes. Unfortunately, no report of either 
case is available.
P.ecent experience in the United Kingdom in relation to 
the law of criminal libel - until recently considered a 
'dead-letter' - graphically demonstrates this possibility• 
These English cases are further discussed in Chapter 
Seven below.
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to show that he did not know, or have reason to believe, 
that the statement was false; and that he took * reasonable 
measures to verify /its./ accuracy'1. Verification is a 
time-consuming and therefore a costly procedure; and the 
proof of a 'negative' is always difficult.
The constitutionality of these provisions accordingly merits 
some examination. The rules (particularly with their 
requirement of prior verification) are prima facie in con­
flict with the constitutional guarantee of the right to
'receive and impart ideas and information without inter- 
2
ference' . However, the constitution also permits deroga­
tion by any law that is 'reasonably justifiable in a demo-
3
cratic society* for the purpose of maintaining public order . 
The question accordingly arises whether these provisions 
are so 'reasonably justifiable'.
In one of the few reported decisions on this provision,
4
R v Amalgamated Press (of Nigeria) Ltd and another , it
was contended that section 59 was void for inconsistency
with the guarantee of freedom of expression contained in
5section 24 of the Independence Constitution . The court 
accorded this argument short shrift, emphasising that '/s/
See p 229 above.
2
See s 36, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
3
See ibid, and s 41(1)(a), ibid.
4 /1961/ 1 All N.L.R. 199
5
This, of course, is the exact equivalent of section 25 
of the Republican Constitution, and the close equivalent 
of the present guarantee, in s 36, Constitution, supra. 
(The terms of s 24 are set out at p 199 above)•
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24 ... guaranteed nothing but ordered freedom and ... /could/ 
not be used as a licence to spread false news likely to cause 
fear and alarm to the public'1.
This ruling seems to smack of excessive judicial caution;
and though it must be acknowledged that the Supreme Court
did take pains to stress that it remains 'legitimate and
constitutional to ... criticise the Government ... by means
2
of fair arguments' , the difficulty (of course) lies in 
determining what jls fair; and the judgment provides no 
guidance in this regard.
In addition, the Supreme Court failed to pay adequate atten­
tion to the heavy burden placed upon the accused by these 
provisions. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law 
that the onus lies upon the state to prove all elements of 
a crime. These rules cut across that principle: whilst the 
verification requirement presents grave practical difficulties 
and is therefore likely to promote self-censorship by the 
media. It is accordingly submitted - notwithstanding this 
judgment - that the provisions go further than is 'reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society* and that - to the extent
3
(at least ) to which they place the onus upon the accused - 
they are unconstitutional.
3.2.2. Obscene and Indecent Publications
4
As Nwabueze ^points out, it is 'difficult to give a single
1 R v Amalgamated Press, supra, at 202.
2
Ibid, emphasis supplied.
3
It may also be contended that the provisions are too vague 
and wide-reaching to be constitutional; and that closer 
definition is required of what is meant by a statement 
'likely to cause fear and alarm to the public' or 'to 
disturb the public peace'.
4
B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutional Law of the Nigerian Republic, 
London, 19 64.
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definition of what constitutes the offence of obscenity in 
Nigeria, because the law governing the matter is different
i
in different parts of the country'.
In the northern states, the matter is governed by the United 
Kingdom Obscene Publications Act, 1857 (which applies, by
2
virtue of the general reception process previously described , 
as a 'statute of general application in force in England on
1 January 1900'); and by s 202 of the Penal Code.
The latter renders it an offence, punishable by two years' 
imprisonment or fine of unspecified amount or both, to sell, 
distribute, import, print or make for sale 'any obscene
3
book, pamphlet, /or/ paper' or to have possession of such 
articles. No definition of obscenity is provided either 
by the Penal Code or by the United Kingdom statute, which 
'simply empowers... magistrates to order 'seizure and condemn­
ation' of obscene publications, leaving its punishment to
4
the common law' . The common law test of obscenity (now
5
reflected in more recent English legislation ) is whether 
the matter in issue has the 'tendency... to deprave and 
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences 
and into whose hands such a publication might fall'.^
-
Nwabueze, ibid, p 370.
2 See p 131 above.
3
Various other articles, including paintings and figures, are 
brought within the ambit of the section; and the list reflected 
in the text above is limited to those most relevant to the 
media.
4
A.A. Adeyemi, 'Obscene and Indecent Publications', in T.O. 
Elias, ed., Nigerian Press Law, London and Lagos, 1969, 
pp 109-121 , p 112.
See the Obscene Publications Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz.2c.66, s 1. 
This test was laid down in R v Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B.
360 at 371, per Cockburn, C.J.
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In the eastern states# the governing legislation is again 
the Obscene Publications Act 1857, but this time in conjunction
i
with s 232 of the Criminal Code. The latter renders it a
misdemeanour, punishable by two years' imprisonment or fine
of two hundred naira,to make, produce or possess any obscene
2
writings, printed matter, pictures or photographs ; to
3
import, convey or export such matter ; to carry on any 
business or dealings in such matters or to distribute or
4
exhibit them ; to advertise the fact that such matter is
5
obtainable from any person ; or publicly to exhibit any
g
indecent show or performance . The court has wide powers
7
to order the destruction of any obscene matter . The legis­
lation makes no attempt to define what is 'obscene'; and the 
common law test accordingly applies.
In the western states, the position is substantially the 
same, except that the Obscene Publications Act 1857 does not
o
apply and the matter is governed entirely by identical
9
provisions of the western Criminal Code.
1
Cap 30, (Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963).
2
s 232 (1 ) (a), ibid. The list of matter included in this
provision is considerably more extensive, and only those
most relevant to the media have been listed above.
3 s 232(1)(b), ibid.
* s 232(1)(c), ibid.
5 s 232 (1 ) (d) , ibid.
6 s 232(1)(e), ibid.
 ^ s 232(2), ibid, applicable on the conviction of an accused - 
and s 232(3), ibid, applicable in other circumstances.
Q
This is by virtue of the western states' Law of England 
(Application) Law, 1959, Cap 60.
g
s 175, Cap 28 (Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959).
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In Lagos State, additional legislation has been introduced, 
modelled substantially on the United Kingdom Obscene Public-
i
ations Act 1959. Thus, the Obscene Publications Law 1961
applies to the exclusion of the English statute or the 
2
Criminal Code, and provides, in brief outline/ as follows.
In terms of s 4, it is an offence (punishable by imprisonment 
for three years or by fine of four hundred naira or both) 
for a person to distribute or project - whether for gain or 
not - any article which is deemed to be obscene for the
3
purposes of the Law , as further described below. 1 Article1 
is defined as meaning 'anything capable of being or likely 
to be looked at and read or looked at or read, and includes 
any film or record of a picture or pictures, and any sound
4
record' . 'Distributes' includes 'circulates, lends, sells,
5
lets on hire or offers for sale or hire' and 'projects'
‘in relation to an article to be looked at or heard, includes 
shows or plays'^.
In terms of s 3, the test of obscenity is whether the 'effect 
/of an article/ taken as a whole is such as to tend to 
deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard 
to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the 
matter contained or embodied in it'. '/T/his is substantially
i
No 51 of 1961. Thus, again, although the law of obscenity 
is primarily 'colonial' law, the classification is not 
9 entirely water-tight.
_ s 7, ibid.
s 4(1), Obscene Publications Law, ibid. 
s 2, ibid.
* Ibid.
7 m i -
s 3, ibid.
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the Hicklin test, with the difference (a) that the public­
ation must be taken as a whole, and (b) /that/ regard must 
be had to all relevant circumstances' . Hence, the effect
of the statutory definition is to introduce a further
2
'measure of elasticity into the test of obscenity' . It 
should be noted that the test is objective and depends upon 
the article itself; 'and not upon there being an intention 
on the part of the author or publisher to corrupt' . How­
ever, a person is not to be convicted 'if he proves that he had 
not examined the article in respect of which he is charged 
and /that/ he had no reasonable cause to suspect that it 
was such /as to render him liable under the statute/'.^
The statute confers wide powers of search and seizure, 
providing - in essence - that if a magistrate 'is satisfied 
by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that /obscene/ articles... are... /being/ kept 
for publication for gain in any premises... stall or vehicle..., 
/he/ may issue a warrant... empowering any constable to 
enter (if need by force) and search the premises,... stall 
or vehicle... and to seize and remove any article found 
/there/ which the constable has reason to believe to be
5
obscene...' . Such articles may be brought before a magistrate,
g
who may order their forfeiture .
7 “ ~ ~
Adeyemi, op cit, p 113.
2
Ibid. Adeyemi also submits, however, that the provisions of 
s 3(2) of the statute deprive the phrase 'taken as a whole' 
of much of its practical efficacy.
3
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 11, para 1017, n 4, 
citing R v Shaw, [1962] A.C. 220 (H.L.(E.)).
4
s 4(2) Obscene Publications Law, supra.
5 s 5(1), ibid.
 ^ s 5(3) to 5(8), ibid.
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An important defence to liability is provided by s 6, which 
states that a person may not be convicted (and an order for 
forfeiture may not be made) rif it is proved that public­
ation of the article in question is justified as being for 
the public good on the ground that it is in the interests 
of science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects
i
of general concern' < In considering the defence, 'the 
strength of the tendency to deprave and corrupt.../and/
2
the strength of the literary, sociological or ethical merit' 
of the publication must be balanced. The opinion of experts 
as to the literary, artistic, scientific or other merits
3
of an article are admissible in evidence in this regard.
The ambit of the statute is limited in a number of important 
respects. Thus, it does not apply to 'exhibitions in private 
houses to which the public are not admitted or to anything
4
done in the course of television and sound broadcasting' . 
Furthermore, no prosecution for an offence under s 4(1)^may 
be commenced more than two years after the commission of
g
the offence.
 ^ s 6(1), ibid.
2
Halsbury's Laws of England, supra, para. 1018, n 3.
3
s 6(2), Obscene Publications Law, supra.
4
s 3(2), ibid. As regards the latter limitation, the broad­
cast media are instead made subject to the duty not to include 
in programmes any matter 'which is likely to offend against 
good taste or decency or... to be offensive to public 
feeling'. See s 8(a), Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria 
Act 1979, discussed at p 329below, and the equivalent provis­
ions in the Nigerian Television Authority Act 1977, discussed 
at p335 below.
5
The provisions of s 4(1) are, of course, discussed above 
at p 235.
g
s 4(4), Obscene Publications Law, supra.
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In Lagos State, further legislation - the Children and
Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Law, 1961 - renders
it an offence (punishable by six months' imprisonment or
fine of two hundred naira or both) to print, publish, sell
or hire or to possess for purposes of sale or hire any
2
book or magazine to which the statute applies. Such books 
and magazines are defined as those 'of a kind likely to fall 
into the hands of children or young persons and consisting/ 
wholly or mainly of stories told in pictures (with or without 
the addition of written matter), being stories portraying -
(a) the commission of crimes; or
(b) acts of violence or cruelty; or
(c) incidents of a repulsive or horrible nature;
in such a way that the work as a whole would tend to corrupt
3
a child or young person into whose hands it might fall' .
It is, however, a defence for the accused to prove that 
'he had not examined the contents of the book or magazine 
and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the book or
4
magazine was one to which th/e/ law applies'.
Wide powers to search for and to dispose of works to which 
the statute applies, or of articles which are used in their 
publication, are conferred by s 5; but no prosecution for
5
an offence under s 4(1) may be commenced without the consent
1 No 52 of 1961.
2 s 4(1), ibid.
 ^ s 2(2), ibid.
 ^ s 4(2), ibid.
c
See above.
1
of a Law Officer.
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As regards the common law, it should be noted that 'it is
2
an indictable offence at common law to publish obscene matter' 
as well as to 'procure obscene prints or libels with intent
3
to publish them' . 'These offences are punishable by fine 
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court'Ucwev/o' tUese,
\T^ 4c£ ajrc. V = > A i / ^  KvejejJ) <r. y vi.rt'u-a. 3 of tla-
C=>AS V 11 U -lr to A . ^ C'- CcXAc! U s  ^"CCCCA/VTv « s ) .
There is a marked paucity of Nigerian cases reflecting the 
operation of these laws and it is accordingly difficult to 
assess the extent to which they constitute a restriction on 
freedom of the media in practice. As regards their constit­
utionality, they are prima facie in violation of the right 
to 'receive and impart ideas and information without inter­
ference', as guaranteed by s 36 of the 1979 Constitution. 
However, s 41 makes express provision for the saving of any 
law 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society... in
5
the interest of... public morality' ; and the laws examined 
above appear to fall within the ambit of this provision.
Leaving aside the question whether it is the proper province 
of law to dictate moral standards to adults, the major object­
ion that may be made to the legislation is its uncertainty.
7 “ “ “ " ”
s 4(3) Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications)
Law, supra.
2
Halsbury's Laws of England, supra t para. 1022. Note 
that the Lagos statute contains no proviso in relation to 
matters falling within the statutory definition of obscene, 
as is found in the United Kingdom Obscene Publications Act, 
s 2(4).
3 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
5
s 41(1) (a), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
S  33> C t2^ , < n iU ic _ r  p -o  v 'o to ./s j, 4t> - t t a .  e - j |c x fc .^  s t c J r o i
C. S-VxC'U ^\ct b-c_ C<2 '\\-/r 1 C-t e cl -£>(■ XVT.iV'fSvi t ‘t’lvcjt
u ©vivjjJ ii Uec£ iA .•% 14-Ga .
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The definition of what is 'obscene' is extremely broad; 
and the fact that it is also objective exacerbates the 
position. The legislation applicable in Lagos State goes 
some way towards meeting certain difficulties by (for example) 
making the definition more elastic and by introducing the 
defence of publication 'for the public good'. It is 
accordingly arguable that the Obscene Publications Law of 
Lagos State/ as well as the Lagos statute prohibiting 
publication of matter harmful to children and young persons/ 
are indeed constitutional; whilst the law applicable in the 
remainder of the country (especially the North) is too vague 
to meet the criterion of being 'reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society'. In the absence of cases illustrat­
ing the manner in which the rules are applied in practice/ 
however, the matter must remain largely speculative.
3.3. Legislation of the First Republic
During the period of the First Republic - which lasted 
from the attainment of independence in 1960^ to the military 
coup of January 1966 - a number of statutes relevant to 
freedom of the media were introduced. The most important 
of these are briefly summarised below.
3.3.1. Disclosure of Official Secrets
2
The Official Secrets Act 1962 forbids the reproduction or
7 ”
See the section on the History of Nigeria at p 92, et seq.
2
No 29 of 1962. This repealed and replaced the earlier 
enactment of 1958 which had extended to Nigeria the United 
Kingdom Official Secrets Acts of 1911 and 1920. The Act 
applies throughout the Federation, as expressly provided 
by s 10(2).
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transmission (inter alia) - without lawful authority - of 
any 'classified matter1, defined (in essence) as any infor­
mation the disclosure of which has been prohibited under
any system of security classification in force at the time
1
and would be prejudicial to the security of Nigeria . It 
is, however, a defence to a charge under this provision if 
the accused proves that, at the time he reproduced or trans­
mitted the material, he did not - and could not reasonably 
have been expected to - believe it to be classified and 
(further) that as soon as he realised this - or should
reasonably have done so - he placed his knowledge of the
2
case at the disposal of the police.
The Act also makes it an offence - for a purpose prejudicial
to the State - to enter a 'protected place'; to photograph,
sketch or otherwise record its physical description; to
reproduce any such photograph, sketch or record; or to
obstruct or interfere with a person engaged in guarding it.
'Protected place' is defined, in essence, as any military
installation or any 'other area' so designated by the 
3
Minister. A person charged under this section may be 
deemed to have acted for a purpose prejudicial to the State- - 
but only if, from the surrounding circumstances (including 
his character and general conduct), he appears to have 
acted for such purpose.
1
Section 1(1), ibid.
2
Section 9, ibid.
3
Section 2, ibid, emphasis supplied.
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i
The Act further prohibits (during a period of emergency )
the sketching or photographing of any 'defence material'
specified in the Defence Minister's prohibition order# save
2
with the written permission of the latter.
The punishment for all three of the above offences is im­
prisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. No 
proceedings may be instituted under these provisions without 
the consent of the Attorney-General or Director of Public
3
Prosecutions of either the Federation or one of the states.
As for the effect of the Act on freedom of expression in 
Nigeria# this is somewhat difficult to gauge - especially 
as there are no decided cases on this topic. In the view
4
of Ohonbamu , it is a legitimate restriction since it 'is 
designed not necessarily to prevent comments upon matters 
of public interest, but only to prevent espionage and the 
communication or transmission of information vital to the 
security of the state from falling into the hands of an 
enemy... /orJ potential enemy with whose country there is
5
a likelihood of war'. Clearly# it is less wide-ranging
than United Kingdom Official Secrets legislation - which
is briefly analysed below in order to demonstrate the contrast.
See section 70 of the Republican Constitution and its 
counterpart in the 1979 Constitution and the discussion 
of the effect of a declaration of an emergency in the 
section on the general scheme for the protection of 
human rights at p 188, above.
Section 9(1)#Official Secrets Act, supra.
3 — ---Section 7, ibid.
d
O. Ohonbamu 'State Security and the Press' in T.O. Elias 
(ed.) Nigerian Press Law, London and Lagos# 1969# pp 35 - 45.
5 Ibid, p 40.
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The most notorious provision in the United Kingdom Act is s 
2 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911. This is too long and 
complex a provision to reproduce in; full? but subsection
(1)(a) and (2) are set out below, in order to provide some 
idea of its terms.
2. Wrongful communication, etc., of information
(&) If any person having in his possession or control /"any 
secret official code word, or pass word, or/ any sketch, 
plan, model, article, note, document, or information which 
relates to or is used in a prohibited place or anything 
in such a place, or which has been made or obtained in cont­
ravention of this Act, or which has been entrusted in 
confidence to him by any person holding office under His 
Majesty or which he has obtained /or to which he has had 
access/ owing to his position as a person who holds or has 
held office under His Majesty, or as a person who is or has 
been employed under a person who holds or has held such an 
office or contract, -
(a) communicates the /code word, pass word/ sketch, 
plan, model, article, note, document, or information 
to any person, other than a person to whom he is author­
ised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in 
the interest of the State his duty to communicate it, or,
(2) If any person receives any /secret official code word, 
or pass word, or/ sketch, plan, model, article, note, docu­
ment, or information, knowing, or having reasonable ground 
to believe, at the time when he receives it, that the /code 
word, pass word,/ sketch, plan, model, article, note, docu­
ment, or information is communicated to him in contravention 
of this Act, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless
he proves that the communication to him of the /code word, 
pass word,/ sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, 
or information was contrary to his desire.
Subsection (1) thus prohibits the unauthorised communication 
or passing on of official information - a restriction which 
may seriously hinder the press in fulfilling their role 
as "watchdogs" over society in general (and over those in 
authority especially). Subsection (2) has even more serious 
consequences for the media, however, for it renders it a 
crime (subject to the same penalty of two years' imprisonment
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as applies to subsection 1) to 'receive' unauthorised info­
rmation, knowing or having reason to believe its communi­
cation to be prohibited by the Act; unless the recipient 
is able to prove that the communication to him was 'contrary 
to his desire'.
This wide-ranging prohibition has had serious consequences
for freedom of expression in Britain. As discovered by
1the Franks Committee (established in 1972 to report on
the Acts in the face of growing public criticism and concern
at their wide ambit), the small number of prosecutions
2
under the section 'disguises the much greater effect that
3
the section has had’ . In the words of the Report of the 
Committee, although 'Section 2 is rarely activated in the 
courtroom,... it is seen by many as having a pervasive 
influence on the work and hehaviour of hundreds and thousands
4
of people' .
Those prosecutions which have been brought clearly reveal 
the wide-ranging ambit of the section. For example, in
5
the Sunday Telegraph trial in 1971 (which was of particular 
interest to Nigeria) the editor of the Sunday Telegraph
-  - -
Departmental Committee on Section 2 of the Official Secrets 
Act 1911, (chaired by Lord Franks), cmnd 5104, 1972.
2
The Committee discovered 23 between 1947 and 1972.
3
Leslie Chapman and Robin Chapman: 'The Official Secrets Act 
Its History and Effect' in Secrecy, or the Right to Know, 
published by the Library Association for the Freedom of 
Information Campaign, London, 1980.
4
Para. 26, supra. See also-Robin Callender Smith, Press 
Law, London, 1978, p 178.
5 Cited by Callender Smith, ibid, pp 150-151.
-245-
(amongst others) was prosecuted under section 2 for having 
published a report (compiled by the defence advisor to 
the British High Commission in Lagos) regarding the 
Nigerian civil war. This report 'criticised the poor 
leadership and tremendous waste displayed by Nigerian 
officers' and revealed that 'the /British/ Prime Minister 
... and his Foreign Secretary... had misled the public 
about the extent of British army support provided to
i
Nigeria'. No military intelligence was contained in
2
the report, nor was any of its information secret.
Although the accused were ultimately acquitted, the fact 
that proceedings were brought against them in the first 
instance clearly demonstrates how far the provision goes 
in inhibiting freedom of expression. Moreover, the 
outcome of the case was largely the result of the 'stub-
3
born common sense' evinced by Mr. Justice Caulfield in 
summing up to the jury - and in emphasising that 'there 
is no duty in law for an editor or his newspaper to go 
running to Whitehall to get permission to print articles
4
or news' . However, the fact remains that the Act is 
extremely broadly worded; and that it thus constitutes 
a major threat to media freedom, in that it 'inhibit/”sy
1
Smith, supra, p 150.
2 Ibid.
3
Callender Smith, ibid, p 151.
 ^ This dictum is reproduced in Callender Smith, ibid.
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the /media/ from doing things which may be quite legi 
timate11.
In the decade since this decision, the Franks Committee
has recommended the repeal of the section in favour of
a more restrictive prohibition; and various attempts
have been made to secure this. So far, however, none 
2
has succeeded .
A comparison of the United Kingdom legislation with the Ni­
gerian Official Secrets Act shows clearly that the latter is 
far more limited in ambit. It is accordingly submitted by 
Ohonbamu that the Nigerian legislation (unlike the United
1 Callender Smith, ibid.
2
See the Labour Party White Paper, 1 Reform of Section 
2 of the Official Secrets Act, Cmnd. 7285, 1978; 
the Freedom of Information Bill introduced by the 
Liberal Member of Parliament, Clement Freud, which 
secured considerable support but fell with the 
Government in April 1979; and the Protection of 
Official Information Bill, introduced by the new 
Conservative Government in October 19 79, but with­
drawn before its second reading the following month.
For a comprehensive review of the United Kingdom 
laws, see Patricia Hewitt, The Abuse of Power,
Oxford, 1982, pp 81 - 90; S.H. Bailey, D.J. Harris 
and B.L. Jones, Civil Liberties: Cases and Materials, 
London, 19 80, pp 272 - 286; Smith, op cit, pp 145 - 
154; and the publication Secrecy, or the Right to 
Know?, supra.
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Kingdom statutes) cannot be '"technically" contravened by
the disclosure of information which bears no relation to
national security' ; and it is clear that he believes that
the Act goes no further than is necessary in protecting
legitimate interests of the State and in providing essential
guidelines as to where the individual (and the journalist/
2
especially) should 'draw the patriotic line' . It is sub­
mitted, however, that this may be too sanguine a view, for
the definitions of both 'classified matter' and 'protected 
3
place' are extremely wide and depend entirely upon the 
unfettered discretion of the Minister.
The Official Secrets Act cuts prima facie across the con­
stitutional guarantee of freedom of expression enshrined 
within the Nigerian constitution, for it undoubtedly restricts 
the freedom to 'impart and receive ideas and information 
without interference', guaranteed by s 36. However, it 
is also arguable that the law is 'reasonably justifiable 
within a democratic society' in the interests of defence, 
public safety and public order, within the meaning of s 
41(1)(a). It is clear that every state must take steps 
to maintain its security and that the communication of 
official secrets to an enemy (or potential enemy) may 
therefore legitimately be curtailed. Insofar, however, 
as the Nigerian legislation is vague in its provisions or 
casts the onus upon the accused to establish his innocence,
1
Ohonbamu, op cit, p 41.
 ^ Ibid.
3
See text at p 241 above.
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it is arguable that it goes beyond what is ‘reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society* for these purposes 
and is accordingly unconstitutional. The question is, how­
ever, a complex one; and requires more detailed examination 
than can be accorded to it in this study in order to reach 
a definitive view.
3.3.2. Publication of a False Statement, Report or Rumour
In 1964, a controversial amendment was made to the News­
papers Act, 19581. The controversy centred around section
2
4 of the amending statute , which - in essence - rendered
3
it an offence (punishable by a fine of £200 or imprison­
ment for one year) to publish *any statement, rumour or
report knowing or having reason to believe /it to be/
4false* . Whilst this, in itself, may appear unobjection­
able, the sting lies in the tail of the provision: which 
presumes knowledge of falsity by the accused and casts the 
onus on him to prove that ‘prior to publication, he took 
reasonable measures to verify the accuracy of /the_/ state­
ment, rumour or report*^.
The repercussions of this amendment for freedom of the 
press are difficult to gauge. In the view of one commenta-
g
tor at least , its effect has been slight, although *it
1 Cap 129, (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
2
The Newspapers Amendment Act, 1964 (no V of 19 64), described 
in detail by T.O. Elias, 'Legal Requirements for Publishing 
a Newspaper', in T.O. Elias, (ed.), Nigerian Press Law,
London and Lagos, 1969, pp 1 - 15, at pp 5-6.
This provision is now contained in s 21, Newspapers Law,
Cap 86, (Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973).
3
This is the equivalent of -N400.
4
S. 4 of the 196 4 Amendment Act, and s 21, supra.
5 Ibid.
6 John P Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics. London, 1966.
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did limit reports of troubles during the 1964 elections in 
the North as no paper:could afford an itinerant investigator 
to check all facts. /'Its/ effect /’therefore/ was on report­
age, not on editorial criticism, which... remained as spirited
i
as ever1.
This sanguine view contrasts sharply, however, with the 
misgivings voiced by Nwabueze. In his view, 'the law imposed 
very serious limitations upon newspaper reportage, since 
no newspaper in Nigeria could afford to post field reporters 
in every part of the country to check upon the truth of 
every report. Besides, the truth of alleged political 
persecution or electoral malpractices might be difficult 
to prove. And so it was that the rigging of the 1964
2
federal elections failed to get adequate newspaper coverage'.
It is interesting to note that an exact equivalent of this 
provision - introduced in Lagos in the teeth of considerable 
opposition from the media - was already included in the
3
Newspaper Law of the eastern states . It seems, thus, 
that 'the highly controversial issue raised by th/is/ 
statutory provision /in the East/... had been overlooked
4
because it occurred in a Regional enactment' . In the 
western states, a substantially similar provision was 
introduced (also in 1964) by the Newspapers (Amendment) Law
1 Ibid, pp 48-49.
2
B.O. Nwabueze: Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, 
London, 1973, pp 151-152.
3
Newspaper Law (eastern states) Cap 86 (Laws of Eastern 
Nigeria, 1963), s. 16.
4
Elias, op cit, p 11.
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of 19641.
As regards the constitutionality of these provisions, the
2
same arguments as previously adduced in relation to the
substantially similar offence of publishing 'false news,
likely to cause fear or alarm', apply mutatis mutandis to
3
these laws. In addition, it is submitted by Elias that 
the fact that 'no criminal prosecution may be commenced 
/for these offences/ without the prior order of a judge in 
chambers /or of the Attorney-General, as used to be the
4
case in the western states / cannot be regarded as satisfac-
5 6tory' . Furthermore, in the view of Nwabueze , these pro­
visions are 'in direct conflict with the principle that the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press requires 
that knowledge of the falsity of the statement should be
7
proved as a fact by the state, and not presumed' .
It is submitted that the provisions in question are accord­
ingly unconstitutional: for they are fundamentally incon­
sistent with the guarantee of freedom of expression 
enshrined in section 36.
1 No 26 of 1964. These provisions were, however, repealed in 
19 6 7 by the Newspapers (Amendment) Law (Repeal) Law of 1967, 
no 29 of 1967. For further information, see Elias, op cit, 
p 12 et seq.
2
See p 232 above.
3
Supra.
4
See the erstwhile s 27A(2) of the Western Newspapers Law,
Cap 81 (as incorporated by the amending legislation of 1964).
5
Elias, supra, p 11
c
B.O. Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria, 
London, 1982.
7 Ibid, p 477.
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3.4. Legislation of the Military Government
During the period of military rule in Nigeria/ from 1966 
to 1979/ a number of laws relevant to the media were 
promulgated by the military authorities. In this section, 
it is proposed to canvass in brief the most important of 
these.
3.4.1. Ban on the Circulation of Newspapers.
One of the most effective means of gagging unwelcome press
criticism is to ban the circulation of outspoken newspapers.
Although a clear contravention of the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression , a ban had in fact been imposed
on the Post and Times newspapers by certain local government
councils in the aftermath of the controversial General
2Elections of 1964 . It is interesting to note that one of
the first actions of the new military regime was to lift
these restrictions and to prohibit similar bannings in
future. Thus, the Circulation of Newspapers Decree^ made
it an offence, punishable by substantial fine or period
of imprisonment, to 'd[o] anything calculated to prevent
or restrict the distribution or general sale of any news-
4paper m  any part of Nigeria.
It may be recalled that the Constitution Drafting Committee 
stressed that such bans were unconstitutional and indicated 
that proceedings could have been taken to secure redress, 
when newspapers were in fact banned during the period of 
the First Republic. (The Committee thus considered that the 
guarantee of freedom of expression was adequate (even though 
it had not been invoked in practice) and this was one of the 
reasons for the Committee's refusal to introduce an express 
guarantee of freedom of the press, as previously discussed
2 at p 216 above) .
Elias, 'The Law, the Press and the Public' in TO, Elias, (ed.)
3 Nigerian Press Law, London and Lagos, 1969, pp 122-136, p 133.
4 Decree No. 2 of 1966. 
s 1(2), ibid.
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There was then a fundamental change of heart, for 1967 witnessed
the introduction of the Newspapers (Prohibition of Circulation)
Decree , which authorised the Head of the Military Government
to prohibit the circulation or sale of any newspaper in
Nigeria 'where /he/ is satisfied that /its/ unrestricted
circulation... is or may be detrimental to the interest of
2
the Federation or of any state thereof'.
It is interesting to note the view of one writer at least' 
that this restriction was imposed only '/a/s a result of 
persistent and what was widely felt to be mischievous report­
ing on the part of certain foreign newspapers'? The terms 
of the Decree are clearly wide enough, however, to extend 
to any newspaper, either local or foreign; and the only 
newspaper initially banned under its provisions was, in fact,
4
the Biafra Sun . It must, on the other hand, also be 
remembered that the country had been 'plunged into a bloody
5
civil war* only three days previously and that the operation 
of the Decree was expressly limited to 12 months - 'unless
g
sooner revoked or extended' .
7
It is difficult to trace any express extention of the Decree
1 Decree No. 17 of 1967.
2 s 1(1)/ ibid.
3
See Elias, op cit, p 133.
4
This was in terms of the Biafra Sun (Prohibition of Circulation 
Order) 1967, effective 30 May 1967.
5
Elias, supra, p 131.
 ^ s 1(1), Decree No. 17 of 1967.
7
There are no records gf further extensions in the official 
records of legislation, but is is possible that these may 
have been omitted. The lacuna casts considerable doubt on 
the continued efficacy of the enactment - though this did not 
deter the Federal Military Government from subsequently invok­
ing it (as further described in the text below)•
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after the expiry of this period; and also to ascertain 
whether any other newspaper was banned under its terms prior 
to 19 78. In June of that year, the Federal Military Govern­
ment imposed a two-year ban1 on the circulation of the 
fortnightly magazine Newbreed (printed in Britain). The 
Government also seized its mid-June issue, which contained 
an article querying 'Who is ganging up on Chief Awolowo?',
as well as comment on the 'Uses and Abuses' of the National
2
Security Organisation . (An earlier issue, which featured 
an interview with the former Biafran leader, Colonel Ojukwu, 
had also been seized in May 19 77). Any question as to the 
lawfulness of these seizures or the ban on circulation 
was excluded by the Newspaper (Prohibition of Circulation)
3
(Validation) Decree, 19 78 .
At State (as opposed to Federal) level, the Military 
Governor of the South-Eastern State banned the Nigerian 
Daily Standard (Calabar) in 19 70 for criticising his admin­
istration. This ban was lifted after five years by a new 
Governor, who simultaneously made it clear that 'he would
4
not tolerate irresponsible journalism' . In addition, the 
Morning Post and Sunday Post newspapers were banned in
5
the western states in 1967 .
This was in terms of the Prohibition of Circulation 
""Newbreed") Order, 1978, (L.N. 46 of 1978).
2
/1978-79/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B739.
 ^ Decree No. 12 of 1978.
4
/1975-76/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B795.
5
This was in terms of the Morning Post and Sunday Post 
(Prohibition) Edict, 1967, (W.N. 12 of 1967)•
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These appear, from the sources available, to be the princi­
pal instances of newspapers being banned by the authorities 
during the thirteen years of military rule. It seems, 
therefore, that - despite the wide-ranging power conferred 
by the Decree of 1967 - it was, in fact, seldom invoked.
The enactment was repealed in 19791, in preparation for the 
return to civilian rule (though it is interesting to specu­
late as to whether this was indeed necessary, given the fact
that the Decree was expressed to be operative for twelve 
2
months only , unless extended - and there appears to be no 
record of extension having been effected). Be that as it 
may, the repeal of the legislation is greatly to be welcomed: 
for the statute could not be considered consistent with the 
constitutional guarantee of free expression. It was, of 
course, arguably legitimate as a law 'reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society' in the interests of public order
3
and public safety . However, it is submitted that there is 
little force in such a contention: and that the wide-ranging
4
and unfettered discretion vested in the President under the 
enactment - which entitled him to ban any newspaper which 
'/mighty be detrimental to the interests of the Federation' - 
went further than was 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic
This was in terms of the Constitution of the Federal Repub­
lic of Nigeria (Certain Consequential Repeals, etc) Act, 
1979 (No 105 of 1979).
See p 252 above.
See s 41(1) (a), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979.
The unconstitutionality of an absolute and unregulated 
executive discretion is further discussed at p 378 below.
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society1. Any law which undermines the liberties guaranteed 
by the Bill of Rights should be reasonably certain and 
strictly limited to what is truly necessary to protect 
interests such as public order and public safety; and a 
statute which goes beyond this should not be considered 
constitutional. It is interesting to note, moreover, that 
the reason for the repeal of this (and various other decrees 
of the Military Government) was to facilitate the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms in the new era of the Second 
Republic1. This accords clear - if implicit - recognition 
to the incompatibility of the banking power conferred by 
this legislation with the guarantee of freedom of expression.
3.4.2 Restriction of Matter Likely to Cause Public Alarm 
or Industrial Unrest
Under the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment)
2
(No. 2) Act, 1969 , it is an offence, punishable by five 
years' imprisonment, 'for any person to publish in a news­
paper... any matter which, by reason of dramatization or 
other defects in the manner of its presentation, is likely
3
to cause public alarm or industrial unrest' •
There are no reported cases reflecting the operation of this 
provision in practice; and it is accordingly difficult to
See the Explanatory Note to Act No 105 of 1979, supra. 
 ^ (Decree) No. 53 of 1969.
 ^ s 1 (e), ibid.
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assess the extent to which it has served to restrict press 
freedom in the past. Its terms are slightly more precise 
than those of the Newspapers (Prohibition of Circulation) De­
cree, described above; and it could accordingly be more 
cogently argued that this restriction is one 'reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society' in the interests of 
public order and public safety. However, it is again sub­
mitted that any statute which infringes fundamental liberties 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights must be precise and certain 
in its formulation, and must go no further than objectively 
required to protect the particular interest in issue.
Hence, the provision - by virtue of its inherent ambiguity 
- should not be accepted as constitutional.
3.4.3. Reproduction of Coypright
The governing enactment in the context of copyright is the
1 2 Copyright Act 1970 , which applies throughout the Federation.
No succinct definition of copyright is provided by the statute
(which instead includes a number of detailed rules applicable
3
to different types of copyright material ) and the definit­
ion of copyright provided by the Oxford English Dictionary 
accordingly affords a convenient starting point for brief 
explanation of the law. According to the Dictionary, copy­
right is 'the exclusive right given by law for a certain 
term of years to an author, composer, etc... to print, publish 
and sell copies of his original work'.
 ^ (Decree) No. 61 of 1970 
 ^ s 19, ibid.
3
These are futher explained in brief outline below.
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This definition accords in considerable measure with that
contained in the United Kingdom Copyright Act 1911, which
applied in Nigeria by virtue of an Order-in-Council , but
has now been repealed in Nigeria by the 1970 statute.
The latter today constitutes the sole source of copyright
2
within the country.
In terms of s 1, literary, musical, and artistic works as 
well as cinematograph films, sound recordings and broad-
3
casts are eligible for copyright ; and s 2 confers copy­
right on every work so eligible provided the author is 
either a citizen of, or domiciled in, Nigeria or (in the
4
case of a body corporate) is incorporated within Nigeria .
In circumstances not covered by s 2, s 3 confers copy­
right on every work, other than a broadcast, which is
eligible for copyright and which is first published or made 
5m  Nigeria.
Copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work or in a 
cinematograph film is defined as 'the exclusive right to 
control... the reproduction in any material form,... the 
communication to the public, and... the broadcasting /in 
Nigeria/ of the whole or a substantial part of the work
 ^ See Order-in-Council No 912 of 1912, dated 24 June 1912, 
made under s 25 of the 1911 Act.
2
See ss 18 and 16 of the (Nigerian) Copyright Act, supra.
3
In the case of the first three, further conditions for 
eligibility (for example, 'sufficient effort... to give 
/the work/ an original character') are prescribed by s 
1 (2), ibid.
4
See s 2, ibid. Reciprocal protection in relation to countries 
with which Nigeria has treaty relations in the sphere of 
copyright is provided by s 14, ibid.
5 s 3, ibid.
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either in its original form or in any form recognisably
i
derived from the original* . Similarly/ copyright in a 
sound recording is 'the exclusive right to control in 
Nigeria the direct or indirect reproduction of the whole or 
a substantial part of the recording either in its original
o
form or in any form recognisably derived from the original' 
and copyright in a broadcast likewise entails the exclusive 
right to control the recording and rebroadcasting or the 
communication to the public of the whole or a substantial
3
part of the broadcast.
The first ownership of copyright is governed by s 9, which 
lays down the general principle that copyright 'vest/s\J
4
initially in the author' , subject to the proviso that where 
a work is commissioned or is made in the course of the 
author's employment, it vests either in the person who
5
commissioned it or in the author's employer. . Copyright 
in any eligible work which is made under the direction and 
control of the Federal or a State Government or by a 
prescribed international body vests in that government or 
body.^
 ^ s 5, ibid.
2
s 7, ibid.
3
s 8, ibid. The broadcasting of literary, musical or 
artistic works incorporated in a cinematograph film is 
further regulated by s 6, ibid.
 ^ s 9(1), ibid.
 ^ s 9(1)(a) and (b), ibid.
® s 9(2) read with s 4, ibid.
Copyright is infringed 'by any person who, without the
licence of the owner of the copyright... does, or causes
any other person to do, an act the doing of which is cont-
rolled by copyright* or who imports into Nigeria (other
than for his private and domestic use) any article entitled
2
to copyright protection. Such infringment is actionable
in the High Court by the owner of the copyright, who is
entitled to relief by way of damages, injunction, accounts 
3
or otherwise . Damages may not, however, be obtained where 
'at the time of the infringement the defendaht was not 
aware, and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting, that 
copyright subsisted in the work to which the action relates* 
but the court may, in such circumstances, order an account
5
of profits. . The court has power to award 'additional 
damages', where (apart from other material considerations) 
the infringement is flagrant and 'any benefit /isJ shown to 
have accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement.
The rules provided by the statute are detailed and complex, 
and further analysis of these lies outside the scope of this 
study. Assessment of their practical significance is made 
more difficult by the paucity of reported decisions in this 
sphere. As regards the constitutionality of the Act, it
1 s 11 (1) (a), ibid.
2 s 11 (1) (b), ibid.
3 s 12(1), ibid.
4 s 12(2)(b), ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 s 12 (3), ibid.
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appears prima facie# to fall within the ambit of laws 
'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' for the 
purpose of regulating 'wireless broadcasting, television
i
or the exhibition of cinematograph films' , or for the
purpose of 'protecting the rights and freedoms of other 
2
persons' . The time period during which copyright subsists 
has been considerably reduced under the 1970 Act and now 
lasts twenty years (from the time of making) in the case 
of sound recordings and broadcasts and twenty-five years 
(from first publication) in the case of cinematograph films 
and photographs; whilst - in the case of literary, musical 
or artistic works other than photographs — copyright expires 
twenty-five years after the end of the year in which the
3
author dies . These time periods are substantially shorter 
than those previously applicable in Nigeria (in terms of the 
United Kingdom Copyright Act 1911 which, in essence, provided 
for protection fof fifty years from the death of the author
4
or date of first publication ■) . Accordingly - in the absence 
of evidence that the statute operates harshly in practice - 
it appears 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'; 
and, accordingly constitutional.
See s 36(3)(a), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979.
 ^ See s 41 (1) (b)> ibid.
3
See Schedule 1, Copyright Act 1970, supra.
4
See M.O. Adesanya, 'Newspapers and Copyright' in T.O. Elias, 
ed., Nigerian Press Law, London and Lagos, 1969, pp 58-66. 
Unfortunately, the discussion of the copyright infringement 
in this chapter has become largely out-dated through the 
introduction of the 1970 legislation.
Note that the United Kinqdom Copvright Act 1911 has been 
repealed and replaced by the Copyright Act, 1956 (4 & 5 
Eliz. 2 c. 74), which provides for essentially the same 
time periods.
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3.4.4. Prohibition of False Allegations of Corruption
i
The Public Officers (Protection from False Accusation) Act 
renders it an offence, punishable by two years' imprisonment 
without the option of a fine, to propagate, by any means, 
any false allegation of corruption in relation to any public 
officer. 'Public officer' is defined as including,inter 
alia, any member of the Nigerian Armed Forces and Police, 
any person in the Public Service of the Federation or a 
State, or in the service of a corporation in which either 
the Federal or any State Government has a controlling interest.
Although there appear to be no reported cases in which 
this provision has been in issue, it must nevertheless be 
viewed as a very serious limitation on freedom of the media.
It is widely known that corruption is rife in Nigeria:
and the media have an important role to play in investigating
and exposing such misconduct on the part of public officials.
It is, of course, undeniable that a false accusation of 
corruption may have serious consequences for any person 
unjustly accused. However, the existing law of defamation 
provides sufficient protection for a person whose reputation 
is damaged by such an accusation; and there seems no reason 
to impose this additional and draconian measure which not 
only prescribes imprisonment (for two years) as a mandatory 
punishment but also - it would seem - imposes strict liability 
on the publisher of the allegation. Prima facie, the 
statute makes no provision for consideration of the publisher's 
knowledge of the falsity of the allegation; nor does it
(Decree) No. 11 of 1976.
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indicate that an honest belief in the truth of the accusation 
constitutes a defence. Furthermore, the ambit of the enact­
ment is extremely wide, by virtue of the broad definition 
of 'public officer' which (as indicated above) includes 
even an employee of a state or federal-owned corporation.
It is doubtful whether such sweeping protection against false 
allegations of corruption is truly necessary.
The law is prima facie in violation of the right to 'impart 
ideas and information without interference' which is 
guaranteed by s 36 of the Constitution. It may be argued 
that it is saved by s 41, on the basis that it is a law 
'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others. However, it is submitted 
that it goes further than is reasonably justifiable because 
of the factors described above: its heavy penalty, apparent 
imposition of strict liability and wide-ranging ambit. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the enactment is unconstit­
utional; and that it should be acknowledged as being void 
for inconsistency with s 36 - leaving any public official
who alleges that he has been falsely accused of corruption
1
to seek redress under the ordinary law of defamation.
The law of defamation is described in Chapters Six and 
Seven below. In these chapters, it is submitted that 
any public official who alleges that he has been defamed 
should (following the approach of the United States of 
America) be required to prove 'express malice' on the 
part of the publisher as a pre-condition to a successful 
claim. It is recommended that the same principle should 
be applied in this context.
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3.4.5. Regulation of Access to Information
Freedom of the media depends also upon unrestricted access
to information. Whether this is indeed available in Nigeria
is open to question - for in March 1978, the News Agency
of Nigeria (for which provision had been made in legislation
of 1976 ) was established. The function of the Agency is
to collect news from all sources, local and international,
and to supply 'complete, objective and impartial inform- 
2
ation' to its subscribers against payment of a prescribed 
fee.
The implications of this for freedom of the media are diff­
icult to gauge. The first point to note, however, is that 
Third World countries in general have recently become 
extremely sensitive to the present monopoly over the inter­
national flow of news enjoyed by the four major Western
3
agencies ? and are anxious to establish national and regional 
news agencies of their own in order to counteract the per-
4
vasive influence of the "Big Four" . If this were indeed 
one of the underlying motivations for the introduction of 
the Nigerian News Agency, it does not bode entirely well 
for freedom of expression. Such reason for establishing
the Agency suggests that it may be intended to present to
1
The News Agency of Nigeria Act 1976, (Decree) No. 19 of 1976.
2 s 2(1)(c), ibid.
3
These are the Associated Press, Reuters, United Press 
International and Agence France Presse.
4
See p 38 above, where the problem facing Third World 
countries in this regard is briefly discussed.
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the outside world a particularly favourable image of Nigeria 
and one which may not always entirely correspond with reality. 
This, in turn, may therefore call for the suppression or, 
at least, the "down-playing" of information regarding diffi­
culties with which the country is faced.
The second point to note is that the Agency is entirely
Government-controlled, proposals for an independent Trust
to perform the functions of news collection and distribution
having been rejected1. If, therefore, the Agency has sole
and full control over the flow of information, there must
inevitably be a real risk of it suppressing news in the
interests of the Government, as the Kenya News Agency was
alleged to have done when it withheld information relating
2
to the Stanleyville paratroop landings in March 19 65 .
The key consideration, accordingly, is the extent to which 
information may be obtained from sources other than the Agency 
and this is not entirely clear from the terms of the Act. Thus, 
section 2(2) provides that the 'Agency shall have the monopoly 
of collecting news in Nigeria for sale to foreign news agencies 
This may serve no more sinister purpose than to ensure 
that all revenue from the sale of news to foreign agencies 
accrues to the national Agency and hence to the state.
However, it may also have the effect of restricting
/19 72-73/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B698. Furthermore, 
the provision in the 19 76 legislation for a Council of 
Trustees (including non-Government representatives, such 
as members of the Nigerian Bar Association and the 
Nigerian Guild of Editors) was repealed in 19 78 (when 
the Agency was established) by the News Agency of Nigeria 
(Amendment) Act, (Decree) No 10 of 19 78.
2
East African Standard, 6 March, 1965, (cited by L.O. 
Adegbite, The Concept of the Rule of Law in Africa, un­
published Ph.D. thesis, University of London, December 
1965, p 486 n 1).
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the information regarding Nigeria which reaches the outside
world; and may have the effect of compelling foreign news
correspondents to rely on the Agency alone for their reports.
On the other hand/ it must also be noted that section 16(2)
expressly states that:
’Arrangements for news collection and distribution made 
by the Agency shall be without prejudice to the right of 
Nigerian newspaper... subscribers to make their own independent 
arrangements for news coverage by their own correspondents'.
The latter provision clearly seems to give newspapers the 
choice of either relying on the Agency or pursuing their own 
independent avenues of information. If this is the correct 
interpretation/ the Nigerian News Agency does not exercise 
full control over access to information and should not be 
seen as an infringement of freedom of the media. This 
may be too sanguine a conclusion/ however/ for it must -■ 
also be remembered that a number of participants in the 
Great Debate saw a real heed for a constitutional guarantee
i
of free access to information - a need which remains unful­
filled under the terms of section 36.
It remains to consider the constitutionality of these provis­
ions. Again, the matter is not easy to assess: and depends 
in large measure on the extent to which the Agency - in 
practice - controls the flow 6f information and suppresses 
news which it considers inimical to the image of Nigeria 
which it wishes to project. If suppression does occur, 
this prima fcicie, violates the guarantee of the right to
1
See for example. The Sunday Observer, 23 January, 1977;
The Daily Sketch, 13 January, 1977; The Daily Times, 14 
June 1977. (The 'Great Debate' in question is, of course, 
the debate on the Draft Constitution, previously described 
at p 105 above).
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'receive and impart ideas and information without interference' 
contained in s 36. Is such violation 'reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society' in order to promote an interest 
which is recognised by the Constitution as justifying dero­
gation? The interests thus recognised by the Constitution 
are many and varied: but none seems entirely apposite in 
this context. It is stretching language to assert that 
such restriction of information (assuming, of course, that 
it does occur) is justifiable in the interests of 'public 
order* or 'public safety'; and these are the only recognised 
interests which are even arguably in point. Suppression 
in general - in order to boost Nigeria's image abroad - 
is therefore not to be considered constititional; though 
suppression of individual items of news may, of course, 
be justifiable (on their own particular merits) in terms 
of the recognised interests. Thus, for example, if the 
News Agency did not disclose details of troop movements 
aimed at repelling a threatened invasion, this would clearly 
be legitimate in the interests of public security.
However, it must again be emphasised that the extent of 
repression of information by the Agency is uncertain. 
Accordingly, it is by no means suggested that the entire 
statute should be repealed - as an Agency of this kind may 
undoubtedly provide a valuable service - but rather that 
its principal objectionable feature (the fact that its 
members are all government-appointed) should be removed. 
Instead, the majority of appointments to the Agency should 
be made by autonomous professional bodies, such as the
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Nigerian Guild of Editors. In this way, the positive aspects 
of the Agency would be strengthened: and the risk of its 
being used to suppress important information would be much 
reduced.
3.4.6 Control through the Nigerian Press Council
In the course of the debate on the new Constitution, a 
number of hard-hitting criticisms were levelled at the
i
Nigerian press for its low standards of journalism - evid­
enced especially by its sensationalism (which must often 
have exacerbated ethnic tensions) and by its failure to 
investigate the truth underlying the official versions of 
events. 'Half-truths, mistruths, suppression of truth, 
jaundiced reporting and witch-hunting, mal-education of 
the public, sycophancy and lack of guts /were described
2
as being/ the characteristics of the Press in Nigeria.1
As a result, a number of calls were made for the establish­
ment of an independent Press Council to govern the work of 
journalists and to generate 'a more knowledgeable and
3
professionally competent Press' . There is no doubt that 
a Press Council may indeed fulfill a vital and constructive 
role in relation to both the profession and society as a 
whole. Ideally, its functions should be to preserve and
1
See, for example, The Punch, 1 February, 1977; The Daily 
Times, 19 January, i97/; The Daily Sketch, 13 January,
19/7; The Daily Times, 14 June, 197/; and The Sunday 
Observer, 29 January 1977.
2
The Daily Times, 19 January , 1977, supra.
 ^ The Daily Times, 14 June, 1977, supra.
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safeguard media freedom by monitoring and mobilising 
resistance to any change in the law which threatens to 
curtail this; to set and maintain high standards of respon­
sibility, independence and impartiality in reporting; and 
to assist both the public and the profession by providing 
a knowledgeable forum for the hearing of complaints by 
the public against individual reporters.
The constructive role that may be played by such a council 
is well illustrated by the Press Council established in 
Britain in 1953. This has played an important part in 
maintaining high standards of journalism and in keeping 
under review the law and practice of censorship, contempt 
and libel and is now, despite the controversy surrounding 
ito inception, held in 'growing repute' by both the public 
and the press itself.
The key element in the high standing enjoyed by the British 
Press Council is, however, its independence from government 
control. In the absence of such autonomy, there is undoubt­
edly a risk that a Press Council which is government-cont­
rolled will use its powers to promote the interests of that 
government - and that freedom of the press will suffer 
commensurately.
It is accordingly disturbing to note that the Press Council
i
H.P. Levy, The Press Council: History, Procedure and Cases, 
London, 1967, cited by Elias, in The Law, the Press and the 
Public', op cit, p 132.
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established in Nigeria (under the Nigerian Press Council
i
Act of 1978 ) is not an independent body. Although six of
its 14 members are appointed on the election or nomination
of autonomous institutions such as the Newspapers Proprietors
Association of Nigeria, the Nigerian Guild of Editors, the
Nigerian Union of Journalists and the Nigerian Bar Association,
its remaining eight members - including the Chairman - are
2
all appointed directly by the executive .
Because of this element of control, strenuous objections
3
were raised to the introduction of the Council , but passed 
unheeded by the Military Government. Although the new 
civilian government under President Shagari has promised 
to review the legislation, no such action has yet been taken.
It seems, however, that such protest has not been entirely
in vain; as the Council has not yet been brought into full
operation, pending amendment of the legislation 'so as to
4
make it acceptable to all concerned1.
Under the terms of the statute, the duties of the Nigerian 
Press Council include the promotion of high standards of 
journalism, the monitoring of legal developments likely to 
imperil Press freedom, the introduction of a Code of Conduct 
for the profession and the hearing of complaints against
c
journalists by members of the public.
* (Decree) No. 31 of 1978.
2 s 3(1) - (3), ibid.
3
See, for example, /r1978-79/ and /1979-80/, Africa Contemporary 
Record, p B 740 and B 594 respectively.
4
Letter to the writer from Chief Olu Oyesanya, Secretary/ 
Registrar, Nigerian Press Council, 5 April 1982.
5
s 2, Nigerian Press Council Act, supra.
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Under the Code of Conduct, the primary duty of journalists 
is 'the maintenance, in spirit as well as in deed, of the
i
unity and stability of Nigeria' * Breach of the Code is
2
punishable primarily by fine but the statute also provides 
more serious penalties in that, under section 16, a journ­
alist may be struck off the register for, inter alia, 
'persistent false reportage' - and may thus be precluded 
(unless and until reinstated) from further practice as a
3
registered journalist .
The legislation also sets new standards for admission to 
the profession, requiring, in essence, the satisfactory
4
completion of approved theoretical and practical training.
The Council is given the primary power of decision over 
applications for registration, alleged breaches of the 
Code of Conduct and complaints by the public against indivi­
dual journalists. However, there is also a right of appeal 
(in the former case) to the Minister and (in the latter 
two instances) to the High Court. **
Insofar as the Act serves to promote higher standards of 
journalism, it is to be welcomed. There is, however, also
* s 6(1), ibid.
2
s 9(1)(c)(ii), ibid. The sub-section also provides for 
the publication of an apology and of the name of any 
offending journalist.
3
s 12, ibid provides for the registration of journalists 
and s 17 makes it an offence for an unregistered journalist 
to hold himself out as entitled to practise the profession.
4
For further details, see sections 14, 18 and 21, ibid.
 ^ s 15(1); and 9(3) and 16(5), ibid.
-271-
a real risk that it will give further impetus to self­
censorship by the press. The primary duty to maintain,
i
in spirit and in deed, the unity and stability of Nigeria 
is very broad; and, so long as the power of enforcement 
rests in the hands of a Council that is Government-controlled, 
journalists will remain understandably reluctant to publish 
material that may be considered inconsistent with this duty.
In addition, the provision for the registration of journalists 
is a matter for considerable concern; and it is noteworthy, 
in this regard, that the Press Council in the United Kingdom 
is rigorously opposed to the imposition of such measures, 
believing them intrinsically inimical to freedom of the 
media.^
As for the constitutionality of the legislation, this is
not easy to assess. If the statute operates in practice
to promote self-censorship or results in the punishment of
a journalist for failing to maintain 'in spirit and in deed,
3
... the unity and stability of Nigeria * , then this, prima 
facie, would violate the right to 'receive and impart ideas 
and information without interference' guaranteed by s 36.
Moreover, none of the permitted derogations seems entirely 
apposite to this form of control; and it is accordingly 
difficult to see on what basis the legislation could be 
said to be 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' 
in the service of a recognised interest. On the other hand, 
there are a number of positive features in the legislation;
7 “
See s 6(1), ibid.
2
Interview with the Secretary of the Press Council, Mr R Swingler 
in London, in April 19 82.
3
See again, s 6(1), Nigerian Press Council Act, supra.
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and it is submitted that the optimum solution to the difficulty 
would be to amend the law to remove both executive control 
over the Council and the system of compulsory registration 
of journalists. Amended in this way, the legislation would 
promote the responsibility of the press itself to regulate 
its own affairs and to improve its journalistic standards; 
and would thus fulfill a valuable function.
3.5. Legislation Since the Return to Civilian Rule
Since the return to civilian rule in 1979, very little new
i
legislation has been enacted ; and only one statute has
2relevance to the media. This is the Electoral Act , which 
(inter alia) provides for the restriction and monitoring 
of media reports of the forthcoming August 1983 elections 
for a period of three months before and one month there­
after. This system of control is to be effected through 
the establishment of a national advisory council on Federal
3
Government-owned mass media.
The press campaigned vigorously against the introduction 
of this provision; and, following the passage of the bill 
through the federal legislature, petitioned President
Only seven Acts were passed in 1980; and two in 1981, these 
being the Finance Act and the highly controversial Allocation 
of Revenue (Federal Account) Act. 1982 legislation includes 
the Economic Stabilization (Temporary Provisions) Act and 
the Electoral Act, below. The only legislation prima facie 
relevant to the Press is that contained in the■Electoral 
Act, as further described below.
Unfortunately, copies of the Electoral Act (notwithstanding 
inquiry at the Nigerian High Commission, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies) are not yet available.
See /1982/ 4 Index on Censorship, Notes. Since almost all 
newspapers are government-owned, as further explained at p 
285 below, this represents a very considerable restriction.
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i
Shagari not to give his assent to it. In August last year/
'the Nigerian Newspaper Proprietors' Association and the
Union of Journalists jointly started a court action/ seeking
a declaration that fthej provision... /"is/ unconstitutional 
2
and void' . Unfortunately/ however/ no report of these 
proceedings is yet to hand.
It is submitted that there is considerable force in the 
media's contention that the provision is invalid under the 
terms of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of express­
ion. Prima facie/ it cuts across the right 'to receive 
and impart ideas and information without interference' 
enshrined in s 36(1); and it is difficult to see under which 
of the recognised interests (for the promotion of which 
derogation is permitted) the provision can be brought. The 
only recognisable interests even arguably in point are 
those relating to 'public order' and 'the rights and freedom'
3
or others, as provided by the 19 79 Constitution*. Is it 
tenable to contend that these restrictions on press coverage 
of the elections are 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society' for the furtherance of these interests?
The question is not altogether easy to answer. On the one 
hand, it is clear that full press coverage of the competing 
parties and their different policies plays an important 
part in informing the electorate of the choices available
1
The need for the President's assent to legislation derives 
from s 54(1)/Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
19 79.
2 Index on Censorship, supra.
3 See ss 41(1)(a) and s 41(1)(b), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
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to it; and, in this regard, it is salutary to note the view
expressed by Dr. Akinsanya of the University of Lagos -
'that newspapers were indispensable to the parties during
the elections of 1979'1. On the other hand, it is also
disconcerting to note the concern expressed by Dr Akinsanya
'that federal and state-government-owned newspapers engaged
2
in partisan publication during the campaigns' ? and it must 
accordingly be acknowledged that biased newspaper coverage 
may inhibit the conduct of 'free' and'fair' elections. If 
the new legislation succeeds in limiting such partisan 
reporting, it may fulfill an important role in society and 
serve to smooth the path of democracy. Viewed in such light, 
the legislation may be regarded with considerable sympathy. 
However, the derogations from freedom of expression authorised 
by the constitution should not be overlooked; and, if a 
particular provision does not fall within their ambit, no 
amount of sympathy for its underlying social need or 
motivation should be allowed to outweigh that fact. In 
addition, any such 'prior restraint* against publication 
should - as in the United States of America, as further
3
explained below - be regarded as bearing a heavy presumption 
against constitutionality: so that it should not lightly
Dr A Akinsanya, 'The Nigerian Press and the 19 79 General 
Elections', in 0. Oyediran, (ed.), The Nigerian 19 79 
Elections, London, 1981, pp 111 - 122, p 122.
Ibid, p 121. In Dr Akinsanya's view, '/'t/he result /was/ 
that the U.P.N. and N.P.N. were favoured at the expense of 
the /other three parties/ /and that/ /t/hese three parties 
were obviously at a disadvantage as there was not one 
'national' newspaper that projected their image to the 
extent enjoyed by the U.P.N. and N.P.N.'.
In the U.S.A., freedom of the press is considered a 'pre­
ferred freedom'; and any 'prior restraint' on publication 
is viewed with particular suspicion - an approach which, 
as further explained in Chapter Four - has considerable 
merit.
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be considered, 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society'. Moreover, even though unrestricted election 
reporting may be partisan/ it is preferable to have a choice 
of biases available/ than to be restricted to what govern- 
metn determines to be 'suitable for publication'. If the 
national advisory council were entirely autonomous and 
independent, the matter would be considerably different 
(though/ even then/ the difficulty of bringing the legis­
lation within the ambit of the permitted derogations would 
remain).
In sum, it is accordingly submitted that the new provision 
is indeed inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee 
of freedom of expression/ in that it cannot be fitted into 
the authorised exceptions and goes, in any event/ beyond 
what is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'. 
Hence, the legislation in question should be regarded as 
void to the extent of such inconsistency.
3.6. "Extra-legal" Controls over the Media
In addition to the laws described in the preceding sections, 
it should also be noted that there are two major "extra- 
legal" controls over the operation of the media: restrictions 
which are not stricto sensu provided by any law but which 
nevertheless have great significance for freedom of the media. 
The first concerns the detention or other harassment of
It will be recalled, as previously noted, that s 1(2) of 
the 1979 Constitution provides that any law inconsistent 
with the Constitution is void, pro tanto.
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journalists; whilst the second relates to wide-ranging 
government ownership of the media.
3.6.1. Detention and Intimidation of Journalists
The fear of suffering detention without trial is unquestionably 
one of the strongest deterrents against the publication 
of frank, outspoken criticism of those in power. The record 
of detention and intimidation of journalists in Nigeria 
is difficult to gauge in full (because of the limited 
sources of information available), but clearly includes 
the following instances.
In April and May 1971, the editors of three leading papers 
(including the Government's Morning Post and the New Nigerian) 
were arrested for short periods - no reason for this being
i
made public ;
In June 1971, three editors from the Daily Express and Daily
Sketch were detained without trial by the police - again
2
with no public explanation ;
In 1972, the news editor of the Lagos Daily Times was detained 
for a month after writing an article on the long-delayed
3
selection of a new principal for Ibadan Polytechnic ;
* /19-70-71/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 420.
2 Ibid, P B 652.
3
/1972-73/, Africa Contemporary Record, p B 698.
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Also in 19 72, Colin Legum, Commonwealth Correspondent of 
The Observer/ and Bridget Bloom/ African Correspondent of 
of the Financial Times, became the latest of a long list 
of journalists banned for their reporting of the Nigerian- 
Biafran civil war1.
In 1973/ the acting editor of the Daily Express and two 
senior members of her editorial staff were arrested and
detained for five hours in Lagos for a front-page editorial
. . . . 2 criticising an increase in Lagos bus fares ;
In the same year/ the editor-in-chief of East Central State's 
semi-official daily. Renaissance, was detained for several 
days by Enugu police along with two colleagues because of 
a series of articles on border disputes involving the three
3
eastern States ;
Also in 1973, the chief correspondent in Port Harcourt of
the Nigerian Observer, Amakiri, was detained, shaved and
flogged for publishing a story on schoolteachers' grievances
4in Rivers State, as further described below ;
In 1974, the editor of the Ibadan weekly The News was 
arrested for a short while for publishing a pamphlet accusing 
the Federal Commissioner for Communications (J.S. Tarka) of 
corruption^;
1
/1974/ 3 Index on Censorship, Notes.
2
/1973-74/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 736.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5
/1974-57 Africa Contemporary Record, p B 743.
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On 11 April 1974, a reporter and the news editor of the 
Daily Times were arrested for unspecified reasons, though 
the editor was later released. Following their arrest,
'the Nigerian Union of Journalists appealed to General 
Gowon... to assist in preventing the unwarranted harassment 
of journalists by the police. The Union also referred to 
an earlier incident at Lagos Airport, where Air Force 
personnel horse-whipped and used their gun butts on journa­
lists awaiting the return of the Nigerian team from the
i
Commonwealth Games. Three of the journalists were injured.'
Also in 1974, the acting editor of the Nigerian Tribune
was reported to have been arrested 'after publishing an
editorial alleging that General Gowon was surrounded by 
2
’flatterers'* . At the same time, it was also reported 
that a correspondent of a German television network had 
been refused entry into the country (notwithstanding his
3
valid entry visa) for reasons that were unspecified.
In 1975, the acting editor of the Daily Sketch was arrested - 
allegedly for writing about an attempt to divert milk imported
4
by the National Supply Company ;
Also in 1975, the news editor of the Daily Sketch was arrested 
for publishing a letter criticising the air force and
5
commenting on the Tarka affair (above) .
7 “ ”
/1 9 7 4/ 3 Index on Censorship, Notes.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 /1974-75/, Africa Contemporary Record, p B746.
5 Ibid.
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In addition, in 1975, the editor of the weekly newspaper, 
The News, the editor of the weekly Sunday Renaissance and 
Agwu Okpanku, a literary correspondent, were arrested, the 
latter two in Enugu ‘following publication of an article
i
critical of the Federal government' .
In 1976, two journalists of the Sunday Renaissance, were
detained for over a month for criticizing the Government's
decision to change the name of the Bight of Biafra to Bight 
2of Bonny ;
In 1976, 'Reuter's chief correspondent in Lagos and two 
of his Nigerian assistants... were arrested without explan­
ation in Lagos on 16 February, when the police closed the 
agency's office there. The correspondents had given the 
world the first news of the abortive coup in the country
3
three days earlier.' All were released on the following 
day, and Colin Fox was deported to the neighbouring state 
of Benin.
In 1977, 'the West African correspondent of The New York 
Times was arrested in Lagos on 11 March and expelled the
4
following day. No reason was given' .
2 /*1975/ 2 Index on Censorship, Notes.
 ^ /1 975-76/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 794.
4 /*1976/ 2 Index on Censorship, Notes.
/1977/ 4 Index on Censorship, Notes. Although not strictly 
relevant to freedom of the media, it is also noteworthy that 
on 18 Feb., 1977, the home of Nigeria's most outspoken 
dissident, the musician Fela Anikulepo-Kuti, (a cult figure 
amongst Nigerian youth) who frequently criticised the military 
government on the stage of his nightclub "The Shrine", was 
attacked by several hundred soldiers and set on fire. This 
was the second such attack in ten days and it was followed 
by a 'five-hour long riot in the slum section of Lagos, as 
the soldiers clashed with civilian passers-by'. See /”1977/
3 Index on Censorship, Notes.
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In 1978, as student protest spread throughout the country 
following the killing of a student and a pregnant woman 
at Lagos University on 18 April, a journalist (and woman 
member of staff) were reported to have been beaten up by
i
police at the University of Ife.
Also in 1978, 'Walter Schwarz, a correspondent for the 
London Guardian, was expelled without explanation on 10 May 
- only two days after he had been allowed into the country 
on a 30-day visa. At the airport plain-clothes policemen 
searched his briefcase and suitcase, confiscating notebooks 
and papers.1^
In 1980, a correspondent of the New York Times, who had 
been covering the visit of Vice-President Walter Mondale to 
Nigeria, 'was expelled without explanation on 19 July - 
but was allowed to return the following day, officials
3
claiming that a mistake had been made* . It transpired 
that the executive editor of the New York Times 'had sent 
Mr. Mondale a telegram informing him of the Nigerian action1 
and asking him to 'register a protest over this unwarranted
4
violation of free press coverage' .
In 1981, the editor of the New Nigerian was arrested on 
17 June, on orders of the Chief Justice of Plateau State, 
for contempt of court. He was kept in custody for five
5
days and then released 'with a warning' . It appeared
7 “ “ “ “ “
o /H9787 4 Index on Censorship, Notes.
3 Ibid«
. /1980/ 6 Index on Censorship, Notes.
5 Ibid«
/”198V 6 Index on Censorship, Notes.
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that the editor had been 'summoned to court to apologise 
for an article in the 28 May issue of the newspaper, but 
/had been/ unable to attend, at which the Chief Justice
i
had taken offence' .
Also in 1981, in early August, 'six senior Nigerian editors
were arrested, and the offices of three opposition daily
2
newspapers raided by the police' .
On 3 August 1981, following publication of a front-page 
story in the Nigerian Tribune on 28 July, in which 'President 
Shagari was alleged to have bribed opposition federal 
legislators so as to ensure support for his Bills in the
3
National Assembly* , the paper's editor and editor-in-chief 
were arrested and held, whilst 'more than 100 armed police
4
sealed off and searched their offices' . The journalists 
were released after 36 hours in police custody; and were 
charged with sedition. Regrettably, no report of the 
proceedings (set down for hearing from 9 to 13 November)
5
is yet to hand.
Also in August 1981, the editor and editor-in-chief of the 
Nigerian Standard 'were arrested and detained for more than
g
48 hours, and their offices raided' . The issue of 24 July
 ^ Ibid.
2
/1981/ 6 Index on Censorship, Notes.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5
Unfortunately, law reporting in Nigeria is still somewhat 
incomplete,and there is also some delay in reports being 
received in London.
 ^ 6 Index on Censorship, Notes.
-282-
had featured a front-page story/ quoting charges 'by the 
Gongola State chairman of the Great Nigeria Peoples' Party., 
that the President's National Peoples' Party... was plotting
i
to assassinate its political opponents in the state' .
Furthermore, on 14 August 1981, the editor of the Daily 
Sketch was arrested and some 100 anti-riot police raided 
the offices of the newspaper. On 24 July, the paper had 
published 'a communique from an opposition party, the 
People's Redemption Party... which stated /inter alia/... 
that senior officials of the party were /threatened with/ 
assassination'^ .
Finally, on 17 August of that year, the Nigerian Tribune 
editor was again arrested, together with the acting editor 
of the Sunday Tribune. No reason for this was given by
3
the police ? but it may possibly have been in response to 
an article published some 10 days previously, alleging 
'police involvement in a smuggling affair in Nigerian
4
territorial waters'.
In December 1981, the managing editor of the Sketch news­
paper and representatives of its publishing company in 
Ibadan 'were summoned to appear before a Kaduna Chief 
Magistrate's court over a charge of publishing a false
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4
/1982/ 1 Index on Censorship. Notes.
1
statement *
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In October 1982, '/t/he 'editor of the Sunday Concord. . .
was arrested and detained for seven hours... On allegations
that he possessed the report of the Belgove Tribunal probing
the cause of a fire that /had/ gutted the Republic Building
2
in Lagos on 14 December 1981’ .
Although the record outlined above is not a particularly 
salutary one, it is encouraging to note that the punishment
3
meted out to Amakiri (as described above) did not go 
unredressed. The incident provoked a storm of criticism 
from the press and a joint petition was addressed to General 
Gowon by the Newspaper Proprietors' Association/ the Nigerian
4
Guild of Editors and the Nigerian Union of Journalists .
The official who had ordered his punishment was sent on
5
compulsory leave; and, in proceedings brought against him
Ibid. Also in December 1981, Fela Anikulepo-Kuti, singer 
and musician - and outspoken critic of government - was 
arrested in Lagos and charged (on seven counts) the following 
day. He was released on bail some 8 days later, and at trial, 
was discharged and acquitted when the prosecutor withdrew 
the charges.
2
/"1983/ 1 Index on Censorship.
3
Graphic detail of the indignities suffered by Amakiri is 
provided by F.O. Shyllon and 0. Obasanjo, The Demise of the 
Rule of Law in Nigeria under the Military: Two Points of View, 
Ibadan, 1980, pp 14-15. Amakiri's hair was shaved 'in the 
rain with an old rusty razor blade', he was given 24 strokes 
'administered with ruthless military precision leaving /hisJ 
body a mess of blood and bruises, and he was then 'dumped 
in a disused toilet and locked in there'. (Emphasis as 
supplied by Shyllon).
 ^ /1973-74/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 736.
5
It seems, however, that no penalty was suffered by the 
Governor of the State who must, presumably, have given 
the 'superior' order for the journalist's maltreatment.
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by Amakiri, was ordered to pay the aggrieved journalist 
N10,000 in damages. Whether this had any substantial effect, 
however, in curtailing the detention and harassment of 
journalists by the authorities seems open to doubt. Accord-
i
ing to one commentator , 'the Armed Forces and the Police 
Forces, as was their wont, ignored /the judgment and/ the 
arrest of journalists and critics of the government actually 
intensified'.
The problem of detention of journalists was referred to by
a number of participants in the Great Debate on the Draft
Constitution, organised by Nigeria's leading newspaper,
2
the Daily Times • Although their remarks are general in 
nature, they do contribute to general understanding of the 
extent of intimidation through detention, and the most 
representative are accordingly reproduced in full-.
(a) '/J/ournalists ha/ve/ been detained indiscriminately 
without trial. Journalists ha/ve/ also been hounded out 
of their homes by men in authority... For the past ten 
years, journalists in this country have suffered unlimited 
outrage (sic) on their individual liberty'3;
(b) '/M/any journalists as well as contributors for the 
Press suffered spells of detention f6r daring to criticise 
the government before July 29, 1975' .
(c) '/H/istory has shown that our response to any form of 
criticism from either the working journalist or the common 
man has been immediately to put the critic behind bars, 
regardless of the authenticity of his or her facts'5.
Onagoruwa, 'Press Freedom in Crisis: A Study of the Amakiri 
Case,' p 38 (cited by Shyllon, supra, p 15).
2 See the section of the History of Nigeria at p 105 above,
as well as the section on the Guarantee of Freedom of Express­
ion at p 204 above. The views of journalists have been published 
in book form in Ofonagoro W.I., Ojo A. & Jinadu A., (eds.,)
The Great Debate: Nigerian Viewpoints on the Draft Constitution 
1976/1977, Lagos, 1977.
3 Daily Times, 4 January, 1977.
4 Ibid, 30 December, 19 76.
5 Daily Sketch, 13 January, 1977.
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(d) 'In Nigeria, the Press has suffered hardships and 
deprivation in the hands of civilian governments no less 
than in the hands of the military regime. Among these hard­
ships are unjustified imprisonment and detention of journ­
alists..., arbitrary arrest and torture..., summary 
dismissals of editors and other journalists who refuse or 
neglect to kotow (sic) the line of government officials, 
threat of detention and torture meted out to journalists 
who dared insist on their right to protect their sources 
of information..., arson, looting and murder committed 
against... the press.... These journalistic hazards are so 
great in Nigeria that there is hardly any country in the 
world to which the expression 'publish and be damned* can 
be applied more appropriately than in Nigeria'.
Though the Great Debate evoked a number of such comments 
on detention, this topic nevertheless received considerably 
less attention than many others - thus suggesting that 
detention is perceived as a less serious obstacle to press 
freedom than a number of other factors. Of these, control 
through government ownership ranks as the most fundamental.
3.6.2. Control of the Media Through Government-Ownership
Wide-ranging government ownership of the media generates 
a profound doubt as to whether freedom of the press - quite 
apart from the laws previously considered and further des­
cribed below - can have any real significance in the country. 
The position was greatly exacerbated in August 1976, when 
the Federal Military Government assumed control of the 
three newspapers with the largest circulation and highest
2
reputations in the country: the Daily Times and Sunday Times
Nigerian Herald, 30 November 1976- This inversion of the 
usual meaning of this phrase seems particularly apt in 
the context.
The circulation figures of these were then 230,000 and 
400,000 respectively: /*1975-76/ Africa Contemporary Record, 
p B 794.
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i
and the New Nigerian . The result was to bring virtually
2every newspaper m  Nigeria under either substantial or
total government ownership. Only four independent news-
3 4papers were left , all with small circulations and so
financially weak as to be 'overwhelmed by the government-
financed newspapers which have the public money at their
disposal to employ the best in both material and human
5
resources' » The situation has improved since then with 
the establishment of the National Concord in 1980 which, 
though originally a dedicated supporter of the ruling party/ 
has recently adopted a diametrically opposite approach^.
In addition, early 1983 witnessed the establishment of 
another independent newspaper, the Guardian/ which has 
attracted into its employ many of the stars of Nigerian
7
journalism and hopes to become a powerful force in the 
country in time. Nevertheless the fact remains that/ at 
present, the great majority of Nigeria's major newspapers 
are government-owned and this, coupled with present exclusive 
government ownership of radio and television broadcasting 
services, gives the government the indisputable capacity 
to control the press at its very foundations.
This newspaper was formerly controlled and run by six 
Northern states (Africa Contemporary Record, ibid); and 
is 'regarded as the voice of the northern establishment /but. 
also as/ one of the most serious and intellectually indepen­
dent of the papers': The Times (of London), Special Supple­
ment on Nigeria, 3 February 1982.
2
The Daily Times is 60 per cent government-owned: The Times/ ibid
3
Africa Contemporary Record, supra.
 ^ Ibid.
5 New Nigerian, 18 November 1976.
6 The newspaper is published by 'the wealthy Chief M.K.O. Abiola': 
The Times, supra. Its change in policy apparently follows
a dispute between its publisher and the ruling party: Inter­
view with former Editor-in-Chief of the Daily Times/ Chief 
Alhaji Alade Odunewu, in. London, on 23 December 1^82.
7 Interview in London with former Editor-in-Chief of the
Daily Times, Chief Alhaji Alade Odunewu, ibid.
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Although the government has disclaimed any influence over
newspaper reporting, particularly in relation to the Daily 
1
Times , it is difficult to believe that "he who pays the
piper does not call the tune" - a truism emphasised by a
2great many participants in the Great Debate on freedom of 
the press. It must also be remembered that the corollary 
of ownership is the power to control appointments and promo­
tions - and the charge has accordingly been laid that 
'journalists aspiring to a future in their profession /have 
been/ forced to prostitute their pens and publish in support 
of every whim and idiosyncrasy of /government/ . Whilst 
this may perhaps be somewhat exaggerated, it is unquestion­
ably true that, since the government-take-over of the Daily 
Times, 'the board has been completely reconstituted, the 
editor changed and a large number of senior men redeployed,
4
many leaving the company as a result' . It has also been 
alleged that these changes were designed 'to make the paper 
a more consistent supporter of the ruling National Party 
of Nigeria, though this is vigorously denied by the party
5
and the new Daily Times men' .
1
See, for example, the emphatic denial (at the time of 
Military Government) that the Daily Times was 'controlled 
from Dodan Barracks', reported in /1977-78/ Africa Contemp­
orary Record, p B 746. More recently, the ruling National 
Party of Nigeria has issued similar denials, as further 
described below.
2
See the section on the Guarantee of Freedom of Expression 
at p 204 above; and the publication in which the viewpoints 
of the press are summarised: W.I. Ofonagoro, A Ojo and A. 
Jinadu (eds.,), The Great Debate: Nigerian Viewpoints on 
the Draft Constitution, 1976/77,~Lagos, 1977.
3
New Nigerian, 18 November, 1976.
4
The Times (of London), 3 February 1982.
5 Ibid.
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During the period of the First Republic, the consequences 
of government-ownership of the media for freedom of express­
ion have been described in the following stark terms:
'Only such news as was in accordance with the wishes 
of the ruling parties was... published. There was no 
question of any newspaper... taking a line that was 
independent of, not to say adverse to, the government or 
party that owned it. The function of the press was first 
and foremost to advertise the owning government or party, 
and to boost its public image and popularity. Criticism 
was a secondary role, /"expressed only/ when considered 
desirable or expedient by the political bosses.**'
At the time of the debate preceding the adoption of the
2
1979 Constitution , the dangers of government ownership 
for freedom of the press (especially in a constitutional 
framework providing for a strong executive presidency) were 
repeatedly emphasised. Two leading representatives of the 
press who submitted a memorandum on press freedom to the
3
Constituent Assembly asked for 'a constitutional ban on 
Government takeovers of privately-owned newspapers... and 
for an independent trust to manage the dozen newspapers 
already under the /Government's/ control'^. These proposals 
were rejected, however, in favour of the present constitut­
ional guarantee of freedom of expression which provides no 
special protection for the media. The result is that 
government ownership remains in full operation as a pervasive
B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, 
London, 1973, p 152.
See the section on the History of Nigeria, at pl05 above.
The role played by the Constituent Assembly has previously 
been discussed in the section on Nigerian History, at p 105 
above.
West Africa, 13 June 1977.
-289-
and insidious restraint on media freedom - the effect of 
which is graphically demonstrated by the following examples.
In June 1982, the Federal Court of Appeal in Kaduna - in 
a judgment which represented a signal vindication of the 
claim to Nigerian citizenship of the Majority Leader in 
the Borno State House of Assembly, Alhaji Shugaba Darman - 
upheld by a majority the ruling of the Maiduguri High Court 
declaring that he was indeed a bona-fide citizen of Nigeria, 
and dismissed the appeal of the Federal Government against
i
this judgment of the lower court . The Daily Times, how­
ever, in reporting this decision, stated (in its issue of
17 June) in banner headlines on the front page: 'Shugaba 
2
loses suit' . It then 'went on to give a one-sided and 
totally inaccurate version of the court's proceedings and 
rulings and ignored the main substance of the Federal Appeal 
Court judgment - the fact that Alhaji Shugaba was declared 
a Nigerian, that the Maiduguri High Court was ruled as 
having jurisdiction by four judges to one and that Shugaba
3
was awarded 50,000 naira as damages and 7,000 naira as costs'. 
Although the newspaper subsequently published a front-page
4
apology, 'the damage had /already] been done' . This gross 
distortion of information embarrassing to the ruling party 
graphically reveals the dangers of government-ownership; 
and clearly appears to give the lie to assertions that the
For a full report of these proceedings, see Shugaba v 
Federal Minister of Internal Affairs and Others, (1981),
2 N.C.L.R. 459.
Address by the Kano State Governor at the 5th Graduation 
Ceremony of advanced writing students of the Nigerian 
Institute of Journalism, Jos, on 9 July, 1982, reported 
in the Sunday Triumph, 25 July, 1982.
Ibid.
Ibid.
2
3
4
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60 per cent government holding has affected neither content 
nor editorial policy.
In the context of the broadcast media, it is equally dist­
urbing to note the coverage devoted by the Nigerian Tele­
vision Authority ('NTA') to the ruling National Party of 
Nigeria ('NPN') - to the virtual exclusion of information 
relating to the other political parties) which 1 sometimes 
/find it/ a running battle to get the television stations
controlled by the Federal Government to carry such items 
2
at all* . Moreover, the charge has also been made that 
'/NPN/ functionaries [ are allowed by the NTA to/ address 
the nation and vilify political ppponents as if the medium 
was /the/ property of the NPN, /whilst/ elected government 
functionaries of other political parties are denied access
_ 4
/to say nothing of/ fair hearing' .
Space does not permit the citation of further illustrations 
of the distortion produced by government-ownership of the 
media. It is submitted that such ownership strikes at the 
very heart of press freedom, and that the guarantee enshrined 
in s 36 of the right 'to receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference' can have little meaning
1
See ibid, for a description of the large-scale coverage 
of, for example, the NPN Special Convention in Lagos, 
which 'monopolise/d/ the sole network for hours on end 
at prime viewing time*.
2 Ibid.
3
This, no doubt unintentionally, is somewhat ironic given 
the fact that the NTA is indeed effectively the property 
of the NPN-controlled executive, as further explained below.
See supra.
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so long as the executive retains its present wide-ranging 
ownership and control of all branches of the media. It 
is accordingly submitted that the time has come to imple­
ment the proposal (made by press representatives during the 
constitutional debate^ for the creation of an independent 
and autonomous trust to assume control over government- 
owned media; for only then will the Nigerian press be able 
to claim in full measure the accolade of being the "freest" 
in Africa.
3.7. The Nigerian Press: The "Freest" in Africa
Portrayal of freedom of the press in Nigeria cannot be 
complete without according due acknowledgement to the great 
number of instances when the press has indeed given express­
ion to frank and outspoken criticism. Analysis confined to 
a ten year period (from 1970 to 1980) reveals numerous 
illustrations of this - of which the following are merely 
a random sample.^
1970 - the press criticised the implications of the notorious 
2
Decree No 28 and the New Nigerian's legal correspondent 
queried whether the Federal Military Government could still
3
be considered as less than a * total dictatorship*.
For considerable further detail/ see Frank Barton, The Press 
of Africa, London» 1979, especially Chapter Four.
2
The Decree in question is the Federal Military Government 
(Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree, promulgated 
with retrospective effect in the wake of the Lakanmi case 
as previously described in the section on the History of 
Nigeria, at p 101 above.
3 /1 970-71/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 418.
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1971 - The press were 'pretty severe on corruption at all 
levels' and proved generally 'capable of publishing critical 
views or unpalatable facts' - often by means of devices such
1as 'expressive verbal ellipses' and 'uncaptioned photographs'.
1973 - The press continued its vigorous campaign against 
corruption at all levels and the New Nigerian called for 
the public execution for corruption of military officers 
and other 'big-wigs'. The press expressed much concern 
over the alleged 'resignation' of the former Commissioner 
for Health and Social Welfare (S.G. Ikoku) and did not 
hesitate to publish the letter substantiating his claim of 
'dismissal' nor his hard-hitting criticism of the Federal 
Military Government. Furthermore/ sections of the press 
were highly critical of police methods and hinted that
2these extended to torture of prisoners awaiting trial.
1974 - The New Nigerian commended the Inspector-General
of Police for criticising the arbitrary use of police power 
and called on the Federal Military Government to reconsider 
the continuing need for emergency powers. The paper also 
criticised a senior Army officer for ordering the detention 
of an individual and described the former as 'a bully tramp­
ling on the liberties of a humble/ defenceless citizen*.
The Nigerian Observer published the article which sparked
* /1971-72/ Africa Contemporary Record# pp C 222 and B 652.
 ^ /‘1972-73/ Africa Contemporary Record/ pp B 695, B 689
and B 69 6.
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off the *Amakiri* incident - which in turn, evoked a storm
1
of protest from the press throughout Nigeria.
1975 - The press campaigned vigorously for a full invest­
igation into allegations of corruption on the part of the 
Federal Commissioner for Communications (J.S. Tarka) and 
this led ultimately to his resignation. The press also 
gave wide coverage to other corruption scandals, including
allegations of large-scale corruption involving the Military
2
Governor of Benue Plateau State (J. Gomwalk).
1976 - The press continued its vigorous criticism of official 
ineptitude and corruption and, in response to allegations
by the Military Chief of Staff that it was corrupt and 
biased in its reporting, immediately challenged him to
3
substantiate these charges.
1977 - A vigorous debate was maintained throughout 1977 
on the need for a specific guarantee of press freedom in 
the new Constitution and severe criticism was levelled at 
Government control over newspapers and harassment of
4
journalists.
1978 - The press criticised the authorities* handling of 
student disturbances and gave considerable critical coverage
1
/"1973-74/ Africa Contemporary Record# pp B 730 and B 736.
2
^1974-75/ Africa Contemporary Record, pp B 742 and B 743.
3
/1975-76J/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 794.
4
/"1976-77/ Africa Contemporary Record, p B 745.
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to the controversy over the proposal (ultimately rejected) 
for a new Federal Sharia (Islamic) Court of Appeal; the 
chairman of the Daily Times urged the Government to relin­
quish its control over the media; and the editor-in-chief 
of the magazine Newbreed (and president of the Nigerian 
Guild of Editors) criticised police raids on the offices
i
of the Punch and Daily Express in Lagos.
1979 - The press protested strongly against the establishment 
(at the end of 1978) of the government-controlled Nigerian 
Press Councils The New Nigerian criticised the Federal 
Military Government for failing to devote as much attent­
ion to reducing military expenditure as it had to cutting 
down numbers.^
1980 - The press continued to protest against the Press 
Council Decree and gave free rein to its views on the con­
troversial Supreme Court decision to uphold the election 
of President Shagari. The Daily Times criticised senators
and members of Parliament for abusing their positions to
3
their personal advantage.
From this brief survey alone, it would seem, therefore, that 
freedom of the press is by no means a dead-letter in Nigeria. 
It must, of course, also be acknowledged that the examples 
above have been arbitrarily selected from the available
i
/1977-78y Africa Contemporary Record, p B 739.
 ^ /T978-79_/ Africa Contemporary Record, pp B 740 and B 736.
3
/T979-80./ Africa Contemporary Record, pp B 594-595.
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material. They may therefore be the exceptions which prove 
the rule and over-emphasis on them may provide a totally 
distorted image of press freedom in Nigeria. It seems,
*i
however, from the views of commentators generally , that
this is not the case. On the contrary, the Nigerian press
is largely regarded as enjoying a considerable measure of 
2
freedom and there is widespread pride in maintaining its
reputation as the freest in Africa. Indeed, in the view
of some, the press in Nigeria is 'too' free and is in need,
3
primarily, of greater control and restraint.
The overall picture of the Nigerian press which emerges, 
therefore, is one of a press subject to a number of restrict­
ive laws (which must inevitable foster self-censorship); 
and subject also to considerable harassment and intimidation 
as well as control through government-ownership. Nevertheless, 
it is a press which remains vocal in its criticism (partic­
ularly in areas such as corruption) and which has continued 
this tradition even through a 13-year period of Military Rule.
See, for example, £\ 971-72/ Africa Contemporary Record, 
p B 652; and The Times (of London), 3 February 1982. See 
also Barton, op cit, p 44, and /1974-75/ Africa Contemporary 
Record, p B 746, where the Nigerian press is described as 
having 'continued to maintain signs of its characteristic 
freedom despite overt and covert institutional pressures.'
2
It may however, be justified to say that 'Nigerian journa­
lism, though free, is not independent: that is, that most 
newspapers follow a party line and that most journalists 
do as they are told rather than exercise their own judgment'. 
See The Times (of London) supra.
3
See, for example, A. Fadlalla, 'Fundamental Human Rights 
and" the Nigerian Draft Constitution', (19 77) 10 V.R.U., 
pp 543 - 553. See also The Daily Times, 4 February, 1977.
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Having thus traced - in broad outline - some of the most 
important restrictions on the media in.Nigeria, attention 
must now be directed towards the principal subject of 
this study: the laws governing the media which are of 
'colonial' origin, as previously identified at the be­
ginning of this chapter. First within this category 
are the rules providing for licensing and regulation of 
the media: and this important topic now requires in- 
depth examination.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LICENSING AND REGULATION OF THE MEDIA
4.1 The Significance of Licensing and Regulation for 
Media Freedom
The significance of licensing and regulation of the media 
for freedom of expression lies in the fact that both result 
in the exercise of "prior restraint" over the content of 
material reaching the general public by way of the media. 
Thus licensing of newspapers or broadcasting stations 
results in only the statements and opinions of the "chosen 
few" being made available to society; while regulation of 
the broadcast media (usually, as in Nigeria, by way of 
vesting control over them in a para-statal corporation) 
must inevitably affect the selection of programme material 
and hence, again, must restrict the range of information
i
made accessible to the public.
The absence of such "prior restraint" at the instance of
1
It must, of course, be acknowledged that many other cont- 
straints inevitably affect and limit the range of material 
made available through the media. The political standpoint 
of an editor, the type of audience aimed at, the costs of 
production, plus a myriad of other factors, all exercise 
restrictive influence. There is little that law can do 
to eliminate these. The best that law can achieve, there­
fore, is to refrain from imposing additional restraints 
and to establish a climate in which the general public has, 
at least, 'a choice of biases available to /"it/' . See 
Denys C. Holland, 'Freedom of the Press in the Commonwealth,' 
(1956) 9, Current Legal Problems, pp 184-207, at p 186.
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the executive is seen by many as the hallmark of freedom 
of expression. Thus, Blackstone, for example, has declared:
'The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the 
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no 
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matter when published. Every 
free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he 
pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy 
the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is 
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the con­
sequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to 
the restrictive power of a licenser... is to subject all 
freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man and make 
him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all.controverted 
points in learning, religion and Government.'
Similar sentiments have been expressed by leading judges
in England. Thus, Lord Mansfield has observed that:
'The liberty of the press consists in printing without
Lord Ellenborough has avowed that
'The law of England is a law of liberty' and that 
'consistently with this liberty... there is no... prelim­
inary licence necessary; but if a man publish a paper, 
he is exposed to the penal consequences, as he is in 
every other act, if it be illegal.'
In the viewpoint of Dicey, these principles are essential
aspects of the fundamental rule that 'no man is punishable
4
except for a distinct breach of the law.' As Dicey 
points out, 'this principle is radically inconsistent 
with any scheme of licence or censorship by which a man 
is hindered from writing or printing anything which he
I C ^
thinks fit. He acknowledges that deposit requirements
Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 4, 151-2.
2 The King v Dean of St. Asaph (1784) 3 T.R. 429 (note) .
2 The King v Cobbett (1804) 29 St. Tr. 1.
4
A.V. Dicey. The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., London, 
1959, p 248.
 ^ Ibid.
® Deposit requirements in relation to the press do indeed 
form part of Nigerian law, as further explained below.
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and other limitations on the right to publish are not 'of
necessity inexpedient or unjust'1, but nevertheless insists
that 'such checks and preventive measures are inconsistent
with the pervading principle of English law, that men are
to be interfered with or punished, not because they may or
will break the law, but only when they have committed some
2
definite assignable legal offence' •
Dicey's philosophical objection to the imposition of licen­
sing or other prior control has considerable force. Equally 
important is the undoubted reality that such restrictions 
inevitably curtail the free flow of information? and that 
the temptation for government to use such powers to prevent 
the dissemination of criticism must always be present.
In this regard, it is salutary to recall the warning of 
Harold Laski that:
'An executive that has a free hand will commit 
all the natural follies of dictatorship... • It will 
deprive the people of information upon which it can be 
judged. It will misrepresent the situation it confronts 
by the art of propaganda... . It will be obtuse to sugges­
tion. It will^regard enquiry as menace. It will be care­
less of truth' .
The media have a vital part to play in acting as a check 
on such governmental abuse of power. In order to fulfill 
this role, however, they must not be subject to "prior 
restraint" at the instance of government itself.
Dicey, supra.
2 Ibid, pp 248-249-
3
H. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, 4th ed., London, 1955, 
p 126,
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4.2 Licensing and Regulation of the Media in the United 
Kingdom
Past and present provisions regarding the licensing and 
regulation of the media in the United Kingdom provide a 
useful comparative background to the Nigerian law within 
these spheres.
In regard to licensing of the press, it is noteworthy that,
since 1695, no licensing system has been in force. An
'ingenious system of control'1 had been established in the
sixteenth century when 'the Crown assumed the prerogative
power to grant printing privileges and thereafter treated
2
this power as its monopoly' . In order to avert the threat
'to the established order of Church and State presented by
3
unrestrained printing' , the Stationers' Company was 
established in 1556 under a royal charter which 'confined 
printing to members of the Company and its licensees /and/ 
in return /for which/ the Company undertook to search out
4
and suppress all undesirable and illegal books' • The 
system continued in force through the Tudor and Stuart eras; 
and its operation is illustrated by the Licensing Act of 1662, 
under which 'all printed works had to be registered with, 
and licensed by, the Stationers' Company,... /and/ a licence 
was required to import and sell /such works? whilst/ printing 
presses... had to be registered /and/ wide powers to search
5
for and seize suspected printed matter... were given' •
Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed., 
New York, 19 78, p 18.
Harry Street, Freedom, the Individual and the Law, 5th 
ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1982, p 105.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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By the end of the seventeenth century, however, 'the demands 
of business-oriented printers for release from /they stric­
tures /of the system/, and the impossibility of managing 
the surveillance as the number of printers and the reading
i
needs of the public grew' spelt the death of the controls, 
and licensing of the press accordingly terminated in 1695 
when the House of Commons refused to renew the law providing 
for it.^
Provisions for the registration of newspapers were, however, 
introduced in 1881 in the Newspaper Libel and Registration 
Act, 1881* S. 1 of the Act defines 'newspaper' as meaning 
'any paper containing public news, intelligence or occurr­
ences, or any remarks or observations therein printed for 
sale, and published in England or Ireland periodically, 
or in parts or numbers at intervals not exceeding twenty- 
six days between the publication of any two such papers, 
parts or numbers.' S. 8 provides that '/a/ register of 
the proprietors of newspapers as defined by the Act shall 
be established under the superintendence of the registrar'; 
and - under s. 9 - it is 'the duty of the printers and
Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, p 18.
It is accordingly interesting to note that 'the end 
came not through any decision of principle, but merely 
through complaints at abuses in operation and the 
difficulty of devising a workable machinery of control.' 
Street, 0£ cit, p 105.
Note that the definition also includes 'any paper printed 
in order to be dispersed, and made public weekly or 
oftener, or at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days, 
containing only or principally advertisements'.
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publishers for the time being of every newspaper to make 
or cause to be made to the Registry Office... /an annual 
return stating/ (a) the title of a newspaper; (b) the 
names of all the proprietors of such newspaper together with 
their respective occupations/ places of business (if any), 
and places of residence' . These provisions clearly serve 
a useful purpose/ inter alia/ in facilitating the ascert­
ainment of those responsible for the publication of a 
newspaper for the purpose of instituting proceedings; 
and are a far cry from a system of licensing the chosen 
few.
As regards the broadcast media/ however/ the position is
considerably different. The British Broadcasting Corporation
('B.B.C.') is a body incorporated by royal charter. Its
nine governors are appointed by the Crown on the advice of
the Prime Minister and its powers and obligations with
respect to broadcasting are contained in a Licence and 
2
Agreement. The requisite licence to broadcast is granted 
by the Home Secretary who is empowered 'from time to time 
by notice in writing /to/ require the Corporation to 
refrain at any specified time or at all times from broad- 
casting any /specified/ matter' ; and who is further 
entitled (without Parliamentary approval) to cancel the 
licence (or indeed to revoke the royal charter) if the
1
Ss. 8 and 9/ Newspaper Libel and Registration Act 1881.
2 Cmnd 4095, 1969.
3
This is in terms of Clause 13(4) of the Licence/ iBid.
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Corporation fails to comply with his directions. As Street
i
points out/ these 'clearly... are water-tight legal controls' .
Pursuant to his power of direction/ the Minister 'has 
sent prescribing memoranda to the B.B.C. that direct it
i
not to broadcast its own opinion on current affairs or
on matters of public policy/ and not to broadcast matters
2
of political/ industrial/ or religious controversy' .
The B.B.C. also 'accepts that it owes a duty to the Minister
to ensure that so far as possible programmes should not
offend against good taste or decency/ or be likely to
encourage crime or disorder/ or be offensive to public
feeling. It accepts a similar obligation to treat controv-
3
ersial subjects with due impartiality' . The latter duties 
are not/ however/ binding upon the Corporation; and non- 
compliance would not justify cancellation of the licence.
The Independent Broadcasting Authority ('I.B.A.') 'operates 
under the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 19.73, as amended 
by the Broadcasting Act 1980/ t§ provide television and 
sound broadcasting services additional to those of the
4
B.B.C.' Its top management is appointed by the Home 
Secretary and it is also obliged to obtain a licence to 
broadcast from the Minister who is similarly empowered 
'at any time /to/ require the I.B.A. to refrain from
Street/ 0£ cit, p 84. 
2 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid, pp 84-85.
 ^ Ibid/ p 85.
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i
broadcasting /specified/ matter' . However, the situation
is different from that relating to the B.B.C. in that the
licence to the I.B.A. 'is silent on programme content and
therefore makes no express provision for revocation on
2
non-compliance with directives' . In terms of the Act/ 
however/ it is the duty of the I.B.A. to comply with such 
directives and the Home Secretary could accordingly obtain 
an order of mandamus requiring this.
The Act imposes various other duties on the I.B.A. Thus/ 
for example/ s.2 obliges the I.B.A. to ensure that prog­
rammes 'maintain a high general standard in all respects 
... and... a proper balance and wide range in their subject
3
matter' • S. 4(1)(a) requires the I.B.A. to satisfy 
itself so far as possible/ that 'nothing is included in 
the programmes which offends against good taste or decency 
or is likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead
4
to disorder/ or to be offensive to public feeling' • S. 4 
(1)(f) imposes the duty of satisfying itself that 'due 
impartiality is preserved... with respect to matters of 
political or industrial controversy or relating to current
5
public policy' .
Both the B.B.C. and I.B.A. are required to broadcast any
Street/ 0£ cit, p 89. 
 ^ Ibid.
3 Ibid, p 86.
 ^ Ibid.
Ibid/ p 87.
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Government announcement at the time specified by a Minister^
and the 'biggest safeguard against political abuse of
this Government power is that the B.B.C. and I.B.A. are
entitled to say that the'broadcast is being made at the
2
request of the government* •
3
Further detailed rules surround ministerial broadcasts /
4 5budget broadcasts , party political broadcasts , general
g
election broadcasting / and the broadcasting of parliament-
7
ary matters , but further consideration of these lies
p
outside the scope of this study ; and it is instead proposed 
to focus now on the licensing and regulatory controls 
which govern the media, operative in Nigeria itself.
This does not refer to statements regarding Government 
policyt but rather official announcements/ 'such as the 
calling up of certain classes of reserves in the armed 
forces': Street/ ibid/ p 90.
2 Street/ ibid.
3
The relevant rules are contained in an agreement between 
the Conservative and Labour Parties and the B.B.C. of 
3 April 1969/ usually referred to as the 'aide-memoire'. 
This gives the Opposition a right of reply in certain 
circumstances. See Street/ ibid/ pp 90-92.
4
Both the B.B.C. and I.B.A. offer broadcast time to the 
Chancellor and to a spokesman nominated by the Opposition 
during budget week.
5
In terms of the 1947 aide-memoire/ the allocation of 
broadcasting time for such material is decided by the 
Committee on Party Political Broadcasting/ composed of 
'two representatives each from the B.B.C./ I.B.A. and the 
three main parties': Street/ supra/ p 92.
g
Arrangements for general election broadcasting are also 
made by the Committee on Party Political Broadcasting.
The operation of the system is strongly criticised by 
Street/ ibid/ pp 93-94.
7
The televising of Parliamentary proceedings is still 
forbidden/ but radio discussion of Bills going through 
Parliament has been allowed since 1955/ subject 'only 
to the legal restraint that due impartiality and balance 
are maintained': Street/ ibid/ p 95.
8 For further details see Street/ 0£ cit, pp 84-104 and 
Paul O'Higgins/ Cases and Materials on Civil Liberties/
London/ 1980, Chapter 11/ pp 264-338.
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4,3 Sources of the Nigerian Licensing and Media Regulation 
Laws
Nigerian laws relating to the licensing and regulation of 
the media are to be found entirely in local enactments, at 
both state and federal level. 'Wireless, broadcasting and 
television (other than broadcasting and television provided
1
by the Government of a State), is an item included within
2
the Exclusive Legislative List , as is the 'allocation of 
wave-lengths for wireless, broadcasting and television
3
transmission' . By contrast, legislation regarding the
4
press falls within the residual category • It follows 
that legislation regarding radio and television broadcasting 
is the exclusive preserve of the federal legislature (except, 
of course, for the broadcasting services provided by 
State governments within the general framework so provided), 
whilst legislation regarding the press is exclusively within 
the competence of the states. The various state enactments
5
regarding the press are, however, substantially similar.
This is listed as Item 64 of the Exclusive Legislative 
List, provided by Part 1 Second Schedule, Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
2
For further information regarding the division of leg­
islative power between federal and state legislatures, 
see the section on the Nigerian Constitution at p 120above.
3
See item 64, Exclusive Legislative List, supra.
4
T.O. Elias, 'Legal Requirements for Publishing a Newspaper,' 
in T.O. Elias, ed., Nigerian Press Law. London and Lagos, 
1969, pp 1-15, p 1.
 ^ The notable exception is the Newspaper Law (Eastern States) 
Cap 86, which omits the important 'affidavit and bond' 
requirements, as further explained below.
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Since the system of control applicable to the sound or 
electronic media is radically different from that pertaining 
to the press, is is proposed to deal separately with each 
in turn, beginning with the press. It is further proposed 
to outline all the important laws within each sphere; 
before attempting to identify the extent of executive 
control generated by the laws, or to assess their constit­
utionality.
4.4 Registration Formalities for Newspapers
In describing the registration formalities applicable to
newspapers in Nigeria, it is proposed to focus attention
on the requirements provided by the Newspapeis Law of 
1Lagos State , (which incorporates the Newspapers (Amendment)
2
Law of 1964) . Substantially the same formalities are 
prescribed in all other state enactments, and such differ­
ences as exist will be described in due course.
S. 2 of the statute defines 'newspaper1 as meaning 'any 
paper containing public news, intelligence or occurrences 
or any remarks, observations or comments thereon printed 
for sale and published in Lagos periodically, or in
3
parts or numbers; but, except in section 23 , does not 
include any newspaper published by or under the authority
1 Cap. 86 (Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973).
2 No. V of 1964. The former Lagos Newspapers Law - Cap 129- 
has now been combined with the provisions of the 1964 
amending statute in the present Cap 86, supra.
 ^ S. 23 requires the consent of the Attorney-General before 
any criminal prosecution may be commenced against any 
proprietor, printer, or publisher or editor of a news­
paper for any libel published therein. This requirement 
is further described in the context of criminal defamation 
in Chapter Seven below.
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1
of the Government' .
The most important of the provisions is to be found in section 
4 which states:
'No person shall print or publish or cause to be printed 
or published any newspaper unless the proprietor/ printer 
and publisher shall each have previously -
(a) /sworn/... and registered in the office of the 
Minister an affidavit containing...:-
(i) the correct title or name of the newspaper;
(ii) a true description of the house or building 
wherein such newspaper is intended to be published;
(iii) the real and true names and places of abode of 
the persons intended to be the proprietor/ 
printer/ publisher and editor of the newspaper; 
and
(b) the proprietor/ printer and publisher shall each 
have previously given and executed and registered in the 
office of the Minister a bond... in the sum of five hundred 
naira with one or more sureties as may be required and 
approved by the Attorney-General of the Lagos S t a t e 2 . »
The form of the required bond is specified in the Schedule
to the Act. Under the terms prescribed/ the proprietor/
printer and publisher must each undertake to pay the sum
of five hundred naira to the Governor of the State/ in
the event of failure to pay any penalty imposed under the
Newspapers Law/ or any other law/ or any damages and costs
3
awarded in an action for libel .
The Minister may accept a cash deposit in lieu of the 
surety or sureties and may use the sum deposited to pay 
'every penalty which may at any time be imposed by any 
court in Nigeria on the proprietor/ printer and publisher
4
or any of them' - 'whether in respect of libel published
s 2 Newspaper Law/ Lagos State/ Cap 86. In practice, 
therefore, the provisions described below do not apply to
(iWowijW <Jk« ae IsfceJkc. cjow'.y*WMi'xts (or ->W Vc j potlbico)
 ^ s . 4, ibid.
. Schedule, ibid.. 
s . 4 (bX1) , ibid.
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i
in the newspaper or otherwise' • Any amount so paid out 
of the deposit must immediately be made good by the prop­
rietor/ printer and publisher; and failure to do so will
result in the suspension of the newspaper until such time
2
as this has been done . If the deficit in the deposit 
is not made good/ the Minister is empowered to retain the 
remaining balance for two years; and, if there are no 
civil or criminal proceedings pending against the prop-
3
rietor/ publisher or printer/ may then return it to them • 
The Minister is directed to invest sums so deposited with 
him in the Post Office Savings Bank/ and to pay all interest 
accruing thereon to the person who deposited the sum with 
him^ •
A new affidavit must be sworn whenever there is a change 
in the proprietors/ printers/ publishers or editor; or if
5
the title of the newspaper is altered • A new bond may 
also be required in a number of circumstances: for example/ 
if any surety dies, becomes bankrupt/ leaves Lagos State 
without retaining there property sufficient to discharge 
his obligations under the bond/ or withdraws from the
g
suretyship . Every bond required under the statute must 
be executed before a magistrate and at least one independent
See Elias/ 0£ cit, p 2.
s 4(b)(ii) and (iii), Newspapers Law, supra, 
s 4 (b)(iv) ibid. 
s 4 (b)(v) ibid. 
s 7 ibid.
s 9 ibid. Further provisions regarding the withdrawal of 
a surety are contained in s. 10/ ibid. Following with­
drawal, he remains liable in respect of any penalties 
incurred during his suretyship/ and before his discharge.
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i
witness ; and every affidavit registered in terms of the
Law may be received and admitted 'as conclusive evidence
of the truth of all such matters set forth in /it/' as
2
are prescribed by the statute • Moreover, once such an 
affidavit has been admitted in evidence/ and a newspaper 
bearing the same title and the same names of printer, 
publisher and place of printing is produced in court/ it 
is not necessary for the informant or prosecutor in any 
civil or criminal proceedings to 'prove that the newspaper 
to which such trial relates was purchased at any house/ 
shop or office belonging to or occupied by the defendant.../ 
or /to prove/ where such printer or publisher usually 
carries on the business of printing and publishing such 
newspaper/ or /to establish/ where the same is usually 
sold'3.
Penalties in relation to certain of the above provisions 
are prescribed bys 11 which states that:
'Any person who -
(a) shall print or publish or cause to be printed or 
published any newspaper in contravention of section 4 
or section 9; or
(b) shall sell any newspaper which he knows or has 
reason to believe has been printed or published in 
contravention of either of the aforesaid sections/ 
shall be liable to a fine of one hundred naira.'
The statute prescribes a number of further obligations/
as follows:
(i) The true name and place of abode of the printer and 
publisher and of the editor (or editor in chief) and a
s. 8/ ibid. 
s. 12, ibid. 
s. 13/ ibid.
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true description of the newspaper's place of printing,
must be inserted /at/ the foot of the last page of each
copy of every newspaper, and at the foot of the last page
of each copy of every supplement'. Any person who prints
or publishes a newspaper (or causes it to be printed or
published) without including these particulars is liable
to a fine of one hundred naira for 'every such publication'
any any person who sells such a newspaper 'knowing or
having reason to believe' that it omits the required
information, is liable to a fine of ten naira in respect
2
of 'each such sale'.
(ii) The printer and publisher of every newspaper are 
under a duty to deliver or post to the Minister, 'upon 
every day upon which such newspaper shall be published',
a copy of every paper published (and of every supplement), 
which must be signed by the printer and publisher; and 
which are then kept on file by the Minister. The penalty 
prescribed for each failure by a printer or publisher to
3
comply with these duties is a fine of ten naira.
(iii) The editor is under an additional duty to sign
and deliver or send to the Minister 'a copy of every news­
paper and every supplement edited under his general super-
4
vision and control '. In the absence of the editor
5
himself, this duty must be performed by the acting editor .
s 14(1), ibid. 
s 14(2), ibid. 
s 15(i), ibid. 
s 16(1), ibid. 
s 16(2), ibid.
1
2
3
4
5
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If any newspaper is not delivered or sent to the Minister 
as required under these provisions, he may (notwithstanding 
any other proceedings taken by reason of such failure)
'by notice under his hand addressed to the printer, 
publisher or editor require him to deliver or send to
i
him' the requisite copies/ duly signed. Failure to
comply with such a notice is punishable/ on summary
conviction/ by a fine of one hundred naira for every day
2
on which such failure continues.
3
Other miscellaneous provisions of the law include those 
governing the institution of proceedings on any bond
4
(following failure to fulfill its conditions) ; providing 
for the service of process upon any proprietor/ printer/ 
publisher or editor at the house or building where the
5
newspaper is printed ; and obliging the proprietor and 
publisher of a newspaper printed or published outside 
Lagos St&te, but circulating within it/ to establish an 
office (at which service of process may be effected) 
within Lagos State within two months of commencing such
' s 17(1)/ ibid.
2 s 17 (2), ibid.
3
Other important provisions of the statute - notably 
s 21 (prohibiting the publication of false news) and 
s 23 (requiring the fiat of the Attorney-General for 
the commencement of prosecution for criminal libel against 
the proprietor/ publisher/ printer and editor of a news­
paper) are further described at p 248 and 604 respectively. 
For further information regarding other provisions of 
the statute/ see Elias/ op cit/ pp 1-7.
4
s 20/ ibid. The Attorney-General may put the bond in 
suit against any person who has executed it. The amount 
recovered is payable into general revenue/ except that 
any amount owing by way of damages and costs to a plaintiff 
must first be deducted and paid to him.
5 See s 24/ ibid.
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i
circulation . Furthermore/ the Minister has power to make 
regulations either to prescribe the fees payable for the 
registration of affidavits and bonds and certified copies 
thereof/ or 'generally to give effect to the purposes of 
the Law'^.
In the northern states/ the governing enactment is the 
3
Newspapers Law / which is largely based upon the Lagos 
legislation examined above and is accordingly substantially
4
the same in its provisions •
In the eastern states/ however/ the governing Newspaper
5
Law is different in a number of respects from its Lagos 
counterpart. Thus/ newspaper is defined in s. 2 as meaning:
any paper containing public news, intelligence or 
occurrences/ or any remarks or observations thereon/ printed 
in Nigeria and published or circulated for sale in Eastern 
Nigeria periodically or in parts or numbers at intervals 
not exceeding three months^ between the publication of any 
two such papers/ parts or numbers; also any matter printed 
in order to be displayed and made public periodically or 
at intervals not exceeding three months containing only or
See s. 25. ibid. Failure to comply with this obligation 
is punishable on conviction by a fine of between twenty 
and fifty naira/or by imprisonment for a term of three 
months.
2
See s. 26/ ibid.
3
Newspapers Law (northern states) / Cap 80/ (Laws of Northern 
Nigeria/ 1963).
4
For further detail/ see Elias/ 0£ cit/ pp 7-8. In doing 
SO/ it should/ however/ be recalled that at the time when 
Elias was writing (1969)/ the Lagos enactments examined 
above had not yet been consolidated into one statute 
(as this was effected only in 1973).
5
Newspaper Law (eastern states) Cap 86 (Laws of Eastern 
Nigeria/ 1963).
g
Cf the absence of any such time limit under the Lagos 
State Newspaper Law; but note the time-limit provided 
by s. 1 of the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act 1881/ 
described at p 301 above.
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i
principally advertisements ; but does not include any 
newspaper published by or under the authority of the 
Government12.
Further# the eastern states' Newspaper Law breaks new 
ground by bringing news-agents within the ambit of its 
provisions. 'Newsagent' is defined as including 'any 
person who sells, whether for himself or on behalf of 
another, a newspaper in a shop/ stall or other structure 
whether movable or not/ but does not include a street
3
hawker of newspapers * •
The Law provides for the establishment of a Registry 
Office and for the compilation (by the Registrar) o-f an
4
Annual Register of newspapers/ proprietors and newsagents. 
Proprietors are accordingly required to render annual 
returns to the Registry Office 'stating the title of the 
newspaper and the names of all its proprietors together
5
with their occupations and places of residence' ; and 
'the same is /also/ required of all newsagents operating
g
within the former Eastern Nigeria' .
All proprietors and publishers of newspapers produced 
outside the eastern states but circulating within them 
are required to establish an office within the area and
1
Under the laws of Lagos State/ the regulation of advert­
isements is instead provided by separate legislation.
The eastern states Newspaper Law reflects the provisions 
of s. 1 of the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act 1881 
in this respect as well.
2 s. 2, Newspaper Law/ supra.
3 Ibid.
* s. 3/ ibid.
5
Elias/ 0£ cit/ p 9.
 ^ Ibid.
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to register it with the Registry Office. All changes of 
address of such office must be also duly registered.
Failure to register within the specified period (one
i
month from the date of first circulation ) is punishable
2
by a fine of £25 or imprisonment for three months.
The 'penalty for selling newspapers that are not duly
3 4registered is a fine of £100 or six months' imprisonment*
and the punishment for any 'conscious and wilful misrep­
resentation or omission... from returns required to be
C  f?
rendered' is a fine of £100 *
The name and address of the printer/ publisher and editor 
of every newspaper and its supplement must be printed 
on every copy of it; and failure to do so renders the 
printer/ publisher and editor (or the newsagent who sells
a paper without such particulars) subject to a fine of
7 8£5 in respect of each such copy. The printer and
publisher of a newspaper are further required to deliver
or send by post to the Minister a copy of every newspaper
1
Or/ (at the inception of the law) one month from the 
date of its coming into operation. This time period is 
plainly no longer relevant in practice.
2
Following the adoption of the naira as the unit of 
currency in Nigeria/ this should now be read as N50.
 ^ Equivalent to N200.
4
Elias/ supra/ p 10.
5 Ibid.
® Equivalent, again, to N 200.
7
This is equivalent to N10.
Q
s. 10/ 11 and 12, Newspaper Law (eastern s’<tates)^SUpra<
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and supplement on every day of publication; and the penalty
1 2 for non-compliance is a fine of £5 for each instance.
In addition, '/'t/here are in s 14 the usual penalties
for non-delivery after due notice has been given by the
3
Minister to the printer or publisher* .
All newsagents are obliged to keep monthly accounts of all 
newspapers distributed by them and to submit these to 
their employers before the fifteenth day of the following
3
month. Non-compliance is punishable by a fine of £100
5
or six months' imprisonment.
The other major provisions of the Law are examined else-
g
where in this study *, and it should be noted that, in a 
significant departure from the laws previously examined, 
the statute omits the requirement to lodge an affidavit and
7
bond, as a pre-condition to publication.
Equivalent to N10.
2 , os 13, supra.
3
Elias, op cit, p 10.
4
Equivalent to N200.
5
s 15, supra.
g
These are s 16 (rendering it an offence to publish false 
news) and s 18 (providing for the defence of 'apology* 
in respect of a libel contained in a newspaper provided 
certain conditions are met). These are discussed at p 249 
and 521 respectively.
These requirements are discussed at p 308 above, in relation 
to the Newspapers Law of Lagos State. They are also found in 
the northern states Newspapers Law; whilst, in the western 
states, they apply to newspapers printed and published 
in those areas but not to newspapers which are merely 
circulated in the west, being printed and published else­
where. The latter are simply subject to the same require­
ment as under the eastern states Newspaper Law, as further 
explained below.
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The Newspapers.Law applicable in the western states is 
something of a mix between the Lagos State provisions and 
those applicable in the eastern states. 'Newspaper* is 
defined in broadly the same terms as in the Lagos enact­
ment? but - in line with the eastern states' legislation - 
the Newspapers Law of the western states also brings news­
agents within the ambit of its provisions/ and defines 
these in the same terms as does the eastern states * 
provision.^
Thereafter/ the Law is divided into two parts. The first
substantially reproduces the Newspapers Law applicable
within Lagos State/ but limits the application of these
provisions to newspapers published within the pre-1963
Western Region. The second part contains provisions
substantially the same as those within the eastern states'
Newspaper Law, and applies only to newspapers printed
outside - but circulated within - the western states.
The Law provides for the appointment of a Registrar; and
it is to him that all obligations under the Law (whether
3
under Part 1 or II) are owing.
An amendment to the Law introduced in 1964 is examined
4
further elsewhere in this study.
Newspapers Law (western states) Cap 81 (Laws of Western 
Region of Nigeria, 1959).
s. 2, ibid.
See Elias, 0£ cit, p 12.
This relates to the publication of false news and is 
further examined at p 249. This amendment has, in any 
event, been repealed since 1967, as further explained 
at p 250.
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4.5 Deposit of Newspapers with Libraries
1
Under the terms of the Publications Law / applicable in 
Lagos state/ the publisher of a book (as broadly defined 
to include 'newspaper1/ as further explained below) is 
under a duty to deliver/ within one month of publication/ 
two copies of the book to the Minister (to be preserved
as directed by the Executive Council) and two copies to
2
the Library of the University of Lagos . Failure to 
comply is punishable/ on summary conviction/ by a fine 
of N10.3
The definition of 'book' is extremely wide and includes/ 
inter alia, 'every part or division of a book, newspaper/ 
magazine, review/ gazette/ pamphlet /or/ sheet of 
letterpress'^ but does not include a commercial advert­
isement.
The Minister has power to exempt any book or class of 
books from the provisions of this legislation.^
Cap 107/ (Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria/ 1973).
2
s. 3/ ibid.
3 s. 4, ibid.
4
s. 2/ ibid.
5
Elias cites the example of school magazines and school 
prospectuses which have been exempted in the northern 
states (where equivalent provisions are in force/ as 
further explained below) under the Preservation of 
Copies of Books published in Northern Nigeria (Exception) 
Order/ 1964/ which came into force on December 4/ 1964. 
See Elias/ 0£ cit, p 14/ n 2.
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As regards the other states within the Federation, it 
should be noted that ' almost identical provisions now
exist in the Publications Laws of the former Northern1,
2 3 4Western and Eastern Regions of Nigeria' •
4.6 Regulation of Printing Presses
5
Under the Printing Presses Regulation Law , applicable in 
Lagos State, no person may 'keep in his possession any 
press for the printing of books or papers who shall not 
have made and subscribed*., /a/ declaration before a magis-
g
trate' in which he specifies his name and the address at 
which the printing press is kept. Such a declaration must 
be forwarded by the magistrate concerned to the prescribed 
authority, who is responsible for maintaining a register 
of all such declarations. If a printing press is sub­
sequently destroyed or becomes permanently unfit for use, 
its owner must report this occurrence to the prescribed
7
authority and explain the reasons therefor . 'Equally, 
whenever a press is sold or transferred to a new owner, 
the former owner must, within fourteen days, report to the
Publications Law (northern states) 1964, no 13 of 1964.
Publications Law (western states) Cap 109, (Laws of the 
Western Region of Nigeria, 1959).
Publications Law (eastern states), Cap 109, (Laws of 
Eastern Nigeria, 1963).
Elias, op cit, p 14.
Cap 101, (Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria, 19 73). 
s. 3, ibid.
See Elias, supra.
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prescribed authority the date on which, and the name and 
address of the person to whom, the press was sold or trans-
i
ferred' . The particulars of the new owner must then be
entered in the register. Premises at which a declared
press is kept may be visited by any police officer of or 
above the rank of Assistant Superintendent and by every 
administrative officer, during normal office hours, to 
ensure that the provisions of the statute have been carried 
out, but two days' written notice of the intended visit
^ u 2must be given .
Failure to declare a printing press in this manner is
punishable by a fine of up to N1Q0 or by imprisonment for
a maximum of six months, or both; and - for the purposes 
of this provision - the 'occupier of any premises in which 
any such press is found /*is\J deemed to have kept the same
3
in his possession, unless he proves the contrary' .
Every book or paper printed within the Lagos State and 
intended for publication or dispersal must bear on the 
front (and last) page(s) - in legible characters in the 
English language - the name and address of the printer and 
(if the book or paper is published) that of the publisher 
as well, together with the place of publication. This 
obligation is separate and distinct from the similar duty
4
prescribed by the Newspapers Laws, examined above, and 
non-compliance is punishable by a fine of N100 or imprisonment
Elias, ibid.
This is in terms of Regulations made under s. 5 of the Act. 
See Elias, ibid, p 15, n 1.
s. 3(4) Printing Presses Regulation Law, supra.
See p 310 above.
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1
for six months or both.
Under s. 2 of the Law, 'book' is defined as including any 
volume... or... collection of printed sheets of paper... 
bound together; and 'paper' is defined as including any 
printed sheet of paper or similar material or any unbound 
collection of printed sheets of paper or similar material. 
'Printed' means 'produced by printing, lithography, or any 
other like process', and 'printing' and 'printer' have 
corresponding meanings.^
As regards the remaining states within Nigeria, substantially 
the same provisions are to be found in the western states
3
in the Printing Presses Regulation Law and, in the
northern states, in the Printing . Presses (Regulation) 
a
Law . No similar legislation obtains in the eastern states, 
however ?
4.7. Licence Requirements for Wireless Telegraphy
The regulation of wireless telegraphy in general is governed 
by the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1961^ . The Act - which
7
has effect throughout the Federation - begins by defining
s. 4, Printing Presses Regulation Law, Cap 101.
2 s. 2, ibid.
3
Cap 97, (Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 1959).
4
Cap 99, (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963).
5
See Elias, op cit, p 15.
6 No. 31 of 1961.
7
See s. 1(2), ibid.
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"wireless telegraphy" as meaning:
' . .. the emitting or receiving, over paths which are
not provided by any material substance constructed or 
arranged for that purpose, of electro-magnetic energy of 
a frequency not exceeding three million megacycles a second, 
being energy which either -
(a) serves for the conveying of messages, sound or visual 
images (whether the messages, sound or images are actually 
received by any person or not), or for the actuation or 
control of machinery or apparatus; or
(b) is used in connection with the determination of position, 
bearing or distance, or for the gaining of information as
to the presence, absence, position or motion of any object 
or of any objects of any class....'1
It needs little emphasis that this study is chiefly concerned
with electro-magnetic energy which 'serves for the conveying
2
of messages, sound or visual images'.
The key provisions of the Act are sections 4 and 6. Section 
4 makes it an offence to 'establish or use any station for 
wireless telegraphy or /to/ install or use any apparatus 
for wireless telegraphy except under and in accordance
3
with a licence in that behalf'. Section 6 confers upon
4 5the Minister the sole right - in his absolute discretion
to 'grant licences for the purposes of th/e/ Act... for
any particular case as he may approve and /to/... renew
£
licences so granted' . The Minister also has sole and 
absolute discretion as to the conditions upon which a licence
s 2, ibid.
 ^ See s 2Id), ibid.
 ^ s 4r( 1) * ibid.
Minister, in terms of section 2, ibid, means 'the Minister 
charged with responsibility for matters relating to 
wireless telegraphy'.
 ^ See s 6(2) which provides: 'The grant or renewal of a
licence shall be in the discretion of the Minister'. No
guidelines as to the manner in which this discretion is
to be exercised are provided by the Act.
 ^ s 6(1), ibid.
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may be issued and may accordingly impose 'limitations 
as to the position and nature of the station, the purposes 
for which, the circumstances in which, and the persons by 
whom the station may be used, and the apparatus which may
i
be installed' . The Minister may also specify the period
2
for which the licence is to continue ; and may revoke a
licence at any time by notice in writing (to a specific
holder) or by publication in the Gazette (in relation to
3
a class of licence-holders) .
In terms of section 7, the Minister may also prescribe the
4
fee payable on the issue or renewal of a licence ; and, 
under s 9, may make regulations inter alia, 'prescribing 
the things which are to be done or are not to be done in 
connection with the use of any station for wireless tele-
5
graphy' , and 'imposing on the /licensee/...obligations 
as to permitting and facilitating the inspection of the
g
station and apparatus' . S 23 confers wide powers of 
entry and search of premises where 'a magistrate is 
satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable 
ground for suspecting that an offence under th/e/ Act has 
been or is being committed, and that evidence of the 
commission of the offence is to be found on any premises
s 6(3), ibid.
 ^ s 6(4), ibid.
 ^ s 6(5), ibid.
* s 7(1), ibid.
5 s 9(1)(a), ibid.
 ^ s 9(1)(b), ibid. For further details, see also subsections
(c), (d) and (e) and subsection (2).
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specified in the information'^.
S 24 gives the executive wide-ranging powers to assume
'control over the transmission or reception of messages by
2
wireless telegraphy' either 'on the occasion of an
3
emergency' or (more generally) where this is 'in the public
4
interest' . In such circumstances/ the Minister may 
prohibit the use of wireless telegraphy on board vessels 
or aircraft within or over Nigeria or her territorial
5
waters; may take possession of any apparatus for wireless 
telegraphy;^ direct the licensee to submit to him all 
communications tendered for transmission or received by
7
means of the apparatus; and/ in general/ instruct the 
licensee to comply with all directions the Minister may
Q
think fit to give-.
In terms of s 25, the onus of proof of compliance with the 
Act is effectively shifted on to any person who is found in
s 23(1)/ ibid. The terms of this section are long and 
complex, and full examination of them lies outside the 
scope of this study. For further information, however, 
see subsections (2) to (4).
 ^ s 24, ibid.
3
Ibid. No attempt is made to define 'emergency'.
4
Ibid. No indication is given by the Act of when the 
assumption of such control may be said to be 'in the 
public interest'. It seems therefore that the executive 
has complete discretion in this regard.
 ^ s 24(a), ibid.
 ^ s 24(b)(i), ibid.
7 s 24(b)(iii),ibid.
® s 24(b)(v), ibid.
possession of any apparatus for wireless telegraphy - for 
such a person is 'deemed/ until the contrary is proved/ to
i
have used the same'.
Special provision for 'Government sound and television
2
broadcasting services' is contained in s 31. This empowers 
the Minister to grant to State governments 'licences to 
provide sound or television broadcasting services trans-
3
mitting on such wavelengths as may be allocated' . A 
licence granted pursuant to this power may be made subject 
'to such conditions as the Minister may see fit to impose 
for the purpose of -
(a) ensuring a proper and efficient allocation of wavelengths 
throughout Nigeria; or
(b) giving effect to or ensuring compliance with the terms 
of any international convention relating to wireless tele­
graphy to which the Federation is a signatory; or
(c) avoiding undue interferrence with wireless telegraphy 
whether inside or outside N i g e r i a . 4 .
No other conditions may however/ be imposed by the Minister
5
in relation to licences to State governments. Furthermore 
the Minister may not refuse to grant a licence to a State 
government '/e/xcept in so far as it may in the opinion of 
the Minister be necessary or expedient for any of the 
purposes mentioned /above/*** so to do'^. The Minister may 
cancel a licence to a State government by notice in writing 
but may only do so on grounds falling within (a) to (c)
7
above. In general - apart from the need to obtain a
 ^ s 25/ ibid.
 ^ s 31(1)/ ibid.
3 Ibid-
 ^ s 31(2)/ ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
6 _ ,, , ,
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licence, as described above - 'the provisions 6f the /Act/ 
/"dq7 not apply in relation to broadcasting or television
i
provided by the government of a State' .
4.8 Regulation of Radio Broadcasting
The regulation of radio broadcasting is governed by the
2
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act 1979 which came 
into retrospective effect from 1 April 1978. The statute
repeals and replaces the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation
3 4Act/ / as amended, under which the original Nigerian
Broadcasting Corporation was established. In its place,
the new Act provides for the establishment of a successor
body corporate, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria
('the Corporation') which has overall responsibility for
5
national and external radio broadcasting services.
The corporation is comprised of a Chairman and the following 
other members, all appointed by the Minister with the prior
s 31(5), ibid. The significance of this important provis­
ion is further examined below.
(Decree) No. 8 of 1979.
Cap 133, (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
The amending statutes in question are the Nigerian Broad­
casting Corporation (Amendment) Acts of 1959, 1960 and 
1961. Of these, the last is the most important and the 
change it introduced - still reflected in the present 
legislation - is discussed further at p 345 below.
See Explanatory Note to the Act (No. 8 of 1979).
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1
approval of the Federal Executive Council:
2
(a) the Chairman of each Zonal Board ; -
(b) the Director-General of the Corporation ;
(c) one representative of the Federal Ministry of Information;
(d) one representative of the Ministry of External Affairs;
(e) one person to represent women's interests in Nigeria; and
(f) six persons with requisite experience in -
(i) the mass media
(ii) education
(iii) management
(iv) financial matters
(v) engineering, and
(vi) arts and culture'
Members (other than public officials) hold office for three
4
years and are eligible for further three-year appointment. 
They may be prematurely removed from office (for misconduct
s 140 of the 1979 Constitution establishes various federal 
executive bodies, with responsibility for a variety of 
functions as described in the Third Schedule to the 
Constitution. None of the enumerated functions assigned 
to these bodies appears entirely apposite to the present 
situation, and it is accordingly submitted that this 
role must now be performed by the Council of State, under 
its residuary powers. All future references to the 
Federal Executive Council should therefore be construed 
accordingly.
2
In terms of s 15 of the Act, ibid, the Corporation has 
four zones, each responsible for broadcasting in different 
languages, as provided in Schedule 2. The zones are 
Lagos, Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu. All broadcast in English, 
but Lagos broadcasts also in three Nigerian languages 
(unspecified in schedule 2), whilst the three other zones 
broadcast, inter alia, in Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo respectively.
3
The Director-General is the chief executive officer of the 
Corporation and is responsible for the execution of the 
policy of the Corporation and its day to day business.
He is appointed by the Minister with the prior approval 
of the Federal Executive Council. See s 4 of the Act.
s 2(1), ibid. 
s 2(2), ibid.
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or incapacity) by the Minister: with the approval of the
Federal Executive Council and following consultation with
the interests^ if any/ represented by the particular member.
In addition/ the Corporation may recommend the removal of
any member absent without acceptable explanation from two
consecutive ordinary meetings of the Corporation or whose
continued presence/ in its view is 'not in the national
2
interest or in the interest of the Corporation' ; and the 
Minister may thereupon 'declare the office of that member 
vacant'.^
The chief executive officer of
4
Director-General, responsible 
of the Corporation and its day 
appointed by the Minister with
5
Federal Executive Council.
The general functions of the Corporation are described in 
s 5 as follows:
'5 - (1) It shall be the duty of the Corporation to 
provide as a public service in the interest of Nigeria/ 
independent and impartial radio broadcasting services for 
general reception within Nigeria and to provide External 
Services for general reception in countries outside Nigeria.
(2) The Corporation shall ensure that the services 
which it provides/ when considered as a whole/ shall reflect 
the unity of Nigeria as a Federation and at the same time 
give adequate expression to the culture/ characteristics 
and affairs and opinions of each State/ Zone or other part 
of the Federation.'6
1 s 3(1), ibid.
2 s 3(2)(b), ibid.
3 Ibid .
4 See preceding page, n 3.
5 See s 4(1) and (2), supra
6 s 5, ibid.
the Corporation is the 
for carrying out the policies 
to day business. He is 
the prior approval of the
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The particular functions of the Corporation are provided
by s 7 and include the maintenance and operation of radio
transmitting and receiving stations and of wired radio
1
distribution services ; the planning and co-ordination of
the activities of the Zones and of the entire Federal radio
2
broadcasting system ; the collection and provision of news
3
and information ; and the acquisition of copyrights and
4
other materials and apparatus required .
In terms of s 8, the Corporation is enjoined to satisfy 
itself that the programmes broadcast by it and by the zones 
comply with the following requirements;
'(a) that nothing is included in the programmes which 
is likely to offend against good taste or decency or is 
likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to dis­
order or to be offensive to public feeling, or to contain 
an offensive reference to any person, alive or dead;
(b) that the programmes maintain a proper balance in 
their subject matter and a generally high standard or 
quality;
(c) that any news given in the programmes is presented 
with accuracy, impartiality and objectivity;
(d) that due impartiality is preserved in respect of 
matters of political, or industrial controversy or relating 
to current public policy; and
(e) that subject to /"the provisions described below/, 
no matter designed to serve the interests of any particular 
political party is included in the programmes... 5
The last-mentioned limitation does not, however, prevent:
'(a) the inclusion in the programmes of properly balanced 
discussions or debates in which the persons taking part 
express opinions and put forward arguments of a political 
character; and
(b) the inclusion in the programmes of party political 
broadcasts... in accordance with /a/ scheme... which apport­
ions the facilities and time allowed... the /various/ parties 
in such a manner as appears to the Corporation equitably to 
represent their respective claims to the interest of the public.6 1
s 7 (a) and (b), ibid. 
 ^ s 7 (d), ibid.
 ^ s 7(h) and (i), ibid.
 ^ s 7(j) and (1), ibid.
 ^ s 8(1), ibid.
6 s 8 (2), ibid.
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The Corporation may not, however, express its own opinions 
on matters of political or industrial controversy or relating
i
to current public policy.
The Corporation is further obliged to provide such facilities 
'as may appear to /it/ to be desirable in the public interest'
3
for the broadcasting of ministerial speeches and of matters 
of any kind relating to the main streams of religious
4
belief in Nigeria .
In addition, section 10 places the Corporation under a 
wide-ranging duty to broadcast government programmes. Thus,
5
'whenever so requested by an authorised public officer1 
(meaning 'any officer in any of the public services in the
g
Federation declared to be such by the President' ) the 
Corporation must broadcast (at its own expense) a Government 
'programme'. No definition of 'programme' is provided and 
it cannot be assumed that the term is to be understood as 
being limited to 'announcement' - even though the latter 
word is used in the marginal note to the section. The Corpor­
ation is also under a duty, 'whenever so requested by any 
such officer in whose opinion an emergency has arisen or 
continues.../to/ broadcast... any other matter which the
s 8(3), ibid,
s 9, ibid. This would seem to leave the determination to 
the Corporation in its own discretion. However, the value 
of this is largely eroded by the sweeping provisions of 
s 10, described below, in terms of which the Corporation 
is obliged to broadcast any Government programme at the 
request of authorised public officers.
s 9(a), ibid.
s 9(b), ibid.
s 10(1), ibid, emphasis supplied.
s 10(2), ibid. It needs no emphasis that this definition
is wide in the extreme.
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1
officer may request the Corporation to broadcast' . The 
Corporation has a discretion in deciding whether to announce 
that the material in question has been broadcast at such 
request^.
Certain items - notably federal news bulletins/ Presidential
speeches and 'other matters of national interest or import-
3
ance which the Corporation requires to be so relayed' 
must be broadcast by all stations of the Corporation/ in
4
each of the four zones*
Commercial broadcasting is restricted under s 11, whilst 
External Services are regulated under s 13. The establish­
ment of the four zones - Lagos, Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu - 
with their Zonal Boards and Directors is governed by ss 15 
to 18 and the remaining sections of the Act deal, inter alia
5
with the Corporation's power of entry onto land , its
6 7financial arrangements , the bringing of suit against it ,
Q
its staff regulations and conditions of service , its
9
Annual Reports and the Regulations which may be made by
the Federal Executive Council to ensure the proper carrying
10into effect of the provisions of the Act
1 s 10(1), ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 s 12(2) (b) , ibid.
4 s 12, ibid.
b ss 19 to 21 , ibid
& ss 23 to 26, ibid
/ ss 27 to 30, ibid
8 s 32, ibid.
y s 34, ibid.
10 s 35, ibid.
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It remains to consider two further important provisions of 
the Act. Under s 6, the Corporation enjoys exclusive res­
ponsibility for radio broadcasting in 'shortwave or powerful 
medium-wave for effective and simultaneous reception in
i
more than one State at any one time* . Accordingly, any
other broadcasting authority in Nigeria is limited to
transmitting radio broadcasts for 'effective reception'
2
m  one state only and any transmitters belonging to such 
other broadcasting authority which are capable of trans­
mitting at a greater radius are deemed to be vested in
3
the Corporation as from the day the Act came into operation . 
This change brought about by the Act sparked considerable 
controversy and was strenuously objected to in Kaduna, 
where a powerful shortwave service had previously been
4
established.
Finally, under s 14, the Minister is empowered to 'give 
the Corporation directions of a general character or 
relating generally to particular matters (but not to an 
individual case) with regard to the exercise by the Corp-
5
oration of its functions under th/e/ Act' and it is 'the
c
duty of the Corporation to comply with such directions' .
This provision reflects an amendment to the original
7
Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Act which was introduced
s 6(1), ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
3
Para 7, Schedule 3, ibid.
4 r/1978 - 797, Africa Contemporary Record, p B 740
5 s 14, Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act, supra.
 ^ Ibid.
7
Cap 133, (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
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in 1961 ; but goes somewhat further than its predecessor
2
in certain respects, as further explained in due course.
4.9. Regulation of Television Broadcasting 
Regulation of television broadcasting is provided by the
3
Nigerian Television Authority Act of 1977 which came into
4
operation, with retrospective effect, from 1 June 1976 .
The Act provides for the establishment of a body corporate, 
known as the Nigerian Television Authority ('the Authority') 
which has exclusive responsibility for television broad­
casting in Nigeria and has accordingly taken over television 
broadcasting facilities from all other broadcasting organ-
5
isations previously established.
The Authority comprises the following members, all appointed 
by the Federal Executive Council on the recommendation of 
the Minister, -
'(a) a Chairman; 6
(b) the Chairman of each Zonal Board ;
(c) the Director-General of the Nigerian Television 
Authority7;
(d) one representative of the Federal Ministry of 
^Information;
(e) one person to represent womenis organisations in 
Nigeria; and
Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Act 1961,
Act no. 35 of 1961.
See p 345 below.
(Decree) No. 24 of 1977.
s 36, ibid.
See explanatory note to the Act, ibid.
For the purposes of television broadcasting, Nigeria is 
divided into six zones, as further explained at p336below.
The Director-General is the chief executive officer of the 
Authority, as further explained below.
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(f) six persons with requisite experience in -
(i) the mass media,
(ii) education,
(iii) management,
(iv) financial matters,
(v) engineering, and .
(vi) arts and culture.1
Members, other than public officials, hold office for three
years and are eligible for appointment for a further three- 
2
year term ; and may be prematurely removed from office in 
substantially the same circumstances as previously described
in relation to members of the Federal Radio Corporation of
. 3Nigeria .
The chief executive officer of the Authority is known as 
the Director-General. He is appointed by the Minister with 
the prior approval of the Federal Executive Council and 
is responsible for 'the execution of the policy of the
4
Authority and of its day to day business' .
The general duties of the Authority are 'to provide as a 
public service in the interest of Nigeria, independent 
and impartial television broadcasting for general reception
5
within Nigeria' and to ensure that the services provided 
'reflect the unity of Nigeria as a Federation and at the 
same time give adequate expression to the culture, charac­
teristics and affairs of each State, Zone or other part of
g
the Federation* ,
1
s 2, Nigerian Television Authority Act, supra.
 ^ s 3(1), ibid.
3
See p 327 above; and s 4, ibid.
 ^ s 5, (1) to (3) , ibid".
 ^ s 6(1), ibid.
® s 6(2), ibid.
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The particular functions of the Authority are described in
s 8, and are substantially similar to those previously
described in relation to the Federal Radio Corporation of
Nigeria . One notable difference (reflecting perhaps a
shortage of locally produced television programmes) is
the express provision that one of the functions of the
Authority is to 'specify the types of programme which should
be transmitted by the whole network and the quantity/ type
2
and contents of foreign materials' .
In terms of s 7 of the Act/ the Authority is given respon­
sibility 'to the exclusion <5f any other broadcasting 
authority or any person in Nigeria* for television broad­
casting within Nigeria; and has accordingly taken over 
this function from all federal and state television broad-
4
casting stations previously established .
5 9 of the Act casts upon the Authority the duty to ensure, 
in broad outline/ that its programmes maintain high standards 
of quality and taste/ as well as accuracy/ balance and due 
impartiality. The obligations in question are the mirror- 
image of those pertaining to the Federal Radio Corporation
5
of Nigeria, previously described above , and their precise
provisions will not be repeated here. The Authority is
g
likewise under a duty to broadcast ministerial speeches
1
See p 328 above, and s 8, ibid.
2 s 8 (1)(g)/ ibid.
 ^ s 7(1), ibid.
4
The Times (Special Supplement on Nigeria), 3 February 1982. 
 ^ See p 329 above; and see also s 9, supra.
6 s 10(1), ibid.
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and matters relating to the main streams of religious belief 
1
in Nigeria ; and may also be called upon to broadcast/ at
2
its own expense, any government 'announcement* requested
3
by an 'authorised public officer' (meaning 'any officer in 
any of the public services in the Federation declared to
4
be such by the President or /State Governor/' ). The
broadcasting of any other matter may also be requested
'by any such officer in whose opinion an emergency has
5arisen or continues' ; and the Authority has a discretion 
as to whether or not to indicate that the material is 
being broadcast pursuant to such request^.
Commercial television broadcasting is permitted in terms 
of s 12; whilst ss 14 to 17 provide for the establishment 
of six zones, each with its own Zonal Board and Managing 
Directors. Further provisions of the Act - substantially 
similar to those relating to the Federal Radio Corporation
7
of Nigeria - entitle the Authority to enter upon land ;
o
and govern its financial arrangements , the bringing of
9
legal proceedings against it , the conditions of service
s 10(2), ibid.
s 11(1), ibid. The wording of this subsection differs 
significantly from that of the equivalent provision (s 10) 
of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act, discussed 
at p 330above. Thus, this provision refers expressly to 
government 'announcement/s/', whilst the latter speaks 
simply of government 'programmes'. It seems therefore 
that the "television" provision is considerably narrower 
than the "radio" one in this regard.
s 11(2), ibid.
Ibid.
s 11(1), ibid.
Ibid.
ss 19 to 21, ibid.
ss 23 to 26, ibid.
ss 27 to 30, ibid.
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i 2
of its employees ; its Annual Reports and the Regulations 
which may be made by the Federal Executive Council pursuant 
to the legislation^.
In addition, the Authority is made subject to the directions 
of the Minister under the terms of s 13/ which provides 
that:
'The Minister may give the Authority directions of a 
general character or relating generally to particular matters 
with regard to the exercise by the Authority of its functions 
under th/e/ Act/ and it shall be the duty of the Authority 
to comply with such directions'4.
Finally/ the Act also makes provision for the establishment 
of a news department, with responsibility for 'the gathering 
of items of news from all sources and for their editing
5
and subsequent dissemination' . The news department falls 
under the aegis of a Director of News, who is responsible - 
'subject to any directions given to him by the Director-
g
General' - for 'the execution of the policy of the Authority 
in so far as the news department is concerned and for the
7
administration of the day to day business of the department' 0
4.10. Constitutional Regulation of Media Ownership
Under the 1979 Constitution, ownership and operation of 
the media is regulated by s 36(2), as follows:
s 33, ibid. 
s 31, ibid. 
s 32, ibid. 
s 13, ibid. 
s 18(1), ibid. 
s 18(2), ibid. 
I bid.
1
2
3
4
5
6 
7
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'(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection 
(1) of this section, every person shall be entitled to 
own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination 
of information, ideas and opinions:
Provided that no person, other than the Government of 
the Federation or of a State or any other person or body 
authorised by the President, shall own, establish or operate 
a television or wireless broadcasting station for any 
purpose whatsoever' .
A sharp distinction is thus drawn between the electronic
2and other media • In relation to the latter, the Constitution 
provides clear protection against government monopoly; 
whilst radio and television broadcasting - by contrast - 
are expressly subjected to direct government control. It 
is noteworthy that the subsection provides no indication 
as to the conditions or criteria governing the grant of 
authority by the President: and the conclusion is thus 
inescapable that the discretion conferred upon the President 
in this regard is absolute.
4.11. The Extent of Prior Restraint and Government Control 
of the Media
It remains to consider the extent to which the provision^ 
described above give rise to "prior restraint" and government 
control over the media. In examining this issue, it is 
proposed to scan in brief the laws previously outlined; 
and to highlight those aspects of their provisions which 
appear particularly controversial.
 ^ S 36(2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 19 79. 
Subsection (1), of course, contains the substantive 
guarantee of the right to 'freedom of expression, including 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas 
and information without interference'.
2
It is interesting to note that 'any medium' in this prov­
ision has been interpreted to include not only the news 
media but also a school: See, for example, Ehimare v 
Governor of Lagos State and others, (1981)1 N.C.L.R. 166.
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The affidavit and bond requirements imposed upon news­
papers^ clearly amount to a "prior restraint" against
publication, in the sense that '/n/o person /may/ print
2
or publish... any newspaper' until these requirements 
have been satisfied. The obligation to swear and register 
the requisite affidavit does not, however, seem particularly 
onerous, and it is strongly arguable that it constitutes 
no more than a reasonable requirement for the proper main­
tenance of records which - at minimum - are of vital 
importance to any person wishing to bring proceedings 
against a newspaper, whether for defamation or otherwise.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the view of the 
West Indian Court of Appeals in assessing the constitution­
ality (under a guarantee of freedom of expression modelled
3
on the Nigerian provision as originally framed ) of similar 
obligations placed upon newspaper proprietors, publishers,
4
printers and editors in Antigua . The Appeal Court pointed
5
out that '/t/he purpose of these provisions is obvious' 
and that 'they are designed to ensure thfct responsibility 
for any breach of the criminal or civil law arising out of
These are described at p 308 above.
2
s 4- f Newspapers Law, Lagos State, Cap 86 (Laws of Lagos 
State of Nigeria, 1973).
3
The original Nigerian Bill or Rights (now somewhat amended 
under the 1979 Constitution) served as a model for similar 
provisions introduced in the majority of new Commonwealth 
states in following years. See p 173 above.
4
The proceedings in question are those in Attorney-General 
and another v Antigua Times Ltd.,/(1973) , 20 W.I.R.
573 W.I.A.S.y which is further discussed at p 364 below.
5
Ibid, at 585, per Lewis, C.J. (Ag) . The provisions in 
issue (as regards this aspect of the case) are contained 
in the Newspaper Registration Act, Cap 318, Laws of Antigua, 
1962.
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any matter published in a newspaper is easily and readily 
brought home to the offending party whose name and address
i
will be known' The court accordingly concluded that the
provision 'is indeed a salutary fonej as no community
could be expected to tolerate the publication of a newspaper
2
under conditions of anonymity' .
As regards the bond requirement, however, the matter is 
more controversial; and will be further examined in due
3
course . Suffice it therefore, for the present to note 
that the amount which must be guaranteed or deposited is 
not particularly high and - interestingly enough - is the 
same as the sum originally required when the predecessor to 
the present legislation (the Newspapers Ordinance of 1903)
4
was first introduced in Nigeria.
Other obligations imposed under the various Newspapers 
Laws - for example, to print the name and address and place
5
of publishing on every newspaper , to send copies of news-
c
papers to the Minister and to submit annual returns giving
7
details of newspapers, proprietors and newsagents - do
Ibid.
Ibid.
See p 364 below, where further aspects of Attorney-General 
and another v Antigua Times Ltd., supna, are examined.
See Elias, 0£ cit,p 2 n 2. The present requirement of 
N500 is the equivalent of £250 - the sum required under 
s 3(2) of the Newspapers Ordinance of 1903.
See p 310 above.
See p 311 above.
See p 314 above.
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not give rise to "prior restraint" or executive control 
of content and thus do not in themselves constitute any 
infringment of press freedom. As pointed out by Holland,
'/✓v/e live in an age of records and statistics.. ./'and/
/i/t is vital to know who is responsible for running a 
newspaper and where it is printed and published in case 
lapses occur in respect of which proceedings have to be 
taken' * .
Likewise, the requirement that copies of newspapers be
2
deposited with libraries constitutes no infringement of 
press freedom and may, on the contrary, serve an important 
purpose in facilitating the collection and storage of 
reference materials.
The obligations imposed under the Printing Presses Regulation 
3
Laws applicable in the various states (except those in
4
the erstwhile Eastern Region ) are arguably more controversial. 
However, on a proper reading of the Laws, it is clear that 
they do not impose any form of prior licensing on the 
possession of a printing press. The statutes do not demand 
that the would-be printer first obtain permission for the 
acquisition of a press. Instead, they merely require that 
he notify the fact of his possession of a press to a 
magistrate - and that he also inform the registering 
authority when the press is no longer in use by him;
Denys C. Holland, 'Freedom of the press in the Commonwealth', 
(1956) 9 Current Legal Problems, pp 184-207, p 194.
See p 318 above.
See p 319 above.
See p 321 above.
whether because it has been damaged or destroyed or because
i
he has sold it to some other person. It may of course, 
be queried why government needs information of this kind: 
but the obligation to provide it does not - in itself - 
infringe press freedom.
It is thus interesting to note that these provisions, as
described above, do not establish a system of licensing of
newspapers or printing in Nigeria. Nigerian legislation
in this context differs markedly from that introduced in a
number of other British dependencies; and the contrast
merits emphasis in order to underline the comparative
freedom obtaining in Nigeria. Thus, in Aden, the Press and
Registration of Books Ordinance, 1939, as amended, provides
'It shall not be lawful for any person to print, publish
or edit any newspaper within the Colony unless authorised
by a licence in writing granted by the Governor and signed
by the Chief Secretary, which licence the Governor may,
2
in his absolute discretion, grant, refuse or revoke' . In 
the Federation of Malaya, a licence was required not only 
for the printing and publication of a newspaper, but also 
for the possession of a printing press; and thus the 
Printing Presses Ordinance, 1948, provided that: 'The 
Chief Secretary may in his discretion grant to any person 
in the Federation a licence to keep for use and to use a 
press for the printing of documents, and may at any time 
withdraw such licence either permanently or for such period 
as he thinks fit.'^
See p 319 above.
s 5, Press and Registration of Books, Ordinance, 1939, 
cited by Holland, 0£ cit, p 187.
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These provisions speak for themselves; and it accordingly 
needs no further emphasis that the obligations imposed in 
relation to newspapers and printing presses under Nigerian 
legislation are of an entirely different order. The bond 
and deposit requirements do, however, constitute a "prior 
restraint" against publication; and their constitutionality 
(in the light of the Nigerian guarantee of freedom of 
expression) is accordingly further examined in due course.
The licensing requirement imposed by the Wireless Telegraphy 
2
Act of 1961 also constitutes a clear "prior restraint" on 
the dissemination of information by the electronic media.
It must, however, be acknowledged that the number of 
frequencies available for broadcasting is limited; and 
that some form of licensing is accordingly essential to
3
prevent 'intolerable overcrowding of desirable wave-bands' . 
Even accepting the need for such regulation, however, the 
Nigerian legislation remains open to considerable criticism. 
The principal shortcoming of the Act lies in the absolute 
and unfettered discretion it confers upon the Minister in 
a number of key respects. Thus, the legislation gives no 
indication of the criteria to be taken into account by the
4
Minister in deciding whether to grant or refuse a licence. 
Likewise, the statute provides no guidance as to the condit­
ions regarding the use of broadcasting stations which the
5
Minister may impose. Moreover, licences are granted for 
1
See p 3Gu- below.
2
See p 321 above.
3
Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed., New 
York, 1978, p 14.
4 See p 322 above.
5 See p 323 above.
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an unspecified period and are revocable at any time by the 
Minister; and - again - no indication is given by the Act 
as to the grounds on which revocation may be ordered.
In addition, the Minister's sweeping powers to assume 
direct control of broadcasting stations may be exercised 
not only 'on the occasion of an emergency' but also when­
ever this is 'in the public interest'; and the latter
2
provision is intrinsically vague and extremely wide-ranging . 
In short, thus, the Minister's discretion is indeed 
absolute; and the inference seems clear that those who wish 
to acquire and to retain a licence to broadcast by radio
3
and television had best keep on his "right" side.
In summary therefore, the licensing requirement under the
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1961 constitutes a clear "prior
restraint" against publication; and the absolute discretion
conferred upon the Minister in exercising his functions
under the Act carries with it a grave danger of executive
control over the content of radio and television broadcasts.
The constitutionality of these provisions is accordingly
4
examined further in due course.
See p 323 above 
See p 324 above.
It must, of course, be remembered that these provisions 
do not apply to state-owned broadcasting services. In 
relation to these, the criteria for the grant or revocation 
of a licence are expressly enumerated and the Minister 
has no further power of control. The significance of 
this is further considered below.
See p 375 below.
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i
Under the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Act 1979 , 
government control over radio broadcasting services is 
clear. Not only do the members of the Corporation/ includ­
ing its chief executive officer (responsible for the
execution of its policies and running of its day to day
2 3affairs ) consist entirely of government-appointees , but
the executive's power of control is expressly confirmed
by section 14 which provides that the Minister may 'give
the Corporation directions of a general character... with
4
regard to the exercise by /it/ of its functions' . This
5
power of direction was first introduced in 1961 in the 
midst of considerable controversy. Thus, The Service 
newspaper expressed the fear that the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation ('the N.B.C.') - the predecessor to the present 
body - would 'cease to be either impartial or objective or 
independent' ; and little credence was attached to the 
Government's assurance that the only reason for the change 
was that it would bring the N.B.C. into line with other 
statutory corporations such as the Nigerian Ports Authority 
and the Railway Corporation (in relation to which similar
7
powers of Ministerial direction already existed. ). It 
seems, moreover, that these fears were borne out by
See p 326 above.
See p 328 above.
See p 327 above.
See p 332 above
This amendment to the then Nigerian Broadcasting Act, Cap 
133, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, was 
introduced in s 4 of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation 
(Amendment) Act, 1961, no 35 of 1961.
The Service, September 9, 1961, cited by Ian K Mackay, 
Broadcasting in Nigeria, Ibadan, 1964, p 70.
7 Mackay, ibid, p 67.
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subsequent events, particularly during the 1965 elections, in
1 2 Western Nigeria , when - according to Nwabueze - 'both
the federal and regional broadcasting services daily blared
out fraudulent results issued by Chief Akintola's N.N.D.P.-
/having/ been instructed to take their report of the election
results from Chief Akintola's office/ instead of from the
3
counting stations' .
Thus, notwithstanding the provisions in the Act which 
require the Corporation to exercise due impartiality/ esp-
4
eciaily in matters of political controversy/ it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that government control 
over appointees to the Corporation/ as well as the Minister's 
wide-ranging power of direction/ must inevitably influence 
the way in which these obligations are discharged. The 
constitutionality of this control is accordingly further
5
examined below.
g
Under the Nigerian Television Authority Act of 1977 , the 
position is substantially the same as that relating to the 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria. Thus the Authority 
is comprised entirely of members appointed by the executive
7
and is subject to a similar power of Ministerial direction. 
See the section on the History of Nigeria/ atp96above.
2 B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States/ 
London, 1973.
3 Ibid/ p 152.
4 See p 329 above.
See p 382 below.
 ^ See p 333 above.
See p 337 above.
-347-
In addition, the collection and dissemination of news by the
Authority is expressly made subject to executive control,
through the News Department headed by the Director of News.
It follows that the content of television broadcasting is
also subject to considerable government control, and the
2
constitutionality of this is likewise examined below.
As regards the regulation of media ownership under the
Constitution, the guarantee of the right of every person
to own and operate any medium for the dissemination of 
3
information is to be welcomed; but the proviso excluding 
the electronic media from this guarantee and subjecting the 
establishment of a broadcasting station to the authorisation
4
of the President clearly constitutes a "prior restraint" 
against publication. The ‘constitutionality' of this 
restriction cannot, of course, be challenged; but the need 
for its amendment will nevertheless be considered in due
5
course. Before turning to examine this issue, however, 
as well as the constitutionality of the other legislative 
provisions identified above - it is salutary to note the 
markedly different approach taken in the United States of 
America to both licensing and regulation of the media.
See p 337 above. 
See p 385 below. 
See p 337 above. 
See p 338 above* 
See p 386 below.
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4.12* The Contrasting Approach of the United States
In the United States, licensing of print (as opposed to
broadcast ) media has long been abolished. Following the
refusal of the House of Commons in 1695 to renew press
2registration requirements in England itself, licensing 
lingered on in the United States for some further thirty 
years. The continuation of licensing was then challenged 
by James Franklin, the printer of the New England Courant;
and though he suffered imprisonment twice for his defiance, 
'licensing had to be acknowledged dead after his release 
in 172313.
A twentieth-century attempt to reinstate a modified form 
of the licensing of old was held unconstitutional in a
4
landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Near v Minnesota.
Different provisions apply to the broadcast media because 
of the fact that the frequencies suitable for broadcasting 
are limited, as further explained below.
See Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd. ed.,New 
York, 1978, p 18. The system of control of the press 
established in the sixteenth century by the Tudor monarchs 
and perpetuated by the Stuart kings had largely disappeared 
by the end of England's Glorious Revolution of 1689; 
and '/T/icensing and censorship in England died in 1695 
when the House of Commons refused to renew the 
/Licensing Act-J', as further explained at p 301 above.
See Nelson & Teeter, ibid, pp 2|-2.
Near v Minnesota ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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This case involved a 'smear sheet', the Saturday Press, 
which charged law-enforcement agencies with dereliction 
in their duty to control gambling, bootlegging and rack­
eteering in Minneapolis. Its language was extreme and it 
'vilified Jews and Catholics' Its publication was halted
under a Minnesota statute 'authorising prior restraint of
2
"nuisance" or "undesirable" publications' . Its publishers 
appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the statute 
was unconstitutional; and, by a majority of 5:4/ the 
Court found in their favour.
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes emphasised 
that the provisions of the Minnesota statute constituted
3
'the essence of consorship' and stressed that 'the chief
4
purpose of the constitutional guaranty' had been to prevent 
such prior restraint. He was not prepared to concede that 
prior restraint could never be justified, for there were 
circumstances (involving the security of the nation, or
5
the protection of public morals ) in which this might be 
1
Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 44.
2
Ibid. A permanent injunction against publication was 
imposed, subject to the proviso that publication could 
be resumed if the publishers could satisfy the court 
that the newspaper would no longer contain the objection­
able material which contravened Minnesota's 'gag law'.
3
Near v Minnesota, supra at 713.
4
Nelson and Teeter, op cit, p 45, citing Near, ibid.
5
See Near v Minnesota, supra, at 716, where Chief Justice 
Hughes acknowledged that 'No one would question but that 
a government might prevent actual obstruction to its 
recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates 
of transports or the number and location of troops...
/or7 incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow 
by force of orderly government'. He also considered 
that 'the primary requirements of decency /might/ be 
enforced against obscene publications.
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necessary. On the other hand/ he also emphasised that:
'/’T/he fact that the liberty of the press /might/ be 
abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal /did/ not make 
any the less necessary the immunity of the press from 
previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. 
Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the 1
appropriate remedy/ consistent with constitutional privilege'.
Chief Justice Hughes further expressed particular concern
at the need - not to shield officialdom from criticism -
but rather to encourage a 'vigilant and courageous press'?
for the increasing complexities of modern government as
well as burgeoning crime and corruption rendered this ever
2more important.
Near v Minnesota stands as a milestone in the development 
of freedom of the media in the United States. It was 
'the first case involving newspapers in which the Court 
applied the provisions of the First Amendment against
3
states through the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
And it was to serve as important precedent for protecting
4
the press against government's demands for suppression.'
Ibid/ at 7 20/ emphasis supplied.
2 Ibid See also p 719, where Chief Justice Hughes sketches 
the dangers in graphic terms.
3
The Court thus built upon the principle first recognised 
in the case of Gitlow v New York 268 U.S. 652 (1925) that 
'freedom of speech and of the press - which are protected 
by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress - 
are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States': (See p 666).
The importance of this was incalculable, for it established 
the competence of the Supreme Court to examine the const­
itutionality of State action infringing freedom of speech 
and of the press.
4 Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 47.
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Other indirect forms of licensing have also been ruled 
unconstitutional in the years since the Near decision.
Thus, in Lovell v City of Griffin/ tor example/ freedom 
to distribute publications without the need for prior 
permission was confirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court.
The appeal to the Court arose out of the conviction of Ms. 
Lovell, a Jehovah's Witness/ for failure to obtain written 
permission from the City Manager of Griffin for the 
distribution of her religious tracts, as required by a 
city ordinance which prohibited the 'practice of distribut­
ing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars/ handbooks/
advertising, or literature of any kind without first
2
obtaining permission from the City Manager... .
The Supreme Court was unanimous in denouncing the ordinance,
declaring that it was 'invalid on its face' and that it
'/■struck/ at the very foundation of the freedom of the press
3
by subjecting it to license and censorship' . It made 
no difference that the ordinance was directed at leaflets 
and pamphlets rather than newspapers, for publications of 
the former kind 'have been historic weapons in the defense
4
of liberty' ; and the press 'in its historic connotation 
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a
5
vehicle of information and opinion1 . Nor did it matter 
that the ordinance related to distribution, rather than 
publication: for '"Liberty of circulating is as essential
1 303 U.S. 444 (1938) .
2 Ibid, at 447.
 ^ IMd, at 451 .
 ^ Ibid, at 452.
 ^ Ibid.
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to... freedom /of speech/ as liberty of publishing; indeed, 
without circulation, the publication would be of little 
value" ' . *
2
In Jones v City of Opelika , a further restriction on dist­
ribution was in issue: this time in the form of an annual 
licence (for which a £10 fee was payable) to register as a 
"Book Agent". It was contended (by Jehovah's Witnesses) 
that this licence tax (imposed by the City of Opelika in 
Alabama) 'could be a dangerous weapon of censorship because 
the license could be revoked at will by city officials'
When the case first came before the Supreme Court, it held 
(by a majority of 5:4) that the Opelika Ordinance was 
valid, on the basis that it was in keeping with 'the pres­
ervation of peace and good order' and reflected the 'ordinary
4
requirements of civilised life* . Eleven months later,
however, the Court (having heard more Jehovah's Witnesses'
cases) reversed its previous ruling and held that the
Ordinance was indeed unconstitutional. It emphasised that:
'/T/he requirement of a licence for dissemination of 
ideas, when as here the licence is revocable at will without 
cause and in the unrestrained discretion of administrative 
officers,_is... an unconstitutional restraint on those 
freedoms' .
The freedoms in issue were those of speech (and of religion); 
and the Court believed that 'the Constitution, by virtue
Ibid. The Court was here citing its earlier dictum in 
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) at 733.
2 316 U.S. 584 (1942) .
3
Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, p 619.
4
Jones v City of Opelika, supra, at 594-595.
Ibid, at 600. The Court now 'adopted, as its majority 
position, the 1942 dissent in Jones v Opelika written 
by Chief Justice... Stone'. Nelson & Teeter, supra.
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of the First and Fourteenth Amendments* hafdj put /'them/
in a preferred position* . Hence/ '/t/he First Amendment
is not confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and
freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to 
2
wipe them out' . Rather, it confers protection against 
'every form of taxation which... is capable of being used
3
to control or suppress' these freedoms.
Different rules apply, however, to the broadcast media - 
for the simple reason that the number of frequencies avail­
able for broadcasting is limited, and some regulation is 
accordingly essential. In the early years of radio broad­
casting, no licensing restrictions were imposed; and '/b/y 
1926, the limited number of frequencies available for broad 
casting was unable to carry the traffic without intoler-
4
able interference among stations.' The Radio Act of 
1927 was passed at broadcasters' request; and established 
a Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to regulate broadcasting 
and ensure that it met the demands of 'public interest,
5
convenience or necessity' . All would-be broadcasters 
required a licence, for which application had to be made 
to the FRC. In 1934, the Communications Act was passed 
by Congress and established 'the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) under which radio and television have 
been regulated since'.^
Ibid, at 608.
 ^ IJaid.
3 Ibid.
4
Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, p 446. 
3 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
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The strong contrast between these controls and the freedom 
from licensing enjoyed by the print media prompted a 
challenge to the constitutionalitysf the Communications
i
Act. In National Broadcasting Co. v United States/ however,
its validity was upheld - the Supreme Court emphasising:
'Unlike other media of expression, radio inherently 
is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic; 
and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is 
subject to government regulation. Because it cannot be 
used by all, some who wish to use it must be d e n i e d ' . ^
The Court adverted to the criteria provided by the Act for
the grant or refusal of a licence - viz., 'public interest,
convenience or necessity'; and confirmed that '/d/enial of
a station licence on /those grounds/, if valid under the
3
Act, is not a denial of free speech' .
Moreover, although censorship of programme content is 
barred under the Communications Act, it is recognised that 
'there /are/ positive obligations upon the holder of a 
/broadcast/ license to operate in the public interest,
4
obligations which /are/ not imposed upon the printed media'.
5
This was explained by the Federal Court of Appeals on
the following basis:
'A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper 
publisher, but he is not in the same category in terms of 
public obligations imposed by law. A broadcaster seeks and 
is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and 
valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that 
franchise, it is burdened by enforceable obligations. A 
newspaper can be operated at the whim or caprice of its 
owners, a broadcasting station cannot'.^
319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, (1943).
 ^ I_bid, at 226.
3 Ibid> at 227.
4
Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 447.
5
In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v 
FCC,123 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994, (1966).
6 Ibid, at 1003.
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The difference between the obligations resting upon the
print and broadcast media is vividly illustrated by contrast­
's
ing the decision in Near v Minnesota with that in Trinity
Methodist Church, South v FRC?. In the former, the Supreme
Court had stressed 'the primary need of a vigilant and
courageous press' and had confirmed that:
'The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused 
by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the 
less necessary the immunity of the press from previous 
restraint. '3
4
By contrast/ in Trinity Methodist Church, South v FRC/ 
a radio broadcaster's application for re-licensing was 
rejected on the grounds that his programmes 'attacked the 
Roman Catholic Church, were sensational rather than instruc­
tive, and obstructed the orderly administration of public
5
justice' . His appeal to the Federal Appeals Court was
dismissed on the ground that the agencies established to
regulate the airwaves have the right to refuse renewal to
a broadcaster who has abused his licence by publishing
6
'defamatory or untrue matter' . To hold the opposite
would turn broadcasting from a benefit into a scourge; and
since there was no automatic right to a licence to use the
limited frequencies available, denial of a licence was
'neither censorship nor previous restraint, nor... a whittling
7
away of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment' •
283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931), previously discussed 
at greater length at p 348 et seq.
2 61 U.S.App.D.C . 311, 62 F.2d 850 (1932), certiorari
denied 284 U.S. 685, 52 S.Ct. 204, 288 U.S. 599, 53 S.Ct.
317 (1933).
3
Near v Minnesota, supra, at 720.
Supra,
5 Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, p 449. (The latter ground referred
to the attacks on judges which he had broadcast).
6 Ibid.
7 Trinity Methodist Church. South v FRC/suPra' 62 F 2d 850 
*(1932) , at 853.
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Broadcast licences are granted by the FCC, under the Comm­
unications Act of 1934, for (renewable) three-year periods 
on the basis of 'public convenience, interest or necessity'.
An application for a licence may be challenged by other 
'parties in interest' and the Commission is empowered to 
hold hearings to resolve the issues raised. The Commission 
issues policy statements and guidelines as to its criteria 
in granting licence applications. Its two principal 
considerations are 'the best practicable service to the 
public1 and the 'maximum diffusion of control of the media 
of mass communications'.
Detailed consideration of these criteria lies outside the
2
scope of this study . Under the first head, the Commission 
takes into account considerations such as 'citizenship, 
character,... financial, technical and other qualifications, 
... full-time participation in station operation by owners, 
the proposed program service and the past broadcast record, 
the efficient use of the frequency, /and a catch-all crite-
3
rion of/ "other factors"'. The second major criterion 
is premised upon 'faith in the tenet of the self-governing 
society th&t truth emerges from the clash of differing
4
ideas and opinions' , Pursuant to this principle, the 
Commission has evolved a number of rules regarding the 
maximum number of broadcasting stations that may be controlled
Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, p 451 .
For further information, see Nelson & Teeter, ibid, 
EP 450-468.
Nelson & Teeter, ibid, p 450-451.
Ibid, p 463.
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by a single person or entity and has also sought to limit
2
'radio-newspaper combinations' .
Once a broadcasting licence has been obtained, the licensee 
becomes subject to a number of important obligations (the 
fulfilment of which is always relevant to any application 
for renewal of the licence). The most important of these 
are the 'equal time', the 'seek out',and the 'personal 
attack' rules which are briefly described below.
Under the 'equal time' or 'equal opportunities' provision 
of the Communications Act, any broadcaster - if he allows 
'a legally qualified candidate for any public office' to 
use his broadcasting station - must afford equal opportunities 
to use the station to all other such candidates for that 
office. Bona fide news programs covering the activities 
of such candidates are, however exempted from the rule.
Under the 'seek out' rule, broadcasters are obliged to seek 
out and transmit contrasting viewpoints on controversial
For example, in 1953, it formulated a 'concentration of 
control' rule which 'permits common ownership of no more 
than seven AM stations, seven FM stations, and seven tele­
vision stations not more than five of which may be VFH'.
See Nelson & Teeter, ibid, p 464.
Thus, in 1975, the Commission ruled that 'no future appli­
cant would be permitted to own both a daily newspaper and 
a broadcasting station in the same community'. For a 
fascinating account regarding the controversy surrounding 
the position of existing radio-newspaper combinations, 
see Nelson & Teeter, ibid, pp 464-468.
Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, p 470. This has been the position 
since 1959; and the difficulty in determining what const­
itutes such a news program is briefly canvassed at pp 
471-472. The broadcaster has a choice as to whether he 
allows any such broadcast at all. He is not under a duty 
to do so, by contrast with the obligation imposed by the 
'seek out' rule, described below.
-358-
issues of public importance/ compliance with this duty 
being regarded by the Commission as a sine qua non for 
the renewal of a licence. This is in keeping with what is 
generally known as the 'fairness doctrine'; the principle 
that the 'public interest requires ample play for the free
i
and fair competition of opposing views'.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced in determining
what constitutes a 'controversial issue of public importance'
2
so as to be subject to the 'seek out' requirement. Object­
ion to the principle has also been voiced on First Amendment
grounds as derogating from freedom of expression which
• 3(it is contended)'includes the freedom to be unfair'.
An illustration of the rule is provided by the Commission's
4
ruling in 1976 that a radio station centred in an area 
of extensive strip mining was obliged to seek out and 
broadcast contrasting viewpoints on this issue.
In terms of the 'personal attack' principle, when 'a broad­
cast attacks the integrity or character of a person or
* Ibid/ p 472.
2
This is illustrated/ inter alia, by the 'Pensions' case; 
Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 958 (1973), later 
cited as National Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 
(D.C.Cir.1974), which raised the question whether the 
unsatisfactory operation of private pension plans was 
a 'controversial issue of public importance'. On appeal, 
it was held - reversing the view of the FCC - that it 
was not. For further examples, and clarification of the 
practical operation of the rule, see Nelson & Teeter, op 
cit, pp 474-482.
3
See Nelson & Teeter, ibid, p 474. It is plain that the 
print media enjoy such freedom - as illustrated by Near 
v Minnesota,283 U.S. 697, discussed at p348 and 355 above.
4 See Representative Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
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group, or an editorial supports or opposes a political 
candidate, the station must promptly notify the person 
attacked or opposed, furnish him with the content of the
i
attack, and offer him air time to respond' . Bona fide
newscasts, news interviews and commentaries fall outside
the ambit of this obligation; in recognition of the fact
that 'the rules calling for notice, transcript and offer
of time /might otherwise/ have the effect of discouraging
2
stations from airing important controversial issues' .
The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine (incorporating 
both the 'seek out' rule and the 'personal attack' principle) 
was challenged-but upheld - in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v 
FCC3.
The Supreme Court ruled that the fairness doctrine was intra
4
vires the powers delegated to the FCC by Congress ; and 
went on to confirm that there is a fundamental distinction 
between print and broadcast media and that - as regards the
Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 482.
2 Ibid.
3
395 U.S., 367 (1969). This decision involved two cases, 
decided together under the Red Lion title. In the first, 
a broadcasting station, Red Lion, Pa., had refused to 
allow free time for the rebuttal of a personal attack, 
and went to court claiming that the fairness doctrine 
was unconstitutional. In the second, the National 
Broadcasting Co., (amongst others) challenged the validity 
of the costly notification procedure under the 'personal 
attack' rule.
4
In 19 59, Congress had amended section 315 of the Communic­
ations Act to provide that stations must 'operate in the 
public interest and... afford reasonable opportunity for 
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public 
importance'. Although no express provision was made 
for the 'personal attack' rule, there was no reason to 
consider the rule out of step with the general requirement 
for the airing of contrasting views on important issues. 
Hence, the 'personal attack' rule was not an unconstitutional 
exercise of the FCC's powers. See Red Lion Broadcasting
Co v FCC, supra at 385.
-360-
latter - the First Amendment interest in free speech lies
primarily with the public, rather than the broadcaster.
Accordingly^ the court declared:
'/T/he people as a whole retain their interest in free 
speech by radio and their collective right to have the
medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of
the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is 
paramount...It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an unihhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth 
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance mono­
polization of that market, whether it be by the Government 
itself or a private licensee...It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political,
aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is 
crucial here.''
Despite its confirmation by the Supreme Court, the fairness
2
doctrine continues to attract considerable controversy ; 
and, with changes in broadcasting technology, especially 
the introduction of cable television, its underlying premise 
- the limited number of frequencies available for broad­
casting - may no longer be tenable. Accordingly, the 
time may indeed have come for a fundamental reevaluation of 
the doctrine and its consistency with First Amendment 
guarantees - as indicated in the dissenting opinion of
Judge Bazelon in the Court of Appeals in the Br.andywine-
3
Main Radio case . Here, Judge Bazelon - disagreeing with 
the majority decision to uphold the refusal of an application
4
for a broadcasting licence renewal - emphasised the enormous
Ibid, at 390.
See Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, 485-486. The constitutional 
question dies hard among journalists, many of whom believe 
that these rules cannot be reconciled with free speech.
Brandywine-Main Radio, Inc.,25 R.R.2d 2010; Brandywine- 
Main Line Radio v FCC, 473 F.2d 16, (D.C.Cir.1972).
The FCC had refused to renew the broadcasting licence on 
the grounds of past failure to comply with the fairness 
doctrine. The Court of Appeals preferred, however, to 
base its decision (in confirming the refusal) on misrep­
resentations made by the broadcaster. One of the judges 
favoured refusal for both misrepresentation and violation 
of the fairness doctrine. The second joined him only on the
ground of misrepresentation; and the third - Judge Bazelon 
dissented altogether. 
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capacities of cable television and queried whether 'ancient 
assumptions and crystallized rules have blinded all of us
i
to the depth of the First Amendment issues' raised by the 
fairness doctrine. There is clearly considerable force 
in this contention. The rationale for applying different 
rules to the broadcast media and subjecting them to far 
greater regulation than traditional print media has always 
been the limited availability of broadcast frequencies.
Once that consideration falls away, the retention of controls 
over broadcast media (of a kind not tolerated in relation 
to print) is difficult to justify.
In summary it is submitted that the approach of the United 
States - especially as regards the print media - is fundament­
ally sound. So long as the press remains subject to licence 
requirements and the grant or refusal of a licence lies 
within the sole and arbitrary discretion of state authorities/ 
freedom of the press must always be illusory. Freedom from 
licensing is thus, undoubtedly, the first and foremost 
requirement for freedom of the media.
As regards the broadcast media, it is submitted that - for
as long as reliance must be placed on limited frequencies
2
for transmission - the approach adopted by the United 
States is the most favourable possible., There are undoubtedly 
difficulties in the practical application of the criteria 
for the grant of a licence and in enforcement of the
Brandywine-Main Line Radio v FCC., supra, at 64.
2
Once cable television, for example, becomes more widespread, 
there will be no further need for these controls and the 
broadcast media should then be assimilated to print media 
in this regard.
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duties of * fairness* - but this is far preferable to allow­
ing a state or private concern to monopolize the airwaves.
The impact of television and radio is enormous - and it 
is vitally important to secure the dissemination - through 
these powerful media - of as great a diversity of viewpoint 
as is possible.
The approach adopted in the United States thus stands in 
marked contrast to that presently applied in Nigeria. As 
regards the print media, it shows a clear and uncompromising 
commitment to the principle prohibiting "prior restraint".
As for the electronic media, it reveals a sound and salutary 
attempt to overcome the problems of monopoly control and 
to enjoin upon the media a sense of their social responsib­
ilities. Once technological advance renders the electronic 
media as freely and generally available as the print media 
then, of course, the prohibition of "prior restraint" and 
freedom from regulation should apply equally to the former 
as it does now to the latter. Until that time, however, 
the present distinction in treatment has merit: and the 
principles governing both branches of the media seem well 
worth following. It is submitted that the lessons to be 
learned from the United States* approach should accordingly 
be borne in mind in examining the important remaining 
issue: the constitutionality of the Nigerian provisions 
under the guarantee of freedom of expression contained in 
the Bill of Rights.
T
The impact of radio is especially significant in a country, 
like Nigeria, where television broadcasting is still 
limited, and both media have immeasurable importance in 
a society still largely illiterate.
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4.13. Constitutionality of "Prior Restraint" and Government 
Control of the Media
Under the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria, freedom of expression 
'including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart ideas and information without interference' - is 
guaranteed by section 36. The right to freedom of express­
ion is not, however, absolute; and hence may be curtailed 
by laws 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' 
fof a number of purposes. Those relevant in the present 
context are contained in sections 36\3) (a) and 41. Thus, 
the former authorises derogation from freedom of expression 
by 'any law that is reasonable justifiable in a democratic
society... for the purpose of... regulating... wireless
2
broadcasting /or/ television' ; whilst the latter preserves 
the validity of 'any law that is reasonable justifiable in 
a democratic society -
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, 
public morality or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms
3
of other persons' .
In the light of these provisions, it now remains to examine 
the constitutionality of "prior restraint" and government
4
control over the media in Nigeria, as previously identified.
See the section on the Guarantee of Freedom of Expression 
at p 201 above.
s 36(3) (a), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
Ibid, s 41.
See the discussion at p 338, et seq.
-364-
4.13.1, The Constitutionality of the Bond Requirement ■ 
for Newspaper Publication
i
As regards newspaper publication, the principal "prior
restraint" is the requirement to deposit with the Minister
_(or guarantee by way of bond) the sum of N500 (to be used
for the payment of any penalties or damages awarded against
a newspaper), as a condition precedent to the commencement
2
of publication. This obligation is prima facie a viol­
ation of the freedom to 'impart ideas and information 
without interference' guaranteed by s 36(1) of the Nigerian 
Constitution <5f 1979. The crucial question, accordingly 
is whether the provision is 'reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society... for the purpose of protecting 
the rights and freedoms of Other persons', as provided
3
by s 41(1)(b). In answering this question, an important 
0-f disturbing) precedent is provided by the case of 
Attorney-General of Antigua and another v Antigua Times
4
Ltd., The decision has importance for Nigeria because 
it concerned the constitutionality (under a guarantee of 
freedom of expression modelled upon and substantially
5
similar to the Nigerian provision ) of a deposit requirement
The 'affidavit' requirement - described at p 308 above - 
is also a "prior restraint" against publication; but itself 
does not infringe freedom of expression as previously 
explained.
2
This requirement has been more fully explained at p 308 et seg
3
See the section on the Guarantee of Freedom of Expression 
at p201above; and see also the terms of section 41 as 
reproduced above.
4 /(1973) 20 W. I. R. 573 W.I.A.S./ and/1 976/A.C .1 6 (P.C.).
5
The Antiguan guarantee of freedom of expression is modelled 
on the Nigerian Bill of Rights which - as previously 
explained at pi73above~ provided the basis for similar 
Bills introduced in a great many new states of the Common­
wealth on their attainment of independence.
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1analogous (though more onerous ) than that applicable in
Nigeria; and because it was ultimately decided by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which (in cases of
2
this kind) has highly persuasive authority in Nigeria.
3
The decision raises a number of issues , but that relevant 
to the present inquiry is the constitutionality of the News­
paper Surety Ordinance (Amendment) Act 9/1971 ('Act 9/1971'). 
This added to the existing bond requirements (substantially 
similar to those in force in Nigeria4), the further obligation
The difference in terms is further explained at n 1*. oacL p 370* 
From the viewpoint of the decision's value as a precedent 
in Nigeria, it is clear that if a more onerous obligation 
is held constitutional, a fortiori a less burdensome duty 
must also be considered within the limits of the 'freedom 
of expression' guarantee.
It will be recalled from the section on the Sources of 
Nigerian Law at 154 above that only decisions of the Privy 
Council on appeal from Nigeria (before such right of appeal 
was abolished in 19 63) are binding on Nigerian courts. 
However, decisions of the Board interpreting similar prov­
isions in the law of other Commonwealth countries clearly 
have considerable weight in Nigeria).
These include the constitutionality of a licence requirement 
for newspaper publication and of an annual licence fee 
(of £600) introduced by further amending legislation: the 
Newspapers Registration (Amendment) Act 8/1971 ('Act 8/1971') 
and the constitutionality of an unfettered and unregulated 
discretion vested in the executive, as further discussed 
at p 378 below. The trial court and the West Indies Court 
of Appeal found Act 8/1971 unconstitutional because it 
prima facie infringed the Antiguan guarantee of freedom 
of expression and had not been shown by the state to be 
'reasonably required' to further an interest recognised 
by the Constitution. The Privy Council on further appeal 
found the Act valid, on the basis that the company challeng­
ing its validity had provided insufficient evidence that 
it was not 'reasonably required' to promote such an interest. 
The decision thus raises in acute form the problem presented 
by the doctrine of constitutionality previously discussed 
in the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights at p 191 above; 
and further briefly discussed at p371below.
Except that the sum required was slightly less, being £960 
approximately N400; as opposed to the Nigerian requirement 
of N500. See Newspaper Surety Ordinance, Cap 319, Laws of 
Antigua, 19 62.
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1
to deposit, in cash, the sum of £10,000 (equivalent to
£2,100) with the Accountant-General, as a pre-condition
to the printing or publishing of any newspaper. The purpose
of the deposit was stated to be 'to satisfy any judgment
of the Supreme Court for libel given against the /publishers/
2
of /such/ newspaper' . Following the introduction of this 
obligation, Antigua Times Ltd., (the publisher of a bi­
weekly newspaper called the Antigua Times, which had started 
up approximately one year previously) was compelled to
cease publication, as the company could not afford the
3
cash outlay required which (so it was estimated) would 
have taken 'about six months with a circulation of 350,000
4
newspapers' to recover. The company accordingly contested 
the constitutionality of the statute under the Antiguan 
Bill of Rights which guarantees 'the freedom... to receive 
and impart ideas and information without interference', 
subject to laws 'reasonably required' to protect certain
The deposit had to be paid in cash; unless the Minister - 
in exercise of the discretion conferred on him by the Act 
(as described ia n 2 below)-waived this requirement, being 
satisfied with the security offered in lieu.
2
Attorney-General v Antigua Times,/(1973)20 W.I.R. 573 
W.I.A.S./, at 590, where the terms of the amending legislation 
are reproduced. The Act further provided that 'the Minister 
responsible for newspapers on being satisfied with the 
sufficiency <5f the security in the form of a Policy of 
Insurance or of a guarantee of a Bank may waive the require­
ment of the said deposit'. The West Indian Court of Appeals 
considered that this gave the Minister an unfettered and 
unregulated discretion in this regard, which the court held 
unconstitutional. The Privy Council, by contrast, thought 
that the Minister's discretion was limited and that he was 
governed in exercising it by the objective criterion of the 
sufficiency of the guarantee tendered. The constitutionality 
of an unfettered executive discretion (as considered in this 
and other authorities) is examined further at p378 below.
3 The £600 licence fee required under Act 8 of 1973 was, of 
course, also a contributing factor.Thus, Antigua Times Ltd 
testified that it was the prospect of having to find both 
sums which prompted its decision to close the paper.
4 Supra, at 591.
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1interests, such as the 'rights and reputations of others' .
The trial court found the statute unconstitutional; and so too 
did the West Indies. Court of Appeal. On further appeal to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council/ however/ the 
Board upheld the constitutionality of the legislation.
The conflicting decisions of the latter tribunals accordingly 
merit some examination.
2
The West Indies Court of Appeal based its judgment on
the premise that:
'Once it has been established that /a statute/ is prima 
facie a violation of s 10 of the Constitution (/which may be/ 
apparent on the face of th/e/ enactment itself), then the 
burden shifts to the /state/ (a) to show th&t th/e/ Act 
comes within the permissible limits imposed by s 10(2) of 
the Constitution and (b) to place before the court all 
relevant facts and materials to show that its enactment 
was reasonably required^' .
c
Applying this principle to Act 9/71 , the court was satisfied 
that it was prima facie unconstitutional as the financial 
burden it imposed 'not merely hindered but /had/ actually
Ibid/ at 577,where the terms of the guarantee of freedom 
of expression in Antigua, contained in s 10 of the Antigua 
Consititution Order 1967 (S.I.1967 No 225) are reproduced.
 ^ This is reported at /(1973) 20 W.I.R. 573 W.I.A.S../.
3
s 10(2) authorises substantially the same derogations from 
the guarantee of freedom of expression as are permitted 
under the Nigerian Constitution.
4
In terms of s 10(2),, the test to be satisfied is whether 
the law in issue is 'reasonably required' to protect a 
recognised interest. This is a stricter test than the one 
applicable in Nigeria, where the question is whether the 
law is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'# 
From the viewpoint of the value of the Antigua Times case 
as a precedent in Nigeria, it is clear that a statute which 
is found to satisfy the more rigorous test of the Antiguan 
Constitution is a fortiori more likely to pass the more 
c flexible test applicable in Nigeria.
Attorney-General v Antigua Times, supra, at 587, per Lewis,
6 C.J. (Ag.).
It is interesting to note that even the dissenting Peterkin, 
J.A. (Ag.), agreed on this point. See Attorney-General v 
Antigua Times, supra, at 607.
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rendered impossible the... enjoyment of /the/ right /to
freedom of expression/ in that it /had/ resulted... in
-|
the closure of /the/ newspaper' . The onus accordingly
shifted to the state to show that the legislation fell within
the permitted derogations and was 'reasonably required'
for the purposes so authorised. In this regard, Lewis, C.J.
(Ag.), opined that 'the satisfaction of /a/ judgment /for
libel/ is not essential to the protection of /the plaintiff's/
reputation, /but/ is merely incidental to the exercise of
the right of action, and /that/ it is the right of action
itself which gives the true protection to the injured
2
person's reputation' . Furthermore, as regards the discretion
vested in the Minister to waive the deposit requirement on
3
the provision of suitable security , the Act made no attempt
4
to specify the 'policy considerations' which should guide 
the Minister in exercising his discretion; and, accordingly, 
in so far as the Act conferred on him an unfettered and
5
unregulated discretion, it was also unconstitutional .
Finally, there was no evidence that the deposit requirement 
was 'reasonably required' to protect the rights and reputations 
of others, as it seemed that only three libel actions 
had been brought in Antigua in over a decade and there was 
no evidence that damages had not in fact been paid in any
g
one of these. Act 9/1971 was therefore unconstitutional.
See ibid, at 591.
Ibid, at 591. For comment on this view, see p372 below.
See p 366above, where the terms of the discretion given 
are described.
Attorney-General v Antigua Times, supra, at 592.
See ibid, at 593.
See ibid.
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The Attorney-General and Minister of Home Affairs appealed
against this decision to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, which adopted a radically different approach.
Far from accepting that the onus shifted to the state to
prove the constitutionality of laws prima facie in conflict
with the guaranteed rights, the Judicial Committee stressed
that 'the proper approach... is to presume/ until the
contrary appears or is shown/ that all Acts passed by the
2
Parliament of Antigua were reasonably required' .
Adopting this approach, the Board found that no evidence 
had been adduced to rebut the presumption that Act 9/1971
3
was 'reasonably required' . On the contrary, the Board 
disagreed with Lewis, C.J. (Ag.),'s view that it is 'the 
right of action /rather than the recovery of damages/ which
4
gives the true protection to the injured person's reputation' . 
The Judicial Committee emphasized that damages are designed 
to compensate for the injury suffered by the person libelled; 
and pointed out that he may be deterred from instituting 
proceedings unless 'there is a reasonable prospect of his 
obtaining the damages awarded to him and of payment of his
5
costs' . In addition, so their Lordships declared, 'the 
fact that the deposit will be used to satisfy a judgment for 
libel and that, if it is, it must be replenished by them,
i
See Attorney-General and another v Antigua Times Ltd.,
/1976/ A.C. 16 (P.C.)
 ^ ]^ bid, at 32.
3
See Attorney-General v Antigua Times, supra, at 33. The 
Board also confirmed the constitutionality of Act 8/1971- 
imposing a licence requirement as well as an annual licence 
fee— on the ground that there was nothing to indicate that 
the law was not reasonably required in the interests of 
public safety, order, morality and health.
4 Ibid,
5 Ibid, at 34.
-370-
is an inducement to the publishers of a newspaper to take
care not to libel and to damage unjustifiably the reputation
of others '. Accordingly, (having further ruled that the
discretion conferred on the Minister by the Act was not
'unfettered and unregulated', but, rather, was 'limited to
2
determination of the sufficiency of the security offered1 ), 
the Board concluded that there was 'no valid reason... for 
holding that the presumption that th/e/ Act... was reason- 
ably required /had been/ rebutted1 .
If this opinion of the Judicial Committee is followed in 
Nigeria, the bond requirements imposed by the Newspapers 
Laws - which are less onerous in a number of respects than
4
the deposit requirement prescribed in Antigua - must 
clearly be regarded as constitutional, under the more 
flexible Nigerian test of whether a law is 'reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society' to promote a recognised 
interest. As previously stated, Privy Council decisions 
interpreting constitutional guarantees similar to those 
found in Nigeria are generally regarded as highly persuasive. 
Should the Nigerian bond requirements accordingly be accepted
T IbidT
i Ibid, at 33. This aspect of the judgment is considered
further at p 378 below, in relation to the constitutionality 
of the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1961.
 ^ Ibid, at 34.
4
Thus, the sum demanded under Nigerian law is considerably 
less (and, as previously noted at 340 above, has not been 
increased since 1903). In addition, the Nigerian provisions 
entitle the newspaper publisher, etc., to provide sureties 
instead of paying eash - whereas the Antiguan law demanded 
cash, unless the Minister, in the exercise of his discretion 
accepted a guarantee instead.
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as constitutional, notwithstanding the "prior restraint" 
they impose upon newspaper publication? It is submitted 
that they should not: for the opinion of the Board in the 
Antigua Times case is open to considerable criticism, and 
therefore should not be followed in Nigeria.
First and foremost - though this is a criticism of general 
import, not confined to the specific issue of the validity 
of deposit requirements - it is submitted that the Judicial 
Committee erred in its application of the doctrine of 
constitutionality. The approach applied by their Lordships 
places an extremely heavy burden of proof on the person 
challenging the validity of legislation, for not only must 
the challenger prove a negative (that the law is not 
'reasonably required') - a burden which is always more 
difficult in practice to discharge than the proof of some­
thing positive - but he must also overcome the difficulty 
that evidence as to the underlying need for legislation is 
inevitably more readily accessible to the state than to the 
ordinary citizen. Moreover, the presumption of constitut­
ionality threatens the general principle that exceptions 
to a rule should be narrowly construed; and seems to ignore 
the crucial point that constitutional guarantees of fund­
amental rights are designed to protect minorities against 
injury by majorities who would otherwise (under the West-
i
minster system of government ) always be able to impose 
their will upon the former. Hence in the sensitive area 
of guaranteed rights, the presumption of constitutionality
1
Under the Westminster system, the general rule (with the 
exception of entrenched provisions) is that legislation 
is passed by simple majority.
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(rightly applicable to other legislation) should not be 
allowed to prevail1.
Moreover, criticisms specifically directed to the 'deposit1
question include the following. First, the Board appears
to have accorded scant regard to the practical outcome of
their decision (which was to limit newspaper publication to
those - unlike Antigua Times Ltd - who could afford to pay
2
the substantial sums required ); and seems entirely to have 
ignored the important local insights of the lower courts - 
both of which had agreed that the statutes contravened the 
guarantee of freedom of expression.
Secondly, the Board ignored the point stressed by the West
Indies Court of Appeal that very few libel actions against
newspapers had been brought in the past and that there
was no evidence that damages had not been paid in any of 
3
these . Furthermore, whilst there is some force in their 
Lordships' view that a right of action for defamation is 
not sufficient to secure redress and that compensation and 
recovery of costs are also required, the Judicial Committee
It thus needs little emphasis that the approach adopted 
by the West Indies Court of Appeal to the doctrine of 
constitutionality - as described at p 367 above - is far 
to be preferred. This approach, contrary to the view of 
one commentator on the case, does not concentrate exclusively 
on subsection (1) of the guarantee, but gives due weight to 
both the substantive right and the permitted derogations: 
casting the onus first on the challenger to show prima 
facie violation of the right; and then on the state to 
show that the derogation is nevertheless authorised by the 
constitution and is reasonably required. Thus, the criti­
cism of Margaret DeMerieux, 'The Delineation of the Right 
to Freedom of Expression', /1980J Public Law, pp 359 - 366, 
especially at p 364, is misconceived.
2
The point has possibly less force in Nigeria where the sum 
demanded is N-500 (about a quarter of that required in Antigua) . 
However, to a "fringe" newspaper or magazine commencing pub­
lication, the sum required may be a substantial financial 
burden.
3
See p 36S above.
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ignored the fact that the risk of a judgment obtained 
remaining unsatisfied is one which faces all litigants - 
and that there is no reason to give preferential treatment 
to the plaintiff in defamation proceedings against a news­
paper.
Thirdly, the Privy Council seems to have been fully alive 
to the impetus to self-censorship inevitably engendered 
by the obligation to maintain a "damages for defamation" 
fund at the prescribed level - but seems (most disturbingly
i
to have welcomed this consequence. In this regard, it is
salutary to note the fears expressed by the International
Press Institute that 'the danger of such provisions is that
'the printer or publisher, for fear of forfeiting his deposit,
may be led to interfere in editorial matters and seek to
prevent the editor from printing matter which he considers
2
perfectly legitimate" . The result of this, in the words 
of the International Press Institute, is that 'the printer
3
or publisher assumes the role of unofficial censor' . In 
such circumstances, freedom of expression must inevitably 
suffer: a reality which the Privy Council seems entirely 
to have overlooked.
Finally, the opinion of the Judicial Committee takes no 
account of a fundamental objection of principle to deposit
4
requirements of this nature. As emphasised by Dicey , it 
is a cardinal rule of common law that 'no man is punishable
1
? See p 369 above.
(1955) I.P.I. Survey, No. IV, pp 27-28, cited by Holland,
•3 2 £  cit• P 195.
4 Ibid.
Dicey, o£ £it.
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except for a distinct breach of the law' ; and deposit
requirements of the kind here in issue 'are inconsistent with
the pervading principle of English law, that men are to
be interfered with or punished, not because they may or
will break the law, but only when they have committed some
2
definite assignable legal offence* * It is most disturbing 
that their Lordships should entirely have failed to consider 
this aspect of the legislation.
It is thus submitted that these criticisms of the Judicial 
Committee's opinion are sufficiently strong and cogent to 
take from it the persuasive authority normally accorded in 
Nigeria to Privy Council rulings on such questions. Accord­
ingly, should the validity of the bond requirements be cha­
llenged in future, the Nigerian courts should decline to 
follow this Privy Council authority. Furthermore, it 
should be recognised that the bond requirements are intrin- 
sical unacceptable - for all the reasons described above: 
the fact that they limit newspaper production to those who 
are able to pay (or provide sureties for) the sums required; 
the unwarranted advantage (at the expense of freedom of 
expression) which they confer on the plaintiff in defamat­
ion proceedings against a newspaper; the impetus to self- 
censorship which they generate; and the penalty in advance
Dicey, ibid, p 248. 
Dicey, ibid, p 249.
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i
of proven guilt which they prescribe. Accordingly/ it is 
submitted that the bond requirements under Nigerian law 
are not 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' 
to protect 'the rights and freedoms of others': and that 
the legislation in question is pro tanto unconstitutional.
4.13.2 Licensing and Executive Control over Wireless Telegraphy
The constitutionality of licensing and executive control
over wireless telegraphy must now be examined. It may be 
2
recalled that the acquisition of a licence from the 
Minister is a condition precedent to the use of any apparatus 
for wireless telegraphy and that the Minister in general 
has absolute discretion both as to the grant of such a 
licence and as to the conditions governing its exercise.
It is only in relation to broadcasting by state governments 
that the Minister's discretion is curtailed by the provision
3
(described above ) listing three factors only which he may 
take into account in granting or revoking a licence to a
4
state government/ or in prescribing conditions for its exercise.
The obligation to obtain a Ministerial licence to broadcast 
is clearly a "prior restraint" against publication/ and - 
as such - is prima facie in violation of the right guaranteed 
by s 36(1) of the 1979 Constitution to 'impart ideas and 
information without interference'. The question
7 -
All these points are/ of course/ more fully elaborated at p
308, et seq.. As regards the latter objection/ it is submitted 
that even the compromise suggested in Indian law (the Press 
(Objectionable Matter) Act 1951/ cited by Holland/ oja^city 
p 196)— that 'security should only be demanded on proof that 
objectionable /"including libellousy matter has been printed 
by the newspaper'-does not provide an acceptable solution.
The effect of such a provision is still to penalise a news­
paper for further libellous publication of which it has 
not - and may never - be guilty.
\ See p 322 above.
3 See p 325 above.
4 Ibid.
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accordingly arises whether this derogation from the guaranteed
right is Reasonably justifiable in a democratic society
... for the purpose of... regulating... wireless broadcasting
/andJ television', within the meaning of s 36(3). It
is submitted that the answer must be in the affirmative,
as indicated by the United States' authorities previously 
2
considered. The frequencies suitable for radio and tele­
vision broadcasting are finite; and regulation in the form 
of prior licensing is essential to prevent chaotic over-
3
crowding of the airwaves.
It remains, however, to examine the constitutionality of 
the unfettered discretion vested in the Minister (in relat­
ion to private - ie., non-state - broadcasting stations) 
and which must inevitably give the executive wide-ranging 
control over such services. It may be contended that this 
is a point of academic interest only, given the fact that 
private broadcasting services in Nigeria are, at present, 
non-existent: all such stations being owned and operated 
by government, at either state or federal level. However, 
the 1979 Constitution recognises the possibility that a 
non-state entity may operate a broadcasting station (by
4
prior authorisation of the President ); and it is accordingly
See s 36(3) (a), Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1979.
2 _  ^
 ^ See p 353, et seq.
Different considerations, of course, apply to cable broad­
casting; and it is strongly arguable that the prior licensing 
of wired distribution services is not 'reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society' and is, accordingly, unconstitutional. 
Cable broadcasting is likely to assume increasing importance 
in future years, and may ultimately necessitate a fundamental 
. re-ordering of broadcasting law.
See s 36(3), 1979 Constitution, supra.
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appropriate to consider the legal constraints under which 
such a private broadcasting station would be compelled 
to operate.
In the context of private broadcasting, the Minister's
discretion - as previously emphasised - is absolute. This
unfettered discretion (and the power of executive control
it implies) prima facie infringes the freedom to 'impart
ideas and information without interference'; and it must
therefore be questioned whether it is 'reasonably justifiable
in a democratic society... for the purpose of... regulating
-)
... wireless broadcasting /andJ television' ,
In this regard it is salutary to recall the substantially
different approach to broadcasting services adopted in the
United States of America. There, as previously explained,
broadcasting licences are granted for fixed three-year
periods by the Federal Communications Commission on the
basis of criteria which are clearly stated in the Commun-
2
ications Act of 1934 and which have been amplified by 
policy statements and guidelines issued by the Commission 
itself. Where there is competition for a licence, the
3
Commission conducts Comparative Hearings ; and an aggrieved 
applicant who alleges that the Commission has failed to 
comply with the appropriate criteria may apply to the courts
4
for redress . The important factor is that the guiding
 ^ See s 36(3)(a), ibid.
2
See Nelson & Teeter, 0£ cit, p 450.
3
See Nelson S Teeter, ibid, p 451.
4
See, for example, the Trinity Methodist Church, South 
case, previously discussed at p 355 above.
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principles are prescribed and known (and do not depend on 
executive whim); and that the framework, at least, is 
thus clear - even though broadcasting services may not 
always, in practice, meet the standards laid down. More­
over, the two fundamental criteria governing the grant and 
renewal of licences - the 'best practicable service to the 
public' and the 'maximum diffusion of control of the media 
of mass communications' - are of cardinal importance and 
are designed to promote freedom of the media to the utmost.
Furthermore, it is important to note that considerable
doubt has been expressed as to the constitutionality of
an unfettered and unregulated discretion, such as has been
vested in the Minister under the Nigerian Wireless Telegraphy
Act of 19 61. It may be recalled that the West Indies Court
of Appeal, in Attorney-General and another v Antigua Times 
2Ltd., held that the statute imposing the deposit require­
ment was unconstitutional for the further reason that it 
failed to specify 'what policy considerations'3 the Minister 
should follow in exercising his discretion to accept 
security in lieu of cash. Lewis, C.J. (Ag.), relying upon
4
Indian authority as well as an inference from the decision
See Nelson & Teeter, supra.
2 /(1973) , 20 W.I.R. 573, W.I.A.S./.
3 Ibid, at 592.
4
Particularly, Dwarka Prasad v State of U.P. and others 
as reported in Basu's Cases on the Constitution of India, 
(1952-1954), in which it was held that '/a/ lawT.. which 
confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the executive 
... cannot but be held to be unreasonable'. See judgment 
ibid.
(The full citation of this case is 1954 S.C.R. 803).
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i
of the Privy Council in Francis v Chief of Police, emphasised 
the need for some objective criteria in this regard, and 
declared:
'even though it may be assumed that the Minister may 
not abuse his discretion yet where, as in this case, the 
object of the legislation is prima facie violative of a 
fundamental right, and in addition the Minister is without 
guidance, the possibility of an erroneous exercise of his 
discretion is greatly increased and in such circumstances 
I would hold that in so far as there is an absence of guide­
lines in the Act this fact renders it unconstitutional'2.
It is submitted that this dictum is applicable with equal
force to the Nigerian executive discretion under consideration.
It must, of course, be acknowledged that the Privy Council 
disagreed with the West Indies Court of Appeal on this issue. 
The Privy Council found, on the facts, that the discretion 
given to the Minister was not unfettered, since (in the 
view of the Board) the Minister was constrained by the 
legislation to have regard only to the sufficiency of the 
security tendered and could not reject an offer of security
3
which - objectively - was sufficiently high. However, it 
is clear that the Board's ruling fchat the statute was not 
unconstitutional by virtue of the discretion given the 
Ministei), turned entirely on the particular terms of the 
Act in issue. The decision therefore leaves open the question
/1973/ A.C.761 (P.C.) Here the Privy Council held that
the Chief of Police's discretion as to whether to grant 
permission for the use of a noisy instrument during a 
public meeting, was not unregulated - although no specific 
criteria were provided by the statute - but had to be 
exercised in the light of the underlying purpose of the 
legislation (which was to preserve public order). Lewis, 
C.J.(Ag.), considered that the inference from this ruling 
of the Board was that - in the absence of such implied 
regulation of his discretion - the power accorded to the
2 Chief of Police may indeed have been unconstitutional. 
Attorney-General v Antigua Times Ltd# supra, at 593.
3 Attorney-General v Antigua Times, Ltd., /1976y A.C.16(P.C) 
at 33.
-380-
whether legislation which is not susceptible to interpret-
1
ation in this way should indeed be considered unconstitut­
ional; as the lower court believed.
In principle, there is undoubtedly considerable force in 
the contention that the arbitrary power implicit in an unfet­
tered and absolute executive discretion goes beyond what 
is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'. More­
over, strong support for the contention is to be found in 
the United States of America, where legislation which is 
inherently vague or inordinately wide-ranging in ambit
(measured against the purposes it is designed to achieve)
2
is clearly regarded as unconstitutional.
It is also salutary to note the practical consequences of 
the restrictions placed on the Minister's discretionary 
powers in relation to state broadcasting services. As 
previously explained, the Minister's discretion in granting, 
revoking, or imposing conditions upon, a broadcasting 
licence to a state government is severely circumscribed.^
The various state broadcasting services are accordingly 
free from control by the Federal Ministry: and the result 
is a diversity of information and opinion which, although
1
Thus, the statute may be so wide in its terms, and its 
purpose so general, that no equivalent limitation on the 
exercise of discretionary power can be implied. It is 
submitted, as further explained below, that the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act 1961 in Nigeria is precisely such a statute.
2
See Dorsen, Bender & Neuborne, eds., Political and Civil 
Rights in the United States, 4th ed., 1976, pp 54-55. The 
cases there cited in illustration of the 'void for vagueness* 
and 'overbreadth' doctrines are not on all fours with the 
type of executive discretion here in issue: but the under­
lying principle is equally applicable.
3 See p 325 above.
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largely structured around the doctrines of the differing 
political parties supported by the various state governments, 
nevertheless gives a healthy impetus to freedom of expression 
throughout the Federation. If the state broadcasting 
services were subjected to the same unfettered discretion 
of the Minister as applies to private broadcasters, it is 
difficult to feel confident that this diversity would 
continue. Instead, the state governments which do not 
support the ruling political party might find themselves 
constrained«-in order to retain their licences - to limit 
broadcasts criticising the central government or advocating 
different policies.
In summary, it is accordingly submitted that the unfettered 
discretion presently conferred upon the Minister is not 
'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'; and that 
the statute should be amended to introduce criteria and 
guidelines similar to those applicable in the United States 
of America: which are aimed at securing high standards of 
production, adequate coverage of matters of contemporary 
significance, and balanced and impartial treatment of every 
issue.
It will be recalled that there are 19 states in Nigeria 
and five recognised political parties; and that by no 
means all the state governments support the ruling party. 
Thus, for example, Borno and Gongola States support the 
Great Nigeria People's Party; Plateau, Anambra and Imo 
States support the Nigerian People's Party, and the 
western states the United Party of Nigeria: see The
Economist, 23 January, 1982. The result, as noted by 
The Times (of London), in a Special Supplement on Nigeria 
of 3 February 1982, is that '/syeveral state governments^ 
mainly those opposed to the present Government, are now 
also establishing their own T.V. stations'.
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4.13.3. The Constitutionality of Executive Control over the 
Federal Radio Corporation
It will be recalled that the Federal Radio Corporation of 
Nigeria, established by the Act of 1979, is composed entirely 
of government-appointees and is also made subject to Minist­
erial directions which it is the duty of the Corporation 
to obey . These controls must inevitably influence the 
content of broadcast programmes and accordingly cut, prima 
facie, across the constitutional guarantee of the right 
'to impart ideas and information without interference'.
This raises the question whether the controls are 'reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society' for the purpose of 
regulating wireless broadcasting: for - if not - they are 
clearly unconstitutional.
The question is not altogether easy to answer. It may be
recalled that the B.B.C. is subject to precisely the same
'water-tight' controls, being composed of members appointed
by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister; and being
subject to the directions of the Home Secretary, who has
2
power to cancel its licence for failure to comply . Yet 
the B.B.C. is widely (and justifiably) praised for its high 
standards of objectivity and balance. It should also be 
remembered, however, that the general public has little 
means of ascertaining the extent to which control is applied 
in practice (whether through self-censorship or through 
direct Ministerial intervention). In this regard, it is
1
See p 326 above.
2
See p 302 above.
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noteworthy that the B.B.C. has recently refused to televise 
The War Game,a documentary film on the destruction which 
would be wreaked by nuclear war. It is certainly possible 
that this particular incident represents no more than the 
"tip of the iceberg" and that restriction is considerably 
wider-reaching than is popularly supposed.
In Nigeria itself, the way in which fraudulent election 
results were broadcast at the behest of the executive in
2
the 1965 elections in the West has previously been described . 
Such instances are no doubt extreme examples, which should 
be seen in the light of the particular circumstances prevail­
ing at the time. Nevertheless, they show the danger which 
exists: and illustrate the fact that - so long as the law 
confers such executive control-it is naive to assume that 
it will not be exercised.
Finally, it is again salutary to recall the approach taken 
to the control of broadcasting services in the United States
3
of America. Here, the emphasis is placed on ensuring as 
wide a diversity of control as possible, in recognition 
of the undoubted reality that this is crucial to freedom 
of expression. The principle requiring 'maximum diffusion
4
of control of the media', coupled with the 'equal time rule*
5
and the 'fairness doctrine' in its various aspects - establish
1
See the unfortunately somewhat cursory allusion to this 
incident in Street, 0£ cit, p 104.
2
See p 346 above.
 ^ See p 353, et seq.
 ^ See p 357 above.
5
See p357, et seq.
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a framework which is fundamentally sound. Abuses may occur 
or shortcomings be exposed , but the important factor is 
that the legal principles in issue inhibit rather than 
facilitate this. The situation, accordingly, is very differ­
ent from that which obtains when the executive is given 
arbitrary powers of control.
It is accordingly submitted that those features of the 
Federal Radio Corporation Act of Nigeria which subject the 
Corporation to direct control by the executive (through 
Ministerial direction and government-appointment of its 
members) are not 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society1; and that the legislation should be amended accord­
ingly. Appointments to the Corporation should be made by 
an autonomous professional body (except, of course, as 
regards those members appointed ex officio, such as the
2
Ministers of Communications and of Education and Development ). 
The number of 'official' members should not, however, exceed 
the 'unofficials'. In addition the power of Ministerial 
direction should be abolished. If these changes were 
effected, the Corporation would then be free to uphold the 
important obligations placed on it under the Act to provide
1
See, for example, the 'grandfathering' by the FCC of existing 
cross-ownerships of radio and broadcasting stations 
described by Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 464. This special 
treatment was held invalid by the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals in National Citizens Committee for 
Broadcasting v FCC, 555 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1977) as the FCC 
had given insufficient reasons for according these stations 
a status different from the norm. For further details, see 
Nelson & Teeter, ibid, pp 464-468.
2
The list of ex officio members here suggested is not intended 
to be exhaustive, but simply to provide some indication of 
the government-appointees who should be included: always 
subject to the proviso that they do not, by their numbers, 
control the Corporation.
-385-
broadcasting services of high quality/ characterised by 
balance and due impartiality . Furthermore/ to facilitate 
the diffusion of control of broadcasting services/ the pro­
vision in the Act giving the Corporation exclusive respons­
ibility for radio broadcasting throughout the Federation
2
should be repealed; and so too should the section limiting
state radio stations to broadcasting within their own
boundaries/ thus giving the listener in Lagos (for example)
the opportunity/ if so desired, to tune in, once again, to 
3
Radio Kaduna
4.13.4 The Constitutionality of Executive Control over the 
Nigerian Television Authority
Executive control over the Nigerian Television Authority 
takes, as previously explained, substantially the same form 
as that pertaining to the Federal Radio Corporation - with, 
however, the addition that the dissemination of news is 
under the control of the Director of News, who, in turn, 
is responsible to the government-appointed Director-General. 
This executive control prima facie violates the freedom to 
'impart ideas and information without interference' guaranteed 
by s 36(1) of the Constitution of 1979. It remains to 
consider whether it is nevertheless 'reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society' for the purpose of regulating 
television broadcasting.
See p 329 above.
2
See p 332 above.
3 Ibid.
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The issues raised by this question are substantially the 
same as those previously considered in relation to the
i
Federal Radio Corporation. Accordingly, it is not proposed 
to reiterate them here. Suffice it to state that the 
same policy considerations apply mutatis mutandis to tele­
vision broadcasts, and that freedom of expression requires 
as wide a diffusion of control as possible. If follows 
that the provisions giving the executive control over the 
Authority are not 'reasonably justifiable' and should be 
amended in the manner suggested for the Radio Corporation.
In addition, the power of control over news should be 
repealed.
Moreover, the provision giving the Authority exclusive 
responsibility for television broadcasting throughout the 
Federation inhibits diffusion of control; and it, too, should 
be regarded as 'unconstitutional'.
4.14. Amendment of s 36 of the Constitution to Facilitate 
Private Media Ownership
It will be recalled that s 36(2) of the 1979 Constitution
declares the right of every person to 'own, establish and
operate any medium for the dissemination of information,
2
ideas and opinions', but subjects this to the proviso 
that 'no person other than the Government, of the Federation 
or of a State or any other person or body authorised by the 
President, shall own, establish or operate a television or
1
See p 382 above.
2
s 36(2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
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wireless broadcasting station for any purpose whatsoever' .
2
As previously noted, no indication is given in the section 
as to the criteria to be taken into account by the President 
in granting the requisite authority. By contrast with the 
position pertaining in the United States of America, where#
3
as described above , the grant of a licence by the Federal 
Communications Commission is governed by clearly stated 
principles, this provision in the Nigerian Constitution 
gives the President an absolute discretion. Accordingly 
as noted in the Daily Times, in the course of the "great
4
debate" on the guarantee of freedom of expression , it 
is most unlikely that permission will be granted 'to persons 
hostile to the ruling class, no matter how popular or
5
honourable the course to be pursued by the applicant/grantee' . 
The proviso to s 36(2) cannot, of course, be challenged on 
the grounds of 'unconstitutionality'; but it is submitted 
that it is inimical to freedom of expression, and that it 
should be amended by the introduction of clearly stated 
conditions for the grant or refusal of such Presidential 
authority.
Ibid.
2
See p 338 above.
3
See p 356 above.
4
See the section on the Guarantee of Freedom of Expression, 
at p 204 above.
5
Daily Times, January 22, 1977.
It is noteworthy that the Nigerian Press Organisation (in 
the debate preceding the adoption of the present Constitu­
tion) , stressed the need for this provision to be altered 
so as to limit the President's discretionary powers to 
the allocation of frequencies alone. In this way, the 
Organisation hoped that the right to private ownership 
of the broadcast media would be made more explicit. See 
Ofonagoro, W.I., et al. (eds.), The Great Debates Nigerian 
Viewpoints on the Draft Constitution. 19 76/77# Lagos, 19 77,p
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To recap thus, in brief, it is submitted that the present 
rules regarding the licensing and regulation of the media 
go beyond what is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society' in a number of key respects. Thus, at minimum, 
the bond requirements imposed upon newspaper publication 
should be amended, as should the unfettered discretion 
conferred upon the executive in relation to the licensing 
of broadcasting and the exercise by the Federal Radio Corp­
oration of Nigeria and the Nigeria Television Authority of 
their important functions. Criteria for the grant of 
Presidential authority for the establishment of broadcasting 
stations should also be specified: for only if these changes 
are made will the law be in keeping with the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of expression - and the media in Nigeria 
be freed from the shackles of the "prior restraint" to which 
it is presently made subject.
MEDIA FREEDOM IN AN AFRICAN STATE 
NIGERIAN LAW IN ITS HISTORICAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of London 
by
ANTHEA JEAN JEFFERY
Volume Two
19 83
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LAW OF SEDITION
5*1. The Significance of the Law of Sedition for Media 
Freedom
The significance of the law of sedition for media freedom 
lies principally in the fact that it constitutes a restrict­
ion on the power to criticise government. Accordingly; 
it touches on fundamental questions regarding the relation­
ship between ruler and ruled, which are summarized in the 
following memorable passage from Stephen's History of the 
Criminal Law of England;
'Two different views may be taken of the relation 
between rulers and their subjects. If the ruler is regarded 
as the superior of the subject, as being by the nature of 
his position presumably wise and good, the rightful ruler 
and guide of the whole population, it must necessarily 
follow that it is wrong to censure him openly; that even 
if he is mistaken his mistakes should be pointed out with 
the utmost respect, and that whether mistaken or not no 
censure should be cast upon him likely or designed to 
diminish his authority.
'If on the other hand the ruler is regarded as the agent 
and servant, and the subject as the wise and good master 
who is obliged to delegate his power to the so-called ruler 
because being a multitude he cannot use it himself, it is 
obvious that this sentiment must be reversed. Every member 
of the public who censures the ruler for the time being 
exercises in his own person the right which belongs to the 
whole of which he forms a part.
'He is finding fault with his servant. If others think 
differently they can take the other side of the dispute, 
and the utmost that can happen is that the servant will 
be dismissed and another put in his place, or perhaps that 
the arrangements of the household will be modified'^.
Sir James Fitsjames Stephen, History of the Criminal Law 
of England, London, 1883, 11, p 299.
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Since the time (1883) when Stephens wrote# it is the latter 
concept which has won general acceptance - in theory# at 
least, if not always in practice - and government is gener­
ally regarded as being intended to serve and to promote 
the well-being of its people. However# if this purpose 
is to be achieved# it is important that the population 
retain the right to criticise and to censure all aspects 
of government# to point out inconsistent or mistaken 
policies, to draw attention to abuse of power; and generally 
to preclude the executive from obtaining the 'free hand' 
that may encourage it to 'commit all the natural follies 
of dictatorship'.
The difficulty however# lies in knowing where to draw the 
line between criticism that is constructive and that which 
is aimed at riot or insurrection# or at the violent over­
throw of the state# with all the bloodshed and anarchy 
these would entail. The law of sedition attempts to draw 
this line by providing# in essence# that it constitutes
a criminal offence to 'bring /government/ into hatred and
2
contempt# or /to/ excit/e/ disaffection against it'. In 
the United Kingdom# an essential element of the offence is 
the intention to excite to violence but, in Nigeria# (as 
in other former British dependencies) it seems that this
4
is not required# as further explained in due course.
 ^ See H Laski# A Grammar of Politics# 4th ed.# 1955, p 126; 
and see also p 299 above.
2
See Denys C. Holland# 'Freedom of the Press in the Common­
wealth'. (1956) 9 Current Legal Problems# pp 184-207 at 
p 203. The definition of sedition is discussed further below.
3
See ibid# and the discussion of the U.K. law of sedition 
below.
4 See p4i3below: and see Holland# supra# pp 203-204.
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From this brief outline alone/ it is readily apparent that 
the law is extremely broad in its sweep. Thus, as pointed 
out by Dicey (in relation to the more stringently constit-
i
uted English law) , ' the legal definition of /sedition7
might easily be so used as to check a great deal of what
is ordinarily considered allowable discussion/ and would
if rigidly enforced be inconsistent with prevailing forms
2of political agitation.'.
From the philosophical viewpoint/ the principal significance 
of the law of sedition for media freedom is thus two-fold. 
First/ the law acts as a check on criticism of government 
which may be vital to the correction of abuses and the 
maintenance of democracy. Secondly, it is so broadly 
framed as to encompass even minor criticisms; and its 
criminal sanctions thu^ inevitably, provide considerable 
impetus to self-censorship by the media.
Moreover, on a practical level, the significance of the 
law of sedition for freedom of the media lies in the extent 
to which it has, in past experience, been used by govern­
ments to stifle criticism and dissent. Thus, Mackintosh 
(for example) describes the sedition laws, as interpreted
3
by the Nigerian courts , as having created 'a widespread 
feeling that any trenchant attacks on an established govern-
4
ment might be held to be sedition' . The laws are also 
7
This, of course, is by virtue of the rule that the accused 
must have intended to excite to violence. This requirement 
P is not part of Nigerian law, at present.
A.V.Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. London,
3 1959, p 244.
See the discussion below, especially that relating to the
4 Chike Obi decision, described at p408, et seq.
J.P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 
1966, p 47.
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considered to have been one of the factors which 'led law­
makers and politicians to become "more adventurous in their 
violations of any remnants of... freedom of expression
i
through the printed word"' ; and have been summed up by
Nigerian journalists as 'very pliable and convenient instr-
2
uments for the suppression of unacceptable views' .
5.2. The Law of Sedition in the United Kingdom
The law of sedition in the United Kingdom provides a useful 
comparative framework for examination-of the Nigerian law.
In England, sedition is a common law offence, which is 
defined in Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, - in terms 
which are substantially reflected in the Nigerian provisions 
- as follows:
'A seditious intention is an intention to bring into 
hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against the 
person of Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, or the 
Government and Constitution of the United Kingdom by law 
established, or either House of Parliament, or the admin­
istration of justice, or to excite Her Majesty's subjects 
to attempt otherwise than by lawful means, the alteration 
of any matter in Church or State by law established..., or 
to raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty's 
subjects, or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility 
between different classes of such s u b j e c t s ' 3 a
However, the Article in Stephen's Digest then further
provides:
'An intention to show that Her Majesty has been misled 
or mistaken in her measures, or to point out errors and 
defects in the government or constitution as by law establ­
ished, with a view to their reformation, or to excite Her 
Majesty's subjects to attempt by lawful means the alteration 
of any matter in Church or State by law established, or to 
point out, in order to /‘effect/ their removal, matters which 
are producing or have a tendency to produce, feelings of 
hatred and ill-will between classes of Her Majesty's subjects 
is not a "seditious intention".^
7 *“
/Nigerian/ Sunday Times, Editorial, 18 December, 1977.
Ibid.
3 Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, 9th ed., 1959, p 92,
4 ibid.
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However, although no express reference to this is included
in Stephen1 s ddiirition, it is clear that, in England,
'sedition involves a further element, namely the intention
to excite violence' This is not altogether easy to square
with the dictum of Coleridge, J., (in directing the jury;
2
in R v ifldred) , warning that if a man 'makes use of language 
calculated to advocate or to incite others to public disorders, 
to wit, rebellions, insurrections, assassinations, outrages, 
or any physical force or violence of any kind, then what­
ever his motives, whatever his intentions, there would be 
evidence on which a jury... ought to decide that he is
3
guilty of a seditious publication' .
Notwithstanding this dictum, emphasis on the element of 
incitement to violence is clearly evident in the earlier
4
case of R v Burns, where the accused was charged with
sedition for having told a large meeting of London unemployed,
5
'Unless we get bread, they must have lead* . Despite this - 
and the actual occurrence of violence after his speeches - 
he was found not guilty of sedition because the requisite 
intention to excite violence was not established. Similarly,
g
in R v Caunt, the accused was acquitted of sedition even 
though the article he had written was strongly critical
T *" ~ “ "* " “ “
Holland, 0£ cit, p 85.
2 (1909) 22 Cox C.C.1., reproduced by Robin Callender Smith, 
Press Law, London, 19 78, p 86.
Ibid. This seems clearly to indicate that the test for 
sedition is objective: and that subjective intent to incite 
violence is not required. However, the balance of authority 
clearly favours the view that mens rea in such form is 
indeed required.
4 (1886) 16 Cox C.C. 355.
g Ibid.
The Times, 18 November, 1947.
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of British Jewry and ended with the words: 'Violence may 
be the only way to bring them to the sense of their respon- 
sibility to the country in which they live' Again, the 
requisite element of intent to incite to violence was not 
shown.
These cases also illustrate another important safeguard 
which limits the operation - in practice - of the English 
law of sedition. This is the fact that all instances of 
alleged sedition are tried by jury: and this mode of trial 
is particularly important when comment or criticism of 
government or of highly charged issues is under review.
As Denning points out in Freedom under the Law, 'even when 
judges are independent they may not always see clearly on
a question of freedom of speech because of their own predil-
ictions on the matter in hand'. Hence, in Denning's view,
'/*t/his is where the value of a jury is most clearly seen'.
In Nigeria, however, trial by jury 'only takes place in 
Lagos and only on a charge of committing /or being involved 
iny an offence punishable with death'. It follows that 
this practical limitation on the scope of sedition is not
4
available in Nigeria .
Ibid. The acquittal is all the more noteworthy in the light 
of the fact that 'anti-Jewish feeling was high /"at the 
time/ because of atrocities committed against British troops 
in Palestine prior to the birth of the Israeli state': 
Callender Smith, supra, p 86.
2 Sir Alfred Denning, Freedom under the Law, London, 1949, p36.
3
T. Akinola Aguda, The Criminal Law and Procedure of the 
Southern States of Nigeria, 3rd ed., London, 1982, para.529.
4
Although trial by jury causes considerable problems in the 
context of sub judice publications in the law of contempt, 
as further described below, it seems that it would indeed 
fulfill a useful function in cases where freedom of expression 
is in issue. The assessment of the effect of language is 
fundamentally subjective: and it may not be best to leave it 
to the determination of a single (or limited number) of judges 
who inevitably represent only a narrow segment of opinion.
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5.3. The Sources of the Nigerian Law of Sedition*
The Nigerian law of sedition is to be found in the appropriate 
. . 1provisions of the Criminal and Penal Codes, as interpreted
by the courts. The Criminal Code is closely modelled on
the Queensland Code, which, in turn, was based upon a
draft Criminal Code prepared by Sir James Fitzstephen in
1878 to replace the common law in England with all its
complexities, but never in fact enacted by the British 
3
Parliament. It was first introduced in Northern Nigeria 
in 1904; and,following the amalgamation of North and South
4
m  1914 , it was extended to apply throughout the country
5
m  1916 . However, many of its provisions are fundamentally
fiat odds with the Moslem Maliki law of crime and hence 
were unacceptable to the predominantly Moslem communities 
of the North. In 19 58, a panel of jurists^, was appointed 
to examine the problem; and recommended the introduction 
of a Penal Code based upon the Sudanese Code (which 'had 
worked satisfactorily in a country in many ways similar to
These are further identified below.
The Queensland Criminal Code was enacted in 1899 and is 
largely the work of Sir Samuel Griffith, as explained in 
further detail in R.Y. Hedges, Introduction to the Criminal
Law of Nigeria, London 1962, p 4. The result is that
Australian cases interpreting the Criminal eode have highly 
persuasive authority in Nigeria.
See C.O. Okonkwo (ed,).t. Okonkwo. and Naish on Criminal Law 
in .Nigeria, 2nd ed., London, 19 80, p 5.
See the section on the History of Nigeria, at p 69 above.
See Okonkwo and Naish, supra.
For example, Maliki law does not recognise ttet provocation 
may reduce murder to manslaughter. For further illustrations 
see Okonkwo and Naish, ibid, p 6.
This was chaired by Sayyad Md. Abu Ranat, Chief Justice 
of the Sudan.
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1
the Northern Region' ) and which - in turn - was based
upon the Indian Penal Code, originally drafted by Lord
2 3Macauley . The resulting Penal Code came into force in
the former Northern Region on 1 October 1960 and, from that
date, the operation of the Criminal Code became confined
to the sourthern areas of the country. Today, the Penal
Code applies to all offences committed in the northern
4 5states and the Criminal Code to all which take place in
Alan Gledhill, The Penal Codes of Northern Nigeria and the 
Sudan, London and Lagos, 1963, p 18. The author provides 
a comprehensive account of the adoption of the Indian 
Penal Code, and the manner in which a modified version of 
this became applicable in Northern Nigeria, at pp 15-19.
The result of the Indian 'parentage' of the Penal Code is 
that Indian decisions interpreting its provisions are highly 
persuasive in Nigeria; and reference will accordingly be 
made to these from time to time.
The role played by Lord Macauley is described by Gledhill, 
ibid at pp 16-18.
The Penal Code is contained in the Schedules to the regional 
Penal Code L:aw 1959 and the Penal Code (Northern Region)
Federal Provisions Act 1960. The former deals with matters 
within the legislative competence of the then Northern 
Region, and is supplemented by the latter which relates 
to matters of federal competence, such as treason (and 
also sedition).
These are Kwara, Niger, Sokoto, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Borno, 
Plateau, Gongola and Benue.
'The Criminal Code forms the schedule to the Criminal 
Code Act and sets out the law of the nine Sourthern States 
of Nigeria in respect of the matters with which it deals'
See Aguda, 0£ cit, para. 980. Aguda further points out, 
in para. 990, that '/t/he Criminal Code Act... including 
the Criminal Code now has effect in the Lagos State as if 
the whole were an Act of Parliament, and in the four 
Eastern States, the Western and the Bendel States as if 
so much of it as is law made with respect to a matter 
included in the Exclusive Legislative List were an Act of 
Parliament. In the Western States the sole authentic 
edition of the remainder of the Act and Criminal Code is 
that contained in the Revised Edition of the Laws of the 
Western Region 1959 /which contains./ those portions of 
the former Ordinance and Criminal Code which the Law 
Reform Commission regarded as having effect as a State 
law, with a number of consequential amendments and with 
the sections of the Code numbered consecutively from 1 
to 449' (which indicates that a number of provisions have 
been omitted). Corresponding sections in the Western States' 
Code (Cap 28) will be expressly identified and discussed 
in this study only if significantly different, as will the 
provisions of the Criminal Codes of Lagos State (Cap 31, Lagos 
Laws, 19 73) and the Eastern States (Cap 30, Eastern Laws, 196 3)
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1
the south. Where different elements of a crime occur in
both north and south/ the Code applicable in the area in
which the initial act or ommission took place governs the
offence, 'as if all the subsequent elements had occurred
2
within the territory* . Thus, in principle, a newspaper 
printed and produced in Lagos and distributed in Kano is 
subject to the sedition provisions of the Criminal Code; 
whilst a newspaper produced in Kano is governed by those 
contained in the Penal Code (notwithstanding its subsequent 
distribution in southern areas of the country). Pn practice - 
as revealed by reported cases - the provisions of the Criminal 
Code have more often come before the courts for judicial 
interpretation.
The sedition rules in the Criminal and Penal Codes are 
substantially similar but differ in some respects; and both 
are accordingly summarised below in order to point to the 
contrasts.
The relevant sections of the Criminal Code are ss 50 to 
52. S 50 is a 'definition1 provision, and defines 'sedit-
3
ious publication1 and 'seditious intention1. The latter 
in turn, is defined as an intention to bring the President 
or a State into 'hatred or contempt'^, or 'to excite
The southern states in which the Criminal Code applies 
are Cross River, Imo, Anambra, Rivers, Bendel, Ondo, Oyo, 
Ogun and Lagos.
2
Okonkwo and Naish, op cit, p 11.
3
s 50(1) Criminal Code, Cap 42.
4
This means 'not merely the absence of affection and regard 
but disloyalty, enmity and hostility*. See Aguda, op cit, 
para 1175, citing P.P.P. v Obi, /1961/1. All N.L.R. 186, 
discussed in further detail at p411, et seq.
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1 2 disaffection1 against such persons or bodies • Alter­
natively, it means an intention 'to excite the citizens or 
other inhabitants of Nigeria to attempt to procure the
alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other
3
matter in Nigeria as by law established' ; or to 'raise 
discontent or disaffection amongst the citizens or other
4
inhabitants of Nigeria' ; or to 'promote feelings of ill-
5
will and hostility between different classes of the popula-
g
tion of Nigeria' . However, 'an act, speech or publication is 
not seditious by reason only that it intends... to show that 
the President or /a State/ Governor... has been misled or mis­
taken in any measure...; or... to point out errors or defects 
in the Government or constitution of Nigeria, or of any State 
... with a view to the remedying of such errors or defects; 
or... to persuade the citizens or other inhabitants of Nigeria 
to attempt to procure by lawful means the alteration of any 
matter... as by law establihsed; or... to point out, with a 
view to their removal, any matters which are producing or 
have a tendency to produce feelings of ill-will or enmity
7
between different classes of the population of Nigeria' .
'Disaffection' connotes enmity and hostility, estranged 
allegiance, disloyalty, hostility to constituted authority 
or to a particular form of political government': Aguda, 
ibid, citing D.P.P. v Obi, ibid.
2
s 50(2)(a), Criminal Code, supra.
3 s 50 (2) (b) , ibid.
4 s 50(2)(c), ibid.
Note that in Adjei and another v R, (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 253, 
a decision emanating from Ghana and interpreting the virtually 
identical provisions of the Criminal Code there applicable, 
it was held that 'the Syrian community of Ghana were suffi­
ciently well-defined as a class for an attack calculated 
to promote feelings of hostility against them to come with­
in /this subsection/': Aguda, supra, para 1176.
 ^ s 50(2)(d), Criminal Code, supra.
7
Proviso to s 50(2), ibid.
In determining whether the intention in issue is seditious/ 
'every person fisj deemed to intend the consequence which 
would naturally follow from his conduct at the time and under
i
the circumstances in which he so conducted himself' .
5 51 defines various offences relating to sedition/ and thus 
provides that '/a/ny person who ... does or attempts to do... 
any act with a seditious intention; /ory... utters any 
seditious words; foicj. . . prints, publishes, sells, offers
for sale, distributes or reproduces any seditious publication;
2 3forj who imports any seditious publication , . . . /isy
4
guilty of an offence' . The penalties prescribed are 
imprisonment for two years or fine of two hundred naira 
or both (on first conviction); and imprisonment for three
5
years for any subsequent offence. Seditious publications 
are forfeited to the State**. Furthermore, it is also an 
offence for '/*a/ny person... without lawful excuse /to have,/
7
in his possession any seditious publication' ; and the 
penalties applicable are one years' imprisonment or fine of
i
s 50(3), ibid. The practical consequence of this provision 
is considered further below in the course of the discussion 
of P.P.P. v Obi, Infra.
o
'Import' is defined in s 50(1) of the Criminal Code and in 
s 46 of the Western States Code but the definition is 
omitted in the Eastern States Code: See Aguda, op cit, pa.11
This will not, however, be an offence in terms of the sub­
section if the accused 'has no reason to believe that it 
is seditious': see s 51(d), Criminal Code, Cap 42, supra.
4
s 51 {%') , Criminal Code, ibid.
** Ibid.
6 Ibid .
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one hundred naira (or both) for a first offence/ and imprison-
ment for two years on subsequent offences . Again/ such
2
seditious publications are forfeited to the state .
S 52 is a procedural provision and stipulates that '/n/o 
prosecution for an offence under s 51 /may/ be begun /more 
than/ six months after /its commission/1 , that a prosecution 
for an offence under s 51 may not be instituted without 
the 'written consent of the Attorney General of the Federation
4
or of the State concerned/ ; and that no person may be 
convicted for the offence of uttering seditious words 'on 
the uncorroborated testimony of one witness' .
The relevant provisions of the Penal Code are ss 416 to 421,
(except for s 418 which prohibits the publication of false
&statements or rumours, as previously described ). Under 
s 416, any person who 'by words... signs... visible represent­
ation or otherwise excites or attempts to excite feelings
Tjr
of disaffection against Her Majesty, /the President/ a
State Governor/ or the Government or constitution of the
United Kingdom or of Nigeria or any state thereof or againfet
a
the administration of justice in Nigeria or any State...
* Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
3 s 52(1), ibid.
 ^ s 52(2), ibid.
3 s 52(3)/ ibid.
® See p 229 above.
7
In terms of Explanation 1/ 'disaffection' includes disloyalty 
and all feelings of enmity.
The Penal Code is significantly different from the Criminal 
Code in including this provision, but is similar to the 
definition in Stephen's Digest, at p 392 above.
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shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
i
extend to seven years or with fine or with both' . In 
'explanationi'to the section (similar to the proviso previously 
described) it is made clear that comments expressing dis­
approbation of the measures or administrative or other 
action of the Government... of the United Kingdom, the 
Federation or the Northern States with a view to obtaining 
their alteration by lawful means or without exciting or
attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do
2
not constitute an offence under the section.
S 417 further renders it an offence, punishable with impris­
onment for up to three years or by fine (likewise of unspec­
ified amount) or both, to 'seek to excite hatred or contempt 
against any class of persons in such a way as to endanger
3
the public peace' . The possession without lawful excuse 
(proof of which lies on the accused) of any books, pamphlets, 
papers, tape recordings, drawings, etc., the publication 
or exhibition of which is prohibited under the preceding 
provisions, is punishable by imprisonment for up to two
4
years or fine (of unspecified amount) or both. Furthermore,
5
the Minister 'with responsibility for such matters , may - 
if he is of the opinion that this is in the public interest - 
'prohibit the importation of any publication or of all 
publications published by or on behalf of any organisation
1
s 416, Penal Code (Northern Region) Federal Provisions, Act 
No. 25 of 1960.
2
s 416, Explanation 2, and Explanation 3, ibid.
3 s 417, ibid.
 ^ s 419, ibid.
3 s 420(1), ibid.
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i
or association specified in the order. The intentional 
importation, publication, sale, distribution, reproduction 
or possession of any publication the importation of which 
has been so prohibited, is punishable by imprisonment for
2
up to three years or fine (of unspecified amount) or both.
5.4. Interpretation of the Sedition Provisions in the 
Criminal and Penal Code
In interpreting the sedition provisions of the Criminal and 
Penal Codes, the first important point to note is that an 
'intent to excite to violence' is not pre-requisite to 
liability under either Code, by contrast with the position
3
in the United Kingdom. As regards the Criminal Code, the 
authority for this is to be found in the case of R v Wallace
4
Johnson, which was approved by the Supreme Court of Nigeria
5
in Director of Public Prosecutions v Obi , As regards the 
Penal Code, the matter has not been authoritatively deter­
mined by a local court, but Gledhill^ points out that the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has ruled against
7
the need for such intent in a case under the Indian Code
s 420, ibid. An order of the latter kind applies to all 
subsequent issues and continues in force irrespective of 
any change in name of the organisation or association 
concerned. The intention that it should have retrospective 
effect must be expressly stated, if this is desired by the 
Minister.
 ^ s 421, ibid.
3
See the discussion of English law at p 392 above.
4 /"1 940/ A.C.231 (P.C. ) .
 ^ /1961/ 1 All N.L.R. 186, discussed further below.
£
Gledhill, 0£ cit.
7
This was in Emp. v Sadashiv, A . I . R . / 1 9 4 7 /  P.C. 82.
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(on which the Nigerian Penal Code is, or course, ultimately
based ) and that 'this interpretation also has been accepted
2
by the Supreme Court of India' . The fons et origo of 
this interpretation may thus be said to be the Wallace 
Johnson decision; and the case accordingly merits careful 
consideration.
5.5. The Opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in Wallace-Johnson
Wallace Johnson (b.1895), a Sierra Leonean, became a political 
activist during the 1930s and 'organised an independence 
movement that represented a threat to the survival of colonial
3
rule in Sierra Leone' . He also founded the Nigerian Mine 
Workers Union, organised the West African Youth League and 
its official newspaper, the African Standard, and wrote 
regularly for the Gold Coast Spectacular and the Africa 
Morning Post. He is viewed as one of the heroes of the 
colonial period in West Africa, and, in 1978, a statue in 
his honour was erected in front of the city hall in Freetown. 
Yet, in 1936, Wallace Johnson was charged and convicted 
of sedition, under section 330 of the Criminal Code of the 
Gold Coast Colony (identical in all important respects with 
the Nigerian law against sedition). The charge arose out
1
See p 396 above.
2
Gledhill, supra, p 176, citing Romesh Thappar v State, /"19507 
S.C.J.418. Indian cases are, of course, highly persuasive 
in Northern Nigeria.
3
Barbara Harrell-Bond: 'Freedom of the Press in Nigeria: The
Debate '/i 9 78/No. 32 Africa, American Universities Field 
Staff Reports, p 3.
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of his publication, in a newspaper circulating in the Gold
Coast, of an article which stated, in essence, that 'various
laws being passed by the Gold Coast Legislative Council
were mere cloaks to hide the fact that Europeans were
enslaving Africans and stealing their money'1. The general
tenor of the article is illustrated by the following extract:
'In the Colonies Europeans believe in the God 
that commands "Ye adminstrators, make Sedition 
Bill to keep the Africans Gagged, Make Forced 
Labour Bill to send the Africans into exile 
whenever they question your authority"' .
No violence resulted from publication of the article, nor 
was there any evidence that the accused had intended to ex­
cite such violence. He was nevertheless convicted before 
the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast Colony - 'the opinion
3
of two Gold Coast assessors to the contrary being disregarded* . 
His appeal to the West African Court of Appeal against his con­
viction was dismissed - and so too was his further appeal to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The proceedings before the Privy Council are particularly sig­
nificant for their further impact on the law of sedition in 
other British dependencies. It was argued on Wallace 
Johnson's behalf, before the Judicial Committee, that section 
330 of the Gold Coast Criminal Code was intended to reflect 
the English common law of sedition (as evidenced by its 
similarity to the definition contained in Stephen's Digest) 
and that, accordingly, it was meant to cover the English
1 J.F. Scotton, 'Judicial Independence and Political Expression 
in East Africa - two colonial legacies', (1970) 6 East 
African Law Journal, pp 1-19, at p 6.
2 Denys C. Holland, 'Equality before the Law', (1955) 8 
Current Legal Problems, pp 74-90, at p 87.
3 Holland, ibid.
-405-
common law in its entirety - including, therefore, the require- 
ment that the accused must have intended to excite violence 
by his words.
The Privy Council gave short shrift, however, to this conten­
tion. Viscount Caldecote, LC, delivering the judgment of 
their Lordships, emphasised that the case 'arose in the
Gold Coast Colony, and that the law applicable /was/ contained
2
in the Criminal Code of the Colony ' - 'not in English or
3
Scottish cases' . He went on to point out that 'The Code 
was no doubt designed to suit the circumstances of the 
people of the Colony /and that/ /’t/he elaborate structure 
of section 330 suggest/edy that it was intended to contain 
as far as possible, a full and complete statement of the
4
law of sedition in the Colony' . It followed that the Code 
should be 'construed in its application to the facts of th/e/ 
case free from any glosses or interpolations derived from 
any expositions, however authoritative, of the law of England
5
or of Scotland' .
Furthermore, the words of section 330 were clear and unambig­
uous and there could, accordingly, be no justification for 
adding 'words which /were/ not in the Code and /were/ not 
necessary to give a plain meaning to the section' . On
This requirement is, of course, reflected in R v Burns and 
R v Caunt, discussed above, at p 393 .
2
R v Wallace Johnson, supra, at 239.
 ^ Ibid, at 240.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ IJbid.
 ^ Ibid.
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the contrary, there was nothing in the section to 'support 
the view that incitement to violence /was/ a necessary
i
ingredient of the offence of sedition' . As stressed by
their Lordships, '/v/iolence may well be, and no doubt
often is, the result of wild and ill-considered words, but
the Code does not require proof from the words themselves
2
of any intention to produce such a result1.
It followed that the task of the Judicial Committee was 
simply to determine whether or not the words published by 
the accused fell within the ambit of the definition of 
sedition contained within the COde. Extrinsic evidence of 
the accused's intentions in publishing the words in issue 
was accordingly irrelevant and inadmissible.
Approached in this light, the offending words were clearly
3
seditious - and Wallace Johnson had rightly been convicted.
Ibid, at 241.
 ^ Ihid.
3
One further consideration which was, in fact, not dealt 
with by the Privy Council, should perhaps be canvassed at 
this stage. Some writers have expressed the view that 
reference to English authorities such as R v Burns and R 
v Caunt was, in any event, precluded (in the Gold Coast 
Colony, at least) by subsection 7(3) of its Criminal Code 
which states that the Colony's courts 'shall not be bound 
by any judicial decision or opinion from the English courts 
in construing /its provisions/.': See Scotton, op cit, p 8. 
However, as Allott points out (in Anthony Allott, Essays^ in 
African Law, London 1970, p 35), this provision only removes 
the binding - but not the persuasive - authority of English 
decisions. It does not mear^ therefore, that relevant English 
cases are to be ignored. On the contrary, as emphasised 
by the courts on a number of occasions, where colonial 
legislation is closely modelled on English statutes, there 
is strong authority that guidance in their interpretation 
is indeed to be obtained from the English decisions.
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This opinion of the Judicial Committee has had wide-ranging
significance. In the words of one commentator/ it 'left
political expression in the British territories stripped
bare of almost all protections against government suppression.
A colonial legislature - invariably composed largely of
Europeans and government appointees - could pass a statute
tightly controlling free expression, and the judiciary would
2enforce it free from any common law interpretations' .
3
Without the safeguard - in particular - of the requirement 
of an intention to incite to violence, virtually any 
criticism of government policies could be construed as 
sedition - for even the 'dispassionate pointing out of 
errors may well excite hatred and contempt for those respon-
4
sible for them' . The result is a "Catch 22" situation - 
in which the more grievous the error or defect, the more 
likely it is to arouse hatred or contempt for those respon­
sible; and the more danger there is of being convicted of 
sedition for bringing the error or defect to public attention. 
Thus one of the most important functions of the press - 
to act as a watchdog against the abuse of government power 
- is inexorably eroded. It is accordingly most unfortunate 
that the Wallace Johnson decision has had such wide-ranging 
impact on the law of sedition in many former British depend­
encies - including Nigeria, as further explained in due course
This seems something of an over-statement, except in the 
earlier years of British rule.
2
Scotton, op cit, p 9.
3
The other important safeguard is, of course, the right to 
jury trial, discussed at p 394 above.
4
Holland, op cit, p 87.
5
See p 413 below.
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5.6. Interpretation of Sedition in the Criminal Code
The sedition provisions contained within the Criminal Code 
have come before the Nigerian courts for interpretation in 
a number of cases, the most important of which is the Chike 
Obi decision, discussed at some length in due course.
Before turning to this case, however, certain earlier judg­
ments (for the most part handed down before the adoption 
of the Bill of Rights in 1959 ) warrant brief consideration.
2
In 1952, African Press Ltd. v R, an article 'warning the 
public to be aware of administrative officers and alleging 
that they were „ . „ disguised enemies of the struggle for 
freedom, mostly incompetent dictators working against
3
nationalists' was held to be seditious. In the view of 
the West African Court of Appeals, the article was 'clearly 
designed to whip up hostile feeling against Administrative 
Officers"'^ and accordingly fell within the ambit of s 50
5
(2)(c) as it was capable of 'not only of causing disaffection 
and discontent towards Administrative Officers by people of 
Nigeria but /Was./ equally capable of causing discontent
g
and disaffection among Administrative Officers themselves.'
7
In 1956, in R v African Press Ltd and another, the accused 
(the publisher and printer as well as the editor) of the 
newspaper, the Nigerian Tribune, were charged with sedition
T
See the section on the History of Nigeria, at p 9 2 above.
2 (1952) 14 W.A.C.A.57.
3
Okonkwo and Naish, op cit, pp 342-343.
4
Aguda, op cit, para 1176.
5
See p 398 above.
6 Aguda, supra.
7 /19577 W.N.L.R.1.
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following the publication of an editorial alleging that 
the police and Legal Department (responsible for the instit­
ution of prosecutions) were 'partial /in outlook/ to the 
extent of abetting lawlessness /and strife/ created by one
i
man and his followers or Jby a particular political party/1.
The court stressed the need for impartiality on the part
of the police and Legal Department; and ruled that '/t/o
suggest that they are otherwise/ to impute bad motives to
their actions or inactions, to accuse them of aiding and
abetting lawlessness... is not only to bring them into
hatred and contempt but to excite disaffection against
their persons and to raise discontent or disaffection amongst
Her Majesty's subjects or inhabitants in Nigeria and the
2
Western Region m  particular'. The court also emphasised 
that such allegations would cause people to lose faith in 
both police and Legal Department and to take the law into 
their own hands. In the court's view, there were 'lawful
3
and effective ways of waking up /a/ department (which was 
not doing as much as it should), but the method adopted by 
the accused was 'not only seditious but /was also/ an example 
of gross and dangerous irresponsibility which must be
4
checked'.
5
In 1960, in Qgidi v Commissioner for Police , a telegram 
to the Minister of Justice (copied to the Press and sent
 ^ IJgid, at 4.
 ^ Ibid.
3 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
5 (1960) 5 F.S.C.251.
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also to radio stations for broadcast), called for the replace­
ment of the judges in certain customary courts in the Warri 
Division and alleged, inter alia, that they were biased 
in favour of the political party known as the Action Group . 
The tenor of the telegram is illustrated by the following 
extract:
'Unless these courts are abolished we deem them communist 
institutions. Citizens not safe with customary courts still 
existing in Warri x Nation Co and all citizens lost confidence 
and West Regional Governments name and good intention Draged 
(sic) in mud due primitive interpretation of justice Customary 
Courts Warri Division'.2
This telegram - even though emotional to the point of incoh­
erency - was held to be seditious.
In all three of these decisions, the courts seem to have 
taken an unduly narrow and harsh approach, displaying what 
can only be termed hyper-sensitivity to allegations which 
were not shown (according to the reports of the proceedings) 
to have had any adverse consequences in reality. It is 
difficult to assess the truth of the various allegations 
from the judgments themselves, but the suspicion must remain 
that they did at least contain some kernel of validity which 
would seem to have required further investigation in the 
public interest, rather than suppression under the law of 
sedition.
It will be recalled from the section on the History of 
Nigeria, at p 82 above, that this was the political party 
which enjoyed ascendancy in the former Western Region in 
the initial days of independence.
See A.G. Karibi-Whyte, 'Seditious Publications', in T.O. 
Elias (ed.), Nigerian Press Law, London and Lagos, 1969, 
pp 67-86, at pp 76-77.
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It was to have been hoped that the attainment of independence 
as well as the adoption of the Bill of Rights, with its 
guarantee of freedom of expression, would have resulted 
in some amelioration of the harshness of sedition rules.
This hope was considerably dashed, however, by the decision 
of the Nigerian Supreme Court in Director of Public Prosecutions 
v Obi«^
In 1961, Dr. Chike Obi, (leader of the minority Dynamic 
Party) published a pamphlet entitled "The People: Facts 
that you must know", the salient parts of which read as 
follows:
'Down with the enemies of the people, the exploiters of 
the weak and oppressors of the poor I... The days of those 
who have enriched themselves at the expense of the poor are 
numbered. The common man in Nigeria can today no longer be 
fooled by sweet talk at election time only to be exploited 
and treated like dirt after the booty of office has been 
shared among the politicians.'2
He was charged, before the High Court of Lagos, with sedition 
(under section 51(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which renders 
it an offence, inter alia, to print, publish or reproduce 
any seditious publication). A 'seditious publication' is, 
in terms of section 50 of the Code, one having a 'seditious 
intention'; and 'seditious intention' is defined as previously 
outlined in brief, in section 50(2), as follows:
/ 1 9 6 V ,  1 All N.L.R. 1 8 6 .
M.I• Jegede, 'The Supreme Court's Attitude towards some 
Aspects of Individual Freedom and the Right to Property', 
in A.B. Kasunmu (ed.), The Supreme Court of Nigeria, Ibadan, 
1 9 7 7 ,  pp 1 0 7 - 1 3 2 ,  at p 1 1 1 .
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A "Seditious intention" is an intention
(a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection 
against the person of the President or the Governor of
a State, or the Government of the Federation, or of any 
State thereof, as by law established or against the 
administration of justice in Nigeria; or
(b) to excite the citizens or other inhabitants of Nigeria
to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise than
by lawful means, of any other matter in Nigeria as by 
law established; or
(c) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the citizens
or other inhabitants of Nigeria; or
(d) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between
different classes of the population of Nigeria.
But an act, speech or publication is not seditious by reason 
only that it intends-
(i) to show that the President or the Governor of a State
has been misled or mistaken in any measure in the 
Federation or a State, as the case may be; or
(ii) to point out errors or defects in the Government or 
constitution of Nigeria, or of any State thereof, as
by law established or in legislation or in the adminis­
tration of justice with a view to the remedying of 
such errors or defects; or
(iii)to persuade the citizens or other inhabitants of Nigeria 
to attempt to procure by lawful means the alteration
of any matter in Nigeria as by law established; or
(iv) to point out, with a view to their removal, any matters 
which are producing or have a tendency to produce feel­
ings of ill-will and enmity between different classes 
of the population of Nigeria.
The High Court of Lagos found the publication prima facie
seditious, but - in response to the defence argument that
sections 50 and 51 of the Criminal Code had been rendered
void through the enactment of the constitutional guarantee
i
of freedom of expression - it referred to the Federal 
Supreme Court, for its determination, the following questions:
See the description of the general procedure for the protect­
ion of human rights in Nigeria at p 177, et seq.
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(1) Had sections 50 and 51 been rendered void?
(2) If not, did their terms require modification in any 
way to fit the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression?
The Federal Supreme Court (per Ademola, C.J.F.) answered 
both questions in the negative; and, in the course of so 
doing, made a number of important comments on the law of 
sedition, which may perhaps be summarised under the following 
heads.
(i) The meaning of 'seditious intention'.
The Federal Supreme Court appeared to assume - without any
detailed consideration of this important question - that
it should follow the approach of the West African Court of
1
Appeals in R v Wallace Johnson which (as previously explained)
2
had been confirmed on appeal to the Privy Council • Accord­
ingly, in a statement with far-reaching implications for 
freedom of expression in Nigeria, the Court held that 'an 
incitement to violence is not a necessary ingredient of the
•3
offence [of sedition/' . The consequences which flow from
the elimination of this requirement for sedition have already
been emphasised and need not be reiterated. It is accordingly
most disturbing that the Nigerian Supreme Court should blindly
have followed R v Wallace Johnson without considering whether
it was appropriate to do so in the very different circumstances
of a free and independent Nigeria.
_
(1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 104
2
/1940/ A.C. 231 (P.C.), previously described at p 403 et seq.
3
D.P.P. v Obi, supra, at 192.
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On the other hand, it should also be noted that the court 
emphasised that the intention in issue is one 'of exciting a 
state of ill feeling against the Government' , and that 
words are not seditious if they merely point out errors or 
defects in government with a view to their remedy. The test 
of 'exciting a state of ill feeling' is, of course, a 
nebulous one - but it does reflect some acknowledgement on 
the part of the court of the need to limit the meaning of 
'seditious intent'.
(ii) Proof of seditious intention
The court referred to section 50(3) which provides, in
essence, that the accused is to be deemed to have intended
the consequences which would naturally follow from his
2
conduct in all the surrounding circumstances. The court 
was satisfied that this provision had been inserted simply 
to ease the task of the prosecution by enabling it to 'rely 
on the... words or the document itself without calling any
3
extrinsic evidence' The court stressed, however, that 
'the subsection cannot be construed so as to deprive a person 
of his right to show that his only intention /was/ one of
4
those set out in the exceptions to section 50(2)' .
(iii) Truth as a defence to a charge of sedition
It is clear that the Supreme Court did not reject the relevance
of truth as a defence in general. It did, however, point
1 Ibid, at 192.
 ^ See p 399 above.
3 Ibid, at 195.
 ^ Ibid.
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out that truth could not be a defence 'where the seditious
i
intention was clear and patent1 - a statement which raises 
a host of unanswered questions. On the other hand, it also 
qualified this by explaining that truth 'may... in certain 
circumstances, be a relevant consideration for the purpose
2
of ascertaining... the real intention of the person charged.'
(iv) Whether the laws against sedition are indeed 'reasonably 
justifiable'.
Defence counsel had contended that the sedition laws were
3
not reasonably justifiable because (1) they exposed individ­
uals to prosecution irrespective of the truth of their 
criticisms of government; and (2) did so irrespective of the
4
actual repercussions on public order ; whilst, (3), a law 
could only be 'reasonably justifiable' in the interests of
public order if the conduct it sought to prohibit would
5 6invariably - in every case - result in public disruption.
The Supreme Court disagreed for the following reasons.
(1) Truth is not irrelevant - except where the seditious 
intention is 'clear and patent', as discussed above.
(2) Incitement to violence is not an ingredient of the 
offence, following R v Wallace Johnson.
 ^ Ibid.
^ I b i d .
3
It will be recalled from the general discussion of the 
guarantee of freedom of expression at p201above, that the 
constitution permits derogation inter alia, through laws that 
are 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' in the 
interests of public safety and public order.
DPP v Obi, supra, at 191.
5 Ibi3r at 196.
6 Ibid .
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(3) Society is entitled to take reasonable precautions to 
prevent public disorder from arising and this may legitimately 
'involve the prohibition of acts which, if unchecked and 
unrestrained, might lead to disorder, even though those acts 
would not themselves do so directly'1.
The Court then proceeded to describe the limits of the 
individual's freedom to criticise the government in the 
following terms:
' fh/ person has a right to discuss any grievance or 
criticise, canvass or censure the act of Government and their 
public policy. He may even do this with a view to affecting 
a change in the party in power or to call attention to the 
weakness of Government, so long as he keeps within the limits 
of fair criticism. It is clearly legitimate and constitutional 
by means of fair argument to criticise the government of 
the day. What is not permitted is to criticise the Govern­
ment in a malignant manner... for such attacks, by their 
nature, tend to affect the public peace' .
Accordingly, the Court concluded that:
'/T/he exceptions to section 50(2) of the Criminal 
Code... form enough protection to a charge of sedition and 
they offer enough freedom of expression to anybody in our 
democratic society. The section does not... prevent fair 
criticism of the Government and only prohibits publications 
made with the intention of exciting hatred and contempt, or 
disaffection against, inter alia, the Government* .
One further aspect of the judgment which merits careful 
consideration is the statement by Brett, F.J., in his 
separate concurring judgment, that the courts - whilst 
remaining alive to their responsibility to rule on the con­
stitutionality of legislation allegedly inconsistent with 
the fundamental rights' provisions - should nevertheless 
'remember that their function is to decide whether a restric­
tion is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, not
1 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid, at 194. 
 ^ Ibid, at 196.
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to impose their own views of what the law should be.' He
2further elucidated this point by citing/ inter alia , the 
judgment of the Indian Supreme Court in State of Madras v
3
Row/ to the effect that judges/ in exercising the function
of constitutional review/ should be guided by -
•their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and 
the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not 
only for people of their own way of thinking but for all/ 
and that the majority of the elected representatives of the 
people have/ in authorising the imposition of the restrictions/ 
considered them to be reasonable'^.
Brett, F.J. accordingly stressed the fact that section 416 
of the Penal Code of the Northrn Region (similar in all 
important respects to sections 50 and 51 of the Criminal 
Code) had been adopted in 1960 by the elected representatives 
of the people and 'at a time when a guarantee of freedom
5
of expression identical to that contained in section 24
g
was already in force' . Accordingly/ the Court was not
dealing merely with 'part of the legacy of a former /colonial/
7regime' . The inference is plain that Brett/ F.J. considered 
this a factor of considerable significance in reaching his 
concurring decision that the law against sedition remained 
fully in force.
 ^ Ibid, at 197.
2 The further authority cited by Brett, F.J., is considered 
below at p 420.
3 (1952) S.C.R. 597.
4
DPP v Obi, supra.
5
This is the section containing the guarantee of freedom of 
expression in the Independence Constitution of 19 60. It 
is identical to section 25 of the 1963 Constitution, in 
issue in these proceedings and substantially similar to the 
present guarantee in s 36 (read with s 41) of the 1979 
Constitution.
 ^ DPP v Obi, supra at 198
^ Ibid.
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Overall assessment of the judgment is not altogether easy.
The judgment delivered by Ademola, C.J.F. suggests to 
some extent th&t the Court was inclined to favour a restrict­
ive interpretation of the statutory provision - so as to 
uphold the interests of individual liberty. Unfortunately, 
however, many of the key aspects of the judgment are so 
vague as to provide almost no guidance in concrete cases 
at all. For instance, what constitutes an intention to
1
'excite a state of ill-feeling against the Government'?
2
When is a seditious intention so 'clear and patent' as to
exclude the relevance of truth as a defence? What is the 
3
ambit of 'fair' criticism?
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court was not called
4
upon, in the circumstances , to decide whether or not Dr.
Obi had in fact been guilty of sedition. Such enquiry would 
have helped to throw some light at least on how the Court 
envisaged these tests being applied in practice. However, 
the Court knew, of course, that the High Court of Lagos 
had already found the charge against Dr. Obi proved on the 
facts; and the Supreme Court's failure to comment on this 
may therefore perhaps be taken as tacit approval of the 
decision.
1
Ibid, at 192 and see discussion at p 414 above.
2
Ibid, at 193 and see discussion at p 415 above.
3
Ibid, at 196 and see also p 416 above.
4
The Supreme Court had merely been asked to rule upon the 
continuing efficacy of sections 50 and 51, as discussed 
at p 412-413, above.
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Be that as it may, the final outcome of the case was undoubt­
edly most unfortunate for freedom of expression in Nigeria.
It would seem, as Nwabueze states, that Dr. Obi was doing
no more than attempting to 'induce the people not to vote
2
for /"the Governemnt/ at the next election' . If this is 
held to constitute sedition, then the scope to offer 'fair 
criticism' of Government is minimal - if it exists at all.
The most disturbing aspect of the judgment itself lies perhaps 
in Brett, F.J. s, call for judicial self-restraint in deter­
mining the constitutionality of legislation. The constitutional
3
guarantees were inserted in recognition of minority fears 
that the legislature and executive (reflecting the will of 
the majority) could not always be relied upon to safeguard 
the minority interests. Accordingly, it was considered 
essential that the judicial branch of government should be 
enjoined - and entrusted - with the task of ensuring that 
legislative or executive action did not infringe the rights
4
of individuals. The doctrine of constitutionality under­
mines this protective scheme - especially when it is applied 
to laws which prima facie contravene the fundamental guarantees. 
It is therefore most disturbing to note not only Brett, F.J.'s 
support for the doctrine, but also his distortion of the
1
B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, 
London, 1973.
2 Ibid, p 151.
3
See the section on the History of Nigeria and the report 
of the,,Willink" Commission, at pages 91 and 171above.
4
The doctrine of Constitutionality in Nigerian law has, of 
course, previously been discussed at p 191 above.
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1
United States’ case which he cites, inter alia , as authority
for adopting it. This is the Supreme Court decision of
2Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad v May ; and from it,
Brett/ F.J. quotes the following dictum of Holmes, J.:
'It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate 
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite 
as great a degree as the Courts' 3.
It is clear, however, from the judgment as a whole that 
Holmes, J., far from upholding the doctrine of constitution- 
ality/ was emphasising that the legislature and judiciary have 
equal responsibility in ensuring that the rights of the 
citizen are not eroded. Holmes, J. 'did not suggest that 
when there is an alleged conflict between the guaranteed 
rights and a Congressional Act, the Court should presume 
the constitutionality of the latter, thus imposing the 
burden of rebutting such a presumption on the citizen for
4
whose benefit the rights were incorporated in the Constitution.'
The Federal Supreme Court decision in DPP v Obi has been 
criticised by a number of commentators. Thus, for example, 
Jegede states:
The other authority relied on by Brett, F.J., (ie. the 
Indian Supreme Court case) has already been discussed at 
p 417 above.
2 1-94 U.S. 267 (1904) .
3
 ^ Cited by Brett, F.J. at 197 of the Chike Obi judgment.
M.I. Jegede, 'The Supreme Court's attitude towards some 
aspects of individual freedom and the right to property' 
in A.B. Kasunmu (ed.): The Supreme Court of Nigeria, Ibadan 
1977, pp 107-132, at p 116. For an interesting discussion ' 
of the U.S. approach to freedom of expression and sedition 
see Dr. Hari Chand: Fundamental Rights in Nigeria. Jos,
1980, pp 44-45, in which the author traces the vicissitudes 
suffered by the 'clear and present danger' approach before 
the U.S. Supreme Court; and see also the discussion at 
p 441 below.
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'It is... regrettable that the Supreme Court was more 
concerned with the exception clause than with the substantive 
section of the guaranteed rights; otherwise (sic) the ambit 
of this section ought to have been amplified with a view 
to making it easier for a citizen to know the scope and 
extent of his guaranteed rights, particularly when the 
Supreme Court has sustained the validity of a sedition law 
whose validity is beyond reasonable comprehension'1
Nwabueze expresses his surprise that a law 'specially designed
to strengthen the hands of the colonial administration'
should 'continue to be applied in the same rigorous manner*
in an independent Nigeria 'under a constitution that
2guaranteed freedom of speech'
Grove queries the correctness of the Supreme Court's approach,
pointing out that:
'The Constitution appears to guarantee absolute freedom 
of expression unless it can be shown that some pressing 
public interest demands recognition. /Accordingly/, the 
proper focus is not on whether or not the residue of perm­
issible expression left over is sufficient, but whether 
the restriction is of /suchy pressing character in the first 
place'3
The Chike Obi decision has clearly had disquieting conse­
quences for freedom of expression in Nigeria. This is 
particularly evident in Africen Press Limited and another v
4
Attorney-General, Western Nigeria, in which the Supreme 
Court was again given the opportunity to rule upon the 
ambit of sedition. The case arose out of the publication,
5
in a newspaper called the Nigerian Tribune of an article
Jegede, supra, p,115.
2
Nwabueze, Constitutionalism and the Emergent States, supra, 
p 397.
3
D.L. Grove, 'The "Sentinels" of Liberty? The Nigerian 
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights', ( 1 9 6 3 )  7 Journal of
African Law, pp 152 - 171, at p 170.
4 / 1 9 6 5 7  1 All N.L.R. 1 2 .
5 On 16 April 1 9 6 4 .
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describing the charges which had been levelled against the 
Western Region Government on a vote df no confidence init­
iated by the Opposition in the Western House of Assembly.
The newspaper undertook to review these charges as well 
as to ,direc/"t7 the attention of the nation to other ugly
i
spots which the Opposition did not mention' . The publisher
and editor of the newspaper were charged and convidted (by
the High Court) of 'sedition'/ under sections 46 and 47 of
2
the Western Criminal Code , equivalent to sections 50 and 
51 described above. They appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the view of the Court (per Brett/ J.S.C.)/ the article
- which began by stating that the Opposition had "neatly 
marshalled a catalogue of reckless squandermania and abuse
3
of office against the government" and then proceeded to 
review these charges and offer its own comments - was 'by
4
any standard a robust piece of invective' . Even though
describing its language as 'abusive throughout', the Court
also acknowledged that
'... if the right to freedom of expression is to be 
given its full effect the court must be satisfied that /the 
article/ went beyond the bounds of what is permissible in 
political controversy/ and that the intention could fairly 
be called seditious'*.
Whilst this approach augurs well for the right of free 
speech/ it is belied by the Court's subsequent analysis.
The Court went on to state:
-
African Press Ltd. v A.G. Western Nigeria/ supra.
2
Criminal Code, (Western States), Cap 28. See p 396 above.
3
African Press Ltd. v A.G. Western Nigeria, supra at 14.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
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'The article was prima facie seditious and if the 
appellants maintained that their only intention was one of 
those set out in the exceptions it was for them to satisfy 1 
the court on the balance of probabilities that this was so1.
In attempting to discharge this onus, truth would not be
an irrelevant consideration - except where the seditious
2
intention was clear/ as held in DPP v Obi.
The Court then went on to consider some of the charges 
levelled against the government in the article. The first 
was that the government had wasted an enormous sum (£250/000) 
on the lease of a house at Ikeja - a charge which was 
entirely false and misleading and which 'illustrate/d/ how
3
deep the appellants' regard for the truth was'.
In addition, the article contained various allegations of 
Government "squandermania", "abuse of office", "misuse of 
money held in trust for the people", and "fraudulent divers-
4
ion of public money for private purpose" . To substantiate 
the truth of these charges, the appellants had called (at 
their trial before the High Court) for the production of 
some 400 files of the Ministry of Trade but this had been
refused on the ground that the Minister had certified (under
section 219 of the Evidence Act) that he was satisfied that 
their production would be contrary to the public interest.
The appellants argued before the Supreme Court that this 
refusal had prejudiced their defence and that their convict­
ions should accordingly be set aside. The Supreme Court's
 ^ Ibid, at 15. 
o
Ibid, at 14-15; and see also the discussion of the relevance 
_ of truth as a defence at p 414 above.
4 IMd, at 15.
Ibid, at 16.
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response to this is interesting and merits some consideration.
The Court acknowledged that it was bound to 'accept the
production of such a /Ministerial/ certificate as conclusive'
but emphasised that
'It remains the duty of the Court to uphold the right 
to a fair trial, and if in a criminal case there are reasonable 
grounds for supposing that the exclusion of evidence by such 
a certificate might have prejudiced the accused in making 
his defence, the court is bound to say that the prosecution 
has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt'” .
Ministers 'should be reminded that it is always contrary
to one facet of public interest if relevant evidence is
excluded /and/ /t/he relevance of evidence is /a question/
2
for the court, not the Minister, to decide' . Accordingly,
the Supreme Court recommended that Ministers should in
future adopt the "middle course" provided for by section
22(3)(b) of the Constitution of the Federation and submit
"sensitive" material to the court for scrutiny in camera -
3
rather than exclude it altogether. As regards this partic­
ular instance, however, the Court agreed 'with the Director 
of Public Prosecutions that /the application for some 400 
files/ was a mere "fishing" application'; and pointed out 
that
'a defendant whose own evidence shows that his charges 
were based on mere suspicion, or on an uncritical acceptance 
of allegations made by others, can /not/ demand a disclosure 
of everything that passes within a government office in the ^
hope that he may find something that would justify his charges.1
Ibid.
2 at 17.
3
Ibid, at 16. The reference here is, of course, to the 19 6 3 
Consitution of the Federation, Act no 20 of 1963. The 
equivalent provision is today contained in s 33(4) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 19 79.
3 Ibid, at 17.
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Hence, the Court was satisfied that no prejudice to the 
appellants had resulted from this refusal.
A further allegation contained in the article was that the 
Government was secretly funding a newspaper called the Daily 
Sketch and attempting to pass it off as an independent 
publication. Defence counsel's attempts to obtain sight 
of further Government files regarding this newspaper had 
been precluded at the trial by a similar Ministerial cert­
ificate that production would be contrary to the public 
interest. In this instance, the Supreme Court believed 
that 'something helpful to the appellants /may indeed have 
been/ excluded by the claim of privilege' . Accordingly,
'... so far as the conviction rested on the finding 
that the passages dealing with that matter were proof of 
a seditious intention /the Court was/ not prepared to 
uphold it'2.
Notwithstanding the above, the Court was satisfied - 'consider 
/ing/ the wording of the article as a whole and the evidence
3
about how it came to be written* - that the article was 
indeed seditious. It found support for this conclusion in 
one particular passage which could in no way have been 
affected by the claim of privilege. The passage began with 
a quotation from a speech made by one of the Ministers in 
the no confidence debate to the effect that "The government 
had aroused awareness among the Yorubas". The article then 
proceeded:
Ibid, at 18. 
 ^ Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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'"We are shuddered (sic) to understand what the govern­
ment meant by this. In other words, the government had 
succeeded in inciting the people it governs to rise against 
other ethnic groups in the federation. Perhaps this point 
will impress the federal government to think of a law which 
will prevent some unscrupulous tribal politicians who are 
out to upset the existence of the federation. The incitement 
of any tribe against another tribe must be made treasonable 
offence"'.1
The Supreme Court's response to this passage is both aston­
ishing and profoundly disturbing. It reads as follows;
'No reasonable tribunal could hold a perverse and 
unfounded accusation of this kind, when made against the 
government of a Region, to be anything but seditious' .
Even allowing for the dangerous divisiveness of inter-ethnic
conflict in Nigeria, this judgment seems unnecessarily harsh
and leaves little scope for the exercise of the right to
free expression.
A further example of what constitutes 'sedition' arose from 
the establishment in 1962 of a commission of enquiry (the 
Coker Commission) to investiagte the activities of a number 
of corporations controlled by the Action Group. '/I/t's 
report was criticised as a "huge document of legal inconsis-
3
tencies"' . For this, the critics, Dr. Olu Odumuso and
others, including the editors of the Daily Express, were
4
convicted of sedition.
More recently, in August 1981, the editor and editor-in- 
chief of the Nigerian Tribune were arrested (and held in
Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
3
B. Harrell-Bond, op cit, p 4. 
 ^ Ibid.
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police custody for 36 hours ) and then charged with sedition
for having published a front-page story in the issue of
28 July 'in which President Shagari was alleged to have
bribed opposition federal legislators so as to ensure support
2
for his Bills in the National Assembly' . An application 
for the charges against them to be quashed was set down for 
hearing on 15 September and, if this failed, trial was
3
scheduled for early November . Unfortunately/ however, no
4report of the outcome of the proceedings is yet to hand.
5.7. Interpretation of Sedition Under the Penal Code
5
As regards the interpretation of the 'sedition' provisions 
of the Penal Code/ there are unfortunately no reported 
Nigerian decisions; and reliance must accordingly be placed 
on Indian cases,- interpreting equivalent provisions of the 
Indian Code, which have strong persuasive authority 6.
The first point to note is that, following the Privy Council
ruling in R v Wallace Johnson, discussed above/ 'it is not
necessary to prove that the words used were likely to lead 
1
to violence'’; nor is it necessary 'to produce evidence of
e
intention outside the words /'themselves/'' . Regard must/
Their offices were also sealed off and searched by more than 
9 100 armed police. See 6 Index on Censorship/ Notes.
 ^ Ibid.
4 Ibid.
Law reporting in Nigeria is still somewhat haphazard/ though 
the introduction of new series such as the Criminal Law Reports 
and Constitutional Law Reports of Nigeria are helping greatly 
to correct earlier deficiencies. In addition, there is some 
t- delay in reports from Nigeria being received in London.
Note that the word ‘sedition1 does not appear in the section 
g itself or in the marginal notes, but only in the Chapter heading 
_ See p 406 above.
Gledhill, op cit, p 176.
Ibid.
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however, be had to the surrounding circumstances and '/t/hings
may /"accordingly/ be said in a medical or legal textbook
which would be punishable if published in a partisan news-
1
paper at a time of tension' . Furthermore, an article
must be read as a whole, and 'if a man speaks with two
2
voices, he cannot claim the innocuous one as his own' 
and repudiate the remainder. Disaffection may be promoted 
by innuendo - in which case, however/ the prosecution must 
prove the guilty meaning alleged. Further, Gledhill points 
out, '/d_/isaf fection may /alsoJ be promoted by statements
3
which are true as well as by false statements' ; and it 
is accordingly most disturbing that the Penal Code makes 
no express provision for truth to operate as a defence.
In this regard, it is worth recalling that sedition in 
common law is a species of criminal libel; and that the 
common law regarded truth in this context as an aggravating 
factor, thus giving rise to the aphorism, further described
4
below, that "the greater the truth, the greater the libel". 
Again, this would seem to place an accused in the uncomfort­
able "Catch 22" situation previously described in relation
5
to the sedition rules of the Criminal Code.
Ibid. A good illustration of this is provided by the Indian 
Case of Joy Chandra v Emp., (1910) I.L.R. 38 Cal 214,
in which an article purporting to describe proceedings 
at a forthcoming religious festival was held to be 
seditious because national feeling was running high at 
the time, and two British officials had been assassinated 
a week before.
2
Gledhill, supra.
3 Ibid;
4
See the discussion of the criminal law of defamation at 
p 592 and 622, et seq,
5 See p 407 above.
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Examples of speeches or publications held 'seditious' in 
India include the following:
(i) a speech addressed to a large audience of labourers
at a time of political unrest and economic hardship# alleging
that Government was 'absolutely callous as to what happened
to the people' and had deliberately refused to co-operate
2
with political leaders to alleviate the situation;
(ii) a speech to the Peasants' Union, urging the abolition 
of landlords, moneylenders and Government and emphasising
3
that the first step was to get rid of Government;
(iii) the allegation that Government has 'deliberately set
4
community against community' and
(iv) the assertion that 'Government in the name of law
5
and order is showering bullets on the people' .
By contrast, criticism of the salaries paid to high officials
g
as compared to ordinary men, exhortation not to pay taxes
7
or join the armed forces , and the call for a boycott of
o
British goods have been held not to fall within the provision.
It seems that if 'rioting or other forms of violent agitation 
directed against Government... /has/ followed a speech or 
publication, that /is/ strong evidence of intention to
9
create disaffection' . In addition, in determining an
The word is used for convenience, even though it does not 
appear in the enactment, as previously explained.
Punnoose, /1948\J M.W.N. (Sup) 35.
Narayan v Imp. A.I.R. /1940] Bom. 379.
Qm Parkash, 42 P.L.R. 382.
Maniben v Emp., A.I.R. /1933/ Bom. 65.
g
7 Qm Parkash, supra. 
q Ibid.
Jagan v Emp. A.I.R. /1932/ Lah. 7.
9
Gledhill, opcit, p 178.
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accused's intentions, regard may be had to his writings or
1
utterances on other occasions.
As regards the ambit of s 416/ it is noteworthy that it is
considerably wider than its counterpart in the Indian Code,
in that it extends to the excitement of disaffection - not
only against government in Nigeria - but also against Her
Majesty or the Government of the United Kingdom. The Indian
2case of Lachhman Singh v Emp., illustrates the practical 
significance of this. Here, an Indian newspaper, 'published 
an article alleging that the English had... /attempted/ to 
capture Afghanistan by duplicity, making the Afghan King 
introduce Western fashions on the one hand and inciting his
3
subjects to rebellion on the other' . The writer was 
acquitted as his attack was directed against the Government 
of the United Kingdom, which is not covered by the Indian 
section. As Gledhill points out, however, '/i/n Northern
4
Nigeria he would /have/ come within the section'.
The Nigerian provision is also wider than the Indian one in 
including within its scope the excitement of disaffection 
against both the Constitution and the administration of
See ibid^
2 A.I.R. /1930/ Lah. 156.
2 Gledhill, op cit, p 179. 
 ^ IbicL..
4- ■ 1justice *
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Criticism of an individual, or of a limited section of a
particular public service (such as a few police officers
in a given town) would generally not be considered as
exciting hatred against Government , as these people could
not be said to represent the 'abstract conception' of Govern- 
2
ment . An attack on a Minister (under a system of responsible
3
Government) may, however, do so.
Hence, '/p/ublishing allegations that the courts did not 
hold the balance fairly in cases to which Government was 
a party or that the authority responsible for the selection 
of appointees to judicial office was guilty of nepotism 
or partiality would be within the section', Gledhill, ibid 
p 181. Under the common law, such allegations would be 
counted as 'scandalising the court' and hence as a species 
of contempt. This provision of the Penal Code is accord­
ingly an important part of the Nigerian law of 'scandalising 
the court' and will be further referred to in the appropriate 
section of this study at p 901 below.
See Gledhill, ibid, p 179.
See Kidar Nath v Crown, A.I.R. /1949/ E.P. 289. Here the 
accused wrote a newspaper article accusing Ministers of 
the East Punjab of being dilatory in dealing with the 
problem of refugees from Pakistan; and charged them with 
having brought 'dishonour on /the Congress Party/ by 
succumbing to partisanship and selfishness': See Gledhill,
ibid, p 180. Interestingly, the court held that the 
attack on the Ministers amounted to an attack on Govern­
ment - so as to bring the accused prima facie within 
the section - but that the article 'would be less likely 
to arouse contempt of Government in the mind of the 
intelligent reader than amused contempt for /the accused 
himself/', and hence was not seditious. See Gledhill, 
ibid.
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As regards the explanations to the section, the 'Judicial 
Committee has said that the/'lrj object... is not to 
modify the first part of the section by implying that
j
I a malicious intention is an essential ingredient of the
offence but to protect the honest agitator whose intent­
ion is to secure redress of wrongs and not a mere mischief 
*1
maker' . It seems thus that '/a/ man may comment upon
any measure or act of Government... and freely express
his opinion upon it/ severely/ unreasonably, perversely
or unfairly, but if he goes beyond that and holds up
Government to contempt, for instance by attributing to
it every evil or misfortune suffered by the people or
by imputing to it base motives or indifference to the
people, he is within the section and the explanations
2
will not save him'. Likewise, he may disapprove or
attack Government measures, 'using strong language if 
3
necessary' , but he may not 'attribute dishonest or
4
immoral motives' to Government, and his language must 
not be such 'as is likely to arouse feelings of enmity,
5
hatred or disloyalty' . These dicta underline the diff­
iculty of drawing the line between what is legitimate,
I and what unlawful. They also indicate that attempt to do
ii
j  so is ..intrinsically arbitrary, for - as Gledhill points
- 'no two persons will draw the line in precisely the same
g
! place' . Again, this underscores the value of trial by
ii
j  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gledhill, ibid, p 182, citing Annie Besant v Advocate- 
General, (1919) L.R. 46 I.A. 176.
Gledhill, op cit, p 182.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
1
2
3
4
5
6
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1
jury in cases of sedition as a means of restricting in some 
measure - the practical ambit of the offence.
As regards s 417/ which makes it a crime to 'seek to excite
hatred or contempt against any class of persons in such a
2
way as to endanger the public peace' , it is clear that 'to 
seek to incite' is to attempt to incite and that, according 
to Indian authority/ intention to incite is therefore an
3
essential ingredient of liability . Evidence of intention 
may/ however/ be gleaned from the surrounding circumstances: 
including factors such as the type of audience addressed
4
and 'the state of public tranquility' at the time. A 
^class'1 must be 'well defined and readily ascertainable
5
/and must/ have some element of permanence and stability' .
It thus includes a religious denomination or the police/
g
but not 'landlords/ moneylenders and capitalists' . It 
must be shown that the accused 'acted in such a way as to
7
endanger the public peace' ; but the actual occurance of 
violence or other disturbance is not a pre-requisite/ though 
it would clearly provide strong evidence that the accused
g
had acted in such manner-.
-j
It will be recalled that trial by jury applies in England 
and its efficacy in limiting the instances in which an 
accused is found guilty of sedition is revealed both by 
the cases discussed above and by the fact that prosecution 
for sedition in England has (largely as a result of these 
cases and the difficulty of securing conviction) become 
extremely rare.
2
See p 401 above.
3
See Gledhill, supra, pp 184 and 176.
 ^ See Gledhill, ibid, p 184.
5 Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
7 Ibid, p 185.
® Ibid.
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As for s 419/ which prohibits the possession of seditious
articles, the onus lies on the prosecution to prove both
possession and the fact that, if the article were published
or exhibited, this would amount to an offence under the
2
sections previously examined. The burden then shifts to 
the accused 'to establish, if he can, lawful excuse for 
possession, such as that he was keeping it for another and 
had no reason to believe that the article was of such a 
nature as to come within the scope of the section... or 
that he was engaged in research and had no intention of
3
exhibiting the article to any other person' .
Finally, as regards s 420, which empowers the Minister - if
in his opinion it is in the public interest to do so - to
prohibit the importation of a specified publication or of
4
all publications produced by a particular organisation, 
the prosecution is under no duty to prove that the public­
ation is objectionable or that its importation would be 
contrary to the public interest. The Minister's discretion 
in this regard is absolute, and all that is required for 
conviction is that the particular publication should be
5
covered by the order made. Publication, sale, distribution
1
See p 401 above.
2
Note that s 420 also refers to articles which fall within 
the ambit of s 418, which ha3 not been described above 
because it relates to the publication of false news, 
discussed elsewhere in this study - in the chapter which 
provides an overview of media freedom in Nigeria at p 229 
above.
 ^ Gledhill, op cit, p 187.
4
See p 401 above.
5
This may raise some difficulty where the order is directed 
not against a particular, specified publication only, but 
against all publications of a given organisation.
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and reproduction of such articles is also prohibited, and 
it seems that the only intention on the part of the 
accused necessary for liability is the narrow intent to do 
the particular act prohibited. Hence '/i/t could not be 
a defence that the accused was unaware of the Minister's 
order' *
5.8. An Additional Disturbing Precedent under a Related Law
An additional disturbing precedent - under Regulations 
closely analogous to the law of sedition - is provided by
2
the case of R v Amalgamated Press of Nigeria Ltd and another.
It must be acknowledged at the outset that this case was
3
decided during a period of some unrest and under regulations 
promulgated pursuant to emergency powers; and that it would 
hopefully not therefore be followed in a period of normal 
rule. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate once more 
the kind of political criticism which may be penalised 
under sedition laws; and therefore merits brief consideration.
The accused were the proprietors and editor of the Daily 
Express and were charged with contravening s 2 of the 
Emergency Powers (Misleading Reports) (Amendment) Regulations,
4
1962 which prohibits the publication in a newspaper of any 
matter which is 'likely... to expose... the government...
1
Gledhill, supra, p 188-
2 /1 962/ W.N.L.R. 272.
3
It will, however, be recalled from the section on the 
History of Nigeria that some commentators believe that the 
'emergency' was largely fabricated by the central government 
inoorder to break the power of the Action Group in the 
West. See p 94 above.
4 L.N. 107 of 1962.
-436-
of... a Region... to hatred, ridicule or contempt' . The
charge arose out of the publication of an editorial in the
newspaper's issue of 17 September, 1962, which was headed
2
"Scrap them Moses" ; and which called, inter alia, for the 
Administrator of the Western Region (then ruling the area
3
under emergency powers ) to stop wasting public funds on 
the publication of two newspapers which (it was alleged) 
were being used by him for 'propaganda purposes to boost 
the prestige of the Emergency Administration and in part-
4
icular of the Administrator himself' . The article is 
worth quoting in full for a proper appreciation of its 
tenor. Having commenced with the heading described above, 
it proceeded:
'Keep abreast with Western Nigeria. Read Western News 
and Irohin Itesiwaju says an advertisement by the Ministry 
of Information of the Emergency Administration of Western 
Nigeria in a local newspaper.
Irohin Itesiwaju means "Progress Report". And coming 
from Western Nigeria one might ask what pride is in a state 
of emergency to shout its"own praises on rooftops. Has the 
declaration of a state of emergency not stained the good name 
of Nigeriaat home and abroad to make the whole episode a sad 
commentary on the nation's self-respect and international 
reputation?
No, not on your life. Why on earth has the Emergency 
Administration embarked on this crazy adventure...
Now, the Western News is back. This time "FREE". You 
don't have to pay for it now. It is a gift from the Emergency 
Administration of Dr. Moses Majekodunmi. The two publications 
are the 1962 Manna from Moses of 1962 to the people of 
Western Nigeria wandering through the wilderness of emergency 
rule.
s 2 (b), ibid, the full text of the relevant regulations is 
set out in the judgment, supra, at 273.
See Amalgamated Press of Nigeria Ltd, supra at 273.
See the section on the History of Nigeria at p 94 above. It 
is ironic to note that consent of either the Attorney- 
General, Director of Public Prosecutions or the Administrator 
was required for the commencement of proceedings under the 
Regulations; and that it was the Administrator himself who 
gave the requisite consent. See judgment, at 273.
R v Amalgamated Press of Nigeria Ltd., supra at 275.
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Only Dr. Majekodunmi knows what he hopes to achieve 
by this new drain on the coffers of Western Nigeria. But 
the Daily Express thinks the whole adventure is misguided 
and ought to be scrapped forthwith.
First, Dr. Majekodunmi tells us that Western Nigeria 
is broke. It is paying the salaries of clerks and messengers 
from loans and overdrafts. That is certainly a tale of woe.
But is there any sign of austerity which should follow 
such discovery? We have not seen it yet. All we find is 
a stubborn policy of waste and extravagance.
The latest of course is to run these two publications 
and the papers like similar propaganda sheets to be distributed 
free.
We have said it before that some people are giving the 
impression that the present state of emergency in the West 
is not a temporary one.
Maybe when Dr. Majekodunmi looks into the mirror at 
Government house, Ibadan, he sees himself as the next Premier 
of the Western Region. That, certainly, is not a bad dream.
As a Nigerian, he is entitled to aspire to that high office.
And more too.
But the way to go about becoming the next Premier of 
the West is first to find himself a constituency. And he 
won't find one in the goodwill of Sir Abubakar.
The Emergency Administration cannot become a political 
party. If these two publications are designed to boost the 
prestige of that administration its effect is bound to be 
temporary.
i
So, why not call off the gamble now, Dear Moses'.
In assessing the effect of the article, the court stressed
the similarity between the Regulations and the law of sedition,
but pointed out that the former - unlike the latter -
penalises the exposure of government to ridjlcule, as well
2
as to hatred and contempt. In the court's view, the article 
'taken as a whole /was/ one that /was/ likely to expose 
the Administrator if not to hatred, clearly to the ridicule
Ibid, at 275-276. 
Ibid, at 274.
-438-
and contempt of persons in Nigeria and especially /in the
Western Region/ 1 . This was particularly apparent in the
heading ("Scrap them Moses") and in the concluding sentence
o
("So why not call the gamble off now, Dear Moses"). All 
in all, in the opinion of the court, the article/went/ 
far beyond the bounds of fair, decent and honest criticism'. 
The court also pointed out that the offence charged under 
the Regulations 'does not give an accused person the various 
safeguards and defences as are provided in the case of 
publication of a defamatory matter or libel (sic)'^; and 
further stressed that 'the real test in the case /was/ not 
the falsity or otherwise of the article but whether the 
publication /was/ likely to expose the Administrator in 
his capacity as a member of the government of Western Nigeria
5
to hatred, ridicule or contempt' .
Taking all these factors into account, the court was satis­
fied that the publication indeed contravened the Regulation.
/T
It accordingly found the newspaper proprietor guilty ; but 
acquitted the paper's editor, on the basis that he had been 
away from his office in Lagos at the time of publication 
(having been attending a court case in Ilorin for the previous 
eight days) and was accordingly 'in no way a party (bo the
 ^ Ib_id, at 275.
2 Ibid, at 275 and 276.
3 Ibid, at 276.
 ^ Ibid, at 274.
 ^ Ibid, at 275.
Ibid, at 278. Unfortunately, no indication is given in the 
report of the penalty meted out to the company.
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publication of the article.1
In assessing the judgment, one aspect of the court's decision
is clearly to be welcomed: viz, the acquittal of the paper's
editor. This indicates that the intent to publish an article
which is found to offend is - at minimum - a pre-requisite 
2
to liability. However, the overall impact of the decision 
is disturbing: and the case clearly illustrates a number 
of ways in which the law of sedition appears to go too far 
in curtailing freedom of expression.
Firstly, although in the particular circumstances, the court 
laid great stress on the element of ridicule or contempt 
in the article; and although there is an important difference 
between the Regulations and the general law of sedition,
3
in this regard (in the former's express reference to 'ridicule' ) 
it must also be acknowledged that the definition of sedition 
in both North and South is sufficiently wide to enable a 
court to place an equivalent emphasis on "contempt" - rather 
than on the excitation of "hatred" - in articles impugned 
under the provisions of the Criminal and Penal Codes. Thus, 
the Criminal Code refers expressly to the arousal of either
4
'hatred' or 'contempt' of government as constituting sedition;
5
and the Penal Code reference to 'disaffection' is sufficiently
This was notwithstanding the fact that the article had 
appeared in the editorial column. The court was able to 
distinguish the earlier decision of R v African Press Ltd 
Jand another, f'Wbl] W.N.L.R.1, on the basis that the editor, 
in the present instance, had given evidence which clearly 
2 showed his absence from the newspapers' offices at the time.
The importance of mens rea, in general, is discussed below.
. See p 436 above.
5 See p 412 above.
See p 400 above.
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broad to include ’contempt" and 'ridicule*
within its ambit. It follows/ thus/ that (as in the present
1
case) an article which is written tongue in cheek , and 
which (although touching on serious issues) is fundamentally 
light-hearted in its approach - and hence is most unlikely 
to stir its audience to violence - may well be found to be 
seditious.
Furthermore, the case graphically demonstrates that defences
available under the law of defamation - notably justification
2 3(or truth) and fair comment/ - have no application under
the law of sedition. It also shows that mens rea (in all
but the narrow sense of intent to publish an article which
4
is found to offend) does not constitute an element of the 
offence/ the question whether the accused intended in any 
real sense to excite hatred or contempt against government 
being accordingly irrelevant.
In short, this case - as well as the Chike Obi decision and 
other cases discussed above - show the law of sedition being 
used to stifle criticism and comment which seems entirely 
legitimate and which cannot seriously be supposed to'pose a 
threat of violence or even disorder. It must of course be
_  -
This is particularly evident, for example, in the delightful 
description of the two publications being the '1962 Manna 
from Moses of 1962 to the people of Western Nigeria wandering 
through the wilderness of emergency rule.'.
2
It must, of course, be acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
in the subsequent case of DPP v Obi, discussed above at p 411r 
indicated that truth might constitute a defence in some 
circumstances but gave no clear indication when this would be.
3
The defence of fair comment (as well as that of justification) 
are further discussed below in the section on Defamation below.
4
The importance of intent in this narrow sense is, of course, 
acknowledged by the court's acquittal of the editor, who 
was absent at the time of publication.
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recognised that freedom of expression cannot be absolute 
and that government is entitled (and obliged) to repress 
utterances which are likely to throw the nation - or any 
part of it - into violent upheaval. The crucial requirement 
in this regard, however, is striking an appropriate balance 
between the two vital interests of free speech and public 
order; and it is a moot question whether the law 6f sedition 
in Nigeria provides a suitable guiding line. Before turning 
to examine this question further (and to analyse the constit­
utionality of the law under the Bill of Rights) it is salutary 
to note the very different principles adopted by the United 
States of America to the problem of sedition.
5.9. The Contrasting Approach of the United States
The well-known case of Schenck v United States provides
a convenient starting point for discussion of the contrasting
approach of the United States to the law of sedition.
Schenck was the general secretary of the Socialist P^rty,
and (in 1917) distributed some 15,000 leaflets urging their
recipients to resist the draft - which was (inter alia)
described as a 'monstrous wrong against humanity, in the
2interest of Wall Street's chosen few'. He (and his colleagues) 
were indicted under the Espionage Act 1917 which - in broad 
outline - proscribed (inter alia) statements 'construed to 
cause insubordination or disloyalty in the armed forces, or
249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919). 
2 Ibid» at 51.
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to obstruct enlistment or recruiting' . Schenck and his
co-defendents were convicted by a federal trial court and
petitioned the Supreme Court on the basis that the relevant
sections of the Act violated constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press. The appeal was dismissed
and the case is principally noteworthy for the formulation
by Mr. Justice Holmes of the 'clear and present danger'
doctrine. Holmes acknowledged that 'in ordinary times',
the defendants would have been within their constitutional
2
rights in saying 'all that was said in the circular' . How­
ever, the times were not ordinary and '/w/hen a nation is 
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
4
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
3
not be endured' . Much, therefore, depends upon the surround
ing circumstances - and Holmes expressed the appropriate
test in the following terms:
'The question in every case is whether the words used 
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as 
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent'.4
The difficulties of applying the 'clear and present danger' 
criterion were graphically demonstrated some six months
5
later in the case of Abrams v United States. Abrams, a 
young 'anarchist-Socialist' and five associates had, in
7 * ' ~
Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed., New
York, 1978, p 35.
2 Schenck v U.S., supra, at 52.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Ibid.
5 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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late August 1918 r distributed leaflets in the lower East
Side of New York which called upon the "workers of the world"
to resist Allied and American intervention in Russia against
the Bolsheviki: by staging a general strike to prevent the
shipment of war materials to the anti-Soviet forces . They
were indicted under the Sedition Act of 1918 which went
'considerably beyond its predecessor/ the Espionage Act of 
2
1917' and prohibited any '"disloyal/ profane/ scurrilous 
or abusive language about the form of government/ the Constit 
ution, soldiers and sailors, flag or uniform of the armed 
forces"', as well as any '"word or act... /opposing/ the
3
cause of the United States"' . They were convicted by a
New York court and three of them were sentenced to 20 years'
4imprisonment plus a fine of #4000 each. Their appeal to 
the Supreme Court was dismissed by a majority of 7:2.
5
The decision has been criticised with considerable force 
and the case is most noteworthy for the dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Justice Holmes, (Brandeis concurring) in the following 
terms:
'/T/he ultimate good desired is better reached by /the/ 
free trade in ideas... /than by suppression/. /T/he best of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market... Every year if not every day
See Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 4th ed., Oxford, 1982, 
p 207.
 ^ IJsid, p 206.
 ^ Ibid.
4
'The lone girl received 15 years and a #500 fine. One was 
sentenced to a mere three years. Four years later. President 
Harding commuted their sentences on condition that they all 
immediately embarked for the Soviet Union - which they did':
See Abraham, ibid, p 207.
5
See Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in the United 
States, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 194§, Chapter III.
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we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based 
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of 
our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant 
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful 
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country.1*
Six years later the 'clear and present danger' doctrine took
2a new and disturbing direction in Gitlow v New York .
Gitlow was 'an active exponent of extreme left-wing causes 
and a member of the most radical wing of the Socialist
3
Party' . He was tried and convicted under the Criminal 
Anarchy Act of 1902 of New York State for having '"advocated, 
advised, and taught the duty, necessity, and propriety of 
overthrowing and overturning organized government by force, 
violence and unlawful means by certain writings" (/these 
being/ the "Left Wing Manifesto" and "The Revolutionary Age")'
5
His appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by 6:2 , the 
majority adopting a test based on 'bad tendency' rather
g
than 'clear and present danger' . Thus, Justice Sanford, 
delivering the judgment of the Court, pointed out that a 
'single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering 
for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive
7
conflagration'. Accordingly, in his view, the State is 
entitled, in the exercise of its judgment, /to/ suppress
g
the threatened danger in its incipiency'.
-
Abrams v U.S., supra, at 630, emphasis supplied.
In the view of Holmes and Brandeis, 'surreptitious public­
ation of /this/ silly leaflet, posed no such threat'.
2 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3
Abraham op cit, p 51.
 ^ Ibid, p 52.
5
Justice Stone did not participate.
g
See Abraham, supra, p 209.
7
Gitlow v New York, supra, at 669.
8 Ibid.
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This approach is indeed, a far cry from the 'clear and 
present danger' test. The criterion thus adopted by the 
majority was whether the conduct in question had merely a
i
'"bad tendency" to bring about a danger * . Justice Holmes 
2
'thundered' his disapproval, emphasising that Gitlow had 
made no real attempt to overthrow the government by force, 
and that his manifesto could be considered an incitement 
only to the extent that '/’eyvery idea is an incitement 
/whichy... offers itself for belief and if believed...^may 
bey acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or
3
some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth' .
If the end result were that the idea of proletarian dict­
atorship became accepted by the majority, then it should be 
allowed to prevail - and the entire concept of free speech 
was meaningless unless each idea was thus given its oppor-
4
tunity for acceptance.
5
Next came the case of Whitney v California, where Ms. Whitney/ 
who had joined the Communist Labour Party of California in
1
See Abraham, op cit, p 210/ who points out that - by framing 
the test in this way (following a phrase from Schaefer v 
United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) the majority shifted the 
balance between individual and state significantly towards 
the latter.
2
Abraham, ibid.
3
Gitlow v New York, supra, at 673.
4
See ibid. Abraham, supra, p 210, points out that Holmes' 
view appears to have been premised on 'faith in the ability 
of the American people to choose their destiny' and to see 
through the false promises of Communist doctrine. Thus, in 
his view, ideas should be allowed free play - but not overt 
illegal actions (for these could destroy free choice in the 
market of ideas).
5 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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1919, was convicted under the state's Criminal Syndicalism
Act of 1919, for having assisted in forming (and then having
joined) a group 'organised and assembled to advocate, teach,
aid and abet criminal syndicalism' . Her appeal to the
Supreme Court was unanimously dismissed on the basis that
'the State of California had an inherent right to guard
2
statutorily against the alleged conspiracy' . Though, 
concurring with the conclusion of the Court, Holmes and 
Brandeis objected to the majority interpretation of one 
section of the statute which had the effect of making it an 
offence merely to be in '"association with those who proposed
3
to teach criminal syndicalism"' . This smacked of the 
Gitlow 'bad tendency' doctrine; and, in an attempt to 
resurrect and strengthen their concept of the 'clear and
4
present danger' test, Brandeis penned a concurring opinion
- stressing the requirement of 'imminence of serious injury'
He thus declared.
'Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression 
of free speech and assembly... /T/here must be reasonable 
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech 
is practised /and/ /t/here must be reasonable gmouijid to 
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent...',
Ibid, at 358.
2
Abraham, op cit, p 211.
 ^ Ibid.
4 Holmes joined in this. It is interesting to note that the 
concurring opinion - which reads like a dissent - was origin­
ally written as such. It was prepared for the case of 
Ruthenberg v Michigan, 273 U.S. 782 (1927), which was 'mooted 
by Ruthenberg's death and dismissed that March. Brandeis 
subsequently seized upon the opportunity of Whitney to ‘incor­
porate the central points of that dissent into what is his 
concurring opinion for Whitney'. See Abraham, ibid, p 212,n 278.
5
He further explained this by emphasising that 'it must be 
shown either that immediate serious violence /is/ to be 
expected or /is/ advocated, or that... past conduct furnishe/s/ 
reason to believe that such advocacy /is/ then contemplated.' 
Whitney v California, supra, at 376.
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'Those who won our independence by revolution were not 
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not 
exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous/ self- 
reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless 
reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, 
no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, 
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent 
that it may befall before there is opportunity for full 
discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion, 
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes 
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence'.
This clarion call for freedom of expression was not, however,
to be heeded for a number of years. The Alien Registration
2 3Act, commonly known as the Smith Act , had been introduced
in 1940; and '/'t/he heart of its provisions, under Section 
2, made it a crime to advocate forcible or violent over­
throw of government, or to publish or distribute material
4
advocating violence with the intent to overthrow government'
5
In 1951, in Dennis v United States, the Act was used against 
leading figures in the American Communist Party, who 'were 
found guilty of a conspiracy to teach and advocate the over­
throw of the United States Government by force and violence, 
and a conspiracy to organise the American Communist Party 
to teach and advocate the same offences*.^ The Supreme 
Court - rejecting contentions that the Smith Act violated 
the guarantee of freedom of expression contained in the 
First Amendment (as well as due process guarantees under the
7
Fifth Amendment ) upheld its constitutionality by a majority 
of 6:2)S.
1 Ibid, at 377.
 ^ 54 U.S. Statutes 670.
3
So called, after Howard W Smith of Virginia who introduced 
it. See Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 37.
4
Nelson & Teeter, ibid.
5 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
6 Abraham, op cit, p 181.
It was argued that the Act was too vague to satisfy the due 
process requirement.
Mr. Justice Clark did not participate.
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i
Chief Justice Vinson (in an opinion supported by three others)
declared that the court was 'squarely presented with the
2
application of the "clear and present danger" test' - and 
was satisfied that this criterion was fulfilled in the 
particular circumstances of the case. He emphasised that 
'/*o/verthrow of the Government by force and violence is 
certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government
3
to limit speech' ; and stressed that the 'clear and present 
danger' test could not require the Government - before 
taking action - to 'wait until the putsch is about to be
4
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited' . 
Nor did it matter whether the attempt to overthrow the 
state was likely to be successful: 'even though doomed from
the outset because of inadequate numbers or power... /itJ
5
is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent' . Adopting 
the formula suggested by Chief Judge Hand in the Court of 
Appeals, Vinson ruled that the correct approach is to ask 
'whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger'^. Applying these principles
7
to the facts, Vinson concluded that the mere 'existence' 
of this 'highly organised conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined 
members subject to call when the leaders... felt that the
Q
time had come for action' constituted a sufficient danger 
to justify suppression.
These were Reed, Burton and Minton.
2
Dennis v U.S., supra, at 508.
3 Ibid, at 509.
 ^ Ibid,
5 Ibid
7 Ibid, at 510, citing Dennis v U.S. 183 F.2d 201 (1950) at 212. 
„ Ibid, at 511.
Ibid, at 510.
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Concurring opinions were delivered by Justice Frankfurter 
(who stressed that the judicial branch of government should 
not lightly interfere with what the legislature had considered
i
appropriate ) and by Justice Jackson who 'waving aside the
2
intricate free-speech problem...' , concentrated on the
3
conspiracy element of the case.
Vehement dissents were expressed by Justices Black and 
Douglas. Neither believed that the activities of the defend­
ants constituted 'a danger either clear or present enough 
to justify what they regarded as a rank invasion of the
4
prerogatives of freedom of expression1 . Douglas charged 
the majority with eroding the requirements of the test it
5
had purported to apply , and stressed that:
'Free speech - the glory of our system of government - 
should not be sacrificed on anything less than plain and ^
objective proof of danger that the evil advocated is imminent' .
He further pointed out that communist doctrine had won 
little acceptance in the countr^; whilst Justice Black 
concluded his opinion with the hope that 'in calmer times, 
when present pressures, passions and fears subside/ this or 
some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties 
to the high preferred place where they belong in a free
o
society'.
_
Ibid, at 539, where he emphasised that 'we /"judges/ are not 
legislators/ /"and/... direct policy-making is not our province'.
2
Abraham, op cit, p 182.
3
Dennis v U.S., supra, where he states that the 'Constitution 
does not make conspiracy a civil right1 (at 572) .
4
Abraham, op cit, p 182.
 ^ See ibid.
Dennis v U.S., supra, at 590.
Ibid, at 589, where he described Communists in the U.S./ as 
'miserable merchants of unwanted ideas'.
§ Ibid, at 581 .
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That hope was realised in June 1957, (by which time, it is
interesting to note, 'the Federal authorities had obtained..
1
89 convictions under the Smith Act' ). Then, however, in
2
Yates v United States , the Supreme Court (by a majority
3
of 6:1 ) severely restricted the application of the statute.
4
Reversing the conviction of 14 Communist Party leaders, 
the Court emphasised the importance of 'the difference 
between teaching the need for violent overthrow as an abstract
5
theory or doctrine, and teaching it as a spur to action' .
£
Justice Harlan declared:
'The legislative history of the Smith Act and related 
bills shows beyond all question that Congress was aware of 
the distinction between the advocacy or teaching of abstract 
doctrine and the advocacy or teaching of action, add that it 
dido not intend to disregard it. The statute was aimed at 
the advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible 
overthrow of the Government, and not of principles divorced 
from action'.?
Accordingly, it would now have to be proved that 'individuals 
on trial for alleged violations of the Smith Act had actually 
intended, now or in the future, to overthrow the government 
by force and violence, or to persuade others to do so. More­
over, the government would still have to demonstrate that
Abraham, supra, p 183.
2 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
3
Justice Clark dissented and Justices Brennan and Whittaker 
did not participate.
4
The Court ordered the aquittal of five of the accused, and 
for the remainder to be retried in accordance with new guide­
lines ,
5
Nelson & Teeter, op cit, pp 40-41.
g
The author of the Court's 'intricate' opinion. See Abraham, 
supra, p 183.
Yates v United States, suprar at 319 - 320.
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the language employed by the advocates of actual overthrow 
was in fact 'calculated to incite to action:..."to do some­
thing, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe 
in something"'.
Following the Yates decision, 'charges against many other
defendants in pending cases were dismissed in lower courts
2
/and/ /t/he Smith Act soon lapsed into disuse'. A signal 
victory for freedom of expression had been won.
The same approach is evident also in the subsequent Supreme
3
Court case of Brandenburg v Ohio , in which the Court reversed 
the conviction of a leader of the Ku Klux Klan for 'advocating 
the duty or necessity of crime, violence or unlawful methods
4
of terrorism to accomplish political reform' . His convict­
ion had arisen from a televised speech, in which he had 
stated that the Klan was 'not a revengent organisation, but 
/that/ if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, 
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible
5
that there might have to be some revengeance taken' . He 
added: "We are marching on Congress... four hundred thousand 
strong".^
Citing precedent since Dennis, the Supreme Court declared:
7 — ~ “ “
Abraham, op cit, p 183, citing the judgment of the Court,
ibid,, at 325.
2
Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 41.
3 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
4
Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 41.
5
Brandenburg v Ohio, supra, at 446.
 ^ Ibid*
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'These later decisions have fashioned the principle that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy 
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action... A stathte 
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes 
upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.'^
The advent of the Burger court has seen no narrowing of
2
freedom <5f expression in this regard . On the contrary,
3
in Landmark Communications Inc. v Virginia , Chief Justice
Burger 'strongly reaffirmed a tough "clear and present
danger" standard upon any legislative attempts to bridle
*4freedom of speech . He also emphasised that the Court 
retains the power to determine whether the conditions 'essen1
5
tial to validity under the Federal Constitution 1 are met.
In summary, thus , the Supreme Court - since the decision
fr
in Yates v United States - has adopted an approach which 
significantly favours freedom of expression (albeit much 
depends on the manner in which the 'advocacy of action' 
principle is applied in practice). Notwithstanding this 
caveat, the Court - by emphasising that the advocacy of 
belief alone is not enough to justify suppression - has 
adopted a viewpoint radically different from that expressed
7
by the Nigerian Supreme Court in the Chike Obi case (to
Ibid, at 447 - 448.
2
See Abraham, op cit, pp 214-215.
3 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
4
A b r a h a m supra, pp 215.
5 Landmark Communications Inc v Virginia, supra at 843-844. 
Supra.
7
/1961/ 1 All N.L.R. 186. This case has, of course, been 
previously discussed.
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name the most notorious example). The provisions of the
Nigerian law of sedition are admittedly different in terms
from the United States' statutes discussed above; but in
spirit, the law is very much the same. It is submitted that
the time has now come for Nigerian courts to shake off the
1
heritage of colonialism in this regard and to draw a clear 
distinction in future cases between speech designed to advocate 
the imminent and violent overthrow of government and that 
which merely criticises government - albeit in strong terms.
If Nigerian courts persist in applying the Chike Obi decision, 
they will be following a path for which no adequate authority 
exists. In English common law, incitement to violence has 
long been recognised as an essential ingredient of the 
offence of sedition. In the United States, the advocacy of 
action as opposed to belief has belatedly - but strongly - 
been recognised as a prerequisite to the suppression of the 
interchange of ideas. The time has now come for Nigeria 
to take an equal stand in favour of freedom of expression: 
particularly in the light of the questionable constitutionality 
of the sedition legislation, as further explained below.
It will be recalled that the Nigerian Supreme Court relied 
upon the earlier decision of the Privy Council in R v 
Wallace Johnson,/1 940/A.C. 231, which had been heavily 
premised upon the special conditions applicable in the 
Gold Coast Colony at the time, which (it was alleged) 
required more severe constraints upon criticism of the 
government than would have been considered appropriate 
in Britain itself.
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5.10. The Constitutionality of the Law of Sedition
It remains to consider the constitutionality of the Nigerian 
law of sedition. Prima facie, its restrictions infringe 
the right to 'receive and impart ideas and information with­
out interference' which is guaranteed by s 36 of the 1979 
Constitution. However, s 41(1) (a) further provides that 
this guarantee does not invalidate 'any law that is reason­
ably justifiable in a democratic society... in the interest 
of... public safety for/ public order'. The sedition laws 
are clearly aimed at securing public safety and public order; 
and the crucial criterion in determining their validity is 
accordingly whether they can be considered 'reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society' for these purposes.
In answering this question, the first step is to recall some 
of the more disturbing features of the present law, as 
previously described. First and foremost amongst these is 
the width of the definition of sedition in both the Criminal 
and Penal Codes. Thus, the Criminal Code prohibits the 
excitation of "hatred", "contempt", "disaffection" and 
"discontent" against government or the promotion of "ill-will" 
and "hostility" between different classes; whilst the Penal
i
Code (in s 416 ) forbids the arousal of "disaffection"
against government: not only in Nigeria, but also in the
United Kingdom. Only s 417 of the Penal Code is more narrowly
framed in its prohibition of an intentional attempt to
* excite hatred or contempt against any class of persons in
• 2
such a way as to endanger the public peace.
“
See the discussion of this section at p 427 et seq. , which 
2 clearly illustrates the width of the provision.
s 417, Penal Code (Northern Region) Federal Provisions Act, 
discussed above at p 401 and 433.
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The next distressing aspect of the la* is the refusal -
following the Judicial Committee opinion in R v Wallace
Johnson - to acknowledge that intent to excite to violence
is an essential ingredient of liability. The importance of
this safeguard against an overweaning application of the law
is well illustrated by the English cases previously described.
Moreover, it is also in keeping with fundamental principles
of criminal liability that mens rea in this form should be 
1
required. Moreover, the Nigerian law contains no equivalent
of the United States' principles of 'clear and present danger'
or 'advocacy of force' aimed at - and likely to produce -
2
imminent lawless action . Yet the latter are important safe­
guards too, for the law should not seek to punish a man 
for urging arson or riot on a busy street corner to people 
too intent on their own pursuits to stop and listen. The 
true object of the law of sedition is to prevent the occurence 
of violence; and it should not go beyond its proper ambit 
to impose more wide-reaching restrictions.
A further disturbing aspect of the law is the lack of defences 
it provides. In particular, it is disquieting that truth 
and fair comment do not constitute defences - though the 
importance of truth has not, of course, been entirely rejected 
by the Supreme Court in the Chike Obi case. So long as the
7
The essence of the offence is excitation to violence (even 
though the present definitions are wide enough to encompass 
more than this) and the guilty mind necessary to give rise 
to liability should accordingly be an intent to cause the 
very consequence which the law seeks to prevent.
2 See the discussion of the United States approach, culminating 
in the case of Brandenburg v Ohio, at p 451 above.
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definition of sedition is as widely framed as at present, 
it is vital that these defences be available, as otherwise 
the person who seeks to draw attention to genuine grievances 
is indeed in the "Catch 22" situation that the more real 
and felt the grievance is, the more likely the mention of 
it (even in the most reasoned and measured terms) is likely 
to rouse "hatred", "contempt" or "disaffection" against those 
responsible.
The final disquieting aspect of the law lies in the fact
that what is seditious or not (in terms of the present wide
definitions) is left to the determination of judges alone,
without the assistance of a jury of "twelve good men and
true". Yet, as Denning has pointed out, even the most
independent judge may be unconsciously influenced by his
own predilections (and may not be able to bring a sufficiently
open mind to bear upon the question of whether a publication
is seditious). Moreover, the definitions are so wide at
present that any such decision is intrinsically arbitary;
and it is far fairer to the accused - in such circumstances -
to invoke twelve opinions rather than to rely on one. This
is not to suggest that trial by jury should be introduced
in Nigeria for cases of sedition, as this would clearly be 
2
impracticable. However, the absence of jury trial under­
lines the need for narrow formulation of the offence; and
for emphasis on the safeguards provided by the need to show
7 “ “
See p 39 4 above.
2
It will be recalled that trial by jury applies only in 
Lagos and only in instances where capital punishment may 
be meted out.
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'intent to excite violence1 (as in the United Kingdom)
coupled with 'clear and present danger' or 'advocacy of
1
immediate force' (as in the United States).
In conclusion/ it is submitted that the shortcomings in the 
present law of sedition in Nigeria as outlined above result 
in the law going further than is 'reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society' to maintain public order and safety.
It is accordingly submitted that the present law is unconst­
itutional; and that it is in need of reform in various ways. 
Thus, the definition of sedition should be tightened to make 
it clear that it is excitation to violence that is prohibited. 
Mens rea in the form of intent to excite to violence should 
be made a pre-requisite to liability; and so too should the 
actual likelihood (or reality) of violence resulting from 
the publication. In this regard, a distinction should be 
drawn between speech and writing, since the former is more 
likely to have immediate effect upon its audience. Further, 
in the context of written publications, a further distinction 
should be drawn between a pamphlet aimed at a particular 
group (bound together by existing sense of grievance) and 
a newspaper intended for circulation amongst the public as 
a whole; and, as regards the latter, the burden on the 
prosecution of proving intent to excite violence and the 
likelihood of its occuning should be recognised as being 
considerably higher.
1
This catchphrase attempts to summarise the principles 
emphasised by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v Ohio, 
described at p 451 above.
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Fur thermore , truth and fair comment - if not recognised as 
complete defences (as may not be appropriate under the 
definition proposed) - should be recognised as powerful 
factors in mitigation and should serve to exonerate all 
but the most irresponsible.
Only if these changes are made, will the law strike an 
appropriate balance between the competing principles of free 
speech and public order. The present law is far too heavily 
weighted in favour of the latter and (as the Nigerian 
decisions previously discussed clearly demonstrate) is capable 
of being used by government to penalise criticism and comment 
which should be recognised as legitimate in a society which 
aspires to democracy. The present law of sedition goes too 
far. It is unconstitutional; and it must be modified to 
bring it into line with the guarantee of freedom of expression 
enshrined in s 36.
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C H A P T E R  S I X
:THE CIVIL LAW OF DEFAMATION
6.1. The Importance of the Law of Defamation for Media Freedom
The law of defamation holds considerable significance for freedom
of the media. Under this branch of law, the publication of
defamatory matter (as further defined below) may constitute a tort
(for which damages are payable to redress the wrong done) or a crime
(for which the sanction is either fine or imprisonment). Little 
1
special protection against liability for defamation is accorded
the media, notwithstanding their primary role in the publication of
opinion, information and ideas; and the problems presented to the
media by this branch of law are exacerbated by the fact that
defamation is, to a considerable extent, a tort or crime of 'strict
liability' in the sens'e (as further described below) that subjective
intent to defame is not an essential requirement for liability under
either the civil or criminal law. Thus, not only may defamation
2
be 'unintentional', but the chain of liability is commensurately 
far-reaching; and those who are only peripherally involved in the 
publication of defamatory matter through the media (such as the street
1. There are exceptions to this general principle, as evidenced - 
for example - by the requirement that the leave of a judge in 
chambers is necessary in order to institute a criminal prosecution 
for defamation against those responsible for the publication of
a newspaper containing defamatory material, as further described 
at p. 604 below.
2. Liability for 'unintentional' defamation and the steps which have 
been taken in England and in some parts of Nigeria to cater
for this difficulty are described at p516 below.
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vendor of a newspaper or the technician engaged in the production 
of a radio or television broadcast) may be held liable under the 
law: even though they cannot be said, in any real sense, to have 
intended to defame.
The Nigerian law of defamation is part of the body of English law
which applies within the country by virtue of the general reception
process previously described.^ In England itself - the country of
origin of the rules of defamation here in issue - considerable
attention has recently been given to the need for reform of the
law. An investigative body, the Committee on Defamation, issued
a report on the law (in both its civil and criminal aspects) in 
2
1975 and has recommended a number of changes in the law as further
described in due course. It seems, however, that there is considerable
force in the recent dictum of Lord Diplock in the House of Lords in
3
G1eaves v Deakin and others that 'the law of defamation, civil as
well as criminal, has proved an intractable subject for radical 
4
reform. In Nigeria, the recipient of the English laws of defa­
mation with all of their difficulties - especially for the media - 
the need for reform is no less strong; but to date (perhaps because 
of all the other pressing problems facing the country as a developing
1. The process whereby Nigeria has received a considerable body 
of English law has previously been described in the section 
on the Sources of Nigerian Law, at p 129 et seq. The sources
of the Nigerian law of defamation are described in further detail 
at p. 643 elt seq.
2. Report of the Committee on Defamation, Cmnd. 5909, 1975,
The Committee was presided over by Mr Justice Faulks, and its report 
is commonly known as the Faulks Report.
3. [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L.(E)).
4. Ibid., at 499.
nation), it seems that the same sort of comprehensive analysis and 
review as has recently been effected in the United Kingdom -'through 
the Committee on Defamation - has not yet been implemented. It is 
accordingly proposed to examine the rules of defamation in some 
detail in an endeavour to provide a more comprehensive analysis than 
has previously been attempted in existing Nigerian texts on 
defamation;^ and to suggest an alternative approach - based upon 
the experience of the United States of America - which may serve 
to meet some of the more pressing problems, The law of civil 
defamation will be examined in this chapter; and the criminal law 
of defamation in the one following: and, in each case, an attempt 
will then be made to review the law in general and to assess its 
constitutionality in the light of the guarantee of freedom of 
expression contained in the 1979 Constitution.
6.2. The Significance of the Law of Civil Defamation
From the viewpoint of the media, the law of civil defamation in
Nigeria undoubtedly has considerable significance, as Kodilinye
graphically describes:
'The immediate post-independence period in 
Nigeria was characterised by vigorous 
political activity supported by an 
articulate and free press. It is significant
1. See, for example, A.V.J. Nylander 'Defamation and the Press', 
in T.O. Elias (ed.), Nigerian Press Law, 1969, pp. 16-34; the 
discussion by C.O. Okonkwo, 'The Law of Torts' in C.O. Okonkwo 
(ed.) Introduction to Nigerian Law, 1980, pp. 265-6; the material 
on 'Defamation' in McNeil & Rains, Nigerian Cases and Statutes
on Contract and Tort,1965, pp. 311-372; the chapter on 'Defamation'
in Kodilinye, The Nigerian Law of Torts, 1982, pp. 131-176; 
and the chapter on ^Defamation' in C.O. Okonkwo in Criminal
Law in Nigeria, 1980, pp. 279-283.
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that the plaintiffis in defamation 
actions in the early 1960s included most 
of the leading political personalities of 
the time, and that there was hardly a national 
newspaper which was not a defendant in 
at least one such action during the period.
With the advent of military rule, defamation 
actions no longer featured "battles" between 
politicians and the press, or between 
politicians themselves, and the great 
increase in road traffic, and therefore road 
accidents, in the 1970s ensured that negligence 
superceded defamation as the most frequently 
litigated tort'. 1
However, as Kodilinye is quick to acknowledge, the situation which
pertained during the 1970s may well change in the future, with the
return of.the country to civilian rule; and defamatioh may well*y
again, become one of the most frequently litigated torts. In any
event, the high incidence of defamation suits during the 'First 
2
Republic' and the clear correlation between these and 'vigorous
3
political activity' plainly shows the significance of the civil law 
of defamation - both in general, and also for the media especially: 
for the media inevitably constitute major channels for the publication 
of comment and criticism on contentious political issues.
1. Kodilinye, op cit, p.131
2. This is, of course, the name given to the initial post-independence
period which terminated with the military coup of January 1966.
The era which began with the return of civilian rule under the 
1979 Constitution is known as the 'Second Republic', as described
in the section on .the History of Nigeria, at pill above.
3. See p. 545 et seq.
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6.3. The Sources of the Law of Civil Defamation
1
In general, the law of defamation (both civil and criminal ) forms
part of the body of English law which has been received into Nigeria
in the manner previously described in the section on the Sources of 
2
Nigerian Law. Thus, by virtue of this reception, English common law
rules relating to defamation as well as statutory principles relevant
to defamation contained in English statutes of general application,
3
in force in England on 1 January 1900 are the principal sources of
the Nigerian law of defamation. In addition, in the context of the
4
law of civil defamation, a number of important rules have been
introduced by Nigerian legislation. The Nigerian statutes in question
are the Defamation Law 1961,^ applicable in Lagos State, and the
substantially similar Defamation Laws of the eastern and western 
6
states. No such legislation has been introduced in the northern 
states, thus leaving a lacuna in the law of defamation as it applies 
in the North which can only be described as unfortunate. The Defamation 
laws which have been introduced in the southern states are largely 
modelled on the United Kingdom Defamation Act 1952 which introduced 
a number of important reforms - especially as regards the defence of
1. The criminal law of defamation is described in Chapter Seven.
2. See p . 130 above.
3. See p. 131 above.
4. The word 'civil1 is here stressed because different legislative 
rules have been adopted, in the context of criminal defamation, 
in the Criminal and Penal Codes, as further explained in Chapter 
Seven.
5. Cap 34,(Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973).
6. Defamation Law (eastern states), Cap. 33 (Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 
1963) and Defamation Law (western states), Cap 32 (Laws of the
Western Region of Nigeria, 1959). For the sake of convenience,
these statutes are subsequently referred to as Defamation Law 
(eastern states), Cap 33; and Defamation Law (western states) Cap 32, 
or (in yet more abbreviated form) as E.S. Cap 33 and W.S. Cap 32.
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'unintentional defamation', as further explained in due course.^
It is thus regrettable that these reforms have not been implemented 
in the North - an area which is far larger than the South and which
contains the majority of the population.
The difference in the law applicable to defamation in the northern
and southern parts of Nigeria also generates complex 'conflict of
law' questions. Say, for example, that a newspaper was produced
and printed in Lagos, but distributed in a northern city such as
Kano, and contained an article which was 'unintentionally' defamatory
within the meaning of the statutory defence provided by the Defamation
Law 1961, applicable in LagosAbut not in the North, Should the laws
of Lagos State be applied - on the basis that this is the area of
origin of the tortious act? Or should the law of northern Nigeria
govern, on the ground that it is here that the defamatory article
has been read and hence here that the tort has produced its harmful
effect? Determining the proper law of a tort in a situation where
two or more sets of conflicting rules are arguably applicable is,
2
of course, a question of great complexity; and further consideration
of this problem lies outside the scope of this study. The difficulty
serves to demonstrate, however, the need for reform of the law of 
defamation in the North - so as, at minimum, to bring it into line 
with that applicable in the southern areas of the country.
1. See p. 516, et seq.
2. Texts on the topic of conflict of laws are too numerous to list, 
but some idea of the complexities is provided in 0. Kahn-Freund, 
General Problems of Private International Law, Leyden, 1976.
-465-
6.4. The Distinction between Libel and Slander
Libel is the publication of defamatory matter in permanent form (such
as writing) and slander is the publication of such matter in transient
form (through words or gestures).^" The reason for this distinction 
2
is obscure and, in the United Kingdom, it has been recommended that
it should be abolished, and that the rules governing slander should
3
be assimilated to those relating to libel.
The distinction has given rise to particular difficulty with the
growth of radio and television, since broadcasts are frequently
based upon scripts previously written. This problem is illustrated
4
by Mukete and others v Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation in which
the plaintiffs claimed damages for alleged defamation contained in
a broadcast issued by the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation. They
failed to allege special damages - a vital element of a claim for
5
slander in the circumstances - so that the question whether the 
broadcast constituted libel or slander was crucial. The trial court 
held that it was entitled to infer that the broadcast had been read 
from a written script (which meant that it would rank as libel).
1. Nylander, ibid, p. 17; Duncan & Neill, Defamation, London, 1978, 
p. 4; and Robin Callender Smith, Press Law, London, 1978, p. 5.
2. Nylander, ibid; and Report of the Faulks Committee, Cmnd 5909 r 1975, 
Appendix VI, 1975 .
3. Report of the Faulks Committee, ibid, para 91; Duncan & Neill, 
op.cit., p.4.
4. {1961] 1 All N.L.R. 482.
5. As further explained below, slander is actionable per se only 
in five sets of circumstances; and in all other instances the 
plaintiff's claim can only succeed if he alleges and proves 
that he has suffered special damage, as further clarified below.
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The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the lower court should not 
have inferred this without proper evidence, 'as the internal 
arrangements of the Corporation [could] not be regarded as a matter 
of common knowledge1.'*' Hence, in the Court's view, the broadcast 
was 'slander' and the claim could not succeed.
In southern parts of Nigeria, at least, the matter has now largely
been clarified by legislation which provides, in essence, that material
broadcast for general reception is to be regarded as having been
published in permanent form and as subject, therefore, to the law
2
of libel. Thus, for example, s 3 of the Defamation Law 1961 provides:
1'For the purposes of the law of libel and slander, 
the broadcasting of words by means of wireless 
telegraphy shall be treated as publication in 
permanent form'.
The law defines 'broadcasting by wireless telegraphy' as meaning, in 
essence, broadcasting for 'general reception', so that broadcasting 
otherwise than for general reception is not covered by the statute 
and continues to be governed by the common law - under which classi­
fication as libel or slander depends on whether or not the broadcast 
material is in fact read from a written script.
Television is not expressly covered by the Nigerian Defamation Laws - 
except in the eastern states where the relevant legislation defines 
broadcasting as including television. However, it is submitted that 
television broadcasts for general reception are indeed covered by
1. Mukete v Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, supra, at 483.
2. Cap 34, Laws of Lagos State, applicable only in Lagos State. 
However, substantially similar provisions are contained in s 2 
Defamation Law (eastern states) Cap 33 and s 3 Defamation Law 
(western states) Cap 32.
These provisions are all based on s 1 of the United Kingdom 
Defamation Act of 1952.
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the Lagos' and western states' laws, both of which provide that 
references in the legislation to 'words' (as in s 3 above) are to 
be construed as 'including a reference to pictures, visual images, 
gestures and other methods of signifying meaning'.^
The practical significance of the distinction between libel and
slander lies in the differing elements of the torts. To succeed in
an action for slander, the plaintiff (in addition to the other
2
essential requirements) must - except in five instances - prove
that he has suffered "special damage" as a result of the slander,
in the form of some material or temporal loss, capable of assessment
3
in pecuniary terms, such as dismissal from employment. By contrast,
'in the case: of a libel the law presumes that the publication has
caused damage to the plaintiff, and it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to prove that he has suffered damage in order to establish
4
a cause of action'.
The five exceptional cases, where slander is actionable per se 
and without proof of special damage, involve statements of the 
following kinds:
(a) those imputing the commission of a criminal offence punishable
5
by imprisonment;
1. See, for example, s 2(1) Defamation Law, 1961. ^
2. These requirements are discussed in turn in the text below.
3. Duncan & Neilj.,,op.cit. , p. 7. See also Kodilinye, op.cit., pp. 139-140.
4. Duncan & Neill, ibid.,. This is one of the most important aspects
of the law of defamation and is part of the reason why the law - at 
present - is so heavily weighted in the plaintiff's favour. Normally, 
in proceedings for tort, the plaintiff's claim cannot succeed 
unless he is able to prove that he has suffered actual loss as a 
result of the wrongdoing. The fact that the plaintiff is excused 
from this burden in the civil law of defamation constitutes a 
considerable advantage to him.
5. Hellwig v Mitchell [1910] 1 K.B. 609.
(b) those imputing certain contagious or infectious diseases;
2
(c) those imputing unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl;
(d) those calculated to disparage a person in any office,
3
profession, trade or business;
(e) those (in Eastern states of Nigeria only) imputing that a
4
person is an osu.
There is also a difference in the available defences in that a
claim for slander (unlike libel) may be defeated by evidence that
the words spoken - in the particular circumstances - amounted to
no more than vulgar abuse and were so understood by those who heard
them, with the result that the plaintiff's reputation suffered no 
5
harm in fact. 'If/ however, the words are written, not spoken,
1. This applies to imputations of venereal disease, leprosy and
(probably) the plague. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.22, n,4.
2. Slander of Women Act, 1891, E.S . Cap 33, s 5; W.S . Cap 32, s 4.
3. Defamation Law., 1961, s 4; E.S. Cap 33, s 4; W.S. Cap 32, s 5.
4. The Osu caste system, under which legal and social disabilities
were imposed on 'osus' existed in various parts of the former 
Eastern Region and was abolished by the Abolition of the Osu 
System Law, Laws of E.R. Cap 1. S. 8 of the Law states:
'Words spoken or published which impute that a person is 
Osu shall not require special damage to render them 
actionable'.
The term 'osu' may, in broad outline, imply that an individual 
is 'an unclean person, an untouchable and [one] not fit for a 
decent human society', as contended in Nwashukwu v Nnoremele,
(1957) 11 E.L.R. 50. However, its precise meaning varies from 
one locality to another and must accordingly be proved in proceed­
ings for slander, as confirmed by this case (where the plaintiff's 
claim failed by virtue of failure to prove the meaning of the 
term).
See, for example, Ajala v Adelagun (1979) 3 L.R.N. 28 where plaintiff 
was called, by her husband's mistress, a thief and a prostitute, 
and the court found that these words were 'spoken merely as general 
vituperation or abuse and were so understood by the hearers'.
See also Olakunori v Olutajin (1972) 2 U.I.L.R. 226 (plaintiff 
called a 'bastard' at a family meeting - mere vulgar abuse).
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they cannot be protected as mere vulgar abuse, since ... readers may 
know nothing of the circumstances which lead to the publication'.^ 
Hence vulgar abuse is no defence to an action for libel.
This principle is illustrated by the case of Awolowo v West African 
Pilot and another.^  Here the court rejected the defendant's plea 
that an article criticising Awolowo (as, inter alia, being prepared-to 
bribe his way into top positions) was simply vulgar abuse of a 
political opponent and would have been so understood by its readers. 
The court did so on the basis, inter alia, that 'vulgar abuse' can 
only be a defence to slander - not libel.
Apart from the above exceptions, the rules governing libel and slander 
are essentially the same; and, in the remainder of this section, 
it is proposed to refer to libel only, since the principles described 
apply equally to slander.^
6.5. The Ingredients of a Prime Facie Case
In order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) that the words in question refer to him;
(2) that their meaning is defamatory of him; and
(3) that they were published by the defendant.
1. Nylander, op.cit., pp. 19-20.
2. [1962] W.N.L.R. 29.
3. For further detail regarding the differences between libel and 
slander, as well as the circumstances in which slander is 
actionable per se, see Kodilinye, op.cit., pp. 135-139.
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6.5.1. Reference to the Plaintiff
Where the words in issue identify the plaintiff by name, this ingredient
is normally'*' easily established. Where, however, the plaintiff is
not so identified, it is necessary for him to show that 'reasonable
persons [would] reasonably [have] believed[d] that the words referred 
2
to [him]r. The following cases may serve to illustrate the problem.
3
In Williams and others v The West African Pilot Ltd., the plaintiffs 
claimed to have been defamed through the publication in the 
West African Pilot, during March and April 1959, of a series of ten 
cartoons describing the fraudulent means by which the Action Group
4
had sought to win the 1951 elections to the Western House of Assembly. 
The content of these cartoons, is described in further detail below, 
in the section analysing the impact of the laws of defamation on 
the expression of political dissent and criticism.^ The significance 
of the case, for present purposes, is that the plaintiffs were not 
named in any of these cartoons, which featured three principal 
characters identified as 'the Brain', the 'Propagandist' and the 
'Fuehrer'. The question whether these cartoon characters could 
reasonably be identified with the three plaintiffs by the ordinary 
reader was therefore of vital importance. The plaintiffs provided 
the following evidence, inter alia, of identification:
1. Complications may, of course, arise where two or more persons 
have the same name.
2. Duncan & Neill, ibid.
3. [1961] W.N.L.R. 330.
4. See the section on the History of Nigeria, at p. 82 above.
5. See p. 545 et seq.
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(a) the first plaintiff (Rotimi Williams) was described in other
issues and pages<of the newspaper as "the brain behind the Action Group",
2
and was of "immense and generous physical proportions", as was the 
cartoon character described as 'the Brain';
(b) the second plaintiff (Akintola) had been described in other issues
3
of the paper as the "Nigerian counterpart of the German Goebbels" 2 
(who was, of course, Hitler's Minister of Propaganda) and had pro­
minent tribal markings on his face similar to those depicted on the 
face of the cartoon character, the 'Propagandist';
(c) the third plaintiff (Awolowo) was popularly known as the Leader 
of the Action Group, wore spectacles at all times (as did the 
cartoon character, the 'Fuehrer') and commonly wore a cap (which had 
become popularised as an Awolowo cap) similar to that worn by the 
'Fuehrer' in the cartoon.
In addition, there was a strong pictorial resemblance between the 
cartoon characters and each of the three plaintiffs.
The court held that the cartoons were capable of referring - and did,
4
in fact, refer to the plaintiffs and - this first hurdle to a
successful claim being overcome^it went on to consider other aspects
5
of the action, which are discussed below.
1. Williams & others v West African Pilot Ltd., s^upra, at 333.
2. Ibid., at 335.
3. Ibid., at 336.
4. Ibid., at 341. This dual test is laid down in Knupffer v London
Express Newspaper Ltd. [1944] A.C.;H 6  at 119 and has been applied
in a number of Nigerian cases, such as Awolowo v Zik Enterprises Ltd.
and others, (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 696.
5. See p. 497 - 498 and 546 - 548, inter alia.
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In Bakare v Oluwide and others, the plaintiff claimed damages 
against the editor, printer and publisher of a newspaper called the 
"Nigerian Socialist1 which, on 27 April 1968, had published the 
following article under the caption - "Aspects of Nigerian life - 
the man of means":
'Not all Nigerians are poor, hungry, naked,unemployed 
and fatigued by toil. There are quite a few whose 
tables are decked with venison and choice wine, 
whose palaces are built to face the ocean breeze, 
who lounge in their luxury clubs built with public 
'funds in workers' residential areas, who attire 
themselves in gold chains and beadly HATS, who 
are opulent enough to sleep at traffic lights in 
their Rolls Royces, who are philanthropic enough 
to purchase a single copy of a reactionary journal 
for £200, who build harems of teenage beauties to 
caress their fat necks and obesit tummies, who 
exploit the labour of dockworkers with the Public 
capital, who are funded by the C.I.A. to create 
their generous images and to corruptly pressurise 
men of power in politics, who can hold double 
chieftaincy titles, and plots and plots of land, 
who can be redeemed and obtain the Queen's pardon 
for their criminal jail terms,who extravagantly 
pass the night by doling out notes to their dancing 
leaguemen and kinswomen at night orgies while they 
sleep through the day; when we toil and labour to 
keep their aimless wasteful and immoral lives 
going.
Such man is The Man of Means in Nigeria; who makes 
up 1% of the population and owns 90% of the wealth 
of the land. The man of means has got means in 
his stomach, a red account at his condescending 
local foreign bank, and properties galore to play 
with. The man of means is he who lacks taste but 
lives in wanton gluttony. Poor man. £t needs the 
struggle of Nigeria to free him, to tutor him, to 
divest him of his ill-gotten gains and to purge 
his tummy of the pork-chop and alcohol that restricts 
his breathing'. 2
1. [1969] 2 All N.L.R. 324.
2. Ibid., at 324-325.
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The plaintiff - though not expressly named - contended that the article 
referred to him and produced the following evidence in substantiation:
(1) he lived in a palatial house which faced Victoria Island and 
enjoyed '^ the ocean breeze1;
(2) he ran the Suru-Lere Night Club, which had indeed been built with
public funds and was situated in a working class residential area;
(3) as a traditional chief, he wore gold chains and hats made of 
beads;
(4) he owned a Rolls Royce car;
(5) he had donated £250 towards the launching of Scope magazine;
(6) he had four wives;
(7) he employed dock workers;
(8) he held double chieftaincy titles (being the Sobaloju of Lagos 
and the Saloro of Ilesha;
(9) he had been given a State Pardon in respect of a previous 
conviction in 1967;
(10) he owned many properties.^-
Furthermore, the article had been published in conjunction with a
2
cartoon - and this bore a marked resemblance to the plaintiff.
The court (per Adedipe, J. ) accordingly concluded 'that [t]he words used
particularly point[ed] to the plaintiff'; and that the article
3
'refer[red] to the plaintiff and the plaintiff only'. It accordingly 
rejected the defendents' plea that the article referred only to a 
general class of people and proceeded, (as described at p.494 below).
1. Ibid., at 331-332.
2. Ibid., at 332.
3. Ibid.
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to award the plaintiff damages for libel in the sum of £2000.
In Dalumo v The Sketch Publishing Co Ltd. t h e  defendants published
an article in the Daily Sketch newspaper alleging that 'top officials
of the Nigerian Airways Corporation1 had taken oaths of secrecy
'not [to] expose any form of corruption, mismanagement or patterns
2
of irregularity within the company'. The plaintiff - who was 
Acting Secretary of Nigeria Airways - successfully claimed damages 
for defamation.
3
In Dafe v Tsewinor and another, the plaintiff claimed that he had 
been defamed through the publication in the Mid West Champion of 
an article headed "How the Ika-Ibo Merger Came About" and describing 
how a 'Minister from Aboh' had gone to meet, draw up and ultimately 
sign a memorandum of agreement with Lt-Colonel Ojukwu. The plaintiff, 
who fitted this description, contended that the article referred to 
him; and the court (per Idigbe, C.J.,) accepted this contention and
rejected the defendants' plea that the article could also have referred
to another, and more junior, minister from Aboh.
4
The principles which emerge from these and other cases appear to be 
as follows:
(a) the test is a two-fold one:
(i) are the words in question reasonably capable of referring
to the plaintiff.1 ;
1. [1972] 1 (Part 2) All N.L.R. 130.
2. Daily Sketch, 15 July 1968, reproduced at
3. [1967] N.M.L.R. 331.
4. See, for example, Awolowo v Zik Enterprises and anor (L959
14 W.A.C.A. 696 and Ukpoma v Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd., (1979)
2 L.R.N. 357. English cases are, of course, of considerable 
persuasive authority and for an indication of the most important 
of these, the reader is referred to Duncan & Neill, op.cit., 
pp. 24 - 30 and to Callender smith, op.cit1, pp. 8 - 11.
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and (ii) if so, were they in fact understood as so referring by the 
reasonable reader?^
(b) the above test is an objective one, and whether the defendant
intended to refer to the plaintiff or not is accordingly 
2
irrelevant.
(c) where reference to the plaintiff derives from extrinsic facts
or circumstances, these must be pleaded and proved by the 
3
plaintiff.
(d) where the words, prima facie, are defamatory of a class, a parti­
cular individual may nevertheless successfully claim damages
for defamation if the words would reasonably be understood as
4
referring to him - either solely, or as one member of the class 
in question.^
6.5.2. The definition of 'defamatory meaning- 1
A catch-all definition of 'defamatory' is extremely difficult to 
crystallize. The classic definition of a defamatory publication is 
one 'which is calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing
1. See Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd., [1944] A.C. 16, 
applied in Awolowo v Zik Enterprises and anor, (1955) 14 W.A.C.A.
696 and in Williams and others v West African Pilot Ltd., [1961] 
W.N.L.R. 330 at 341.
2. See Bakare v Oluwide and others, [1969] 2 All N.L.R. 324 at 334, 
applying Hulton & Co v Jones, [1910] All E.R. 29.
3. See the 'Williams' and Bakare' cases, supra, and Duncan & Neill, 
op.cit., p. 25.
4. See the 'Bakare' case where the court quoted, with approval, the 
following dictum fromLe Fanu and others v Malcomson and others (1848)
9 English Reports 910 "Though defamatory matter may appear only to 
apply to a class of individuals, yet if the descriptions in such mat­
ter are capable of being, by innuendo, shown to be directly applicable 
to any one individual of that class, an action may be maintained by 
such individual in respect of the publication of such matter". See 
334 of the judgment ibid.
5. See, for example, Dafe v Tsewinor and anor, supra, at 332:'Where 
a defamatory article refers to two different persons, both or either 
can sue for damages'. The same will apply to a larger class,
(•.. .continued)
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him to hatred, contempt or ridicule'. Subsequent cases, however,
have revealed the limitations of this concept, which is too narrow
to cater for the dentist (or other professional) who is said to lack
2
the appropriate degrees of professional skill or expertise; or the
woman who finds her friends avoiding her ( out1, of sympathy) , following
3
disclosure that she has been the victim of rape. In the United Kingdom,
the Committee on Defamation has attempted to overcome the difficulties
by suggesting that defamatory material be defined as 'matter which
in all the circumstances would be likely to affect a person adversely
4
in the estimation of reasonable people generally'.
The Nigerian courts seem generally to apply the tests of whether the
words in issue 'tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of
right thinking members of the society' or would tend to cause [such
5
members] to shun or avoid the plaintiff'. In determining the meaning 
of the words in question, the following principles apply:
...continued
provided the plaintiff can provide sufficient evidence that reasonable 
persons would regard him as falling within the class. Clearly, as 
the size of the class increases, this onus becomes progressively more 
difficult to discharge'.
1. Panniter v Coupland, (1840) 6 M. & W. 105 at 108 per Poske E.
2. Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970], 1 All E.R.
1094 & 1104, per Lord Pearson.
3. Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd., ( 1934) 50 T.L.R.
581 & 587, per Slesser L.R.
4. Cmnd. 5909, 1975, para 65. See, however, the criticism of this 
suggestion by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., at p. 35, who point out that 
'it is doubtful whether a single definition is adequate to cover 
every kind of case that may be encountered in practice' and suggest 
that it may be better to leave the question to judicial determination 
in the cases as they arise, using the definitions which have already 
been formulated.
5. See, for example, Ohanbamu v Midwest Newspapers Corp and anor [1974] 6 
C.C.H.C.J. 763 at 780-781.
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'The judge ... has to consider what is the natural and ordinary meaning 
in which these words would be understood by reasonable men to whom 
they were published. In determining whether the words are capable 
of a defamatory meaning, the judge should construe the words according 
to the fair and natural meaning which would be given them by reasonable 
persons of ordinary intelligence who are neither unusually suspicious 
nor unusually naive'.^
The following selection of Nigerian cases may serve to illustrate 
the types of statements which the courts have held to be defamatory.
2
(a) In Williams and others v The West African Pilot Ltd, the court
3
found the allegations , (discussed in greater detail below) that the 
plaintiffs had plotted to win the 1951 Western Region elections by
corruption and thuggery (and, later, to subvert their true result
4
which was in favour of the opposition party, the N.C.N.C.) were 
prima facie defamatory of them.
5
(b) In Ohanbamu v Midwest Newspapers Corp. and anor, the court found
that the plaintiff had been defamed by allegations in a newspaper
article that, inter alia, he was amongst the 'corrupt intellectuals'
who 'should know better' but are in fact 'ambitious, greedy,... with-
£
out principles and without ethics'.
1. Omo-Osagie v Okutubo [1969] 2 All N.L.R. 175 at 179 per Adefarasin, J.
2. [1961] W.N.L.R. 330.
3. See section on the impact of defamation laws on the expression of 
political dissent or criticism, at p545 below.
4. For a brief description of the N.C.N.C., see the section on the 
History of Nigeria, at p. 77 above.
5. [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 763.
6. Ibid., 780 and 781. This decision, with respect, seems wrong - for 
the Court seems entirely to have overlooked the disclaimer in the 
article that this general description of "intellectuals" as a class 
did not, in fact, apply to the plaintiff. See 778, where Dr Ohonbamu 
is acknowledged as being one of the exceptions, as further discussed 
at p.555 below.
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(c) In Awolowo v Kingsway Stores (Nig) Ltd and anor/*- the allegations 
that the plaintiff had been implicated in a crime involving violence 
and that he had failed to promote 'its proper investigation were held 
to be defamatory.
2
(d) In Nwangwu and others v Nwankwo, a description of the plaintiff 
(a member of the Eastern Region House of Assembly) as 'a wolf among 
men and lambs, a parasite who thrives at the expense of the people...1 
was found defamatory.
(e) Within a slightly different context, notice of dishonour of a
3
cheque has been found defamatory of the drawer, but the mere statement
that the plaintiff has failed to pay his debts has not been so 
4
considered. On the other hand, and somewhat surprisingly, impli­
cations of abuse of office (using confidential information to obtain
a lucrative contract, or acceptance of the highest (instead of the
5
lowest) tender by a director of a public corporation) have been 
held not to be defamatory.
(f) An illustration of an allegation of professional incompetence 
constituting defamation is provided by the case of Okon v The 
C.O.R. Advocate Ltd and others.^  Here the defendants had published 
an article in a local newspaper alleging that the plaintiff - the
1. [1968] 2 All N.L.R. 217.
2. (1962) 6 E.R.L.R. 97.
3. Adeleke v National Bank of Nigeria Ltd., (1978) 1 L.R.N. 157.
4. Karunwi v Wema Bank Ltd and another [1973] 5 C.C.H.C.J. 61.
Osisanya v Caretaker Committee of L.C.C. [1974] 5 C.C.H.C.J. 565.
5. Johnson v The Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd and anor [1965] L.L.R. 
110; and Egbuna v The Amalgamated Press of Nigeria Ltd and anor
[1967] 1 All N.L.R. 25.
6. (1961) 5 E.N.L.R. 21.
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principal of Duke Town Secondary School - was 'ruining it and was 
responsible for its falling educational standards. This was found 
prima facie defamatory.^"
In addition, it has been held defamatory to state:
-'that a medical practitioner had a "fake" degree and that he
2
exploited the public; ...
- that a public official had been arrested on suspicion of corrupt 
practices;^
4
- that a legal practitioner had defrauded his clients;
- that a university lecturer had committed adultery with a female
5
student; ... and
- that a tenant had "brought a strange people into the house day 
and night, smoking nauseating substances".^
In determining whether matter is 'defamatory', the interpretation or 
construction of the words in issue is, of course, crucial. It is
1. This case is discussed further at p. 559 below.
2. African Press Ltd., v Ikejiani (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 386.
3. Ukpoma v Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd. (1979) 2 L.R.N. 357.
4. Lardner v The Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd., (1979) 3 L.R.N. 276.
5. Nthenda v Alade (1974) 4 E.S.C.L.R. 109.
6. Mutual Aid Society Ltd v Akerele [1966] N.M.L.R. 257.
These examples are all derived from Kodilinye, op.cit., p. 133.
For further illustrations, see,
Awolowo v West African Pilot Ltd and others [1962] W.N.L.R. 29.
Anunobi v Nigerian National Press Ltd and another [1964] L.L.R. 12.
Benson v West African Pilot Ltd [1965] L.L.R. 175.
Okolo v Midwest Newspaper Corporation and others [1974] 2 C.C.H.C.J. 203.
Adewunmi v Oshinowo [1977] 2 C.C.H.C.J. 187.
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acknowledged that, in approaching this task, the courts should not 
apply the formal principles of interpretation applicable to statutes 
or wills, but should instead consider the likely effect of the words 
used on ordinary people, bearing in mind that 'the layman's capacity 
for implication is much greater than the lawyer's'.'*' It has also been 
acknowledged that words - by virtue of special circumstances - may 
have implications extending beyond what would appear to be their 
'natural and ordinary meaning'. In such instances, the defamatory words 
are said to have an 'innuendo' meaning - which confers upon the 
plaintiff (assuming he can prove the innuendo, as discussed below)
2
a distinct and separate cause of the action, additional to the one 
arising from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.
The distinction between 'natural and ordinary meaning1 and 'innuendo 
meaning' may be summarised as follows:
(a) The former meaning is that 'in which the words would be reasonably
understood by ordinary people using their general knowledge and 
• 3
commonsense:
(b) An innuendo meaning is a special meaning - additional to the 
natural and ordinary meaning - which a word may bear by virtue 
of:
(i) extrinsic facts or circumstances
4
(ii)technical, slang or local meaning not generally known.
1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph, Ltd [1964] A.C. 234 at 277 per Lord Devlin.
2. It may, of course, be that a word has only an innuendo meaning - 
by virtue of some special technical or slang construction known 
only in a particular trade or locality - and not by the general 
population at all. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 18.
3. Duncan & Neill, ibid., p. 10.
4. Duncan & Neill, ibid., pp. 17-18.
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Where the plaintiff wishes to rely on an innuendo meaning, he must plead
and prove the facts or circumstances (or the technical or slang
meaning) on which he relies - for these are an essential part of his 
cause of action. There may be difficulty, however, in distinguishing 
a true innuendo from what is, in any event, part of the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the words - as the following decision may 
demonstrate.
in Adedoyin v Nigerian National Press Ltd and anor,^~ the plaintiff 
claimed damages for libel against the defendants, arising out of 
their publication in the Nigerian Morning Post of an article headed 
"Drag-net for two as Adedoyin reported missing" and their display, 
on the same day, of posters all over the country stating
"SPEAKER ADEDOYIN MISSING". The article read as follows:
"Drag-net for two as Adedoyin reported missing 
WANTED: ENAHORO ADEBANJO
In Lagos yesterday, the police declared two top 
Action Group members as "wanted men."
The men are Chief Anthony Enahoro, Opposition 
Spokesman on foreign affairs and Mr. Ayo Adebanjo, 
an Ibadan lawyer, and one-time president of the U.K. 
branch of the party.
Also yesterday, it was reported that the Speaker of 
the suspended Western House of Assembly, Prince Adeleke 
Adedoyin, had been missing for days.
Two days ago, police were reported to have searched 
Prince Adedoyin's residence in Ibadan and it was 
reported that nothing incriminating was found.
Usually reliable sources said in Lagos yesterday 
that the imposition of a house arrest on Chief Awolowo 
is not unconnected with the present investigations 
which have led to seizure of arms and ammunitions in 
several parts of the country."
1. [1964] 2 All N.L.R. 9.
2* Nigerian Morning Post, 24 September 1962, reproduced at 10-11 
of judgment ibid.
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The plaintiff alleged that the words were defamatory in their ordinary
and natural meaning, and also by virtue of their innuendo - that 'the
plaintiff ha[d] gone into hiding as he [was] involved in the illegal
1
importation of arms and annunitions into the country1. The plaintiff
led 'a good deal of evidence about the conditions prevailing in
2
Western Nigeria at the time of the publications1, in support of
the innuendo alleged - and the court came to the conclusion that the
3
article was defamatory in both meanings. The court appears thus 
to have accepted that the article contained a true innuendo - whereas, 
it is submitted, it is strongly arguable that (within the context of 
the article as a whole with its reference to investigation into the 
'seizure of arms and ammunitions'), the implication that the plaintiff 
was involved in the illegal importation of arms was part of the 
natural and ordinary meaning of the statements that he 'had been 
missing for days' and that 'police were reported to have searched
4
[his] residence ... and ... [to have found] nothing incriminating...'.
In the circumstances, this criticism is of no great moment - but it 
does illustrate the difficulty of assessing when reliance should 
be placed on innuendo; and this may have important ramifications in 
practice because of the requirement that the plaintiff must plead 
the special circumstances in which he relies to substantiate an 
'innuendo' meaning - with the result that his statement of claim
1. Adedoyin v Nigerian National Press Ltd., supra at 11.
2. Ibid., at 12.
3. Ibid., at 13.
4. See paragraphs 3 and 4 of the article in question.
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will be bad in law if he fails to do so.
6.5.3. Publication by the Defendant
In the civil law (as opposed to the criminal law) publication of
defamatory matter to the plaintiff alone is not enough to found a
cause of action. The plaintiff must show that the matter in question
3
has been published by the defendant to one other person at least -
for the essence of the law of defamation is the protection it affords
to the individual's reputation; and this cannot be affected if the
4
plaintiff alone is the recipient of the defamatory words.
In some instances, however, publication is presumed - for example, 
where the defamatory matter is contained in a newspaper issued for 
general circulation or in a broadcast transmitted to the general
1. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 18. See also the description in Adedoyin1s 
case, supra, at 13, as to the procedure to be followed where the 
plaintiff seeks to rely upon an innuendo meaning - and the require­
ment that he provide particulars of the special circumstances in 
question, in terms of Order 19, Rule 6(2) of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court (Annual Practice) and Order 32 Rule 16 of the
High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules.
2. See p. 617.
3. If the plaintiff himself is responsible for publication, his 
claim cannot succeed. Thus, in Okotcha v Olumese, [1967] F.N.L.R.
174, the plaintiff had requested a character certificate to 
support his application for a visa to visit the United States.
The defendant, who was an official in the Central C.I.D. in Lagos, 
sent the plaintiff a certificate headed "To whom it may concern" 
which stated that the plaintiff had twice been convicted for 
offences involving dishonesty. This was erroneous. The plaintiff 
showed the certificate to a third party and, when he instituted a 
claim for damages for defamation, it was held that he himself
had been responsible for publication of the libel to a third 
party - and hence that his action could not succeed.
4. See.Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 36, Callender Smith, op.cit., 
pp. 11-13; and Nylander, op.cit., p.23.
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public. , One caveat to this rule should, however, be noted. If the
plaintiff seeks to rely on an innuendo meaning, he must prove that
the special dircumstances which support that meaning were known at
2
the time to at least some of the recipients of the communication.
'Every person who takes part in the publication of defamatory matter
r 3is prima facie liable in respect of that publication. This rule
is an important part of the significance of the laws of defamation
for those involved in the media. It means, (in the case of newspapers,
for example) that not only the writer of a particular article but also
the proprietors, editors and printers of the newspaper and those
involved in its distribution, including news agents and street vendors,
4may be held liable in damages if the words in question are libellous.
It should also be noted that '[e]ach communication of defamatory
5
matter to a publishee is in law a separate publication, and, in theory, 
would constitute an additional cause of action. In practice, however, 
instead of the plaintiff bringing distinct actions for every issue 
of a newspaper sold (for example), the 'number of copies is treated
1. Publication is also presumed - by way of further example - when 
a libel is written on a postcard sent through the post, or is 
transmitted by telegram, but the presumption can be rebutted by 
proof that it was never in fact read by a single person. Such 
proof would clearly be difficult to provide in practice. See Philip 
Lewis et aT (ed)Gatley on Libel and Slander, 8th ed., London, 1981, p 105.
2. Duncan & Neill, op.cit.,PP» 36 and 38. In some instances, know­
ledge of the special circumstances in question may also be inferred, 
as pointed out by the authors. This might arise where the newspaper 
containing the article had a large circulation and 'the special 
facts were widely known among persons who were likely to read the 
article'.
3. Duncan & Neill, ibid., p.41.
4. Ibid. As they point out, even the newsagent who sells a newspaper
containing defamatory material may be held liable - subject,
however, to the defence of innocent dissemination, discussed below 
at p. 524 et seq.
5. Ibid., p. 38.
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as relevant [rather] to the issue of damages'.
6.6. The Defences Available
The defences available to a claim for alleged defamation fall under 
the following main heads:
1. failure by the plaintiff to make out a prima facie cause of 
action;
2. justification, or truth;
3. fair comment;
4. absolute privilege;
5. qualified privilege;
6. unintentional defamation;
7. apology and payment into court;
8. leave and licence or volenti non fit injuria;
9. innocent dissemination.
6.6.1. The plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie cause of 
action
The plaintiff's action cannot, of course, succeed if he fails to 
establish any one of the three essential ingredients of his claim, 
as identified above. Hence, the defendant may contest the matter on 
the basis that the plaintiff has not shown that the words in question 
refer to him, or that they are defamatory in meaning, or that they 
were published by the defendant.
1. Ibid.
2. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 53. See also Callender Smith, op.cit., 
p. 16 and Nylander, op.cit.,pp. 25-33.
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One of the few Nigerian decisions in which the defence of non­
publication (by at least one of the defendants) has been relied upon 
is Awolowo v West African Pilot Ltd and another?- Two articles critical 
of the plaintiff and published in the West Africa/vPilot were signed 
by the second defendant. At the trial of the action, the second 
defendant (insofar as the claim related to him) put the plaintiff to 
the strictest proof of all the ingredients of a prima facie case, 
including the element of publication. The first defendant admitted 
that the article had been written by the second; and there was also 
evidence that a photograph of the second defendant had been published 
in conjunction with the articles. The court held that this was suf­
ficient evidence of publication by the second defendant to shift 
the burden of rebuttal on to him. The court pointed out that the 
standard of proof in civil proceedings is on the 'balance of proba­
bilities' - not 'beyond reasonable doubt' (as in a criminal trial). 
Moreover, since the proceedings were civil rather than criminal, no 
account need be taken of the special rules surrounding 'accomplice' 
evidence.
6.6.2. Justification or truth
2The original term for this defence was the Latin word 'veritas'
and it has been suggested (by the Faulks Committee in the United Kingdom)
that the defence should be re-named 'truth', as the word 'justification'
3
has misleading connotations. The basis of the rule that truth is 
a defence to an action for defamation has been described as follows:
1. [1962] W.N.L.R. 29.
2. Callender Smith, op.cit., p.22.
3. Cmnd 5909, 1975, para 144, (cited by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.54).
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'The law will not permit a man to recover damages 
in respect of an injury to a character which he 
does not or ought not to possess'. 1
2
Since the law presumed defamatory words to be false, the onus of
proving their truth lies upon the defendant. To discharge this burden,
he must show the truth of the essence or 'sting' of the libel - in
both its natural and innuendo meaning, if any. The case of
3
Adedoyin v Nigerian National Press Ltd and anor, discussed above, 
may serve to illustrate the point.
The defences raised were justification (and fair comment, described
below), so that the truth of the allegations against the plaintiff
was a crucial issue. The court pointed out, however, that it was
'not sufficient to prove that the plaintiff was not present when his
4
houses were searched'. On the contrary,'[w]hat ha[s] to be justified
[:ls ]that the plaintiff went into hiding from the police and that he
was involved in the illegal importation of arms and ammunition, for
5
these constituted the pith and marrow of the libel'.
Where the defamatory words are severable into two or more distinct
charges against the plaintiff and the defendant is able to show the
truth of only portion of these, the common law rule is that he remains
£
liable in damages for the remainder. The difficulty with this is 
that '[t]he plaintiff [will] succeed in such a case if the defendant 
fail[s] to justify some minor charges even though he ha[s] proved
1. McPherson v Daniels, (1829) 10 B & C. 263 at 272, per Littledale, J.
(cited by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 54).
2. See Duncan & Neill, ibid.,p.55. To this extent, defamation may be
considered a tort of 'strict liability'. The heavy burden this places 
on the defendant is further discussed at p. 560 et seq.
3. [1964] 2 All N.L.R. 9.
4. Ibid., at 14.
5. Ibid.
6. Duncan & Neill, supra . * p.56.
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the truth of the others1. The common law rule has accordingly been
2
modified in some parts of Nigeria (but not in the northern states )
3
by legislative provisions modelled on section 5 of the United Kingdom
4
Defamation Act of 1952. S 7 of the Defamation Law 1961 states:
'In an action for libel or slander in respect of 
words containing two or more distinct charges 
against the plaintiff a defence of justification 
shall not fail by reason only that the truth of 
every charge is not proved if the words not 
proved to be true do not materially injure the 
plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth 
of the remaining charges'. 5
Unfortunately, however, there are a number of difficulties
attendant upon this provision. Firstly, it is limited in ambit to those
instances where defamatory words are indeed severable into different
charges. More seriously, it is open to abuse in that 'a plaintiff
can [choose to] bring an action in respect of one untrue defamatory
statement which he has selected from a number of others which were 
true!^ “ with the result that the statutory provision will not avail
1. Nylander, op.cit., p. 25, relying upon the authority of Goodburne 
v. Bowman, (1833) 9 Bing 667.
2. The northern states of Nigeria cover an enormous area and hold the 
bulk of the population. Accordingly, this lacuna in the law of 
these states is potentially highly significant. The difference 
in the civil law of defamation as between the three former Regions 
of Nigeria has previously been discussed, in the section on the 
Sources of the Civil Law of Defamation, at p. 463 above.
3. s 8 Defamation Law (eastern states) Cap 33; s 11 Defamation Law 
(western states) Cap 32; and s 7 Defamation Law 1961.
4. 15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 EliZ’ . 2 c. 66. Section 5 of this statute is
the exact counterpart of the Nigerian provisons set out in the 
text below.
5. This provision has identical counterparts in the eastern and 
western state laws identified at note 3 above.
6. Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 21, citing the criticism (by the 
United Kingdom Press Council) of section 5 of the Defamation 
Act, 1952.
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the defendant. The decision (of the House of Lords) in Speidel v 
Plato Films Ltd.^~ graphically demonstrates the danger.
'[T]he plaintiff had been Supreme Commander 
of the Axis Forces in Central Europe. The 
defendants made a film about him which 
connected him with the murder of King Alexander 
of Yugoslavia and Monsieur Barthou in 
1934 and indicated that he betrayed Field 
Marshal Rommel in June 1944. These were 
the points the plaintiff sued on. The bulk 
of the film, however, dealt with his war 
crimes and atrocities, and the plaintiff 
did not deny these, or the truth of them, 
in his statement of claim. The House of 
Lords held that the defendants could not 
introduce this evidence either in defence 
or in mitigation of damages because he 
had not sued on this broad ground'. 2
The Faulks Committee has accordingly recommended that the United Kingdom 
provision be amended inter alia to enable 'a defendant [to] rely 
on the whole of [a] publication in answer to a claim by a plaintiff 
relating to only a part of it'.^ Such improvement would seen well 
advisable in Nigeria too.
4
Further aspects of the defence are fully described by Duncan & Neill 
but lie outside the scope of this study. Suffice it, therefore, for 
present purposes, to note merely the following additional points:
(a) proof by the defendant that he based his words upon rumours or 
hearsay reported to him and which he honestly believed will not 
be sufficient to discharge the burden;^
1. [1961] A.C. 1090 (H.L.(E)).
2. Callender Smith, op.cit., p.21.
3. Ibid •, and see also the Faulks Report, Cmnd. 5909, 1975, para. 134.
4. <p.cit., Chapter 11, especially at pp. 57-60.
5. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd., [1964] AC 234 at 283, per
Lord Devlin, cited by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 60.
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(b) 'an unsuccessful attempt to justify a defamatory statement will 
aggravate damages'’*' - on the basis, in essence, that "insult" 
has been added to "injury". This perhaps accounts for the fact 
that very little reliance has been placed on 'justification' in 
Nigerian cases by contrast with other defences - notably that 
of fair comment.
6.6.3. Fair comment on a matter of public interest.
There are four important aspects to this defence.
i. The comment must be 'fair'
This word is misleading, for it suggests that the test to be satisfied
is one of objective reasonableness. This is not, however, so; and
all that need be shown is that the comment is 'honest'. Thus, the
question is not 'Is this comment fair?' but rather 'Could any man -
however prejudiced or obstinate in his views - honestly express
3
that opinion on the proved facts?1 The law thus recognises that, 
in the interests of freedom of speech, considerable latitude must
t
be allowed to the expression of opinion on matters of general concern.
1. Nylander, op.cit., p. 26, citing the authority of Ezekwe v Otomewo
and others [1957] W.N.L.R. 130, where Onyeama, Ag, J., held 'that
the conduct of the defendants in trying unsuccessfully to 
justify the libel and in making "monstrous imputations of gross 
professional misconduct against the plaintiff in a crowded court" 
aggravated damages'. See McNeil & Rains, op.cit., p. 335.
2. The meaning of 'comment' is discussed below.
3. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 68 and the passage cited by them
from the judgment of Lord Hewart C.J. in Stopes v Sutherland, on 
p. 69. See also Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 46.
4. See the summing up to the jury of Diplock, J. in Silkin v Beaverbrook 
Newspapers Ltd., [1958] 2 All E.R. 516.
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An important ramification of the requirement that the comment be 
honest is that this defence cannot avail the defendant who is actuated 
by ’express malice’, as further discussed atp 533 below.^
(ii) The words in issue must constitute a 'comment' rather than a 
statement of fact.
The distinction is well illustrated by the juxtaposition of two 
examples in thejudgment of Lord Porter in Kernsley v Foot:
'If the defendant accurately states what 
some public man has really done, and then 
asserts that "such conduct is disgraceful", 
this is merely an expression of his opinion, 
his comment on the plaintiff's conduct....
But if he asserts that the plaintiff has 
been guilty of disgraceful conduct, and 
does not state what that conduct was, this 
is an allegation of fact for which there 
is no defence but privilege or truth'. 2
In practice, inevitably, there are many "grey" instances when this
test is hard to apply. It would seem, however, that 'comment' includes
within its ambit deductions or inferences of fact drawn by the 
3
commentator and is not therefore limited to opinion or judgment, 
stricto sensu.
The Nigerian case of A.W. Ibe and Co Ltd v The Reveille Printing and
1. Where a man is motivated by malice, it is difficult to believe that 
his opinion can be 'honest'. This possibility must however be ack­
nowledged. If he is actuated by the desire to injure the plaintiff,
however, it is most unlikely that he can satisfy the test of having
acted in the 'public interest'. Hence, as elaborated below, express 
malice does not so much negative the defence as preclude the defen­
dant from establishing its elements.
2. [1952] A.C. 345 at 356 [cited by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.64] •
3. See Duncan & Neill, ibid. , p. 66 and the, die turn of Cussen, in
Clarke v Norton [1910] V.L.R. 494 and 449 [cited by Duncan and 
Neil, ibid., p. 67]
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Publishing Co.,~^  provides some illustration of what constitutes 'comment'.
The defendants published an article in a newspaper (called the
Renaissance) alleging that 'the plaintiffs, a firm of contractors,
were insolvent and inefficient in the construction of a layout (sic)
of plots and that the contract ought to have been terminated since
the East Central State Government had removed the name of the plaintiffs
2
from the register of contractors'. The defence of 'fair comment' 
succeeded.
(iii) The comment must be based on fact
There are two important aspects t<t> this principle.
(a) The facts on which the comment is based must either be stated
'or indicated ... with sufficient clarity to enable the [recipient]
3
to ascertain the matter on which comment is being made'. Failing
this, the so-called 'comment' - as pointed out in Kernsley v Foot,
4
above - for example, 'that the plaintiff has been guilty of disgraceful 
conduct' must be viewed as a statement of fact, for which the only 
defence is justification or truth.
(b) The facts commented on must be true. At common law, this require­
ment is so strict that '... each [and every] fact must be 'justified 
[i.e. proved true] and if the defendant fails to justify one, even
1. (1975) 5 E.C.S.L.R. 31.
2. See ibid.
3. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.64. See also Callender Smith, op.cit., 
p. 46 and Nylander, op.cit., p. 26.
4. Kernsley v Foot, ibid., at 357-8, per Lord Porter, [cited by Duncan 
& Neill, ibid.].
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if it be comparatively unimportant, he fails in his defence1. The
only common law exception is where the stated facts are protected by
privilege. Thus, for example, if a journalist bases honest comment
on the testimony of a witness in court proceedings which is subsequently
shown to be perjured, he will not thereby be precluded from successful
2
reliance on the defence of 'fair comment1.
The rigour of the common law rule has now to some extent been modified
by statute. In the United Kingdom, this was effected in 1952, by
3
s 6 of the Defamation Act. Defamation legislation in some parts of
Nigeria has followed this lead; and thus, except within the orthern
4
states of the country, statute - closely modelled on the United
Kingdom enactment now provides:
'Fair Comment. - In an action for libel or 
slander in respect of words consisting partly 
of allegations of fact and partly of expression 
of opinion, a defence of fair comment shall not 
fail by reason only that the truth of every 
allegation of fact is not proved if the ex­
pression of opinion is fair comment having 
regard to such of the facts alleged or referred 
to in the words complained of as are proved'.
The following cases illustrate the ambit of the requirement that the
facts commented upon be true.
1. Kernsley v Foot, ibid., at 357-8, per Lord Porter, (cited by Duncan 
& Neill, ibid.).
2. See Duncan & Neill, ibid., and the passages there cited from 
Mangena v Wright [1909] 2 K.B. 958 and Grech v Odhams Press 
[1958] 2 Q.B. 275 at 295, per Jenkins, L.J.
3. 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 7 Eliz c. 66.
4. Defamation Law, 1961, s 8; Defamation Law (eastern states) Cap.33, 
s. 9; Defamation Law (western states) Cap. 32, s 12.
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In Bakare v Oluwide and others,1 discussed at p. 472 above, it may
be recalled that the court - by virtue of a number of similarities of
fact - had concluded that a newspaper article describing the life of
luxury and conspicuous consumption enjoyed by the 'Man of Means' in
Nigeria, did indeed refer to the plaintiff. It then turned to the
defence contention that the article constituted 'fair comment on a
question of public interest'; and emphasised that '[i]f the facts upon
which the comment purports to be made did not exist, the defence of
2
fair comment must fail'. The 'stings' of the libel were that the 
person referred to:
3
* 'exploit[ed] the labour of dock workers with public capital' - and
this the court found on the evidence to be untrue;
* 'was funded by the American Central Intelligence Agency' - and this
was also untrue; and
* 'corruptly pressurised men of power in politics' - which also was
4
not true.
The defence of 'fair comment' was accordingly rejected.
5
In African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd. v Coker, the defence of fair 
comment was dismissed. The underlying facts are somewhat complex 
and require brief elaboration. In 1966, the Federal Military Government 
instituted an enquiry - which became known as the Saville Tribunal - 
into the affairs of the Lagos City Council in which the plaintiff 
then held office as the City Treasurer. The Saville Report exonerated
1. [1967] 2 All N.L.R. 324.
2. Ibid., at 332.
3. Ibid., at 333.
4. Ibid.
5. [1973] 1 N.M.L.R. 386.
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the plaintiff from a specific charge of corruption levelled against
him, but found that his conduct had been 'irregular' in a number of
instances and would 'in the circumstances of many countries [have]
merit[ed] his compulsory retirement1.^  It recommended that his assets
be further investigated and concluded that, if no greater impropriety
were thus revealed, 'his undoubted talents need not be wasted, and
that in a different capacity, he [might] still be permitted to use them
2
for the benefit of his country'.
The Report was made public in conjunction with a Government White 
Paper in which the Federal Military Government accepted the recommen­
dation that the plaintiff's assets be further probed but emphasised
that, if this was favourable, the plaintiff - although he deserved
3
severe reprimand - should continue in his present offree.
An investigation into the plaintiff's assets was accordingly initiated
- but was conducted in private. The consequent report exonerated the
plaintiff, who was then appointed Permanent Secretary to the Lagos
Finance Ministry. The defendants thereupon published two articles in
the Nigerian Tribttne in which, in essence, they called - on the basis
of 'the findings and the reports of the enquiries set up by the Federal
4
Military Government' - for the plaintiff's removal from this office 
as part of a campaign to keep Nigeria free from corruption.
1. Para (iv) of the Tribunal Report, cited at 394, ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. See The Federal Military Government's White Paper on the Report, 
cited at 395, ibid.
4. Nigerian Tribune, 11 February 1969, reproduced at 389, 
ibid.
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The plaintiff claimed damaged for libel and one of the defences 
raised was 'fair comment's in attempted substantiation of which the 
defendants led evidence as to the irregularities of the plaintiff's 
conduct as reported by the Saville Tribunal.
The court a quo rejected the defence and this was confirmed on appeal
to the Supreme,Court. By excluding all reference to the Government
White Paper which, in the court's view, 'completely exonerated the
plaintiff of corruption', the defendants had 'supress[ed] something
vital to a fair comment1 in that had failed to 'present the whole
truth of the matter'.^ Furthermore, the Saville Report had found
the plaintiff's conduct not corrupt - but irregular; and accordingly
the Report could not provide the basis for comment that the plaintiff
should be removed from office in order to keep Nigeria corruption-free.
In addition, neither of the articles (which appeared to have been written
in the process of a 'war of words' between newspapers of differing
political orientation) could properly be considered as comments on the
Saville Report at all: and hence the requirement that comment should
2
be based on facts stated or clearly indicated had not been met.
1. Ibid., at 387.
2. The judgment of the Supreme Court, per Udoma J.S.C., is unfortu­
nately not presented in brief summary in the fashion here set
out but is dispersed over a number of different pages. It is 
nevertheless submitted that the above passage represents a 'fair' 
condensation of the points it considered important. The defence 
of fair comment was also rejected because the court found that 
the defendants had been activated by express malice. It is 
nevertheless submitted that the court's emphasis (as described
in the text above) on the need for the defendants to show the
truth of the facts commented upon is indeed part of 
the ratio of the decision, since the court dealt with it as 
one of the important questions to be decided.
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1
In Williams and others v The West African Pilot L t d .,
2
discussed above and further at p.546 below, the plaintiffs claimed that
they had been libelled by a series of cartoons alleging that they had
plotted to win the 1951 elections to the (former) Western Region
House of Assembly by fraud, corruption and intimidation and that -
when these plans failed and the N.C.N.C. nevertheless succeeded in
winning a majority of seats - had devised a final master plot to bribe
N.C.N.C. members to "cross the carpet" and give the A.G. the majority
3
required to form the government. The defendants raised the plea of
'fair comment'; but in the particulars lodged by them in support of
this defence, all they stated was that the N.C.N.C. and A.G. were both
major political parties; that they had fought each other in the 1951
elections 'the proceedings of which were and still are of great public
concern'; that the loyalty of Members of the Western House of Assembly
and 'the transfer of their allegiances from one political party to
another' were 'questions constantly canvassed by the press'; and that
'[t]he methods which any political party adopts ... with a view of
(sic) ... gaining power constitute a subject of public discussion and 
4
disputed opinion'. At the trial of the action, the defendants'
counsel referred simply to 'the political turmoil in the East and 
5
West' prevailing at the time.
The court rejected the defence of fair comment on the basis that '[n]o
1. [1961] W.N.L.R. 330.
2. See the section on 'reference to the plaintiff’ at p. 470 above.
3. See the section on the History of Nigeria at p 82 above for further
information as to the 1951 election: and as to the two political 
parties here concerned. The significance of the case for freedom
of expression is analysed at548 below.
4. Williams and others v The West african Pilot Ltd., supra, at 335.
5. Ibid., at 337.
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effort ha[d] been made to show to the court that the plaintiffs or any
of them employed thugs and/or ex-convicts for mass impersonation and
fraud during the 1951 Regional elections',^ as the cartoons alleged.
Moreover, 'the statement that the N.C.N.C. [had] won a majority in
the West [was] not substantiated [and, in the court's view] was patently 
2
false' - for the Court could not believe that the N.C.N.C. (in these
circumstances) would not have challenged the formation of government
by the A.G. or that the Lieutenant-Governor (of the Region) would have
3
'violated the principles of a two-party parliamentary democracy' by 
asking the party with minority support in the legislature to form the 
government. In addition, (though this is a point which bears upon (ii) 
above rather than the present focus of inquiry), the court was not
satisfied that these remarks were 'comments' at all but rather allega-
4 5tions of fact (for which the only defence is 'justification' ).
(iv) The matter commented upon must be 'of public interest'.
This is the fourth important aspect of the defence^ and is well illus­
trated (though perhaps inadvertently) by the particulars in the Williams 
case, described above, which - if not sufficient to substantiate the 
allegations made against the plaintiffs - certainly emphasised that the
issue was one of the general public concern.
1. Ibid., 342.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. See the discussion in the text at p. 492.
6. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 62; Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 46 
and Nylander, op.cit., p.26.
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The abuse of the electoral process is unquestionably a matter 'of
public interest*. It is submitted, however, that the range of public
interest extends far beyond such issues; and that the appropriate test is
1
whether the 'matter is such as to affect people at large' .
Accordingly, 'in appropriate circumstances the treatment of, for
example, any tenant by his landlord or any employee by his employer
or any patient by his doctor is capable of satisfying the test ... of 
2
public interest' .
A further essential point to note regarding the defence is that it 
is defeated by evidence that the publication was actuated by express 
malice on the part of the defendant... It is not, however, proposed to 
canvass this principle further at this stage but to deal with it instead 
in the context of a general discussion of the relevance of the defen­
dant's intention or state of mind, at p 532 below.
It remains to consider the effect of what is commonly known as the
'rolled-up plea'. Its usual form is as follows:
'"In so far as the words complained of consist 
of allegations of fact, they are true in sub­
stance and in fact, and in so far as they con­
sist of expressions of opinion, they are fair 
comments made in good faith and without malice 
upon the said facts, which are matters of 
public interest"'.
3
Although this wording may suggest that the plea is one of justification
1. London Artists Ltd v Littler, [1969] 2 Q.B. 375 at 391, per
Lord Denning, M.R. See also the list of matters of public 
interest provided by Kodilinye, op cit, p 157.
2. Duncan & Neill, op cit, p 63.
3. See Kodilinye, supra, p 159.
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and fair comment "rolled-up" together, the matter was clarified in
Sutherland v Stopes  ^ and 'it is now clear, as Adefarasin J. emphasised 
2
in Saraki v Soleye , that "it raises only one defence - the defence 
3
of fair comment"'. Accordingly, if a defendant wishes to rely on 
the defence of justification as well, he must expressly plead this in 
addition.
6.6.4. Absolute privilege
The word 'absolute' signifies that this kind of privilege provides 
a complete defence to a claim for defamation, irrespective of the 
defendant's motive in publication, however nefarious. It thus differs 
significantly from 'qualified' privilege, which is defeasible by 
evidence of express malice, as further discussed below.
The underlying rationale for this complete defence lies in the 
recognition that, in certain circumstances, the freedom to speak or 
write frankly and openly (without fear of liability for libel) is 
more important than the protection of the reputation in society of 
individuals who may be affected thereby. In a nutshell, the over­
riding public interest is thus seen - in these instances - as 
the encouragement of total candour.
Absolute privilege thus attaches to statements of the following kindsi
1. [1925] A.C. 47.
2. (1972) 2 (Part III) U.L.L.R. .271 at 281.
3. Kodilinye, supra, p. 160.
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(i) statements made in the course of proceedings before a court or
2other tribunal exercising a judicial function - whether by the 
presiding officer, the parties, their counsel or witnesses; provided,
3
however, that their content has some relevance to the matter in issuej
4
(ii) statements made in the course of parliamentary proceedings in 
Federal and State Houses of Assembly as well as in reports or other 
papers published at their order;
(iii) statements made by one officer of State to another in the 
5
course of duty;
(iv) reports by an officer in the armed forces to his superior.
In addition, it appears (though the matter is not entirely free from 
doubt) that absolute privilege is also enjoyed by communications
1. This is widely interpreted and includes, for example, writs, plead­
ings, affidavits and other documents in the proceedings, including 
proofs of evidence. See Lincoln v Daniels, [1962] 1 Q.B. 237
at 257, per Devlin L.J., cited in the course of a detailed dis­
cussion by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.91.
2. For a full discussion of the criteria which determine whether a 
tribunal is protected by absolute privilege, see Dunean & Neill, 
ibid., pp. 86-91.
3. Seaman v Netherclift (1876) 2 CPD 53. Relevance must, however, 
be widely interpreted; and in the same case Amphlett, CtA. said, at 
61: 'I can see many reasons why a witness should be absolutely 
protected for anything he said in the witness box'.
4. The privilege extends to witnesses before committees, for example, 
as well. See Duncan & Neill, ibid., p. 82.
5. Nylander, op.cit., p.28.
6. Duncan & Neill, supra, p. 93-95 and Nylander, ibid.y
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between solicitor (and presumably counsel) and client and by fair
and accurate reports of judicial proceedings in Nigeria if published
2
contemporareously. The latter principle reflects a statutory
3
modification (it would seem) of the common law rule that such reports
enjoyed only qualified privilege. Nigerian legislation in this regard
- which applies only within the southern states - is based upon the Law
4
of Libel Amendment Act of 1888. Thus, the Defamation Law, 1961,
5
of Lagos State (and the Defamation Law of the eastern states) provides 
that:
'A fair and accurate report in any newspaper 
of proceedings publicly heard before 
any court exercising judicial authority... 
shall, if published contemporaneously 
with such proceedings, be privileged:
Provided that nothing in this section 
shall authorise the publication of any 
blasphemous or indecent matter'. 6
7
Further provisions, based upon the belated recognition accorded to 
broadcasting services in the United Kingdom by the Defamation Act of 
1952, extend the privilege to such reports when broadcast 'by means of 
wireless telegraphy as part of any programme or service provided by
1. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.81 and Nylander, op.cit., p.28.
Since this privilege has no direct relevance for freedom of expression, 
further discussion of it falls outside the ambit of this study.
2. See Duncan & Neill, ibid., and Nylander, ibid. The meaning of these 
terms is discussed further in due course.
3. There is some doubt as to whether the statutes have changed the 
common law, as further explained.
4. 51 & 52 Viet. c. 64.
5. s 11 Defamation Law (eastern states^ Cap 33 is virtually identical,
but the broadly equivalent provision (s 15) of the Defamation Law
(western states). Cap 32 contains important differences, as further 
explained below.
6. s 10, Defamation Law 1961 (Lagos State).
7. See s. 11, ibid., and the equivalent provisions (in ss. 12 and 17
respectively) of the Defamation Laws of the eastern and western
states, supra.
-503-
means of a broadcasting station within Nigeria ... providing broad­
casting services [under licence] for general reception1. ^
Controversy as to the ambit of the privilege stems from the failure of 
the legislation to specify whether it is absolute or not. It is inter­
esting to note from the debates surrounding the adoption of the original
provision in 1888 that the word 'absolute' (originally included) was
2
deliberately struck out, suggesting thati Parliament intended the
privilege to be qualified only. This interpretation, however, would
render the statutory provision nugatory for, at common law, such reports
clearly enjoyed qualified privilege, whether or not published contem- 
3
poraneously. In the United Kingdom, however, commentators appear
4
confident that the privilege is indeed absolute; and in two English 
5
decisions, is is assumed (admittedly without argument on the matter), 
that this is indeed the case. In Nigeria, it is interesting to note 
that one of the Defamation Laws (that applicable in the western 
states) does expressly declare - in its equivalent provision^ - that 
the privilege accorded to such contemporaneous reports is "absolute".
ii.
1. Ibid.
2. Hansard, June 6, 1888, cited by Callender Smith, op.cit., p.25.
3. See Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 26, Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.98.
4. Callender Smith, ibid., p.25. Cf, however, the Faulks Report, para 242.
5. Farmer v Hyde, [1937] 1 Q.B. 728 at 740, 744; McCarey v Associated
Newspapers [1964] 1. W.L.R. 855 Icited by Callender Smith, ibid., 
and by Nylander, op.cit., p.28],
6. s. 15, Defamation Law (western states). This section differs
also from the 'Lagos' and 'eastern states' legislation in that 
the proviso extends not only to 'blasphemous or indecent matter' 
but also to '... any matter the publication of which is 
prohibited by law'.
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The inclusion of this word in the Defamation Law of the western 
states is, of course, subject to alternative interpretation.
Either the word was included ex abundante cautela - even though not 
strictly necessary to render the privilege absolute - or it was 
indeed considered essential to achieve this result. No guidance in 
this regard has, unfortunately, yet been provided by the courts. How­
ever, the question as to which is the correct interpretation is of 
considerably more than academic interests for the practical signifi­
cance of the distinction between absolute and qualified privilege 
lies in the fact that the former, unlike the latter, is indefeasible 
by evidence of express malice: and this may have considerable impor­
tance in practice.^
As regards the two substantive requirements - that the reports be
'fair and accurate' and that they be published 'contemporaneously' -
it is the former which appears to have arisen more often before the
courts; and which, accordingly, seems to warrant further consideration.
Since this requirement applies also to reports for which qualified
privilege may be claimed at common law, it is proposed to postpone
such consideration pending brief examination of the general catego-
2
ries of qualified privilege. -
1. The significance of express malice is described further below, 
at p. 533. It seems, however, that (as yet) there has been no
reported instance of a media report of judicial proceedings
being activated by express malice. The possibility of such 
malice was considered (by implication) but rejected in the case 
of Bare and others v Odukomaiya and another [1973] 5 C.C.H.C.J. 
54. Here, proceedings for defamation were brought following 
the publication in the Daily Times of a report of criminal pro­
ceedings in a magistrate's court. The claim failed as the court 
found that the report was fair and accurate and that there was 
no evidence of malice underlying its publication.
2. The meaning of 'contemporaneity' is further discussed at p.- 1022
in the context of the law of contempt.
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6.6.5. Qualified privilege
Qualified privilege attaches to statements of the following kinds:
(i) Statements made in pursuance of a duty (legal, moral or social) to
a person with a corresponding interest or duty to receive them.^ Whilst
legal duties are ipso facto relatively clearly defined, it is extremely
difficult to lay down hard and fast rules as to the circumstances that
will generate a moral or social duty. Some guidance is provided by the
2
judgment of Lindle^ I^ X in Stuart v Bell, to the effect that 1...moral
or social duty ... mean[s] a duty recognised by English people of ordinary
intelligence and moral principle, but at the same time not a duty en-
3
forceable by legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal*. Further 
illustrations are provided by the following Nigerian cases:
4
In Awolowo v West African Pilot Ltd. and anor, the defendants - who
had published an article found to be defamatory of the plaintiff'-
raised the defence that it had been published in response to the plaintiff's
prior attack on Dr Azikiwe ('What I think of Zik') and that 'it was
5
the duty of any Nigerian to defend [Dr Azikiwe]' - who was, according
to the defendants, precluded by his office^ from coming to his own 
defence. This contention was rejected by the court, which held that 
there was nothing to stop Dr Azikiwe from speaking out in his own
1. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 98, Callender Smith, op.cit., pp. 35-36; 
Nylander, op.cit., p. 28.
2. [1891] 2 Q.B. 341 (cited by Duncan & Neill, ibid., p. 101).
3. Ibid., at 350.
4. [1962] W.N.L.R. 29.
5. Ibid.
6. Dr. Azikiwe was then Governor-General of Nigeria.
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defence and that there was no duty cognisable by the law resting upon 
the defendants to do on his behalf.
In similar vein, in the case of Ohanbamu v Midwest Newspaper Corp and
anor, the defendants' plea that their article criticising the plaintiff
had been published - pursuant to social duty - to counteract the
latter's prior accusations against the Federal Military Government
and to boost public morale - was rejected by the court. It found
that '[t]he words were not necessary in pursuance of any social or
moral duty the defendants may have thought they had a public duty or
2
interest to publish'.
3
By contrast, in Ajala v Showunmi, the defendant's letter to the
Chief of Staff of. the Nigerian Army and other senior Army officers
- complaining about the conduct of the plaintiff (a major in the
4
army) was found to enjoy qualified privilege. Likewise, m  Ayoola
5
v Ola jure and another r the court confirmed that privilege of this 
nature attaches to a reference (in this instance, denigrating the
plaintiff's competence as a secretary) supplied by a pa&t employer
6
to a prospective one.
1. [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 763.
2. Ibid., at 782.
3. [1977] 1 C.C.H.C.J. 25.
4. In the end, however, the defence of qualified privilege was
defeated by evidence of express malice. The plaintiff was alleged 
to have demolished the defendant's wall whilst brandishing a 
revolver. The court found this unsubstantiated and concluded that 
the defendant had been actuated by express malice. There was, 
apparently, a long-standing feud between the parties.
5. [1977] 3 C.C.H.C.J. 315.
6. See also Aruna v Taylor, [1977] 1 C.C.H.C.J. 15.
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(ii) Statements made for the protection or furtherance of a 
common interest.^
Nigerian illustrations include the following cases:
2
In Saiaki v Soleye, both parties were medical practitioners and the 
defendant was also the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare. He wrote a hard-hitting letter to the plaintiff, 
accusing the latter, inter alia, of employing unqualified staff, and 
supplying unnecessary injections for monetary gain. He sent a copy 
of the letter to the Nigerian Medical Council. The plaintiff's claim 
for damages for libel was rejected by the court, as both the defendant 
and the Council had a legitimate interest in the subject-matter of 
the letter.
Likewise, in Okusanya v West African Automobile and Engineering Co. Ltd., 
the defendants' letter to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (responsible, inter alia, for the conduct of trade 
exhibitions) complaining of the plaintiff's failure to erect a stand 
at such an exhibition - as contracted for - was protected by qualified 
privilege, so that the plaintiff's claim for damages for defamation 
was dismissed.
(iii) Fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings, however
1. Note that there are two aspects to 'common interest'. The interest
may be a general one, shared by a number of people, including the
parties; or it may be limited in ambit to the parties alone. The 
crucial element is that there should be a legitimate interest in 
imparting the information and corresponding interest in receiving
it. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 98, Callender Smith, op.cit.,p.36.
2. [1972] 2 (Part III) U.I.L.R. 271.
3. [1974] 3;C.C.H.C.J. 365.
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published, and whether or not contemporaneous.
The requirement that such reports be 'fair and accurate1 is illus-
3
trated by the following Nigerian decisions:
4
In Omo-Osagie v Okutubo and another, the plaintiff claimed that she 
had been libelled by an article in the Lagos Weekend stating:
'Chief Justice tells a teacher "You are a bad woman"'. The defence 
raised was that the words were a fair and accurate report of matri­
monial proceedings between the plaintiff and her husband. It appeared 
that the trial judge had made various adverse comments regarding the
plaintiff's conduct (both as a witness in the proceedings and as a 
5
spouse) but that he had never in fact used the words 'You are a bad 
woman'. The court held that
'Although a newspaper has a right to publish 
either a verbatim or an abridged and condensed 
report of what transpired in a court of 
justice, such publication must be done fairly 
and honourably so as to convey a just imr* 
pression of what has transpired'. 6
1. This contrasts with reports protected by statutory privilege, 
as explained below at p. 511.
2. Only contemporaneous reports may enjoy absolute privilege, as 
discussed above at p. 504.
3. See also Bare and others v Odukamaiya and anor, [1973] 5 C.C.H.C.J.
54, where a newspaper report was found to satisfy this requirement; 
and Bandale v Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd., [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J.
755, where the claim of 'privilege' was rejected because of 
inaccuracies in the newspaper's report of proceedings against
the plaintiff in a magistrate's court.
4. [1969] 2 All N.L.R. 175.
5. He had, in fact, described her as 'untruthful ... a woman of no 
mean temper ... [with] a nagging and ill-tempered nature'. See 
ibid., at 178.
6. Ibid., at 179.
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The report in issue failed to satisfy thife test, and the defence of 
privilege’*' accordingly failed.
The reasons for according reports satisfying this requirement the
protection of qualified privilege 'include the fact that judicial
proceedings are open to the public, that the public is concerned
with the administration of justice and that it is better for the
parties involved that a fair and accurate report should be published
2
than that rumours should circulate'. Accordingly, the privilege
does not attach to pleadings or other court documents, which are not
read out in open court. The point is well illustrated by Lardner v
3
Sketch Publishing Co Ltd., which arose out of the publication, by 
the defendants, of an article in the Daily Sketch headed 'Lawyer sued 
over parcel of land'. The newspaper report was based upon averments 
contained in the statement of claim in the proceedings, and the de­
fendants accordingly claimed the protection of qualified privilege.
The defence was dismissed, however, as the statement of claim had 
not been read out in the course of the proceedings. The court refer­
red to a number of English authorities on this question and concluded
'The defence of qualified privilege in relation 
to the reporting of judicial proceedings does 
not apply to the publication of the contents 
of documents not brought up in open court'. 4
1. The report had been published contemporaneously, so the defences 
of both absolute and qualified privilege were raised. Since 
'fairness' and 'accuracy' are requirements common to both, 
neither could avail the defendant.
2. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.109.
3. (1979) 3 L.R.N. 276.
4. Ibid.
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(iv) Fair and accurate reports of Parliamentary proceedings.
In Enahoro v Associated Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd and anor,
the plaintiff claimed damages for an alleged libel contained in two
successive issues of the Southern Nigeria Defender. The gist of
3
the articles in question was that the plaintiff, the Leader of 
the Western House of Assembly, had improperly intervened in cutting 
short a question raised in the House regarding the alleged suspen­
sion of a Customary Court presided over by his father. Comparison
of the newspaper articles with the Hansard report of the proceedings
4
showed, however, that they were 'grossly inaccurate'. The 
defence of qualified privilege accordingly failed.
(v) Certain reports published in newspapers or by broadcasting
1. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 98, Callender Smith, op.cit., pp.33-34 
Nylander, op.cit., p. 29.
2. [1960] W.N.L.R. 219.
3. This was insofar as they related to the plaintiff. Considerable 
criticism was also directed at the obstructive attitude displayed 
by Chief Rotimi Williams.
4. Enahoro v Associated Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd and anor, supra.
5. For the purpose of these provisions, "newspaper" is defined as 
'any paper containing public news or observations thereon,
or consisting wholly or mainly of advertisement, which is printed 
for sale and is published in Nigeria either periodically or in 
parts or numbers at intervals not exceeding thirty-six days', 
s. 9(5) Defamation Law 1961 (Lagos State): bf s. 2(2) Defamation 
Law (western states) Cap 32 which omits reference to such 
interval.
6. This, in essence, means broadcasting by 'wireless telegraphy' 
from a broadcasting station providing services for general 
reception, under licence granted by the Minister of Communications 
See s. 11(2) Defamation Law, 1961 (Lagos State); s. 17 Defamation 
Law (western states) Cap 32; s. 12, Defamation Law (eastern 
states) Cap. 33.
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which enjoy "statutory" privilege.
Following the lead of the United Kingdom Defamation Act 1952,^
2
Nigerian defamation legislation confers qualified privilege on 
certain reports (described below) subject, however, to the satisfaction 
of two overriding conditions:
3
(a) publication must not be prohibited by law; and
(b) the matter in question must be of public concern and its
4
publication for the public benefit.
5
In addition, one category of such reports, is protected only if a 
further condition - as to Explanation or contradiction' - is met.
In other words, as regards this category of report, the statutory 
privilege will not avail the defendant if he is requested by the 
plaintiff to publish or broadcast a reasonable explanation or con­
tradiction of the original report and refuses or neglects to do so
7
(or does so in an inadequate or unreasonable manner).
The two categories of statements enjoying statutory qualified privilege 
areas follows:
1. s 7, Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & Eliz 2 c. 66.
2. s„9, Defamation Law 1961 (Lagos State); s. 12, Defamation Law 
(eastern states) Cap. 33; s. 17, Defamation Law (western states) 
Cap. 32.
3. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 103, discussing the equivalent 
United Kingdom section.
4. Both elements must be shown, and the onus lies on the defendant 
to do so. See Duncan & Neill, ibid., p.104.
5. See below, p . 512.
6. The plaintiff should include with his request a draft of the 
statement he desires. See, Duncan & Neill, p. 104, para 13.14.
7. Duncan & Neill, ibid.
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STATEMENT PRIVILEGED WITHOUT EXPLANATION OR 
CONTRADICTION
3. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings 
in public of the legislature of any part of
Her Majesty's dominions outside Nigeria.
4. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings 
in public of an international organisation of 
which Nigeria or Her Majesty's Government in 
Nigeria is a member, or of any international 
conference to which that Government sends a 
representative.
5. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings 
in public of an international court.
6. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings 
before a court exercising jurisdiction throughout 
any part of Her Majesty's dominions outside 
Nigeria, or of any proceedings before a court- 
martial held outside Nigeria under the Royal 
Nigerian Army Act, 1960, or the Royal Nigerian 
Navy Act, 1960.
7. A fair and accurate report of any proceedings 
in public of a body or person appointed to hold
a public inquiry by the Government or legislature 
of any part of Her Majesty's dominions outside 
Nigeria.
8. A fair and accurate copy of or extract 
from any register kept in pursuance of any 
enactment which is open to inspection by the 
public, or of any other document which is required 
by the law of any part of the Federation of 
Nigeria to be open to inspection by the public.
9. A notice or advertisement published by or 
on the authority of any court within Nigeria 
or any judge or officer of such a court.
1
STATEMENT PRIVILEGED SUBJECT TO EXPLANATION OR 
CONTRADICTION
10. A fair and accurate report of the findings 
or decision of any of the following associations, 
or of any committee or governing body thereof, 
that is to say:-
(a) an association formed in Nigeria for the 
purpose of promoting or encouraging the exer­
cise of or interest in any art, science, re­
ligion or learning and empowered by its consti­
tution to exercise control over or adjudicate
1. Part II of the Schedule to the Defamation Law 1961 (Lagos State). 
Fbr reference to equivalent provisions in the eastern and western 
Defamation Laws, see overleaf.
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upon matters of interest or concern to the 
association, or the actions or conduct of any 
persons subject to such control or adjudication;
(b) an association formed in Nigeria for the 
purpose of promoting or safeguarding the 
interest of any trade, business, industry or 
profession, or of the persons carrying on or 
engaged in any trade, business, industry or 
profession, and empowered by its constitution 
to exercise control over or adjudicate upon 
matters connected with trade, business, industry 
or profession, or the actions or conduct of 
those persons;
(c) an association formed in Nigeria for the 
purpose of promoting or safeguarding the 
interests of any game, sport or pastime to the 
playing or exercise of which members of the 
public are invited or admitted, and empowerdd 
by its constitution to exercise control over 
or adjudication upon persons connected with or 
taking part in the game, sports, or pastime,
being a finding or decision relating to a person 
who is a member of or is subject by virtue of 
any contract to the control of the association.
11. A fair and. accurate report of the proceedings 
at any public meeting held in Nigeria, that is
to say, a meeting bona fide and lawfully held 
for a lawful purpose and for the furtherance 
or discussion of any matter of public concern, 
whether the admission to the meeting is general 
or restricted.
12. A fair and accurate report of the proceedings 
at any meeting or sitting in any part of Nigeria of:
(a) any local authority or committee of a 
local authority or authorities;
(b) any magistrate or judge of a customary court 
acting otherwise than as a court exercising 
judicial authority;
(c) any commission, tribunal, committee or person 
appointed for the purposes of any inquiry by 
law, by the Governor-General, or by a Minister 
of the Crown;
(d) any person appointed by a local authority 
to hold a local inquiry in pursuance of 
any enactment;
(e) any other tribunal, board, committee or 
body constituted by or under, and exercising 
functions under, any enactment,
not being a meeting or sitting admission . to 
which is denied representatives of newspapers 
and other members of the public.
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13. A fair and accurate report of the proceedings 
at a general meeting of any company, association 
registered or certified by or under any enactment 
or incorporated by Royal Charter, not being 
a private company within the meaning of the 
Companies Ordinance. 1
It should be emphasised that the statutory protection extends only to
2
reports in newspapers (as defined) or broadcast for general
reception. Accordingly, to name but two examples, it does not protect
speakers at public meetings (who probably, however, enjoy qualified
3
privilege under common law in any event), nor does it extend to
writers of books or contributors to journals which fall outside the
statutory definition of newspapers. In addition, by no means all
foreign legislatures and courts are brought within the ambit of the
statutory provision, and reports of the proceedings of these
4
accordingly remain subject to common law rules.,
The operation of this 'statutory privilege' is illustrated by
5
Akurefe and others v Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd. and anor. The 
defendants had published an article in the Daily Sketch stating that 
the plaintiffs, the proprietors of a school in Benin City, had been 
handed over to the police by the Commissioner of Education for 
attempting to bribe the Acting Principal Inspector of Education. The 
plaintiffs claimed damages for libel and the defendants raised three
1. Part III of the Schedule to the Defamation Law 1961 (Lagos State) 
Equivalent provisions are contained in Parts I and II of the Sche­
dule to the Defamation Law (eastern states) Cap 33 and in Parts
1 and II of Defamation Law (western states) Cap 32.
2. See p. 510.
3. See Horrocks v Lowe [1975] A.C. 135.
4. Such reports are protected by qualified privilege under common law 
in certain circumstances: See Webb v Times Publishing Co. [1960]
2 Q.B. 535.
5. [1971] U.I.L.R. 13.
defences: fair comment, justification, and statutory privilege. The
defence of fair comment could not succeed because the article had 
been presented in the form of allegations of fact, rather than state­
ments of opinion. Nor could the defence of justification avail the 
defendants, for they had not succeeded in proving that the allegations 
were indeed true. ;Tl>e plea of 'statutory privilege' did, however, 
succeed. The defendants led evidence that the 'publication was an 
extract from [a] news bulletin published by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Information, Benin City'.^ Examination of the news 
bulletin showed that the content of the article was substantially the 
same. The defendants accordingly contended that the publication was
entitled to qualified privilege under the Schedule to the Defamation
2
Law of the western states which, within the category of 'statement[s] 
privileged subject to explanation or contradiction', protects
'A copy or fair and accurate report or 
summary of any notice or other matter issued 
for the information of the public by or on 
behalf of any government department, office 
of state, local authority or superior officer 
of police'. 3
Commenting on the ambit of this provision, the court stated:
'This means that the report may be condensed 
but not coloured or unfair as a result 
of its omissions or abridgment. It need 
not be a complete report, provided that 
it presents to the reader an accurate 
picture'. 4
1. Ibid., at 16.
2. Defamation Law (western states) Cap. 32.
3. Article 12, Part II, Schedule, ibid.
4. Akurefe and others v Sketch Publishing Co., supra at 17.
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The court was satisfied that the article met this test; and, since 
the plaintiffs had proved neither that the defendants were actuated 
by malice nor that they tthe plaintiffs) had requested'*' the publica­
tion of a reasonable explanation or contradiction which the defendants 
had failed or neglected to publish, it followed that the plea of 
qualified privilege under the statute succeeded - and the plaintiffs'! 
claim was dismissed.
Statutory privilege is accordingly of great importance to the media - 
as this decision graphically demonstrates. In the circumstances, no 
other defence could have exonerated the defendants.
6.6.6 . The statutory defence of 'innocent publication1
The inadequacy of common law defences for defamation was revealed
2
by two well-known cases in English law. In Hulton v Jones, Hultons 
published a humorous account (which was intended to be entirely fic­
titious) of the amorous exploits of one Artemus Jones at a festival 
in Dieppe. A barrister named Artemus Jones led evidence to show that 
associates of his had thought the publication referred to him - and
he successfully claimed damages for defamation. In Cassidy v Daily 
3
Mirror, the defendants published a photograph of Mr Cassidy, together 
with a woman and stated that 'their engagement ha[d] been announced'. 
Unknown to the defendants, Mr Cassidy was already married, and his wife 
successfully sued for defamation on the basis that her reputation had
1. 'All that the plaintiffs' Solicitor [had done] ... was to write 
a general letter, the nature of which was not specified, and 
was not even referred to in the statement of claim, or given in 
evidence'. Ibid., at 18. This, following Khan v Ahmed [1957]
2 All E.R. 385, was not sufficient.
2. [1910] A.C. 20.
3. [1929] 2 K.B. 331.
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been diminished through the innuendo that she had falsely been holding 
herself out as being married to him.
None of the common law defences could have availed the defendants in
either case - and a statutory defence of 'unintentional1 defamation
was accordingly inserted in the Defamation Act of 1952.^ In Nigeria,
equivalent provisions are to be found in each of the Defamation 
2
statutes - but do not apply in the vast northern states.
The elements of the defence and the procedure to be followed in 
relying upon it may be summarised as follows.
In order for a publication, to qualify as 'innocent', the publisher 
must be able to prove
(i) either that he did not intend the alleged defamatory words to 
refer to the plaintiff and did not know of circumstances by which 
such reference might be inferred: the Hulton v Jones situation; 
or that the words were not prima facie defamatory and that he did 
not know of circumstances that might render them so: the Cassidy 
v Daily Mirror type of case;
and
(ii) that, in either event, he exercised all reasonable care in
3
relation to the publication.
All references to the 'publisher' in this regard are to be construed 
as 'including a reference to any servant or agent of his who was
1. Section 4, Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo 6 Eliz. 2 c. 66.
2. s. 6, Defamation Law, of 1961 (.Lagos State); s. 10 Defamation Law
(v/estern states) Cap 32; s 7 Defamation Law (eastern states) Cap 33. 
For convenience, further references will be limited to the appro­
priate provisions of the Defamation Law, 1961.
3. s. 6(5) Defamation Law, 1961, ibid.
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concerned with the contents of the publication'.'*'
If the publisher wishes to rely on the defence of innocent publication, 
he must
(i) make an offer of amends (i.e., an offer to publish (or join in
publishing) a 'suitable correction' and a 'sufficient apology')
and, where the defamatory material has been distributed by or
with his knowledge, must take 'reasonably practicable' steps
to notify persons to whom, it has been so distributed that 'the
2
words are alleged to be defamatory of the party aggrieved'; and
(ii)accompany his offer of amends with an affidavit specifying the
3
facts on which he relies to show that publication was 'innocent'.
He must also (as further explained below) take these steps as soon 
as reasonably practicable after he receives notice that the words 
are, or might be, defamatory of the complainant,
If the offer is accepted by the complainant, he cannot subsequently
5
bring a claim for damages against:the offeror - so that the provision 
(in theory at least)^ provides an important safeguard against incurring
1. Ibid.
2. s. 6(3), Defamation Law, 1961 ibid.
3. s. 6(2), ibid.
4. s. 6(1)(b), ibid.
5. s. 6(1)(a), ibid. The offer must, of course, also be duly per­
formed and the complainant is not, in any event, precluded from
bringing proceedings 'against any other person jointly responsible 
for that publication'.
6. The provision does not appear to work well in practice, as further
explained below.
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heavy financial penalties for 'innocent' defamation. He may, however, 
be able to obtain an order for costs (or an indemnity basis) as well 
as reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred as a consequence of 
the publication in question.**'
If the offer is not accepted, the publisher will nevertheless have 
a good defence to a claim for damages for defamation if he is able 
to prove:
(i) that the words were published 'innocently' - with reference to
2
the criteria described above;
3
(ii) that an offer of amends was made as soon as practicable and has
4
not been withdrawn; and
(iii)(where he himself is not the author of the words), that the
5
words were written by the author without malice.
In attempting to prove these essential elements ofhis defence, the 
publisher may only rely upon the facts specified in the affidavit 
which accompanied his offer of amends.^
This statutory defence has been criticised in a number of respects.
7
First, it is considered too formal, time-consuming and expensive.
1. See s. 6(4), Defamation Law, 1961, supra.
2. s. 6(1)(b), ibid.
3. This requirement explains the need, in practice, for the offer 
of amends to be made reasonably quickly, as indicated above.
4. See s 6(1)(b), supra.
5. s. 6(6), ibid.
6. s. 6(2) , ibid.
7. Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 19.
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In addition, the limitation that the publisher may rely only on the
facts specified in the affidavit places him in a dilemma: 1[Il'f he
misses any evidence he cannot use it later ... but if he tries to
collect every piece of evidence he may need [which may be particularly
difficult where he personally was not the author of the defamatory
material], the court may rule that he did not make the offer as soon
as possible'.^ Furthermore, the necessary evidence that the author
(where not the publisher himself) was not actuated by malice may be
extremely difficult to provide - especially in the case of an anonymous 
2
letter or report.
The practical difficulties inherent in the provision are attested by
the fact that, in the United Kingdom, there have been only two repor-
3
ted cases on its meaning since its inception in 1952. Nigerian case 
law reveals no reliance on it at all. This clearly indicates that it 
is not frequently invoked in practice: and this conclusion is borne 
out by the findings of the Faulks Committee in the United Kingdom, 
which has recommended the repeal and replacement of a s. 4 of the 
Defamation Act 1952 by a simplified provision which 'would dispense 
with the need for an affidavit, allow argument about the offer of 
amends to be decided by the courts, allow the defence to go beyond 
their original statement of defence and, finally, abolish the require­
ment that a publisher who was not the author of the words should
4
have to prove that the actual author was not malicious'.
1. Ibid. . ,
2. Given the reality that newspaper 'sources' may often wish to 
preserve their anonymity, this requirement may work extremely 
harshly indeed.
3. See Callender Smith, ibid., and Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p.110.
4. Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 20. For further detail, see also 
the Report of the Committee on Defamation, Cmnd. 5909, 1975, 
para. 287.
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6.6.7. Apology and payment into court
This defence differs substantially from that of 'unintentional defa­
mation' , discussed above. In English law, it is derived from the
1 2 
Libel Act 1843 (commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act), as amended
by the Libel Act 1845. In Nigeria, equivalent provisions have been 
incorporated in the Defamation Laws of the eastern and western states 
- but not in the Defamation Law of 1961, applicable in Lagos State.
It follows that in Lagos State as well as in the northern states of 
Nigeria (where no legislation similar to the Defamation Laws appli­
cable in the south has been introduced), the provisions of Lord 
Campbell's Act continue to apply on the basis that the Act is 'a 
statute of general application in force in England on 1 January 1900' 
and has accordingly been received into Nigerian law by virtue of the 
general reception process previously described.
Unlike the statutory defence of 'unintentional' defamation, this plea
is competent only in relation to defamatory material published in a
4
public newspaper or other periodical publication. It requires proof 
by the defendant that:
(i) the publication was made without actual malice;
(ii) that it was also made without gross negligence;
(iii)that a full apology was published before the commencement of the
1. 6 & 7 Viet c 96.
2. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 118, para. 16. 07 n 1; Nylander, 
op.cit., p. 31.
3. s. 14, Defamation Law (eastern states) Cap 33; s. 14 Defamation
Law (western states)Cap. 32. See also s 18 Newspaper Law (E.S.), Cap 86.
4. The defence does not therefore extend to the broadcasting of 
defamatory material; nor to the publication of such matter in, 
for example, a book.
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the action or at the earliest opportunity thereafter;^" and that
(iv) a payment into court was made at the time the defence was 
served.
The onus lies on the defendant to show the adequacy of the apology,
as well as the absence of actual malice or gross negligence. In the United
2
Kingdom,, the defendant in Bell v Northern Constitution Ltd.7 
failed to discharge the latter onus for the court found that the 
newspaper's publication of the announcementDf a birth without obtain­
ing prior verification of a notice received by telephone constituted
negligence of this nature. The question of gross negligence was also
3
considered (albeit obiter) in the Nigerian case of Edukugho v
4
The Proprietors of the Sunday Times and others. The defendants had
published an article in the Sunday Times alleging, inter alia, that
the plaintiff (who had been an official adviser to the London Conference
5
on the Constitution of Nigeria in 1957) had made no worthwhile con­
tribution to its proceedings but, on the contrary, had not even 
attempted to understand what was happening and had spent his time 
shopping and visiting his g i r l f r i e n d s .^ when the plaintiff claimed 
damages for defamation, the defendants sought, at one stage, to
1. The apology may be published either in the same newspaper or, if
this appears at intervals of more than one week, in any other
newspaper of the plaintiff's choice.
2. [1943] N.I. 108 [cited by Duncan & Neill, supra.] .
3. The defence (under the equivalent provision of section 2 of Lord
Campbell's Act) had in any eyent, been withdrawn, as further explained.
4. [1958] W.N.L.R. 215.
5. See the section on the History of Nigeria, at p. 88 above.
6. The article was not quite so explicit as it referred to the plaintiff
and three other ad sers b^ r name and then wentoon to make general : 
comments about the waste involved in sending a number of advisers,.:, 
many of whom had made no contribution, but,had, instead, spent tjieir 
time shopping, etc. In the aircumstances, however,the court was satis­
fied that the ordinary reader would consider the general comments 
applicable to the plaintiff and that he had therefore been defamed by 
the allegations - the substance of which was as summarised in the text 
above.
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rely on this defence but subsequently withdrew it.^ Whilst acknow­
ledging that the defence was therefore no longer in issue, the court 
nevertheless indicated that it would not have availed the defendants 
for the article was 'so clearly a libel on the plaintiff [that] ... 
the defendants should not have printed and published [it] until they
had made sufficient reasonable inquiries to find out if the article
2
was based on facts'. Accordingly, in the court's opinion, 'the
defendants were in fact guilty of gross negligence in publishing 
3
th[e] article'.
The defence is seldom used in practice. It is more complex than a
5
simple payment into court under the relevant Rules and renders the 
defendant's chances of recovering his costs from the plaintiff as 
from the date of the payment into court more hazardous. Ordinarily, 
if a payment into court is made by the defendant and the damages 
ultimately awarded to the plaintiff are the same or less than this
1. Although the requisite payment into court had been made, this 
had not been pleaded, nor had it been stated on what portion of 
the alleged libel the payment into court had been made. Counsel 
for the defendants therefore agreed that the defence was bad. 
Edukugho v The Proprietors of The Sunday Times and others, supra, 
at 218.
2. Ibid., at 221.
3. Ibid., The case also throws some light on the requirement that an 
apology be published as soon as practicable. The court was here 
concerned with mitigation of damages under s. 1 of Lord Campbell's 
Act but the same criteria would doubtless apply. In the particular 
circumstances, there had been a delay of some eight months between 
publication of the article and the subsequent apology, and this 
was considered excessive. (The court also considered the apology 
insufficient but did not explain why) ,
4. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 118; Nylander,op.cit., p. 32 where he 
points out that 'it is more advantageous for a defendant to combine 
an apology with payment into court'. The reason for this is 
further explained below.
5. See, for eg, High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules 0.37, rr.
2 and 5, Cap 211, 1948 Edition, Laws of Nigeria.
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sum, the defendant is entitled to his costs as from the date of 
payment in. Where the defendant relies on this defence, however, this 
entitlement will not arise unless the defendant also discharges the 
onus of proving the various elements of the defence.'*'
6.6.8. Leave and licence or volenti non fit injuria
This defence rests upon the plaintiff's consent to, or acquiescence
2
in, the publication in issue. Although such consent may be either
express or implicit from the circumstances, it must extend to the
defamatory material complained of. Thus, in Moore v News of the World,
the plaintiff gave an interview to a reporter from the defendant
newspaper, believing that it was intended to publicise her 'musical 
4
come-back'. Instead, the article subsequently published focused on 
her relationship with her former husband, Roger Moore, The defence 
of 'volenti' failed.
6.6.9. Innocent Dissemination
This defence applies to the person who acts merely as the distributor
of defamatory material but who is nevertheless, in law, considered
5
responsible for publication as much as the author or publisher.
It is thus of particular importance to booksellers newsagents and
1. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 118.
2. Duncan & Neill, ibid., p. 115; Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 17; 
Nylander, op.cit., p. 33.
3. [1972] 1 Q.B. 441 (C.A.).
4. Callender Smith, supra.
♦
5. Duncan & Neill, supra, p. 115.
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libraries and provides the disseminator with a complete defence 
provided he can establish -
(i) that he did not know that the publication contained the libel 
in issue;
(ii) that he also did not know that the publication was 'of such a 
character that it was likely to contain libellous matter''*’; and
(iii)that his lack of knowledge in relation to both (i) and (ii) 'was
2
not due to any negligence on his part'.
The operation of these rules is illustrated by Awolowo v Kingsway 
3
Stores and anor, in which the defendants were the sellers and dis­
tributors in Nigeria of a book entitled 'The one-eyed man is king'.
Certain passages in the book alleged that the plaintiff had been impli-
4
cated lin the Apalara murder case and in subsequent attempts to curtail 
its proper investigation; and went so far as to state that the murder 
weapon had been found in the plaintiff's house and that he had subse­
quently been charged with complicity in the case but had been 
acquitted. None of these allegations was true.
When the plaintiff claimed £100,000 damages for libel, one of the 
defences relied upon by the defendants was that they were innocent 
disseminators of the book and should not be held responsible for 
publication of the libel. The court examined a number of English
1. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 116.
2. Ibid. For further detail regarding this defence, see Duncan & Neill,
ibid., pp. 115 - 117.
3. [1968] 2 All. N.L.R. 217.
4. This had attracted considerable puhlicity because of its undertones
of ethnic conflict: the Apalara were a Yoruba cult and most of the 
police and others charged with investigation of the murder were 
Ibos.
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authorities on the defence and ultimately concluded that, in order 
for it to succeed, the defendants must be able to show:
1 (i) that [they] did not know that the book contained the libel or
(ii) that [they] did not know that the book was of a character likely 
to contain a libel and
(iii)that such want of knowledge was not due to negligence on [their]
2
part1.
1. These included Emmens v Pottle, (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 354, Mallon v 
W.H. Smith and Son (1893) 9 T.L.R. 621, Vizetelly v Mudies Library
[L900 ] 2 Q.B. 170 and Bottomley v F .W . Woolworth and Co. Ltd.,
(1932) 48 T.L.R. 521. Reference was also made to certain United 
States' authorities, including Onalee Bowerman v Detroit Free Press 
120 A.L.R. 1230 and the Restatement of the Law of Torts Vol. Ill 
para 581 at p. 208. As regards the United States' authority 
referred to by the court, it is interesting to note that the court 
appears to have equated their approach with that of the English 
authorities and to have overlooked the substantial difference 
between them. The English authorities clearly support the view 
taken by the Nigerian court: that the distributor of defamatory 
material is liable for its publication unless he can show that 
there was no element of negligence in his conduct. Thus, liability 
is strict and the onus lies on the defendant to establish his 
innocence. By contrast, in the United States, according to the 
Restatement referred to by the Nigerian court, a distributor 'is 
not liable, if there are no facts or circumstances known to him 
which would suggest to him, as a reasonable man, that a particular 
book contains matter which-upon inspection, he would recognise 
as defamatory'. (Emphasis supplied) It follows that, on this 
approach, the onus lies in the first instance on the plaintiff 
to show that there are facts or circumstances known to the 
distributor which should put him on his guard. The practical 
result may in many circumstances be the same (as would probably 
have been been the case here if the United States' approach 
had been adopted) but the distinction in principle is nevertheless 
important.
2. Awolowo v Kingsway Stores and anor, supra, at 245.
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In attempting to substantiate these requirements, both defendants
led evidence to the effect, in essence, that they dealt in some
7,000 to 10,000 titles each year arid that their representatives had"
accordingly merely glanced through the offending book before putting
it up for sale. The court clearly had doubts as to the truth
of the latter statements"*' and finally concluded that the defendants
had failed to discharge the onus of showing that their lack of knowledge
of the defamatory content of the book (assuming that they had not in
fact known of it) was not due to negligence on their part. The court
emphasised that the title in itself (alluding to the English saying
that "in the country of the blind the one-eyed man is King") should
have been enough to put the defendants' representatives on their 
2
guard. The court also found it difficult to 'see how anyone, after 
reading a few passages in [the book] , [could]' fail to [appreciate]
, 3
the need to make sure that [it] [did] not defame anyone in Nigeria'.
Hence, in the particular circumstances, the defence of 'innocent
dissemination' could not succeed. The court was also at pains to
point out, however, that it '[would] not go as far as to say that
a book seller has a duty to read every book which he puts out for 
4
sale.' Adefarasin, J. acknowledged that he '[could] see the diffi­
culty in the way of booksellers in the position of the ... defendants 
who sell books in the order of between 7,000 and 10,000 copies if 
[they] were asked to do that'.^ He went on the emphasise, however, 
that 'if circumstances exist about any book,,which such book sellers 
are putting out on sale, which ought to put them on their guard or
1. Ibid., at 250 and 253, by way of illustration.
2. Ibid., at 251.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., at 252
5. Ibid.
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which ought to have led them to suppose that such book contains a
libel they would be liable if they acted negligently and put such
book out for sale'.^ Adefarasin^ J. acknowledged that the 'same duty
may not be required in respect of books of an entirely different character
2
such as fiction, poetry, literature, Art, etc.'. In the instant 
case, however, the circumstances (as outlined above) were such as to 
have put the defendants on their guard;, and they should have taken 
further steps to satisfy themselves that the book contained no defa­
matory allegations before they put it out for sale. Hence the
defendants were not innocent disseminators - but, on the contrary,
3 4
were liable to the plaintiff in damages.
5
The principle - derived from English authority - thus applied by
the court in these proceedings may operate extremely harshly against
the distributor of defamatory material, who is prima facie liable for
its publication unless he can establish his innocence.^ The danger
this represents to freedom of expression is well illustrated by the
7
recent English decision of Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd and others.
1. Ibid., at 252-253.
2. Ibid., at 253.
3. Ibid., at 257.
4. The quantum of damages awarded by the court is discussed further
at p. 544.
5. As previously noted at p. 526, the Nigerian court appears to
have erred in equating United States' authority with English 
precedent. The United States' approach is substantially different 
in that it places the burden of proving the guilty knowledge of 
the distributor on the plaintiff.
6. In the sense that he did not know that the publication did - or 
was likely to - contain defamatory matter.
7. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 478 (C.A.)f 509 (H.L.(E.)). No judgment in the 
matter was given by the House of Lords, as leave to appeal against 
the ruling of the Court of Appeal was refused by the Appeal Committee 
of the House of Lords. See ibid, at 509.
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Here, the plaintiff (an influential company chairman and director) 
alleged that he had been libelled in three consecutive issues of the 
controversial and satirical magazine Private Eye. He commenced civil 
proceedings against its editor and main distributors and criminal 
proceedings against its publishers.^ In addition, the plaintiff 
issued 74 writs against 37 secondary wholesale and retail distributors 
of the magazine in respect of the second and third articles, claiming 
damages and an injunction in regard to each article. Sixteen of 
the distributors settled with the plaintiff on the basis that they 
would henceforth cease handling the magazine altogether. The circu­
lation figures of the paper dropped from 100,000 to 88,000. The 
remainder of the 37 secondary distributors applied for an order staying 
or dismissing the actions against them as an abuse of the process of 
the court 'in that the plaintiff's purpose in pursuing the actions 
against the distributors was ... not ... to protect his reputation
but the collateral purpose of destroying the paper by cutting off
2
its retail outlets'. A stay was granted by Master Warren but was
lifted on appeal; and, on further appeal to the Court of Appeal, it
was confirmed, by a majority of 2:1 (Lord Denning M.R. dissenting),
that the actions should be allowed to proceed. In so ruling, the
majority of the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the plaintiff's
purpose in all the litigation was merely to 'vindicate his reputa-
3
tion and [to] prevent further anticipated attacks upon it*.
The dissent of Lord Denning M.R. was forceful and - it is submitted -
1. This aspect of his claim is.further considered in Chapter Seven 
(on the.criminal law of defamation), below,
2. Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd., supra, at 479.
3. Ibid.
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cogent. He was clearly satisfied (and the evidence which he adduces
seems plainly to support this conclusion)^ that '[t]he plaintiff's
predominant purpose in suing the distributors was to shut off the
2
channels of distribution of the paper1 and that this was an abuse
of the process of the court. He further stressed the vital importance
of keeping open the channels of distribution; and warned that the
3
freedom of the press depends upon this.
The heart of the matter is, however, emphasised in the judgment of
Scarman, L.J.. , who pointed out that 1 [i]f there is a threat to freedom
of the press in these proceedings it comes from the law itself, which
provides a cause of action, not only against publishers of a libel,
4
but also against distributors'. This is, indeed, the crucial point. 
Opinions on particular factual circumstances may differ (as the case 
itself graphically demonstrates - the majority believing that the -facts 
disclosed no collateral purpose in bringing the proceedings and
1. Lord Dehning M.R. thus pointed out that the plaintiff issued the 
writs without any semblence of warning or attempt at prior nego­
tiation; that he issued 74 separate writs where he could have 
issued one or two, and then have joined the other distributors 
in the proceedings; that he refused to accept any lesser under­
taking from the distributors (in agreeing settlement) than that 
they should cease entirely to handle Private Eye in future; and 
that he threatened (by implication if not expressly) that failure 
to settle on the terms demanded would lead to the institution of 
criminal prosecution against the distributors.
2. Goldsmith v Sperring Ltd., supra, at 496.
3. The importance of freedom of distribution has been emphasised 
in the United States, as further explained at p 351 above,
as a vital part of the principle that there should be no 'prior
restraint' on publication.
4. Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd., supra, at 501, per Scarman, L.J.
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Lord Denning, M.R.taking a diametrically opposite view ; but the main 
difficulty lies in the way in which the law is formulated at present: 
for it weights the scales too heavily against the distributor and 
places on him an extremely difficult burden of proof. The sixteen 
secondary distributors who agreed to settle with the plaintiff must 
undoubtedly have been influenced in their decision by the difficulty 
of discharging the burden of proving not only that they did not know 
that particular issues of Private Eye contained matter allegedly 
defamatory of the plaintiff but also that they did not know that the 
magazine was likely to contain such matter. As soon as objection was 
taken by the plaintiff to the first article (let alone the second 
or third) the onus - given the objective test by which it is governed'*’ 
- would have been impossible in practice to discharge. It follows 
that any publication which engages in investigative journalism and 
as a result makes allegations which may well be defamatory but which 
may also touch on issues of vital public concern is vulnerable to 
having its outlets closed in the manner illustrated by the 
Goldsmith case. As soon as the publication becomes contentious, and 
especially if a libel writ is served on it (as had in fact happened 
to Private Eye on a number of occasions in the past), it may well 
become difficult for a distributer to establish that he did not know 
or suspect that a particular issue of the publication contained
1. As explained above, and reiterated below, the distributor must
be able to prove not only that he did not know that the particular 
publication contained defamatory matter or that he did not suspect 
that it was likely to do so - but also, in both instances, that 
his lack of such knowledge was not due to any negligence on his 
part. Accordingly, his conduct falls to be judged by the standard 
of the reasonable man: who would undoubtedly take precautions which 
any busy distributor, dealing in a considerable number of publi­
cations, would not in practice be able to implement.
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defamatory matter and that his lack of knowledge was not due to any 
negligence on his part. It follows that Scarman, L.J. was right to 
emphasise that the principal fault lies in the law itself - and that 
this requires reform if freedom of expression is to be safeguarded.
6.7. The Relevance of the Defendant's Intentions and the Significance 
of Express Malice.
Except in those instances where 'express malice' negatives a defence 
of fair comment or qualified privilege (as explained below), the 
defendant's intention in publication is generally irrelevant, the ques­
tion in issue being determined, instead, by objective tests. Thus, 
'reference to the plaintiff' is decided on the basis of the understand­
ing of the ordinary reader or listener, as graphically illustrated
by Hulton v Jones  ^and the Nigerian decision of Bakare v Oluwide 
2
and others. Likewise, whether the publication in issue is defamatory
3
in meaning in no way depends on the defendant's intention - or even, 
ironically, on the way it was in fact understood. The likely inter­
pretation of the ordinary 'right-minded' member of society is instead
4
the crucial criterion. Accordingly, - and somewhat irrationally - 
if defamatory matter is proved to be true, the defence of justification 
exonerates the defendant even if, in fact, he wished the plaintiff 
ill - and this was the underlying motive for publication.^ Further,
1. See discussion at p. 516.
2. See discussion at p. 472 above and see also Duncan & Neill,
op.cit., p. 25.
3. Duncan & Neill, ibid., p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 55.
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where a statement is published on an occasion 'absolutely' privileged,
the defendant's intention is unimportant,^  as is his understanding of
2
whether or not the occasion was (in law and fact) so privileged. In
addition, the usual allegation in the plaintiff's claim that the
defamatory words were published 'maliciously' by the defendant is
3
unnecessary and misleading since what is really in issue is whether 
the defendant published them 'without lawful excuse' - and this the 
law presumes in the plaintiff's favour (leaving it to the defendant 
to rebut the inference, if he can, by proof of an appropriate defence).
All this should not, however, obscure the importance of 'express
malice' in the context of 'fair comment' and 'qualified privilege'
(common law or statutory). The term is somewhat unfortunate
for two reasons: First, it connotes 'spitefulness' or 'ill-will'
and malice, in law, has a wider ambit than this and includes, for
example, the desire to achieve some personal advantage rather than to
injure the plaintiff. Secondly, where there is evidence of ill-will
between the parties, the court may 'find it difficult to appreciate
that [this] ... is not equivalent to proof that the defendant was
4
actuated by malice at the time of publication'.
In the United Kingdom, the leading authority on the elements of 
express malice is now the House of Lords decision in Horrocks v
1. Whether the occasion is privileged in this degree is for the court
to decide; and if it is so privileged, the defendant has a complete
defence. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., Chap. 13 in which the defen­
dant's intention is not mentioned, because - it is submitted - it 
is irrelevant.
2. Duncan & Neill, ibid., para 14.06, p. 100. Note, however, the
submission by Duncan & Neill that '[d]espite this general rule ... a
person to whom an inquiry is addressed is entitled to the protection 
of qualified privilege for his answer if he has a bona fide, though 
mistaken, belief that the circumstances are such as would confer a 
privilege'.
3. Ibid., p. 120.
4. Ibid., p. 121.
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Lowe^which although, decided in the specific context of qualified 
privilege, nevertheless lays down propositions of a general nature
2
which would seem equally applicable in the context of fair comment.
The elements of express malice may be summarised as follows:
(i) the improper motive must be the sole or dominant motive;
(ii) the defendant's motive is to be inferred from his words and conduct 
but evidence that he did not believe in the truth of what he 
published is generally conclusive proof of express malice;
(iii)recklessness by the defendant as to its truth may be taken as 
evidence that he knew it was false - but not mere carelessness, 
impulsiveness or irrationality;
(iv) evidence that the defendant did believe it to be true does not
exclude express malice, but the court should be slow to infer,
in these circumstances, that the sole or dominant motive was the 
3improper one.
4
The final crucial principle (as confirmed in Horrocks v Lowe) is 
that the burden of proof - once the defendant has established the 
elements of either fair comment or qualified privilege - lies on 
the plaintiff to show express malice. If the plaintiff fails to 
do so in such circumstances, his claim must be dismissed,
Furthermore, the question whether the defendant was actuated by 
express malice is one which must be placed in issue by the plaintiff 
himself, and which should not be raised by the court of its own
1. [1975] A.C. 135 esp. at 
pp. 121 - 123 .
149-151 (reproduced by Duncan & Neill, ibid,
2. Duncan & Neill, ibid., p.,125.
3. See Duncan & Neill, op. cit., pp.121-126 esp. paras. 17.06 and 17.10
4. [1975] A.C. 135.
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accord, Thus, in Bakare and anor. v Ibrahim, the Nigerian Supreme
court held that the trial judge had erred in considering the question 
of express malice - for, in his pleading^,; the plaintiff had filed 
no reply to the defendants' plea of fair comment so as to place 
express malice in issue. The Supreme Court emphasised that it was 
'decidedly in support of the well-known rule of pleading and practice 
that, in an action for defamation, where it is intended to allege 
express malice in answer to a plea of fair comment or qualified pri­
vilege, it is necessary to deliver a Reply, giving particulars of
2
the facts from which express malice is to be inferred'. Its under­
lying reason was that 'it is only fair, and indeed, quite in keeping
with the principles of justice, that the defendant, whose defence is
3
fair comment or qualified privilege, ought [not] to be exposed to any 
4
kind of surprise'.
The ingredients and effect of express malice are further illustrated
5 6
by the following Nigerian cases. In Ajala v Showunmi , the defendant
1. [1973] 6 S.C. 205. The defendants had published a notice in the 
West African Pilot warning the public that;the plaintiff had no
authority to sell the shares of a particular company. When the 
plaintiff claimed damages for libel, the defendants raised the 
defence of 'fair comment' and the trial court found that the facts 
they relied on in support of this plea were substantially true.
The trial court then, however, proceeded to consider the defendants' 
underlying motives - even though no allegation of express malice 
had been raised in the pleadings. It found that the defendants
had been actuated by such malice, so that their plea was negatived,
and the plaintiff entitled to damages. The Supreme Court reversed 
this decision. There was insufficient evidence of express malice
and, in any event, the question should not have been considered
at all on the pleadings which had been filed.
2. Ibid., at 215.
3. It is submitted that the omission of this word is an oversight.
4. Supra.
5. See also African.Newspapers of Nig. Ltd v Coker [1973] 1 N.M.L.R.
386; arid Amieklah v Okwilage [1962] 2 .(Part 2) All N.L.R. 3.
[1977] 1 C.C.H.C.J. 25.
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wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Nigerian army (and copied 
the letter to the Director of the Public Army Corp) alleging 
that the plaintiff, a major in the army, had - in the company of two 
armed soldiers - demolished a wall on the defendant^ land and that 
he (the plaintiff) had also 'stood around brandishing a revolver'.
The court found that allegations of such conduct on the part of 
an army officer were prima facie defamatory but was also prepared 
to accept that the letter - sent to the plaintiff's superior office?: - 
was protected by qualified privilege. There remained, however, the 
question of express malice. The evidence showed that there was a 
long-standing dispute over the land on which the wall had been 
built - the plaintiff alleging that it was part of the public highway 
and the defendant claiming it as his own. In addition, the allega­
tions that the plaintiff and soldiers accompanying him were armed 
and 'poised for action' against the defendant was contradicted by 
apparently reliable testimony - indicating that the defendant was 
aware of the falsity of his accusations. Hence, the court concluded 
that the defendant had indeed been actuated by express malice.
The plea of qualified privilege accordingly failed and the plaintiff 
was found entitled to damages.
In Awolowo v The West African Pilot Ltd and anor,^  the defendants 
made no attempt to substantiate their allegations against the plaintiff 
(that, inter alia, he had lied in his autobiography, had aroused 
anti-Ibo sentiment and had been prepared to betray his own political 
party for personal advancement); and the court accordingly accepted 
that they knew these to be false, or were reckless as to their
1. [1962] W.N.L.R. 29.
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truth or falsity. Hence, the pleas of fair comment and qualified 
privilege could not succeed."*"
2
In Williams and others v The West African Pilot Ltd., the court's 
ruling on express malice was strictly obiter since it was, in any 
event, satisfied that the defendants had failed to substantiate the 
allegations of fact on which they based their defence of 'fair 
comment'. It is interesting to note, however, the factor which the 
court particularly singled out as evidence of express malice. This 
was the fact that the libels in question (which related to the 
plaintiffs' conduct during the 1951 elections) 'were not contempor­
aneous with the events but were a sudden crusade with no justifiable
3
reasons to support it'. This, in the court's view, 'destroy[ed]
4
the protection offered by th[ e] ... plea'.
Whether this fact constitutes sufficient evidence of express malice 
is open to considerable doubt. The court's focus on this particular 
circumstance is difficult to square with the principles enunciated 
by the House of Lords in Horrocks v Lowe, as described above, for 
determining when malice may be held to defeat a prima facie defence 
of qualified privilege or fair comment. There was no evidence before 
the court to show that m-alice was the dominant motive underlying 
publication, nor did the court attempt to assess whether the defendants' 
belief in the truth of their allegations was 'honest' even though 
possibly also the result of 'carelessness, impulsiveness or
1. Ibid., at 39.
2. [1961] W.N.L.R. 330,4
3. Ibid., at 343
4. Ibid.
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irrationality1 The fact that the cartoons were published only
eight years after the event does not necessarily show that ‘the
defendants, (in publishing) were merely 'giv[ing] vent to personal
2
spite or ill will towards the [plaintiffs]'. On the contrary, it 
is quite possible that the secret conspiracy had only then come to 
light. To take the example of the Watergate scandal in the United 
States, if information regarding the electoral malpractices there in 
issue had emerged only eight or so years later, would it have 
constituted evidence of express malice if the Washington Post and 
New York Times had only then begun to make their allegations of 
misconduct? It is submitted that the answer must be in the negative; 
and that the Nigerian court therefore erred in its assessment of 
the 'malice' factor.
In addition, evidence of express malice may also be found in the
language itself: as, for example, where this'[is] violent or exces- 
3
sively strong'. This must, however, remain suspect to the proviso
4
that wide latitude is necessary in the interests of free speech.
5
Failure to retract or to apologise has also, on occasion, led to an 
inference of such malice, but there is a danger in this for a refusal 
to apologise may also be consistent with a sincere and genuine 
belief in the truth of the defamatory allegations. If, however, a 
defendant is provided with proof, after publication, that.hewas
1. See Horrocks v Lowe, [1975] A.C. 135 at 150.
2. See ibid.
3. Adam v Ward [1917] A.C. 309 at 339 [cited by Duncan & Neill, 
op.cit., p. 127].
4. Ibid., at 330.
5. Duncan & Neill, ibid., p. 128.
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mistaken and what he said untrue and if he still refuses to retract 
or to apologise, then this may indeed provide good evidence of express 
malice.^
6.8. Damages for Defamation
Apart from an injunction against further publication (in appropriate
circumstances), the only relief the successful plaintiff in a defama-
2
tion action may claim is an award of damages. The purpose of such
3
award is not to punish the defendant, but to compensate the plaintiff
and 'restore [him], as far as money can do so, to the position he
4
would have been in if the tort had not been committed1. The
difficulty of applying this well-established principle of restitutio
in integrum in defamation cases, however, is that (as in instances
of physical injury involving, for example, the loss of a limb) the
pain and distress caused to the plaintiff is not truly measurable
in monetary terms. The correct figure cannot be determined 'by any
5
purely objective computation' - and thus the damages for defamation 
are said to be "at large".
The factors to be taken into account in such assessment have been 
described by the Supreme Court of Nigeria, in Uyo v Egware^ as 
follows:
1. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 129
2. Ibid., p. 130
3. Ibid. See also Awolowo v Kingsway Stores and anor, [1968] 2 All
N.L.R. 217 at 259.
4. Duncan & Neill, supra, p. 131,
5. Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027 at 1070 per Lord Hailsham 
of Marylebone L.C.
6. [1974] 1 All N.L.R. 293.
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'Such an award [i.e., for defamation] must 
be adequate to repair the injury to the 
plaintiff's reputation which was damaged, 
the award must be such as would atone for 
the assault on the plaintiff's character 
and pride which were unjustifiably 
invaded; and it must reflect the reaction 
of the law to the imprudent and illegal 
exercise in the course of which the libel 
was unleashed by the defendant'. 1
In Awolowo v Kingsway Stores and anor, the High Court of Lagos,
3
relying on Gatley, identified the relevant criteria as:
'...the conduct of the plaintiff, his 
position and standing, the nature of the 
libel, the mode and extent of publication, 
the absence or refusal of any retraction 
or apology, the whole conduct of the 
defendant and the evidence led in 
aggravation or mitigation of damages'. 4
With respect, however, neither of these analyses offers sufficient
guidance and it is submitted that it is more helpful to consider
5
assessment of damages under the following heads;
(i) Special damage. This means, in essence, any material loss capable
£
of being estimated in money and comprises, therefore, the pecuniary
loss resulting from attendant termination of employment or loss of
business (whether general or specific).
1. Ibid., at 297, per Coker J.S.C.
2. [1968] 2 All N.L.R. 217.
3. Libel and Slander, 6th Edition, paragraph 1380 - cited ibid., 
at 259.
4. Awolowo v Kingsway stores and anor, supra, at 259.
5. See Duncan & Neill, op.cit., pp. 134-144.
6. Ibid., para 18.10, p. 134.
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(ii) Injury to the plaintiff's feelings, including aggravatingfactors. 
The court is entitled to take into account the plaintiff's 'grief
and distress ... at being spoken of in defamatory terms',’*’ and to consider
'if there has been any kind of-highhanded, oppressive, insulting or
contumelibus behaviour by theidefendant which increases the mental
pain and suffering caused by the defamation and may constitute
2
injury to the plaintiff's pride and self-confidence'. In such 
circumstances, the plaintiff may be entitled to 'aggravated damages'
(as appropriate compensation for his loss, rather than as a punish­
ment to the defendant). The factors that may lead to such an award
are many and varied, but two of the most common are the defendant's
3
refusal to apologise or unsuccessful plea of justification.
(iii) The extent of publication. This clearly bears a direct 
relationship with the potential injury to the plaintiff's reputation 
and is thus a crucial factor. Accordingly, publication in a national 
newspaper with wide-ranging circulation, or over radio or television,
is likely to increase the damages claimable - as illustrated by
.4
Williams and others v West African Pilot Ltd., where the court
(in assessing damages) emphasised the fact that the newspaper in
5
which the defamatory cartoons were published was 'a very important 
national daily [with] a very wide circulation within the Federation
of Nigeria, and possibly in other countries [as well] ... and that
6it exercises immense influence on its readers elsewhere'.
1. McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd. (No 2) [1965] 2 Q.B. 86
at 104 per Pearson, L.J. [cited by Duncan & Neill, ibid., para 18.12,
p.135}.
2. Ibid.
3. Duncan & Neill, ibid., para 18.13, p.136, and see also the discussion
of the plea of justification at p. 486 et seq.
4. [1961] W.N.L.R. 330 4. supra, at 343.
5. The content of these cartoons is discussed at p.547.
6. See n 4 above.
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It must be remembered, however, that the nature as well as the size 
of the group to whom publication is directed is important - and 
that limited publication to the plaintiff's friends or work asso­
ciates may accordingly result in equal harm.
(iv) Mitigating factors. These are.important in reducing the
damages otherwise appropriate and though their content may be in­
finitely variable, depending upon the particular circumstances, 
they clearly include matters such as the plaintiff's reputation
prior to publication of the defamatory material,'*' whether the plaintiff
in any way provoked the publication by his behaviour towards the
2 3
defendant, whether the defendant has apologised and whether it is
clear that he was not, in fact, actuated by malice in making the
publication.^
(v) The possibility of obtaining exemplary damages. Such damages 
are intended to be punitive, and may be claimed only in .three sets 
of circumstances:
(a)'where the plaintiff has been injured by oppressive,
arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the
5government';
£
(b)'where [such] damages are expressly authorised by statute';, 
and (c)'Miere: the defendant deliberately sets out to reap financial
benefit for himself at the expense of the plaintiff's reputation.
1. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., pp.137 -140, where the authors discuss, in 
some detail, the difficulties of leading evidence of general bad 
reputation.
2. Duncan & Neill, ibid., para 18,.19, p. 140.
3. Ibid, para 18.20* See also ss 8 an<3- 17, Defamation Laws (W.S. and E.S.).
4. Ibid., para, 18.21, p. 141.
5. Ibid., p. 142.
6. Ibid.
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The rationale for awarding exemplary damages in the third instance
has been well summarised by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard -^ as being
• 2'to teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay*. Thus,
'Where a defendant with a cynical disregard 
for a plaintiff's rights has calculated 
that the money to be made out of his 
wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages 
at risk, it is necessary for the law to 
show that it cannot be broken with impunity' -
and exemplary damages may be awarded.
The leading case in the United Kingdom is now Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome 
where the defendant publishing house ignored prior warnings that a 
book describing a disastrous ships' convoy to Russia during World War 
II might contain defamatory matter, and proceeded to advertise it as 
a 'sensational interpretation of a naval disaster'.^ The House of
Lords upheld an award of £15,000 compensatory damages and £25,000
6 Vexemplary damages on the basis that 'it could properly be inferred 
that [the defendants] thought that it would pay them to publish the 
book and risk the consequences of any action the [plaintiff] might 
take'. ^
1. [1964] A.C. 1129 [cited by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 143].
2. Ibid., at 1226.
3. Ibid.
4. [1972] A.C. 1027.
5. Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 54.
6. Ibid.
7. For further examination of the court's reasoning and conclusions,
see Duncan & Neill, supra, pp. 143 - 145.
8. Cassell,& Co Ltd v Broome, supra, at 1088, per Lord Reid.
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In Nigerian law, the question appears to have arisen for decision in
only one case: Awolowo v Kingway Stores and anor.^  Here, exemplary
damages were claimed against the defendants, the distributors of a
book entitled "The one-eyed man is king" which was found by the court
to contain defamatory allegations that the plaintiff had been implicated
in the Apalara murder case and in the subsequent attempts by the
2
authorities to curtail its proper investigation. The argument in
favour of exemplary damages was that the defendants 'stood to made
3
[a] profit out of [the book]'. The court, however, found this an
insufficient basis for the award of punitive damages - emphasising
4
the 'booksellers and distributors circulate books for profit' but
that this fact alone does not necessarily place them in the category
5
of 'persons whoprofi[t] by their own wrongdoing'. The court was 
clearly influenced by the fact that only 152 copies of the book were 
distributed in total and that the defendants took steps to withdraw 
it from circulation as soon as they were informed of the libel. Thus, 
in all the circumstances, the court's conclusion was that:
'A more direct and substantial pecuniary 
benefit [would have to] be shown to make 
a bookseller or distributor liable for 
punitive or exemplary damages'. 6
One final point regarding the assessment of damages is that an appeal 
court will not lightly overturn the decision of the court a quo
1. [1968] 2 All N.L.R:. 217.
2. The facts of this case are discussed further in the section on the
impact of defamation laws on freedom of expression at p. 551.
3. Awolowo v Kingsway Stores, supra, at 262.
4. Ibid., at 263
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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in this regard - as was emphasised by the West African Court of Appeal
in Zik's Press Ltd v Ikoku^ and reiterated by the Nigerian Supreme
2
Court in Uyo I v Egware. In the lattezr case, the plaintiff appealed 
against the quantum of damages (£300) awarded him at the trial of 
the action. The Supreme Court pointed out that:
1... appellate courts are very reluctant to ...
attempt to re-assess the amount of damages
the trial judge has given, and ... they will 
never do so unless it can be established that 
at the trial the judge proceeded upon a wrong 
principle of law or that his award was 
clearly an erroneous estimate, since the 
amount was manifestly too large or too small1
In the particular circumstances, however, (given the serious nature of 
the libel - that the plaintiff had treacherously collaborated with the 
rebels during the Civil War - as well as the high social standing of the
plaintiff, who was the 'Ovie' of the Ozoro community) the trial judge
had clearly erred and his award was increased to £1000.
6.9. The Impact of the Civil Law of Defamation on Freedom of the
Media in Nigeria.
The impact of the civil law of defamation on freedom of the media -
especially in the vital context of the expression of criticism and
dissent regarding political issues - is not easy to assess. The point
4
has previously been made that, in the years immediately following 
independence in Nigeria, defamation was one of the most frequently
1. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 188.
2. [1974] 1 All N.L.R. 293.
3. Ibid., at 295 citing Zik's Press, supra, at 189.
4. See the section on the Significance of the Law of Civil Defamation
at p. 461.
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litigated torts and that 'the plaintiffs in defamation actions in the 
early 1960s included most of the leading political personalities at 
the time, [whilst] ... there was hardly a national newspaper which 
was not a defendant in at least one such action during the period'.^  
This indicates that the civil law of defamation must have had some 
impact on the expression of politically oriented criticism and 
comment; and it is accordingly important to determine whether the law 
has operated well in practice in providing a necessary shield against 
unjustified and derogatory verbal attack; or whether it has gone too 
far in curtailing the freedom to canvass issues of vital public 
importance. The question is perhaps best addressed by examining some 
practical examples of the law in operation; and then attempting to 
analyse the significance of these.
2
In Williams and others v The West African Pilot, the plaintiffs, as
3
previously described, sued for damages for defamation arising out
of the publication, in the West African Pilot, of a series of ten
cartoons alleging, in essence, that the plaintiffs had plotted to win
the 1951 elections through a combination of fraud and intimidation and -
subsequently - to subvert (though bribery) the victory nevertheless
4
achieved by their political opponents, the N.C.N.C. The nature of 
the allegations in issue is perhaps best illustrated by quoting the 
court's description of three of the offending cartoons.
1. Kodilinye, op.cit., p. 131.
2., [1961]; W.N.L.R. 330.
3. See pages 470 and 497 especially.
4. For a further description of this political party and its arch-rival, 
the Action. Group (A.G.), see the section on the History of Nigeria, 
at p 77 and 82 respectively.
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The seventh cartoon in the series was headed '"A Master Plan"1^  and 
showed the cartoon character called the 'Fuehrer' (whom the court 
had previously found referred to Chief Awolowo) saying to his co­
conspirators - the 'Brain' (alias Chief Rotimi Williams) and the 
'Propagandist' (alias Chief Akintola): '"Now comrades, we must mortgage
all our properties to our last pair of trousers in order to raise a
2
colossal loan with which to operate our bribe-and-win scheme"'. In
the ninth cartoon, 'the Brain was depicted as setting out before his
two comrades ... the plan to employ thugs and ex-convicts for mass
impersonation and fraud at the polls "so we could command over-whelming
3
majority in the new legislature"'. The tenth cartoon showed a meet­
ing of the same three characters after the election results were known 
and 'it showed the three men in a most unhappy mood after what was 
claimed to be an N.C.N.C. victory ... [with] the Fuehrer ... telling 
his other two comrades what their next plan should be. Underneath 
the cartoon [were] the words "Plans for the Last Card" and the 
Fuehrer was alleged to say -
"It's Incredible, It's Terrible, that the 
N.C.N.C. Could Win the Majority inspite 
of our great scheme, The only Hope now 
is for us to bribe all the 'soft' N.C.N.C. 
victors to cross carpet to our party"'. 4
5
The defendants, as previously described, made singularly little 
effort to substantiate the truth of their allegations - and the court
1. Williams and others v West African Pilot, supra, at 333.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., at 334.
5. See p. 497.
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had no hesitation in concluding that they were false and in awarding 
the plaintiffs damages totalling £10,500 plus costs.
Was the law of defamation used here to stiflfe vital political criticism?
The answer depends on what did in fact happen in the 1951 elections.
If the plaintiffs had been guilty of the conduct alleged - or if
there were reasonable grounds for suspecting this - then it would
be vitally important, in the general public interest, that this
should be exposed and brought to public attention. In this regard,
it is worth recalling that there is considerable evidence of electoral
malpractice in different parts of Nigeria in the past. Thus, it
was partly the intimidation experienced by the Action Group in
attempting to campaign for the 1951 elections in the then Northern
Region which prompted the establishment of the Minorities Commission
and the introduction of the Bill of Rights.^ In addition, it is
clear that the 1964 and 1965 elections (especially the latter) were
rigged to a considerable extent, as chronicled in some detail by 
2
Nwabueze. Against this background, it seems particularly important 
that any further allegations of electoral irregularities should be 
canvassed in full. On the other hand, if the plaintiffs were 
entirely innocent, it is equally important that the law of defamation 
should have been available to assist them in redressing the damage 
to their reputation and standing in Nigerian society. Unfortunately, 
however, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the truth of these 
allegations of electoral malpractice; and the difficulty is com­
pounded by the secrecy which ipso facto surrounds such a conspiracy.
1. See the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights, at p. 171 above.
2. B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, London, 
1973, pp. 148-150.
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Given the difficulty of proof in such circumstances, it must be 
queried whether the civil law of defamation strikes the right balance 
between competing interests by assuming the falsity of defamatory 
allegations - and placing the onus on the defendant to establish 
their truth. This question is considered further below.'*'
2
In Awolowo v The West African Pilot Ltd and anor, the plaintiff 
claimed that he had been defamed by articles alleging, inter alia, 
that he had disrupted harmonious relationships between the Yoruba and 
Ibo and that he was prepared to 'bribe and cringe his way1 to any 
important position in government. His claim succeeded and the court 
awarded him damages totalling £8,000. Again, the question whether 
the law of defamation worked "badly" - to stifle legitimate criticism - 
or "well" - to protect a reputation unjustifiably attacked - depends 
on whether the allegations were true. The court found them false; 
and this conclusion (on the evidence placed before it) seems fully 
justified. The defendants led no evidence to substantiate the truth 
of the second allegation; nor did they produce much to support their 
assertion that the plaintiff was "anti-Ibo". Passages from the plain­
tiff's autobiography which were relied upon by the defendants in this 
regard were rejected by the court as insufficient to substantiate 
the allegation. On the contrary, in the court's opinion, they showed 
that 'what ha[d] been done by the author [of the article in issue]
[was] to pick on [certain] extracts ... [and to] interpret them not
3
just as a criticism of Dr Azikiwe's conduct in certain respects
1. See p. 560 et seq.
2. [1962] W.N.L.R. 29.
3. The articles in issue had been published in response to the prior 
publication of an article entitled 'What I think of Zik', drawn from 
the plaintiff's autobiography 'Awo'.
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but as an attack on the Ibos.'^  There is nothing in the judgment
itself to indicate that the defendants were precluded in any way
from bringing further evidence before the court in order to show the
2
truth of their accusations against the plaintiff and there seems
no reason to reject the court's findings on the facts, that the
allegations were false. If that is so, it follows that the law of
defamation worked "well" in this instance in protecting the plaintiff's
reputation against unjustified attack (even though the quantum of
3
damages awarded was possibly rather high).
Another case with clear political implications is Adedoyin v Nigerian
4
National Press Ltd., and anor in which the plaintiff (the Speaker
5
of the Western House of Assembly) was, by innuendo, alleged to be 
implicated in arms-smuggling operations. The court awarded him 
£250^ as damages for defamation. Again the law of defamation must
1. Awolowo v West African Pilot Ltdandlanor, supra, at 35.
2. Contrast this with the case of African Press Ltd and anor v 
Attorney-General Western Nigeria, [1965] 1 All N.L.R. 12 discussed
at p.424 above in the section on Sedition where a Ministerial 
certificate that disclosure would not be in the public interest
prevented the defendants obtaining access to a number of documents 
which would (arguably at least) have helped them to substantiate 
their allegations.
3. It is arguable that the articles would not have been taken particularly 
seriously by the average reader in view of their somewhat "wild
and woolly" assertions. See, for example, the extract reproduced 
at p.35 which begins: '"History bears witness that Ibos had lived 
in harmony with their Yoruba brothers until in 1945 when Chief 
Awolow wrote in London inter alia: 'Ibos belong to the lowest 
strata of society yet they make loudest noise for self-government"'.
4. [1964] 2 All N.L.R. 9.
5. See the discussion at p482 above for further detail as to how 
the innuendo was constituted.
6. Damages were assessed at this rather low figure on the basis, 
inter alia, of evidence (by the plaintiff's own witness) that he 
had thought the plaintiff just the type to engage in arms 
smuggling: thus indicating that the plaintiff's reputation, prior 
to publication of the libel, had not been particularly good.
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be regarded as having worked "badly" if the allegations were true
and "well" if they were not. The court found them false and
- again - this conclusion (on the evidence placed before it) does
seem justified. The judgment is not entirely clear in this regard,
but it appears1 that all the defendants succeeded in establishing
was that 'the plaintiff was not present when his houses were searched';
and this, of course, did not prove his involvement in the arms
operations. 'At the same time, it must be acknowledged that proof of
the plaintiff's involvement in secret.^operations of this kind would
3
not be easy to provide; and it is also worth recalling that the 
plaintiff's own witness had informed the court that he had thought 
the plaintiff just the type to engage in arms smuggling. The court 
considered this assessment of the plaintiff's character as relevant 
only to the question of damages - and had accordingly awarded the 
plaintiff a sum considerably lower than that claimed. However, 
the comment does also call to mind the aphorism that there is 'no 
smoke without fire'; and once again.raises the question whether the 
law of defamation strikes the right balance between the individual's 
right to protection of reputation; and society's right to be informed 
of matters of great public concern.
A further example of a publication with political implications (again
4
involving Awolowo) is Awolowo v Kingsway Stores (Nig.) Ltd and anor.
1. Unfortunately, the court did not deal crisply with this issue. 
It is submitted that this is nevertheless a legitimate inference 
from its comments at 14.
2. Supra, at 14.
3. See n 6, p 550 above.
4. [1968] 2 All N.L.R. 217.
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Here the plaintiff was alleged to have been implicated in the Apalara 
murder case and its official "cover-up". His claim for damages for 
defamation succeeded and the court awarded him £5000, plus costs 
assessed at £210. The defence principally relied upon by the defen­
dants was that of innocent dissemination, so little argument was 
addressed to the truth or falsity of the allegations against the 
plaintiff. One assertion at least - that the plaintiff had been 
charged but acquitted of complicity in the murder - was clearly false 
and though some attempt was made, in the final sentences of the off­
ending paragraph, to "clear" the plaintiff by stating that 'he would 
have preferred his complete innocence established', the court was 
nevertheless satisfied that the passage, taken as a whole, 'left the 
reader with the firm impression that Awolowo's complete innocence had 
not been established'.1
Viewed against this background, the answer to the question whether 
the law of defamation worked "well" or "badly" in this instance 
seems easily answered. The court's conclusion that the allegations 
were false seems entirely justified: and there is nothing to indicate 
that the law of defamation was here used to stifle legitimate criti­
cism of a key figure in government.
Another defamation case involving a publication with political over-
2
tones is African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd v Coker. Here, two articles 
published in the Nigerian Tribune urged the removal of the plaintiff 
from his office as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance; 
and did so on the grounds that he was corrupt. The evidence relied
1. Ibid., at 232.
2. [1973] 1 N.M.L.R. 386.
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upon by the defendants at the trial in order to substantiate this 
allegation derived exclusively from the report of the Saville Tribunal 
of Enquiry, established by the Military Government in 1966. This 
report, however, expressly stated that:'"Only one specific allega­
tion of corruption was made against Mr Coker during the course of 
our inquiry, and this we believe to have been patently false"'. The 
Saville Report found that the plaintiff had been guilty of 
'irregularities' and recommended that his assets be further investi­
gated; for it could not account for certain payments into his bank 
accounts and there had been a 'general undercurrent of suggestions 
during the inquiry that the senior officials of the City Council 
[Mr Coker was then City Treasurer] were corruptr.1 This evidence was 
clearly insufficient to substantiate the allegations of corruption 
so that prima facie, the court's conclusion .was correct and the law 
of defamation was "well" used to uphold the plaintiff's reputation 
against unjustified attack. Yet the report of the case nevertheless 
leaves the reader with the impression that the law of defamation 
might instead have operated, in this instance, to curtail important 
criticism of a government official. The investigation which the
Saville Tribunal had recommended (and which exonerated the plaintiff
2
in full) was conducted in secret. According to the Nigerian Tribune
articles, its campaign to rid Nigeria of corrupt officials had
succeeded in some instances, but not in relation to the plaintiff -
3
who (interestingly enough) was a cousin of the Military Governor.
On the other hand, "corruption" is a specific and very serious
1. Ibid., at 394.
2. Ibid., at 387.
3. Ibid., at 389.
-554-
allegation and it must be acknowledged that the defendants were 
unable to substantiate this (though perhaps if the report of the 
secret inquiry had been available, this would have been easier).
A further politically-oriented decision is that Ohonbamu v Midwest 
Newspapers Corp and anor1 where the plaintiff (a senior lecturer in 
law at Lagos University) claimed damages for defamation arising out 
of the publication in the Nigerian Observer of an article which criticised 
corrupt intellectuals - in general - and the plaintiff in particular.
The court found the plaintiff's claim proved and awarded him damages 
of N 2,000 plus costs of N 250.
The question whether the law of defamation operated "well" or "badly"
in this instance is complex and the answer is perhaps 'Yes' - in 
principle; but 'No', - on the particular facts. As regards the 
affirmative part of the answer, the circumstances underlying publi­
cation were that the plaintiff had previously published an article 
sharply critical of the Federal Military Government's conduct of the 
civil war against Biafra and calling on the government to redouble
its efforts to bring the fighting to a speedy conclusion. It was in
response to this that the allegedly defamatory article criticising 
the plaintiff was published in the Nigerian Observer. In principle 
it is "goqd" that the law of defamation was available to the plaintiff 
to assist him in countering an attack which seemed totally unjustified,
especially since the plaintiff (in voicing his criticisms of the
2
Government's conduct of the war) was doing no more than to exercise
1. [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 763.
2. The court's view of Ohonbamu's article was that 'it was not in 
good taste'. See ibid., at 782.
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the freedom of speech guaranteed him by the Constitution.'*' To this 
extent, therefore, the law of defamation worked 'well' in upholding 
the right to voice political dissent, for the plaintiff would feel 
free (having successfully claimed damages for defamation) to continue 
with the type of criticism which had provoked the defamatory attack 
against him; and (his reputation having been restored through the 
intervention of the court) his future comments would be accorded 
appropriate respect by those to whom they were addressed.
So far, so good. Unfortunately, however, - on the particular facts 
of the case - the court seems to have erred on one major point; 
and this inevitably casts doubt on the correctness of its decision 
overall. One of the court's main reasons for finding the article 
criticising Ohonbamu to be defamatory was that it described intellec­
tuals in extremely derogatory terms as, inter alia, 'ambitious,
2
greedy, corrupt, without principles and without ethics' and (in
the court's view) made it clear that this description applied also
to the plaintiff as one member of the class. Thus, the court stated!*
with reference to the general criticism of intellectuals,: 'It is
clear upon a reasonable reading of the passage [in question] that the
reference there is to none other than the plaintiff and others like 
3
him'. In reaching this conclusion, however, the court appear
4
completely to overlook the disclaimer contained in the article 
itself that there are, of course, some exceptions to the general rule
1. This, it may be recalled, guarantees the right to impart.ideas and 
information without interference, and its significance for the 
law of defamation is further discussed below at p. 587.
2. Supra, at 780.
3. Ibid., at 781.
4. Ibid., at 778, where the defamatory article is reproduced and
the words set out below in the text are quoted. No reference
whatsoever to this important disclaimer is to be found in the
judgment of Adefarasin, Ag. QJ.
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regarding the ambition, greed and so forth of intellectuals as a 
class - and that Dr Ohonbamu is one of these exceptions. The 
actual passage in the article is worth quoting to make the point 
quite clear.
'When they [the Nigerian intellectuals] 
wave their certificates, they expect us 
to decorate them with five rows of medals, 
bow and worship. But they are like other 
Nigerian mammals ambitious, greedy, corrupt, without 
prihciples and without ethics. They are 
worse. What this war means to them is a 
quick return to civilian rule - if the 
soldiers would do their dirty work for 
them quickly - so that they may be able to 
take over with palpable indolence what the 
Ibos had secured with hard work. I would 
not say there are no exceptions. Dr. Ohonbamu 
is one."
It must be acknowledged that this was not the only passage on which
the court based its finding that the article was defamatory of the
plaintiff. It referred also to the allegation that 'people like
Dr Ohonbamu are members of the committee of convinced and dedicated
men "who originate materials for dissemination" even of falsehood'.^  
2
This allegation, in the court's view, was 'bound to bring a man ...
into odium, ridicule or contempt in the estimation of right thinking
3
members of the society. With respect, however, the allegation in
question seems so vague and so ill-phrased that it may be doubted
whether it would indeed have this effect. In addition, the court
relied on the reference in the article to Biafra being 'his [i.e.,
4
the plaintiff's] Biafra' which the court considered clearly
1. Ibid., at 775.
2. The order of words is changed slightly in the court's discussion 
of the passage but the discrepancy is minor and, it is submitted, 
inconsequential.
3. Ibid., at 780.
4. Ibid., at 780 - 781.
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defamatory as it was 'bound to hold out the plaintiff in (sic)
ridicule in the eyes of reasonable readers'.^ The passage which the
court had in mind reads as follows:
'Dr Ohonbamu complains that the Federal Army 
was guilty of unpreparedness for a war 
against his 'biafra'; but our case really
was that we conceived no genocide against
the Ibos'. 2
With respect, it is doubtful whether this passage, particularly when 
read in the context of the article as a whole, would have suggested 
to the ordinary reader that the plaintiff identified himself with 
the rebel cause - as the court seemed prepared to infer.
In short, then, the evidence on which the court relied for its con­
clusion that the article was defamatory of the plaintiff seems tenuous 
in the extreme. To this extent, therefore, the law of defamation 
operated "badly" for the defendants appear to have been wrongly held 
liable - and this may well have militated against their future 
willingness to engage in criticism and debate•
Another case worthy of mention once more in this regard is that of 
3
Bakare v Oluwicie. It may be recalled that, in this case, the 
Nigerian Socialist had published an article criticising the life 
of luxury and ease enjoyed by the opulent Nigerian 'Man of Means' - and 
had contrasted this with the poverty endured by the majority of the 
population. The article was general in its terms, but the court was
1. Ibid., at 781.
2. Ibid., at 775 - 776.
3. [1969] 2 All N.L.R. 324.
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nevertheless satisfied that there were sufficient points of similarity
between the fictitious 'Man of Means’! and the plaintiff to warrant
the inference that the article was intended to - and did in fact -
refer to him.'*' When it came to considering the 'stings' of the libel,
however, (that the plaintiff, inter alia, was funded by the C.I.A. and
2
had 'corruptly pressurised men of power in politics') the court 
was not satisfied that sufficient evidence of these facts had been 
adduced in order to substantiate a defence of fair comment. The 
court's approach seems somewhat harsh against the defendants, however, 
for it was quick to accept the evidence of factual similarity so as to 
establish the necessary reference to the plaintiff - and equally quick 
to assert that the defendants had not adduced sufficient factual 
evidence to substantiate their comments. The court seems to have 
taken an unduly narrow approach to what constituted the 'stings' of 
the libel and to have focused on those allegations which - by their 
very nature - would be the most difficult to prove. The latter point 
raises again the question whether the law of defamation strikes the 
right balance between competing interests and gives sufficient scope 
to freedom of expression. The gap between rich and poor in the 
country, the prevalence of corruption and the possibility of abuse of 
the economic power enjoyed by the wealthy few are all questions of 
legitimate public concern in Nigeria; and it is disturbing that an 
article couched in the terms of that in the Bakare case should have 
been found to be defamatory.
1. This aspect of the case has previously been discussed at p. 473.
2. See p. 494 above, where this aspect of the decision is discussed 
in more detail.
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On the other hand, account must also be taken of the case of Okon v
C.O.R. Advocate Ltd and others.'1’ Here the defendants had published,
in a newspaper entitled the C.O.R. Advocate, an article alleging,
inter alia, that the plaintiff - the principal of the Duke Town
Secondary School - had ruined the school and was responsible, through
his incompetence as a principal, for its falling educational standards.
The facts underlying the publication of these allegations were that
the plaintiff was standing as a candidate in forthcoming elections
to the Calabar Urban County Council and had previously published an
article criticising the C.O.R. State Movement (which was closely
2
linked with the Action Group) and that the defendants were supporters
of the party and had published their allegations against the plaintiff's
competence as a school principal in retaliation for this and in order
to undermine his credibility. Thus, the final paragraph of the article,
for example, queried: 'If Mr Bassey Okon cannot manage a small - I
Secondary School successfully ..., why has he effrontery to speak of
3
the C.O.R. Leaders slantingly?' The plaintiff's claim for defamation 
succeeded and the court awarded him damages of £350. The court was 
satisfied that the article had been actuated by express malice and 
that the defendants had gone out of their way to attack the plaintiff 
personally; and, moreover, that they had done so by particularly 
underhand means through impugning the plaintiff’s professional com­
petence. In this instance, the law of defamation clearly worked 
"well" and provided essential protection against a verbal attack which
1. (1961) 5 E.N.L.R.21.
2. For a further description of the Action Group, see the section on 
the History of Nigeria, at p. 82 above.
3. Okon v C.O.R. Advocate Ltd., supra, at 22.
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could very seriously have affected the plaintiff's professional 
career (as there was evidence that some two-thirds of the community 
had begun to doubt the plaintiff's competence as a school principal 
as a result of the article).
It follows from this brief description'of the cases above that assessment 
of the impact of the civil law of defamation on freedom of expression 
is by no means easy. There are instances when the law appears to 
have worked well;^ but there eLre also a number of occasions in which 
the uncomfortable feeling remains that the canvassing of issues of
2
vital public importance has been stifled through the law of defamation. 
The main question which emerges from these decisions is whether the 
law of defamation, as presently constituted, strikes the right 
balance between competing interests. The law, at present, is heavily 
weighted against the defendant (and in favour of the plaintiff) in 
a number of ways. First, the falsity of defamatory allegations is 
presumed, and - instead - the difficult (and in some circumstances 
impossible) onus of proving them to be true (so as to be able to rely 
on the defences of justification of fair comment) lies on the defendant. 
Secondly, the test of whether particular material is defamatory - 
or refers to the plaintiff - is objective? and depends (not on the 
defendant's subjective intent in this regard) but on whether the 
material - from the viewpoint of the reasonable man - is likely to 
lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-minded members of society 
generally. Thus, as pithily stated in the English case of Cassidy v Jkx\\y
1. As, for example, in the Okon case above and in Awolowo v West African 
Pilot Ltd., supra, p. 449 - 450.
2. As in Williams v West African Pilot Ltd., supra p. 548; African 
Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd v Coker, supra p.553; and Bakare v Oluwide, 
supra, p. 558.
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1
Mirror Newspapers Ltd. , 'Liability for libel depends, not on the
intention of the defamer, but on the fact of defamation'. Although
2
some steps (arguably inadequate in any event ) have been taken to 
redress this situation, the rule remains in full force and effect 
throughout the northern states of Nigeria, which comprise the bulk 
of both area and population within the country.
Thirdly, the law presumes that the plaintiff has suffered damage through 
the publication; and hence the plaintiff - contrary to the general 
principle of tort law - is able to succeed in his claim without having 
to establish what is ordinarily regarded as a fundamental element of 
liability in delict. There is an exception in the case of slander 
where 'special damage' must be proved in all but the five enumerated 
instances in which slander is actionable per se. However, this excep­
tion is of little benefit to the printed media; and its significance 
in the context of radio and television broadcasts is open to some 
question. Thus, in the southern states of Nigeria, it has been 
provided by statute that the broadcasting of words (or images) 
for 'general reception' is to be regarded as 'publication in perma­
nent form'. In the North, where the common law continues to govern,
classification as libel or slander depends on whether the material
3
in question is, in fact, read from a written script .
1. [1929] All E.R. 117.
2. See the criticism of the statutory defence of 'unintentional 
defamation' at p 519 - 520.
3. See the discussion at p 466 - 467 above, and see also Gatley 
on Libel and Slander, 8th ed., London, 1982, para 147, p 76.
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Then there is the vexed question of the liability of distributors of 
defamatory material. Again, the plaintiff need not prove that the 
distributor knew of the defamatory material or intended to defame 
the plaintiff in any way. Instead, the distributor is prima facie 
liable for 'the fact of defamation' (reiterating the dictum above 
in Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd.)  ^unless he can show that 
he did not know, and did not suspect, that the publication contained 
such matter; and, further, that his absence of such knowledge was 
not due to negligence on his part. The discharge of this burden of 
proof may be impossible in practice and the costs of attempting to 
do so in litigation may be crippling. The resultant risk - inevitably
- is that distributors may refuse to handle controversial publica­
tions at all: as graphically demonstrated by Goldsmith v Sperrings 
Ltd.2
It is thus apparent that the civil law of defamation is indeed 
heavily weighted in the plaintiff's favour. It is subm itted that 
the present balance is unduly restrictive of freedom of expression
- and that it is salutary in this regard to note the very different 
approach that has been applied in the United States of America in 
recent years.
1. [1929] All E.R. 117.
2. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 478 (C.A.), discussed at p. 528.
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6.10. Thh Contrasting United States1 Approach to the Civil Law of 
Defamation
6.10.1. The 'Times v Sullivan' doctrine
The law of libel and slander in the United States of America is derived
from the English common law"*" and the elements of defamation (with one
vital exception, described below) and of the available defences - as
2
outlined above - are essentially the same. Detailed consideration of 
the complexities of United States' law on this topic lies outside the 
scope of this study: but, in one respect at least, the United States' 
Supreme Court has adopted an approach diametrically different from that 
pertaining in other common law countries; and this important innovation 
requires brief consideration.
It will be recalled that, at common law, all that is required to establish 
liability for defamation in the civil law is proof that the words in 
question referred to the plaintiff, that they were defamatory and that 
they wfere published by the defendant. The law presumes both that the 
defamatory words were false (and hence that they were published maliciously) 
and that publication of the libel has caused the plaintiff damage. In 
essence, therefore defamation at common law may be said to be governed 
by a rule of "strict liability", and is heavily weighted in the 
plaintiff's favour.
1. See Nelson and Teeter, Law of Mass Communications; Freedom and
Control of Print and Broadcast Media, 3rd ed., New York, 1978, p 57.
2. See ibid., Chapter 3, for a description of the basic elements of 
defamation and see Chapter 5 for an analysis of the traditional 
defences of privilege, fair comment and truth.
3. Hence, under the common law, malice (or express malice) need only 
be considered if the defendant has succeeded in establishing the 
defence of fair comment or qualified privilege. At that point, 
liability for defamation may still be incurred if it can be shown 
that the publisher was actuated by express malice. See p.532 above.
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Since 1964, however, in the United States, the Supreme Court has set
its face against this principle. It has done so in recognition of
the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open1^" and in
acknowledgement of the difficulty (so amply illustrated by the
Nigerian cases discussed above) of proving the truth of particular
allegations. As stated by the Supreme Court in its watershed decision,
'[a]llowance of the defence of truth, with the burden of proving it
on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be
deterred. Even courts accepting this defence as an adequate safeguard
have recognised the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the
alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars.... Under such
a rule, would-be critics ... may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is
in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or
2
fear of the expense of having to do so.
The Supreme Court accordingly concluded that '[t]he rule thus dampens
3
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate1 - and that it 
should therefore be replaced by a new principle, under which 'a public 
official [is prohibited] from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with "actual malice" - that is, with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
1. New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, (1964) , at 270. (Cited by
Nelson' & Tester, sypra, p, 57) .
2. New York Times Co v Sullivan, supra, at 279.
3. Ibid.
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or not'.^
The decision in which this principle was established was New York Times 
2
Co. v Sullivan. It arose from the publication in the Times of an
3
'editorial advertisement' describing the struggle of black students
in the South for recognition of their civil rights and the police
4
repression this had evoked. Sullivan, a police Commissioner in the
area, claimed - and was awarded - $500,000 for libel on the basis
of an Alabama law that "the defendant has no defence as to stated
facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their
particulars".^ The Supreme Court reversed the decision, however,
holding that the law was "constitutionally deficient for failure to
provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that
6 7
are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments ".
Stressing that "[c]ases which impose liability for erroneous reports 
of the political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine
g
that the governed must not criticise their government' and, further,
1. Ibid., 279-280.
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
3. The court considered it irrelevant that the statement had been 
paid for. It was still entitled to constitutional protection - 
especially as the effect might otherwise be to 'shut off an important 
outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons
who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities'. Ibid., at 266.
4. For an extensive quotation from the .'since-famous advertisement,titled
"Heed Their Rising Voices", 'see Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., pp.93-94.
5. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 96.
6. The content and significance of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
have previously been discussed at p. 350.
7. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p. 95.
8. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid. The Supreme Court was here quoting
the decision in Sweeney v Patterson, 76 U.S. App* D.C. 23,
128 F. 2d 457 (193771
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that [w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field 
1
of free debate' , the Supreme Court held that the factual inaccuracy
of some of the statements in the advertisement did not destroy its
2
claim to constitutional protection . It then proceeded to lay down 
the vitally important principle regarding public officials described 
above.
The significance of this principle cannot be over-emphasised. Not
3
only did the Supreme Court define 'malice' with reasonable precision ,
but it also established it as a threshold requirement in the plaintiff's
claim, thus entitling the publisher to summary judgment if the necessary
4
degree of 'malice' is not prima facie shown •
Since 1964, the doctrine of New York Times Co v Sullivan has been
extended in two important respects. First, it has been established
5
that the principle applies equally to 'public figures' . Secondly, 
it has further been held that liability for defamation is not to be
1. Ibid.
2. It pointed out that '"erroneous statement is inevitable in free 
debate" and ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression 
are to have the "breathing space" that they "need to survive"...'. 
See Nelson & Teeter, ibid.
3. 'Malice was [thus] no longer [to be]... the vague, shifting concept 
of ancient convenience for judges who had been shocked or angered 
by words harshly critical of public officials'. See Nelson & 
Teeter, ibid., p. 97. Hence, it would no longer suffice to show 
(as in the past) '"evidence of ill-will" on the part of the 
publisher'; or '"hatred" of the publisher for the defamed'; or 
"'intent to harm" the defamed'.
4. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid, p. 118. The possibility of obtaining 
summary judgment at an early stage in the proceedings has great 
practical importance. It offers the prospect of keeping legal 
costs to a minimum and hence helps to militate against the self­
censorship the media may otherwise be induced to practise.
5. See text below, etseq.
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imposed on a 'strict' basis at all,'*’ so that even the private individual
who claims damages for defamation may succeed only if he can show
2
that the publication was 'negligent'. In addition, limitations have
3
been placed on the award of punitive or exemplary damages, and it
has been suggested that the public official or figure test should
be replaced by one of 'public interest in the issue' - according to
which the express malice requirement would apply to all publications
relating to such questions, irrespective of the public or private
4
status of the individuals concerned. Each of these developments 
warrants brief consideration.
6.10.2. Extension of the Times v Sullivan doctrine to public figures.
In 1966, the Supreme Court took up and decided two cases in the same
5
opinion in order to clarify controversy regarding the impact ot the 
Times v Sullivan rule on persons who cannot be considered "public 
officials" but who are, nevertheless, "public figures" and :'involved
1. See p. 574 below.
2. See p. 574. . The word 'negligence' is here used because it is the
requirement most commonly applied - . since the Supreme Court's
ruling that strict liability was not to be imposed. However, the 
Supreme Court did not specify what degree of fault was required; 
and state practice in this regard varies to a considerable extent, 
as further explained below.
3. See p. 575 below..
4. See.p. <572 below.
5. This was particularly acute following the dictum of the Btederal
Court in Pauling v Globe-Democrat Pub\ ■ :Co. 362 F,2d 188, (8th Cir.
1966) that a public figure who 'had project[ed] himself into the 
arena of public controversy ... [and was seeking] to guide public 
policy ... should have no greater remedy than does his counterpart 
in public office'. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 100.
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in issues in which the public has a justified and important interest'.^
2
The two cases in question are Associated Press v Walker and Curtis 
3
Pub. Co.v Butts. Ih the formes Walker - a retired United States 
4
Army general - was described in an Associated Press dispatch (cir­
culated to member newspapers around the nation) as having encouraged 
rioters - protesting against the admission of a black student to the 
University of Mississippi - to use violence; and of having 'personally 
led a charge against federal marshalls'  ^ in the course of the protest. 
In the latter, Butts - a former athletic director at the University 
of Georgia - was alleged, in an article in the Saturday Evening Post, 
to have conspired to "fix" a football game between Georgia and the 
University of Alabama. Both filed suits for libel and the question 
arose as to whether they fell within the ambit of the Times v Sullivan 
rule. Neither was a "public official": but either was, arguably, a 
"public figure".
Justice Harlan (supported by three others making a total of four^) was 
satisfied that Walker was indeed a "public figure" as he had thrust 
'his personality into the "vortex" of an important public
1. See the opinion of Mr Justice Harlan in Curtis Pub. Co. v Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967), at 134. (Cited by Nelson & Teeter, ibid., p. 101).
2. Earlier proceedings in this case, in which the Supreme Court of
Texas denied a writ of error in relation to the trial court's
award to Walker of damages of $500,000 are reported at 393 S.W.
2d. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
3. 388 U.S. 130, (1967). Both cases were considered by the Supreme
Court together.
4. He had retired 'after a storm of controversy over his troop-
indoctrination program'. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 100.
5. Nelson & Teeter, ibid., p. 101.
6. The justices who supported Harlan were Clark, Stewart and
Fortas.
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controversy 1\  but believed that he should not be subject to the same
rule in libel as a "public official". He should, however, be
required - in order to recover damages - to show that the publisher
had been guilty of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
2
adhered to by responsible publishers'. In the circumstances,
Associated Press had shown no such departure: for the "news required
immediate dissemination,...[tjhe Associated Press.... respondent
gave every indication of being trustworthy and competent ... and [the
dispatch] would not have seemed unreasonable to one familiar with
General Walker's prior publicised statements on the underlying 
3
controversy'. Accordingly, the plaintiff - having failed to establish
4
the requisite '"severe departure from accepted publishing standards'" 
was not entitled to damages.
5
Chief Justice Warren (supported by two others) agreed with this 
conclusion: but for a different reason. In his view, the Times v 
Sullivan requirement of proof of express malice should apply equally 
to "public figures". He pointed out that distinctions between 
governmental and private sectors are becoming increasingly blurred 
and submitted that:
1. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid.
2. Curtis Pub. Co. v Butts, supra, at 155.
3. Ibid., at 158-159.
4. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 102.
5. These were Justices Brennan and White.
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'...differentiation between "public figures" 
and "public officials" and adoption of 
separate standards of proof for each had 
no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment 
policy1. 1
Moreover, in his view, it was plain that:
'..."public figures" like "public officials" 
often play an influential role in ordering 
society.... [so that] [o]ur citizenry has 
a legitimate and substantial interest in 
the conduct of such persons, and freedom of 
the press to engage in uninhibited debate 
about their involvement in public issues 
and events is as crucial as it is in the 
case of "public officials'". 2
Chief Justice Warren also strongly criticised the test of "extreme
3
departure" (advocated by Justice Harlan) for its uncertainty and its
4
failure to accord adequate protection to free speech.
Both groups of justices agreed, however, that the 'libel judgment
5
against the Saturday Evening Post should stand'. Justice Harlan 
(with whom Chief Justice Warren agreed in this regard) pointed out 
that the story was not "hot news" and that the Post had ignored ele­
mentary precautions by relying on the unsupported affidavit of its 
informant who claimed (through electronic error) to have overheard the 
telephone conversation in which Butts sold the football secrets to 
his rival team. In the view of Justice Harlan, this evidenced a
1. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, at 163.
2. Ibid., at 164..
3. See p. 569 above.
4. Supra, at 163. See also Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 104.
5. Nelson & Teeter, ibid., p. 102.
-571-
"severe departure from accepted publishing standards"; whilst in the 
opinion of Chief Justice Warren, it revealed a "reckless disregard" 
of whether the statements were false or not.^
The Supreme Court was thus agreed on the ultimate resolution of the 
libel claims, but its underlying reasoning was sharply divergent.
Justice Harlan (and three others) believed that the relevant test for pub­
lic figures is that of. "extreme departure" from responsible reporting 
standards (satisfied in relation to Butts but not vis-a-vis Walker); 
whilst Chief Justice Warren (and two others) stressed that "public 
figures" are subject to the same test of "express malice" as Vpublic 
officials" (and that this test was.met in Butt's case but not in 
Walker's). No majority principle emerges, therefore, from this case, 
on the important question of the test applicable to "public figures";
but the "extreme departure" formula of Justice Harlan appears to have
2
had considerable impact on subsequent decisions.
6.10.3. Amplification of the Times v Sullivan doctrine in Gertz v 
Robert Welch Inc.
This decision of the Supreme Court must now, however, be read in the 
light of its subsequent ruling (by a majority of five) that "public 
officials" and "public figures" are in substantially equivalent positions 
and should both be subject to the same requirement - that of "express
1. See ibid., p. 102-103.
2. See ibid., p. 104, where Nelson & Teeter point out: 'Since Justice 
Harlan's opinion lacked majority support in the Court of nine 
persons, it cannot be said to have the force of a Court-adopted 
rule. Yet his standard of "extreme departure" from responsible 
reporting has had a persistent influence in subsequent decisions'..
-572-
malice". This principle was established in the case of Gertz v 
Robert Welch, Inc.^  - a landmark decision in a number of respects.
Gertz was a Chicago lawyer, who had been 'retained by a family to bring
a civil action against [a policeman] who had shot and killed their 
2
son'. He was accused in American Opinion of having been the architect
of a "frame-up" of the policeman (as part of a communist conspiracy
to discredit local police); and of being a Leninist and a "Communist- 
3
fronter". Gertz claimed damages for libel and was successful before
4 5
the trial court. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, the judgment was reversed - on the basis that the question is
issue was one of "public interest" and that Gertz was accordingly
obliged to show "express malice" in order to recover. This judgment
was based on a principle previously laid down by three Supreme Court
9
justices in the 1971 decision of Rosenbloom v Metromedia,Inc . . ,Here, 
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion had stressed that the important 
criterion was not whether the individual concerned had "public" or 
"private" status; but rather whether the matter under discussion was
1. 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).
2. Nelson & Teetey, op.cit., p. 107.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. It awarded him damages of $50,000.
5. 471 F. 2d 801 (1972) .
6. 403 U.S. 29, 91 S Ct 1811 (1971).
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one of general "public interest". If so, debate concerning it should
be free and uninhibited - and, in order to promote this, libel claims
regarding such questions should be subject to the "express malice"
requirement of Times v Sullivan.^  Gertz, objecting to the application
of this principle - which had not been accorded majority support in the
2
Rosenbloom proceedings - appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court (by majority of 5:4) ruled that the "express malice"
3
requirement should not apply to private citizens, like Gertz. It
was legitimate to impose it on "public officials" and "public figures"
who enjoy 'significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counter-
4
act false statements than private individuals normally enjoy'.
5
Moreover, those who seek public office or prominence in public affairs 
must accept the hazards this may entail; and
1. Justice Brennan declared:
'If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot 
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved.... The public's primary interest is in the event.... We 
honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is 
embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protec­
tion to all discussion and communication involving matters of public 
or general concern, without regard as to whether the persons involved 
are famous or anonymous'. Ibid., at 43.
2. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 106, who point out that '[l]ower 
courts accepted th[is] plurality opinion as a ruling'; with the 
result that very few libel suits (by public or private individuals) 
were won; and commentators predicted the disappearance of libel suits.
3. The criteria for distinguishing "public" from "private" individuals 
are discussed further, at p. 577 below; together with the Supreme 
Court's reasons for concluding that Gerts fell within the "private" 
category.
4. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 344.
5. Justice Powell, delivering the majority opinion, pointed out that 
'[h]ypothetically, it [might] be possible for someone to become
a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but [that] 
the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly 
rare1. See p. 345. Accordingly, both public officials and public 
figures might legitimately be considered to have 'sought' their 
special positions.
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1...the communications media are entitled to 
act on the assumption that public officials 
and public figures have voluntarily exposed 
themselves to increased risk of injury from 
defamation1. 1
The private individual, by contrast, has 'relinquished no part of
his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently
... has a more compelling call on. the courts for redress of injury
2
inflicted by defamatory falsehood1.
This did not mean, however, that the private citizen should continue
to enjoy the benefit of the common law rule of strict liability
3
(under which the law presumes (inter alia ) both the falsehood of
defamatory words and malicious intent on the part of the publisher).
Instead, the different states 'might set their own standards (adopt
laws) imposing liability for defamatory falsehood harming private
individuals - "so long as they d[id] not impose liability without 
4
fault"'. As for the "fault" required, 'Powell termed it 
5
"negligence".' .
Striking a further blow for freedom of expression, Justice Powell 
further ruled that that 'state laws would not be permitted to provide 
"recovery of presumed or punitive damages" but only "compensation
1. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 345.
2. Ibid.
3. A further aspect of the common law rule - as pointed out by
Nelson & Teeter, bp.cit., , p. 109, is that the law also presumes
damage, from defamatory words, the only question being the 
quantum recoverable.
4. Nelson & Teeter, ibid , p. 108, citing the opinion of Justice 
Powell at 347. The emphasis is as supplied by the authors.
5. Ibid., p. 109. State have, in fact, adopted;varying standards - 
not limited to 'negligence', as further explained at p-579 below.
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1 2 3
for actual injury"1. In his view, "presumed" or "punitive"
4
damages were unjustified, except where the plaintiff was able to show
5
the "express malice" of Times v Sullivan. In other instances,
damages should be limited to compensation for actual injury; which
would, however, include compensation for 'impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish
and suffering'^ - even though these were not easily measurable in
7
precise monetary terms.
g
Of the four dissentients, three believed that the "negligence" prin­
ciple in relation to private individuals did not go far enough in
1. Ibid., p. 109, citing Justice Powell at 349.
2. As pointed out atp 561 above, the common law presumes damage to 
flow from defamatory words in the form of libel, so that there is np 
need for the plaintiff to prove this. This is, of course, a consider­
able derogation from the general principle in tort that the plaintiff 
must prove all elements of his claim, including the fact that he
has suffered loss through the defendant's wrongdoing.
3. Punitive damages are designed to punish the wrongdoer and hence
bear no necessary corrolation with the damage caused to the injured 
party. Indeed, they are invariably - Ipso facto - higher than such 
loss.
4. He pointed out (at 349 - 350) that presumed damages inhibit
free speech unduly as do punitive damages which amount to 'private 
fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct' - 
and which are incompatible with the compensatory purpose underlying 
the rule that private individuals may recover damages for libel on 
proof of negligence.
5. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p. 109..
6. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., supra) at 350.
7. See ibid.
8. These were Justices Douglas and Brennan, and Chief Justice Burger.
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protecting freedom of expression, and one'*' considered that it went 
too far in 'scuttling the libel laws of the States in ... wholesale 
fashion1. ^
Thus, Justice Douglas repeated his view that the First Amendment
bars the imposition of any libel law 'impos[ing] damages for merely
3
discussing public affairs'. Justice Brennan, the author of the
4
plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v Metromedia Inc. reiterated his
conviction that the crucial criterion is not the public or private
status of the individual, but the "public interest" in the matter
under discussion. He also pointed to the dangers of "self-censorship"
arising from requiring the media to observe ."reasonable care" and
warned that limiting damages to "actual injury" was not enough, as
the media would still face crippling legal costs in showing that they
had not been negligent. The "public interest" principle was accordingly
preferable from this viewpoint as well as it would limite the area of
5
potential litigation. Chief Justice Burger expressed a similar view, 
stressing that the majority decision would inhibit some editors.^
By contrast, Justice White objected to the onus placed on the private 
citizen by the majority decision to prove both "fault" (or negligence)
1. This was Justice White.
2. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 370
3. Ibid, at 360.
4. 403 U.S. 29, 91 S. Ct. 1811 (1971).
5. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit. , p..110.
6. See ibid., p. 111.
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on the part of the publisher as well as 'actual damage to reputation
resulting from the publication';^ and considered that the majority
decision went too far in curtailing the private individual.'s
2.
capacity to obtain redress for damage to his reputation. '
Given the different rules applicable to "public" and "private" indivi­
duals (under the majority decision), categorisation becomes a vital 
issue: and the Supreme Court attempted to formulate some guidelines 
in this regard. It distinguished between two different types of public 
figure: first, the public figure 'for all purposes' - being the person who
has attained 'general fame or notoriety in community: and pervasive
3
involvement in the affairs of society'; and, secondly, the public
figure 'for a limited range of issues' - being the person who has
'thrust [himself] to the forefront of particular public controversies
4
in order to influence [their] resolution'.
Applying these principles to the particular facts, it was clear that 
Gertz - although he had been active in community and professional 
affairs - had not achieved general fame or notoriety, so as to bring 
him within the first category of public figure. Furthermore, he had 
done no more, as regards the particular issue, than to fulfill his 
obligations as legal representative of the family and had not 'thrust 
himself into the vortex of this public issue'.Accordingly, Gertz
1. See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 3 89 -3 94 for the heart 
of MR. Justice White's dissent.
2. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 111.
3. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., at 3 51.
4. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, citing Gertz, ibid., at 351 - 352.
5. Ibid., at 352.
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was not a public figure within the second head - and hence did not 
have to prove that American Opinion libeled him with express malice.^-
6.10.4. The application of these tests.
Subsequent decisions have provided a measure of further clarification
of the distinction between "public" and "private" status. Thus it is
clear that the children of famous parents may themselves be considered
as having 'general fame within the community', within the first
2
category of "public figure". It also emerges from this - and other 
3
decisions - that an individual may be drawn into public attention
(rather than thrusting himself into that position) and still fall
4
within the category of public figure. However, it seems also that 
'"private figures" do not necessarily lose that status overnight by
1. The Supreme Court accordingly ordered a new trial.
2. See Meeropol v Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The children 
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953 for passing 
national defense information to the Soviet Union, sued for libel 
against the author (Nizer) of a book describing the parents' trial/ 
and also the children themselves. They were held '[a]s children of 
famous parents, [to have] ... achieved general fame or notoriety
in the community "' (at 34) and hence were obliged to show express 
malice in order to succeed.
3. See Trans World Accounts, Inc., v Associated Press et al., 425
F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Here the Federal Trade Commission had 
investigated Trans World, found potentially harmful activities by 
the company, and had published its decision to issue a proposed 
complaint. The result was that Trans World had been drawn into this 
particular public controversy, and was a public figure for this 
limited issue. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., pp. 115-116, who 
point out that it may not be inappropriate to speak of Trans World 
having been 'drawn into' public controversy 'because the root of 
the matter was its own activity which the FTC saw as misbehaviour'.
4. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid., and contrast the above two decisions
with the circumstances of Exner v American Medical Association et al., 
12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P. 2d 863 (1974) where 'Dr Frederick Exner 
for two decades and more had been "injecting" and "thrusting" 
himself into the flouridation-of-water controversy through speeches, 
litigation books and articles' and who therefore constituted a 
public figure in relation to this question.
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Sudden media publicity' and that the divorce proceedings of well-known
'socialities' are 'not the sort of "public controversy" referred to 
2
in Gertz', so that the individuals involved do not constitute 'public 
figures'.^
It remains to consider the type and extent of the "fault" that must
4
be shown by the private individual - as a threshold requirement -
in order to bring a successful claim for libel. The Supreme Court in
Gertz's case described the "fault" required as "negligence" - but also
made it clear that the different states might adopt varying standards, so
5
long as they did not impose liability without fault. The majority 
of states have adopted the standard of negligence^ - which, in general, 
requires consideraton of whether the publisher has exercised reasonable
1. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid., at 116, commenting on the case of 
Troman v Wood, 62 111.2d. 184, 340 N.E. 2d 292 (1975) where Mrs 
Troman became involved in a glare of publicity when a newspaper
implied that her home was a gang headquarters. When she sued the newspaper 
for libel, the court ruled that she retained her private status.
2. Time, Inc v Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976) at 965.
3. Ibid. Here Time magazine had erroneously reported the grounds of
divorce granted to Ms Firestone - a memberof the "society" elite of 
Palm Beach; and was sued by her for libel. The Supreme Court ruled 
that, notwithstanding the publicity which had surrounded the 
divorce proceedings and the plaintiff's position in the "Palm Beach 
400", she did not constitute a public figure within the meaning
of Gertz.
4. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p. 119. Thus the fault requirement 
must be examined early in the libel proceedings, for unless it can 
prima facie be shown, the 'defending news media may win summary
judgments, precluding trial'.
5. Some, however, have adopted stricter standards, as explained by
Nelson & Teeter, ibid., pp. 121-122. For example, New York State
requires 'express malice' for private individuals, and Indiana and 
Colorado have adopted the 'public interest' approach advocated in 
Rosenbloom v Metromedia, as described at p. 572 above.
6. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid., p. 119.
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care in the circumstances.^ A concrete example of the application of 
this test is provided by the case of Peagler v Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 
where the court made it clear that "something better than a single, 
possibly biased source for derogatory remarks about private persons' 
is required.^
It remains to consider the meaning of “express malice'' as required by 
the Times v Sullivan rule. This, according to the Supreme Court 
definition, may take two forms - reckless disregard for the truth or 
falsity of the publication, or knowledge that the publication was
* i 4false.
Concentrating for the moment on the former, the requirement of
"reckless disregard" has been further clarified in a number of cases.
5
In Garrison v Lousiana , the accused - who was charged with criminal 
libel^ - was a prosecuting attorney in Lousiana and accused a number 
of judges of laziness and’inattention to duty. Hie conviction was
1. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 121 who point!out that the word
'care' has been used in a number of cases: the question being whether
the publisher has exercised 'reasonable care' or 'ordinary care!
or 'due care'. The American Law Institute's Second Restatement of 
Torts defines negligence (in ascertaining the truth of allegations) 
as '"the failure to use that amount of care which a reasonably 
prudent person would use under like circumstances'". See Nelson
& Teeter, ibid, p. 120.
2. 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d. 1216, 1223 (1977).
3. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p. 120>
4. Ibid., p. 122.
5. 379 U,S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964).
6. The Supreme Court confirmed that the fact that the case involved
criminal libel was irrelevant. The 'express malice' requirement of 
Times v Sullivan applied equally to it. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, 
p. 125. The significance of the decision for the criminal law of 
defamation . is further considered at p. 685 e^ t seq.
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reversed by the Supreme Court, which ruled that 'reckless disregard' 
implies r"[a] high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity on the part of 
the publisher''’*' and there was no evidence of this in the particular 
circumstances.
2 .
In St. Amant v Thompson, 'St Amant read, in a televised political
campaign, [an] accusation by one Albin that Herman Thompson had had
money dealings; with another man accused of nefarious activities in labor 
3
union affairs'. In considering whether St Amant had shown "reckless
disregard" for the truth or falsity of the accusation, the Supreme
Court warned that mere '[p]rofessions of good faith [would] be unlikely
4
to prove persuasive' but also emphasised that:
'There must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication'. 5
The circumstances did not disclose such serious doubts on St Amant's
part. Albin had sworn his statement, St Amant had verified portion of
it and there was insufficient evictence to show that lAlbin was generally
6
considered untrustworthy.
1. Garrison v Lousiana, supra, at 74 and 216 respectively.
2. 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (1968).
3. Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 123.
4. St Amant v Thompson, supra, at 1326.
5. Ibid,, at 1325, emphasis supplied.
6. See Nelson & Teeter, supra p. 124.
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Significantly, the Federal Court of Appeals has held that prior veri­
fication is not, however, required to negative "reckless disregard".
In Washington Post Co v Keogh^ (where the Washington Post had published 
a story by columnist Drew Pearson accusing Congressmen of bribe-splitting 
- without attempting first to verify it), the court pointed out that
'[v]erification is a costly process, and the newspaper business is
2
one in which economic survival has become a major problem'. Hence,
a requirement of verification would encourage self-censorship -
3
especially amongst 'less established publishers' - and might well spell
the end of this particular form of journalism. The court pointed out
that 'Pearson and his fellow columnists seek ;and often uncover the
sensational, relying upon educated instinct, wide knowledge and confi- 
4
dential tips', and warned that '[verification] would be certain to 
dry up much of the stream of information that finds its way into their 
hands'.^
It is clear, however, that this cannot be taken as an absolute rule.
Thus, for example, in Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts, the fact that 
the Saturday Evening Post had relied on an unsubstantiated report of 
a telephone conversation overheard by accident (in relation to a
1. 125 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 365 F. 2d. 965 (1966).
2. Ibid.,,at 972*
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. ' _
6. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). it may be recalled (from the description of
the case at 568 above) that Butts was alleged to have sold the football 
secrets of his team to a rival school. The source of the story was 
an individual (not a columnist, like Pearson in the Washington Post 
Case) who claimed to have overheard (as a result of electronic error) 
the telephone conversation in which Butts sold the secrets.
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story that was not "hot news") was held (by three Justices of the
Supreme Court)'*' to be evidence of "reckless disregard". This shows
the difficulty of attempting to lay down any hard-and-fast principle.
Inevitably, much will depend on the particular circumstances and rigid
2
rules may in fact prove counter-productive.
The Butts case is one example of "reckless disregard" being found to
exist. Another illustration is provided by the case of Snowden v
3
Pearl River Broadcasting Corp. Here, a radio station which ran a live 
'phone-in' programme in which it asked all callers to identify them- 
selves-but did not warn them against making defamatory allegations 
over the air-was held to have evinced "utter recklessness" in this 
regard. As the Louisiana Appeal Court indignantly declared:
J'The procedure employed amounted to 
an invitation to make any statement 
a listener desired, regardless of how 
untrue or defamatory it might be,
1. Only three justices considered that the express malice rule applied 
to Butts on the basis that Butts was a "public figure" and subject 
to the same requirement as a "public official". Four of the justices, 
by contrast, thought that the "express malice" requirement should
not be extended to "public figures", but that Butts would never­
theless have to show an "extreme departure" from accepted standards 
of responsible reporting (which, in the circumstance, he had done).
See the discussion at p. 569 et_seq and see also Nelson & Teeter, 
op.cit., pp. 125-126.
2. It is submitted that it is preferable for the courts to remain 
fully sensitive to all the nuances of "reckless disregard", rather 
than to lay down strict requirements regarding verification, etc.
3. 251 So.2d.405 (La. App. 1971) one particular caller - who omitted 
to give his name -accused a particular restaurant of being 
involved in narcotics. The announcer broke in repeatedly trying 
to get him to disclose his name, but did not warn him against 
making defamatory statements nor attempt to cut him short. On 
the contrary, he 'concluded by thanking the caller when the caller 
had finished his statement1.
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&bout any person or establishment, 
provided only that the declarer identify 
himself. The announcer's qualifying 
remarks did not even remotely indicate 
that unfounded remarks were ou.t of order, 
or that statements and accusations should 
be based on personal knowledge, or that 
mere rumour, speculation, suspicion and 
hearsay would not be permitted'. 1
The broadcasting station could easily have taken the precaution of
taping conversations for transmission only after monitoring; and could,
at least, have warned a particular caller that he would be cut off
2
if he did not disclose his name.
"Express malice" may be evidenced not only by "reckless disregard"
for the truth of falsity of allegations, but also by publication
"with knowledge of their falsity". An illustration of the latter is
3
provided by the case of Dalton v Meister where Meister had
described Dalton (a former Assistant Attorney General) as a "gestapo
leader" and had accused him of conducting a "smear" campaign against 
4
Meister. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found, however, that the boot
was on the other foot, for 'the evidence plainly showed a "persistent
5
course of conduct on the part of Meister to 'get Dalton'". The 
court found that Meister's statements had been made with knowledge 
of their falsity, and awarded Dalton $150,000 - half in compensatory'1
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., and see p. 583 . above.
3. 52 Wis.2d. 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971).
4. See Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 129 for further factual
background.
5. Nelson & Teeter, ibid.
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1
and half in punitive damages .
Further analysis of decisions in which express malice has been found
2
present lies outside the scope of this study . Reference must, however
be made to an important recent decision of the Supreme Court which may
well have the effect of narrowing the protection conferred by the
3Times v Sullivan rule. The case in question is Herbert v Lando ,
4
decided in 1979 by a majority of 6:3 , in which the Supreme Court 
ruled that * a public official had a right to request reporters to 
testify on their "state of mind"*^ in levelling particular allegations 
against him or her. This requirement is not only disturbingly in­
trusive : but also threatens to undermine the principle that the 
burden of proof (under Times v Sullivan) lies on the public official 
allegedly defamed to show the requisite malice on the part of the 
publisher.
Notwithstanding this development, however, or the possible narrowing
of the category of public figure evinced by Time, Inc v Firestone^
7
(and its successors ), it is clear that the approach of the
1. This case was, of course, decided before Gertz in 1974. Even 
after Gertz, however, punitive damages could still legitimately 
have been awarded, since the Supreme Court indicated that res­
trictions on presumed and punitive damages do not apply to cases 
where "express malice" is found. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 109
2. For further examples, see Goldwater v Ginzburg, 414 F. 2d 324,
(2d Cir. 1969); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc v Fields, 254 Ind.
219, 259 N.E. 2d 651 (1970) and Morgan v Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
421 F. 2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1970).
3. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
4. The majority opinion was written by Mr Justice White, and the 
dissenters were Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall.
5. Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 4th ed., New York, 1982, p 157.
6. 424 U.S. 448, 96 S Ct 958 (1976), discussed above at p 579.
7. See Abraham, supra, p 156 n 17.
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United States affords far greater protection to freedom of speech 
than does the common law in England or Nigeria. If this approach had 
been followed in Nigeria in cases such as Williams and others v 
West African Pilot ~^ - where the plaintiffs fell clearly in the "public" 
category - the results may well have been very different. And the 
benefits for freedom of speech would have been incalculable. At the 
risk of repitition, may it be reiterated that conduct of the kind 
alleged in the newspaper (the rigging of elections) is of vital 
public concern and if there is any evidence at all that this has 
indeed occurred, this should be brought to public attention. Yet 
the law of defamation as presently constituted in Nigeria militates 
against this; for it presumes that defamatory words are false and 
enables the publisher to escape liability only if he can prove the 
allegations substantially true. However, proof of truth is often 
difficult - and is especially so in relation to a "secret plot" of 
the kind alleged in this case. Far better, therefore, to cast the 
burden of proof on the public official or figure to show that the 
publication is motivated by express malice - whether in the form of 
reckless disregard for the truth or of knowledge of falsity. The 
opposite approach must inevitably encourage self-censorship by the 
media - and the public's right to be informed of matters of vital 
concern must be commensurately.curtailed.
It must, of course, be acknowledged that the United States' guarantee 
of freedom of speech is different from that pertaining in Nigeria.
The First Amendment robustly declares that 'Congress shall make no
1. See p.546 above.
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law abridging ... the freedom of speech or of the Press'.^- It 
remains, therefore, to consider whether the civil law of defamation, 
as presently constituted in Nigeria, is in keeping with the guarantee 
of freedom of expression contained in the Nigerian Bill of Rights, 
with its substantially different wording.
6.11. The Constitutionality of the Civil Law of Defamation.
Under the Nigerian Bill of Rights, enshrined within the 1979 Consti­
tution, ,1 freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference1 
is guaranteed by section 36. . This guarantee is not absolute, however, 
and accordingly does not invalidate any law which is 'reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society' in the furtherence of certain
interests. The range of permitted derogations is wide, as previously
2
discussed, and the one relevant to the law of defamation is clearly 
that contained in section 41(1) (b) , which upholds the validity of 
'any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society ... 
for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other 
persons'. Such rights and freedoms plainly include the right to 
reputation, untarnished by defamatory publication.
Prima facie, therefore, the civil law of defamation in Nigeria falls 
within the ambit of the derogations from freedom of expression permitted 
by s.41. It remains to consider, however, whether the law as pre­
sently constituted can be said to be 'reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society'.
1. See the section on the Guarantee of Freedom of Expression at p.206.
2. Ibid.
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The words 'reasonably justifiable' provide a somewhat uncertain 
yardstick for assessment; and section 41(1)(b) is clearly open to 
interpretation in a number of different ways. It is submitted, 
however, that the phrase must be strictly interpreted in order to 
prevent the permitted exceptions from swallowing up the principle.
It is further submitted that the present imbalance in the law - with 
its heavy weighting in the plaintiff's favour - goes beyond what is 
'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' to protect the 
reputation of others; and that the Nigerian courts should now follow 
the lead of the United States in abandoning the 'strict liability' 
principle and imposing upon the plaintiff the burden (which normally 
applies in the law of tort) of proving all elements of the delict - 
including the guilty state of mind'*' of the tortfeasor and the damage 
caused to him by the alleged wrong. In addition, public officials 
and public figures should be made subject to the threshold require­
ment of establishing'express malice' on the part of the alleged deta­
iner: and it should be made clear that 'express malice' connotes 
knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory material or recklessness 
as to its truth or falsity. In keeping with the suggested general 
requirement that liability for defamation is not to be imposed without 
fault, distributors should no longer be prima facie liable for the 
publication of defamatory material; and, instead, the onus should 
lie squarely on the plaintiff to show that the distributor had actual, 
subjective knowledge of the defamatory matter and hence either 
intended to defame the plaintiff (or must have been careless as to
1. Thus it should be shown that the publisher of the defamatory
material subjectively intended to defame the plaintiff, or that 
he was negligent in causing this result.
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whether or not this result occurred).
In a nutshell, therefore, freedom of expression requires the correc­
tion of the present imbalance in the law of defamation and demands 
that the plaintiff be made subject to the btirden of proof which 
normally obtains^- in the law of tort. In the context of public 
officials and public figures - where the full canvassing of matters 
related to their public conduct is vital to the effective functioning 
of democracy - the burden on the plaintiff should be pitched higher, 
and proof of express malice should be required. The law as presently 
constituted goes further than is reasonably justifiable in a demo­
cratic society' to protect reputation? and its emphasis should now
be changed in the manner effected in the United States through
2 3
New York Times Co v Sullivan and Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc.
In conclusion, it is salutary to note that one Nigerian decision
already reflects support for this approach - at least in the context
4
of public officials. Thus, in Adedipe v Falaiye, the plaintiff 
(a member of the Akure District Native Authority Council in Ondo 
Division) claimed damages of £10,000 from the defendant (a member 
of the Western House of Assembly) in respect'of certain defamatory 
allegations contained in a letter written by the defendant to the 
District Authority Council, Akure, The sting of the defamatory 
passages was that the plaintiff had received £200 as 'dash' from
a particular business concern (Finch and Company) 'under the false
1. Thus,, the plaintiff must be able to show all elements of his 
claim, as emphasised above.
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed at p. 564 above.
3. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed at p. 571„above.
4. [1956] W.N.L.R. 54.
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pretence that he would influence the Council [of which he was a 
member] to favour the application of [the] ... Company for [certain] 
Sawmill and Timber concession[s].  ^ The defendant relied upon a 
'rolled-up plea' of justification and fair comment which the court 
found substantiated by the evidence. The court accordingly dismissed 
the plaintiff's claim, and - in so doing - it emphasised the following 
important principle:
'IT]he . plaintiff, being a member of the 
Council, was holding a public office 
and anyone who undertakes to fill such a 
public office offers himself to public 
attack and criticism, and public 
interest requires that a man's public 
conduct shall be open to the most searching 
criticism'. 2
In the light of all that has been said above, it needs no further 
emphasis that this is the approach which should be followed by all 
Nigerian courts in future years.
1. Ibid., at 55.
2. Ibid., at 54.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF DEFAMATION
7.1. The significance of the Criminal Law of Defamation
The opening passage of .the judgment of Lord Edmund-Davies in Gleaves v 
Deakin and others  ^ (a recent criminal libel case in the United Kingdom) 
provides a convenient starting point for examination of the significance 
of the criminal law of defamation. His Lordship pointed out that it 
is a 'startling state of affairs' (in the view of many)that:
'[A]ny person who considers, or merely 
cares to assert, that he has been defamed 
in w r i t i n g 2  may, without let or hindrance 
(unless he be libelled in a newspaper^), 
ignores his civil remedy for damages 
and institute proceedings for criminal 
libel so that his alleged defamer may 
be imprisoned or fined'. 4
The main rationale for prohibiting criminal libel on pain of imprisonment
1. [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L.(E)). The facts of the case are described
below at p. 626 et seq.
2. In English law, slander (the publication of defamatory matter in
transitory form, as discussed at p. 465 above) is not punishable as
a crime, as further explained at p. 608 below.
3. Where libel is contained in a newspaper or other periodical, the
leave of a judge in chambers in required in order to institute a 
prosecution against those responsible for publication. This is 
explained further at p. 604 below. In other cases, however, no 
leave is required to commence proceedings, as further described at 
p. 601 et seq.
4. Gleaves v Deakin, supra, at 503.
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or other1 punishment^ was said, in the early seventeenth century, to be
that 'harsh words about another person Imight] tend to cause him to
seek revenge through violence against the writer, and that such broach
2
of the peace Iwas] a public evil"to be guarded against1. Thus, in 
the decision of the Star chamber in De Libellis Famosis in 1605, it 
was stated:
1 If it be against a private man it deserves 
a severe punishment, for although the libel 
be made against one, yet it incites all 
those of the same family, kindred, or 
society to revenge, and so tends per consequens 
to quarrels and breaches of the peace, and may 
be the cause of shedding of blood, and of 
inconveniences.1 3
In addition, so went the reasoning, 'if the offending words were true, 
the offense was aggravated, for true defamation would make revenge
4
even more sought after than would a lie, which could be disproved'. 
This gave rise to the rule 'the greater the truth, the greater the 
libel', which was modified only in 1843 with the introduction of a 
statutory defence of justification in Lord Campbell's Act,^ as further 
explained below.
1. In the seventeenth century, the punishment was often mutilation.
Thus, Dr Leighton (for example) 'was whipped, had both ears cut off, 
branded on both cheeks and had his nostrils slit': (1630) 3 St.Tr. 384, 
cited by J.R. Spencer,'Criminal Libel - A Skeleton in the Cupboard 
(1)', [1977] Crim.L.R. pp383 - 394, at p. 385, n:.9.
2. Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed., New York,
1978, p. 307.
3. 5 Coke 125 (1605), 3 Coke's Reports (Fraser ed., 1826) 254, part 5 - 
125a.
4. Nelson & Teeter, supra.
5. Libel Act 1843, 6 & 7 Viet. c. 96, described further at p. 623.
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The rationale that powers of criminal prosecution were necessary in 
order to prevent aggrieved citizens from taking violent measures of 
reprisal against the maker of defamatory allegations is readily under­
standable^" in an age when duels were widely regarded as an appropriate 
means of avenging verbal insults. Today, however, such reasoning can 
clearly no longer hold good. It is interesting to note, however,
that the result has not been the abolition of the law of criminal
2 3
libel, but the rejection of any 'rule' that a threat to the public
peace is a pre-requisite for the institution of criminal proceedings.
4
Thus, beginning with R v Wicks, and as subsequently confirmed by the
5
Court of Appeal in Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd and by the House of
Lords in Gleaves v Deakin,^  it has now been made clear that the libel
need not be 'of such a character as to be likely to disturb the peace
7
of the community or to provoke a breach of the peace'. The libel 
must not be trivial: and if it is such as to threaten the peace, then 
ipso facto it must be regarded as serious. Evidence that it may disturb 
the general community is no longer, however, a sine qua non to showing
1. At the same time, it must also be acknowledged that the law of criminal 
libel provided a convenient vehicle for the suppression of criticism
of government, as indicated by the cases in which the law was thus 
invoked, described at p.594, following.
2. It has, however, been suggested that the law should be reformed in 
various way, as further discussed below at p.679 et seq.
3. In R v Wicks, [1936] 1 All E.R. 384 at 386-387, du Parcq, J., deliver­
ing the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal, rejected counsel's 
submission that it was 'incumbent upon' the prosecution to prove the 
likelihood of a breach of the peace resulting from the libel, stating 
that the court could find 'no support for this theory in any judgment'.
4. Ibid.
5. [1977] 1 Q.B. 83.
6. Supra, [cited at p 591, n 1) .
7. Ibid., at 502, per Viscount Dilhorne
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its serious nature.
This modification in the emphasis of the law is not necessarily
to be criticised - even though it may extend the ambit of criminal
proceedings - for there are many situations in which p may
indeed be salutary in the public interest, even though no element of
a threat to public peace arises. Thus, for example, criminal proceedings
may be the only effective remedy against 'the writers of anonymous
poison-pen letters, the persistent senders of obscene postcards, and
paranoids who make a nuisance of themselves by making wild, unfounded
complaints about other people to their superiors, their relatives or 
2
the police'.
In instances such as those suggested above, the law of criminal
defamation appears to offer a much needed protection against abuse.
However, it must also be acknowledged that the rules themselves are open
to misuse, as illustrated by those instances in which prosecutions have
been brought by 'private prosecutors who were mentally unbalanced, or
3
seeking publicity, or pursuing sordid private vendettas'. It is also
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the law has been invoked on
more than one occasion in the past to'^punish persons who in good faith
4 5
sought to raise issues of public importance'. The 'classic' example
1. Ibid., at 505, per Lord Edmund-Davies*
2. Spencer, op.cit., p. 390, who points out that such persons may be 
mentally deranged and in need of restraint, and may also have no 
money with which to pay damages.
3. Spencer, ibid . 3 The last mentioned possibility is discussed further 
at p597 n.1.
4. Ibid., p. 391. Spencer cites five cases in which this appears to 
have occurred. Only one of these, relating to Cecil Chesterton, is 
described below; but all make fascinating reading and strongly 
support the inference.
5. This is the epithet applied to the case by Spencer, ibid.
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of this is provided by the prosecution of Cecil Chesterton in 1913 (for 
publicising what appears to be strong evidence of corruption in negotia-
1
tions between the government of the day and the English Marconi Company)
2
and which resulted in his being convicted and fined £100.
Prosecution at the instance of the government - rather than the private in-
3
dividual - has become 'very rare indeed'; but this provides no guarantee 
that the law may not be so invoked in the future, as graphically illustra­
ted by the recent prosecutions brought in the United Kingdom at the instance 
of private citizens. In this regard, it is salutary to remember that, at the 
very time that a judgment of the Court of Appeal was being read - which
asserted that 'it would be "mere moonshine" to suggest that there was any
4
possibility of a charge in the criminal courts for libel' - a private pro-
5
secution for libel (in Gleaves v Deakin) was being heard. It is also dis­
turbing to note that a number of earlier cases - which evidence considerable 
suppression of political criticism - have 'never been disapproved [njor over­
ruled, and [that] a good deal of bad and oppressive law is still theoreti-
6 V
cally in existence' - and will continue to apply until modified by statute.
Examples of these cases include 'the successful proseciiition of Cobbett
1. See The Trial of Cecil Chesterton, Famous Trials Series, ed. Lord
Birkenhead; Maisie Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1944); and see also 
the summary of the facts in issue provided by Spencer, ibid. It seems 
that a number of members of the government, including the Attorney^. 
General, Sir Rufus Isaacs, held shares in the American Marconi Company, 
'a closely related concern, [and did so, moveover,] at a substantial 
undervalue'.
2. Chesterton was unable to justify the innuendoes which he drew from the 
facts regarding the shareholdings.
3. The prosecution of Chesterton, although it touched on members of
the government, was brought not by the Attorney-General himself, but by 
his brother. Spencer states that the only case of recent origin known 
to him is the prosecution of Mylius (see The Times, 2 February 1911) for 
. 'publishing in his left-wing newspaper the completely false statement 
that George V had committed bigamy in 1893': Spencer supra, p. 387.
4. Philip Lewis, ed., Gatley On Libel and Slander, 8th ed., London, 1982, 
p. 646, para 1591, n 1.
5. Ibid.
6. Spencer, supra, p. 387.
7. Although proposals for legislative reform have been made in the United 
Kingdom, as further explained below, there is no indication of any such 
reform being effected in Nigeria.
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and Johnson for seditious and defamatory libel contained in their
criticisms of government policy in Ireland;^ ... the prosecution of
Hartiand White for seditious and defamatory libel by alleging a mis-
2
carriage of justice in a murder trial; ... the successful prosecution
of Harvey and Chapman for defamatory libel of George IV by publicly
3
questioning his sanity; ... [and the successful prosecution of]
Peltier, a French emigre living in England, [for publishing] a scathing
4
attack upon Napoleon1, with whom the British Government was then
5
anxious to be on friendly terms. It should also be remembered that -
from the viewpoint of a government determined to suppress telling
criticism of its policies - the law of criminal libel has the great
advantage (over the law of sedition)^ that successful prosecution no
longer requires evidence that the libel would be likely to result in
a breach of the peace, and certainly does not demand proof that the
accused should have intended to incite his audience to violence, as the
7
law of sedition - in the United Kingdom at least - prescribes.
1. (1804) 29 St. Tr. 1; (1805) 29 St. Tr. 81.
2. (1808) 30 St. Tr. 1131.
3. (1823)) 2 St. Tr., N.S. 1; 2 B. & C. 257.
4. (1803) 28 St. Tr. 530.
5. Spencer, supra, p. 386. The description of the cases above is also 
derived from Spencer, pp. 385-386.
6. Sedition law is, of course, primarily aimed at curtailing criticism 
of the government.
7. See the section on Sedition at p. 393 above, where the requirement 
of 'intent to incite to violence' is described. The point has less 
force in Nigeria itself, of course, where the law of sedition has, 
in any event, been interpreted to mean that such intent is not a 
necessary ingredient of the offence. (See p. 413 above), Should 
this interpretation of sedition be changed in the future, however, 
(as has been recommended) then the point would assume equal validity 
in Nigeria.
In summary, therefore, although it is apparent that the law of criminal
defamation has served the public interest in the past (for example,
by providing for the punishment of 'poison-pen1 writers), it is also
open to misuse by, for example, individuals intent on pursuing private 
1
vendettas, and has undoubtedly been invoked on occasion to suppress
matters of general public concern (such as the corruption allegedly
2
surrounding the Marconi contract) or to silence criticism of government
1. Spencer, op.cit., p. 390, makes no such submission, but it is certainly 
arguable that the threat of criminal prosecution was used in this 
way in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd., [1977] 1 W.L.R. 478 (C.A.). Here, 
following publication in 1 Private Eye1 of a series of articles sharply 
critical of the plaintiff and insinuating that he was concerned in 
some way in three major scandals (the Lucan murder, the Slater Walker 
collapse and the Poulson/Dan Smith affair), the plaintiff instituted 
civil proceedings against some 37 distributors of the magazine, on the 
basis of their prima facie responsibility for 'publicising' these 
alleged libels. 16 of the distributors settled the plaintiff's 
claims against them by undertaking never again to distribute 
'Private Eye*. It seemed, however, that 12 of the 16 did so only 
after they had received a thinly veiled hint that, if they did not 
give this undertaking, criminal prosecution would be instituted 
against them. (See the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. at 492, where 
the 'warning' letter is reproduced). It must be acknowledged that 
the Court of Appeal (by majority, against the strong dissent of 
Lord Denning M.R.) believed that the plaintiff had done no more than 
he was entitled to in order to protect his reputation. In the 
writer's view, however, there is considerable force in Lord Denning M.R 
dissenting opinion; and it is indeed strongly arguable that the 
plaintiff abused both the civil law (by issuing some 74 writs "out 
of the blue", with no warning or prior attempt to reach a rapprochement) 
and the criminal law (by the threat that criminal prosecution would 
be brought against the distributors unless they agreed to give an 
undertaking which - it should be noted - was wider than that which 
any court of law would have ordered). It seems, thus, that the 
plaintiff may indeed have been pursuing his own private vendetta 
against the magazine and that he was determined to 'strangle' it 
by effectively closing all its avenues of distribution.
2. See again the Chesterton prosecution, described at p. 595 above.
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policies. The law accordingly has considerable significance for freedom 
of expression. This is exacerbated by the fact that it is attended 
by serious shortcomings, especially as regards the available defences 
and the ease with which proceedings may be instituted, as further 
discussed in due course.^
7.2. The Sources of the Nigerian Criminal Law of Defamation
The criminal law of defamation forms part of the body of common law,
2
equity and statutory rules which have been received into Nigerian law,
3
in the manner previously explained. Furthermore, both the Criminal 
and Penal Codes (the former applicable in the southern states)
1. The defences discussed are those of justification, described at p 622 
below; and fair comment, discussed at p 631 below. The rules relat­
ing to the commencement of proceedings, as recently clarified
in English proceedings, are discussed in the following section at
p. 601.
2. The statutory rules in question are, in general, those contained
in 'statutes of general application in force in England on 1 January 
1900', as previously explained in the section on the Sources of 
Nigerian Law. For further detail, see p. 131.
3. See the description of the reception of English law in the section 
on the Sources of Nigerian Law at p. 129 et seq.
-599-
and the latter in the northern ones, as earlier described) both
contain a number of provisions regarding criminal defamation.
To the extent that these provisions in the Codes overlap with
substantive rules of English law received into Nigeria, they may
2
be taken, in general, to have replaced the English law and to
3
provide complete and authoritative statements of the relevant rules.
However, it must also be remembered that, where the provisions are
based upon common law principles (as, for example, in the definitions
4
of 'defamation' and 'publication' contained in the Codes ), cases
5
interpreting the common law continue to be highly persuasive.
Where the Codes are silent on some substantive rule, it
6
must be taken to have been repealed by implication, but
1. It will be recalled that the history of the Codes and the extent 
of their territorial application has previously been discussed, 
both in the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law at p 142
above, and in the preceding section on the Law of Sedition, at p 396 
above.
2. See, however, the caveats expressed in this regard in the section 
on the Sources of Nigerian Law at p. 143 above.
3. See R v Coker, (1927) 8 N.L.R. 7, discussed further at p. 624
below as regards the Criminal Code; and A. Gledhill, The Penal 
Codes of Northern Nigeria and .the Sudan, London and' Lagos,
1963, p. 15, as regards the Penal Code.
4. These are discussed in due course, at p. 612 and p 617, 
respectively.
5. In relation to the Criminal Code, see T. Akintola Aguda, The 
Criminal Law and Procedure of the Southern States of Nigeria,
3rd ed., London, 1982, p. 7. As regards the Penal Code, decisions 
of the Indian Courts (interpreting similar provisions of 
the Indian Penal Code on which the Nigerian statute is based) are 
likewise persuasive. See Gledhill, supra, p. 20.
6. See R v Coker, supra.
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where the point is procedural , then the received English law continues 
to apply.
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code are contained in sections 
2
373 to 381 ; and, under the Penal Code, the rules governing defamation
3
(and related offences ) are to be found in Chapter XXIII, comprising 
sections 391 to 395. The provisions of the two Codes, though similar 
in principle, are considerably different in detail; and it is accord­
ingly interesting to note that (once again) - albeit for quite different 
4
reasons - a distinction must be drawn between the laws of northern and 
southern Nigeria in the context of criminal defamation (as must also 
be done in the context of defamation as a tort^). Again, this raises 
interesting 'conflict of law* questions. In principle, each Code 
applies (to the exclusion of the other) to all offences committed within 
its geographical area of operation^. If different elements of an offence 
are committed in both north and south, then - in general - the area in 
which the first element is committed determines which Code shall apply
1. Ibid.
2. The equivalent provisions in the Western States Code are ss. 314 to 
332.
3. See p 672 et seq.
4. The Criminal Code, as previously explained in the section on the
History of Nigeria, at p 142 above, applied in the whole of Nigeria 
until 1960 when the Penal Code was introduced in the northern states 
to cater for their predominantly Muslim population. By contrast, the 
common law of defamation applies throughout the Federation as part
of the body of 'received' English common law; but these common law 
principles, in so far as they relate to defamation as a tort, have 
been modified to a considerable extent by the Defamation Laws 
applicable in Lagos State, and in the western and eastern states
(as previously explained at p 463 above). In the northern states,
however, no amending legislation has been introduced.
5. See n. 4 above. The result, thus, is that the law of criminal 
defamation differs between northern and southern states, as does 
the law of civil defamation. This makes it important to determine 
which set of rules governs the particular alleged offence, as 
further explained in the text below.
6. See the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, at p 142.
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1
to the crime in its entirety . Thus, for example, a newspaper printed 
in Lagos and distributed in Kano or Kaduna (in the north) would (if 
it contained defamatory matter) be subject to the criminal law of 
defamation as provided by the Criminal Code; whilst “ in the converse 
situation of a newspaper published in Kano or Kaduna and distributed 
in Lagos - the Penal Code provisions would apply. The same rules 
would seem, in principle, to apply to the broadcast media, the location 
of the broadcasting station thus determining the applicability of either 
the Criminal or the Penal Code provisions.
7.3. The Commencement of Proceedings for Criminal Defamation
It is noteworthy that, in general, 'no leave is required for the
3
commencement even of a private prosecution for criminal libel1.
At one time, it was thought that the criminal law could only be
invoked where the libel was of such a nature as to be likely to cause
4
a breach of the peace, but this restriction plainly no longer applies.
However, it seems that recourse should not be had to the criminal law
unless the defamatory allegation in question is of a serious nature.
6
Thus, in.,Gleaves v Deakin, the House of Lords stressed that criminal 
proceedings should not be brought where the libel was merely trivial 
and (to focus on the judgment of one of their Lordships) it was the
1. See ss 3 and 4, of Penal Code Law / Cap 89, read with S 1 A of the 
Criminal Code Act, Cap. 42.
2. An exception is made in relation to libel published in a newspaper, 
as further explained below.
3. Philip Lewis, ed., Gatley On Libel and Slander, 8th ed., London, 
1981, para 1599. p. 650.
4. See the discussion at p. 593.
5. Ibid.
6. [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L. (E) ) .
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view of Lord Scarman that:
'the references in the case law to ... 
outrage, cruelty or tendency to disturb 
the peace are no more than illustrations 
of the various factors which either alone 
or in combination contribute to the gravity, 
of the libel. The essential feature of 
a criminal libel remains, as in the past, 
the publication of a grave, not trivial, 
libel1. 1
In English common law, criminal defamation is triable on indictment:
and proceedings for committal provide some safeguard against vexatio.us
prosecution. Thus, in determining whether to commit an accused to
trial, an examining magistrate - although not concerned with the
question whether the prosecution should have been commenced in the
first instance - must consider whether 'there is sufficient evidence
2
to put the accused on trial for the alleged libel'. This involves 
consideration not only of whether the material is prima facia libel­
lous and of whether the accused is prima facie responsible for its 
3
publication, but also requires examination of whether the libel
is sufficiently serious to warrant - in the public interest - the
committal of the accused to trial. The last-mentioned requirement
provides some protection against vexatious prosecution: but there is
considerable doubt as to whether its protection is sufficient. The
inadequacy of the law in this regard has recently been graphically
4
demonstrated by the case of Gleaves v Deakin, where there appeared
1. Ibid., at 509.
2. Ibid., at 497.
3. Ibid., at 507 - 508, per Lord Scarman, citing the judgment of
Cockburn, C.J., in R v Sir Robert Carden, (1879) 5 Q.B.D. 1 at 6.
4. Supra.
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to be considerable truth in the allegations made against the prosecutor and
where the need for the intervention of the criminal law to resolve
what was essentially a private dispute was open to considerable
question. So defective is the law in this regard that three of the
Law Lords who gave judgment in the case felt the need to call for
reform of the present rule, by introducing the requirement that the
leave of the Attorney-General be required for the prosecution of
all criminal libels (not merely those contained in newspapers),^
2
as further explained m  due course.
In Nigeria, however, even this limited safeguard is not available.
Under the Criminal Code, the maximum penalty for criminal defamation
3
is imprisonment for two years, and the offence accordingly falls
outside the ambit of indictible offences (defined, in s 2(1) of the
4
Criminal Procedure Act, as offences which, 'on conviction, may be
5
punished by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years' ). Criminal 
defamation may accordingly be tried by a court of summary jurisdic­
tion, without the intermediary process of committal - and without 
any need whatsoever to consider whether there is a public interest
in the prosecution. Under the Criminal Procedure Code^, criminal defa-
7
mation is triable by a Magistrate of the First Grade; and, again,
1. The requirement of leave in relation to newspapers is discussed below.
2. See p. 679 below, where various suggested reforms are examined.
3. See p. 676 below, where the penalties for defamation are fully
described.
4. Cap 43, (Laws, of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
5. s 2(1), ibid., emphasis supplied.
6. Cap. 30, (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963).
7. See s 16, ibid,, read with Appendix A.
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there is no need for committal nor for any consequent consideration 
of the public interest in criminal proceedings being brought 
(rather than the parties being left to pursue their remedies in the 
civil courts). The result is thus that criminal prosecution for 
defamation can be instituted in Nigeria with singular ease - and 
the only procedural safeguard which exists is that relating to the 
publishers of newspapers, as further explained below.
By way of exception to the general principle that no leave is 
required for the institution of a prosecution for criminal defamation, 
the English Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888^ introduced the require­
ment that the leave of a judge in chambers must be obtained before
criminal proceedings could be commenced against 'any person respon-
2
sible for the publication of a newspaper', as defined. Nigerian
counterparts of this provision are now to be found in the Newspapers
Laws of all states except those in the former Western Region, where
3
the Newspapers Law contains no equivalent provision.
4
Thus, s 23 of the Newspapers Law applicable in Lagos State provides:
'No criminal prosecution shall be commenced 
against any proprietor, printer, publisher 
or editor of a newspaper for any libel 
published therein without the consent of 
the Attorney-General of the Lagos State'. 5
1. The relevant provision is contained in s 8.
2. The definition of "newspaper" in this statute is the same as that
provided by the Newspaper .Libel and Registration Act, 1881. See p 301.
3. Cap 81,'Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 1963.
4. Cap 86, (Laws of the Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973) .
5. s. 23, ibid.
6. Newspapers Law (northern states) Cap 80 (Laws of Northern Nigeria,
1963).
-605-
A substantially similar provision is contained, in s 15 of the Newspapers
Law'*’ of the northern states; whilst, in the eastern states, the
2
applicable Newspaper Law requires the 'order of a Judge in
Chambers' for the commencement of a prosecution for libel against
!any proprietor, publisher, editor or any person responsible for
. 3the publication of a newspaper'.
No equivalent provision is to be found in the Newspapers Law appli-
4 5
cable in the western, states; and it seems, therefore, that s 8 of
the English statute continues to apply in this area.
Some guidance as to the criteria to be applied by a judge in chambers
(and, presumably, also by the Attorney-General in the Lagos and
northern states) in deciding whether to grant leave is provided by
6the recent English decision of Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd. Here,
Wien, J. declined to lay down any hard and fast principles in this 
regard, emphasising that the decision is ultimately discretionary.
He did, however, also indicate that the following requirements for 
the grant of leave must be met;
1. Newspapers Law (northern states), Cap 80, (Laws of Northern Nigeria,
1963).
2. Newspaper.- Law (eastern states), Cap 86, (Laws of Eastern Nigeria,
1963).
3. See s 17(1), ibid. In terms of s 17(2), such application must 
be made on notice to the person concerned who must be given an 
opportunity of being heard against the application.
4. Newspapers Law, (Western states) Cap,81.
5. The continuing efficacy of certain English statutory provisions 
is further discussed at p. 625 below. In essence, it seems that
any procedural rule (as here in issue) which forms part of the
body of English law received into Nigeria and which has not been 
replaced by any local Nigerian enactment continues to apply.
6. [1977] Q.B. 83.
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(i) there must be evidence of a clear prima facie case;
(ii) the libel must be 'so serious that it is proper for the criminal 
law to be involved';^
(iii)'the judge must be satisfied that the public interest requires
2
the institution of criminal proceedings'.
3
At one point, it seemed clear that the latter criterion would only 
be satisfied where there was evidence that 'the publication of the
4
libel would tend to disturb the peace and harmony of the community'.
5
More recently, however, in R v Wicks - decided in 1936 - the Court 
of Criminal Appeal indicated that it may also be met where 'the
I
publication seriously affects the reputation of the person concerned';
7
and in Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd., the decision was followed by 
Wien,J. It seems, therefore, that - in order to obtain the requisite 
order from a judge in chambers - it is not necessary to provide
1. Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd., supra, at 88.
2. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 154.
3. At the end of the nineteenth century: see Duncan & Neill, ibid.,
and p. 592 et seq,
4. See the direction of Lord Alverstone, C.J. to the grand jury at
the Somerset Assizes in 1906, cited in Fraser on Libel and Slander
(7th Edition) p. 210 and in Duncan & Neill, ibid., p. 155.
5. [1936] 1 All E.R. 384.
6. The court quoted with approval the leading case of Thorley v
Lord Kerry (1812) 4 Taunt. 355 at 364, that any 'imputation which
is calculated to vilify a man, and bring him, as the books say,
into hatred, contempt, and ridicule' may form the basis for an
indictment.
7. Supra.
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evidence that the libel in issue is likely to cause a breach of the 
peace; but that it is nevertheless essential to show its serious 
nature. Any tendency it has to cause public disturbance will, of 
course, be relevant to this question and so too (it seems) will 
'any public position held by the person defamed'.^
Even though it is thus no longer necessary to show that the libel 
is likely to cause a breach of the peace, the principle that leave 
must be obtained for the commencement of prosecution and - in parti­
cular, the emphasis on whether the public interest requires the inter­
vention of the criminal law - provides a salutary safeguard against 
vexatious prosecution. Unfortunately, however, the ambit of the
statutory provisions is extremely limited. Thus, in the first instance,
2
they apply only to newspapers, as defined; and, accordingly, the
requirement of leave does not apply to defamatory material published 
3
in books, or through the medium of radio or television. Secondly,
the need for leave to prosecute applies only to persons 'responsible
for the publication' of newspapers; and does not, therefore, extend
(to name but one example) to the author of a newspaper article con-
4
taining defamatory material.
1. See Duncan & Neill, op,ci.tf,pp. 155 - 156, relying on the authority 
of Goldsmith*s case.
2. The definition of "newspaper" provided by the various Newspapers Laws 
has previously been described at p 307, The same meaning applies in this 
context except that no saving is made for Government-owned newspapers.
3. Thus, in Gleaves v Deakin, supra, where the defamatory allega­
tions were contained in a paperback novel, the requirement of leave 
accordingly did not apply.
4. See Duncan & Neill, supra. , p. 153.
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7.4. The Distinction between Libel and Slander
In the civil law of defamation, slander - the publication of defamatory
matter in transitory form - is actionable only in limited circumstances,
as previously described.^- In England, the distinction between libel
and slander is of vital importance in the criminal as well as the
civil law, as only '[t]he publication of written defamatory words is
a crime ... [whilst] [o] ral defamation is not a crime, unless.it
2
consists of reading out a libel or defamatory words are published
3 4in the course of a play, . In Nigeria, however, in the context of 
criminal defamation, the distinction between libel and slander falls 
away by virtue of the express provisions of the Codes.
Thus, s 373 of the Criminal Code - in defining 'defamatory matter' 
states that:
'Such matter may be expressed in spoken 
words or in any audible sounds, or in words 
legibly marked on any substance whatever, 
or by any sign or object signifying such 
matter otherwise than by words....'.
1. See the section on the Civil Law of Defamation, at p. 467.
2. Gatley on Libel and Slander, supra, submits that -, it is wrong to regard 
the reading of defamatory matter from a written document into a 
broadcasting apparatus as slander. See para 147, p. 76, n 37.
In the civil law, the problem is solved to some extent by the 
Defamation Act 1952 and its various Nigerian counterparts. See p 466. 
This does not assist in the criminal law context, as these statutes do 
not apply to criminal libel.
3. s 4 Theatres Act 1968.
4. Gatley on Libel and Slander, .supra., para 1591, p. 646.
Likewise, in defining defamation, s 391(1) of the Penal Code specifies 
that the offence may be committed by words 'either spoken or reproduced 
by mechanical means or intended to be read or by signs or by visible 
representations!, Gledhill explains - as regards the Penal Code - 
that this provision reflects the view of Macaulay^ that 'in exempting 
spoken words from criminal liability, the English law was inconsistent' ‘ 
as there was nothing to show that slander was less potentially harmful 
than libel.
7.5. Reference to the Complainant
The requirement that the defamatory matter in issue must reasonably
be understood as referring to the complainant is essentially the same
as the parallel element of 'reference to the plaintiff' in civil
proceedings. There is, however, one important difference. In civil
law, the publication of defamatory material - to be actionable - must
relate to a living person. In criminal law, by contrast, defamation
3
of the dead may still be punishable as a crime;
This will only be the case, however, in English common law, if living
relatives of the deceased 'can show that the object of the publication
4
was to bring contempt and scandal on them', In Nigerian law, essen­
tially the same requirement has been given statutory form in the
1. Macauley was responsible for drafting the Indian Penal Code on
which the Nigerian Code (through the Sudanese Code) is modelled.
2. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 686.
3. See Gatley on Libel and Slander, op.cit., para 1594 p. 648.
4. Callender Smith, op.cit., p. 72. See also Gatley, ibid.
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Northern Penal Code which explains that:
'It may amount to defamation to impute
anything to a deceased person, if the
imputation would harm the reputation 
of that person if living and is intended 
to be hurtful to the feelings of his 
family or other near relatives'. 1
In the Criminal Code, it is stated to be 'immaterial whether at the
time of the publication of the defamatory matter, the [complainant]
is living or dead' - subject, however, to the proviso that 'no
prosecution for the publication of defamatory matter concerning a
dead person shall be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-
2
General of the Federation' . No guidance is provided by the Code
as to the criteria to be applied by the latter in deciding such a
question. It is submitted by Okonkwo and Naish, however, albeit
3
without full examination of the matter , that an offence is committed
only where there is proof both of intent to injure the family and
4
of harm to a living relative of the deceased .
Whether defamation of a 'class' may constitute a crime is open to a
certain degree of question; but the availability of such an action
appears to be supported by the balance of authority. Thus, Gatley
on Libel and Slander affirms that 'a publication [which] is likely
5
to bring a group into discredit ... may be criminal' , but does also
1. s 391(1), Explanation 1, Penal Code, Cap 89.
2. s 373, Criminal Code, Cap 42.
3. The authors make no mention of the lack of guidance on this point
in the Code and appear to assume that the common law requirements 
continue to hold good.
4. Okonkwo and Naish, op cit, p 280
5. Gatley on Libel and Slander, op cit, para 1594, p. 648.
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submit that 'the authorities for this proposition are old, and [that]
it is far from clear that if the facts fall short of seditious libel,
criminal libel proceedings are now available'*. The Law Commission, however,
in its Working Paper on Criminal Libel, seems clearly to accept that
2
a class action does indeed obtain in the criminal law..
Okonkwo and Naish submit that defamation of a 'class' may indeed be
criminal, provided the class is definite: but do so on grounds
which are (with respect) somewhat tenuous. They point out that
section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act defines 'person' as
including 'any company or association or body of persons corporate
or unincorporate'; and hence conclude that the offence of defamation
3
can indeed be committed in relation to a class • However, an unin­
corporated association stands in a very different category from a 
'class', as commonly understood in the law of defamation. Notwith­
standing the weakness of this particular argument, however, there
seems - in principle - no reason why a member of a class may not be
4
defamed by innuendo, as in the civil law of defamation .
The Penal Code provides clear authority for the availability of a 
class action in the northern states of Nigeria. Thus, section 391(1) -
which defines defamation - is qualified by Explanation 2, which states:
1. Ibid, n 21. Here, the authorities alleged to support a class action
are examined in some detail; and it is submitted that these are far
from clear. Thus, for example, in R v Williams (1822) 5 B & Aid.
595, where a libel on 'the clergy of the diocese of Durham' was
in issue, the point contested was whether 'an information would 
be granted for a "public" libel on the application of an unknown 
private prosecutor without an affidavit that the libel was false.
The argument in favour of the information relied on cases where the 
libels were on a number of individuals in a public body and the 
information was granted'. Accordingly, the case does not seem alto­
gether conclusive authority.
2. Criminal Libel, Working Paper No 84, London, 1982, p 158 and p 207.
3. Okonkwo and Naish, op cit, p 280.
4. See p. 475.
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'It may amount to defamation to make an 
imputation concerning a company or an 
association or collection of persons 
as such*. 1
Gledhill accordingly submits that, whilst 'it is not defamation to say ...
"all lawyers are thieves" ... [since] obviously such [a] sweeping
generalisation cannot seriously affect the reputation of any individual
2
member of the class condemned' , it may nevertheless give rise to
criminal liability to make imputations against a class which is
3
'narrower and clearly distinguishable* . He further points out,
however, that in the latter type of instance - where it may be possible
to establish that the imputation affects the complainant personally -
the matter should perhaps rather be regarded as falling within the
4
ambit of Explanation 3, which provides for defamation by innuendo .
7.6. The Meaning of 'Defamatory'
Whereas, in the law of tort, the meaning of 'defamatory matter' 
is not statutorily defined and has gradually crystallized through 
the decisions of the courts, in criminal law its meaning is described 
(though not necessarily to the exclusion of all difficulties in 
application) in each of the respective Codes.
In the Criminal Code, defamatory matter is defined as 'matter likely
to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or likely to damage any person in his profession
5
or trade by an injury to his reputation' . It may be expressed by
1. s 391(1), Explanation 2, Penal Code, Cap 89, emphasis supplied.
2. Gledhill, op. cit., p 693.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., and see also Appendix IV for the text of this Explanation.
5. s 373, Criminal Code, Cap 42.
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means of either written or spoken words, or through other sounds
or gestures and may be conveyed 'either directly or by insinuation
, 2or irony1.
Practical illustration of what does - and does not - constitute
3
defamatory matter is provided by the following cases. In R v Coker, 
an article was published in a newspaper called Eko Igbehin, alleg­
ing that the Alake of Abeokuta had 'marked out [several people] for 
destruction' and had instigated a number of attempts on their lives.
In the court's view, this was so clear-cut an example of defamation
that '[i]t [was] hardly necessary to say that the whole passage [was]
4 5
defamatory'. By contrast, in Arayi v Ojubu, the alleged defamatory
statement was that the Olu of Warri had '"ordered that each person
should pay £5 flat rate tax and £7 each for the Western Region free
£
compulsory primary education scheme"'. On appeal, the court found
that these words, 'without innuendo, were not defamatory of the
Olu ... [for] It]hey could not reasonably be said to expose him to
7
hatred, ridicule or contempt'. As the court in worldly-wise fashion
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. (1927) 8 N.L.R.7.
4. Ibid., at 8. This finding of the trial judge was confirmed by the 
Full Court (at 13 and 15) in considering the case stated for 
their determination, as discussed at p. 624 below.
5. [1956] W.N.L.R. 145.
6. Ibid. }
1. Ibid., at 146.
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concluded, they would 'at the very most ... expose him to unpopularity, 
a fate which, sooner or later, overtakes anyone who is concerned in 
the imposition or collection of taxes'.^
The Penal Code is somewhat differently framed, It begins by defining
defamation, in essence, as the making or publication of any imputation
2
concerning any person with intent to harm the reputation of that 
3
person. The type of imputation in question is then further explained 
as being one which
'...directly or indirectly in the estimation 
of others lowers the moral or intellectual 
character of that person or lowers the charac­
ter of that person in respect of his calling or 
lowers the credit of that person or causes it 
to be believed that the body of that person 
is in a loathsome state or in a state generally 
considered as disgraceful'. 4
Gledhill points out that '[a]n imputation is only defamatory [in
terms of this provision] if it affects Ithe complainant's] reputation
in one of the four ways stated above and [that] whether it has an
effect entailing liability must, to some extent, depend on the time
and place'.^ Thus, although it would no longer be defamatory to
describe a woman as a witch in England, this is not the case in
Northern Nigeria, where it is still an offence to represent oneself 
6
as being a witch. Examples of allegations which would be defamatory 
under the section include charges that another person is a swindler
1. Ibid., at 147.
2. The relevance of the accused's intention or knowledge is discussed 
further at p. 659 et_ seq.
3. S 391(1), Penal Code, Cap 89.
4. Ibid., Explanation 4.
5. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 689.
6. Ibid.
-614A-
1 2 3
or crook , or that he is insane , or insolvent or has leprosy or
4
veneral disease . It would also be defamatory to accuse an author 
of being a plagiarist or a doctor of being a quack'*.
The crucial question which remains for consideration in relation to 
both Codes is whether defamatory meaning is to be determined on an 
objective basis - or by reference to the accused's subjective intent.
In other words, does liability depend on intent to defame? Or on 
'the fact of defamation' - as is clearly the case under the civil 
law^? Neither of the Codes provides any guidance on this point.
As regards the Criminal Code, Aguda points out that the definition 
of 'defamatory' in s 373 of the Code 'is based on the definition of
7
defamatory libel at common law' . This indicates that no special
meaning is to be attached to 'defamatory' under the Code and that it
0
should be accorded its normal common law - and objective - meaning.
This inference is strengthened by Gatley on Libel and Slander, in
g
which it is submitted that '[b]roadly speaking , the publications which
1. Ibid. This would tend to lower the complainant's moral character.
2. Ibid. This would tend to undermine his intellectual character.
3. Ibid. This would tend to lower his credit.
4. Ibid. This would tend to indicate that his body was in a loathsome
or disgraceful state.
5. Ibid. This would tend to lower the reputation of either the author 
or the doctor in his calling.
6. See the discussion at p. 561.
7. Aguda, op cit, p 804.
8. As regards the common law, it is noteworthy that the Law Commission
in its Working Paper, Criminal Libel, supra, has little doubt but that
the offence is one of strict liability (and that this aspect of the
law is in singular need of reform, as further explained in due course).
9. The only exceptions here mentioned in Gatley have no relevance as 
regards the need for mens rea.
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are the subject of civil and criminal libel are the same1 This
indicates that a defamatory publication such as that in issue in 
2
Hu1ton v Jones could equally found the basis for a criminal prosecution 
as a civil suit and that - in either instance - the fact that the 
publisher did not intend to defame the complainant (or plaintiff) 
would be irrelevant.
As for the Penal Code, Gledhill provides a number of examples (as
indicated above) of statements which would be regarded as defamatory
within the meaning of a 391(1), as clarified by Explanation 4.
Unfortunately, he gives little attention to the question of whether
the accused's subjective intent is relevant in this regard. However,
all the examples he quotes relate to statements which would clearly
satisfy an objective test of defamatory meaning. Moreover, he also
asserts (albeit without full consideration of the issue) that:
'In determining whether a statement about another lowers that other's
character in any of the ways mentioned in the section, the opinion of
the reasonable man, living today, in Northern Nigeria ... must be 
3
considered'. Although the point might have been clearer if Gledhill 
had expressly rejected the relevance of the accused's subjective intent 
in this regard, it nevertheless seems plain that Gledhill regards the 
test of defamatory meaning as objective - the crucial criterion being 
thus the viewpoint of the reasonable man.
Another question of importance concerns the onus of proving the truth 
or falsity of defamatory allegations. Under the civil law, as
1. Gatley on Libel and Slander, op.cit., para 1594, p. 648.
2. [1910] A.C. 20 (H.L. (E.) ) .
3. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 689, emphasis supplied.
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previously discussed, the defamatory allegation is presumed to be 
false and its truth only becomes an issue in the proceedings if the 
defendant relies on a defence of justification or fair comment. Does 
the same presumption apply in the criminal law? Again the Codes 
are silent in this regard - but it would seem (on the same reasoning as 
above) - that the matter must be determined on common law principles, 
which draw no distinction between the civil and criminal law of 
defamation in this respect. Moreover, any doubt on this point would 
seem to have been eliminated by the decision of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in R v Wicks,^  in which it was declared that:
'The falsity of the libel is to be presumed, 
and, in the absence of a plea of justifica­
tion, could not be questioned'. 2
To summarize these points, it seems thus that an alleged defamatory 
allegation is presumed to be false under the criminal law, as in the 
law of tort; and that the question whether the allegation in question 
is indeed defamatory of the complainant must be determined on an objec­
tive basis - taking no account of the accused's subjective intent.
To a considerable extent, therefore, the crime of defamation is one 
of 'strict liability' - a disturbing aspect of the law which is dis­
cussed further below in the section on the relevance of mens rea.
It remains to note one point of relatively minor significance. This 
is the fact that neither definition in the Codes extends to the type 
of statement that would lead to the complainant being 'shunned' or 
'avoided' (through sympathy) by ordinary right-thinking persons
1. [1936] 1 All E.R. 384. The manner in which the Court approached
the question of the accused's acknowledge of the falsity of the 
defamatory allegations in issue is discussed further below, in the 
section on the Relevance of Mens Rea, at p. 666.
2. Ibid., at 387.
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in society. Accordingly, the ambit of defamatory matter is narrower 
- in this respect - in the criminal, than in the civil, law.'*'
7.7. Publication by the Defendant
There is another important difference between the civil and criminal
law in this regard. In the law of tort, publication of the defamatory
material to a third person, other than the plaintiff, is essential for
a claim to lie. In criminal law, by contrast, at least as regards 
2
the Criminal Code, publication to the complainant alone is sufficient 
to give rise to the commission of the offence. This emerges unambi­
guously from the clear wording of section 374 which defines publication, 
inter alia, as 'the speaking of [defamatory] words ... in the hearing 
of the person defamed;... [or] the delivering [of defamatory matter]
with intent that it ... be read ... by the person defamed or by any 
3
other person.'
The meaning of the latter provision arose for consideration in R v 
4
Arubi, in which the Full Court was asked to rule whether there was
sufficient proof of publication in the particular circumstances. The
evidence was that the accused had writted the defamatory letter in
issue, and that it had been received in the ordinary course of post.
This, in the Full Court's view, was 'sufficient to raise the presump-
5
tion that the appellant posted it'. This, in turn, showed, that he
1. Contrast civil law cases such as Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 
Pictures Ltd., discussed at p. 476*
2. The Penal Code is less clear, but arguably does require publication
to a third person, as discussed below.
3. Criminal Code, Cap 42, emphasis supplied. The full text of this
provision is reproduced in Appendix III.
4. ( 1933) 11 N.L.R. 27.
5. Ibid., at 28.
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had 'delivered it with intent that it should be read by the [recipient]' 
and publication was accordingly proved.
The requirement of 'publication' also arose for consideration in R v 
2
Coker where the accused admitted that he had written the defamatory
letter "To the Editor" which subsequently appeared in the Eko Igbehin
newspaper, but contended that he had left it 'on a' shelf in his bedroom
3
when it had mysteriously disappeared'. The court disbelieved this
story and held that 'if a person writes a libel which is afterwards
printed, this is prima facie evidence at least of a publication of
4
the libel by [him]'.
The Penal Code is significantly different in.-its wording, and is more
difficult to interpret. It contains no definition of publication per se,
5
but instead defines the offence of defamation as, in essence, the 
mak[ing] or publish[ing]' of 'any imputation concerning any person, 
intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such 
imputation will harm the reputation of such person'. It is difficult 
to envisage how such intent or knowledge could be proved except where 
the imputation is made to a third person in whose eyes the reputation
1. Ibid.
2. (1927) 8 N.L.R. 7.
3. Ibid., at 8.
4. Ibid. The finding that publication was proved was confirmed without
hesitation by the Full Court in answering the case stated to it,
as described at p. 625 below. Unfortunately, however, the Court 
made no comment on this ruling of the trial judge, which was based 
on the authority of Odgers On Libel (4th Ed. p. 625); and did not 
canvass the question whether reliance should be placed on such 
presumptions in criminal law, where the onus rests upon the prose­
cution to prove all elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
5. The full text of this provision, contained in section 391(1) Penal 
Code, Cap 89, is reproduced in Appendix IV.
6. s. 391 (1), ibid.
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of the person defamed is commensurately diminished. There are no 
decided cases in Nigeria on this point, however - and it is, of course, 
also arguable that the criminal law is primarily concerned with deter­
ring the making of defamatory statements - so that publication to the 
person defamed alone may be sufficient to incur its penalties. On 
balance, however - and in view of the clear wording of the Penal Code -
it is submitted that, Within its area of operation, publication to a
1
third party is indeed required.
It should be rioted that the above interpretation of the Penal Code is
2 3
supported by Gledhill, on the basis of Indian authority. Gledhill
thus states:
'In every case there must be publication
to some third party. The delivery of a
dafamatory letter to the person defamed
cannot make the person who despatched or
delivered it liable, as the statements
in it cannot lower the addressee in the
estimation of others who were not aware4
of those statements, but if the same 
message were sent in a telegram or on 
a postcard, there is publication to the 
post office officials who handle them1. 
[Likewise,] [f]illing a petition and 
swearing an affidavit containing imputa­
tions against another amount to publication^'.^
1. Unfortunately, the discussion by Okonkwo and Naish, op.cit., p. 281, 
is limited to the Criminal Code where the position is quite clearly 
stated.
2. Op.cit., pp. 686-688.
3. Indian cases interpreting the Indian Penal Code are, of course,
persuasive because of the close relationship between the Nigerian
and Indian Penal Codes.
4. Abdul Aziz v Syed Md. Arab, A.I.R. [1935] Cal. 736.
5. Abdul Hakim v Tei Charidar, (1881) I.L.R. 3 All. 815; Bhikachand v
Emp., A.I.R. [1927] Sind 54.
6. Gledhill, supra, p. 687.
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As regards imputations made in a newspaper, 'the publisher [is deemed 
to have] published it whether he knew of it or not,'*' unless it was 
done in his absence and without his knowledge and he had bona fide
2
entrusted the management to a competent deputy during his absence'.
Furthermore, all that is necessary 'to prove publication is ...
to show that a newspaper was delivered in the area over which the
3
court exercises jurisdiction'.
As regards the words 'makes' or 'publishes' in s 391(1), it has
(according to Gledhill) been 'consistently held that "makes" is intended
to refer to the originator of the imputation and "publishes" to the
4
persons who repeat it'.
Also relevant in this regard, however, is the Defamatory and Offensive
5
Publications Act of 1966, which extends the meaning of 'publication' 
in particular circumstances. The relevant provision is, with respect, 
badly phrased and difficult to interpret and is accordingly, for fear 
of distorting its effect, reproduced in full, as follows:
'The National Military Government hereby 
decrees as follows:
1. Sounds where recorded shall, if defamatory,
be deemed to be published if reproduced in ,
any place to the hearing of persons other
than the person causing it to be reproduced;
and in any prosecution, the penal provisions
whether of the Criminal Code to the extent
of its operation elsewhere than in the Northern
1. Emp. v McLeody(1880) I.L.R. 3 All. 342.
2. Ramasami v Lofcanada,! ?Q1886) ,IJL.Ri.9 Mad. 387.
3. Emp. v Jhabbar Mai, A.I.R. [1928] All. 222.
4. Gledhill, supra, p. 686.
5. s.l, ibid. ,(Decree) No. 44 of 1966. The Act is extremely short and
contains only one other substantial provision, described at p.. 678.
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Group of Provinces, or as to the said 
Northern Group, of the Penal Code shall, 
in so far as they relate to or purport to 
define publication of defamatory matter, 
be construed and have effect subject to 
this section'. 1
As regards unauthorised publication, an escape from liability, in
certain circumstances at least, is provided by s. 380 of the Criminal
Code. This relieves the proprietor, editor or publisher (but not
the author) from criminal responsibility for the publication bf
2
defamatory matter in a periodical (as defined below) on proof
'that such publication took place without his knowledge and without
3
negligence on his part'. '"Periodical" inludes any newspaper, review,
4
magazine, or other writing or print, published periodically'.
There is no couhterpart of this saving provision in the Penal Code,
though some protection against 'innocent printing'is implicit in s'. 394.
This provides that printing or engraving any matter, 'knowing or
5
having good reason to believe' that it is defamatory, is punishable 
by imprisonment for up to two years, or fine (of unspecified amount) 
or both. The inference from the words underlined is that printing 
or engraving without such knowledge or reason for belief is not so 
punishable.
1. s. 1, ibid.
2. The onus of proving this seems clearly to lie on the proprietor, 
etc., seeking to avoid criminal responsibility.
3. s 380(2), Criminal Code, Cap 42.
4. s 380(1), ibid.
5. s 394, Penal Code, Cap 89, emphasis supplied.
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7.8. The Defence of Justification
Both the Criminal and Penal Codes provide that the publication of
defamatory matter does not constitute an offence where the following
conditions are satisfied: firstly, that the material in issue is 
1
true; and, secondly, that its publication is for the public benefit 
(or public good,^ in the pharaseology of the Penal Code). The onus 
lies on the accused to show that both requirements are met.
Thus, s 377 of the Criminal Code provides:
'The publication of defamatory matter is not 
an offence if the publication, is, at the 
time it is made, for the public benefit, 
ana if the defamatory matter is true'. 4
The Penal Code, in s 391 states:
'(2) It is not defamation -
(i) to impute anything which is true
concerning any person, if it be 
for the public good that the imputa­
tion should be made or published; 
whether or not it- is for the'public, good 
is a question of fact' ^
Both sections, in their brevity, contrast sharply with section 6 of 
Lord Campbell's Act upon which they are based. Under English common 
law, the "truth of the libel" was no defence to a prosecution for
1. s 377, Criminal Code, Cap 42; s. 391(2) (i) Penal Code, Cap 89.
2. s. 377, Criminal Code, ibid.
3. s. 391(2)(i) Penal Code, supra.
4. s. 377j  Criminal Code, Cap 42.
5. s. 391(2)(i) Penal Code, Cap 89.
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defamation and, indeed, was considered as aggravating) the offence so
as to justify the imposition of an even higher penalty. Hence the
ironic aphorism: "the greater the truth, the greater the libel".^
The common law was reformed in this regard in 1843 by section 6 of the 
2
Libel Act which enabled the accused, from thenceforth, to raise the
defence of justification: subject, however, to a number of conditions.
Thus, the section provided (in outline) that 'the truth of the matters
3
charged [might] be inquired into' but would only provide a defence
4
if publication were 'for the public benefit'. In addition, the 
defendant was only entitled to lead evidence of truth if he had 
previously, in pleading to the indictment of information, alleged 
the truth of the defamatory material as well as the public benefit 
in its disclosure and the facts supporting the latter submission.
The section further provided that if the defendant was subsequently 
convicted, it would be 'competent to the court, in pronouncing sen­
tence, to consider whether the guilt of the defendant [was] aggrava­
ted or mitigated by the ... plea [of justification]'.^
Given the substantial difference in wording between s 6 of the
English statute and the Nigerian provisions above, it is a moot
question to what extent section 6 has been superceded by the
£
Nigerian legislation. Both Codes were intended to provide a complete
1. See again the section on the significance of the law of criminal 
defamation at p. 592.
2. 6 & 7 Viet. c. 96.
3. s 6, Libel Act 1843, ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid..
6. It will, of course, be recalled that the Criminal Code is intended 
to be a complete and exhaustive statement of the- law on the matters 
with which it deals. Where the discrepancy is very large, however, 
(as here) this principle seems somewhat difficult to accept.
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and comprehensive statement of the substantive law on the matters
within their ambit."*" Accordingly, it would seem that any substantive
element of section 6 which is not reproduced in the Nigerian legis-
2
lation must be taken to - by implication - to have been repealed.
On this basis, it is clear - from the terms of the Nigerian provisions
reproduced above - that justification or truth does indeed constitute
a defence to a charge of criminal libel - provided, of course, that
publication is for the public good or benefit. What is not so clear,
however, from the wording of the relevant legislation, ife whether
the procedural requirement regarding the pleading of justification
3
continues to operate; and whether an unsuccessful plea of justification
4
may lead to increased penalty.
As regards the former problem, however, the matter has been clarified 
(at least as regards the Criminal Code)by the decision of the Full 
Court in R v Coker.^
The accused in this case was charged with defamation, arising out 
of the publication in a local newspaper of a letter written by him, 
alleging that the Alake of Abeokuta was attempting to murder several 
persons. At his trial, he wished to rely, inter alia, on 'justification'; 
but had not pleaded this when charged with the offence. The trial 
judge held that he was precluded by the requirements of s. 6 of
1. See the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law (in general) at 
p. 142 above, and the discussion of the sources of the law of 
criminal defamation at p. 599 above.
2. See R v Coker, (1927) 8 N.L.R. 7, discussed further at p. 625.
3. As discussed below.
4. As discussed at p. 628.
5. Supra
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Lord Campbell's Act from bringing evidence to substantiate this
defence.^ The question whether this decision was correct was, to-
2
gether with a number of other issues, referred to the Full Court for 
its decision.
The substantive requirements of section 6 (the need for proof of truth
and public interest) had clearly been replaced by the provisions of
3
s 377 of the Criminal Code. The latter section was silent, however,
as regards the procedural requirement relating to the pleading of
justification. This omission could be interpreted in two ways. Either
the Code (which was intended to be a complete statement of the law)
had abolished the requirement; or it was unaffected by the Code and
remained in effect as part of an English statute of general application
in force on 1 January 1900 in the United Kingdom; and therefore, by
4
virtue of s. 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, also in Nigeria.
The Full Court, after careful consideration, concluded that the latter 
interpretation was correct. It pointed out (per Combe, C.J. ) that 
the Criminal Code was indeed intended to be a complete statement of 
the substantive criminal law. Accordingly, any substantive provision 
of section 6 (such as the requirement that publication be for the 
public benefit) would - if not incorporated within' the Code - have 
ceased, by implication, to form part of Nigerian law. No such 
consideration applied, however, to the procedural aspect of section 6.
1. Ibid., at 12.
2. Two of the other questions - whether he was correct in finding 
the letter defamatory and in concluding that there was sufficient 
evidence of its publication by the accused have already been
adverted to at p. 613 and 618 above; and the fourth (and last)
relating to qualified privilege is discussed at p 649 et seq.
3. So too were all other relevant ordinances. See R v Coker, supra at 13.
4. The general "reception" statutes have previously seen discussed 
in the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, at p. 131.
The provision specifically in issue here is s 14, Supreme Court 
Ordinance, Cap 3 (The Laws of Nigeria, 1923).
The Code did not purport to deal with procedural matters - so no 
particular significance could be attached to the omission of the proce­
dural requirement in s 377. On the contrary, there was nothing to 
justify the assumption 'that the Legislature intended that the very 
necessary and proper provisions regarding procedure in section 6 of 
Lord Campbell's Act should cease to apply in Nigeria because those 
provisions were not incorporated in the Code'.'*’ Maxwell, J., concurred: 
and so too did Petrides, J., who made the additional point that no 
equivalent procedural requirement was contained in the Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance and that, since this Ordinance was not intended 
to contain a complete exposition of criminal procedure in Nigeria, this 
was all the more reason for the continued efficacy of a procedural
requirement that had undoubtedly formed part of Nigerian law on 
3
1 January 1900. Thus, the decision of the Full Court, unanimously
reached, was that the procedural element of s 6 of Lord Campbell's
Act indeed continued to apply, notwithstanding the adoption of the
Criminal Code - and that the accused's evidence of justification had
4
therefore rightly been rejected.
The case of R v Coker accordingly provides considerable insight into 
how harshly this procedural requirement may operate in practice
5
against an accused. A further illustration is provided, inter alia, 
by the recent House of Lords' decision in Gleaves v Deakin and others.^
1. R V Coker, supra, at 14 per Combe, C.J.
2. Ibid., at 15.
3. Ibid., at 17. See also Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 20 (1923 Laws).
4. Ibid., at 14 and at 17 - 18.
5. See R.v Sir Robert Carden, (1879) 5 Q.B.D. 1.
6. [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L.(E)).
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Here, a private prosecution for criminal libel was instituted by the 
notorious Roger Gleaves ('the respondent') who had previously been
1
convicted on a number of occasions on charges of buggery and assault ,
against the authors and publishers ('the appellants') of a paperback
book entitled 'Johny Go Home' which - so submitted by the respondent
2
Gleaves - contained a number of defamatory allegations against him.
When the matter came before an examining justice in proceedings for 
committal to trial, the appellants sought to lead evidence of the 
respondent's bad character, in order to show that his 'general reputation
was already so bad that the allegations complained of constituted no
3
'serious' slur on him! and that the trial of the appellants for
criminal libel was accordingly unwarranted. The magistrate refused
4
to admit the evidence, however, and this was upheld on appeal to the
House of Lords. In a unanimous ruling, the House of Lords stressed
that a plea of justification may, under section 6 of the Lord Campbell's
Act, be made only at trial, as earlier confirmed in R v Sir Robert 
5
Garden. The appellants could not attempt to circumvent this rule
by leading evidence of the prosecutor's bad character at the commit- 
6
tal stage.
1. Ibid., at 500, where his various previous convictions are listed.
2. Ibid., at 503, where Lord Edmund-Davies summarises the nature of 
the allegations made.
3. Ibid.
4. This refusal seems somewhat ironic, in view of the fact that the 
magistrate had permitted the respondent to be cross-examined on his 
previous convictions. See ibid., at 500.
5. Supra.
6. See, for example, the judgment of Lord Edmund-Davies, ibid., at 506, 
where his Lordship expressly endorses the view expressed in the 
Divisional Court by Lord Widgery, C.J. that,
1... the consequences would be disastrous if the calling of 
evidence about the general reputation of the prosecutor could be 
indulged in in.committal proceedings and was not subject to the same 
restrictions as the case of justification'.
-628-
Whilst this decision is clearly correct in terms of the existing law, 
its practical effect seems equally harsh. Their Lordships accordingly 
recommended that the law should be reformed in various ways, as 
further described below.'*'
Thus far, only the continued efficacy of the procedural element of 
section 6 has examined. More difficulty surrounds the further 
question whether that part of section 6 which entitles a court to 
consider whether 'the guilt of the [accused] is aggravated or miti­
gated' by a plea of justification continues to apply. It was noted
by Petrides, J. in R v Coker that the plea of justification is a
2
'double edged weapon' by reason of its possibly aggravating effect
on punishment. This dictum would accordingly indicate that Petrides, J.
believed that this part of section 6 does indeed have continuing
3
efficacy. However, his statement was clearly obiter; and it is 
submitted that there must remain considerable doubt as to the con­
tinuing applicability of this part of the section. A provision for 
increased sentence in certain circumstances is not procedural in 
nature - unlike the pleading requirement previously discussed. 
Accordingly, it is strongly arguable that - together with other sub­
stantive aspects of section 6 - it ceased to apply in Nigeria on the
4
enactment of the Criminal Code.
1. See p. 680 et seq.
2. (1927) 8 N.L.R. 7.
3. Note that the decision of the Full Court was that the accused was 
not entitled - in any event - to rely upon the defence of justifi­
cation, given his failure to plead it as required. Thus, this plea 
could clearly not have affected his sentence.
4. See R v Coker, above.
As regards the continued efficacy of section 6 of Lord Campbell's 
Act in the northern states of Nigeria where the Penal Code applies, 
it is submitted that the position is substantially the same. Like 
the Criminal Code, the Penal Code was intended to be a complete and 
comprehensive statement of the law on the matters within its ambit. 
Hence, any substantive elements of section 6 not reflected in a 
391(2) (i) must be taken no longer to form part of the law; whilst 
procedural aspects of section 6 are not affected by the provisions of 
the Penal Code. It follows that the substantive requirements of 
'truth' and 'public good' continue to apply, as does the procedural 
requirement that the accused may only lead evidence of truth if he 
has indicated his intention of relying on this defence in pleading 
to the charge. The further substantive aspect of section 6 - that an 
unsuccessful plea of justification may aggravate punishment - does not 
however, continue in force, for the reasons explained in relation to 
the Criminal Code.'*' In this regard, it should also be recalled that 
the Criminal Code initially applied throughout Nigeria - and was only
2
replaced by the Penal Code in the North at a considerably later date. 
Accordingly, any substantive provisions of s 6 which ceased to have 
effect on ther enactment of the Criminal Code could not subsequently 
have been re-introduced into the law save by express legislation to 
that effect: and the Northern Penal Code contains no such provisions.
As regards the interpretation of the 'justification' provision in
the Penal Code, some guidance is provided by the Illustrations appended
to the section. Thus, it may be 'for the public good' to reveal that
1. See p. 628.
2. The Penal Code came into effect only in 1959, as previously 
discussed in the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, at 
p. 141.
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a man who opens a new school has recently been involved in dishonest 
conduct, but this would not be the case where the dishonesty had 
been perpetrated some twenty years ago, and the man had led an 
exemplary life in the interim.^-
Further glosses as to the meaning and ambit of the provision are added 
2
by Gledhill. He submits that the onus of establishing this defence
3
(as well as the other exceptions to liability ) lies on the accused; 
and that it is sufficient for him to show that the imputation is sub­
stantially true in the sense that 'the departures from the truth are
not such as materially to affect the impression made on the mind of
4
the reader or hearer'. Somewhat ambiguously, however, Gledhill 
further asserts, on the basis of Indian authority,"* that '[i]f there 
is doubt about the truth of the imputation, the accused is not entitled 
to the benefit of the d o u b t ' I t  is submitted, however, that this 
interpretation cuts across established principles of criminal law 
and should not be followed by the Nigerian courts.
Gledhill defines the 'public good' as 'the good of the general public
as opposed to that of the individual; [and as] ... the common convenience
7
and welfare of a considerable section of the public'. He submits, further,
1. See illustrations (a) and (b) to s. 391(2)(i) and see also Gledhill, 
op.cit., p. 695.
2. Ibid., pp. 695-696.
3. As further explained in due course in the text below.
4. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 695.
5. Lalmohan Singh v King, A.I.R. [1950] Cal. 339. Indian cases on
the Penal Code are, of course, of persuasive authority only.
6. Gledhill, supra.
7. Ibid.
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that [t]o proclaim that a man keeps a mistress or is too fond of
liquor or is mean in relation to household expenditure, even if true,
1
is unlikely to be for the public good* .
Gledhill also points out that the benefit of the defence may be lost
if the publication extends beyond what is needed in the public good.
2
He cites in illustration a further Indian decision in which the 
accused wrote to the secretary of the local municipality advising 
him that a particular employee of the municipality had been dismissed
by two previous employers. Whilst this alone would not have rendered
3
him liable to conviction , he had then gone further and had proceeded 
- before the municipality could take any action - to have the letter 
published in a local newspaper. It was held that he 'could not claim
the benefit of the exception in relation to the publication of his
4
letter in the newspaper' .
7.9 The Defence of Fair Comment
In neither the Criminal nor Penal Codes is there any provision speci­
fically labelled the 'defence of fair comment'. Instead, sub-sections 
embracing the elements of this defence are to be found in s. 379 of 
the Criminal Code (headed 'cases in which publication is conditionally 
privileged') and in s.391 of the Penal Code (which describes 
publications which do not - in law - amount to defamation).
1. Ibid.
2. Q.E. v Janardhan, (1894) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 703.
3. The case, presumably, was decided on the basis of 'justification'. 
It seems, however, that a defence of 'qualified privilege' based 
on duty or common interest might equally have been applicable - 
but would also not have availed the accused, by reason of exces­
sive publication, as further explained below.
4. Gledhill, supra, p. 696.
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Thus, the Criminal Code, in the sections relevant to fair comment, 
provides as follows:
's. 379. The publication of defamatory matter is conditionally 
privileged, and no person is criminally liable in respect thereof, in 
the following cases:
(4). If the defamatory matter consists of fair comment on [matters
which are absolutely privileged under s' 378"^ ; or on documents published
2
by, or under the authority of, the President; or on proceedings in
3
court or before other public body or public meeting; or on any
information issued by a Government department for the information of 
4
the public];
(5) if the defamatory matter consists of fair comment upon the public 
conduct of any person in public affairs, or upon the public conduct
of any person employed in the public service in the discharge of 
his public duties, or upon the character of any of such persons so far
as it appears by such conduct; or
(6) if the defamatory matter consists of fair comment on any published 
book or other literary production, or any composition or work of art, 
or performance publicly exhibited, or any other communication made
to the public on any subject; or on the character of the author of 
such book, production, composition, work of art, or the person
exhibiting such performance, so far as their characters may appear
1. See p. 641.
2. See s 379(4), read with s 379(1).
3. See s 379(4), read with s 379(2).
4. See s 379(4), read with s 379(3). The full text of all these
provisions is set out in Appendix III.
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therefrom respectively...1.
The Code is silent as regards the important question of whether the
conditional privilege attaching to fair comment of this kind is
1 2 
lost on proof that the publication was actuated by express malice.
s 379 begins by declaring (as noted above) that: 'The publication of
defamatory matter is conditionally privileged, and no person is
3
criminally liable in respect thereof, in the ... cases' described
above. It seems difficult to accept that this remains the position
even where the comment, though fair, was in fact maliciously motivated.
Moreover, it is a general principle that 'the law as to the defences
4
of absolute and qualified privilege is the same for criminal libel 
as for a civil action'.^ On this basis, fair comment should indeed 
rank as criminal defamation if actuated by express malice - notwith­
standing the lack of any express provision to this effect in the
Criminal Code. As regards onus of proof, it is submitted - both by
6
way of analogy with the civil law, and because of the general 
principle of criminal law that the burden lies on the state to prove 
all elements of an offence - that it is for the prosecution to establish 
that the comment was indeed malicious.
1. The question of onus of proof of malice is considered further below.
2. For the meaning of express malice, see the discussion, in the context
of the civil law of defamation, at p 533 et seq.
3. s 379, Criminal Code, Cap 42, emphasis supplied.
4. It is submitted that qualified and 'conditional! privilege (the term
used in the Criminal Code) may legitimately be equated.
5. Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 160.
6. It may be recalled from the discussion at p.534 above that, in the 
civil law, the plaintiff who wishes to rebut a defence of fair 
comment must file a Reply in which he asserts that the publication 
was motivated by express malice. At the trial, the onus clearly 
lies on him to substantiate the allegation of malice.
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This interpretation is supported by Aguda^ who submits - as regards
the western states' Criminal Code - that 'if the comment is fair on the
face of it, the prosecution must prove malice in order to disprove 
2
fair comment'. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to ascertain
the basis for this assertion, since the legislation itself is in
exactly the same terms as that previously considered and makes no
express reference to malice, its proof or effect. Accordingly,
in the absence of definitive pronouncement by the courts, the matter
3
must remain speculative to some degree. The statute is also silent
4
as regards another important question of onus. On whom (defence
or prosecution) does the burden lie to show that the the defamatory
matter in question does or does not fall within the ambit of s 379(4),
(5) or (6)? It might be argued^that, since this question is vital to 
the determination of whether the accused may be held 'criminally
g
liable' at all, the onus must lie upon the state to prove this 
important element of the offence. On the other hand, however, fair 
comment provides a defence to liability and it therefore seems more
1. T. Akinola Aguda, The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Southern 
States of Nigeria, 3rd,ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982.
2. Ibid., p. 1835.
3. Aguda, ibid., also, points out that '[w]here conditional privilege 
is pleaded under the Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges)
Act, s 27, or, in the Western and Bendel States under the Legislative 
Houses (Powers and Privileges) Law, s. 21, in respect of an extract 
from or abstract of any matter published by or under the authority 
of a Legislative House, the burden of proving bona fides and absence 
of malice appears to rest on the defence.'
These provisions, accordingly, would appear to support the counter- 
contention; and definitive pronouncement on the matter is commensurately 
more difficult.
4. The question of onus in relation to express malice has previously 
been considered.
5. Not only in relation to these provisions, but also as regards the 
sections dealing with justification, absolute privilege and other 
aspects of 'conditional privilege'.
6. See s 379, as reproduced on p. 632.
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logical to conclude that the burden lies on the accused to substantiate 
it. The onus is clearly on the defence to establish justification, and 
there seems no reason why a different rule should apply in the context 
of fair comment. Accordingly, it seems that it is for the accused to 
show (on a balance of probabilities) that the material in question does 
indeed fall within the ambit of the statutory protection.
The Penal Code is again somewhat different in its approach and states 
clearly (in s. 391(2) that 1[i]t is not defamation1 to make imputation 
of various kinds. :Those relevant to fair comment are as follows:
s 391(2) (ii) : The expression 'in good faith' of any opinion whatever
'on the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public 
functions' or on his character as so revealed;
s 391(2) (iii): The expression 'in good faith' of any opinion whatever 
on 'the conduct of any person touching any public question' and on his 
character as so revealed;
s 391(2) (v) : The similar expression of any opinion on the merits of any
civil or criminal case or on the conduct or character of any person invol­
ved in such proceedings insofar as revealed by such proceedings;
s 391 (2) (vi): The expression, likewise, of any opinion on 'the merits
of any performance which its author has submitted to the judgment of the 
public'
As regards the first of these categories of opinion  ^ 'respecting 
the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public
1. The full text of these provisions is set out in Appendix IV.
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function1 ^-a number of illustrations as to its meaning are provided
2 3by Indian cases. Thus, the editor of a newspaper was held liable
for publishing an article alleging that political prisoners in a
temporary camp jail were 'half-starved' and had been brutally beaten
when they asked for more bread. It was held that he could not have
acted 'in good faith' in publishing, because 'he had accepted the
statements of some prisoners, whom he must have known were highly
interested parties, without giving the other party any opportunity
4 5
to rebut them'. In another case, a newspaper editor was also con­
victed for publicising the prosecution of a particular individual
without drawing attention to the fact that the prosecution had subse-
6
quently been withdrawn. By contrast, however, the writer of a news­
paper article alleging that a particular revenue officer was 
corrupt and had oppressed certain villagers was found to be protected 
under this provision because the court was satisfied that he (the
writer) had made a proper enquiry and had exercised due care and
7
attention before publishing.
It thus appears that the requirement of good faith 'demands reason-
g
able care in [the] ascertainment of facts'. As regards the opinion
1. s. 391(2)(ii), Penal Code, Cap 89.
2/ These illustrations are cited by Gledhill, op.cit., pp.696-697.
3. The accused was also the publisher and printer of the paper.
4. Gledhill, supra, p. 696, referring to K . Rama Rao v Emp., A.I.R.
[1943] Oudh 1.
5. The accused was also the proprietor and publisher of the paper.
6. See Imp, v B.Kakde, (1880) I.L.R. 4 Bomb. 299.
7. See K. Kelu Nair v T .S. Thiramampu, A.I.R. [1948] Mad. 266.
8. Gledhill, supra, p. 697..
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itself, and the way in which it is expressed, Gledhill submits that 
'regard must be had to the wide diversity of opinions which men can 
honestly hold on ... many questions and the violence with which they • 
can proclaim them'.^ Thus, Iwhether the court approves the opinion 
or the manner in which it is expressed is irrelevant; [and] what it has 
to consider is whether any fair man, however obstinate or prejudiced, 
would have expressed the opinion complained of an in the form complaind 
of!.2
It should be noted that protection does not extend to imputations
regarding the private life of a public official, nor to expressions
of opinion of the character of public officials except insofar as
revealed by their official acts. Thus, an allegation that a public
servant was a habitual gambler and unfit to hold office would not be
3
protected - unless this was apparent in his official conduct.
The second category concerns fair comment on the 'conduct of any person
4
touching any public question'; and is designed to cover the expression,
in good faith, of opinion on the conduct of private individuals who
concern themselves in matters of public interest by (for example)
5
petitioning the government on an issue of general importance. The 
requirement of good faith demands the same degree of care in ascer­
taining facts as pertains to the first category of comment, as
1. Ibid.,
2. Ibid.
3. See Gledhill, op.cit., p. 697.
4. s 391(2)(iii), Penal Code, Cap 89.
5. See the illustration to this provision.
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describedahbove.^ 'Exaggerated expressions of opinion [do] not
2
[however] prejudice the defence1. Again, only imputations on charac­
ter as revealed by conduct relating to the particular public question 
are protected.
An illustration of the operation of the section is provided by the
3
Indian case of Emp. v McLeod. Here, the editor of a medical journal
published a comment regarding an appeal to the public for funds, made
by a doctor in charge of an eye hospital, and alleged that the doctor
had breached professional ethics by the way he had made his appeal.
It was held that the editor was protected by this provision as the
'maintenance of the hospital [had been made] a public question and
4
[he] had acted in good faith'.
The third category comprises comment on the merits of cases decided
in court or on the conduct of witnesses and others concerned in the 
5
proceedings - again with the limitation that imputations on character
are protected only to the extent that the particular trait is revealed
by the proceedings themselves. Thus, it is legitimate to comment
that a witness's evidence is so contradictory that he must be either
'stupid or dishonest';^ but an allegation that his evidence should not
be believed because he is 'a man without veracity' would not be 
7
protected. Again, the comment must be made with due care and
1. See p. 636 above.
2. Murlidhar v Natayendas, A.I.R. [1914] Sind. 85.
3. (1880) liL.R. 3 All. 342.
4. Gledhill, supra, p. 698.
5. See s 391(2)(v), Penal Code, Cap 89.
6. s 391(2) (v) , Penal Code, Cap 89, illustration (a).
7. Ibid.
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attention and information must not be suppressed or distorted in order 
to support the comment.
As regards comment on the merits of cases, it is 'legitimate to point
out that there ha[ve] been errors in law or procedure or that the law
hals] been misunderstood or misapplied or that a law which produced ...
2
a [particular] result is in need of amendment'. Comment on the conduct 
or character of the presiding judicial officer is not specifically 
referred to in the provision and, accordingly, is protected only to 
the extent that it constitutes comment on the-merits of a case. Thus, 
an allegation that a magistrate committed an accused for trial on 
insufficient evidence is protected (as comment on the merits) but not
3
so an insinuation that 'the magistrate had acted from improper motives'.
4
The final category concerns comment on the merits of public performance,
and covers the expression of opinion on 'literary compositions, works
of art, theatrical and musical performances, and public lectures and 
5
speeches'. Submission to the public in general rather than to personal 
friends or a private audience is required. The comment must be fair, 
in the sense that lituimust be a possible inference from the work 
itself'^ and must be made with 'due care, and attention ... [having
1. Ibid.
2. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 700.
3. Ibid., p. 701.
4. See s 391(2)(vi), Penal Code, Cap 89.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 702.
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regard] to the general circumstances and the capacity and intelli­
gence of the accused'.^ Any evidence of bad faith or of 'recklessness
2
in making unconscionable assertions' takes the comment beyond the 
protection of the provision. An amusing illustration of this is pro­
vided by the English case of Whistler, in which Ruskin, commenting on 
an exhibition of paintings, wrote:
'for Mr. Whistler's sake, no less than 
for the protection of the public, works 
ought not to have been admitted in which 
the ill-educated conceit of the artist so 
nearly approaches the aspect of wilful 
imposture. I have known much of 
cockney impudence but never expected to 
hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for 
throwing a. pot of paint in the public's 
face'. 3
Although the language used was generally interperate, 'it was only
the expression "wilful imposture" which took the passage beyond the
4
boundary of fair comment'.
Disparagement of character is protected only to the extent that such 
character is revealed in the work itself. It is legitimate, thus, 
to allege that a book is foolish and its author therefore a 'silly
man'; but not to assert that the author is known, in general, to be
5 6
a fool. Thus, in the Indian decision of Emp. v Abdool Wadood, the
allegation that the writer of a particular pamphlet was 'on account
of his worldly habits, unfit to give counsel as a mufti or qadi
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Whistler, (1878), cited by Gledhill, op.cit., p. 702.
4. Gledhill, ibid.
5. S. 391(2)(vi), Penal Code, Cap 89, illustration (d)
6. (1907) I.L.R. 31 Bom. 293.
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and that he had an inborn habit of deception'^ was held to fall outside 
the statutory protection because it was general in nature and was not 
based on the content:of the pamphlet itself.
7.10. The Defence of Absolute Privilege
The Criminal Code expressly states that certain publications are
'absolutely privileged' so that 'no person is criminally liable in
2
respect [of them]'. The material entitled to absolute privilege 
is, briefly, as follows:
s. 378(1): Matter published by, or at the order of, the President or 
a Governor , or in any official document or Gazette; 
s. 378(2): Publications in petitions to the President or a Governor; 
s. 378(3): Publications which take place in any court proceedings or 
inquiry authorised, inter alia, by the President or a 
Governor;
s. 378(4): Publications in official reports made pursuant to such 
inquiries;
s. 378(5): Publications relating to the military disciplining of a
person subject to such discipline by others entitled to
3
wield such discipline over him.
The Code contains no guidance on the question of onus, but (again) 
it seems reasonable to infer that the burden of proving that the
1. Gledhill, supra, pp. 701-702.
2. This is substantially similar to the position in civil proceedings, 
as discussed at p.500 above, in the sense that 'absolute' privilege 
excludes all liability- irrespective of malice.
3. s. 378, Criminal Code, Cap 42. The full text of these provisions 
is set out in Appendix III.
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publication in issue falls within the ambit of one of these sub—sections 
lies upon the accused.
As regards the Penal Code, it is somewhat surprising to note that it 
contains no provisions equivalent to the above. Since the Code is 
intended to operate as a complete statement of the law in the areas 
covered by it, it would seem (therefore) that defamatory publications 
of the kind protected under s 378 of the Criminal Code may, if published 
in the northern states, give rise to prosecution in respect of Which 
no defence under the Penal Code will be available. If this in­
terpretation is correct, the consequences for freedom of testimony in 
court proceedings in the North (to take but one example) are potentially 
extremely serious.^
A further disconcerting omission from the Criminal and, a fortiori, 
also from the Penal Code; is the absence of any provision for 'parli­
amentary privilege ' , to protect statements made in the course of
parliamentary proceedings, as well as in reports of such proceedings
2
(or in other papers published at the order of the legislature ). In
the United Kingdom, the matter is clearly covered by the common law,
which, as earlier stated, is essentially the same 'as to the defences
3
of ... privilege ... for criminal libel as for a civil action*.
1. Statements which are fair comment on the testimony of witnesses 
are protected under s 391(2) (v), as previously described, but this 
does not protect the witness himself. Protection is, however, 
afforded to statements made in furtherance of interest under
s 391(2)(ix), as further described at 652 below, and this sub­
section is generally seen as covering statements by counsel, wit­
nesses, and so forth in proceedings. The most important gap is 
therefore arguably in relation to statements in (and reports of) 
parliamentary proceedings, as further explained below.
2. See p. 501 above, where the privilege which pertains to such state­
ments in the civil law of defamation is described.
3. See p. 633 above, citing Duncan & Neill, opcit, p 160.
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In Nigeria, however, the introduction of the Codes has created a very 
different situation, and it is strongly arguable (following the 
reasoning of R v Coker'*') that substantive rules of the common law 
which have not been reproduced in the Codes no longer form part of 
Nigerian law.
Unfortunately, there are no reported Nigerian cases in which this
difficulty has been discussed, let alone resolved. If this lacuna
in the law indeed exists (as undoubtedly appears to be the case) then
legislation would seem necessary to remedy the defect. It is not
safe to assume - from the absence of prosecutions in this context in 
2
the past - that criminal proceedings may not at some future time 
be instituted to penalise the maker (or reporter) of a defamatory 
statement in the course of parliamentary proceedings. So long as 
this possibility remains, so too does the danger to freedom of ex­
pression and (by implication) the risk to the effective functioning 
of the legislature.
3
7.11. The Defence of Qualified Privilege
In the section on defamation in the law of tort, this defence was
discussed in the context of various sub-headings - such as statements
in pursuance of duty, protection of interest, and so forth - and it
\
1. (1927) 8 N.L.R. 7, especially at 14.
2. Recent criminal libel prosecutions in the United Kingdom, such as 
Gleaves v Deakin and others, [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 , (H .L. (E .) }', discus.sed 
at p.595 above, graphically illustrate the possibility of laws 
previously considered of academic interest being given a new 
practical significance.
3. This heading is used, rather than 'conditional' privilege (as in
s 378 of the Criminal Code) because the matters here discussed are 
paralleled (to a considerable extent) by the rules governing 
'qualified privilege' in the law of tort.
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is proposed to analyse the various provisions of the Codes by reference 
to the same categories. These are as follows:
(i) Statements in pursuance of legal, social or moral duty.
The provisions of the Criminal Code relevant to this category are as 
follows:
s. 379(3): This, in essence, confers 'conditional' privilege (thus
negating criminal liability) on publications made 'for
the information of the public at the request of any 
Government department or peace officer' or on notices or 
reports issued by such authorities for public information.
The privilege will only lie, however, 'if in every such 
case the publication is made without ill-will to the person 
defamed'.^
s. 379(8): This relates to publications made, in good faith, by a person
with lawful authority over another in order to censure the
latter on matters within the ambit of the authority. No
express requirement regarding the lack of 'ill-will' is
2
made in the sub-section but the proviso to section 379 
makes it clear that the privilege will only obtain where 
'the person making the publication honestly believes the 
matter published to be true, the matter published is
1. This requirement is found in only three subsections of s. 379. If
the term 'conditionally privileged' implies, as discussed at p. 633.
above, that the privilege is lost in the face of malice, then this 
provision is, strictly, tautologous.
2. The 'ill-will' requirement is found in sub-sections (1), (2) and
(3) only. For the full text of these provisions, see Appendix III.
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relevant to the matters the existence of which may excuse 
the publication of defamatory matter, and the manner and 
extent of the publication do not exceed what is reasonably 
sufficient for the occasion'.'*'
The relevant provisions of the Penal Code are the following:
s. 391(2)(vii): This relates to publications in good faith to censure 
a person over whom the publisher has authority;
s. 391(2)(viii):This covers accusations, in good faith, against any
person 'to any of those who have lawful authority over 
that person with respect to the subject matter of the 
accusation';
s. 391(2) (ix): This extends to imputations on the character of others,
provided they are made in good faith for the protection 
of the publisher or any other person or the; public 
good;^
2. 391(2) (x): This protects the conveyance of a 'caution in good
faith to one person against another', provided it is 
intended for the good of the recipient (or some person 
in whom the latter is interested) or for the public 
good.^
1. The same proviso applies also to subsections (7), (9) and (10), as 
discussed in due course.
2. This type of publication falls also within the ambit of statements 
pursuant to interest (and would do so exclusively were it not for 
the final provision in terms of 'the public good').
3. Ibid.
The full text of these provisions is set out in Appendix IV.
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Publications which satisfy these criteria do not constitute defamation, 
in terms of the opening of s. 391(2).
Guidance as to the meaning of these provisions in the Penal Code is
provided by a number of illustrations to each sub-section. Thus, as
regards censure in good faith by a person who has lawful authority
over another,^- it is legitimate for a magistrate or alkali to
censure the conduct of a witness or officer of court; or for a head
of department- to censure those under his orders; for a parent to
censure a child in the presence of other children; or for a master to
2
censure his servant for inefficiency in service. The requirement of
good faith demands that there must be reasonable grounds for uttering
the censure; that it must not be made recklessly or maliciously; and
3
that its publication must be no wider than necessary.
As for accusations preferred in good faith to authorised persons, this
category would cover 'a complaint made to a magistrate, a report made
to the police, [and] a complaint made about a servant to his master
4
... [or] about a child to its father'. There must be reasonable
5
grounds for making the complaint; it must be limited to matters 
within the range of authority of the recipient;^ and publication must
1. s 391(2)(vii) Penal Code, Cap 89.
2. See illustrations to this provision, ibid.
3. See Gledhill, op.cit., pp. 702-703. As regards the latter point, 
if the censure were sent in a postcard or telegram, the statutory 
protection would be lost, as illustrated by Basumati v Budram,
(1894) l.L.R. 22, Cal. 46.
4. See Gledhill, supra, p. 704. Good faith would be especially necessary 
where the complaint was made to a magistrate, as this would be 
particularly serious.
5. See Gledhill, supra, p. 704. This would be especially necessary 
where the complaint was made to a magistrate, as this would be 
particularly serious.
6. Gledhill, ibid., citing Singaraju, (1895) 1 Weir 612.
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be limited to what is appropriate to the occasion.'*' The exception is
2
well illustrated by the case of Poona v K.E. in which a number of
'paddy traders complained to tie traffic manager of the Burma Railways that a
certain station master [had given] preference to charcoal dealers in
3
[allotting] waggons'. Although this allegation proved, on inquiry,
to be untrue they were nevertheless held entitled (in proceedings for
defamation brought by the traffic manager in question) to the benefit
of the exception because, 'at the time when the complaint was made,
4
they had good grounds to believe their allegations to be true'.
The third of the categories listed above - that provided by s 391,(2) (ix)
- is broad enough to cover statements in pursuance of duty as well
5
as those m  furtherance of interest. Examples of the latter are
accordingly discussed below.^ An illustration of an imputation on
character pursuant to duty is provided by the Code itself
which states that a District Officer who casts aspersions upon a
particular individual in making a report to his superior officer will
7
be protected provided he acts in good faith. Gledhill makes the
1. Gledhill, ibid., p. 705, Thus, there is no protection under this
exception for a complaint regarding a servant made not to his master
but published in a newspaper.
2. (1916) 8 L.B.R. 440.
3. Gledhill, supra.
4. Ibid.
5. It must be acknowledged that it is not only this exception, but
the other three listed above as well, which seem to overlap both
'duty' and 'interest' and cannot, therefore, be easily or entirely 
satisfactorily slotted into either category.
6. See p i  648 below.
7. s 391(2)(ix) Penal Code Cap 89, illustration (b).
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general observation that whilst '[t]he first exception^- protects true
statements published for the public good ... this exception extends
to statements which, though not true, are made in good faith for the
public good, [which means] the common welfare or convenience of the
2
public or a considerable section of it'.
The final category, relating to the conveyance of a caution intended
3
for the good of the recipient or the general public good, extends 
(for example) to the issue by a trade association to its members of 
a list of prospective customers it does not consider trustworthy; but 
would not protect the publication of such a list in a local newspaper. 
Thus, publication must not go beyond what is necessary, and the 
requirements of due care and attention must also be satisfied,
(ii) Statements in protection of furtherance of interest.
The following provisions of the Criminal Code fall within this 
category:
s. 379(7): This covers publication, in good faith, seeking remedy
or redress for any wrong or grievance from a person having 
(or reasonably believed to have) the right to effect such 
remedy or redress.
1. i.e. s 391(2)(1)(i), relating to 'justification1, discussed at
pp. 622 - 628; and reproduced at p. 622 above.
2. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 705.
3. s 391(2) (x) , Penal Code, Cap 89.
4. See Gledhill, supra, p. 710.
5. Ibid.
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s. 379(11): This confers protection where defamatory matter is published
in answer to an inquiry provided the inquirer is believed, 
on reasonable grounds, to have 'an interest in knowing 
the truth' and the information is given in good faith: 
s. 379(12): This extends to defamatory publications consisting of
information in relation to which the publisher believes 
(on reasonable grounds) the recipient has an interest in 
knowing the truth.-
In addition, publications within the ambit of subsections (7) and (11)
are protected only if three further conditions are satisfied. These
2
have already been set out in full at p 644 ; and - in essence - they
demand honest belief that the matter published is true, that the matter
published be relevant to the interest giving rise to the privilege and
that the 'manner and extent' of publication go no further than is
3
'reasonably sufficient'.
As for publications within sub-section (12), the additional requirements
for protection against liability are that the defamatory matter must
be relevant to the subject and, further, must either be true or 'made
without ill-will to the person defamed and in the honest belief, on
4
reasonable grounds, that it is true'.
Attempted reliance on sub-section (7) and (12) is illustrated by the 
case of R v Coker'*' where, it may be recalled, the defamatory publication
1. For the full text of these provisions, see Appendix III.
2. See pp 644 - .645..
3. For the full text of these provisions, see Appendix III.
4. Ibid.-
5. (1927) 8 N.L.R. 7.
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in issue alleged that.the Alake of Abeokuta was attempting to murder 
several people. The author of the publication was one of his alleged 
intended victims. When prosecuted for criminal libel, he raised the 
defence that the publication was protected under either subsection (7) 
(relating to the seeking of redress from a person having ^ or reason­
ably believed to have - the right to provide it) or subsection (12), 
(regarding the publication of information in relation to which the 
recipient has an interest in knowing the truth). The publication had, 
in fact, taken the form of a letter to the editor of the Eko Igbehin 
newspaper.
The trial court's response to this defence was sharply dismissive,
Tew, J. stating that he was 'unable to understand' how 'the publication
in a newspaper of rumours to the effect that some person is intending
to murder other persons can be said to fulfil any of the conditions laid
down in either of the [subsections] quoted above'.’*' On reference
2
to the Full Court, this conclusion was unanimously confirmed. The 
Full Court also endorsed the ruling of the court a quo that evidence 
of the truth of the rumours - for the purpose of showing honest 
belief in the truth of the defamatory matter (as required by the 
provisos to subsections (7) and (12) - was irrelevant and therefore 
inadmissible in view of the fact that the primary criteria contained 
in the sub-sections had not been met. As succinctly stated by 
Petrides J., '[t]he defendant having failed to prove that the publi­
cation of the .defamatory matter complained of was conditionally pri­
vileged, it follow[ed] that evidence could not be tendered under a 
plea of conditional privilege that the defendant honestly believed
1. Ibid., at 9.
2. Ibid., at 15, per Combe, C.J.: and at 15 per Maxwell, J., and at 
16 per Petrides, J.
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it to be true'.^
As regards the Northern Penal Code, the provisions relevant to publi­
cation pursuant to interest are as follows:
s. 391(2) (ix): This covers the making of an imputation against the
character of another, provided it is made in good faith
for the protection of the interests of the publisher,
or any other person, or for the public good.
s. 391(2) (x) : This confers protection where a caution is conveyed
in good faith to another either for his own good, or
that of some person in whom he is interested, or for 
2
the public good.
3
In such instances, the publication does not amount to defamation.
It remains to examine in further detail the statutory protection
4
given (under s 391(2)(ix)) to statements made in furtherance of
interest. Since every man has an interest in his own property, a
statement made to protect such interest (such as a warning by a
shopkeeper to his assistant to sell nothing on credit to a particular
customer, as the latter is not trustworthy) is prima facie within the
5
statutory exception. Further, where a litigant, in support of an 
application for transfer of proceedings to another court, alleges that 
a named individual, friendly with the presiding magistrate, has been
1. Ibid., at 16.
2. For the full text of these provisions, see Appendix IV,
These sub-sections are, of course, also relevant to statements 
pursuant to duty (by virtue of the provision 'for public good'.
Accordingly they have also been included in that category, at p. 645,
3. This, -of course, is in terms of the opening words of s. 391(2).
4. This section has already been considered to some extent at p. 646 above.
5. s. 391(2)(ix), Penal Code Cap 89, illustration (a). ,
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attempting to interfere in the proceedings, this statement is protected
because 'made for the protection of his interest in the case'. ^  It
is clear, however, that the statement must be limited to what is
necessary to protect the interest in issue and must not include extra-
2
neous defamatory allegations!
In addition, publication must not extend beyond what is appropriate
to the interest concerned, as illustrated by the case of Vanayak v 
3
Shantaram. Thus, the publication in a newspaper of the decision of
a secret sect not to admit a particular individual to its meetings
in future was not entitled to the benefit of the exception since the
'publication of [this decision] to the general public went beyond what
4
was necessary for the protection of the interest of the sect'.
The main significance of this exception in practice lies in the fact
that it provides the basis for protecting statements made in the course
of judicial proceedings by judges, counsel, parties or witnesses.
In England, such statements are absolutely privileged and this is also
the position in those parts of Nigeria (the southern states) in which
5
the Criminal Code applies. In the North, however, (as in India)
'such statements are only entitled to such protection as the Code 
affords',^ as further discussed below.
It should be noted that '[w]hen any statement made in court by a 
judge, counsel, party or witness is made the basis of a charge of
1. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 708, citing Aravamuda v Sahthana Krishana 
Krishnan, A.I.R. [1952] Mad. 184.
2. Gledhill, ibid., p. 707, citing Bhola Nath v Emp., A.I.R. [1941] All.l.
3. A.I.R. 11941] Bom. 410.
4. Gledhill, supra, p. 708.
5. See s. 378(3), Criminal Code, Cap 42.
6. Gledhill, supra.
-653-
defamation and the present exception is pleaded, the Indian courts 
hold that it must be presumed that it [was] made in good faith for 
the protection of an interest, in effect calling upon the prosecution 
to prove that it [was] not for the protection of an interest or that 
its publication was malicious.'^
As regards statements by judges, some additional protection is con­
ferred by another provision of the Code which states that: 'Nothing 
is an offence which is done by a person when acting judicially as a 
court of justice or as a member of a court of justice in the exercise
of any power which is or which in good faith he believes to be given 
2
to him by law'. However, the protection 'given by this section is 
3
limited' and does not extend, for example, to malicious imputations
4
having no bearing on the proceedings.
As for statements by counsel, the Indian courts have acknowledged
the difficulties facing counsel but have nevertheless refused to accord
5
absolute privilege to their statements in judicial proceedings.
However, counsel's good faith must be presumed - even where it appears
that his client knows the particular imputation to be fake - because
'counsel's duty is to present his client's case and, in relation to
defamation, it would be unreasonable to say that it is his duty to
£
enquire whether his client's case is true or false'. However, counsel
1. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 709. It is submitted that the same approach
should be followed in northern Nigeria.
2. s. 42, Penal Code, Cap 89.
3. Gledhill, supra.
4. Ibid.
5. See T.F.R. McDonnel v K.E., A.I.R. [1925] Ran. 345.
6. Gledhill, supra.
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ipust 'use common sense and reasonable caution in putting defamatory
questions'^ and thus, for example, if counsel (in cross-examination)
charges a witness with being a thief, a gambler, and frequenter of
brothels when this is irrelevant to the proceedings in hand and the
2
witness is generally highly regarded within the community, he would 
not be entitled to the benefit of this exception.
As regards statements by parties and witnesses, 'the presumption of
good faith in protection of an interest is more easily drawn in the
3
case of [the former] ... than [of the latter]'. 'It is [also] more
easily drawn in regard to answers to questions put in cross-examination
4
than to answers given in examination-in-chief'. Gledhill submits,
interestingly enough, that the presumption is also more easily drawn
where examination-in-chief is by a public prosecutor 'whose duty it
is to establish the truth' that where it is conducted by a private
5
legal practitioner, 'whose duty is to his client'. It seems, 
accordingly, that Gledhill regards counsel's supposed overriding duty 
to the court as something of a fiction.
Finally, as regards statements by witnesses, '[w]hen a statement is 
volunteered by a witness and is irrelevant to the proceedings, the 
burden would be on him to establish his right to the protection of the
1. Gledhill, ibid., p. 710.
2. See M. Bannerjee v Emp., A.I.R. [1927] Cal. 823.
3. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 710.
4. Ibid . ,
5. Ibid.
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exception1 .
(iii) Fair and accurate reports
The Criminal Code confers protection on these in the following terms:
s. 379(2): Where the defamatory matter 'constitutes, in whole or in
part, a fair report, for the information of the public, of 
any proceeding of any court, whether preliminary or final' 
it is entitled to conditional privilege. So too are 
reports (subject to the same conditions) of the 'public 
proceedings of any body ... authorised to hold such pro­
ceeding by [law]; or of 'any public meeting so far as the 
public is concerned in the matter published'. An over­
riding condition (which applies to all three instances
mooted by the sub-section) is that 'the publication [must
2
be] made without ill-will to the person defamed'.
s. 379(1): Although only peripherally relevant to this head, this does
provide that extracts from, or abstracts of, petitions to
the President, Governor or Secretary of State; or documents
published by or under their authority, are conditionally
privileged - provided, again, that 'the publication is
3
made without ill-will to the person defamed'.
1. Ibid., See, for example, Emp. v Ganga Prasad, (1907) I.L.R. 20 
All. 685 where a witness (called, interestingly enough, by the 
defence) in a prosecution for theft asserted that he knew nothing 
about the theft in question but that the accused had stolen his 
watch some eight years ago and that 'he had [had] to pay money to Z, 
whom he pointed out in court, to recover it. Z was, in fact, a 
respectable person of some position and affluence.' The witness was 
held guilty of defamation.
2. For the full text of this provision, see Appendix III.
3. See Appendix ,111.
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The Penal Code provides for this category of publication in terms of
s. 391(2)(iv) , which simply states that to publish a'substantially true
report of the proceedings of a court of justice or of the result of any
1
such proceedings' does not amount to defamation . It needs no emphasis 
that this provision is very much more limited in ambit than the 
corresponding sections of the Criminal Code.
A surprising omission from both Codes is the absence of any provision
2
covering fair and accurate reports of Parliamentary proceedings..
7.12. The Defence of 'Innocent Publication1
It may be recalled that, in the civil law of defamation, concern at
3
the fundamental inequity of cases such as Hulton & Co v Jones and
4
Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd prompted the enactment (in the
United Kingdom) of a special statutory defence of 'innocent publica- 
5
tion' . Similar provisions have been incorporated in the Defamation
6
Laws of Lagos State, as well as those of the eastern and western states :
but these do not affect the position as regards criminal libel, since
7
all are expressly declared to be confined to the civil law . This
1. Again, this is in terms of the opening words of s 391(2) (the full 
terms of which are, as previously noted, reflected in Appendix IV)•
2. Contrast the protection afforded fair and accurate reports of such 
proceedings under the civil law, as described at p. 507 above.
3. [1910] A.C. 20 (H.L. (E.)).
4. [1929] 2 K.B. 331 (C.A.)
5. This is contained in s 4, Defamation Act, 1952.
6. See the discussion of this defence at p 516, et_ seq.
7. See s 15(2), Defamation Law, 1961 (Lagos State) and the identical ss.
19(2) in both eastern and western states Defamation Laws. These
mirror the United Kingdom provision (contained in s 17(2), Defamation 
Act, 1952) that: 'Nothing in this Act affects the law relating to 
criminal libel'.
-656A-
lacuna is most disturbing - especially in the light of the fact that
criminal libel is - to a considerable extent - an offence of strict
1
liability, as further discussed below . The criminal law is not entirely 
without provision in this regard, however, and the relevant sections of 
the Criminal and Penal Codes must now briefly be examined.
In the Criminal Code, section 380(2) (which applies only to publication 
in a periodical, as defined below) provides that:
'The criminal responsibility of the proprietor, 
editor, or publisher, of any periodical for the 
publication of any defamatory matter contained 
therein, may be rebutted by proof that such pub­
lication took place without his knowledge and 
without negligence on his part'.
2
'Periodical' is defined as 'includ[ing] any newspaper, review, maga-
3
zine, or other writing or print, published periodically' . The onus 
of proving the absence of knowledge or negligence lies clearly on the 
person seeking to escape his prima facie criminal responsibility; and, 
in keeping with general principle, it seems that proof on a balance of 
probabilities will suffice.
The extent of the protection conferred by this provision is not al-
4
together clear. In circumstances such as those in R v Coker (which 
involved the publication of a defamatory letter 'to the editor', written 
by the accused), it seems doubtful whether the editor or publisher of 
the newspaper - if charged - would have been able to escape liability 
under this section. The letter in question - alleging that the Alake
1. See the discussion of the Importance of Mens Rea, at p. 659 et seq.
2. s 380(2), Criminal Code, Cap 42.
3. s.380(1), ibid.,
4. (1927) 8 N.L.R. 7.
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of Abeokuta was plotting to assassinate various persons - was prima 
1
facie defamatory : so that it would have been difficult to establish 
the requisite absence of knowledge or negligence. Furthermore, the 
provision is clearly not expressly designed to cater for the Hulton v 
Jones or Cassidy v Daily Mirror situations; and its wording is very different 
from that pertaining in the Defamation Laws of the southern states in 
this regard. It is accordingly questionable whether its language could 
be stretched to provide a defence in such circumstances; but it is sub­
mitted that the answer must be in the affirmative. Although less 
explicit than the civil law provisions, it does nevertheless clearly 
state that the editor (for example) of a periodical may escape criminal
responsibility if 'such publication [i*e*, the publication of defamatory
. 2 
matter] took place without his knowledge and without negligence' .
Hence, it is strongly arguable than an editor who had no idea (to use
the Hulton v Jones example) that a particular individual shared the
same name as a fictitious character he had described in derogatory
terms, should be able to show that the publication of defamatory
matter took place without knowledge or negligence on his part. In the
absence of reported decisions confirming this interpretation, the
matter must, however, remain speculative to some degree.
As regards the Penal Code, the protection provided against 'innocent 
publication' is considerably more limited; and the only provision in 
point in this context provides a defence by inference rather than 
express wording. The section in question is s. 394, whigh states:
1. Thus, it may be recalled - from the discussion of the case at p. 
613 above - that the Full Court considered the allegation so 
clearly defamatory that it was 'hardly necessary' to say so.
2. See again s 380(2), as reproduced on the preceding page.
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'Whoever prints or engraves any matter or 
prepares or causes to be prepared any record 
for the purpose of mechanical reproduction 
of any matter, knowing or having good reason 
to believe that such matter is defamatory 
of any person, shall be punished with im­
prisonment for a term which may extend to 
two years or with fine or with both'.
1
The implication from this is that the 'innocent* printer or engraver 
is not to be held liable at all. The section is silent as to the 
question of onus, but it would seem that the burden of proof must lie 
on the prosecution to establish the knowledge or reason for belief 
which is apparently a vital element in liability.
As regards the ambit of this provision, it is clear that its protection 
extends to printers, engravers and others engaged in the preparation of 
'any record for the purpose of mechanical reproduction'; but it is 
less certain whether it extends to others involved in the publication 
process - such as the editor or proprietor of a newspaper. Prima 
facie, however, it seems that it does not extend to the latter category 
of persons. This limitation is most unfortunate.
Whether the provision would avail the printer (for example) in a 
Hulton v Jones situation is not entirely clear. Again, its terms are 
not specifically oriented to that kind of case: but it seems that its 
wording is sufficiently broad to provide a defence against liability 
in such circumstances (albeit one that may be relied upon by only a 
limited number of persons).
In summary, then, it is apparent that the Codes provide only a narrow 
protection against 'unintentional publication'; and it is submitted that 
this deficiency is in much need of redress.
1. s. 394, Penal Code, Cap 89.
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7.13. The Defence of Leave or Licence or 'Volenti non fit injuria1
Again, this defence cannot be relied upon in the criminal law since it
is not included within the Codes. In any event, since the purpose of
criminal proceedings is to punish the wrongdoer for the general benefit 
of society as a whole, the consent of the victim should, in principle, 
be considered irrelevant.
7.14. The Defence of 'Innocent Dissemination1
In the Criminal Code, the defence of 'innocent dissemination' is 
provided by s. 381. This states that the sale by any person of any 
book, pamphlet or issue of a periodical does not constitute publication 
of it 'unless [the seller] knows that [it] contains defamatory matter; 
or, in the case of any [issue] of any periodical, that such periodical 
habitually contains defamatory matter'.^
Protection against 'innocent dissemination' under the Penal Code is
far less clearly provided; but may be inferred from s. 395. This
states that the sale of any printed or engraved substance containing
2
defamatory matter 'knowing that [it] contains such matter' is punish­
able by imprisonment for up to two years, or fine (of unspecified 
amount) or both. Again, the inference is that the sale of such matter 
without such knowledge is not an offence.
The Codes are silent as to the question of onus, but it would seem -
1. s. 381 Criminal Code Cap 42. For full text, see Appendix III.
2. Emphasis supplied.
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from the wording of these provisions - that .knowledge that the publi­
cation in question contains defamatory matter must be proved by the 
prosecution.
The inference is particularly clear in s 381 of the Criminal Code
which provides that the sale of a defamatory book, etc., 'is not a
publication thereof for the purposes of this chapter [i.e. on Defamation]
unless [the seller] knows that :the book [etc.] contains defamatory
matter'.'*’ The wording of s 395 of the Penal Code is marginally more
ambiguous, but it is nevertheless submitted by Gledhill that the onus
2
does indeed lie upon the prosecution. He further submits that whilst
proof of knowledge must often be a matter of inference, it 'is not
enough to show that the accused had reason to believe the substance
3
to be defamatory'. Knowledge cannot be presumed from the mere
fact that a book (for example) which is offered for sale contains
matter that is obviously defamatory, 'for a bookseller cannot read
4
every book in his shop'. However, '[i]f the defamatory nature of the 
book was a matter of common knowledge, [then] knowledge by the accused 
might be presumed'.^
-7.15. The Defence of Apology and Payment into Court
There is no equivalent of this defence in either of the Codes nor 
does such a defence seem appropriate in criminal proceedings, where
1. s. 381,Criminal Code Cap 42, emphasis supplied.
2. See Gledhill, op.cit., p. 716. Although Gledhill does not state so 
ipany words, this is Ibhe only possible inference from his observations.
3. Gledhill, ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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the object is the punishment of the wrongdoer in the interests of 
society.
7.16. Other Defences in Criminal Law
In the Criminal Code, provision is made for further, defences in relation 
to factors which, in civil law, are considered relevant to mitigation 
of damages'*" only. The relevant sub-sections of the Criminal Code are 
as follows:
s. 379(9): This relates to publications made 'on the invitation or
challenge of the person defamed'; 
s. 379(10): This covers publications made 'to answer or refute ...
2
other defamatory matter published by the [complainant] * .
Publications satisfying these criteria are 'conditionally privileged':
provided the three conditions contained in the proviso to s. 379
3
(discussed at p. 644 above ) are met.
The Penal Code contains no equivalent provisions.
7.17. The Importance of Mens Rea
It is not easy to determine the importance of mens rea in the context
4
of criminal defamation . It is, of course, a fundamental principle of
1. See discussion at p. 542.
2. For the full text of these provisions, see Appendix III.
3. These, as previously explained, demand honest belief that the
published matter is true; that the matter published must be relevant 
to the interest giving rise to the privilege; and that the 'manner 
and extent' of publication must go no further than is 'reasonably 
sufficient'.
4. The difficulty is exacerbated by the absence of any 'clear statement 
in any of the modern authorities as to the precise extent to which
mens rea is required in criminal libel'. (Criminal Libel, Law
Commission Working Paper No 84, London, 1982).
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English common law that ’a man's act [can] not amount to a crime
so as to make him liable to punishment unless he was himself conscious
of doing wrong'.^ This principle has become embodied in the maxim:
2
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. It is submitted by. Aguda
that 'the concept of mens rea .... is such a fundamental principle of
law that a Nigerian court would uphold it in the absence of clear words
3
in the relevant statute including it!. However, it is also clear 
that this assumption could not apply in the face of plain provisions 
excluding mens rea as an element of a particular offence.
The extent to which mens rea is an element of criminal defamation 
depends, therefore, in large measure, on the terms of the relevant 
legislation. Both the Criminal and Penal Codes contain a number of 
provisions relevant to mens rea; and the topic is accordingly perhaps 
most easily understood by setting these out and then examining their 
effect.
As regards the Criminal Code, the sections relevant to mens rea - both 
in general and. in the specific context of defamation - are as follows:
(i) s. 24: This establishes the general rule that 'a person is not
criminally responsible for an act or omission, which occurs independently
4
of the exercise of his will, or for an event which occurs by accident1.
1. Aguda, op.cit., p. 482.
2. This is defined by Gledhill, op.cit., p. 4, as meaning: 'no act
entails criminal liability unless done in a criminal state of mind'.
For further detail as to the evolution of the requirement of
mens rea, see Gledhill, ibid., pp. 3-4.
3. Aguda, supra, p. 483.
4. s. 24, Criminal Code Cap 42.
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Underlying motive is generally immaterial,^ as is the result intended
by the accused (except where 'the intention to cause-a particular
2
result is expressly declared to bean element of the offence' ) ;
(ii) s. 374(2).: This defines the publication of defamatory matter
3
(in a form other than spoken words or audible sounds) as 'the exhibit­
ing it in public, or causing [it] to be read or seen ... with intent
that it may be read or seen by the person defamed or by any other 
4
person ;
(iii) s. 375: This provides that 'any person who publishes any defama­
tory matter is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment 
for.one year; and any person who publishes any defamatory matter
5
knowing it to be false is liable to imprisonment for two years';
(iv) s. 376: This section is concerned with blackmail, and renders 
it a felony (punishable by seven years' imprisonment) to publish, 
threaten to publish or offer to obstain from publishing any defamatory 
matter 'with intent to extort money or other property ... or benefit 
of any kind'. ^
(v) s. 380(2): .This .provides that '[t]he criminal responsibility of 
the proprietor, editor, or publisher, of any periodical [as defined 
in subsection (1)] for the publication of any defamatory matter
1. Ibid.,
2. s. 24, Criminal Code, supra.
3. The publication of defamatory matter in such form is governed by
s 374(1), which omits any reference to intention as contained in
s 374(2).
4. s.374(2), emphasis supplied.
5. s 375, emphasis supplied.
contained therein, may be rebutted by proof that such publication took 
place without his knowledge and without negligence on his part'.^
(vi) s 381: This establishes the defence of 'innocent distribution1
as discussed at p. 657 above and provides, in essence, that the distri­
butor is not liable unless he knows that the publication in question
2
contains defamatory matter.
(vii) s. 377: This establishes the defence of justification, discussed
above, which requires proof that the defamatory matter is not only
3
true but was also published 'for the public benefit'.
(viii) s 379: This provides for the defence of 'conditional privilege'
in a number of circumstances, as previously discussed under the
4 5
headings of"fair comment" and "qualified privilege". Certain sub­
sections are expressly made subject to the requirement that the
£
publisher must 'honestly believe the matter published to be true' 
or that the publication must be made 'without ill-will to thte person
7
defamed in the honest belief, on reasonable grounds, that it is true' ;
1. s 380(2). In terms of 380(1), 'the tern "periodical" includes
any newspaper, review, magazine, or other writing or print, published
periodically.' This provision has been further discussed at p. 656A.
2. See s 381, and the discussion above at p.657.
3. See the discussion at p.623 above.
4. See p. 632.above.
5. See p. 644 above.
$
6. These are subsections (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11), previously 
discussed at p 644 - 645 above.
7. This relates to subsection (12), previously discussed at 
p. 649 above.
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and it has previously been submitted that, even where such requirement 
is not expressly provided, the defence of 'conditional privilege1 is 
nevertheless lost on proof that the publication was actuated by express 
malice.^
In the light of these provisions, the attempt to determine the extent
to which mens rea is an element of the offence of defamation is by no
means easy. Whether matter is defamatory or not is an objective
2
question, as previously discussed, and it is accordingly irrelevant
whether or not the accused intended the material to lower the reputation
of the complainant, if this, in fact, has been the result. On the
other hand, as reflected in (ii) above, the publication of certain
kinds of defamatory matter does require mens rea in the limited form
of intent that it should be read or seen by the person defamed or
others. Further, it appears, from (iii) above, that knowledge by the
accused of the falsity of the defamatory material may lead to increased
3
punishment; and the significance of this is discussed further below..
However, it also seems that where the defamatory matter consists of
4
'spoken words or audible sounds', the publisher may be convicted and 
sentenced to one year's imprisonment (under s 375) even though he may 
not have realised that the material was (objectively) defamatory 
(in terms of the definition in s 375) and even though he may have 
uttered the particular words (for example) without intent that they
1. See p. 633 above.
2. See p.614Aabove.
3. See p.665 below.
4. See p. 661, n 3 above; and p 664, n 1 below.
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be heard by the person defamed or any other.^ To this extent, it
seems therefore that mens rea is not required: unless, perhaps, the
need for it can be inferred from the general terms of s. 24 (described
at (i) above) or from the fundamental principle that mens rea is an
2
essential element of criminal responsibility. The correct interpre­
tation is thus not readily apparent; and it is accordingly interesting
to note that a number of English authorities regard defamation as
3
based upon strict liability.
In other respects, it is clear, however, that mens rea is a: crucial
factor in determining liability. Thus, as regards (iv) above, the
crime of extorsion clearly requires mens rea on the part of the 
4
accused. In addition, from (v) above, it appears that the innocent 
publisher and the innocent distributor of defamatory material are 
not to be held liable, thus indicating that mens rea is an element of 
criminal responsibility in these instances. Further, it appears that 
the accused's state of mind is also relevant (in a negative sense) 
in the context of (vii) and (viii) above, as it seems clear that the 
accused will not be able to rely on the defences of either justifi­
cation or conditional privilege (in all its aspects) if he has acted 
in bad faith.
1. See s 374(1), which defines the publication of defamatory matter 
in the case of spoken words or audible sounds as, simply,
'the speaking of such words or the making of such sounds in 
the hearing of the person defamed or any other person'.
2. See the statement by Aguda at p. 660, supra.
3. See, in particular, R v Wicks, 11936] 1 All E R 384, discussed 
at p. 616 above and further below.
4. See p. 661.
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It remains to consider the meaning of s 375 of the Criminal Code -
and the significance of its provision that 'any person who publishes
any defamatory matter knowing it to be false is liable to imprisonment
for two years' . ^  On whom does the onus of proving such knowledge
lie? And how is the burden of proof to be discharged? Both questions
2
were canvassed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Wicks which 
accordingly provides an important - if disturbing - precedent in this 
regard.
As for the onus of proving knowledge, the Court of Criminal Appeal
clearly affirmed (in relation to the substantially similar s 4 of the
3
Libel Act of 1843) that this lies upon the prosecution. Thus, the 
court declared:
There is no doubt that, under such a 
count,^ it is for the prosecution to 
satisfy the jury that the defendant had 
such knowledge, ctnd.that the burden of 
proving that he had not such knowledge 
never lies upon the defendant1. 5
1. s 375 Criminal Code, Cap 42, emphasis supplied.
2. [1936] 1 All E.R. 384. The facts underlying the prosecution of
Wicks for criminal defamation make fascinating (if disturbing) 
reading and are described in full by J.R. Spencer, 'Criminal Libel 
in Action - the Snuffing of Mr. Wicks', (1979) 38 C.L.J. pp.60-78, 
especially at pp. 60-63. It seems fair to conclude that something 
of a vendetta had developed between Mr Wicks and the Sun Life 
Assurance Company of Canada (which believed that \Wicks was partly 
responsible for spreading ... rumours' concerning the company's 
financial stability) and that this underlay the prosecution of 
Wick£ instituted by the company's solicitor.
3. S. 4 of the Libel Act, 1 43, (6 & 7 Viet. c. 96) provides:,
'If any person shall maliciously publish any defamatory libel, 
knowing the same to be false, every such person, being convicted 
thereof, shall be liable to be imprisoned ... for any term not 
exceeding two years...'.
4. The court was here referring to the count preferred against Wicks 
under s 4 above. He was also charged with 'publishing a defamatory 
libel ... contrary to section 5 of [the Libel Act 1843], where 
knowledge of the falsity is irrelevant'. See Spencei; supra, p. 65.
5. R v Wicks, supra, at 387.
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This affirmation of a fundamental principle of criminal liability - 
that the burden of proving all elements of an alleged crime lies on 
the state - is to be welcomed. However, when it came to the question 
of determining whether the prosecution had discharged this onus, the 
judgment of the court proceeds on a basis which is disturbing favour­
able to the state and commensurately inimical to the accused.
The court further declared:
'In the present case, we see no reason for 
holding that the prosecution did not fully 
discharge the burden which rested upon them. 
The falsity of the libel is to be presumed, 
and, in the absence of a plea of justifica­
tion, could not be questioned. The best 
and often the only way of proving that a 
statement was known to be false by the person 
who made it is to prove that he had the 
means of such knowledge. A jury is then 
entitled to draw what may be, in some circum­
stances, the irresistible inference that he 
had knowledge in fact'.^
This passage has been severely criticised by Spencer, who points out
that 1[t]here is a difference between knowing something to be false,
3
and believing it to be so'; and that, whilst 'a person [may] believe 
something to be false which happens to be true, ... he cannot know
4
it to be false unless it is so'. Accordingly, in Spencer's view/
'in order to prove that a defendant knew a 
libel to be false, the prosecution have in 
principle to show two things: (i) that he 
believed it to be false, arid (ii) that it
1. Ibid., at 387-388.
2.’ Op.cit.
3. Spencey, supra, p. 73.
4. Ibid.
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was so' .
However, the court in R v Wicks did not require the prosecution to lead 
evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt the falsity of the allegation. 
On the contrary, the court was prepared to accept that the necessary 
proof was supplied by the presumption that a defamatory allegation is 
false. The effect of this is most disturbing. In Spencer's graphic 
phrase,
'Presuming the libel to be false in this 
context is handing the prosecutor on a 
plate one of the essential elements of 
the offence, relieving him of all necessity 
to prove it for himself. The presumption 
[thus] turns "knowing" it to be false 
into "believing it to be false", although 
the Libel Act clearly says the former, ? 
and the latter is more severe to a defendant1.
Furthermore, the presumption of falsity also rendered it unnecessary 
(in the view of the court) for the prosecution to lead evidence that 
the accused believed th’e defamatory allegation false (assuming of course, 
that such 'belief' - rather than 'knowledge' - is sufficient to ground 
liability). Thus, the court's reasoning proceeded as follows:
The accused had published defamatory allegations regarding the 
complaint. These defamatory allegations (on the basis of the presumption 
above)' were false. The accused had acknowledged that he had known the 
complainant for a number of years, and any person who had known the 
complainant for such time would have known whether the allegations 
were true or not1. Ergo, the accused must have believed the allegations 
to be false: and no further evidence was required in this regard.
1. Ibid.
2. It should be noted that the Nigerian Criminal Code, in s 375, also 
refers to 'knowing'.
3> Spencer, supra.
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Thus, as Spencer points out, 1[b]y invoking the presumption of falsity 
here as well, the court relieved the prosecutor of the need to furnish 
even secondary evidence of belief'.^
The overall effect of the court's approach may, accordingly, be summarised 
as follows:
"Whilst stressing that the prosecution have 
the burden of proving knowledge of falsity 
in a charge under section 4, the court in 
fact forced the defendant to disprove it by 
turning the presumption that a libel i^ s 
false into a presumption that the defendant 
knows it to be so'. 2
The possibility that s 375 of the Nigerian Criminal Code may be inter­
preted in the same way is disturbing. This approach clearly cuts 
across accepted principles of criminal liability and places far too 
heavy a burden upon the accused. It is accordingly to be hoped that 
Nigerian courts, in construing this section, will eschew the principles 
enunciated by the Court of Criminal Appeal in this case and will 
instead require the prosecution to prove all elements of the offence - 
including the fact that the accused (by virtue of the proved falsity
of the defamatory allegation) must have known it to be untrue at the
3
time of publication.
Even if this approach is adopted, however, this will not be sufficient 
to eliminate all difficulties. In terms of s 375, the accused may 
still - in the absence of proof of his knowledge of falsity -
1. Spencer, supra, p. 74.
2. Ibid.
3. It is accordingly disturbing to note the view of the West African 
Court of Appeal in R v Mba, [1937] 3 W.A.C.A. 190 that knowledge of 
falsity may be inferred from gross exaggeration. Thus, the court 
stated that 'an exaggeration may be so gross as to amount to a false 
statement'. This may be so: but it does not necessarily prove that 
the accused knew it to be false. He may well believe his exaggerated
version of events - even though others would not so do. Knowledge 
of falsity must be more clearly shown.
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be sentenced to a maximum of one year's imprisonment. It follows
that the offence of criminal defamation - to this extent at least -
must be regarded as one of strict liability. It follows that in the 
2
Hulton v Jones type of situation, the publisher of the defamatory 
matter (if prosecuted under the criminal law) could be sentenced to 
imprisonment for up to one year: and would not have any defence on
which to rely, as the statutory defence of ^unintentional defamation1
3 4
previously discussed has no application in the criminal law.
As<;regards the relevance of mens rea under the Penal Code, it should
be noted - in the first instance - that the basic principle of English
5
law that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 'applies to most 
penal sections of the Northern Nigerian ... Cod[e] ... [and] is not 
only important in the interpretation of the section[s] of the Cod[e] which 
define offences but also [underlies] the general and special exceptions 
in the Cod[e]'. The section on Criminal Responsibility in the
7
Code contains a number of provisions reflecting the fundamental 
principle that a guilty mind is vital to liability. Thus, for example,
1. Thus, on a charge of publishing defamatory matter knowing it to
be false, the accused may be convicted simply of publishing defamatory 
matter, if it is notproved that he knew the matter to be false: 
s 179(1) Criminal Procedure Act, and Aguda, op.cit., p. 805.
2. 11910] A.C. 20 (H.L. (E.)).
3. See p. 517 above.
4. See s 15(2) Defamation Law, 1961 (applicable in Lagos State) which
provides that the Defamation Law does not 'affect the law relating
to criminal libel;1. Identical provisions are found in the other
Defamation Laws, applicable in the eastern and western states.
See s 19(2) of the Defamation Law (eastern states) Cap 33 and s 19(2) 
of the Defamation Law (western states) Cap 32.
5. For the meaning of this maxim, see p. 660 above.
6. Gledhill, op.cit., p.4.
7. This is Chapter II, which comprises sections 43 to 58.
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s 48 provides that 'Nothing is an offence which is done by accident 
or misfortune and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the 
course of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful "means and with proper 
care and caution';'*' and sections 50 and 51 exonerate from responsibility
those too young 'to judge the nature and consequence[s] of [particular]
2 3act[s]' and those of unsound mind.
As regards provisions specifically relevant to defamation, the most
important provision appears to be s 391(1) which defines defamation as
the making or publishing (in various ways) of 'any imputation concerning
any person, intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe
4
that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person'. This
would seem clearly to indicate that mens rea is indeed an essential
element of defamation under the Penal Code. Gledhill submits, however,
(in relation to this provision) that 'malice is only relevant when the
accused pleads one of the exceptions of which good faith is an essential 
5
element'. He then goes on to describe the type of evidence required 
to establish the intent referred to in s 391(1) and states: 'Except 
in such cases [i.e., where good faith is an essential element], it is 
sufficient that a reasonable man would regard the imputation as likely 
to affect the reputation of the person against whom it is made in any 
of the ways set out in explanation 4 [i.e. by lowering his intellectual 
or moral character, e t c . T h i s  indicates that the accused's intent____
1. s 48 Penal Code Cap 89.
2. See s 50, ibid.
3. See s 51, ibid.
4. s 391(1), ibid., emphasis supplied.
5. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 694.
6. Ibid.
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to harm the reputation of the individual concerned must be judged 
objectively, using the standard of the reasonable man. If this objective 
test is satisfied, it is immaterial, (in Gledhill's view) whether the 
imputation does in fact cause harm to the complainant.'*' These dicta 
accordingly all go to indicate that no subjective inquiry into the 
accused's state of mind is necessary or appropriate except in cases 
where his defence rests upon his having acted in good faith. On this 
interpretation, therefor^, criminal defamation in northern Nigeria is 
also essentially an offence of 'strict liability' - in the sense that 
the important criterion is the objective likelihood of harm to reputation 
rather than the subjective intent to bring such harm about.
2
Mens rea is also an important factor in relation to all save two of the 
exceptions to liability under the Penal Code, as discussed above. Thus, 
in terms of s 391 (2) (;i), it is not defamatory to make an imputation 
which is true provided publication is for the public good; and, in terms 
of s 391(1)(2)(iv) it is 'not defamation to publish a substantially 
true report of the proceedings of a court of justice'. Hence, in
3
neither of these provisions, is good faith expressly made a requirement: 
but, in all other exceptions provided by the Code, it is essential that 
the accused should have acted 'in good faith' and this must inevitably 
necessitate an inquiry into his state of mind.
Mens rea is also relevant to the related offences of 'printing or
4
engraving matter known to be defamatory' (where liability depends
1. See ibid.
2. These are the exceptions provided by s 391(2)(i) and (iv), as further 
explained in the text below. The other exceptions have, of course, 
been discussed at various points in the text above.
3. It is, however, of course arguable that the accused (in relying 
upon a defence of justification) would have to show his good faith
in order to establish that he made the publication 'for the public good'.
4. s. 394 Penal Code Cap 89, heading.
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on the ahcused 'knowing or having reason to believe that [the particular]
matter is defamatory')'*'; “and selling 'printed or engraved substance
2
containing defamatory matter' ('knowing that such substance ... contains 
3
such matter' ). The accused's knowledge of the defamatory matter is
plainly an essential requirement under either provision: but it is
interesting to note the difference in wording between the two sections.
Thus, the former requirement is clearly satisfied by objective inquiry
into whether the accused 'had reason to believe' the matter in question
to be defamatory. The latter contains no equivalent provision, however,
and provides no guidance as to how the accused's knowledge is to be
shown. The inference from the difference in terminology, may therefore
be that actual subjective knowledge must be established in relation
4
to the latter offence.
Mens rea is also an important element of certain additional offences 
related to some degree to defamation as further described below.
7.18. Offences Related to Defamation Provided by the Penal Code.
The first of these is the offence of 'Injurious Falsehood', defined 
in s. 393(1) as follows:
1. s. 394, ibid.
2. s. 395, ibid., heading.
3. s. 395, ibid.
4. As indicated at p. 658 above, however, it is Gledhill's view that
proof of knowledge may be a matter of inference; ahd th&t '[i]f the 
defamatory nature of. [a] book was a matter of common knowledge, 
knowledge by the accused might be presumed'. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 
716.
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1 Whoever, save as hereinafter excepted, by 
words either spoken or reproduced by mecha­
nical means or intended to be read or by signs 
or by visible representations makes or publishes 
any false statement of fact, intending to harm 
or knowing or having reason to believe that 
such false statement of fact will harm the 
reputation of any person or class of persons 
or of the Government of of any native authority 
in Northern Nigeria or of any local government 
authority in Northern Nigeria shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to two years or with fine or with both.':
1
An exception to liability is provided by subsection (2), which states:
'It is not an offence under this section 
to make or publish in good faith a false 
statement of fact which the accused had 
reasonable grounds for believing to be 
substantially true and proof that he had 
such reasonable grounds shall lie on the 
accused'.
2
The question whether a particular allegation constitutes a statement
of fact or an expression of opinion’'is a matter for the decision of
3 4the court'; but it seems from Sudanese authority, as cited by
5
Gledhill, that little attempt is made in practice to distinguish 
between the two. Thus, in Sudan Govt v Abdulla,^ where the editor 
of a newspaper was charged under this section following his publication 
of an article alleging that 'the Sudan police force was so badly 
paid that its members were forced to take bribes', no distinction 
was drawn between the expression of opinion (that the police force
1. s 393(1), Penal Code, Cap 89 •
2. s 393(2), Penal Code, Cap 89 •
3. s 391(1), ibid., explanation 2.
4. See text below.
5. Gledhill, op.cit., p. 712.
6. 1954 Sudan Court of Criminal Appeal Reports 5.
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were badly paid) and the statement of fact (that they were obliged to 
take bribes). ^
The section casts the burden on the accused of showing that the
2
statement is substantially true; and Gledhill accordingly submits
that 'no partial statement of the facts, withholding a fact which would
3
alter the impression made on the mind of the Irecipient] ? would 
satisfy this criterion.
Mens rea is an important factor in the commission of the offence in
a number of ways. Thus, it may be necessary to show that the false
4
statement was 'intended to be read' in terms of a 393(1) and, in
all cases, it 'is not enough [to show] that the statement is false;
it is also necessary that the accused should intend to harm the repu-
5
tation of a person or class or know or have reason to believe that 
the statement would harm reputation'^ in this way. It seems, however, 
that the test of the latter intent or knowledge is objective, as 
confirmed by the court of criminal appeal in Sudan Govt v
1. See Gledhill, supra.
2. s 393(2), supra.
3. . Gledhill, supra, p. 713.
4. See preceding page for the text of s 393(1).
5. The meaning of 'class' was considered in Sudan Govt v Abdulla, 
supra, where the court of criminal appeal held that 'in construing 
the ... section, the courts should not be bound by the rules 
applicable to defamation; [and that] the police force was not too 
wide a body to be included in "any class of persons"'. See Gledhill 
supra, p. 714, who points out, in addition, that 'in cases under 
the corresponding section of the Indian Code it has been held
that to come within its scope, the class must be numerous, ascertain 
able with reasonable certainly, reasonably distinguishable from 
other classes and have some elements of permanence and stability, 
so that "capitalists", "money-lenders" and "landlords" would 
not form a class but religious denominations would and so would 
"the police" and "army officers".'
6. Gledhill, supra, pp. 713-714.
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Abdullah,^  above. This was also the view taken in another Sudanese
2
decision, Sudan Govt v Mahgoub, involving the publication of a
newspaper article alleging an army conspiracy which (the court held)
1 the accused must have known ... would harm the reputation of army 
3
officers1.
Mens rea is also clearly an essential factor as regards the exception
to liability provided by s 393(2) above, as only publication 'in good
faith' is entitled to protection. In Gledhill's view, this requires
4
'due care and attention' and, in circumstances where there is plainly
some doubt as to the matter, the making of 'a genuine effort to reach
, . 5 the truth'.
The Penal Code also prescribes certain other offences, related - to 
some degree - to defamation, in which mens rea is an important factor. 
Thus, in terms of s 396, it is an offence (in outline) to 'threaten 
another with injury to his person, reputation or property ... with 
intent to cause alarm to that pe r s o n ' a n d ,  under s 399, it is
1. 1954. Sudan Court of Criminal Appeal Reports, 5. In the court's 
view, the test was whether the reputation of the police or 
Government was likely to suffer!. See Gledhill, op.cit., p. 714, 
emphasis supplied.
2. [1957] S.L.j .r . 65. The article alleged that certain army officers 
had been arrested and hinted that one had been physically abused
in order to extract a confession.
3. Gledhill, supra.
4. Ibid., p. 713.
5. Ibid. Thus, in Sudan Govt v Mahgoub, where 'the accused admitted 
that he doubted the truth of the statement when he published it',
he should have made greater efforts in order to satisfy the require­
ment of publication 'in good faith'.
6. s 396 Penal Code, Cap 89.
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prohibited (in essence) '[i]ntentionally [to] insult la person]
with intent to provoke ^ breach of the peace1 . ^  Detailed consideration
2
of these offences lies outside the scope of this study, however.
7.19. The Penalties for Criminal Libel and Related Offences
The penalty for criminal libel prescribed by the Criminal Code
varies according as to whether the publication of the defamatory matter
was made with - or without - knowledge of its falsity. In the latter
instance, where the accused 'publishes defamatory matter knowing it
3
to be false' he is 'liable to imprisonment for two years', Without 
4
proof of knowledge of falsity, the publisher of defamatory matter
is instead liable to imprisonment for one year. The burden of proving
such knowledge lies on the prosecution, as previously discussed,
The judgment of the west African Court of Appeal in R v Mba^ suggests
7
that knowledge of falsity may be inferred from gross exaggeration.
The Penal Code draws no such distinction and simply provides that 
'[w]hoever defames another shall be punished with imprisonment for
g
a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both'.
1. S 399, ibid..,. heading.
2. For further information on these offences, see Gledhill, supra, 
pp. 716-719 and 720-722, respectively.
3. s 375, Criminal Code, Cap 42, See p. 661 above.
4. If it cannot be proved that the accused knew it to be false he may be 
convicted merely of publishing defamatory matter'. See Okonkwo and 
Naish, op.cit., p. 282).
5. See the discussion of R v Wicks [1936] 1 All E.R.384, at p. 666.
6. R v Mba [1937] 3 W.A.C.A. 190.
7. See the discussion of this point at p. 668, n 3.
8. s. 392, Penal Code, Cap 89.
-677-
Bo th Codes prescribe further penalties for related offences. Thus, 
in the Criminal Code, if defamatory matter is published 'with intent 
to extort money or other property! or 'with intent to induce any 
person to give [or] confer ... any property or benefit' to any person, 
this constitutes a felony and the offender is liable to imprisonment 
for seven years!.^
The penalties for offences related to defamation provided by the 
Penal Code are as follows:
ti) for the printing or engraving of matter known to be defamatory,
imprisonment for a maximum period of two years, or fine (of
2
unspecified amount) or both;
(ii) for the sale of printed or engraved substance containing
3
defamatory matter, imprisonment; or fine as above;
(iii) for the publication of an !injurious falsehood', as described 
above,^ imprisonment or fine as above;
(iv) for criminal intimidation,^ imprisonment or fine as above,
unless the threat in question is 'to cause death or grievious
hurt ... or the destruction of any property by fire ... or
an offence punishable with death or imprisonment [of up to] ...
7
seven years or to impute unchastity to a woman', in which case
1. S. 376 , Criminal Code, Cap 42.
2. s. 394 , Penal Code, Cap 89.
3. s. 395 , ibid.
4. See p. 672 et seq.
5. s. 393(1), supra.
6. See p. 675.
7. s. 397(b), supra.
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the penalty may be imprisonment for a maximum of seven years 
or fine (again of unspecified amount) or both;^"
2
(v) for intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace,
3
imprisonment or fine as at (i) above.
4
Under the Defamatory and Offensive .^Publications Act , a penalty of 
a fine of up to £50 (N 100) or imprisonment for up to three months 
or both may be imposed on conviction for the offence of provoking 
any section of the community through the publication of any matter 
likely to lead to such result. Commission of the offence may occur 
in the following ways:
(i) through the publication or display of 'the pictorial representation 
of any person living or dead in a manner likely to provoke any 
section of the community'; or
(ii) through the publication or circulation of newspapers, leaflets, 
posters and periodicals which are 'likely to provoke or/bring into 
disaffection any’section of the community'; or
(iii)through the singing or recording of songs 'the words of which are
5
likely to provoke any section of the community'.
Some protection is conferred on the "innocent disseminator" of such 
materials, provided he can. prove that he made reasonable enquiries 
prior to the sale or other distribution and that these left him
1. Ibid.
2. See p. 676f
3. s. 399, supra.
4. No. 44 of 1966.
5. s 2, ibid.
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1 unaware of the possibility that Ithe material] might be used for the 
purposes mentioned in subsection (1)' and that 'thereafter The] withdrew 
the record from sale or recalled any record lent or hired out by him'.^ 
The reference to the 'purposes mentioned in subsection (1)' is difficult 
to understand in that no express mention of any "purposes" is made 
in the subsection. The main effect of the provision (as discussed at 
p. 620 above) is to widen the ambit of "publication" by providing that:
'1. Sounds where recorded shall, if 
defamatory, be deemed to be published 
if reproduced in any place to the hearing 
of persons other than the persons 
causing it to be reproduced...!.
Presumably, therefore, the "purposes" alluded to in the section on
dissemination, described above, are those of reproducing - in the hearing
of any other person - recorded sounds which are defamatory. The matter
is far from clear, however, and there are, unfortunately, no reported
2
cases which throw light upon the question.
7.20. Proposed Reform of the Law of Criminal Libel in the United Kingdom
Recent prosecutions for criminal libel in the United Kingdom have
3
re-awakened awareness that this offence (prior to 1977 considered
1. s 3, ibid.
2. Nor is any guidance provided by the comment on the Act in the
Nigerian Bar Journal of that year. See (1966) 7 'Annual Law
Review' Nigerian Bar Journal p. 68.
3. This was the year in which a criminal prosecution for'libel was
instituted by Mr (later Sir) James Goldsmith against Private Eye
in the case of Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd. [1977] Q.B. 83. Since 
then, 'various others [have been prompted] to litigate libel in 
the criminal courts': Spencer, op.cit., p. 60. Thus, it can no longer 
be said - as stated by Duncan & Neill, op.cit., p. 151,- that it is 
only 'in theory' that the publication of a libel is a criminal 
offence as well as an actionable wrong.
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something of a dead-letter) is still very much part of the law. In 
Spencer's succinct phrase, 'lawyers have now woken up to the fact 
that any writing which would ground a civil action for libel is automa­
tically a criminal libel as well ... [and punishable by] up to two
1
years' imprisonment and an unlimited fine' . Considerable concern 
has been expressed at the harshness of the law in a number of respects 
and various proposals for reform have been put forward. Thus, to 
begin with the decision which so enhanced awareness of the present de­
ficiencies of the law, it is interesting to note that the House of
2
Lords itself in Gleaves v Deakin and others has recommended that 
the law be reformed in two major respects.
First, their Lordships have recommended that the law should be amended
'to require the consent of the Attorney-General ... for the institution
3
of any prosecution for criminal libel' . Viscount Dilhorne pointed 
to the anomaly that leave is required for the institution of criminal
4
proceedings against those responsible for the publication of newspapers
but that - in other instances - the decision to commence prosecution
5
depends upon the 'unrestricted whim' of the complainant. Accordingly,
he believed that the 1 fiat of the Attorney-General [should] be rendered
6 7 8necessary' and both Lord Scarman and Lord Diplock concurred in this
1. Spencer, supra.
2. [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L. (E.)).
3. Ibid., at 499, per Lord Diplock.
4. This, of course, is in terms of s 8, Law of Libel Amendment Act, 
as previously discussed at p. 604.
5. Gleaves v Deakin, supra, at 507, per Viscount Dilhorne.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid, at 509.
8. Ibid, at 499.
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recommendation . In adding his support to the suggestion, Lord Diplock 
further recommended that '[i]n deciding whether to grant his consent 
in the particular case, the Attorney-General Jsh]ould ... consider
whether the prosecution was necessary on any of the grounds specified
1 2 in art 10.2 of the Convention1 and submitted that - if the Attorney­
's
General were not so satisfied - 'he should refuse his consent.
The House of Lords also recommended a further improvement in the law 
to enable the accused to rely on "substantial justification" as a 
defence in appropriate circumstances. The reform of the civil law of
defamation effected in the United Kingdom, by s 5 of the Defamation
4 5
Act 1952 (also introduced in certain parts of Nigeria) has, at present,
no counterpart in the criminal law. 'The position at present is that
<^ st<y\cfc S jo V O v/ c  jtv&_ o p
if an alleged criminal libel contains■several^of them, the jury should
in duty convict (R v Newman), ^  whereas if the allegation complained !>
of is general, in its nature it is sufficient to prove as much of the
7 8
plea of truth as would justify the libel (R v Labouchere )1. This 
situation is highly anomalous. Accordingly, the House recommended that 
the law be changed to enable the accused (as under section 5) to escape 
liability provided he can show that allegations which he cannot prove
1. The terms of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
are reproduced at p. 48 above.
2. Gleaves v Deakin, supra, at 499.
3. Ibid.
4. See the discussion of this reform at p. 488 et seq.
5. i.e. in the southern areas, but. not in the vast North. See discussion
of the Sources of the Law of Civil Defamation.
6. (1853) 1 E. & B. 558.
7. (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 320.
8. Gleaves v Deakin and others, supra, at 507, per Lord Edmund-Davies.
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true do not 'materially injure the [complainant's] reputation having
1
regard to the truth of the remaining allegations ' .
In addition, Lord Diplock drew attention to the discrepancy between
the law of criminal libel and the obligations relating to freedom of
expression which the United Kingdom has assumed under article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, as further discussed in due 
2
course .
3
Since the decision in Gleaves v Deakin and others , the need for re­
form of the common law has been canvassed in some depth by the Law
4Commission m  the United Kingdom . The Commission has concluded that
there are 'features of the existing [common law] offence which are ...
5
undesirable as a matter of principle' and that the present common 
law crime should accordingly be replaced by a new statutory offence 
which would seek 'to penalise the worst sort of case, namely, the 
"character assassin" - the person who makes or publishes a deliberately 
defamatory statement about another, which is untrue and which he knows 
or believes to be untrue'^. In keeping with this objective, the Com­
mission has further recommended that only a statement which is 'untrue,
1. Ibid., citing s 5 of the Defamation Act, 1952.
2. See p. 690, et seq.
3. [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L. (E.)).
4. Criminal Libel, Law Commission Working Paper No 84, London, 1982.
5. Ibid, p 203.
6. Ibid. The Commission gave serious consideration to the possibility
of abolishing any criminal sanction altogether and leaving it to 
the party aggrieved to seek a remedy in the civil courts: but ulti­
mately concluded that conduct of the kind described above should 
remain subject to punishment under the criminal law. (It has 
further recommended, however, that the maximum penalty should
be two years' imprisonment,or fine, or both. See ibid, p 205).
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1
defamatory, and likely to cause the victim significant harm' should
be the subject of criminal prosecution; that mens rea should be made a
crucial element in liability, so that the prosecution would have to
show that the defendant 'intended to defame and must have known or
2
believed the statement to be untrue' ; that a defence of absolute 
privilege should apply as in the civil law of defamation; and that 
no prosecution should be instituted save at the instance of the Direc­
tor of Public Prosecutions, who 'should have sole responsibility for
3
the conduct of proceedings' .
Further analysis of these proposals lies outside the scope of this 
4
study ; and attention must now instead be directed to the various 
deficiencies in Nigerian law - which appear clearly to stand in 
equal need of wide-ranging reform.
7.21. Shortcomings in the Nigerian Criminal Law of Defamation
The defects and lacunae in the Nigerian criminal law of defamation 
have been described at some length in the preceding sections and, at 
this point, it is accordingly proposed to do no more than focus on 
some of the principal shortcomings.
Thus, apart from the ease with which proceedings may be commenced and
5
the absence of a statutory defence of "substantial justification" , the 
defects in the criminal law of defamation include the following:
1. Ibid, p 204.
2. Ibid, p 205. The Commission has acknowledged the difficulty of 
proving such knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant and 
has called for further suggestions in response to its own recommen­
dations in this regard (which are more fully described at paras. 8.20 
- 8.44 of its Paper).
3. Ibid. This, of course, echoes the recommendation of the House of 
Lords as described above.
4. For further details, see ibid., pp 203 - 207.
5. These, of course, are the defects noted by the Lords in Gleaves, supra.
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(i) the objective test applied in determining whether a particular 
publication has a defamatory meaning;^"
(ii) the fact that publication to the person defamed alone may give
rise to liability (at least under the Criminal Code) even though there
2can be no real risk to reputation in such circumstances;
(iii)the rule that the accused may be convicted and sentenced for up
to one year's imprisonment (under the Criminal Code) irrespective
of whether he knew the defamatory matter to be false and thus
3
notwithstanding his lack of mens rea;
(iv) the rule (under the Penal Code) that the accused may likewise be
convicted on the basis of an objective test - viz., whether he
had treason to believe? that the imputation would harm the reputation
4
of the complainant;
(v) the presumption that the defamatory allegation is false and the 
indication (in R v Wicks) that the court is entitled to infer
5
the accused's belief in such falsity from external circumstances;
(vi) the requirement that the accused must plead justification when
the charge is put to him so as to entitle him to lead evidence
6
of the truth of the defamatory allegation at his trial;
(vii)the limitation that truth alone is not sufficient to ground a 
defence but can do so only if the accused can also show that
1. See the discussion at p. 612 et seq.
2. See p. 617.
3. See p. 663.
4. See p. 621.
5. See the discussion at p. 666 et seq.
6. See p. 623.
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1
publication is for the public benefit;
(viii)the absence of any defence of 'unintentional defamation', such
as has been introduced (in certain parts of Nigeria at least)
2
in the civil law .
3
Although these are not the only defects , they are perhaps the most 
disturbing. It is accordingly salutary to note, once again, the 
substantially different approach adopted in the United States of 
America to the criminal law of defamation, which goes an appreciable 
way (especially in the context of defamatory allegations concerning a 
public official) towards redressing certain of these shortcomings.
7.22. The Contrasting Approach of the United States to Criminal 
Defamation
4
In Garrison v Louisiana , the Supreme Court extended the 'express
5
malice' requirement established in New York Times Co v Sullivan to 
criminal defamation of public officials; and laid down further 
important principles which significantly narrow the scope of the 
criminal law of defamation in practice.
The proceedings arose out of allegations (made at a press conference, 
by the accused, a district attorney) that the 'large backlog of pending 
criminal cases [was due] to the inefficiency, laziness and excessive
1. See p. 624.
2. See p. 656.
3. Thus, for example, it may be recalled that there is also no absolute 
privilege for parliamentary statements and reports, as pertains
in the civil law (see p 642); and that defamation of the dead, or 
of a class may constitute a crime., (See p 609 and 611).
4. 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case has, of course, previously been 
discussed in the context of the civil law of defamation.
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vacations, of the judges'. In addition, the accused charged the judges
with 'hampering ... enforcement of the vice laws by refusing to authorise
2
the expenses for the necessary investigations'; and also 'alluded 
to certain 'racketeer influences on our eight vacation-minded judges''.^ 
He was convicted of criminal defamation, but this was reversed on 
appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Court referred to the 'express malice' requirement established in
4
New York Times Co v Sullivan in the context of civil defamation, and 
saw no reason why this requirement should not also apply in criminal 
proceedings. It thus stated:
'The reasons which led us so to hold ... 
apply with no less force merely because 
the remedy is criminal. The constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of expression 
compel application of the same standard 
to the criminal remedy ... And since 
"... erroneous statement is inevitable 
in free debate ..." only those false 
statements made with the high degree of 
awareness of their probable falsity demanded 
by New York Times may be the subject of 
either civil or criminal sanctions. For 
speech concerning public affairs is more 
than self-expression; it is the essence of 
self-government. The First and Fourteenth 
Amendments embody our 'profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public 
officials''.^
Garrison v Louisiana,- supra, at 66* See also B.O. Nwabueze, The 
Presidential Constitution of Nigeria, London, 1982, p 476.
2. Ibid, (13 L ed 2d 125).
3. Supra, at 66.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Garrison v Louisiana, supra, at 74 - 75.
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However, since ‘the known lie ..• is ... at odds with the premises of 
democratic government', the 'knowingly false statement and the false state­
ment made with reckless disregard of the truth'^ are not similarly protected.
The Court also affirmed certain other vital principles. Thus, it
declared that truth - in itself - is a complete defence; irrespective
2
of whether publication was 'for the public benefit'. '[T]he interest
in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest,
secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth concerning
3
public officials and their official conduct' - irrespective of whether
the publication is motivated by ill-will or desire to injure. Thus,
'under Garrison..., criminal libel statutes of several states have been
4
held unconstitutional because they diluted the defence of truth'
by requiring, in essence, that 'the publication of a true statement
5
should also be for good motives and for justifiable ends'.
Furthermore, the Court has also declared that - even if a false state-
6
ment is shown to have been published with the requisite express malice 
'criminal punishment is still not constitutionally justified unless 
the publication is calculated or has an imminent tendency to cause a 
breach of the peace, in the sense not merely of provoking the individual 
defamed to violent retaliation, but of provoking public disorder, which
1. Ibid., at 76.
2. Contrast the provisions of the Criminal and Penal Codes regarding 
the defence of justification, discussed at p. 622, etseq.
3. Nwabueze, supra, p. 476.
4. Nelson and Teeter, op.cit., p. 307.
5. Nwabueze, supra, p. 476.
6. As explained above, with knowledge of its falsity, or being reckless 
as to whether it is false or not.
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may happen only in the case of a popular political figure with [a] large 
following among the population1.^"
The Court affirmed that the 'clear and present danger1 test applies to 
criminal libel as well; and that suppression of publication is not 
justified unless this test is met.
The effect of this decision - in which the court has made it clear
that 'libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limi-
2 3
tations' - has been to inflict 'a death-blow' on criminal defamation.
The practical significance of this is clearly revealed by the fact
that '31, or about one fifth of the 148 criminal libel cases reported
in the half-century after World War I, grew out of charges made against 
14
officials. There prosecutions were particularly disturbing because
it seemed to many commentators that they were simply 'seditious libel
actions in disguise: government's punishment of those who dare[d]
5
to criticize its personnel.' The change . heralded by Garrison v 
Louisiana is accordingly particularly to be welcomed.
7.23. The Constitutionality of the Criminal Law of Defamation in 
Nigeria.
It remains to consider the constitutionality of the criminal law of 
defamation in Nigeria, in the light of the guarantee of freedom of expression
1. Nwabueze, op.cit., p. 477.
2. This dictum is derived from New York Times Co v Sullivan, supra, 
at 269 but - it is submitted - seems equally appropriate in the 
context of criminal defamation as well.
3. Nwabueze, supra.
4. J.D. Stevens, et al., "Criminal Libel as Seditious Libel, 1916 - 65",
(1966) 43 Journalism Quarterly, 110, cited by Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p306.
5. Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., pp. 312 - 313.
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.contained in s .36 of the' 1979 Constitution. This, in essence,
guarantees the freedom, ’to impart information and ideas without
interference’, subject - however - to derogations authorised by
laws that are ’reasonable justifiable in a democratic society’ to
2
protect certain interests. The permitted derogation relevant
3
to defamation is, as previously discussed, contained in section 
41(1)(b) which upholds the validity of ’any law that is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society ... for the purpose of protecting 
the rights and freedoms of other persons’ - including, clearly, 
the right to untarnished reputation.
Prima facie, therefore, the criminal law of defamation falls within 
the scope of the permitted derogations and it is legitimate for the 
law to impose criminal penalties on the makers and publishers of 
defamatory allegations in order to protect the right of others to 
reputation. However, whether the balance struck between the 
competing interests in issue (freedom of expression as opposed to 
protection for reputation) is correct - or, in the wording of the 
Constitution - is ’reasonably justifiable in a democratic society1 
is open to considerable question. The law, at present, is heavily 
weighted in favour of the state and against the accused - in a 
manner which in general would seem to cut across accepted principles 
of criminal liability. The criticisms of the criminal law of 
defamation listed above provide clear evidence of this imbalance
1. The full text of this provision is reproduced at p. 201.
2. See the discussion of the guarantee of freedom of expression in 
1979 Constitution at p. 199 et_ seq.
3. See p. 587.
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in the prosecution's favour: and it is submitted that these aspects
of the law take it beyond the bounds of what is 'reasonably justifiable
in a democratic society'. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
Lord Diplock, in the case of G1 eaves v Deakin and others,'*' was clearly
of the view that the law of criminal libel in England is inconsistent
with the obligation to uphold freedom of expression assumed by the
United Kingdom under the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.
This has significance for Nigeria as well, as the guarantee of freedom
2
of expression in the Convention (contained in Article 10) forms the
3
foundation for Nigeria's own guarantee and is substantially similar
in wording. There is of course one major difference between the two
provisions: in that Article 10 authorises derogations through laws
which are 'reasonably necessary in a democratic society (to protect
certain interests), while the Nigerian guarantee uses the formula
'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'. The latter may
appear wider and more flexible than the European formulation: but it
is submitted that both should be interpreted in the same way and that
all derogations from the guaranteed freedom should be subject to strict
scrutiny so as to ascertain whether they do, in fact, correspond to
4
a 'pressing social need'. If this approach is not adopted, the 
danger is clear that the permitted exceptions may deprive the sub­
stantive right of most of its force and practical effect.
1. [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L.(E))v
2. The terms of Article 10 are reproduced at p. 48 - 49.
3. See the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights at p. 199.
4. This was the interpretation of the word 'necessary' adopted by the 
European Court of Justice in the Handyside case, and reaffirmed
in the 'Sunday Times' case, further discussed at p. 784 below.
The court thus ruled that derogation from freedom of expression 
could only be justified to the extent that the restriction in 
question could be shown (by the state) to correspond to a 'pressing 
social need'.
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In summary, therefore, it is contended that the Nigerian guarantee of 
freedom of expression should be interpreted in the same way as the 
European Convention guarantee: and that Lord Diplock1s comments on the 
inconsistency of the law of criminal libel with the United Kingdom's 
Convention obligations are equally applicable in the Nigerian context.
What, then, did Lord Diplock say? He began by pointing out that 'under
art 10.2,of the European Convention, the exercise of the right of
freedom of expression may be subjected to restrictions or penalties
by a contracting state only to the extent that those restrictions
or penalties are necessary for the protection of ... the reputation of
individuals ... [and] the public interest'.'*' Against this background,
Lord Diplock stressed certain unsatisfactory aspects of the criminal
law of defamation: the rule that 'the truth of the defamatory statement
2
is not in itself a defence'; the fact that '[n]o onus lies on the
prosecution to show that the defamatory matter was of a kind that is
necessary in a democratic society to suppress or penalise in order
3
to protect the public interest'; the anomaly that 'even though no
public interest can be shown to be injuriously affected by imparting
to others accurate information about seriously discreditable conduct
of an individual, the publisher of the information must be convicted
unless he himself can prove to the satisfaction of a jury that the
4
publication of it was for the public benefit'.
1. Gleaves v Deakin, supra, at 498.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., at 499.
4. Ibid.
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Lord Diplock observed that these factors combined 'to turn art 10 
of the Convention on its head';^ and he concluded by emphasising the 
inconsistency between the law of criminal libel and the Convention 
guarantee in the following stark terms:
'Under our criminal law a person's freedom 
of expression, wherever it involves exposing 
seriously discreditable conduct of others, is 
to be repressed by public authority unless 
he can convice a jury ex post facto that the 
particular exercise of the freedom was for 
thh public benefit, whereas art 10 requires 
that freedom of expression shall be untram­
melled by public authority except where its 
interference to repress a particular exercise, 
of the freedom is necessary for the protection 
of the public interest'. ^
The criminal law of defamation in Nigeria, as presently constituted, is 
equally inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of expression contained 
in s 36 of the Constitution and goes far beyond what is 'reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society' to protect the right of others to 
reputation. Accordingly, it is submitted that the law must be reformed 
to bring it into line with the constitutional guarantee and to eliminate 
the shortcomings previously identified. Thus - to name but a few of the 
more obvious examples - the truth of the defamatory matter (irrespective 
of the public interest in its publication) should be made a complete 
defence; the falsity of defamatory allegations should no longer be 
presumed and the test of what is defamatory should be made dependent on 
the accused's subjective intent; it should be made clear that criminal 
proceedings may only be instituted where this is required in the 
public interest and that in all other instances, the parties must rest
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
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content with civil remedies; and last - but by no means least - an 
equivalent of the Garrison v Louisiana rule should be introduced to 
prevent prosecutions for criminal defamation being used to stifle 
criticism of public officials and to ensure that proceedings (in such 
circumstances) are made subject to a threshold requirement of proof 
- by the official concerned - of "express malice" on the part^df the 
publisher.
If these (and other necessary')' changes are introduced, the criminal 
law of defamation will still be available in appropriate circumstances 
to provide protection to reputation - but the law will then strike a.i 
more appropriate balance between the competing interests involved and 
will no longer go further than is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society' to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
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C H A P T E R  E I G H T
CONTEMPT OF COURT; GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
8.1. The Significance of the Law of Contempt for Media Freedom
The law governing contempt of court is extremely wide-ranging and covers 
a myriad of different situations. Its principal significance for the 
media lies in the fact that publications of three kinds (those which 
infringe the 'sub judice' rule, 'scandalise' the court or misreport 
court proceedings) may be found to constitute contempt of court; whilst, 
in addition, a journalist's refusal - in the course of court proceed­
ings - to disclose his sources of information is prima facie a contempt.
The wide impact of the law ofcontempt on media freedom is exacerbated 
by the fact that the law applicable in Nigeria is mainly the common 
law of England. Its rules, accordingly, are of ancient origin; and 
have evolved in piece-meal fashion over time. The result is that the 
law not only appears out-dated in many respects, but also abounds 
with anomalies. In addition, the common law tests for liability are 
onerous and the defences few; and the law thus weighs extremely 
heavily against an alleged contemnor. To make matters yet worse, 
liability is determined through a summary procedure which - in many 
instances - leaves little room for the application of fundamental 
principles of natural justice. The result - as regards the media - is 
not only to impose far-reaching restrictions on publication, but also 
to generate a strong impetus to self-censorship, in order to avoid 
potential liability.
>
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In England itself - the source of the Nigerian law of contempt - the need 
for reform of the law has recently been brought into dramatic focus by a 
number of important cases, including the recent judgment of the European 
Court cf in the Sunday Times ' thalidomide 1 case: in which the
Court found that the rule against 'sub judice1 publication, as interpreted
by the House of Lords, placed the United Kingdom in breach of her obliga-
1 2 
tions under Article 10 of the European convention on Human Rights of 1950.
This ruling prompted the enactment of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which 
goes some way towards meeting the various problems presented by the law, 
but leaves many others untouched. In Nigeria, however, no attempt what­
ever at reform has yet been made: and the media accordingly remain subject 
to rules which are highly satisfactory in a number of respects and which 
go disturbingly far in restricting freedom of expression.
8.2. The General Purpose and Ambit of the Law of Contempt.
The law of contempt has been recognised in English common law since the 
3
twelfth century * Its purpose, in a nutshell, is to uphold the fair 
and effective administration of justice: and, since this can be under­
mined in a myriad of ways, the rules of contempt are commensurately 
diverse - so much so that 'contempt of court [has been described] as 
"the Proteus of the legal world, assuming an almost infinite diversity
1. Article 10 contains a guarantee of freedom of expression in terms 
substantially similar to those found in the Nigerian Bill of Rights 
which (as previously described at p. 199 above) is largely modelled 
on the European Convention.
2. This case is examined further below, in the section on the 'sub judice' 
rule.
3. Fox, The History of Contempt of Court, 1927, p. 1. (cited by
G.J. Borrie and N.V. Lowe, The Law of Contempt, London, 1973,p.3).
1
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of f orms"1 . ^  Many of these appear to have no bearing on freedom of
2
expression - though the recent case^of Home Office v Harman , described
3
m  further detail in due course graphically demonstrates the extent to 
which contempt rules prima facie irrelevant to the media (here the 
implied undertaking of a solicitor to the court not to use documents 
obtained on discovery except for the purpose of the particular proceed­
ings in relation to which discovery has been ordered) may in fact 
impinge on freedom of the press (for the effect of the House of Lords' 
decision is to compel journalists in future to rely only on official
3
transcripts of court proceedings which may be slow and costly to obtain ). 
Whilst thus recognising that there is no clear boundary demarcating 
the extent to which the law of contempt affects freedom of expression, 
it is nevertheless proposed to concentrate only on those aspects of the 
law with patent significance for the media.
Before identifying these however, it seems advisable to place them in 
context by providing a brief overview of the types of interference with 
the proper administration of justice which the law of contempt is 
designed to curtail.
First, it is clear that interrupting or insulting a judge in the course
of proceedings interferes with the proper hearing of a case. Accordingly,
conduct of this nature is counted as contempt (commonly termed contempt
4
in facie curiae or direct contempt) and is subject to criminal
1. Moskowitz, 'Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal' (1943) 43
Col. L.R. 780 (cited by C.J. Miller, Contempt of Court, London, 1976,p.1).
2. Home Office v Harman [1982] W.L.R. 338 (H.L.(E)).
3. A full discussion of this case is to be found at p. 1192 below.
4. This terminology is more widely used in American rather than English
law. See Miller, op.cit., p.2.
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sanctions.  ^ In addition, further direct interference in proceedings,
through attempting to influence judicial officers, jurors, witnesses
or parties; or by refusing to be sworn as a witness or to reply to
questions relating to relevant evidence, may likewise militate against
the proper and fair administration of justice, and therefore constitutes 
2
contempt. Outside the ambit of the court itself, the publication
(particularly by the mass media) of information relating to proceedings
pending or in progress may prejudice the right of the accused (in
criminal proceedings) or of the parties (in civil litigation) to have
the matter determined in the light of legal principle and on the
basis of evidence limited to that which is properly adducable in court 
3
proceedings. Accordingly, publication of this nature is also counted 
as contempt (sometimes termed constructive or indirect^) and is likewise 
subject to punishment under the criminal law. In a more general context 
(not necessarily linked to any particular proceedings) comments imputing 
bias, interest or prejudice on the part of judges may undermine public 
confidence in their ability to act as impartial adjudicators and 
diminish public willingness to submit disputes to court for hearing. 
Accordingly, conduct of this nature is also prohibited as contempt 
under the general rubric of "scandalising" the court. Further, any 
refusal or failure to comply with an order of court must inevitably 
erode both respect for the courts and confidence in their ability to act as
1. The penalties in question are described at p. 741.
2. The last-mentioned category is of particular significance to the
media- for it means that a journalist who refuses to divulge the 
sources of his information when called as a witness in proceedings 
before a court, tribunal of inquiry or legislative investigatory 
committee, may be held guilty of contempt.
3. This is limited by the rules of evidence, which exclude - to name
but one example - the admission of hearsay testimony.
4. See Miller, supra.
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fina,}. arbiters in disputes; and conduct of this nature is therefore
also counted as contempt - subject, interestingly enough - to 
1 2
punishment under civil rather than criminal law. Finally, any 
interference with the officers of the court - such as registrars, 
solicitors or process servers - in the proper discharge of their 
functions; or any breach by such officers of their duties to the 
court, may constitute contempt.
The different branches of the law of contempt are comprehensively
3
described in Halsbury's Laws of England and are also described
4
(in varying degrees of detail) in a number of other English texts. 
For the purposes of this study, however, attention is henceforth 
confined to those aspects of contempt with special significance for 
the media:
(i) the publication of information relating to matters 
sub judice;
(ii) publications scandalising the court;
(iii)reports of court proceedings (in public and private);
(iv) contempt through refusal - in the course of proceedings - to 
disclose sources of information.
1. The appropriate penalties are described in further detail at p.741.
2. This is all the more anomalous in that the appropriate penalty, in 
many instances, is committal to prison and the aim of the proceed­
ings is not only to secure redress to the party in whose favour
the order in issue has been made but also to punish the recalcitrant 
contemnor and thus to deter others from following his example.
3. Vol. 9, 4th ed,, London, 1976.
4. See, for example, Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., Miller, op.cit, and
Anthory Arlidge and David Eady, The Law of Contempt, London, 1982.
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Before embarking, however, on a detailed analysis of the rules 
relating to each, it is first necessary to identify the sources 
of the Nigerian law of contempt and to draw attention to the close 
connection between Nigerian law and English common law in this 
regard.
8.3. The Sources of the Nigerian Law of Contempt
The law of contempt in Nigeria is derived, in the first instance,
from the body of English common law received into the country by
virtue of the general reception process previously described.^ Rules
relating to contempt are also to be found in the Criminal and Penal
2
Codes - applicable in southern and northern Nigeria respectively - 
but (contrary to the general principle that the Codes contain
complete and exclusive statements of the law within the spheres they
3 4cover ) it is expressly provided that Nigerian courts retain the
common law power to punish summarily for contempt of court -
notwithstanding the provisions in the Codes. The practical result
is that the relevant sections of the Codes are rarely, if ever,
invoked; and 'in all the reported cases of contempt of court in
Nigeria ... there is no single instance where an individual or the
press has been formally charged with the offence of contempt of
5
court as defined in [these provisions] .
1. See p. 129 et: seq.
2 . See p. 142.
3. See p. 142 et_ seq.
4. The relevant sections are further described at p.702.
5. A Adaramaja, 'Contempt of Court', in T.O. Elias, (ed.) Nigerian
Press Law, London and Lagos, 1969, pp. 46 - 57, p. 48. This is
not entirely true, as there are a limited number of cases on
the contempt provisions of the Criminal Code, as further explained 
in due course, but the general observation nevertheless holds 
good.that the common law is of far greater importance than the 
Nigerian legislation.
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For the sake of completeness, the terms of the contempt provisions in 
the Criminal and Penal Codes should nevertheless be noted. As regards 
the Criminal Code, s 133 (in nine separate sub-sections) defines dif­
ferent aspects of contempt and provides that any person^ guilty of 
such conduct is liable to imprisonment for three months. The sub­
sections relevant to the media provide as follows:
'Any person who - ...
(4) while a judicial proceeding is pending 
makes use of any speech or writing mis­
representing such proceeding, or capable 
of prejudicing any person in favour of
or against any party to such proceeding, or 
calculated to lower the authority of any 
person before whom such proceeding is 
being had or taken; or ...
(5) publishes a report of the evidence taken 
in any judicial proceeding which has been 
directed to be held in private; or ...
(9) commits any other act of intentional 
disrespect to any judicial proceeding or to 
any person before whom such proceeding is being 
had or taken, is guilty of a simple offence 
and liable to imprisonment for three months1. 2
In the northern states, the Penal Code creates a general offence of 
contempt, cast in the following broad terms:
'Whoever intentionally offers any insult or causes 
any interruption to any public servant while such 
public servant is sitting in any stage of a 
judicial proceeding shall be punished with imprison­
ment for a term which may extend to six months 
or with fine which may extend to £20 or with 
both'. 3
1. This includes individuals, corporations or other entities recognised 
as such by the law. See Adaramaja, ibid., p. 47.
2. s 133, Criminal Code, Cap 42.
3. s. 155, Penal Code, Cap 89. The fine provided for is equivalent to 
N 40.
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In addition, s 182 renders it an offence punishable by imprisonment 
for up to two years or by fine (of unspecified amount) or both, to do 
any act either 'with intent to influence the course of justice in any 
civil or criminal proceedings, [or] ... whereby the fair hearing, trial 
or decision of any matter in that proceedings may be prejudiced.
Furthermore, refusal to answer a question in the course of proceedings 
is an offence under s 142, which states that:
'Whoever, being legally bound to answer questions 
put to him on any subject by any public servant 
in the exercise of the lawful powers of such 
public servant, refuses to answer any such 
question, shall be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to six months or with 
fine which may extend to twenty pounds 2 
or with both'. 3
Finally, s 416 of the Penal Code (previously discussed in relation to
sedition^) is also relevant to contempt in that it renders it an offence
(punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years or fine of unspecified
amount or both) to 'excite or attempt to excite feelings of disaffection .
5
against the administration of justice in Nigeria or any [state] thereof'.
However, notwithstanding these provisions in the Codes, it is the common 
law of contempt which is applied in practice in Nigeria, as indicated
1. Alan Gledhill, The Penal Codes of Northern Nigeria and the Sudan, 
London, 1963, p. 291, in discussing this provision, emphasises that - 
under its latter part - liability is strict; and that the courts will 
punish a person who publishes a report prejudicial to pending proceed­
ings , 'even when the nature of the publication is unknown to him or 
when he does not know that proceedings are pending'.
2. This is the equivalent of forty naira.
3. Thus, as Gledhill, op.cit., pp. 325-326 points out, a contempt of
this kind is punishable under this provision, rather than s 155, above
4. See p. 400 and pp 427 et seq.
5. s 416, Penal Code (Northern Region) Federal Provisions Act, Act no.
25 of 1960.
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above.^ This is by virtue of the substantially similar s 6 in both
2
Criminal and Penal Code Acts, which states that:
'Nothing in this Act or in the code shall 
affect the authority of courts of record 
to punish a person summarily for the offence 
commonly known as contempt of court; but so 
that a person cannot be so punished and also 
punished under the provision of the code for 
the same act or omission'. 3
The difference between proceedings for contempt under s 133 of the Criminal
4
Code and under the summary powers preserved by s 6 was briefly examined
by the West African Court of Appeal in Nunku v Inspector-General of 
5
Police. It emphasised that there are 'two ways in which a person guilty
of contempt of court can be dealt with'^ and described these as follows:
'The first way ... is for the Court to 
punish the offender in a summary manner 
without issuing a summons or trying the offender 
in a formal manner, and the second is to hold 
a formal trial as in ordinary criminal cases....
'Section 133 of the Criminal Code [requires]
[a] prosecution ... in due form of law; [and] 
the accused person after appearing in Court 
must be arraigned with consequent trial result­
ing in a verdict. Herein lies the difference 
between a prosecution for contempt of court 
and a summary way of dealing with the same 
offence by the court'. 7
1. See p. 699.
2. Strictly, the northern Nigerian provision is contained in the Penal
Code Law, to which the Penal Code forms the Schedule. Accordingly,
further reference in s 6 as reproduced in the text below to 'Act' 
should be read as meaning 'Law' in the context of the Penal Code.
3. s 6, Criminal Code.Act, Cap 42, The equivalent provision in the 
Penal Code Law, Cap 89 is virtually identical in wording.
4. There is some doubt as to the continuing validity-of s 6 following the
adoption of the 1979 Constitution, as further explained below.
5. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 23, reproduced by Chief Gani Fawehinmi, The Law
of Contempt in Nigeria (Case Book) Surulere, Lagos State, 1980, pp 193-195.
The facts of the case are described at p. 706, in brief outline.
6. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 193.
7. See ibid.
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Following the adoption of the 1979 Constitution, doubts have been 
expressed, however, as to the continuing validity of s.6. This issue is 
examined below; but - before leaving the subject of the sources of the 
Nigerian law of contempt - it should be noted that contempt (as pre- 
viously explained ) is punishable under both criminal and civil law.
As far as civil proceedings for contempt are concerned, the relevant 
Nigerian law is derived entirely from English common law. Thus, contempt 
in the form (for example) of refusal to obey an order of court is 
governed entirely - and unquestionably - by the common law. Cases of 
contempt of this nature are legion in Nigeria, but lie outside the 
scope of this study since the law has only peripheral significance 
for freedom of the media. It is interesting to note, however, that the
view has recently been expressed in Nigeria, echoing a dictum of Lord
2
Salmon, that 'the classification of contempt of court into criminal 
and civil has now become unimportant and unhelpful and almost meaning­
less ' . ^
8.4. The Continuing Application of the Common Law
In R v Onweugbuna and another , in proceedings arising from the publi­
cation in a newspaper of a letter allegedly scandalous of the court, 
as further explained below,^ it was contended on behalf of the defendants
1. See pj698 above.
2. This was in Jennisson v Baker [1972] 1 All E.R. 997. at 1002.
3. Babalola v Federal Electoral Commission and anor, Suit No AK/M4/77, 
reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 143 - 154, per, Aguda, C.J.
See, however, the various points of difference between civil 
and criminal contempt described by Miller, op.cit., pp. 7-19;
and note the doubts which he expresses (at pp. 16-19) as to the
utility of abolishing the distinction.
4. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 243-248.
5. The facts and judgment in the case are further discussed at p. 922. 
below in the section on Scandalising the Court.
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that '[t]he Court had no jurisdiction to punish contempts in a summary 
manner ... because ... section 133 of the Criminal Code provide[d] the 
sole method by which contempts of court [might] be punished in Nigeria'. 
This argument was swiftly rejected on the basis of the clear wording 
of s 6: but it is a moot question whether this analysis holds good 
following the enactment of the 1979 Constitution.
The power of summary punishment sanctioned by s 6 is, of course, a 
power to punish in terms of the unwritten common law of contempt. As 
such, it cuts, prima facie, against the principle ultimately acknow­
ledged as cardinal in Nigerian criminal law (and which was enshrined 
in s 22(10) of the Republican Constitution?.) that 'No person shall be
convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the
3
penalty therefore is prescribed in a written law'. Under the 1963
Constitution and its predecessor, however, this general principle was
made subject to express exception as regards the unwritten law relating
to contempt of court. Under the 1979 Constitution, by contrast, this
saving for contempt is omitted from the equivalent provision of the
4
Constitution - and this leads Okonkwo and Naish to the conclusion that
the unwritten law of contempt is now void for inconsistency with the
5
Constitution in its new form. In marked contrast, however, Aguda 
believes that it continues to operate; and his reasoning, with respect,
1. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 244.
2. The Constitution of the Federation, Act no. 20 of 1963.
3. For further details surrounding the controversy as to the ambit of
written and customary criminal law, and its ultimate resolution as
above, see C.O. Okonkwo (ed.)-. Okonkwo and Naish on-Criminal Law in Nigeria 
2nd ed.,# London, 1980, pp. 4-10.
4. Ibid.
5. T. Akinola Aguda, The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Southern 
States of Nigeria, 3rd ed., London, 1982, para. 1341.
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is persuasive. He points out that s. 33 (12) - the equivalent to 
s. 22(10) above - is expressly made 'subject' to other provisions of 
the Constitution. These provisions include s. 6(6)(a) which states: 
'The judicial powers vested in [the courts] .. - shall extend, not­
withstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all
1
inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law"'. As Aguda points
out these, 'inherent powers and sanctions' include 'the jurisdiction
to deal summarily with contempts both in the face of the court and
2
contempts out of the court'. There is thus considerable force in his 
contention; and it is accordingly submitted that Aguda's view is 
correct - and that the summary power in relation to contempt continues 
to form part of Nigerian law. It is clear, however, that the common 
law jurisdiction is enjoyed only by courts of record: and this raises 
the question whether magistrates' courts are courts of record for this 
purpose.
8.5. Summary Contempt Powers of Magistrates' Courts.
There is some doubt as to whether magistrates' courts constitute courts
of record so as to enjoy any summary powers of punishment for contempt
3
at all. In Onitiri v Ojomo, the plaintiff in proceedings before a 
magistrate's court had applied for transfer of the hearing to another
1. See ibid., emphasis supplied.
2. Op.cit., para. 1342. Whilst the summary power to punish in the face 
of the court is clear (at least as regards superior courts, magis­
trates' courts being further considered below), the Nigerian courts 
have recently indicated that there are limits to the circumstances
in which summary jurisdiction can be exercised in relation to contempt 
which is not in the face of the court. The latter type of contempt 
is, of course, of particular significance to the media; and this 
apparent limitation is further discussed in due course.
3. (1954) 21 N.L.R. 19.
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court. The magistrate considered this a contempt and ordered that he
1
be kept in custody pending trial before another magistrate for the 
offence. The plaintiff's subsequent claim for damages for false imprison­
ment was dismissed. Of note, however, was the statement of Cormarmond,-.
S.P.J. to the following effect:
1"This is not a case where the magistrate 
assumed the jurisdiction of punishing a 
criminal contempt by the summary process 
of attachment or committal. Such 
jurisdiction can be exercised by the 
Supreme Court only'.
2
Adaramaja accordingly concludes that 'it has not yet been directly
decided in any court of authority in Nigeria whether a magistrate's
court is a court of record for the purpose of being able to punish for 
3
contempt'. It is difficult to reconcile this view, however, with the 
clear affirmation by the West African Court of Appeal (in proceedings 
emanating from Nigeria) that a magistrate's court is indeed a court of
record and has power (within certain limits) to punish for contempt.
4
The case in question here is Nunku v Inspector-General of Police,
where the appellant had been summarily committed to prison for five
5
days - by a magistrate's court - for contempt in the face of the
1. This is interesting in that it shows that the magistrate was 
(apparently) conscious of the need to respect fundamental principles 
of justice, including the nemo judex in sua causa rule. However, if 
magistrates' courts are indeed courts of record, as submitted below, 
then it seems that he could have exercised summary jurisdiction (without 
any need to refer the matter to another court) as the conduct in 
question fell clearly within the category of contempt in the face
of the court.
2. Onitiri v Ojomo, supra, as cited and with emphasis supplied by 
Adaramaja, op.cit., p. 53. Adaramaja also points out that 'Supreme 
Court' meant, in 1954, the old Supreme Court which is now the High Court.
3. Adaramaja, ibid.
4. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 23.
5. The court in question was a Grade III court, but it is not suggested 
that the grade of court is significant in this regard. The important 
division is that into superior and inferior courts, and all magistrates' 
courts clearly belong to the latter category, irrespective of their grade.
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the court. He appealed, inter alia, on the ground that the magistrate 
had no power to commit for contempt in this way. His appeal was dis­
missed by the Supreme Court of the Jos Judicial Division; and he appealed 
further to the West African Court of Appeal. Jibowu, Ag C.J. (deliver­
ing the judgment of the Court) declared:
'The Magistrate concerned has jurisdiction 
in criminal matters and could impose fines 
up to £25 or imprisonment up to three 
months. His Court is a Court of Record 
and has, like other Courts of Record, an 
inherent power to fine and imprison people 
guilty of contempt of Court up to the 
limit of its jurisdiction1.
3
The court further emphasised, as previously explained, that there
are two ways in which contempt proceedings may be conducted. It
4
also indicated that the summary procedure applies only to contempt 
in the face of the court: but, since the case in issue involved contempt 
of such a nature, was satisfied that '[i]t was ... not . necessary for 
the Magistrate ... to have gone through the usual procedure for a 
prosecution for contempt of Court1
In the light of this clear declaration of principle (which, it should be
6
noted, was handed down subsequent to the Onitiri case ), it appears 
firmly established that magistrates' (and, by implication, other inferior) 
courts are indeed courts of record, with power to punish summarily
1. For further discussion of the facts of the case, see p. 743 below.
2. Nunku v Inspector-General of Etolice (1955) W.A.C.A. 23; reproduced
by Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 193.
3. See p. 702 above.
4. It seems however that this is implicit rather than express in the 
statement of Jibowu, Ag C.J. that the first way applies 'when the
contempt is in the face of the court'. The learned judge did not thus
specify in so many words that the first procedure may be used only 
in such circumstances.
5. Supra, at 194.
6. Onitiri v Ojomo, (1954) 21 N.L.R. 19, described above. The Nunku 
decision was given in 1955.
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for contempt - provided that the contempt is committed in facie 
curiae. The only argument (leaving aside objections founded on the 
constitutional guarantee of fair trial, discussed below) which can 
be raised against this conclusion is that the entire concept of 
'courts of record1 (with summary powers to punish for contempt) 
is rooted in the common law; and that the summary power is enjoyed 
by dourts of record in England only because they, too, are creatures
of the common law. In Nigeria, however, 'no court ... is a common law
court ... and the powers [of all] [are] strictly limited to such as 
are given to them by the Constitution or the Statutes creating them....' \ 
In this regard, it is note-worthy that 'there is nothing in the Consti­
tution or in any statute declaring the magistrates' courts and various
2
[other inferior courts to be] courts of record. Adaramaja accordingly 
submits that the West African Court of Appeal erred in its judgment: 
which, in his view, is not supported 'by any legal or statutory authority'.
Cogent though this contention may be in principle, the balance of
present authority is undoubtedly, however, to the opposite effect.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that Aguda has no hesitation in
confirming that inferior courts do have power to punish summarily for
contempt: this jurisdiction being confined, however, to contempt
4
committed in the face of the court. Superior courts of record, which
include the Supreme Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Federal and State
5
High Courts and the Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal, enjoy - by
1. Aguda, Principles of Criminal Liability in Nigerian Law, p . 14
(cited by Adaramaja, op.cit., p. 50).
2. Adaramaja, ibid., p. 51.
3. Ibid.
4. Aguda, The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Southern States of
Nigeria, supra, para. 1342.
5. See the section on the Nigerian courts at p. 146 et seq.
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contrast - summary power to punish for contempt committed both in 
and ex facie curiae.  ^ As regards the latter type of contempt, however, 
some limitations on the exercise of the summary jurisdiction have 
recently been emphasised by the Nigerian courts, as further explained 
in due course . ^
8.6. The Reasons for Reliance on the Summary Jurisdiction
Two rjiajor advantages of the summary power of punishment for contempt 
no doubt account for the reliance placed in practice on this jurisdiction 
to the virtual exclusion of the provisions of the Codes. First, the 
punishment that can be imposed for contempt under s 133 of the Crimi­
nal Code, for example, is limited to three months' imprisonment and 
this may not seem sufficient penalty for a particularly deleterious
contempt. By contrast, 'there is no limit to the punishment that can 
3
be inflicted' under the summary procedure. Secondly, proceedings
under the Codes can be instituted only through the usual formal channels
and this must inevitably be more time-consuming and more expensive
than the summary procedure under common law (according to which - in
many instances - 'no charge is formally laid and no witnesses are
4
called to prove the offence' ). Whilst the option of proceeding under 
the Codes remains theoretically open, the practical result (as confirmed
1. i.e., in and out of the face of the court.
2. See p . 713, et seq.
3. Adaramaja, op.cit., p. 48.
4. Ibid.
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by the record of past proceeding^ ) is that the common law power is 
far more important.
It needs no emphasis that - from the viewpoint of the defendant in 
contempt proceedings - the summary jurisdiction entails distinct dis­
advantages for both these reasons. There is also some doubt as to
whether the summary procedure accords with principles of natural
2 3
justice or with the constitutional guarantee of fair trial. It is
accordingly somewhat disturbing to note that even the origin of the
summary power (in relation, at least, to contempt ex facie curiae )^
is surrounded by considerable controversy, and seems clearly to have
sprung from a judicial error.
8.7. The Origin of the Summary Procedure for Contempt Ex Facie Curiae.
The origin of the summary procedure in instances of 'constructive1
5
contempt may be traced to the case of Almon, where the defendant was
6
alleged to have published a pamphlet scandalising the Lord Chief 
justice by accusing him of having acted 'officiously, arbitrarily,
1. See p . 699.
2. These are the principles summed up in the maxims memo judex in sua
causa, and audi alteram partem, both of which may be infringed by
the summary process in which the aggrieved judicial officer may 
himself convict and sentence the accused instanter.
3. This issue is further discussed below, at p. 732 et seq.
4. The summary power in relation to this type of contempt is, of course,
of most concern to the media, as (apart from a journalist's refusal 
to disclose his sources when called as a witness), the media are 
mainly guilty of contempt through publication - which, of course, 
takes place beyond the confines of the court.
5. (1765) Wilm. 243; 97 E.R. 94.
6. The offence of scandalising the court is described in Chapter Ten.
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and illegally'. It was contended on his behalf that contempt of
this nature could not be dealt with summarily and that he was entitled
to trial by jury. Wilmot, J. prepared a judgment which was never in 
2
fact delivered, but which was subsequently published by his son in 
1802. In it, Wilmot, J. declared:
'"The power, which the courts in Westminster 
Hall have of vindicating their own authority, 
is coeval with their first foundation and 
institution; it is a necessary incident to ^
every court of justice, whether of record or not, 
to fine and imprison for contempt to the 
court, acted in the face of it.... And the 
issuing of attachments by the Supreme Courts 
of Justice in Westminster Hall, for contempts 
out of court, stands upon the same immemorial 
usage as supports the whole fabrick of the 
common law; it is as much the 'lex terrae1,
... as the issuing (sic) any other legal 
process whatsoever.
I have examined very carefully to see 
if I could find out any vestiges or traces 
of its introduction, but can find none. It 
is as ancient as any other part of the common 
law; there is no priority or posteriority to 
be discovered about it, and it therefore can­
not be said to invade the common law, but to 
act in an alliance and friendly conjunction 
with every other provision which the wisdom 
of our ancestors has established for the 
general good of society"'.
4
This undelivered judgment and its underlying assumptions have been
5
subjected to rigorous scrutiny and it now appears clear that 'Wilmot, J.
1. Almon's case, supra.
2. It was discovered that the rule nisi to attach Almon had been wrongly
entitled 'The King v Wilkes' and the case had to be abandoned. See
Miller, op.cit., p. 21.
3. If this statement is correct;, it follows that the argument referred
to above (that magistrates' courts are not courts of record, and so
cannot enjoy summary powers of punishment in relation to contempt in 
facie curiae) is misconceived. It seems, however, that 'it is now
generally accepted that it is only courts of record which have power 
at common law to proceed summarily' See Miller, op.cit., p. 25, 
emphasis supplied.
4. Almon * s case, supra,at 254 and 99 respectively(cited by Borrie & Lowe, 
op.cit., p. 255).
5. See Sir John Fox, The History of Contempt of Court, 1927, supra.
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was wrong in saying that constructive contempts had always been tried 
1
summarily1. However, his judgment has given rise to a practice which
has been repeatedly followed in all cases of constructive contempt (not
2 x
only those involving the scandalising of the ;court J and which is accord-
3
ingly 'too firmly established to be overruled judicially1. Moreover, 
the practice seems effectively to have ousted the alternative of pro­
ceeding by way of indictment: which was last invoked (in England) in
4 5
1902 and accordingly 'now seems to have fallen into desuetude'.
Although the summary jurisdiction is now thus a firmly fixed feature of 
the common law, there remains something intrinsically offensive in the 
notion of contempt ex facie curiae being made subject to summary punish­
ment at the instance of the very judicial officer thereby aggrieved.
Perhaps for this reason - in addition to the issues raised by the cons-
6
titutional guarantee of fair trial, as further discussed below - the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria has recently indicated that there are limits 
to the circumstances in which summary jurisdiction may be exercised 
in relation to constructive contempts. These important restrictions 
accordingly merit some examination.
1. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 256. For a more detailed analysis of the 
criticisms levelled at the judgment by Sir John Fox, see Miller, 
op.cit., pp. 21-22.
2. This, of course, was the form of contempt specifically in issue in 
the Almon case.
3. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 256.
4. This was in R v Tibbits and Windust, [1902] 1 K.B. 77.
5. Borrie & Lowe, ibid., who point out, however, at n 6, that this 
must be read subject to the comment of Pearson, L.J. in Re Attorney- 
General's application, Attorney-General v Butterworth, [1963], 1 Q.B. 
696, 728.
6. See p. 719 et seq.
-713-
8.8. Limitations on the Exercise of Summary Jurisdiction Over 
Constructive Contempt.
In a decision of far-reaching significance, the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria has recently indicated that there are certain limitations on 
the exercise of summary jurisdiction in relation to constructive
1
contempts. In the case of Boyo v Attorney-General of Mid West State,
determined by the Supreme Court in December 1969, the appellant had
been summarily charged with contempt by Mr Justice Atake of the High
Court of Mid-Western State on the grounds that he had 'tried by writing
a letter to the Accountant-General of the Mid-West State to obstruct
the payment out of money which the same judge had ordered to be so 
2
paid out'. The^appellant was arraigned before the court and a pre­
liminary objection was taken on his behalf that the matter should not
3
be heard by Atake, J., himself since a 'real likelihood of bias' 
existed in the circumstances. This objection was dismissed by the trial
judge who confirmed that 'his court was the proper forum to try the
4 5
[appellant]' , according to the authority of R v Gray. An adjournment
6
to prepare a defence was accordingly requested and agreed; and 
advantage was taken of this to appeal against the judge's ruling 
that his court was the appropriate forum for dealing with the matter.
1. [1971] 1 All N.L.R. 342 reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 159-167.
2. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 155.
3. Ibid., p. 156.
4. Ibid.
5. [1900] 2 Q.B. 36.
6. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 162.
-714-
The first important point to note is the respondents' concession that 
the contempt had indeed been committed ex facie curiae. The proceed­
ings therefore raised in crisp form the important question of whether 
such constructive contempt may be indeed by punished under the summary 
procedure - and by the very party aggrieved by the alleged wrong.
The Supreme Court began its examination of this issue by pointing out
that in the case of contempt in facie curiae, 'the contempt cannot be
dealt with efficiently except immediately and by the very judicial
1
officer in whose presence the offence was committed'. This conclusion
by no means followed, however, in instances of contempt not in the face
of the court. The Supreme Court was prepared to acknowledge that there
might be 'cases [of constructive contempt] where the offence should
2
be dealt with summarily', but emphasised that 'the case should be one
in which the facts surrounding the alleged contempt are so notorious
3
as to be virtually incontestible'.
The Court thus drew a clear distinction between contempt in and ex 
facie curiae, and strongly indicated that - in the context of the latter 
type of contempt - the summary jurisdiction should only be applied where 
the facts are 'virtually incontestible'. The Court made;ino attempt 
to define further the circumstances in which the facts may be said to 
be thus 'incontestible'; but did attempt to provide some criterion for 
distinguishing contempt in facie curiae (to which the summary juris­
diction undoubtedly applies) from constructive contempt. It
1. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 166.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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thus declared:
'Where the judge would have to rely on 
evidence of testimony of witnesses to 
events occuring outside his view and - > 
outside of his presence in court, it 
cannot be said that the contempt is in 
the face of the court'.
1-
The Court went on to stress the need for hearing - in all circumstances - 
to be conducted in accordance with cardinal principles of fair process; 
and this important aspect of the judgement is examined further in due 
course. For present purposes, the crucial point is that the Supreme 
Court seems to have placed a clear limitation - in relation to construc­
tive contempt - on the circumstances in which the summary jurisdiction
may be invoked at all. This conclusion is further supported by Oku
2 3
v The State, in which the court stated that, 'in most [such] cases,
the proper procedure of apprehension or arrest, charge, prosecution,
4
etc., must be followed'.
8.9. Procedure for Instituting Summary Contempt Proceedings.
Accepting thus that there are limitations to the circumstances in which 
the summary procedure may be invoked at all, it remains to consider the 
manner in which summary proceedings for contempt may be instituted.
1. Ibid., p. 166.
2. [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 60, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 202-207.
3. i.e. cases of contempt ex facie curiae.
4. Supra , p. 207.
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At common law, it is clear that all courts (superior and inferior)
have the capacity to act ex mero motu in relation to contempt committed
in the face of the court. In addition, superior courts may act of
1
their own motion 'in all cases of criminal contempt' including -
therefore - contempt ex facie curiae. In the past, in England itself,
'[t]he predominant role [in instituting proceedings] has, however,
2
been played by the Law Officers of the Crown'; and the important
role of such officers has recently been accorded statutory recognition
in the new Contempt of Court Act 1981 in the United Kingdom. Thus,
s 7 of the Act providesProceedings for a contempt of court under the
3
strict liability rule ... shall not be instituted except by or with 
the consent of the Attorney-General or on the motion of a court having 
jurisdiction to deal with it'.
In Nigeria, however, no such statutory change has been made: and the 
common law rule remains in full force. Even legislative reform of the 
kind reflected in the United Kingdom enactment would not, however, 
solve all difficulties; as the principal problem lies in the capacity 
of the court to deal with contempt of its own motion - and this the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 does not attempt to modify.
Apart from instances in which a court proceeds ex mero motu, it is also
5
clear, at common law, that 'no one body has a monopoly' as regards the
1. Miller, op.cit., p. 40.
2. Ibid.
3. The 'strict liability' rule is further explained, in the context of 
sub judice branch of the law of contempt.
4. The case of Re Onagoruwa, Suit No FCA/E/117/79, further discussed at 
p. 764 below, graphically illustrates the unfortunate consequences 
which may arise from the capacity of a judge to proceed ex mero motu 
to punish a contempt ex facie curiae.
5. Miller, supra.
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institution of proceedings. Thus, 'leave to apply for a committal order
may, for example, be sought by the party to the proceedings allegedly 
1
prejudiced, or by a witness allegedly subjected to pressure to change 
2
her testimony. Alternatively, it seems that it may equally be brought
by an ordinary member of the public with no especial interest in the
3 4
matter 1.
Detailed consideration of the procedure to be followed by such persons in
initiating the summary process;;lies outside the scope of this study. It
should, however, be noted that (with the exception' >of two local rules
applicable in this c o n t e x t ) t h e  relevant procedure in Nigeria is
7
governed by Order 52 of the English Supreme Court Practice 1982 .
'g
The reason, as explained by Aguda, is that 'the practice in the High 
Court of Justice in England is to be followed in [Nigeria] in the absence
1. See for example, R v Duffy, ex parte Nash, [I960].. 2,Q..Bi 188.
2. Re B. (J.A.) (An infant) [1965] Ch. 1112.
3. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No 2) [1968]
2 Q.B. 150.
4. Miller, op.cit., p. 40.
5. For a clear and succinct summary of the relevant rules (applicable 
also in Nigeria, as explained below) see Miller, op.cit., pp. 29-35, 
especially at pp. 30-33; and for more detailed treatment of these 
provisions, see Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., pp. 258-267.
6. These are order 53, rr. 18 & 19 L, reproduced by Aguda, Practice and 
Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts of
Nigeria, London, 1980, pp. 643 and 644 respectively.
7. Jacob, ed., The Supreme Court Practice 1982. London, 1981. Amendments 
pursuant to the introduction of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and
the Supreme Court Act 1981 are noted in the Fourth Cumulative 
Supplement but are of little importance to Nigeria as the procedural 
(as opposed to the substantive) rules have been little changed. The 
major changes introduced by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 are dis­
cussed below, in so far as these are relevant to the various forms 
of contempt of especial significance to the media.
8. Aguda, supra.
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of provisions in [local] laws governing practice and procedure....
The practice to be followed ... except in the Eastern States is the
practice "for the time being" applicable in England, that is the practice
applicable at the point of time concerned. In the Eastern States, it
is the practice applicable in England as at September 30, 1960,that is 
1
to be followed1 (but, in the context of committal for contempt, separate
consideration of these is not necessary as the basic principles remain the 
2same ).
The most important of the rules provided under Order 52 is R.S.C. Ord. 52,
3
r 1(2) which (subject to certain exceptions ) confers 'a wide ranging
and ... exclusive jurisdiction to make committal orders on Divisional
4
Courts of the Queen's Bench Division'. The procedure governing such
applications is governed by Ord. 52, rule 2 and 3. In essence, the
applicant must obtain the leave of the court, and in doing so, must
state the grounds on which committal is sought and support this by an
affidavit verifying the facts relied on. 'If leave to apply is granted,
the application will be by motion, notice of which must generally be
5
served personally on the person whom it is sought to commit'. In 
Nigeria, 'the application under this Rule is usually filed in the 
Registry, and the Chief Judge either takes it himself or assigns 
another Judge to take it.... If leave is refused by the Judge, the only 
avenue open to the applicant is to seek leave to appeal within 14 days 
of the order of refusal. On changed circumstances, however, he may be
1. Ibid., p. 644.
2. See Aguda, ibid.
3. Special rules govern contempt of a court presided over by a single 
judge of the High Court (vizvr. 1(3)); and contempt of the Court of 
Appeal, where the application may be made to that court, as confirmed 
in Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn (No 2) [1968]
2 Q.B. 150 (cited by Miller, op.cit., p. 33 n 15 )3he Nigerian equivalent
(Continued)
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pennitted to make another application which may be heard, by the same .
1
or another Judge1.
8.10 The Principles Applicable to the Exercise of the Summary Power
The principles to be applied in exercising the summary jurisdiction have
been canvassed on a number of occasions by the Nigerian courts. It has
thus been emphasised, with particular force, that the jurisdiction is
one sui generis, 'involving an exceptional interference with the liberty 
2
of the subject' and that the power must accordingly be exercised as
3
sparingly as possible. Accordingly, in Agbachom v The State, the
Supreme Court set aside the conviction for contempt of a litigant who
had applied for a transfer of proceedings to another court (on the ground
4
that the trial judge had a financial interest in the suit). In allowing 
his appeal, the Supreme Court emphasised that the allegation was ambiguous 
and did not explicitly impugn the impartiality of the judge concerned.
It further stressed that the judiciary should not display an 'undue
Continued:
of the Court of Appeal is, of course, the Federal Court of Appeal.
4. Miller, op.cit., p. 30. The Nigerian equivalents are, of course, the
State High Courts, and the Federal High Court and Sharia and 
Customary Courts of Appeal.
5. Ibid., p. 32.
1. Aguda, op.cit., p. 645. There is accordingly some divergence in this
regard between Nigerian practice and\the English Supreme Court Rules. 
For further clarification, see Aguda, ibid. The English rules he 
quotes are derived from the Supreme Court Practice of 1979 but have 
not been changed in the 1982,edition.
2. Oswald on Contempt, p. 17, cited in Deduwa and others v The State [1975]
1 Part 1, All N.L.R. 1, further discussed below.
3. [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 65-72.
4. The allegation in question was that the trial judge had received
the sum of £488-15 being the balance of 700 guineas 'legal debt'
out of 'trust fund'.
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degree of sensitiveness',* nor (by invoking their summary powers) 'give
a wholly underserved advertisement to what had far better have been
2
treated as unworthy of either answer or even notice'; that the
contempt jurisdiction should be sparingly used, as 'its usefulness
3
depends on the wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised' and
that '[i]t is not every act of discourtesy to the court ... that amounts 
4
to contempt'.
5
Likewise, in Deduwa and others v The State, (in which the Supreme
Court again set aside a conviction for contempt, on the ground (further
described below^) that the appellants should never have been put into
the witness box and subjected to inquisition by the judge) , the Court
also stressed the need for judges to exercise their contempt powers
7
sparingly and to conduct themselves 'without undue sensitiveness'.
It further commended that all courts in Nigeria should follow the
8 9principles enunciated in Oswald on Contempt, (reproduced in full below
which stress the need for the utmost care in exercising the contempt
1. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 70.
2. Ibid., p. 71.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. [1975] 1 All N.L.R. 1, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 170-179
6. See p. 725.
7. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 179.
8. See ibid., p. 178. The work cited is G.R. Robertson (ed.), Oswald
on Contempt Committal and Attachment, 3rd. ed., London, 1910, and
the relevant passage is to be found at pp. 17-18.
9. See p. 728.
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jurisdiction .
1Furtherv in Aniweta v The State, .although the Federal Court of Appeal upheld
the conviction for contempt of a barrister who had alleged that a judge
had accepted a bribe of N 2000 in return for altering his judgment in
particular proceedings, the appellate court did, however, reduce the
sentence imposed on the contemnor from 200 days' imprisonment to 120
days, on the ground that the courts must exercise the contempt jurisdic-
2
tion as sparingly as commensurate with the gravity of the offence;
and that the punishment imposed by the trial judge was 'severe in the 
3
extreme'.
The Nigerian courts have also stressed the need for compliance with the
principles of natural justice, as embodied in the maxims audi alteram
partem and nemo judex in sua causa. As regards the former, it has
been emphasised that no person should be punished for contempt 'unless
the specific offence charged against him be distinctly stated and an
4
opportunity of answering it be given to him. As regards the nemo judex 
principle, some ambivalence has been displayed in past decisions, but 
the courts now seem to be moving towards acceptance that trial by the 
aggrieved judicial officer himself is incompatible. with this fundamental 
principle. The authorities are somewhat inconsistent however, and 
it should be noted that the Federal Court of Appeal in Aniweta v The 
State~* rejected the defence contention that the judge against whom the
1. Appeal No FCA/e /47/78, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 98-116.
2. See Fawehinmi,ibid., p. 115, citing Re Davies(1888) 21 Q.B.D. 236 
at 238, where Matthew, J. observed that 'The punishment should be 
commensurate with the offence. It may be severe where the contempt 
is grave....'.
3. Ibid.
4. Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 11, citing Aniweta v The State, supra, and 
Awosanya v Board of Customs, [1975] 1 All N.L.R. 106.
5. Supra.
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1
'scurrilous ... abuse1 in issue had been directed was precluded from
trying the alleged contemnor under the summary jurisdiction.
Douglas, J.C.A. stressed that the court 'ha[d] taken some time to
examine the authorities and ... [could] only say that this contention
[i.e. that an aggrieved judge should not deal with the matter as he
would then be a judge in his own cause], [was] not only baseless but
2
[had] not the slightest legal backing'.
Against this dictum must be weighed, however, the emphasis placed by
3
the Western State Court of Appeal in Awobokun v Adeyemi, that '[w]hen a
contempt is not committed in the face of the court, a judge who has been
4
personally attacked should not as far as possible hear the case'.
5
Furthermore, in Agbachom v The State, the Supreme Court took pains
to point out that where contempt proceedings are brought under s 133
6
of the Criminal Code, they must then be tried 'before a different court
Even more significant is the decision of the Supreme Court in Boyo v
8
Attorney-General of Mid-West State, in which the Court set aside
1. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 111. This description is clearly derived 
from the judgment of Lord Russell, C.J. in R,v Gray [1900] 2 Q.B. 36
2. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p . 111.
3. [1968] N.M.L.R. 289.
4. Fawehinmi, supra, p. 11.
5. [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69, reproduced by Fawehinmi, ibid., pp. 65-72.
6. For a description of the provisions of the Criminal Code on contempt 
relevant to the media, see p. 700 above. The relationship between
s 133 and the common law has been described at p. 702 „
7. Agbachom v The State, as reproduced..in Fawehinmi, supra, p. 72.
8. [1971] 1 All N.L.R. 342, reproduced by Fawehinmi, ibid., pp. 159-167
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a conviction for alleged civil contempt, which had been tried summarily
by the very judge whose order was alleged to have been thwarted. In
doing so, the court cited with approval the dictum of Laski, J. in a
Canadian decision to the effect that 'it is preferable [even under the
summary jurisdiction] ..., where conditions do not make it impracticable,
or where there will be no adverse effect upon the pending proceedings
1
by the delay, to have another judge conduct the contempt charge'.
The Court further emphasised that it 'fail[ed] to see how Atake, J.
[the judge in question] would have avoided placing himself in the most
invidious position of being an accuser, a witness, and also a Judge if
2
he was permitted to hear the matter of contempt'. Further, in the light 
of the particular circumstances, it was clear that - even if (in prin-
3
ciple) '[the] matter [was] within the competence of Atake, J. to hear'
this procedure could nevertheless not be permitted in the present
case, as it was apparent from the record of the proceedings that 'the
4
unhappy personal relationship' between the judge and appellant would, 
inevitably, have militated against an impartial adjudication of the 
issue of contempt.
5
Furthermore, in the case of Deduwa and others v The State, the Supreme 
Court also gave implicit support to the nemo judex in sua causa principle 
by emphasising that it could not 'too strongly deprecate the action of
1. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 166. The judgment cited is that in Mckeon v 
Queen (1971) S.C.R. 357 at 477.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 167; and see also p. 164, where the Supreme Court describes 
part of the record, from which the effect of this strained relationship 
is all too apparent, Atake, J. demonstrating his anger and impatience 
with the accused on several occasions.
5. [1975] 1 All N.L.R. 1, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 170-179.
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a High Court judge degrading himself to the position of a prosecutor
in his own court and at the end of it all purporting to find persons
guilty of offences which were not described and nowhere formulated
1
and dealt with as provided by law'.
It is thus apparent that no clear statement of principle precluding an
aggrieved judge from dealing summarily with contempt has yet been
enunciated in Nigeria: but it is also manifestly evident that Nigerian
courts (and the Supreme Court in particular) are deeply concerned at the
prejudice to fair trial which failure to observe the nemo judex rule
may cause; and that this has provided the foundation in one case at 
2
least for setting aside a conviction for contempt.
The Nigerian courts have also stressed yet another important safeguard
of "due process" in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction. This is
principle that an alleged contemnor must not be put into the witness
box and compelled to answer questions regarding his offence, as this
is inconsistent with the guarantee of fair trial enshrined in s 33 of the
4
1979 Constitution. Thus, in Agbachom v The State, one of the main 
reasons given by the Supreme Court for allowing an appeal against convic­
tion for contempt, was that the procedure adopted by the trial judge 
(in putting the appellant into the witness box rather than the dockr*)
1. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 178. It is submitted that the Supreme Court 
was concerned both at this violation of the nemo judex principle and 
at the uncertainty of the unwritten law of contempt.
2. This of course, was in Boyo v Attorney-General of Mid-West State, 
[1971] 1 AJ.1 N.L.R. 342, discussed at p. 722.
3. See s 33 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. The 
general question of the constitutionality of the summary contempt 
jurisdiction is discussed further below.
4. [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69.
5. See Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 71.
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'apart from anything else, ... offended against s 22(9) of the Consti­
tution of the Federation'.*
2
Similarly, in Boyo v Attorney-General of Mid-West State, the Supreme 
Court (again setting aside a conviction for contempt) emphasised that, 
although there might be 'cases [of constructive contempt] where the
3
offence should be dealt with summarily1, in such instances 'the hearing
[should] be conducted in accordance with cardinal principles of fair
, 4process ' t
Both of these passages were cited with approval by the Supreme Court
5
in its subsequent decision in Deduwa and others v The State, in which
the court allowed an appeal against conviction for contempt on the
ground (inter alia) that the appellants should never have been put into
the witness box and subjected to inquisition by the trial judge. This
would clearly seem to indicate the court's belief that the guarantees
of fair trial provided by the Constitution must always be observed: even
where trial is conducted by summary process. If this contention were
taken to its logical conclusion, however, this would spell the virtual
end of the summary process, for the alleged contemnor would then always
be entitled 'to be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
6
of his defence' and to be represented by counsel of his choice. The
1. Ibid., p. 72. This provision of the 1963 Constitution has now been 
replaced by s 33 of the 1979 Constitution, which is in substantially 
similar terms.
2. [1971] 1 All N.L.R. 342, reproduced by Fawehinmi, ibid., pp. 159-167.
3. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 166; and see also p. 714 where this aspect of 
the judgment has previously been discussed.
4. Ibid.
5. [1975] 1 All N.L.R., reproduced by Fawehinmi, supra, pp. 170-179.
6. See s 33(6)(b) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
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Supreme Court in Deduwa1s case seems to have balked at going so far as
this, and took pains to point out that where the summary procedure is
1
applicable (on the basis elucidated in Boyo's case ) then 'the peremptory
provisions of [the constitutional guarantee of fair trial] are 
2
disregarded1. This aspect of the judgment is, however, open to consider­
able criticism, In the first instance, it seems logically inconsistent 
with the Court1s approval of the dictum in Boyo's case that summary
proceedings should be conducted in accordance with cardinal principles 
3
of fair process and with its agreement that the procedure adopted in 
4
Agbachom1s case (in which the accused was put into the witness box
and compelled to answer questions) offended against s 22(9) of the 1963 
5
constitution. Secondly, it seems to ignore the clear wording of s 
s 22(10) -which made it clear that the contempt jurisdiction was exempted 
from the general requirements of fair trial guaranteed by the Constitution 
only to the extent that courts of record remained entitled to 
apply the unwritten common law, contrary to the general rule that 
1[N]o person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence 
is defined and the penalty therefore is prescribed in a written law'.^
1. In Boyo1s case, as previously discussed at p.714above, the Supreme
Court indicated that the 'case [should] be one in which the facts
surrounding the alleged contempt are so notorious as to be virtually
incontestible'.
2. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 177.
3. See p. 725 above.
4. Agbachom v The State, [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69.
5. See p. 725 above. s 22 of the 1963 Constitution is the counterpart
of s 33 of the 1979 Constitution.
6. Thus, s 22(10) which has no counterpart in the 1979 Constitution, 
began by affirming the general principle reflected in the text 
that a criminal offence must be defined in writing and its penalty 
likewise made clear, and then went on to state: 'Provided that 
nothing in this subsection shall prevent a coiiirti of record from
punishing any person for contempt of itself notwithstanding that 
the act or omission constituting the contempt is not defined in a
(Continued)
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In any event, now that the guarantee of fair trial has been modified in
the 1979 Constitution to exclude the proviso for contempt which formed the
1
basis for the Court's view in this regard , it is strongly arguable 
that the safeguards of fair trial enshrined within the 1979 Constitution 
must be observed in all proceedings - including those brought under 
the inherent power to punish for contempt - and that failure to comply
with their guarantees should be recognised as being unconstitutional
(as further explained in due course).
For present purposes, however, suffice it to reiterate that the
Nigerian courts have firmly ruled that an alleged contemnor is not
to be placed in the witness box and compelled to give evidence against
himself: and that failure to observe this principle means that any
2
resultant conviction for contempt must be set aside •
In addition, the Nigerian courts have also emphasised that rules of 
court governing the commencement and conduct of proceedings must be
3
strictly observed; and have emphasised that judges must make it clear 
whether they are proceeding under the mutually exclusive provisions of
Continued
written law and the penalty therefor is not so prescribed'. Thus, 
this proviso for contempt applied only to this particular subsection: 
and did not extend to the other parts of s 22 (which prescribed various 
further safeguards for fair trial)• The Supreme Court, however, seems 
to have inferred that the proviso applied to all subjections of s 22: 
and this cannot be correct.
1. It will be recalled from the discussion of the continuing efficacy
of s. 6 above, that the proviso contained in s 22(10) was not included 
in the equivalent s 33 of the 1979 Constitution.
2. Thus, in Deduwa's case, the Supreme Court was most reluctant to 
exonerate the appellants for their conduct, amounting - in its view - 
to the 'foulest form of contempt':(see Fawehinmi, op cit, p 179) but 
nevertheless considered it imperative to do so. (It also strongly 
rebuked the trial judge 'by whose mistake it ha[d] been possible for 
the appellants to escape the punishment ... commensurate with the 
gravity of their transgressions': see Fawehinmi, ibid.
3. See Aguda, op cit., p 644, citing Kalejaiye v Sulemon, unreported, 
FCA/L/157/77, March 22, 1979.
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1
the common law or of the Criminal Code - failure to do so being grounds
2
to set any conviction for contempt aside.
Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has 'expressed its
3 4
complete agreement1 with the following 'wise words' regarding the exercise
of the contempt jurisdiction; and has 'commend[ed] [them] to all courts'
in Nigeria:
"It should always be borne in mind in considering 
and dealing with contempts of court that it is an 
offence purely sui generis and that its punishment 
involves in most cases an exceptional interference 
with the liberty of the subject and that, by a 
method of process which would in no other case be 
permissible or even tolerated. It is highly nece­
ssary therefore, where the functions of the court have 
to be exercised in a summary manner, that the 
judge in dealing with the alleged offence should not 
proceed otherwise than with great caution and only 
in cases where the administration of justice would 
be hampered by the delay in proceeding in the ordi­
nary courts of law; and that when any antecedent 
process has to be put in motion, every prescribed 
step and rule, however technical, should be carefully 
taken, observed and insisted upon. The jurisdiction 
should be exercised the more carefully in view of 
the fact that the defendant is usually reduced to 
such a state of humility in fear of more stern 
consequences if he shows any recalcitrancy that he 
is either unable or unwilling to defend himself as 
he might otherwise have done". ^
1. The relationship between the common law preserved by s 6 and the
statutory rules of contempt provided by s 133 has previously been
described at p. 702.
2. See Agbachom v The State, [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 29.
3. Deduwa and others v The State, [1975] 1 All N.L.R. 1, reproduced
by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 170-179, at p. 178 in Fawehinmi.
4. Fawehinmi, ibid. The passage cited is derived from Oswald on Contempt, 
op.cit., pp. 17-18. There are slight discrepancies between the 
passage as reproduced by the Supreme Court and the form in which
it appears in Oswald, but these are insignificant.
5. Ibid.
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8.11. Further Support for the Need for Compliance with Principles 
of Natural Justice
Given the importance attributed by the Nigerian courts to the audi 
*
alteram partem principle in the exercise of the summary jurisdiction 
(as described above), it is interesting to note that further support 
for the need for compliance with principles of natural justice has 
recently been provided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in proceedings emanating from Trinidad and Tobago. The decision in 
question has considerable significance for Nigerian law for two reasons. 
First, it stresses the obligation - at common law - to comply with 
audi alteram partem; and, secondly, it emphasises the unconstitutionality 
(under a guarantee of fair trial similar to that contained in the 
Nigerian Bill of Rights ) of failure to inform an alleged contemnor 
in full of the charge against him. The latter aspect of the judgment 
is considered further below; and its importance for present purposes, 
lies in its ruling that the common law requires that the audi alteram 
partem principle be strictly observed.
The proceedings in question, Maharaj v Attorney-General for Trinidad 
2
and Tobago, arose from the conviction and sentence (to seven days1 
imprisonment) of a barrister for contempt. The underlying facts are 
somewhat complex, but it appears that the barrister had been unable 
to appear before a particular judge (to represent his clients) in a 
number of proceedings, as other matters in which he had been engaged 
had continued for longer than anticipated. The judge had refused to
- — is oofc
1 . The Bill of Rights of Trinidad and Tobago,* derived from the 
Nigerian Bill,£as are most of the Bills of Rights incorporated 
in the new states of the Commonwealth, as explained at p. 173)*
bout Vfcs <^ *ca'cu'tei2_ process1 «S icOlvj -fko. S c .* * .a.,
2. [1977] 1 All E.R. 411 (P.C.).
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to grant adjournments requested on behalf of the barrister, and had 
proceeded with the matters, giving judgment against certain of the barrister's 
clients. He had also allowed certain medical evidence to be given 
in the absence of the barrister.
The barrister had accordingly spoken to the judge in question in his
chambers and had asked him to jre cuse himself from further cases in which
he (the barrister) was involved on the ground of the 'unjudicial'
conduct the judge had displayed. The judge refused this request; and
when hearing in one matter was resumed the following day, the barrister
requested the opportunity to cross-examine the doctors who had previously
testified in his absence. The judge refused: and the barrister 'then
repeated to the judge in open court what he had said to him the previous
day and stated that he reserved the right to impeach the entire 
1
proceedings'. The judge challenged him as to whether he was suggesting
that the court was dishonest, corrupt or biased against him; and the
barrister replied: 'I say you are guilty of unjudicial conduct having
2
regard to what I said yesterday'. The judge then charged him with
contempt; but made no attempt to specify on what grounds he did so.
He rejected the barrister's request for an adjournment to consult with
counsel, and proceeded to convict and sentence him to 'seven days' simple 
3
imprisonment'. In his written reasons for his decision, he recorded
that the barrister had made a 'vicious attack on the integrity of the 
4
Court'; but no such express charge was ever put to the alleged 
contemnor and no opportunity was given him to refute it.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., at 415.
4. Ibid., at 411.
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On appeal to the Judicial Committee, the Board stressed in its disapp­
roval of the fact that:
'in charging the appellant with contempt, 
Maharaj, J. did not make plain to him 
the particulars or the specific nature 
of the contempt with which he was being 
charged1.
1
The Board further declared, in a passage of far-reaching significance:
'This must usually be done before an alleged 
contemnor can properly be convicted and 
punished (Be Pollard). ^ In their Lordship's 
view, justice certainly demanded that the 
judge should have done so in this particular 
case. Their Lordships are satisfied that 
his failure to explain that the contempt 
with which he intended to charge the 
appellant was what the judge has described 
in his written reasons as 'a vicious attack 
on the integrity of the Court' vitiates 
the committal for contempt.'
3
The Judicial Committee further acknowledged that 'the law does not
require that anyone charged with contempt in the face of the court
[should] necessarily be given the opportunity of consulting solicitors
4
or counsel before he is dealt with'; but nevertheless considered it 
5
’runfortunate' that the opportunity to consult with senior counsel had 
not been accorded the appellant.
This opinion of the Judicial Committee is greatly to be welcomed. The 
summary jurisdiction operates extremely harshly against a person charged
1. Ibid., at 416.
2. (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 106. The vital dictum from this case is reproduced
at p. 735.below.
3. Maharaj v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, supra, at 416.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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with contempt (as this case graphically demonstrates); and the minimum 
safeguard which should be insisted upon is compliance with the audi 
alteram partem principle of natural justice. Privy Council rulings on 
the common law are, of course, not binding in Nigeria: but they do 
have highly persuasive authority; and it is accordingly submitted that 
the Nigerian courts should follow this opinion in future decisions; and 
should derive further support from it for the emphasis they have already 
begun to place on the need for an alleged contemnor to be informed in full 
of the basis of the charge against him and to be given an adequate 
opportunity to put his defence to the court.
8.12 . The Constitutionality of the Summary Process
The concern thus evidenced to reconcile the summary jurisdiction with 
fundamental principles of natural justice has generated some doubt 
as to whether the summary process can be reconciled with the constitu­
tional guarantee of fair trial, enshrined in s 33 of the 1979 
Constitution. Notwithstanding their firm commitment to the unconsti­
tutionality of an alleged contemnor being placed in the witness box and
1
compelled to answer questions regarding his offence, the Nigerian
courts have not yet gone so far as to reject the constitutionality of
the summary process intoto. Yet there is considerable force in such
a contention, for the notion that the party aggrieved by an alleged
2
contempt may serve as prosecutor, judge and jury and may commit the
1. See Agbachom v The State [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69, discussed at p. 724 
above; and see also Deduwa and others v The State, [1975] 1 All N.L.R. 1, 
discussed at p. 725 above. The unconstitutionality of this procedure 
lies, in essence, in its inconsistency with the constitutional 
guarantee that no person may be compelled to give evidence at his 
trial. See s 33(11), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979 (the equivalent of thfe subsection of the 1963 
Constitution on which these cases were decided).
2. See the warning against this, voiced - inter alia - in Deduwa v The 
State, supra.
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accused summarily to imprisonment (often without adequate hearing let 
alone time to prepare a defence) is clearly totally inconsistent with 
certain of the constitutitional guarantees of fair trial contained in
s 33.
The provisions of s 33 most relevant in this context are those laid down in 
in subsections (6), (11) and (12) . Subsection (6) guarantees a person 
charged with a criminal offence the rights 'to be informed promptly in 
a language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence; 
... to be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence; ... [and] to defend himself in person or by legal practitioners 
of his defence'. Subsection (11) guarantees that no such person may be 
'compelled to give evidence at [his] trial'; and subsection (12) states 
that:
'Subject as otherwise provided by this 
Constitution, a person shall not be 
convicted of a criminal offence unless 
that offence is defined and the penalty 
therefor is prescribed in a written law'.
The argument that subsection (12) has rendered the summary power void 
for inconsistency with its provisions has previously been discussed* 
and will not be repeated here. The principle that a person charged 
with contempt cannot be placed in the witness box and compelled to give 
evidence against himself has already been accepted by the courts (as 
discussed above ) , on the basis of the clear incompatibility of such 
procedure with the guarantee contained in subsection (11). Some 
consideration has been given to the question whether the exercise
1. See p. 703.
2. See p. 724.
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of the summary jurisdiction offends against subsection (6) - and the
courts have stressed that an alleged contemnor must be informed in full
1
of the charge against him. However, no clear ruling on the consti­
tutionality of the summary process has yet been given in Nigeria.
It is accordingly salutary to note, in this regard, the recent opinion
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Maharaj v Attorney-
2
General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2). The facts of the case have
3
already been explained in the context of the appellant's appeal against
conviction for contempt, which - it will be recalled - was allowed
by the Board on the ground that the judge's failure to clarify the
4
basis of the charge vitiated the committal for contempt.
Not content with seeking this relief alone, however, the appellant 
also instituted proceedings under s 6 of the Constitution of the 
country (the equivalent of the Nigerian s 42 )> claiming 'redress for 
[the] contravention of his right, protected by s 1(a) of the 
Constitution, not to be deprived by his liberty save by due process of 
law'.^ This provision in the law of Trinidad and Tobago is not defined 
with any particularity, but is clearly the equivalent of the right 
to 'fair trial', guaranteed by the Nigerian Bill of Rights. Accordingly, 
the ruling of the Privy Council on the question whether the accused's 
committal for contempt was indeed unconstitutional has considerable 
significance for Nigeria.
1. See p. 721.
2. [1979] A.C. 385 (P.C.).
3. See p. 729 et seq.
4. See p. 731.
5. See the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights, at 
the significance of s 42 is further explained.
P- 179, where
6. Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) , supra,
at 385.
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In approaching this question, the Board pointed to its earlier ruling 
that the judge's order of committal was unlawful because it failed to 
comply with the long-settled common law rule that 'no person should be 
punished for contempt of court, which is a criminal offence, unless the 
specific offence charged against him is distinctly stated, and an oppor­
tunity of answering it given t o h i m ’.^  Highly significantly,their Lordship's 
further view was that the order for committal accordingly 'clearly amounted to
contravention by the state of the appellant's rights under section 1(a)
2
not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process'. It should
be noted that the Board was unanimous on this issue, even Lord Hailsham -
who dissented from the majority view that the appellant was entitled
3
to damages by way of redress, as further explained below - being
4
satisfied that 'a failure sufficiently to formulate the charge' is 
inconsistent with the requirement of "due process".
The Judicial Committee ruling in these proceedings accordingly lends 
considerable weight to the contention that the summary jurisdiction 
may be inconsistent with the constitutional entitlement to fair trial; 
and will be so if the audi alteram partem principle is not satisfied. 
Unfortunately, however, it leaves aside the question (which, of course, 
strikes at the very heart of the summary jurisdiction) whether failure 
to comply with the other fundamental principle of natural justice - nemo 
judex in sua causa - is not equally unconstitutional. It is 
submitted that there is no reason in principle for distinguishing 
between the two; and that practical convenience does not supply
1. Ibid., at 397, per Lord Diplock, citing in Re Pollard, (1868) L.R. 
2 P.C. at 120.
2. Ibid.
3. See p. 738.
4. Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2), supra, 
at 406.
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sufficient grounds for so doing. Accordingly, even where contempt is 
alleged to have been committed in the face of the court, both principles 
of'natural justice should be followed: and the "alleged contemnor should 
not only be informed in full of the charge against him and be given an 
opportunity of defending himself against it, but should also be accorded 
the vitally important right to have the matter heard by an impartial 
arbiter. Moreover, the alleged contemnor should also have an opportunity 
to prepare his defence and to instruct counsel of his choice to represent 
him.
The implementation of these recommendations would no doubt herald the 
end of the summary jurisdiction: but it is submitted that this is a 
result to be welcomed, rather than feared. It cannot convincingly be 
contended that contempt in the face of the court (much as it may offend 
the presiding judicial officer) is an offence of such great moment 
that it cannot adequately be dealt with except in a manner which contra­
venes every established principle of justice. And if this is reasoning 
is valid in the context of contempt in facie curiae, then - a fortiori - 
it must also hold good for constructive contempt, where it is particularly 
difficult to accept that the delay endemic in following normal trial 
procedures would detract in any real sense from the proper administration 
of justice.
One further point of importance - which lends considerable further force 
to the contention that the summary process is unconstitutional - should 
be noted. Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution guarantees the right 
to fair trial in terms which are absolute: in the sense that the
rights guaranteed by s 33 are not made subject to derogation through 
laws 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' for the 
furtherance of specified interests. Thus, s 33 itself contains no 
"saving" for laws so justifiable (and thus stands in marked contrast
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with the guarantee of freedom of expression contained in s 36); whilst 
the blanket provision contained in s 41 - which permits derogation from 
a number of rights, in the interests of public order, safety and so 
forth - makes no mention of the right to fair trial guaranteed by s 33. 
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that s 41 - which permits additional 
derogation from specified rights in times of emergency - again makes 
no mention, in this regard, of the rights guaranteed by s 33. The 
conclusion is thus irresistible that the framers of the Constitution 
regarded the guarantees of fair trial as particularly important: so 
much so that - unlike many of the other guaranteed rights - no deroga­
tion from them whatsoever (even in a period of emergency) is permitted. 
On what basis, then, can the summary jurisdiction - which cuts directly 
across s 33(6) and (11) - be justified? It is submitted that there is 
none.
In short, it is clear that the summary contempt jurisdiction is incon­
sistent with the guarantees of fair trial enshrined in s 33 of the 
1979 Constitution; and that it cannot be "saved" under any authorised 
exception. It follows that the summary procedure is void to the extent 
of such inconsistency; and that it should therefore be replaced by 
procedures for the trial of contempt which make adequate provision for 
satisfaction of all the guaranteed safeguards of "due process".
The comments above apply to contempt of all kinds: whether or not 
committed by the media. Where the contempt in issue involves publica­
tion by the media, then further questions of constitutionality arise: 
for the 1979 Constitution guarantees not only fair trial, but also 
freedom of expression. The latter fvfjkt , of course, subject to 
derogation through laws 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' 
for the purpose of 'maintaining the authority and independence of
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courts';* but it is a moot question whether many of the rules of 
contempt as they affect the media are so justifiable - and this issue 
will be further canvassed in due course.
Suffice it therefore for the moment to note one further aspect of the 
Privy Council ruling, which may serve to give practical impetus to the 
recommendation that the summary procedure be replaced by one more
2
consonant with fair trial. The Judicial Committee, in the Maharaj
3
case, went on to hold by majority (Lord Hailsham dissenting) that the 
appellant's right to redress for contravention of the due process re­
quirement entitled him to monetary compensation for the loss he had 
suffered, including 'any loss of earning consequent on the imprisonment
and recompense for the inconvenience and distress suffered by the
4
appellant during his incarceration'. Since the appellant had made no
claim for exemplary or punitive damages, the Board was not called upon
to consider whether 'money compensation by way of redress under s 6
[the equivalent, as previously noted, of s 42 of the 1979 Constitution
in Nigeria] can ever include an exemplary or punitive award.^ It is
plain, however, that the Judicial Committee's ruling does not exclude 
6
this possibility.
1. s 36(3) (a), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
2. Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad.and Tobago, No.2 [1979],
A.C. 385 (p.c.).
3. Ibid. at 400-410, especially at 406, et seq.
4. Ibid., at 400.
5. Ibid.
6. It should be noted, however, that the difficulty in determining the 
principles which should govern the award of damages was one of the 
reasons given by Lord Hailsham for disagreeing with the majority on 
this issue. He acknowledged that guidance might be sought in princi­
ples long recognised in the law of tort, but also stressed that
' [a]t present, the sea is an uncharted one': See ibid.
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This ruling has considerable practical significance; and it is submitted 
that it, too, though not binding in Nigeria, should in future be followed 
by Nigerian courts. If this is done, it is likely to provide a powerful 
incentive to ensuring that - if the summary process is not abandoned 
altogether, as previously advocated - it will at least be exercised 
with more regard for the right of fair trial guaranteed by the Nigerian 
constitution.
Against the background of this decision, - as well as the Nigerian
1
cases earlier noted - it is Somewhat disheartening to note the views
of certain commentators on the law of contempt in the United Kingdom
that the summary jurisdiction is a 'convenient' method of dealing with
contempt, which requires little modification: save, possibly, for giving
the accused the option of trial by jury if he so wishes. Thus, Miller
affirms that '[t]he overall procedure appears to be convenient, subject
always to the major contention as to whether a jury trial should be
2
denied in cases of criminal contempt'. Borrie & Lowe express an even 
more sanguine view, stating that:
'The present procedure has the virtue of 
interfering as little as possible with the 
normal business of the criminal courts ...
[and] there is usually very little need 
to have recourse to a jury'
3
although it might be desirable to introduce some discretion in this regard. 
On the other hand, it is salutary to note that the Phillimore Committee
1. See p. 719 et seq.
2. Miller, op.cit., p. 32.
3. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 258. For further discussion by the 
authors of whether the summary procedure can be justified, see 
also pp. 256-258.
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1
on Contempt has expressed considerable concern over the dangers inherent in the
summary jurisdiction; and has made a number of recommendations which
are relevant in this regard. Thus, for example, it has suggested that
'any conduct, including publication, which is intended to ... obstruct
the course of justice should continue to be capable of being dealt
with as a criminal offence unless there are compelling reasons requiring
it to be dealt with as a matter of urgency by means of summary contempt 
2
procedures'. In addition, the Committee has recommended that 
"scandalising the court" should cease to form part of the law of 
contempt, and that it should be replaced by a different offence (dis­
cussed further in due course), chargeable on indictment only rather than
3
by summary process. As regards contempts committed in the face of the
court, the Report suggests a number of provisions designed to secure
greater fairness of trial - for example, that the contemnor should
always be given 'an opportunity of explaining or denying his conduct,
4
and of calling witnesses' and that 'before any substantial penalty is
5
imposed there should be a short adjournment'. These recommendations 
have not, however, yet been implemented: the new Contempt of Court 
Act 1981 making no attempt to introduce appropriate provisions in this 
regard.^
1. Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court ("the Phillimore Report"),
Cmnd 5794, 1974.
2. Ibid., recommendation 16, cited by Paul O'Higgins: Cases and Materials 
on Civil Liberty, London, 1980, p. 162.
3. Ibid., recommendation 20. This is further discussed in Chapter Ten.
4. Ibid., recommendation 22(a). See also the Phillimore, Report, supra, para 32
5. Ibid., recommendation 22(b). See also the Report, ibid, para 33.
6. Except, however, that the recommendations regarding the need to
make legal aid available to a person liable to be committed or fined 
for contempt have been incorporated in section 13 of the new Act.
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8.13. Punishment for Contempt of Court
1
At common law, 1[i]n a case of criminal contempt, the superior courts
2
have the power both to fine, impose a theoretically unlimited term of
3
imprisonment, and to order the giving of security for good behaviour',.
4
It appears, however, from the decision in Attorney-General v James
that imprisonment should be for a fixed term, subject to it remaining
5
'open to the offender to apply thereafter for earlier release'.
Civil contempt through failure to comply with an order of court may
also be punished by committal for a fixed or indefinite term. The former
is more appropriate where the object of the proceedings is to punish
for a past offence; whilst the latter is more suitable where the aim
is coercive and committal is designed to carry 'the maximum incentive
to comply with the original order'. In the latter instance, it seems
eminently sensible (as has been emphasised in a number of cases in the
•7
United States of America ) that the contemnor should 'carr[y] the keys
g
of his prison in his own pocket'.
1. The powers of punishment of inferior courts are, of course, confined 
to those conferred on them in general, as emphasised in Nunku v 
Inspector-General of Police, (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 23, discussed at p. 707
2. This is in the sense that the court need not specify any fixed period, 
but may simply commit the contemnor until such time as he has 'purged' 
his contempt. It follows, moreover, that no 'upper limit' is prescribed
3. Miller, op.cit., p. 10.
4. [1962] 2 Q.B. 637 (D.C.).
5. Miller, ibid. Application for release is made under R.S.C. Ord.
52, r. 8(1), which applies (subject, of course, to suitable modifi­
cation for local circumstances) in Nigeria as well. See p. 717.
6. Miller, ibid.
7. See Miller, ibid., p. 11.
8. Re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, (1902) at 461.
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Earlier doubts as to the power to impose a fine for civil contempt
have now been removed by the House of Lords in Heatons Transport (St.
Helens) , Ltd v Transport and General Workers Union,^in which fines
totalling £55,000 were imposed on the recalcitrant defendant. In
principle, as Miller points out, there is 'no reason why a suspended
fine payable on continued disobedience after a specified period should
2
not likewise be imposed as an aid to coercion'.
As regards the penalties prescribed by the Criminal and Penal Codes, the
3
former (as previously noted) lays down a penalty of three months'
imprisonment for contravention of s 133. The Penal Code prescribes
4
imprisonment for up to six months or fine of twenty pounds or both 
for contravention of s 155; whilst s 142 prescribes an identical 
punishment for failure to reply to a question in court proceedings.
By contrast, s 182 (which prohibits any act prejudicial to the course 
of justice in pending proceedings) carries a penalty of imprisonment 
(for a maximum of two years) or fine (of unspecified amount) or both.
An even sterner punishment is provided by s.416 (relating to the 
excitation of disaffection against the administration of justice) 
which renders such conduct punishable by imprisonment for up to seven 
years or fine of unspecified amount or both.~*
8.14,. Appeal Against Conviction and Sentence in the Context of Contempt
As regards appeal from conviction or sentence in the context of contempt, 
the summary jurisdiction may give rise to considerable difficulty,
1. [1973] A .C . 15 (H.L. (E)).
2. Miller, supra, p. 12.
3. See p. 700.
4. This is the equivalent of forty naira.
5. See p. 701.
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as graphically demonstrated by the case of Nunku v Inspector-General
of Police.* Following his summary committal to imprisonment for five
days by a magistrate for contempt in facie curiae, the contemnor appealed
to the Supreme Court of the Jos Judicial Division, which dismissed the
2
appeal on the ground, inter alia, that he had no right of appeal.
On his further appeal to the West African Court of Appeal, the court 
stressed that '[a] right of appeal is a creation of statute and 
no such right exists where there is no provision for it in the statute 
or law creating rights of appeal'.  ^ The relevant enactment was the 
Magistrates' Courts (Appeals) Ordinance (as regards appeal from the 
magistrate's court itself); and the West African Court of Appeal 
Ordinance (as regards further appeal from the Supreme Court to the 
West African Court).
Section 5 of the Magistrates' Courts (Appeals) Ordinance provided:
'"Any person aggrieved by a conviction or 
order by a magistrate in a criminal case 
in respect of any charge to which he has 
pleaded not guilty or of which he did not 
admit the truth may appeal to the appeal 
court from such conviction"'.
4
In the view of the West African Court of Appeal, the words underlined 
set the limits within which appeal lay as of right. Since the accused 
had been convicted under the summary procedure (sanctioned by s 6 of the 
Criminal Code Act) , no charge had been put to him and he had not been
1. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 23.
'2. The other ground of appeal, as previously discussed at p.707 was 
that the magistrate's court had no jurisdiction to deal summarily 
with the contempt at all.
3- Nunku v Inspector-General of Police, supra, as reproduced by
Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 193. The second 'no' seems clearly an oversight.
4. Ibid., emphasis supplied.
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1called upon to plead. It followed that s 5 could not avail him.
The Court pointed out that the same limitation was not contained in s 10
of the West African Court of Appeal Ordinance (which authorises appeal
2
against 'conviction' on any question of law), but clearly considered 
this irrelevant to the appellant's contention. Although the point is 
not expressly stated in the judgment, the inference is clear that the 
primary right of appeal (from the Magistrate's Court itself) must first 
be shown to be satisfied: and, failing this, no appeal to a higher 
court could be made.
It needs no emphasis that this interpretation - difficult to avoid on 
the wording of the statute - operates extremely harshly against a 
alleged contemnor who has been tried under the summary process. Not 
only is he deprived of the usual guarantees of fair trial but r to make 
matters yet worse - his normal right of appeal is then also denied.
The situation has now, however, been rectified to a considerable extent.
Following the introduction of the Bill of Rights and its attendant
entitlement to apply to the High Court for redress on the grounds of
3
infringement of a fundamental right, it is clear that an alleged 
contemnor may - as recently confirmed by the Judicial Committee of the
1. Ibid., p . 195.
2. In this regard, the court cited the judgment of the Privy Council
in R v Izuora, reproduced by Fawehimni, op.cit., pp. 188-191, p.
191), which had held that the word 'conviction' covers 'an order
for payment of a fine and for imprisonment in default ... made by
a Judge in the Supreme Court for conduct adjudged by him to amount 
to contempt of court'. A fortiori, an order for committal alone 
(as in the present case) would also constitute a 'conviction'.
3. See the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights, where the 
procedure for securing enforcement of the guaranteed rights is further 
described, at p. 179 et seq-
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Privy Council in Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago 
1
(No 2) - institute proceedings claiming such relief, quite apart from
any right of appeal against conviction and sentence which he may have.
Such a claim, as the Board in the Maharaj case affirmed, 'does not involve
any appeal either on fact or on substantive law [but simply raises]
an inquiry into whether the procedure adopted by th[e] judge [in]
2
committing ... for contempt contravened a [fundamental] right'-.
3
Consequently, any restriction of the kind illustrated in the Nunku 
case is irrelevant to the alleged contemnor's entitlement to this kind 
of redress.
A note of caution must, however, be sounded in this regard in the light
of the further Privy Council ruling in Chokolingo v Attorney-General of
4
Trinidad and Tobago. Here, following the publication by a newspaper
5
of a short story which - under the guise of fiction - suggested that 
the judiciary in Trinidad and Tobago was corrupt, the editor and pub­
lisher of the paper were convicted of contempt, for 'scandalising the 
court'. At trial, both pleaded guilty on the advice of counsel; and 
neither made any attempt to appeal against either conviction or
1. [1979] A.C. 385 (P.C.), previously discussed at p. 734 et seq.
2. Ibid., at 394.
3. Nunku v Inspector-General of Police, (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 23, discussed 
above.
4. [1981] 1 All E.R. 244 (P.C.).
5. See ibid., at 245-246. The short story, entitled 'The Judge's Wife', 
was written in the vernacular current in Trinidad and purported to 
be an account by a servant recently dismissed from a judge's 
household of the way in which the judge and his wife and,it was suggested, 
his fellow judges habitually conducted themselves. A box heading to
the story accurately summarised its contents: 'The old domestic was 
bent on exposing bribery, corruption and fraud in the household'.
-746-
1
sentence. Some two and a half years later, however, the editor ('the
2
appellant') applied to the High Court, under s 6 of the Constitution,
for 'declarations that the order ... for his committal was unconstitu-
3
tional and void and that his subsequent imprisonment under that order
was in breach of the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed
4 i 5
to him by [inter alia] s 1(a). The latter provision guarantees to 
every individual the right not to be deprived of his liberty except by 
due process of law. The main ground relied on in support of this con­
tention was that the branch of contempt known as 'scandalising' the 
court had become obsolete and that the judge 'in committing him for that 
offence had [therefore] not imprisoned him according to due process of 
law'. ^
The appellant's contention was dismissed by the High Court, following 
a 'careful survey from English and other Commonwealth jurisdictions'.
1. The editor was sentenced to 21 days' imprisonment; and the publisher 
to a fine of $500. In addition, both were ordered to pay the costs 
of the Law Society, which had initiated the application for their 
committal for contempt.
2. This, as previously explained at p. 734 above, is the equivalent 
of the Nigerian s 42^  and entitles any party who alleges that his 
fundamental rights have been infringed to apply to the High Court 
for redress. For further information on the Nigerian provision - 
the counterpart of s* 6 - seep 180. et seq.
3. The appellant in fact served 12 days out of his 21 day sentence,
the balance being remitted by the Crown. See Chokolingo v Attorney- 
General of Trinidad and Tobago, supra, at 246.
4. See ibid., at 246 and 247. The appellant relied originally also on
the guarantees of freedom of thought and expression; and of the 
press. These latter grounds were abandoned in the proceedings 
before the Court of Appeal.
5. Ibid., at 246.
6. Ibid., at 244.
7. Ibid., at 247.
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The appellant appealed further to the Court of Appeal (which likewise 
dismissed the application); and thence to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council.
The Board took the opportunity to repeat its earlier dictum in the 
1
Maharaj case that 'the fundamental right guaranteed by s 1(a) ... of
the Constitution is not to a legal system which is infallible but to 
2
one which is fair. It then proceeded to emphasise that s 6 should
not be seen as providing an automatic collateral avenue of attack upon
an unpopular judgment. As between the parties to litigation (whether
civil or criminal) the final^ judgment of a court is conclusive as to
the law on the particular matter or question.Even if the court has been
mistaken in its application of the law, the interests of certainty
require that its ruling should stand unchallenged: except, of course,
through the normal procedures for appeal. To allow a further challenge
through an application under s 6 would result in 'parallel remedies
[which] would also be cumulative since the right to apply for redress
under s 6(1) is stated to be ’without prejudice to any other action with
4
respect to the same matter which is lawfully available''. Their 
Lordships shied vehemently away from such a notion, emphasising that 
its 'result would ... be quite irrational and subversive of the rule of 
law which it is a declared purpose of the Constitution to
1. Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2), [1979]
A.C. 385 (P.C.), previously discussed at p. 734 and p. 738, inter alia.
2. Chokolingo v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, supra, at 248.
3. See ibid., where the Board explains that a judgment is "final"
•either because there is no right of appeal to a higher court or 
because neither party has availed himself of an existing right of 
appeal'.
4. Ibid., at 248.
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enshrine'.
In assessing the significance of this ruling of the Board, it must be
remembered, that the Privy Council was here concerned with an allegation
that the judge had erred in law in committing the appellant for contempt
(in that he had done so on the basis of rules which, so the appellant
2
contended, were obsolete). There is an important difference between
an allegation of this nature and a contention that the court has failed
to observe fundamental principles of natural justice in the exercise
of the contempt jurisdiction (as was, of course, the submission in the 
3
Maharaj case itself). An error of law is not the same as a failure to 
observe due process; and the Judicial Committee was accordingly correct 
to warn that alleged error in law does not suffice to found an applica­
tion under s 6 for a declaration that due process has not been observed.
Where, then, does this leave the possibility of "appeal" through s 42 
of the Nigerian Constitution (the equivalent of the Trinidad s 6)?
It implies that any contention that a judge has erred in law in exer­
cising the contempt jurisdiction (for example, in ruling that a particular
publication is sufficiently prejudicial to pending proceedings as to
4
infringe the sub judice rule ) must be pursued through the normal 
avenues of appeal and cannot form the foundation for an application for
1. Ibid., at 249.
2. The Board doubted whether this was in fact so, but considered that
the point was not worth ruling upon. Even if this were the case,
it would simply reflect an error of law on the part of the judge; which
would doubtless be unfortunate but could not be acknowledged as 
grounding as application for redress under s 6. See ibid., at 248.
3. Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago (No 2), supra.
4. The degree of prejudice required for liability under this branch of 
contempt is further described in due course.
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redress under s 42. By contrast, however, a submission that a
committal for contempt should be set aside because the judge failed to
comply with the guarantee of fair trial contained in s 33 (for example,
in putting the alleged contemnor into the witness box and forcing him
1
to give evidence against himself ) may ground both an appeal through
2
the usual procedures and application for redress under s 42 .
The result may be to accord the contemnor parallel and cumulative
remedies - but this (within the narrow framework thus outlined) not
only seems legitimate in principle but has been also been given the
sanction of the Privy Council: as evidenced by its rulings in both
3
the first and second Maharaj decisions •
Section 42 thus provides an optional "extra" in certain circumstances. But, 
irrespective, however, of whether it is in fact available, the normal
1. See, for example, Agbachom v The State, [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69, discus­
sed at p 724 above, and Deduwa and others v The State, [1975] 1 All 
N.L.R. 1, discussed at p 725.
2. This would seem the logical conclusion; but the matter is not as clear 
as in the Trinidad Constitution, where section 6 expressly states 
that an application may be made under it 'without prejudice' to any 
other relief in respect of the same matter. S 42 contains no such 
express assertion; but neither does it indicate that there are
any limits to the right of a person 'who alleges that any of the 
provisions of ... Chapter [IV] has been [or] is being ... contra­
vened in relation to him' to apply to the High Court for redress.
Thus, there is no indication that the fact that he has also appealed 
through the usual procedures disentitles him from seeking redress 
under s 42: and, indeed, much of the value of the provision would 
be lost if this interpretation were to be adopted. It is submitted 
therefore that any such suggestion should be eschewed; and that it 
is appropriate to acknowledge that there are concurrent rights 
of "appeal" against committal for contempt where the summary juris­
diction has been exercised without due observance of guarantees of 
fair trial.
3. It will be recalled, as earlier explained at p 734 above, that there 
were two sets of proceedings in the Maharaj case.. In the first, 
the appellant simply appealed against his conviction and committal 
under the normal rules of appeal: and was, in fact, successful in 
having his conviction set aside on the ground that the judge had 
failed to observe the obligation imposed by common law of informing 
the alleged contemnor in full of the charge against him. In the 
second set of proceedings (instituted, in fact, shortly before the 
appeal), the appellant sought a declaration under s 6 that his 
committal infringed the constitutional guarantee of due process.
This issue came before the Judicial Committee after their ruling
/ A ____________
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channels of appeal remain of considerable significance - and must now 
briefly be examined. The relevant rules have been summarised by 
Fawehinmi^, as follows.
An appeal against a committal order by a court of first instance for
2
contempt lies as of right and does not need the leave of that court. 
Moreover, appeal against conviction for contempt by a State High Court or
by the Federal High Court to the Federal Court of Appeal lies as of
3
right, and further appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal to the Supreme 
Court may be brought as of right if the appeal involves a question of law
alone (rather than a question of fact or mixed question of law and
4
fact). In the latter instance, however, leave of the Federal Court
of Appeal may be sought and, if this is refused, application for leave
5
may be made to the Supreme Court itself. Where the conviction is 
imposed by the Federal Court of Appeal itself, the position is substan­
tially the same, appeal lying as of right only if the question at
issue is one of law alone? and, in other cases, the leave of the Federal
6
Court (or, failing this, the Supreme Court) being required.
The Supreme Court itself also has inherent jurisdiction to punish
(continued)
on the first question; and the Board gave no indication that the 
earlier proceedings precluded the appellant from pursuing this 
form of redress as well. In fact, the Board even went so far as 
to award the appellant damages for wrongful imprisonment to afford 
him 'redress' under s. 6.
1. Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 26-27.
2. Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 26, citing Ikabala v Ojosipe [1972] 4 C.C.H.C.J. 
135; In re Aniweta FCA/E/47/78, 31 May 1978? and Re Onagoruwa,
FCA/E/117/79.
3. Fawehinmi, ibid., citing section 220, (1)(a) Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
4. Fawehinmi, ibid, citing section 213, ibid.
5. Fawehinmi, ibid., citing section 213, ibid.
6. Fawehnimi, ibid., p. 27, citing section 213, ibid.
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summarily for contempt; and no appeal against conviction can be brought 
as the court is the final court of appeal in Nigeria. Application 
may, however, be made for a presidential pardon.*
One further anomalous aspect of the right of appeal for contempt - 
which has had considerable practical significance since it has gravely 
inhibited th& development of the common law to keep pace with modern 
times - remains to be clarified. This is the absence - for many 
years - of any right of appeal, in England itself, for criminal contempt 
of court.
In English law, for some fifty years, appeal was possible only 'in
2
respect of a decision concerning a civil contempt'. This was the result
3
of 'a quirk in parliamentary drafting' for the Criminal Appeal Act
1907 which (for the first time) provided a general right of appeal in
criminal cases, stipulated that 'only a person "convicted on indictment"
4
could appeal'. It followed that a person convicted of contempt under
the summary jurisdiction fell outside the ambit of the statute. Nor
could such a person rely on a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal,
'since it was expressly provided that no appeal lay to that court "in
5
any criminal cause or matter"'. The person convicted of criminal con­
tempt under the summary procedure accordingly fell between two stools 
and had no right of appeal at all.
1. Fawehinmi, ibid., citing section 161, ibid.
2. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 287, emphasis supplied.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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The situation was remedied, somewhat belatedly, by section 13 of the
Administration of Justice Act 1960 - which provided a general and uniform
right of appeal against conviction and sentence for both types of
1
contempt (whether civil or criminal). Provision was thus made for
appeals to both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords; and this 
innovationbhas since had great significance. The result has been 
that many fundamental common law principles of contempt have recently 
come before the highest courts in England for examination-and elucidation; 
and this has greatly contributed to certainty in the law. However, the 
fact that criminal contempt has come before these courts on a regular 
basis only since 1960 has also meant that there has been little oppor­
tunity for assessing its deficiencies or for its progressive development 
to meet the much changed needs of modern times.
8.15. Contempt of Court with Reference to the Media
Thus far, certain fundamental principles relating to contempt of court
in general have briefly been described. Against this background, it
now remains to examine the extent to which contempt law constitutes
a restriction on media freedom. Four aspects of contempt of special
2
relevance to the media have previously been identified; and it is 
now proposed to canvass each in turn.
1. See ibid., at 288. For further details, see ibid., pp. 287-294; 
and Miller, op.cit., pp. 37-40.
2. See p. 752.
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C H A P T E R  N I N E
SUB JUDICE PUBLICATION
9.1. The Significance of the Rule against Sub Judice Publication for 
Media Freedom
The sab judice branch of the law of contempt prohibits, in broad outline,
the publication of material likely to prejudice or influence the outcome
of proceedings which are either pending or in actual progress. Its
significance for freedom of the media is considerable: as perhaps most
dramatically demonstrated by recent proceedings in the United Kingdom
in which the House of Lords held that the sub judice rule precluded
the Sunday Times from publishing an article relating to the 'thalidomide'
1
tragedy - a matter which was clearly of the utmost public concern.
Although this judgment was ultimately overturned by the European Court
hajw/uv on the ground that it conflicted with the United Kingdom's
2
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, 
the decision nevertheless graphically illustrates the extent to which 
the sub judice rule may prevent the media from canvassing issues of 
great public importance. Moreover, as the Supreme Court in the United 
States of America has pointed out, the rule exercises its repressive 
effect at precisely the point in time when public interest in a 
particular issue - aroused by the institution of proceedings - is at
1. These proceedings are discussed in detail at p. 779 below.
2. The ruling of the European Court is further discussed in due 
course. The judgment of the Strasbourg Court also prompted 
the enactment of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981 (as previously 
indicated - in Chapter Eight - and further discussed below).
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its height.
Furthermore, liability for sub judice publication is 'strict' in the 
sense that it is the objective likelihood of prejudice resulting which 
determines liability, rather than the alleged contemnor's subjective 
intention to bring such a result about. Thus, the net of potential
liability is spread extremely wide and extends - as regards the media -
to all those involved in 'publication': from journalists and editors, 
to proprietors, printers and producers, to distributors, news agents 
and street vendors. Strict liability for sub judice publication also 
imposes a serious practical restraint on investigative journalism: for 
the media often cannot be sure whether the police are not also investi­
gating a particular matter: which may then be 'pending' within the 
meaning of the rule and may not be the subject of comment. Moreover,
the issue of a writ clearly brings the matters to which it relates
within the ambit of the sub judice restriction, and this may serve 
to 'gag' further media coverage for a considerable period of time -
even though the plaintiff has no intention , at the end of the day, of
2
pursuing the matter in court.
In summary, thus, the sub judice rule places all matters which are the 
subject of proceedings (criminal or civil) in a "cocoon" for what may 
be a period of months or even years; and anyone who publishes comment 
on such issues during this period does so at his peril - being subject 
to conviction for contempt, not because he intended to (or has, in 
fact, caused) prejudice to the proceedings, but merely because prejudice,
1. See p. 855.
2. The common law does, however, take some cognisance of the problem of 
the so-called 'gagging writ' as further explained at p. 849 et seq.
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might, objectively and potentially, have resulted. Furthermore, the 
period during which proceedings are subject to restriction is a matter 
of considerable controversy at common law: and this inevitably encourages 
the media to err on the side of caution and to refrain from comment 
which may, in law, be quite legitimate. The width of the net of strict lia­
bility has been remarked; and it thus needs no further emphasis that the 
rule - for all these reasons - constitutes a far-reaching restriction on 
freedom of the media.
9.2. The Sources of the Sub Judice Rule in Nigeria
The sources of the law of contempt in Nigeria have previously been 
canvassed;^ and suffice it, accordingly, for present purposes merely 
to note that the provisions of the Codes relevant to sub judice publi­
cation are s 133(4) of the Criminal Code (which penalises any act
'capable of prejudicing any person in favour of or against any party
2
to [pending judicial] proceedings') and s 182 of the Penal Code (which
prohibits any act, likely or intended, to 'influence the course of
3
justice in any civil or criminal proceedings'). However, as emphasised 
above, the provisions of the Codes are not relied upon in practice; 
and liability for sub judice publication is accordingly governed primarily by 
common law principles.
9.3. The Rationale for the Sub Judice Restriction
The rationale underlying the sub judice restriction has recently been
1. See p. 699 et seq.
2. See p. 700.
3. See p. 701.
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analysed by the House of Lords in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers, 
Ltd.,^  in the following terms:
'The = due administration of justice 
requires... that all citizens ... should be 
able to rely upon obtaining in the courts 
the arbitrament of a tribunal which is free 
from bias against any party and whose 
decision will be based upon those facts only 
that have been proved in evidence adduced 
before it in accordance with the procedure 
adopted in courts of law; and :. . .1 that, once 
the dispute has been submitted to a court of 
law, they should be able to rely upon there 
being no usurpation by any other person of the 
function of that court to decide it according 
to law....'.
2
The first of these requirements is self-explanatory. The second has
been interpreted to mean that 'other persons [must] desist from prejudging
3
the issues which the court will be called upon to determine'. Both 
requirements are essential to ensure a "fair" trial: meaning 'a trial 
conducted free from prejudice and in which the court tries the case 
impartially after considering all the available evidence which has been
properly submitted [to it]'. With the growing power of the media, 
it has come increasingly to be recognised that the fundamental right 
to a fair trial may be destroyed if "trial by the media" were to be 
countenanced; for '[s]uch "trials" ignore the basic rules of evidence 
and do not provide any right to reply or cross-examine; they tend in 
short to usurp the power of the court without any of the safeguards
1. [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E)).
2. Ibid., at 309, per Lord Diplock.
3. C.J. Miller, Contempt of Court, London, 1976, p. 69.
4. G.J Borrie and N.V. Lowe, The Law of Contempt, London, 1973, p. 35.
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1
provided by the rules of criminal procedure and evidence'.
In addition, the need for the sub judice rule is further buttressed by
the practical consideration that - vere it not to apply - a person in
fact guilty of serious crime night well (if his trial had been surroun-
dered by wide-ranging media publicity) be able to have his conviction
quashed on the grounds of prejudice to the proceedings, as has, in fact,
2
occured in the United States on certain notable occasions. It is 
thus considered preferable that freedom of expression should suffer 
(to the extent that publicity must be limited until after the conclusion 
of proceedings) rather than that the guilty should go scot-free.
Underlying these reasons for the rule, however, - and the. factor which
provides its principal rationale - is the susceptibility of lay members
of a jury to outside influence. It is apparent that jurors (as opposed
to judges and other judicial officers) lack the training and experience
required to exclude from their minds irrelevant and prejudicial material
relating to a trial (as reported by the media); arid to focus their
attention exclusively on the legally admissible evidence. There can
3 •
thus be no doubt (as United States' experience bears out.) that adverse 
media publicity can seriously prejudice a trial conducted by jury.
Hence, whenever this mode of trial is adopted, the rationale for the 
sub judice restriction is readily apparent. Different considerations 
apply, however, where trial is donducted by trained judicial officer 
alone: - and here the need for the sub judice rule is open to consider­
able question. In this regard, it is accordingly worth noting (at the
1. Borrie & Lowe, ibid., p. 36.
2. These United States' decisions are further discussed in due course.
3. This is further discussed at p. 888.
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very outset of this discussion) that jury trial is extremely rare in
Nigeria. It has no application at all in civil proceedings; and, in
criminal proceedings, is available only in Lagos and then only in
1
relation to crimes subject to capital punishment. Unfortunately, however,
the English common law rules have evolved against a background in which
jury trial is the norm; and English precedents are heavily premised
(in general) upon the need to avoid prejudicing the minds of potential
jurors. It is important, therefore, in approaching the topic of sub judice
publicationf that this difference between the mode of trial in 
2
England and Nigeria should always be kept firmly in mind.
9.4. The Rule Against Publication Pendente Lite by the Media as Part 
of a More Wide-Ranging Principle.
The rule prohibiting publication of comment by the media whilst prooeed-
3
ings are 'pending' is simply one aspect of the sub judice rule: which,
in turn, is based upon the wide-ranging principle that the "stream of 
4
justice" must be kept clear and unimpeded, and must not be diverted
from its natural course. It follows that prejudice of any kind to
proceedings either pending or in progress must be precluded: and
this requires, in broad outline, the insulation of all involved in the
judicial process from improper influence. Juries - as previously
noted - are considered particularly susceptible to prejudicial publication
by the media; and the sub judice rule accordingly attempts to
1. See T. Akinola Aguda, The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Southern 
States of Nigeria, 3rd, ed., London, 1982, para. 529.
2. In England, in broad outline, jury trial in civil proceedings is rare, 
but it still generally applies in criminal proceedings. See Miller, 
op.cit., p. 125.
3. The meaning of 'pending' is considered further below.
4. This metaphor is one frequently by the courts in the context of 
contempt, as will be seen in due course.
v
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preclude such influence from arising. However, direct approaches to
jurors may be equally (if not more) prejudicial to fair trial; and hence
these too are prohibited in terms of the wider sub judice principle
1
(of which the rule against prejudicial publication forms part ).
Likewise, it has long been recognised that the "stream of justice"
2
may be polluted through attempts to influence a party to proceedings,
3 4
or a witness in them, or the presiding judicial officer; and each
such category of conduct is accordingly likewise prohibited in terms of the
sub judice restriction.
In Nigeria, a clear illustration of contempt arising under the sub judice
rule through an attempt to influence a party to proceedings i s provided
5
by the case of Adekoya v Jakande, in which it was alleged that the 
respondent had attempted to coerce the applicant into withdrawing a 
claim pending before the courts by "blacking" his business. The under­
lying facts are somewhat complex and require brief explanation.
The applicant sought the committal of the respondent for contempt of 
court on the basis that (whilst proceedings in which the applicant was 
a party were pending) he, the respondent, as President of the Newspapers 
Proprietors Association of Nigeria (1NPAN') had written, inter alia,^
1. See Miller, op.cit., p. 94.
2. See Adekoya v Jakande, described below.
3. See Miller, op.cit., pp. 100-105.
4. See Miller, ibid., pp. 105-106.
5. Suit No LD/1138/76, reproduced by Chief Gani Fawehinmi, The Law of
Contempt in Nigeria (Case Book), Surulere, Lagos State, 1980, pp 40 - 48.
6. See Fawehinmi, ibid., pp. 40-41, where it is explained that similar 
letters were sent to all Newspapers' Executives - clearly in order 
to effect a general "blacking" of the applicant.
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to the General Manager of the Daily Express newspaper, calling upon him 
to implement a unanimous decision of the Executive Council of the NPAN, 
to the effect that 'no member of the [NPAN] should receive any advertise­
ment from [the applicant's] Press Agency either on credit or cash
1
basis or any terms whatsoever'. The letter also explained that the
reason for this was that the Agency was continuing to pursue a legal
action against the NPAN, contrary to an agreement between the NPAN and
the Association of Advertising Practioners of Nigeria (AAPN) (of which
the Agency was a member), whereby the AAPN had undertaken 'to withdraw
2
from Court any legal action against NPAN by any of [its] members'.
Since the AAPN had failed to fulfill this agreement and had failed also
to expel the offending member, the Executive Council of NPAN had
resolved to "black" the Agency concerned. In loyal response to the
3
letter, the Daily Express had duly refused all business from the 
Agency; and the applicant applied to the court for relief.
The court had little hesitation in rejecting the respondent's submission
that publication was an essential element of contempt of this kind and
4
that, accordingly, in the absence of publication, no attempt had been
5
committed. It cited Re Ludlow Charities, Lechmere Charlton's case to
1. Ibid., p. 41.
2. Ibidi
3. See Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 42. The Nigerian Herald, equally 'faithful 
to the decision [of the Executive Council] and loyal to the [NPANI! 
did the same.
4. Ibid., p. 43. Counsel for the respondent pointed out that the letters 
had been sent only to members of the NPAN and contended that this
did not constitute publication. Unfortunately, however, for the 
clarification of the law regarding the elements of publication, this 
point was not crisply answered by the court as - in view of its 
.interpretation of the contempt, as further explained below - it was 
not necessary for it to do so.
5. (1837) 40 E.R. 661; 2 My & Cr 316.
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the effect that:
'"Every writing, letter or publication which 
has for its object to divert the course 
of justice is a contempt. A threatening 
letter must be considered as having equally 
that object, whether addressed to a suitor 
seeking justice, to a judge or an officer 
of court"1.
1
2
The court referred also to Borrie & Lowe as authority for the proposition
that 1"Deterring or preventing a party from bringing an action (or
attempting so to do) ... is an interference with the due administration
3
of Justice, and amounts to "contempt"'.
The crucial question, therefore, was whether the letters constituted
an improper interference in the administration of justice. The court
acknowledged that genuine attempts at out-of-court settlement cannot
be so construed, but emphasised that where such an attempt is accompanied
by a threat, the matter assumes a different complexion. Thus, in 
4
Smith v Lakeman, a letter sent to one of the parties to a pending 
action was held a contempt because it contained a threat to indict 
the defendant for swindling, perjury and forgery if he proceeded with 
the action and was thus '"a threat for the purpose of intimidating him
5
as a suitor, and, therefore ... was unquestionably a contempt of court"'.
1. Ibid., at 670; 339
2. Op.cit •
3. Ibid., P- 223.
4. (1856) 26 L.J.Ch.
5. Ibid.
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Likewise, in Rowden v University Co-operation Association Ltd., 
an attempt at coercion (this time against a witness in pending proceed­
ings) was held to constitute a contempt.
Against this background, the court had no doubt that the respondent's
letters contained 'a threat for the purpose of intimidating [the
applicant], a suitor, and therefore ... was unquestionably a contempt 
2
of Court1.
Further support for this conclusion was provided by the case of
3
Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., in which Lord Diplock and 
Lord Simon of Glaisdale had held:
1"Contempt of Court in a civil action is not 
restricted to conduct calculated to prejudice 
a fair trial by influencing the tribunal or 
the witnesses but extends to conduct calcu­
lated to inhibit suitors from availing them­
selves of their constitutional right to have 
their legal rights determined by the courts'".
In addition, Lord Simon had further observed:
'"Private pressure on a litigant is in general 
an impermissible interference with the course 
of justice and can only be justified within 
narrow limits as when there exists such a 
common interest that fair, reasonable and 
moderate personal representation could be 
appropriate e.g. a genuine, unofficious and 
paramount concern for the welfare of the 
litigant"'.
5
1. (1881) 71 L.T. Jo 373.
2. See Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 45.
3. [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E)).
4. See Fawehinmi, supra.
5. See Fawehinmi, ibid. , p. 45.
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The court had little doubt, however, that the pressure in the present
case was not motivated by 'concern for the welfare of Mr Adekoya or
1
Olu Adekoya Press Agency1.
The court emphasised the dangers to the administration of justice
implicit in the respondent's conduct. If a particular litigant were
deterred from pursuing his legal rights through the courts, this might
have a snowball effect and '[l]itigants [generally] would compromise
their rights [rather] than have them vindicated and then might would
2be right in such a society'.
The court accordingly concluded that the respondent's letters were 
calculated to interfere with the administration of justice and consti­
tuted a contempt of court. It thus ordered the respondent to withdraw 
the offending letters, to instruct all members of the NPAN to stop 
"blacking" the applicant, to publish a suitably worded apology to the 
court and to pay costs of N 50.
This case thus provides illuminating insight into the operation of the 
sub judice rule in its wider context. However, decisions of this kind 
have only peripheral significance for the media; and it is accordingly 
proposed to focus attention henceforth on the sub judice rule only 
insofar as it prohibits publication pendente lite. The first question 
which arises for examination is the manner in which prosecution for 
such prohibited publication may be instituted.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 46.
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9.5. Commencement of Proceedings for Contempt under the Sub Judice 
Rule.
In keeping with the general principles described above,* proceedings 
for contempt under the sub judice rule may be instituted by applying 
(with prior leave of a judge) for the committal of the alleged contemnor. 
Alternatively, the summary process may be instituted by a court of
2
its own motion, as graphically illustrated by the case of Re Onagoruwa.
Here, the proceedings arose out of the publication in the Sunday Times
on 13 May 1979 of an article written by Dr Onagoruwa (the appellant)
3
which, in essence, called on all those standing for the presidency
4
in the 1979 elections - and who had not, in fact, satisfied the 
requirements for eligibility provided by the Electoral Decree of 1977 
- to withdraw their candidacy. Proceedings had previously been insti­
tuted by one such candidate - Dr Azikiwe - against the Federal 
Electoral Commission •('FEDECO1), contesting FEDECO's 
ruling that he (Dr Azikiwe) had failed to pay his tax when due and was 
accordingly not eligible to stand in the elections. These proceedings 
came up for hearing before Arake, C.J. on 15 May - two days after the 
publication of the Sunday Times article. Counsel for Dr Azikiwe rose 
in court to complain that the article published by the appellant - by 
purporting to pass judgment on the issues in question - usurped the 
function of the court and was a blatant contempt."*
1. See p. 715 et seq.
2. Suit No FCA/E/117/79, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 270-289.
3. The facts of the case (particularly the content of the impugned 
article) are further described at p. 773.
4. See the section on the history of Nigeria, at p. 109.
5. This aspect of the decision is discussed further at p. 773 et seq.
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Counsel submitted that the appellant should be brought before the court 
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt;^ and 
Arake, C.J.'s response whs that he would 'give [the appellant] time 
up to Sunday 20th May 1979 to make amends [failing which] proceedings
2
[would] be commenced forthwith against him for him to purge his contempt.
On 22 May, Arake, C.J. having apparently 'seen no amends of any sort
in [the] Sunday Times of 20/5/79, concluded that no steps had been taken
3
to comply with his order' and - regarding this as contempt of his
Court - recorded that he would make an order for the immediate arrest
of the appellant and for him to be brought before him on the 28th May
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. It appeared,
however, that this order was never formally made and that no warrant
for arrest was in fact issued. The Chief Judge's order for the appellant's
arrest was, however, widely publicised by the media; and on the 28th,
the appellant (accompanied by counsel) accordingly appeared before the
court (notwithstanding the absence of any order served on him to do
so) 'out of ... respect ... for the judiciary, ... :[and] in defence of ... the
4
welfare and freedom of the press'. The submission of counsel for the
appellant (denying, inter alia, that the article constituted a contempt)
were given short shrift by the learned Chief Judge, who asserted that
5
the article was clearly a contempt of court and ordered that the 
appellant 'be confined at the prisons at Enugu until such time as he
1. Ibid., at 285.
2. Ibid., at 286.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., at 272.
5. The reasons for this conclusion are further discussed at p . 744.
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[had] purged his contempt'* (in failing to make amends as required) - 
at which point the court would determine the appropriate penalty for 
the initial contemptuous publication.
The appellant's appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was unanimously
2
allowed, by virtue of the procedural irregularities described above . Of 
significance for present purposes, however, is the disquiet expressed 
by the Court (per Belgore, C.J.A.) at the manner in which the summary 
process had been set in train. The proceedings provide a clear example
of a court acting ex mero motu: and graphically demonstrate that the re­
sult is to merge the roles of prosecutor and arbiter in a single indi­
vidual, in a manner clearly inconsistent with fundamental principles
3
of . natural justice . Thus, as Belgore, C.J.A. stressed, (in graphic
if somewhat inelegant terms) the trial had been conducted 'by the
Court prosecuting, finding the appellant guilty, [and] sentencing him
4
while the court itself virtually became the accuser'. He accordingly
emphasised that '[t]here must be [an] accuser before the Court in
5 6 7
contempt ex facie curiae as in R v Jackson ... and II v Ojukoko ...'.
1. Re Onagoruwa, supra, as reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 280.
2. Most important of these was the failure to serve any order on the
appellant or to specify the nature of the amends required.
3. Worse still, the same individual is often also the party aggrieved.
4. Re Onagoruwa, supra, p. 288.
5. (1925) 6 N.L.R. 44, discussed in full in Chapter Ten.
6. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60, further discussed at p. 769. The important 
point for present purposes is that proceedings for contempt through 
sub judice publication were brought by the Attorney-General in both 
these instances.
7. Re Onagoruwa, supra, p. 288.
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It is submitted that there is considerable merit in this recommendation: 
and that it should be generally accepted and applied in Nigeria, not­
withstanding the long line of common law authority in which the capacity 
of a court to proceed ex mero motu in respect of an alleged contempt 
ex facie curiae has been acknowledged. Unfortunately, however,
Belgore, C.J.A. was the only member of the Appeal Court to refer 
expressly to this point (though the need for fairness in exercising 
the summary jurisdiction was emphasised by the entire Bench). It is 
therefore to be hoped that this important dictum will not be overlooked
in future cases; and that it will be generally recognised in Nigeria
1
that fair trial requires, at minimum, that proceedings be instituted 
by an independent law officer; and that the same individual should not 
fulfill the roles of both prosecutor and judicial arbiter.
As regards the suggested requirement that the consent of a Law Officer
should be needed for the institution of proceedings, it is salutary to
note that the Contempt of Court Act 1981, recently enacted in the
United Kingdom, indeed introduces a requirement that proceedings
2
for contempt under the 'strict liability' rule (which governs sub
judice publication) should be commenced either with the consent of
the Attorney-General, 'or on the motion of a court having jurisdiction 
3
to deal with it'. There is a certain merit in this provision: although 
it would have been far preferable if the capacity of the court to proceed
1. This is recommended as a minimum reform. Further necessary changes 
in the law are further analysed in due course.
2. This rule is further examined at p. 801 et seq.
3. S. 7, Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
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ex mero motu had been excluded altogether - or, at least, confined to 
instances of contempt in facie curiae. It is accordingly submitted that 
Nigeria would do well to follow this lead - provided the further amend­
ment is also made*.
9.6. The Type of Publication Prohibited by the Sub Judice Rule
In keeping with its general purpose of preventing prejudice to fair
trial, the sub judice rule restricts publications of many different
types. Thus, for example, it prohibits the publication of matter likely
to be inadmissible in evidence, such as information relating to an
2
accused's previous convictions or misconduct; statements that an
accused has confessed to committing the offence charged or has otherwise
3
admitted incriminating facts; or descriptions of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of a crime which may be found inadmissible 
4
as hearsay. In addition, publications that may affect the weight
5
accorded admissible evidence - by espousing the case of the accused,
0
for example, or of one of the parties in civil proceedings',
1. This is recommended as a minimum reform. Further necessary changes 
in the law are further analysed in due course.
2. Miller, op.cit., p. 97; who cites the examples of R v Parke [1903]
2 K.B. 432 and R v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., [1962] N.I.L.R. 15, 
discussed further below.
3. Miller, ibid., p. 98, citing Clarke, ex parte Crippen (1910)
103 L.T. 636, discussed further below.
4. Miller, ibid., citing the 'Crumbles' case in 1924 in relation to which 
'[t]hree leading newspapers, which had published the results of 
their investigations into the circumstances surrounding the death
[of Emily Kaye] were ... fined for contempt'. See, also, Evening 
Standard, ex p. P.P.P. (1924) 40 T.L.R. 833.
5. Miller, ibid., p. 96. citing Onslow's and Whalley's Case where two 
members of Parliament who took up the cause of the accused and 
called a series of meetings 'charging that he was the victim of 
conspiracy' were found to be in contempt.
6. As in the "thalidomide" case, Attorney-General v Times Newspapers 
Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E)), discussed below.
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or disclosing that a secret tender or payment of money into court has
been made* - are also included within the prohibition. So too are
2
publications prejudging the issues in proceedings; or exposing witnesses
3
to improper influences. Space does not permit full examination of all; 
and it is accordingly proposed to focus on four types of publication 
which have received particular attention in Nigeria and England.
9.6.1. Sub Judice publication directly prejudicial to an accused
A classic illustration of the publication of matter directly prejudicial
to the fair trial of a defendant in criminal proceedings (and which
would not generally be admissible in evidence) is provided by the
4
Nigerian decision of R v Ojukoko. Here, applications for committal 
(or attachment) for contempt of court were brought against the editors 
and printers of three Lagos newspapers (the Daily Times, Nigerian 
Advocate and Eko Akete). This arose from the publication, in each, of 
virtually identical articles alluding to a recent theft from Government 
House, Lagos, and 'stating that the crime had been traced to an ex- 
con Viet who had recently been discharged from prison'.'* The 
Attorney-General contended that these articles were calculated to pre­
judice the fair trial of any person charged with the offence and that they 
accordingly constituted a contempt of court. Tew, J., delivering the
1. K.W. Stuart, The Newspaperman's Guide to the Law, 3rd ed.,Durban^-982, p. 11
2. As for example, in Re Onagoruwa, supra, .as further discussed below; 
and also in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C.273 
(H.-L. (Ej ), /likewise further discussed below.
3. As, for example, in Vine Products Ltdv Green, [1966] 1 Ch 484,
further discussed in due course. For this reason, the publication
of a photograph of a suspect may also constitute contempt, as it 
may prejudice a witness in approaching what is always the difficult 
task of identification. See Miller, op.cit., pp. 103-105.
4. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60, reproduced in Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 240-242.
5. R v Ojukoko, supra, as reproduced in Fawehinimi, op.cit., p. 240.
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judgment of the Court, emphasised that it was very likely that the 
articles in question would have been read by persons called upon to 
serve as jurors at the trial. Thus 'should the person to whom these 
paragraphs refer[red] be committed for trial, * it [was] almost certain 
that some at least of the jurors empanelled would take their seats 
knowing that the accused was alleged to have been previously convicted1. 
It followed that the articles constituted a contempt of court.
English precedent provides a number of further examples of publications
3
of this nature being found to constitute contempt. Thus, in R v Parke,
'an article in the Star newspaper stating that a person currently
charged with forgery had a previous conviction for the same offence
4
was held to be a contempt'. Likewise, in R v Beaverbrook Newspapers 
5
Ltd., the publication of the criminal record of one Robert McGladdery 
who was about to be arrested on a charge of murder was found to cons-
6
titute contempt; as was the description in R v Thomson Newspapers Ltd.,
of Michael Malik (recently charged with contravening the Race Relations
Act 1965 through abusive and insulting language at a public meeting)
as having had an 'unedifying career as brothel-keeper, procurer and
7
property racketeer'.
1. Ibid., p. 241. It seems thus that no person had yet been committed
for trial, and this raises, in acute form, the question,o f !when 
the sub judice rule comes into operation, as further discussed at 
p. 831, et seq (in relation to criminal proceedings, as here).
2. Ibid.,
3. [1903] 2 K.B. 432.
4. Miller, op.cit., p. 97.
5. [1962] N.I.L.R. 15.
6. R v Thomson Newspapers Ltd., ex p. Attorney-General, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1.
7. Ibid., at 4.
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1In addition, in R v Clarke, ex parte Crippen, the Daily Chronicle
was found guilty of contempt for 'publishing a statement from a special
correspondent suggesting that 'Crippen admitted in the presence of
witnesses that he had killed his wife, but denied that the act was 
2
murder''. Yet another illustration is provided by the case of R v
3
Evening Standard Co. Ltd., ex parte Attorney-General, in which a reporter 
for the Evening Standard (who had been attending the trial for murder 
of a man named Kemp) telephoned to his head office a description of the 
proceedings which provided the foundation for the following article:
...'Mrs Gertrude Darmody, of Spitalfields,
Norwich, said at the assizes here today 
that a man accused of murdering his wife 
asked her to marry him. Mrs. Darmody said 
she met Kemp in a public house in September 
last year'.
4
It transpired, however, that the journalist had been gravely mistaken 
in his report of the proceedings, for no such statement had been made 
by Mrs Darmody at all; and similar evidence provided by another wit­
ness in earlier committal proceedings had been ruled inadmissible as
being irrelevant and prejudicial to the accused. The article was held
5
to constitute a contempt.
1. (1910) 103 L.T. 636.
2. Ibid, at 637.
3. [1954] l.Q.B. 578.
4. See Miller, supra, p. 120.
5. The article was also a contempt for another reason: the fact that
it misreported court proceedings. Contempt through such publication 
is further discussed in Chapter Eleven below. The case graphically 
illustrates the operation of the 'strict liability' principle, and 
this aspect of the decision is considered further below.
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A further illustration - of a somewhat different order - is provided
1
by the case of Attorney-General v English. Here, in October 1981, an 
article was published in the Daily Mail newspaper, supporting the can­
didature (in a Parliamentary by-election) of one Mrs Carr, who had 
been born without arms and was standing on an independent "pro-life" 
platform, which advocated the 'sanctity of life and the right of every
person, however severely handicapped, to be cherished and encouraged 
2
to live1. The article warned that the chances of a handicapped baby (such 
as Mrs Carr herself) being allowed to survive in modern times were slim;
and submitted that 1[s]omeone would surely recommend letting [such a
3
baby] die of starvation, or otherwise disposing of [it]. The article 
was published on the third day of the trial of an eminent consultant 
paediatrician for the murder of a newborn baby who was mongoloid: and 
in which it was contended by the prosecution that the consultant (in 
accordance with the parents' wishes) had 'administered to the new born
child a drug which prevented it from taking nourishment, as a result of
4
which it had died of starvation three days after birth'. The House
of Lords was satisfied that the article created 'a substantial risk of
5
serious prejudice' to the fair trial of the consultant (even though 
he had, in fact, notwithstanding its publication, been acquitted by the 
jury of attempted murder); and would, accordingly, have found that the
1. [1982] 2. W.L.R. 959 (D.C.); [1982] 3W.L.R. 278 (H.L.(E.)). The 
case's main importance lies, of course, in illustrating the operation 
of the new Contempt of Court Act 1981. Nevertheless, the content of 
the article provides a good illustration of material prejudicial to 
the fair trial of an accused.
2. Attorney-General v English, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 959 (D.C.).
3. Ibid., at 963.
4. Attorney-General v English, [1982] 3. W.L.R. 278 (H.L.(E.)), at 281.
5. This is the formula provided by the new Contempt of Court Act, 1981, 
as further discussed below.
6. The judge had directed acquittal on the alternate murder charge.
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article constituted a contempt: were it not for a new defence^- which 
has been introduced into the law in England (in s 5 of the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981, as further discussed below), but which has no counter­
part in Nigerian law.
The rationale for restriction of this kind in instances of trial by jury
is reasonably clear (although, as Miller points out, 'there have been
a number of striking- examples in recent years of cases in which a jury
2
has acquitted in spite of its knowledge of previous conviction'.).
However, where trial is by judge alone, the reason for restricting 
publication of this kind falls in large measure away, as further 
discussed in due course.
9.6.2. Publication pre-judging the issues in proceedings
Publications which pre-judge the issues in pending proceedings are
considered a contempt of court under the sub-judice rule because they
tend to usurp the proper function of the trial court. As example of
a publication alleged to constitute contempt on this ground is provided
3
by the case of Re Onagoruwa. Here, the Sunday Times, on 13 May, had
published an article written by Dr Onagoruwa ('the appellant') and
entitled: '"FEDECO and TAX. It is a matter of law and Public morality 
4
not politics"'. The article referred to FEDECO's ruling that Dr Azikiwe 
had failed to pay income tax 'as and when due' in the preceding
1. The defences available are further discussed below, and so too is
the utility of the new statutory defence in England.
2. Miller, supra, p. 97, citing the examples of the Kray and Janie Jones
trials. The case of Attorney-General v English, supra, provides
yet another illustration of the principle that juries are not necessarily 
affected by adverse publicity, for here the jury was clearly not 
influenced by the prejudicial article when it acquitted,the accused.
3. Suit No FCA/E/117/79, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 270-289.
4. See Fawehinimi, ibid., p. 277.
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three years and was accordingly disqualified from standing as a candidate
in the 1979 Presidential elections. It asserted that Dr. Azikiwe -
according to FEDECO - had indeed failed to pay his taxes before their
due date; and stressed the need (after thirteen years of military rule )
for political leaders 'to learn the basic fact that no society can
2
survive on distortion'. In conclusion, it called '[i]n the interest
of posterity, [on] those who have not satisfied the requirements of
3 4the Electoral Decree [to] withdraw'.
Dr Azikiwe had previously instituted proceedings against FEDECO, claiming 
declarations that he had indeed paid his tax when due and was accordingly 
eligible to stand for the presidency. These proceedings commenced two
5
days after the publication of the article and, as previously explained,
the presiding judge instituted summary proceedings for contempt (in
6.\
the highly irregular form described above ) against the appellant.
When Dr Onagoruwa appeared before him, Arake, C.J. ruled that '[h]aving
read the article all over (sic) several times there [was] no other
impression one would get other than that the writer intend[ed] to pass
7
judgment of the case before the Court. On appeal, the Federal Court of
1. See the section on the History of Nigera at p. 97 et seq.
2. See Fawehinmi, supra p. 278.
3. Under the Electoral Decree (no 73 of 1977), no candidate could
stand for the presidency unless he had satisfied certain requirements, 
of which proper payment of income tax was one.
4. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 278.
5. See p. 764 above.
6. The importance of the various procedural irregularities in the case have 
been further examined above..
7. Supra, p. 279.
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Appeal was more concerned with the procedural irregularities which (the
1
Court held) vitiated the committal for contempt than with the question
whether the article in fact contravened the sub judice rule. Certain
dicta of Areme, and Belgore, J.J.C.A. provide some guidance, however,
in. this regard. Thus, Areme, J.C.A. pointed out that '[M]any judicial
opinions have been expressed in long line of cases that publication
calculated to prejudice the minds of the public concerning a pending
2
action is a serious contempt1. He also cited the dictum of Cotton, L.J. 
in Hunt v Clark the effect that:
'"If any one discusses in a paper the rights 
of a case or the evidence to be given 
before the case comes on, that ... would 
be a very serious attempt to interfere 
with the proper administration of Justice. 
It is not necessary that the Court should 
come to the conclusion that a judge or 
jury will be prejudiced, but if it is 
calculated to prejudice the proper trial 
of a cause, that is contempt, and would be 
met with necessary punishment in order to 
restrain such conduct"'.
4
Unfortunately, however, (from the viewpoint of obtaining further clari­
fication of the law relating to publications 'sub judice'), Areme, J.C.A. 
made no attempt to apply these principles to the publication in question, 
nor to indicate whether the article constituted a contempt or not.
Belgore J.C.A. emphasised that:
'The matter before the Court was a civil 
one, there was no jury in that Court and
1. These procedural irregularities are further discussed at p. 765 and 766.
2. Supra, p. 283.
3. (1889) 58 L.J.Q.B. 490.
4. Ibid., at 492.
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it [wasl not imaginable that a publication
tending to prejudice (sic) the issue would
influence the mind of the judge sitting alone
he being learned and able to shift (sic)
through the evidence and arrive at his own
conclusion'..1
He further observed that the risk of interference in proceedings by 
publication had been much reduced in Ertgland since the decline of the 
jury in civil matters and opined that '[a] publication will not grossly
2
affect the hearing the Court (sic) if it is cautious in its treatment'. 
Unfortunately, however, Belgore, J.C.A.,made no attempt to apply these 
principles to the publication in question and gave no ruling on whether 
it constituted a contempt.
In conclusion, he stressed the danger of the courts 'unwittingly ...
3
bringing the doctrine [of contempt] itself into contempt', and ruled 
that the conviction and committal should be set aside.
The judgment thus throws little light on the important question of
whether an article of the kind in question 'prejudges the issues' so as
to constitute contempt of court. The view of the trial judge was clear;
and was not, unfortunately, overruled (in this respect) on appeal. In
the latter proceedings, Phil-Ebosie, J.C.A. expressed no view on the
matter; Aseme, J.C.A. simply emphasised the long line of authorities
confirming that 'publication calculated to prejudice the minds of the
4
public concerning a pending action is a serious contempt' and stressed
1. Ibid., p. 289.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See ibid., p. 283; and the discussion of Aseme, J.C.A.'s judgment above.
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1
that it is not actual, but likely, prejudice that is important; whilst
Belgore, J.C.A. seemed to believe that the likelihood of prejudice
(through publication pendente lite);is small - especially where trial
is by judge alone (without a jury) and the publication is cautiously 
2
phrased.
It is submitted that the article - although it made certain comments
3
on the merits of the proceedings between Dr Azikiwe and FEDECO - should
not be regarded as constituting a contempt. It was restrained in tone and
its main force consisted in its appeal to those 'who have not satisfied
4
the requirements of the Electoral Decree [to] withdraw1. It might be 
contended that this appeal ipso facto judged the issues in the case and 
accordingly constituted a contempt. But this, it is submitted, it to take 
unduly narrow a view. It must be remembered (as pointed out by 
Belgore, J.C.A.) that the proceedings were to be tried by a judge alone; 
and it is highly unlikely that a trained judicial officer would be def­
lected from a proper assessment of the evidence and issues in the proceed­
ings by an article such as that published in the Sunday Times. Accordingly,
5
there was no 'substantial risk' of 'serious prejudice' to the forthcoming 
trial - and there should have been no question of the article being held 
to constitute a contempt.
1. These dicta would seem to indicate that Aseme, J.C.A. believed that 
the article did constitute a contempt.
2. This indicates that Belgore, J.C.A. would have held that the article 
was not contempt. These two conflicting opinions, therefore, provide 
(unfortunately) little clarity.
3. For example, it stated that 'all payments made during 1978/79 were 
made after FEDECO had written to all the Presidential candidates 
(including Dr Azikiwe on February 6 1979)'; and it asserted, accordingly, 
that 'the taxes for the various years were not paid "as and when
due"' - that is, on March 31 of every tax year.
4. See Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 278.
5. This, of course, is to use the terminology now reflected in the
Contempt of Court Act 1981 in the United Kingdom (as further explained 
below) which provides, it is submitted, appropriate criteria for 
determining the degree of prejudice required for conviction.
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A further illustration of a publication.allegedly usurping the function
of the court through pre-judging the issues in proceedings is provided
1
by the case of Akinrinsola v The Attorney-General of Anambra State.
Here (somewhat unusually) the appellant had been summarily tried and
convicted of contempt under s 133 of the Criminal Code (rather than under 
2
the common law). The proceedings had arisen from the publication of
3
an article written by him in the Sunday Punch of 13 May 1979 in which
the appellant had indicated 'the manner in which he thought the Federal
Electoral Commission ('FEDECO') should apply the provisions of the
Electoral Decree, with particular reference to non-clearance of candi-
4
dates for election for failure to pay tax'. On appeal, the Federal
Court of Appeal stressed that the article constituted no more than a
'general comment' on the issue, and emphasised further:
'This apart, judicial opinions are that in 
a case of a trial by a judge alone, as in 
this case, it is only rarely that a publi­
cation will be held to constitute a contempt 
under this head, as it is accepted that 
judges are capable of guarding against 
allowing any prejudicial matter to influence 
them in deciding a case unless there is a 
campaign of pressure (which is not the case 
here) that is so great that even a judge r
could not safely be assumed to be unaffected'.
1. (1980) 2 N.C.R. 17.
2. As previously explained, proceedings under the summary common 
law procedure preserved by s 6 of the Criminal Code Act are far 
more the norm.
3. Interestingly, this is the same date as that on which the article 
in issue in Re Onagoruwa, supra, was published. Clearly, the 
matter was one of considerable public concern at that time.
4. Akinrinsola v The Attorney-General of Anambra State, supra, at 22.
5. Ibid.
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For this reason and one other'*' (not relevant for present purposes) , 
the appeal was allowed.
This decision is greatly to be welcomed: not only for its recognition 
that comment in general terms does not pre-judge issues and thus 
usurp the function of the court, but also for its emphasis on the 
improbability of a judge (as opposed to a jury) being influenced by 
a publication unless - possibly - it is such as to amount to a
* . 2 'campaign of pressure1.
Of particular significance in the context of contempt through pre­
judgment of issues in pending litigation is the celebrated (or notorious)
3
case of Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd. The underlying facts 
are well known and, accordingly, are canvassed in brief outline only.
From 1958 to 1961, Distillers (Biochemicals) Ltd. ('Distillers') 
marketed in the United Kingdom a drug commonly known as 'thalidomide' 
which was widely advertised as a "safe" sedative for pregnant women.
4
It appeared, however, that quite the converse was true: for some 451 
babies were born grossly deformed as a consequence of their mothers 
having taken the drug during the early weeks of pregnancy. 62 children 
brought claims for damages for negligence against Distillers within 
the three-year limitation-period prescribed by statute - and these
1. The appeal was also allowed on jurisdictional grounds: in that the
offence had been committed outside Anambra State, and the State 
High Court accordingly lacked jurisdiction to deal with it under 
the Criminal Code.
2. Publications which impose improper pressure on a litigant are" 
further considered below.
3. [1973] 1 Q.B. 710; [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
4. See the judgment of Lord Denning, M.R. in the Court of Appeal:
[1973] 1 Q.B. 710 at 735.
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claims were settled, in 1968, by a payment of £1,000,000 to those 62.
1
A further 266 were given leave to commence proceedings out of time and
it appeared that writs might still be issued by another 123. Appearances
to the writs had been entered by Distillers, but no further step in the
proceedings had been taken.. Considerable legal difficulties lay in
the way of the children's claims succeeding. First, the claims were,
strictly, time-barred. Secondly, it is by no means clear whether,;in
2
English law, an action lies for pre-natal injury to a foetus.
Thirdly, it would have to be shown that Distillers had been negligent
and this would have involved reliance on extremely complex medical
and scientific evidence. The claimants were accordingly reluctant to
press the litigation to court: and Distillers were perhaps equally
reluctant to risk an adverse finding in trial proceedings. Attempts
were accordingly made to reach a settlement; and Distillers proposed
the establishment of a trust fund of some£3.25 million to cover the
3
400 or so claims not included within the 1968 settlement. Not all 
the parents of the children were prepared to accept this offer, however, 
and so, by 1972, (some ten years after the occurrence of the tragedy) 
no compensation at all had been received by the majority of the 
thalidomide victims.
The editor of the Sunday Times took a keen interest in their plight 
and collected considerable data on the matter in preparation for a
1. There appears to be some confusion in the different judgments as 
to the precise number of suits in fact pending. Thus, for example, 
Lord Reid (see [1974] A.C. 273 at 292) states that 'By February 
1969, 248 writs had been served'. It is submitted that the correct 
number is not particularly important; and the figure of 266 reflected 
in the text (and which is derived from the judgment of Lord Denning, 
ibid.) is given simply to illustrate the magnitude of the thalidomide 
tragedy.
2. See the judgment of Lord Widgery, C.J. in the Divisional Court: 
supra at 718.
3. Such unanimous agreement was essential, as Distillers had made it
a condition of settlement that all claimants should agree to accept
(Continued)
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series of articles which he proposed to publish in the high-circulation
Sunday newspaper with a view to persuading Distillers to offer a more
generous sum.^ On 24 September, 1972, the first article was published.
It canvassed the need for a change in the law to impose strict liability
upon drug manufacturers and distributors; and queried the adequacy of
currently accepted methods of assessing damages. Its 'sting' lay in
its final paragraph, which asserted that 'the thalidomide children 
2
shame Distillers' and which pointed out that the sum offered in settle­
ment (£3.25m) '[did] not shine as a beacon agains pre-tax profits
[the previous] year of £64.8 million and company assets worth £421 
3
million'.
Following publication of this article, Distillers immediately brought 
it to the attention of the Attorney-General, contending that it consti­
tuted a contempt of court. The Attorney-General declined to take 
action; but did ask the Sunday Times for their observations on this 
allegation. This prompted the editor of the newspaper to send to the 
Attorney General for prior "clearance" the draft of an article of a 
somewhat different nature - one which 'contain[ed] a detailed analysis 
of the evidence against Distillers [and which] marshal[led] forcibly 
the arguments for saying that Distillers did not measure up to their 
responsibility, [although] to be fair, it did also summarise the arguments
(Continued
it. The great majority were prepared to do so - possibly out of 
fear that they would otherwise receive nothing. Five refused to 
do so; and an unsuccessful attempt was made to compel these five 
to agree - see In re Taylor's Application [1972] 2.Q.B. 369.
1. The question of the editors intent is discussed in greater detail 
at p. 787 below.
2. This passage is quoted in a number of differentjudgments. See, for 
example, that of Lord Reid, in [1974] A.C. 273, at 293.
3. Ibid.
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that could be made for Distillers': and it concluded by stating:
'There appears to be no easy set of answers'.^-
The Attorney-General thereupon issued a writ against the newspaper
claiming an injunction restraining publication of the draft article.
The application was heard by a Divisional Court which granted the
injunction sought. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the injunction
was discharged; but, on further appeal to the House of Lords, it was
restored. Application was then made to the European Commission on the
2
ground that the House of Lords' judgment infringed Article 10 of the 
European Convention of 1950. The Commission found a prima facie 
infringement, and referred the matter to the European Court of 
which - by a majority of eleven to nine - found that the judgment indeed 
constituted a violation of Article 10 and that the United Kingdom was 
accordingly in breach of her obligations under the European Convention.
As this brief summary suggests, many different views as to the legality 
of the draft article were expressed in the course of the proceedings. 
There were two main grounds on which the draft article was said to 
constitute contempt: first, because it tended to prejudge the issue 
of negligence; and, secondly, because it sought to bring pressure to 
bear on Distillers in its conduct of the litigation. The first ground 
is of special relevance for present purposes; and the various dicta 
expressed on this issue are accordingly canvassed below.
1. See Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government, [1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 245, 
para. 63.
2. This Article guarantees freedom of expression, in terms which are 
substantially similar to the Nigerian Guarantee, for which (of 
course) it forms the model. See the section on the Nigerian Bill 
of Rights, at p. 199.
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The House of Lords placed particular emphasis on the 'prejudgment'
principle. This was especially evident in the judgment of Lord Reid,
who went so far as to assert that 'anything in the nature of prejudgment
of a case or of specific issues in it is objectionable.'^ He explained
this by emphasising that such prejudgment might not only affect the
outcome of the particular proceedings, but might also have far-reaching
side-effects, serving to encourage "trial by media" which, in turn,
would mean that 'unpopular people and unpopular causes [would] fare 
2
very badly'.
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest further emphasised that 'the courts ...
owe it to the parties to protect them ... from the prejudices of pre- 
3
judgment'; whilst Lord Diplock likewise stressed that 'there should
4
be no usurpation of the decision-making function of the courts'.
Lord Cross of Chelsea reiterated the need to 'maintain the rule that 
any "prejudging" issues, whether of fact or of law, in pending proceed­
ings - whether civil or criminal - is in principle an interference with 
the administration of justice'.^
Applying these principles to the draft article, the House of Lords 
was unanimous in holding that the draft article constituted a contempt 
because it tended to prejudge the issue of Distillers' negligence.
1. Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)),
at 300.
2. Ibid.
3 . Ibid., at 307.
4. Ibid., at 309.
5. Ibid., at 322.
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Its reasoning in this regard is pithily summarised by Lord Diplock, 
who stressed that the article 'discussed prejudicially the facts and 
merits of Distillers' defence to the charge of negligence brought 
against them in the actions, before these [had] been determined by the 
court or the actions disposed of by settlement^
The response of the European Court to the prejudgment issue
was radically different. Emphasising that its function was to determine
whether the restriction against publication corresponded to a 'pressing 
2
social need', (an aspect of the judgment considered further in due 
3
course), the European Court stressed that the draft article was balanced
4
in its analysis and 'couched in moderate terms'. Moreover, its
5
conclusion: 'There appears to be no neat set of answers' left the issue 
of negligence wide open. Accordingly, different readers would have 
reached varying conclusions on the question of Distillers' liability; 
and thus - even if some had been disappointed by the ultimate judicial 
ruling on the question - this would not have had the effect of lowering 
public respect for the judiciary (especially in the light of the wide- 
ranging debate on the matter, which had high-lighted the complexities 
of the issues). In addition, the Court considered that publication of 
the article (and of any disclaimers Distillers might then have felt
1. Ibid., at 311.
2. It should be noted that the task of the European Court was to deter­
mine whether the restriction contravened the right ta freedom of
expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention. 
Derogation from this guaranteed right is permitted only through laws 
'necessary' in a democratic society for the furtherance of certain 
interests, including the authority of the judiciary. The Court, 
echoing its earlier judgment in the Handyside case, held that a
law is only thus 'necessary' if it corresponds to a 'pressing social
need'. Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government,[1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 
245, at para. 59.
3. See p. 790 and 871, especially.
4. Supra, at para. 63
5. Ibid.
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obliged to make) would have served the positive purpose of putting a 
'brake on speculative and unenlightened discussion'. ^
It is submitted that there is considerable merit in this lassessment; 
and that the House of Lords adopted an unduly narrow approach - 
especially in declaring that 'any' prejudgment of issues is prima 
facie a contempt. Their Lordships' application of this principle 
to the facts was also unduly severe: for it failed to take account of 
the article's balanced approach and the disclaimer as to 'neat' answers 
with which it concluded. By contrast, the approach of the European 
Court of Justice is fundamentally sound. Not only did it acknowledge 
that the canvassing of matters which form the background to pending 
litigation may be of vital importance in the general public interest, 
but it also recognised that the article posed no real threat either to 
fair trial or to public respect for the judiciary. This pragmatism is 
to be welcomed: and it should be clearly recognised that prejudgment 
does not ipso facto constitute contempt - especially where trial is to 
be conducted by a judicial officer whose training and experience 
insulates him to a considerable degree from the pressures of public 
opinion.
Other examples of alleged contempt through prejudgment of issues are
2
provided by the cases of Vine Products Ltd v Green, where - against 
the background of pending litigation on this point - an article 
expressing strong support for the view that only products from Jerez 
are entitled to the name 'sherry' was published in the Daily Telegraph -
1. Ibid., at para. 66.
2. [1966] 1 Ch. 484.
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1
and Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd., which concerned a television
documentary, describing (inter alia) the tests made and precautions
taken by the manufacturer of a controversial pregnancy-test drug which
was alleged to have caused deformities in babies. The outcome of both
2
cases is discussed further in due course.
9.6.3. Publications which pressurise a party to litigation.
Publications which put pressure on a party to litigation are considered 
a contempt of court not only because of the influence they may have 
on the outcome of the particular proceedings, but also because of their 
tendency to deter other potential litigants from seeking redress through 
the courts and thereby possibly exposing themselves to similar 'public 
obloquy'.^
The classic example of a publication alleged to constitute contempt on
the 'pressure' principle is provided by Attorney-General v Times 
4
Newspapers Ltd. Here, it may be recalled, it was the express and
acknowledged aim of the editor of the Sunday Times to put pressure on
5
Distillers to increase the amount of compensation it had offered to 
the 'thalidomide' victims. Thus, in the affidavit submitted by him 
to the Divisional Court, Mr Evans stated:
1. [1981] 2 W.L.R. 848 (C.A.).
2. See p. 791 and 793 respectively.
3. This term is one frequently invoked in the Sunday Times case ;(as 
discussed below), particularly by the House of Lords.
4. [1973] 1 Q.B. 710; [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
5. See p. 780 above, where the settlement offer is described.
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'I admit that my purpose in seeking to publish 
the draft article is to try to persuade 
Distillers to take a fresh look at their 
moral responsibilities, but I submit that 
this persuasion is in no way improper. In 
my judgment, the fate of these children is 
of great concern, not only to their parents 
but to the country as a whole'.
1
Both the Divisional Court and the House of Lords, however, took a very
different view of the legitimacy of bringing such pressure to bear upon
Distillers. The Divisional Court stressed that publication of the draft
article 'would create a serious risk of interference with Distillers'
2
freedom of action in the litigation'; and this danger was clearly its 
main reason for granting the injunction sought. In the House of Lords, 
Lord Diplock emphasised the undesirability of conduct:
'that is calculated to inhibit suitors generally 
from availing themselves of their constitutional 
right to have their legal rights and obligations 
ascertained and enforced in courts of law, 
by holding up any suitor to public obloquy 
for doing so or by exposing him to public and 
prejudicial discussion of the merits or 
facts of his case before they have been 
determined by the court or the action has been 
otherwise disposed of'.
3
Lord Diplock also pointed to yet another danger: that if a litigant who 
seeks to rely on the law as it stands is exposed to public vilification 
for so doing, the result may be a clamour for a change in the relevant 
rules; and hence, the substitution of "government by the media" for 
"government by Parliament" within the area of law concerned. His main
1. Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 710, at 720- 
721, where para. 26 of Mr Evans' affidavit is reproduced.
2. Ibid., at 726.
3. Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.))
at 310.
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concern, however, was the 'pressure' principle; and the principal basis
for Lord Diplock's conclusion, accordingly, was that the draft article
'held Distillers up to public obloquy for their conduct in relying upon
the defence, available to them under the law as it stands, that they
1
were not guilty of negligence'.
Other of the Law Lords attempted to place some limitations on the circum­
stances in which 'pressure' may be said to constitute contempt. Thus,
Lord Reid pointed out that to hold that 'any' pressure amounted to
contempt was going too far, as this would render it unlawful 'to seek
2
by fair comment to dissuade Shylock from proceeding with his action'
and this could not be correct. Lord Reid attempted to resolve the
3
conundrum by indicating that 'fair and temperate criticism' of a litigant 
should be regarded as legitimate. He then, however, felt constrained 
to add the proviso: except in a case 'involving witnesses, jury or 
magistrates [where] ... even fair and temperate criticism might be
4
likely to affect the minds of some of them so as to involve contempt'.
The result is thus to cast any principle which might otherwise have 
been distilled from his judgment into a quagmire of uncertainty.
In Lord Diplock's view, the important criterion lies in the distinction
between "private" and "public" pressure: the former being quite
legitimate, but the latter beii|g unlawful by virtue of the 'public 
5
obloquy' entailed. This did not satisfy Lord Simon of Glaisdale, however, 
who pointed out that:
1. Ibid., at 313-314.
2. Ibid., at 295.
3. Ibid., at 297.
4. Ibid., at 298.
5. Ibid., at 313.
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'It is the fact of interference [in the 
proper administration of justice] not 
the form that it takes, that infringes 
the public interest'.
1
Accordingly, in Lord Simon's view, private pressure may be equally
reprehensible unless justified on some appropriate basis; and he suggested
that such justification might be found in 'a common interest', based on
' genuine, unofficious and paramount concern for the real welfare of
the litigant', which would render 'fair, reasonable and moderate personal
2
representations ... appropriate'. On this view, thus, a private 
attempt to dissuade Shylock from his course would constitute contempt, 
unless motivated by concern for him rather than Antonio! The proposition 
is somewhat startling.
Some comfort may, however, be derived from the judgment of Lord Cross
3
of Chelsea who doubted whether it would be 'easy or logical' to dis­
tinguish between private and public pressure, and considered that the 
salient criterion was the manner in which pressure was applied. Thus, 
pressure in the form of misrepresentation or abuse may constitute contempt 
but 'if [a] writer states the facts fairly and accurately, and expresses 
his view in temperate language, the fact that publication may bring
pressure - possibly great pressure - to bear on the litigant should not
4
make it a contempt of court'. Applying this principle to the facts,
5
Lord Cross considered the first article published by the Sunday Times
1.. Ibid., at 318, emphasis supplied.
2. Ibid., at 319.
3. Ibid,,.at 325.
4. Ibid., at 326.
5. Ibid. The contents of this article are briefly described at p. 781
above.
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to be legitimate, but - unfortunately - made no ruling in this regard
on the draft article (which he had already found to constitute contempt
1
on the prejudgment principle ) .
The approach adopted by the Court of Appeal and the European Court of
Ri'jWtes. is markedly different - and, it is submitted, far to be preferred*
In the Court of Appeal, Phillimore, L.J. pointed out that Distillers
had been pressurising the children's parents to accept the Settlement
offered; and did not see how the exertion of pressure on the company
2
in return could be unfair. This sentiment was echoed by Lord Denning,M.R.,
who considered that the pressure on Distillers to increase their offer
3
was 'legitimate in the light of all [the circumstances']. The
European Court of Justice took a somewhat different approach; and, in
assessing whether there was a 'pressing social need' for restricting
publication in order to prevent unlawful pressure, stressed the wide-
ranging debate (both in and outside Parliament) which had already taken
place on the issue, and doubted whether 'publication of the article would
4
... have added much to the pressure already on Distillers'.
9.6.4. Publications which influence witnesses in proceedings.
Publications which tend to influence witnesses in pending proceedings 
are also considered a contempt of court because of the danger that 
they may affect the outcome of proceedings, and thus pollute the
1. Ibid., at 324.
2. Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 710, at 744.
3. Ibid., at 741-742.
4. Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government [1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 245,
para. 63.
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"stream of justice".
An example of a publication alleged to constitute a contempt on this
1
ground (as well as its tendency to prejudge the issues.) is provided
2
by the case of Vine Products Ltd v Green.
Here Vine Products Ltd (and others) had applied to court for a declaration
that they were entitled to advertise and sell their products under the
descriptions "British Sherry", "South African Sherry" and so forth,
without infringing any right of the defendants in these proceedings,
who claimed that no wine which had not been fortified, matured and
blended in the Jerez district of Spain could be sold as "sherry". Some 
3
time later - when pleadings had been closed and the matter set down for
trial - an article was published in The Daily Telegraph which (under
the heading "The Truth of Labels") proceeded to opine that 'Sherry,
to be fully entitled to the name, should come from Jerez ... [and that]
[t]o speak of South African or Cypriot sherry is as anomalous as to
4
speak of Spanish champagne'. Vine Products thereupon instituted pro­
ceedings against the editor and proprietors of the newspaper, alleging
that they had been guilty of contempt of court 'in causing or permitting
5
a discussion in the public print of the merits of their action'.
1. See p. 785.
2. [1966] 1 Ch. 484.
3. The writ in the "sherry" proceedings was issued on August 8, 1963 
in the Chancery Division of the High Court; and the article was 
published on June 8, 1965.
4. Vine Products Ltd.v Green, supra, at 487-488.
5. Ibid., at 488.
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One of the principal grounds on which Vine Products relied in support 
of its allegation was that 'the article was calculated to prevent wit­
nesses from giving evidence contrary to the views set out in the
article'.^ The court agreed that this was 'the most serious accusation
2
[which could be] levelled at th[e] article'; but nevertheless found 
the alleged risk of prejudice unsubstantiated. Buckley, J. acknowledged 
that not all the witnesses giving evidence in the proceedings would be
experts (that some, on the contrary, would be 'ordinary retailers'
3
not generally considered as falling within the 'expert' category ),
but nevertheless doubted whether 'this article would be likely to deter
any witness whom the plaintiffs might want to call from coming to give
evidence in the action, or that it would be likely to colour his
4
evidence if he were called'. The court further emphasised that: 'Th[e]
... [contempt] jurisdiction [is one] which should only be invoked
where the risk of the proper administration of justice being interfered
5
with is a real and grave one'. In the particular circumstances, 'so
far as interference with witnesses [was] concerned, this [was] not a
case in which it could be said that there [was] a real and grave risk
that witnesses [would] be either deterred from giving evidence or that
that truth or content of their evidence [would be] likely to be
6
affected in any way by what ... appeared in the article'.
1., Ibid.., , at 495 and 496.
2. Ibid., at 497.
3. Ibid., at 497. The significance of whether or not the witnesses would 
all be experts lies in the fact (as argued by the defence) that 
'witnesses of that sort [i.e. experts] would not be at all likely
to be influenced by such an article as this'. It is accordingly all 
the more significant that the court was prepared to accept that 
even lay witnesses would not have been affected.
4. Ibid., at 497, emphasis supplied.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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Another illustration of alleged contempt of this nature is provided by
Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd.^  Here, Schering, the manufacturer
of a controversial pregnancy test drug, Primodos, which was alleged
to have caused abnormalities in new-born babies, sought an injunction
against the screening - at a time when negligence suits against Schering
were pending - of a television documentary film which, inter alia,
featured one Dr Briggs, who had been Schering's director of research
at the relevant period, and who explained 'the investigation which he
and other members of the company made ... when the drug came under 
2
suspicion'. The injunction sought was granted by the Court of
3
Appeal on grounds irrelevant to the present study; and the significance
4
of the case lies in the dicta expressed by the Court as towhether 
the film had such a tendency to influence potential witnesses in the 
pending proceedings as to constitute contempt.
In this regard, Lord Denning, M.R. emphatically declared:
'... I can[not] see that any witness would 
be put in any difficulty at the trial.
It was suggested that Dr. ... Briggs might 
be embarassed if he were called as a 
witness. I do not think so. The commen­
tator was most considerate to him. No 
trace of his being bullied or treated 
unfairly. No element whatever of "trial 
by television"'.
5
1. [1981] 2 W.L.R. 848.
2. Ibid., at 857.
3. The Court of Appeal accepted that the film had been made in breach
of a duty of confidence owed to Schering, and were therefore not
prepared to countenance its screening.
4. Even though the case turned primarily on the breach-of-confidence 
point, it should be noted the alternate ground on which an injunction 
was sought was contempt. Accordingly, the Court's dicta on the 
contempt question are more than merely obiter.
5. Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd, supra, at 857.
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Lord Shaw emphasised that '[w]itnesses in an action are [either]
credible and reliable or they are not; [and that the accusatorial]
system of trial in which evidence is elicited by examination and cross-
examination provides the means of demonstrating the character and quality 
2
of a witness. Furthermore, the suggestion that 'prospective ...
witnesses [might] be deterred or discouraged from contributing_their
testimony if the documentary contain[ed] material which appear[ed] to
be at variance with or in contradiction of what they would have been
3
prepared to say from their actual knowledge' was also an 'unsubstantial
4
objection to producing the documentary', in the light of its balanced 
and objective treatment.
Both cases demonstrate a sound and practical approach to the risk of 
witnesses being influenced by media reports. It is submitted that 
this danger is slight: for expert witnesses are guided by professional 
competence and integrity, whilst lay witnesses with relevant personal 
experience are unlikely to have their recollection of events displaced 
by a contrary media account.
9.7. "Strict Liability" for Publication Contravening the Sub Judice 
Rule
Having identified four types of publication commonly alleged to constitute 
contempt under the sub judice rule, it is now appropriate to consider
1. Ibid., at 871.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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the test of liability for such publication. The crucial question in 
this regard is whether subjective intent to undermine the proper 
administration of justice is a pre-requisite to liability. The answer 
is clearly in the negative: for the authorities plainly show that it 
is the objective likelihood of prejudice arising which determines 
liability, rather than any subjective intent to bring this consequence 
about. Accordingly, liability under the sub judice rule is "strict" - 
as further explained in due course. Before turning to examine these 
cases and the principles which they illustrate, it should, however, be 
noted that subjective intent is not entirely irrelevant.
9.7.1. The relevance of intent to prejudice proceedings
Although, in general, liability is determined by the objective likelihood 
of prejudice resulting, it is also clear that subjective intent to 
prejudice proceedings has relevance as regards both conviction and 
sentence. Thus, actual intent to undermine the proper administration 
of justice may give rise to liability irrespective of whether prejudice 
has, in fact, resulted or is likely; whilst the absence of subjective 
intent may serve to mitigate the punishment imposed.
The first point is well illustrated by the decision in Skipworth1s
1and the Defendant's Case. Here the court found that a public speech
had been made 'with the express purpose of prejudicing [a pending]
trial by attacking witnesses, and of attempting 'by vituperation'
2
to prevent the Lord Chief Justice from presiding'. In the face of
1. (1873) L.R. 9 Q.B. 230.
2. Miller, op.cit., p. 160.
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such intent, it was irrelevant that the words were unlikely to have had
this effect; and that 'no one ... who [knew] anything about it could
1
ever imagine [they] could be effectual at all1.
Intent to influence proceedings includes not only direct intent to do
so (as in Skipworth's case, above) but also recklessness as to whether
or not such consequence results. Whether the alleged contemnor has
been reckless to this extent is a question of fact: to be determined
in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be inferred
2
from factors such as those in Bolam, ex parte Haigh. In this case, 
it may be recalled, the Daily Mirror described Haigh ('later found 
by the jury to have disposed of his victims with the aid of acid in
what proved to be one of the most notorious murder trials of the
3
century' ) as a 'vampire'; and proceeded to detail other murders he 
had committed in the past. The Divisional Court held that the publi­
cation surpassed all others in 'the long history of th[is] ... class
4
of case' in its prejudicial effect; and sentenced the editor to three 
months' imprisonment and the proprietors to a fine of £10,000. These 
severe penalties reflected the view of the court that the accused had 
not only been reckless of prejudice to fair trial in publishing the 
information, but had also wished to sensationalise the matter to 
maximum effect in the interests of increasing the newspaper's 
circulation.
1. (18 73) L.R. 9 Q.B. 230 at 236, per Blackburn, J.
2. (1949) 93 Sol. Jo. 220.
3. Miller, op.cit., p. 95.
4. Ibid.
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Such findings are rare, however, and - as Miller points out - 'there 
are few modern English cases in which a court has ascribed such an 
intention or culpable disregard to persons concerned with the publi­
cation of newspapers or with broadcasting'.^
As regards the second point - the relevance of subjective intent in
determining sentence - it should be noted that punishment is apt to
be lighter where prejudicial material has been published without intent
to jeopardise fair trial. Thus, for example, in Odhams Press Ltd.,
2
ex parte Attorney-General, the Divisional Court emphasised that absence
of mens rea was 'not a material or decisive question in the case
3
except as to penalty'; and in Evening Standard Co., Ltd., ex parte 
4
Attorney-General, the court's decision that the reporter (who had 
supplied the erroneous report which formed the basis for the prejudicial
5
article published by the newspaper ) should not be punished - even 
though guilty of contempt - was clearly based on the fact that 'he did
not deliberately send up that which he knew to be untrue',^ but had
7 8
merely been 'confused', owing to ill-health or other reasons.
1. Miller, ibid., p. 159.
2. [1957] 1 Q.B. 73.
3. Ibid., at 79, emphasis supplied.
4. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578.
5. See p. 771 above, where the content of the article is further
described.
6. Evening Standard case, supra, at 586.
7. Ibid.
8. The case of Thomson Newspapers Ltd, ex parte Attorney-General [1968]
1 All E.R. 268 demonstrates, however, that absence of mens rea does 
not necessarily ensure that the penalty imposed for contempt by 
publication will be minimal. Here an article prejudicial to the trial 
of Michael Malik was inadvertently published in the Sunday Times, 
the system established by the editor to guard against contemptuous 
publications having failed to operate in the particular circumstances. 
No penalty was imposed on the editor, but the main publishers,
Times Newspapers Ltd, incurred a £5000 fine.
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9.7.2. The relevance of intent to publish
The importance of subjective intent to publish material which -
objectively - is found to constitute a contempt, is illustrated by the
1
case of McLeod v St. Aubyn. Here, the appellant had loaned his copy
of the Federalist newspaper to the local public library of St Vincent
(in the West Indies), as the library had not received its usual copy.
Unknown to him, the issue contained certain letters which were abusive
and derogatory of the chief justice of the colony. He was convicted 
2
of contempt by the Supreme Court, and appealed to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council: which allowed his appeal on the basis
3
that he had 'never intended to publish'.
In general, however, where the narrow intent to publish is present
(a test which ipso facto must always be satisfied in relation to printers 
and others involved in the production and distribution of newspapers 
or broadcasts) the further intent to prejudice proceedings is clearly
irrelevant. Thus, as explained in due course, a printer's or distri­
butor's lack of knowledge of the offending material is no defence to 
4
liability.
9.7.3. Authority for the 'strict liability' rule.
As regards Nigerian decisions, authority for the 'strict liability' 
rule is implicit, rather than express. Thus, in R v
1. [1899] A.C. 549 (P.C.).
2. He was convicted under the branch of contempt known as 'scandalising'
the court, further discussed in Chapter Ten.
3. McLeod v St Aubyn, supra, at 562.
4. See p. 804 et seg (as regards the position of the printer) and p. 803
(as regards that of the distributor).
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1
Ojukoko, the question whether the accused had intended to prejudice
the trial of the thief was ignored by the court. Instead, Tew, J.
emphasised that 1[t]he essence of the offence is conduct calculated
to produce, so to speak, an atmosphere of prejudice in which the trial 
2
must go on'. It is clear from the overall context of this dictum 
that 'calculated' should be read as meaning 'likely'; and that the test 
to be applied was accordingly an objective one, which left no room for 
consideration of the accuseds' subjective intent in this regard.
Some doubt, however, as to whether the test is indeed perceived as
3
objective in Nigeria emerges from the decision of Re Onagoruwa,
4
in which the trial court, it may be recalled, found that the Sunday
Times article concerning Dr Azikiwe and the FEDECO ruling constituted
a contempt because it gave the unavoidable impression that 'the writer
5
intend[ed] to pass judgment on the case before the Court'. This
undoubtedly suggests that subjective intent is an important element
in liability: but it should also be noted that the trial judge made no
attempt to elaborate this point and that the Federal Court of Appeal
did not comment on it at all. Moreover, it is clear that no argument
was addressed to the court on this issue, and the decision's value
as a precedent in this regard is therefore questionable. Unfortunately
6
no further light is thrown upon the issue by the Akinrinsola case,
1. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 240-242.
2. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 240.
3. Suit No FCA/E/117/79, reproduced by Fawehinmi, supra, pp. 270-289.
4. See p. 774.
5. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 279, emphasis supplied.
6. Akinrinsola v Attorney-General of Anambra State, (1980) 2 N.C.R. 17
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in which the Federal Court of Appeal simply ruled that the article 
in question was too general in its comments to constitute contempt 
of court.
English common law authorities, however, are unanimous in holding
that liability for sub judice publication is strict. The clearest
expression of the principle is to be found in the following dictum
2
from the judgment of Palles, C.B., in Dolan:
'As to the law applicable to the case, 
there is no doubt. Actual intention 
to prejudice is immaterial. I wholly 
deny that the law of this Court has been 
that absence of an actual intention to 
prejudice is to excuse the party from being 
adjudged guilty of contempt of Court, if 
the Court arrives at the conclusion which 
I have arrived at, that there is a real 
danger that it will affect the trial'.
3
This statement (although it emanates from the Irish High Court) clearly 
represents the English common law as well; and it was expressly followed
4
by the. Divisional Court in Odhams Press, Ltd., ex parte Attorney-General, 
where Lord Goddard, C.J. stated:
'The test is whether the matter complained 
of is calculated to interfere with the 
course of justice, not whether the authors 
and printers intended that result'.
1. This is the view of Miller, op.cit., p. 158.
2. [1907] 2 I.R. 260.
3. Ibid., at 284 •
4. [1957] 1 Q.B. 73.
5. Ibid., at 80.
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Fur the r , all the cases discussed above (in the section explaining the 
types of publication which contravene the sub judice rule) provide 
implicit authority for the principle that liability for contempt under 
this head is strict. Even Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd.^~ 
demonstrates this; for the intent underlying the proposed publication 
was to awaken Distillers1 sense of moral responsibility and thereby 
to induce the company to offer a more generous settlement: rather than 
to interfere in the proper administration of justice.
Finally, it should be noted that statutory recognition has now been
conferred on the strict liability rule by the new Contempt of Court
Act 1981 in the United Kingdom. The principle is now defined in s 1
of the Act as 'the rule of law whereby conduct may be treated as a
contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice
2
in particular legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so'.
This rule, in terms of the Act, applies only to 'publications' (including
3
'any speech, writing, broadcast or other communication' ) and only to
4
those which, at a time when proceedings are 'active', create 'a sub­
stantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question 
will be seriously impeded or prejudiced'.^ These latter issues (the 
period during which the rule applies and the degree of potential pre­
judice necessary for liability) are further discussed in due course.
For the present, the practical operation of the strict liability prin­
ciple requires some examination.
1. [1973] 1 Q.B. 710; [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
2. S 1, Contempt of Court Act, 1981 (1981 c.49).
3. S 2(1), ibid.
4. S 2(3), ibid. The period for which proceedings are 'active' is
further discussed below.
5. S 2(2), ibid.
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9.7.4. The strict liability principle in general operation
The practical operation of the strict liability principle is clearly
illustrated in Nigeria by the case of R v Ojukoko,^ in which - as
2
discussed above - the editors of the newspapers concerned were found 
guilty of contempt on the basis of the objective likelihood of the articles 
prejudicing the minds of potential jurors. In this case, the operation 
of the rule - though harsh to some degree - does not seem inordinately 
so. The editors were at least aware of the theft from Government 
House and could, reasonably, have anticipated that some person would 
ultimately be charged with the offence; and that his trial might be 
prejudiced by their reports. However, the strict liability rule has 
a far wider ambit than this; and extends even to instances in which the 
alleged contemnor has no knowledge of the proceedings, or is genuinely 
mistaken in publishing a prejudicial report, or is bona fide motivated 
by true altruism. Moreover, it renders liable even the 'innocent 
distributor', who has no knowledge whatever that-a publication contains 
prejudicial material. The net of 'strict liability' thus stretches far 
and wide, as the following authorities amply demonstrate.
3
In Odhams Press, Ltd., ex parte Attorney-General, the defendants' 
lack of knowledge, at the time of publication of an article in The People 
newspaper, alleging that one Micallef was "up to his eyes in the foul 
business of purveying vice and managing street women", that Micallef 
had already been committed for trial on a charge of . brothel-keeping, 
was held irrelevant to their liability for contempt. The court's
1. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60.
2. The printers were aquitted for reasons further explained below.
3. [1957] 1 Q.B. 73.
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approach is summarised in the following statement of Lord Goddard, C.J.:
'It is obvious that if a person does not 
know that proceedings have begun or are 
imminent he cannot be writing or speech 
be said to intend to influence the course 
of justice or to prejudice a litigant or 
accused person, but that is no answer if 
he publishes that which is in fact calcu­
lated to prejudice a fair trial'.
1
2
In Evening Standard Co. Ltd., ex parte Attorney-General, the fact
that an honest mistake had been made by an experienced crime reporter
availed neither the reporter himself nor his editor when both were pro^
secuted for contempt following the publication of prejudicial matter
under the erroneous belief that it constituted a report of evidence given
3
by a witness during trial.
4
In Littlerv Thomson, the editor's statement that he 'had published the 
prejudicial article under the conviction: "that he was advancing and pro­
moting the cause of truth and justice"'^ was found to be an irrelevant 
consideration.
6
In R v Griffiths, the fact that the defendants - distributors m  the 
United Kingdom of the American magazine Newsweek - had no knowledge of 
(and no reason to suspect) the fact that a particular issue contained
1. Ibid., at 80, emphasis supplied.
2. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578.
3. Some account of the facts has previously been given at p. 771 above, 
but to explain these in greater detail, Forrest, a reporter on the 
Evening Standard had been attending the trial for murder of a man
called Kemp. He telephoned a report to his office which formed the 
basis for an article alleging that a witness at the trial, one
Mrs Darmody, had testified that Kemp had told her he was unmarried 
and had asked her to marry him. No such statement had in fact been 
made by Mrs Darmody; and it appeared that Forrest had mistakenly 
attributed to her evidence which he had heard given by another witness, 
Miss Briggs, at the earlier committal proceedings. This evidence 
by Miss Briggs had been ruled inadmissible at the trial as being
(continued)
-804-
material prejudicial to the trial (then in progress) of Dr John Bodkin 
Adams for murder was again held irrelevant to their liability for con­
tempt. The court rejected the defence of innocent dissemination (drawn, 
by analogy, from the law of defamation); emphasised that contempt is 
to be treated sui generis; and based its decision on the 'strict liability 
rule' laid down in Odhams Press.*
9.7.5. Practical operation of the strict liability principle in relation 
to printers
The practical effect of the strict liability principle at common law 
in relation to the printer of prejudicial material is to render him 
liable for contempt (if the material satisfies the objective test) 
irrespective of his knowledge of its content. This harsh result is 
amply demonstrated by the following authorities:
(Continued)
unduly prejudicial and irrelevant. It was clear that Forrest had 
made an honest mistake and that the editor of the newspaper had no 
reason to suspect the accuracy of the report. A contempt was never­
theless held to have been committed by both parties. See Miller, 
op.cit., p. 120 and pp. 160-161.
4. (1839) 2 Beav. 129* 48 E.R. 1129 (cited by Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 182).
5. Borrie & Lowe, ibid.
6. R v Griffiths and others, ex parte Attorney-General [1957] 2 All E.R.379
1. See ibid., at 383 and see Odhams case, above. Fines of £50 were 
imposed on the importers of Newsweek and on its distributors 
(W.H. Smith & Son) in order 'to emphasise the risk which is run by 
dealing in foreign publication imported here but which have no res­
ponsible editor or manager in the country'. (Supra, at 383). The 
court further emphasised that it was being expecially lenient in 
the particular circumstances; but warned that similar leniency might 
not be shown in future.
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In the case of St James's Evening Post,^~ where a printer was charged with
contempt, it was argued in her defence that she had no knowledge of the
contents of the offending publication. This defence was rejected by
Lord Hardwicke, L.C., who emphasised that the printing trade must be
exercised 'with prudence and caution1 and that 'it is no excuse to say
2
that the printer had no knowledge of its contents'.
3
In the subsequent case of ex parte Jones, Lord Erskine, L.C. followed 
the St. James's decision in coming to a similar conclusion; and stressed 
that:
'[a]s Lord Hardwicke observes, it is no 
excuse that the printer was ignorant of 
the contents....' 4
5
In Re American Exchange in Europe, Ltd. v Gillig, Lord Hardwicke's
decision was expressly followed by Stirling, J., who held that the
foreman printer was 'answerable for publishing the article complained of,
£
although he [was] entirely ignorant of its contents:
The common law principle is thus clear: and it is accordingly interesting
7
to note the conclusion of Tew, J., in R v Ojukoko ) that the printers of 
the newspapers containing the offending articles had been 'joined
1. (1742), 2 Atk. 469; 26 E.R. 683.
2. Ibid., (cited by Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 181).
3. (1806), 13 Ves. 237; 33 E.R. 283.
4. Ibid., at 239 and 284 respectively.
5. (1889), 58 L.J. Ch. 706.
6. Ibid.
7. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 240-242.
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tin the proceedings] as a matter of form'l and should not be penalised 
in any way. This is plainly contrary to the established authorities; 
and it is unfortunate therefore that Tew, J. did not elaborate his reasons 
for this ruling. It seems, moreover, (from the report of the proceedings) 
that no argument was addressed to the court on this point; and it appears 
that Tew, J. may not have given full consideration to the issue.
It is submitted that his decision was probably correct in principle - as 
further explained below - but it is unfortunate (from the viewpoint of 
the decision as a precedent in future cases) that Tew, J. did not examine 
the question in depth, or attempt to reconcile his conclusion with the 
English authorities to the contrary.
It is plain that the strict liability principle operates extremely harshly
in relation to printers of prejudicial material: and it is submitted that
some other test of liability should in future be applied to them - so as
to make it clear that their responsibility rests solely on their own 
2
subjective intent to undermine the proper administration of justice.
But how should such a test be formulated? Borrie & Lowe suggest that a
3
test based upon prima facie responsibility for publication, coupled with
4
knowledge iof the contents of the publication, would be appropriate.
It is submitted, however, that mere knowledge of the contents of a publi­
cation should not be sufficient to visit a printer with liability for 
contempt. His liability should be governed solely by his own subjective 
animus to undermine the proper administration of justice - which is by no
1. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 241.
2. 'Intent' includes indirect intent, which connotes recklessness as to 
whether or not prejudice results from a particular publication.
3. Thus, for example, a printer clearly has prima facie responsibility 
by the very fact of his trade, whilst a person in the position of the 
accused in McLeod v St Aubyn, [1899] A.C. 549 (P.C.) - who merely lent 
his copy of a newspaper to a library - does not.
4. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 179.
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means necessarily established by mere knowledge of content - and nothing short 
of this specific intent should suffice for liability. It is according submitted 
that the printer should be acknowledged as simply a secondary party in 
publication: and that his liability:should therefore depend on his know­
ledge of all legally relevant facts: as explained further below (in 
relation to the liability of others involved in the process of 
publication).
9.7.6. Strict liability in relation to others in the publication 
process
From the discussion above, it is clear that the common law imposes strict
1 2
liability upon both distributors and printers of material which - 
objectively - is calculated to prejudice pending proceedings. Considerable
controversy surrounds the liability of others involved in the production
3 . 4of media reports: such as the editor, proprietor (either corporate or
5 6
unincorporate ) the manager or director of an incorporated proprietor
7
and (in the context of television) the programme contractor.; and this 
question is further examined below.
1. See R v Griffiths, [1957] 2 Q.B. 192, discussed at p. 803 above.
Though this decision involved a large commercial distributor, it is 
clear that - in principle - liability extends even to the corner-shop 
news-agent or street vendor.
2. The liability of printers has, of course, been discussed above.
3. See the Odhams Press case, [1957] 1 Q.B. 73 at 80.
4. See R v Thomson Newspapers, ex parte Attorney-General, [1968] 1 All
E,R.~268.
5. See Miller, op.cit., p. 177.
6. See Bolam, Ex parte Haigh, (1949) 93 Sol. Jo. 220.
7. See Attorney-General v London Weekend Television Ltd. [1972] 3 All
E.R. 1146.
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9.7.6.1. The liability of a reporter under the sub judice rule
The three important cases on the common law liability of reporters are 
the following:
(i) R v Evening Standard,^ - in which the reporter - who had telephoned 
to his office an erroneous report of the evidence in court proceedings 
(which formed the basis for a prejudicial article subsequently published 
in the newspaper) was found guilty of contempt;
2
(ii) R v Odhams Press Ltd., in which the reporter - who had not only 
investigated the underlying facts but had also written the article in 
the form in which it ultimately appeared in the People newspaper - was 
held guilty of contempt;
3
(iii) R v Griffiths, in which the reporter - who merely collected items 
of news and sent them to New York for decision as to how (if at all) 
they should be used in Newsweek magazine - was found not guilty of 
contempt.
The reason for the court's decision in R v Griffiths merits careful note: 
for this (it is submitted) provides the key to proper understanding of 
the extent of - and basis for - the liability of reporters in this 
sphere.
In ruling that the reporter in Griffiths' case was not liable for contempt, 
Lord Goddard, L.C. emphasised that: 'The offence is not the mere prepa­
ration of the article, but the publication of it during the proceedings....
1. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578, See p. 803; n 3.
2. [1957] 1 Q.B.-73, See p. 802.
3. [1957] 2 Q.B. 192. See p. 803.
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It has never been held that a reporter who supplied to his editor or
employer objectionable matter which the latter published is himself
1
guilty of contempt'.
The significance of this dictum is discussed further below; but its 
import should be borne in mind in considering the attempts which have 
been made by various writers to reconcile these conflicting decisions.
2
Borne & Lowe suggest that a distinction should be drawn between three
categories of reporter: those whose task is simply to gather information
but who bear no responsibility for its final publication; those whose
reports are published more or less as they stand; and those who write
the 'whole article' themselves. They submit that Griffiths fell within
the first category, and so could not be held liable; whilst FOrrest
(in the Evening Standard case) and Webb (in Odhams case) fell within the
second and third categories, respectively - and so could be held liable
for contempt (on the strict liability test) on the basis that they had
3
'caused an article to be published'.
Two objections may be raised against this analysis. Firstly, as pointed 
out by Miller, the suggested substantive offence of 'causing' prejudicial 
matter to be published 'amounts to no more than an alternative, and some­
what inelegant, way of describing the liability of one who [is] a
4
secondary party to asubstantive offence of publishing'. The second 
(and perhaps more important) objection to this analysis is that it 
overlooks the fact that even the third category of reporter (the kind
1. R v Griffiths, [1957] 2 Q.B. 192 at 202 r emphasis supplied.
2. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 199.
3. Ibid.
4. Miller, op.cit., p. 170.
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highest up the ladder of experience and responsibility) has no"final 
decision-making power over the content of a newspaper. This power 
rests with the editor, who must decide whether or not to include the 
1 whole article' prepared by his reporter. Accordingly, even the 
third category of reporter is engaged (to quote from the dictum of 
Lord Goddard, L.C. in Griffiths' case) in the 'preparation' rather 
than the 'publication' of prejudicial material.
Miller further points out, with considerable cogency, that the reporter
who (like Griffiths) merely cables news items to New York; or who (like
Forrest) simply telephones a report to his office, does not ipso facto
- through his cable or call - himself interfere with the administration 
1
of justice. 'It .{.is] the subsequent dissemination of the [contemptuous
material] amongst the public at large, including members of the jury,
2
which [may] prejudic[e] a fair trial'. The liability - if any - of
a reporter (such as Griffiths or Forrest) therefore rests (in Miller's
view) on the fact that he is a 'secondary party' in the principal
offence of interference with the proper administration of justice through
the publication of material likely to prejudice a fair trial. Miller
further points out that 'liability as a secondary party requires mens
rea in the sense of knowledge of all legally relevant facts, even in an
3
offence which imposes strict liability upon a principal offender'.
1. See ibid., pp. 169 - 170. In fact, Miller specifies only the 
instance of Forrest telephoning his office but it is submitted 
that the same reasoning must apply equally to Griffiths cabling his. 
The distinction which Borrie & Lowe seek to draw between them - 
that Griffiths is a 'first category' reporter and Forrest a 
'second' does not seem warranted.
2. Ibid., p. 170.
3. Ibid.
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Hence Forrest, for example, should not have been held liable since it 
was accepted that he had made an honest mistake and therefore lacked 
the necessary mens rea for conviction as a secondary party.
Miller then goes on to query whether the same reasoning can be applied
to a reporter who (like Webb, in the Odhams case) is responsible for
writing an article in its final form. He submits that it cannot: and
that such a reporter 'can fairly be said to have published as a principal 
1
offender'. This contention, however, is open to serious question. To use 
the same analogy as previously apjiied to Forrest and Griffiths, it is not 
the writing (even in final form) of a prejudicial article which inter­
feres with the proper administration of justice, but its communication
to the public in general (including jurors or potential jurors).
2
Accordingly, there seems no basis for treating the preparation of an 
article in any different way: and it is thus submitted that the liability
of a reporter such as Webb in Qdhams case should also be viewed as that 
of a secondary party - whose guilt depends on actus reus being combined 
with appropriate mens rea: and not on strict liability.
3
Arlidge and Eady provide little analysis of the liability of reporters.
They appear to assume that 'the author or original reporter of a news-
4
paper article' may be liable as a 'principal offender' - in the sense
that he is not vicariously liable, as the editor of a newspaper argu- 
5
ably is. The authors make no attempt to reconcile the conflicting
1. Miller, op.cit., p. 170.
2. The reader is again referred to the test laid down in Griffiths' 
case, above.
3. Op.cit., p. 127.
4. Ibid.
5. See p. 814.
-812-
decisions, however; nor do they refer to the distinctions (as to category
of reporter) drawn by Borrie & Lowe or to the differences (between
primary and secondary liability) which Miller attempts to identify.
They do, however, suggest - without further elaboration or explanation
1
- that the reporter is indeed subject to the strict liability rule.
It is submitted that the correct solution to the problem lies (as 
previously stated) in the dictum of Lord Goddard, L.C., and in the dis­
tinction he draws between the preparation and publication of prejudicial 
material: buttressed, however, by Miller's distinction between liability 
as a primary or secondary party in publication. Thus, it should be 
acknowledged that a reporter may indeed be held guilty of contempt - 
irrespective of whether he falls into the first, second or third categories 
identified by Borrie & Lowe - but that he can only do so as a secondary 
party in- publication: so that his liability must be judged (not according
to the strict liability rule) but on whether he has performed the appro-
2 3
priate actus reus with the requisite mens rea. Viewed in this light,
the decision in Griffiths1 case is correct (though the court's analysis
could have been taken further to eludicate the basis of liability, where
it exists); but the conclusion in the Evening Standard and Odhams
Press cases (that Forrest and Webb, respectively, were guilty of contempt)
is wrong - and should not be followed should similar situations arise
for decision before Nigerian courts. Instead, it should be recognised
(in Nigeria at least) that the liability of a reporter for contempt-
1. Supra„
2. This would consist, for example, in preparing an article for 
publication (at the editor's discretion) or in telephoning or cabling 
information to his office.
3. The mens rea required is the subjective animus to undermine the proper 
administration of justice: nothing short of this should suffice.
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by publication infringing the sub-judice rule—is as described above.
9.7.6.2. The liability of an editor
It is clear that a newspaper editor is indeed prima facie liable for 
contempt (under the strict liability rule) in respect of material pre­
judicial to fair trial published in his newspaper. Thus, as stated by
1
Lord Goddard, C.J. in the Qdhams Press case:
'It has always been a tradition of English 
journalism that the editor takes responsi­
bility for what is published in his paper 
and this was held to be a rule of law 1 in 
R v Evening Standard Co. Ltd., ex parte 
Attorney-General'
It is recognised that this rule may work harshly against an editor who
- in many instances - cannot possibly check either the accuracy or the
legal implications of every article compiled by his reporters. It is
nevertheless considered justified that this rule should apply, on the
3
basis that 'there must be [some] central responsibility', and that
'men occupying responsible positions should [not] be excused because
4
they themselves were not personally aware of what [has been] done1.
In addition, to put the matter yet more simply and cogently 'there is 
a widely held belief that the ultimate responsibility of the editor 
for the contents of his newspaper is a necessary corollary of editorial 
independence'.^
1. [1957] 1 Q.B. 73 at 80.
2. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578.
3. R v Evening Standard, ex parte D.P.P., (1923) 40 T.L.R. 833 at 836.
4. Ibid.
5. Miller, op.cit., p. 174, emphasis supplied.
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Whilst it is thus apparent that the editor may indeed be held liable for
contempt, the basis for such liability is far from certain. Case
authority strongly suggests that the liability is vicarious. Thus, in
1
the Evening Standard case (the only English decision which has examined
2,
the basis of responsibility ) , Lord Goddard, C.J. expressly rejected the
contention of counsel that the liability should not be considered
vicarious and stated:1[t]he principle of vicarious liability is well
3
established in these cases and must be adhered to1.
It seems, however, that the cases on which his Lordship relied to show
4
the 'well-established' nature of the principle are far from conclusive.
In addition, the so-called 'rule' is subject to three-fold objection:
(i) The liability of a reporter is, as discussed above, that of a
secondary party in publication; and such secondary responsibility cannot
5
give rise to vicarious liability;
(ii) Vicarious liability has been recognised in the law of tort, for 
reasons of public policy, in order to ensure that compensation (which 
is, after all, the object of bringing proceedings) will indeed be paid.
Different considerations apply in the context of criminal law, where 
the object is punishment; and where it has long been recognised that
1. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578, discussed at various points above.
2. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 191.
3. Evening Standard case, supra, at 585.
4. See Miller, op.cit., pp. 172-173.
5. See Miller, ibid., p. 173.
6. See Miller, ibid., p. 172.
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'the principal is not answerable for the act of the deputy ... [and 
that] they must each answer for their own acts, and stand or fall 
by their own behaviour'.*
(iii) 'Vicarious liability almost invariably presupposes a relationship
of master and servant, or an equivalent relationship such as principal 
2
and agent' - and editor and reporter do not stand in such relationship
to each other? but are rather 'superior' and 'inferior' servants of the
3
same employer - the proprietor.
Since the editor is, in any event, subject to the strict liability rule, 
it may be queried whether, in practice, the basis of his liability 
(whether personal or vicarious) makes any difference. It is submitted, 
however, that there are important practical reasons for correctly iden­
tifying the editor's liability: and for acknowledging that this is indeed 
personal, rather than vicarious. In the first instance, this must 
assist him in those instances where the strict liability rule does not
(or is thought not) to apply: for example, in relation to the publication
4
of a photograph of a suspect. In addition, it is clear that the 
statutory defence of 'unintentional publication' (discussed in further
1. R v Huggins, (1730) 2 Stra. 883, 885; 93 E.R. 915, 917.
2. Miller, op.cit., p. 173.
3. Ibid.: see also Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 193.
4. There is considerable controversy as to whether the strict liability 
rule applies to the publication of a photograph of a suspect. Some 
support for the view that 'an element of mens rea or negligence is 
required' is to be found in Daily Mirror, ex parte Smith, [1927] 1 K.B.
845 where Lord Hewart, C.J. indicated that 'a contempt would not be
committed where a photograph is published in circumstances in which
it would not be apparent to a reasonable man that a question of iden­
tity was likely to arise'. However, a number of Commonwealth cases 
- for example, in New Zealand - have taken a contrary view. See 
Miller, supra, p. 162.
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1
detail below ) provides a shield against personal liability for publi­
cation; but it is by no means certain whether it applies also to vicarious 
2
liability. In addition, as pointed out by Miller, an editor ought to 
be able to rely on the statutory defence by showing that he himself had 
no knowledge that proceedings were pending and had exercised reasonable 
care. He should not also have the burden of establishing that his 
reporter had also fulfilled these requirements. Yet if the editor's 
liability is considered vicarious rather than personal, there is a 
danger that the section may be construed as imposing this heavy onus 
upon him.^
9.7.6.3. The liability of a proprietor
The liability of a proprietor is well recognised and established; for 
example, by R v Thomson Newspapers, ex parte Attorney-
1. See p.862 et seqThis statutory defence does not apply in Nigeria, but 
there is a need for it to be introduced; and, once this is done, it 
would be advisable to have .clear recognition that an editor's liability 
is personal, and that he may therefore rely on the defence where he 
himself satisfies its conditions; irrespective of whether his reporter 
has also done so.
2. The defence excuses those who 'publish' contemptous material in 
certain circumstances. If the editor is not acknowledged as a 
'publisher' in his own right, he may not be able to invoke the 
defence.
3. Miller, op.cit., p. 174, Here he submits that: 'The concern should, 
in other words, be with the state of mind of the editor, and it 
should not suffice that one of his subordinates associated with the 
publication failed to exercise reasonable care or even, for that 
matter, knew that proceedings were pending'.
4. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 194, who state: 'A newspaper company 
is clearly responsible for the contents of its newspaper and ... they 
will always be held responsible for a contempt by publication'. See 
also Miller, supra, p. 175, who further points out that 'the 
proprietor of the newspaper in which the allegedly prejudicial matter 
is published will almost invariably be the primary target for contempt 
proceedings'. The reason for this, of course, is not difficult to 
understand: the proprietor is responsible for putting a newspaper 
into circulation, and stands to profit by its success. Accordingly, 
public policy legitimately requires that the proprietor should bear 
the brunt of any financial (or other) penalities imposed for publish­
ing matter prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
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1
General, in which a fine of £5,000 was imposed on Times Newspapers
Ltd., proprietor of the Sunday Times newspaper*, The basis of such lia-
2
bility is, however, a matter of some controversy. Again, the only
case in which the point has been considered (that of the Evening Standard,
supra) suggests that the proprietor's liability is vicarious.
Substantially the same objections to vicarious liability can be raised
in relation to proprietors as apply to editors. The only difficulty
which falls away in the case of the proprietor is that the editor and
reporter will normally be employees of the proprietor, so that what is
generally considered an essential pre-condition for the incidence of
4
vicarious liability will, at least, be satisfied. This objection (in its 
application to editors) is, however, a somewhat technical one; and the 
obstacles to vicarious liability that remain - as described above - 
are of far greater substance and import. Accordingly, some other founda­
tion for liability should be ascertained and generally acknowledged.
5
In the case of a corporate proprietor an alternative basis for personal
- as opposed to vicarious - liability is readily discernible in a
doctrine of general application in the field of company law: that of 
6
the alter ego. This doctrine stems from the recognition that a 
company, being an artificial entity with no mind or limbs of its own,
1. [1968] 1 All E.R. 268.
2. See Borrie & Lowe, p. 194.
3. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578.
4. See p. 815 above, point (iii).
5. The majority of proprietors in the modern world are, of course,
incorporated bodies.
6. See Miller, op.cit., p. 177? Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., pp. 195-196.
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must act through human beings - some of whom, inevitably, are so closely 
identified with the company that their actions and intentions may be 
regarded as those of the company itself. The classic formulation of
the doctrine is perhaps that of Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd.
1
v Nattrass, in the following terms:
'A living person has a mind which can have 
knowledge or intention or be negligent and 
he has hands to carry out his intentions.
A corporation has none of these; it must 
act through living persons, though not 
always one or the same person. Then the 
person who acts is not speaking or acting 
for the company. He is acting as_ the 
company and his mind which directs his acts 
is the mind of the company. There is no 
question of the company being vicariously 
liable.... He is an embodiment of the 
company ... [and if his mind] is a guilty 
mind then that guilt is the guilt of the 
company'.
2
An individual will only be regarded as the embodiment of the company,
however, if he occupies a senior position and exercises a considerable
degree of control over the company's affairs - for, as stated by
3
Lord Denning,M.R., there is an important distinction between those
who are 'mere servants and agents' of the company and 'who are nothing
more than hands to do the work' and those who control its activities and
4
may be said to represent 'the directing mind and will of the company'.
Applying these principles to a corporate newspaper proprietor, it seems 
clear that 'an editor can fairly be said to act as the corporation [for]
1. [1972] A .C . 153 (H.L.(E.)).
2. Ibid., at 170, emphasis supplied.
3. In H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd., v T .J . Graham & Sons, Ltd.,
[1957] 1 Q.B. 159 (C.A.).
4. Ibid., at 172.
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[h]e has traditionally a large measure of independence and ... is in
1
day-to-day control of the publication he edits'. Accordingly, it 
seems fair to conclude that the incorporated proprietor incurs personal 
(rather than vicarious) liability for contempt through its alter 
ego - the editor.
What then of the unincorporated proprietor, to whom the alter ego
doctrine cannot be applied? Must his liability be considered vicarious?
It is submitted that the answer is in the negative; and that the
2
solution (as suggested by Miller ) lies in recognising that the unincor­
porated proprietor is a secondary party in publication; and that he 
may therefore be found liable for contempt only to the extent that he 
can be shown to have had the requisite mens rea (in the form of direct
3
or indirect intent). The alternate solution (proposed by Borrie & Lowe ) 
is to regard such a proprietor as being responsible for 'causing' pub­
lication - for it is the proprietor, after all, who 'furnishes the
means to carry on the concern and who entrusts the publication to [the 
-4editor]'. This suggestion, however, is open to the same objection as
5
previously discussed in relation to the liability of reporters: that 
it is simply an inelegant way of describing the liability of a secondary 
party to a principal offence; so that it neither promotes further 
understanding of the issues involved nor provides any answer .to the 
crucial question of the extent of mens rea required for liability.
1. Miller, op.cit ., p. 177, emphasis supplied.
2. Miller, ibid., pp. 175-176.
3. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 196.
4. Ibid.
5. See p. 809.
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In the context of proprietors in general, it may be queried whether
there is any practical significance in recognising liability as personal
rather than vicarious. It must be acknowledged that, in many instances,
the outcome will be the same - irrespective of the foundation for
liability. Thus, where an editor is guilty of contempt under the strict
liability rule (and is unable to rely on the statutory defence of
1
'innocent' publication )-it is clear that the incorporated proprietor will
also be guilty of contempt - on either the alter ego principle or
that of vicarious liability. However, if the proprietor is not a
company but an individual (or partnership), he (or it) will not be
liable on the 'personal' test - without the requisite mens rea for
liability as a secondary party - but would, of course, be guilty
(irrespective of mens rea) if the principle of vicarious responsibility
were to be applied. Similarly, if it were shown that the editor had 
2
been 'innocent' in publishing (although that the reporter had not), 
an incorporated proprietor could not be held liable under the alter ego 
doctrine (as the reporter is too far down the chain of decision-making 
to be said to represent the mind or will of the company) - but would 
be found guilty on the principle of vicarious liability. Likewise, 
the unincorporated proprietor would clearly be guilty of contempt in 
such circumstances if the vicarious test were applied - but might be 
able to escape conviction (for lack of the requisite mens rea) if the 
test of personal responsibility (as a secondary party in publication) 
were adopted."^
1. See the discussion at p 816 above; and see also the further descrip­
tion, of the statutory defence at p. 862 et seq.
2. So as to entitle him to rely on the statutory defence, further 
described at p. 862, ibid.
3. See Miller op*cit., p. 177; and contrast the somewhat different view 
of Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 197; and the very confused treatment
of this question by Arlidge& Eady, op.cit, p. 127.
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In summary, therefore, practical consequences do indeed flow from whether 
the liability of a proprietor is seen as vicarious or personal; and it 
is submitted that such liability should clearly be acknowledged as 
the latter. This is particularly crucial at the present time in Nigeria, 
where the rigour of the strict liability rule has. not yet been tempered 
by a statutory defence of innocent publication; but it will also be 
equally important on the introduction of such a provision, for the 
reasons explained above.
9.7.6 .4. The liability of a manager or director of an incorporated 
proprietor
A related question is whether h) manager or director of an incorporated
proprietor can be held personally liable for contempt; and, if so,
on what ground. The principle of separate corporate personality
suggests prima facie that he cannot be convicted - for it is not he
(but the company) who commits the actus reus of publishing; and
(likewise) it is not he (but againt the company) who employs the
editor and other newspaper staff. However, it was indicated by Lord
I
Goddard, C.J. (in Bolam, ex parte Haigh. ) , that the directors may 
hot be beyond the reach of the law. He thus warned:
’Let the directors beware: ... If for the 
purpose of increasing the circulation of 
their paper they should again venture to 
publish such matter ..., the directors 
themselves might find that the arm of [the] 
court [is] long enough to reach them and 
to deal with them individually'.
2
if. (1949) 93 Sol. Jo. 220.
2. Ibid.
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No indication is given by Lord Goddard as to the basis for such individual
liability. He may (in keeping with the general thrust of his judgment)
have had in mind some further extension of vicarious liability. If
that is so, it is submitted that this approach should not be followed
and that the difficulties attendant upon vicarious liability in this
field should not be compounded. Instead, as Miller proposes,^ it should
be recognised that the directors and managers of a newspaper company
are secondary parties in publication; and that they may therefore be
found guilty of contempt on this basis - always provided that they have
2
displayed the requisite mens rea. 'For this purpose', so Miller
submits, 'it would have to be shown that [such person] had consented
3
to, or connived at, the publication of the prejudicial matter'.
9.7.6.5. The liability of those engaged in radio and television 
broadcasting
The first point to note is the almost complete dearth of authority
in this context - a lacuna which seems all the more strange given the
4
powerful impact of these media. Virtually the only decision in this
5
field is that of Attorney-General v London Weekend Television Ltd., 
which arose out of the screening by the defendants (programme contractors 
for the Independent Broadcasting Authority) of a programme highlighting 
the moral responsibility of the Distillers Company for the thalidomide
1. Miller, op.cit., p. 178.
2. As previously discussed at p.810 above, liability as a secondary
party depends on the presence of mens rea even where the liability
of the principal is strict.
3. Miller, supra.
4. For other cases, see Fox, ex p. Mosley, The Times 17 February 1966;
and Re C (An Infant) 1 The Times 18 June 1969.
5. [1972] 3 All E.R. 1146.
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tragedy. Little guidance on the extent of responsibility for television 
(and, by analogy, radio) broadcasts can be gleaned from the decision,
1
however, for the court took the view that no contempt had been committed; 
and hence was not called upon to examine this issue. It is implicit 
in the judgment, however, that the defendants - as programme contractors - 
were regarded as proper "targets" for contempt proceedings.
The position of other employees within the broadcasting networks remains
obscure. It seems that the same general principles as apply to news-
2
paper publication should be extended by analogy to broadcasting - so 
that, for example, the producer of a programme (with ultimate respon­
sibility for determining its content) should be treated in the same way 
3
as an editor. In many instances, of course, no analogy can be drawn: 
for example, where an unscripted contemptuous remark is made by a 
member of the public in the course of a television or radio interview.
It is nevertheless submitted, however, that appropriate principles can 
be derived (by extrapolation) from the rules already discussed. Thus, 
in the particular example given, the speaker would prima facie be res­
ponsible for (and, hence, a primary party in) publication; and his 
liability would be governed by the strict liability rule. The inter­
viewer, , producer and proprietor of the broadcasting service should be 
liable only as secondary parties in publication - so that their guilt, 
if any, would depend on their having had the necessary mens rea (as
1. This was on the ground that it had not been shown that the defendants 
deliberately intended to influence the proceedings then pending 
between the thalidomide victims and the company; and that, in the 
circumstances, a single showing of the programme did not create a
i serious risk that the course of justice might be prejudiced.
2. This seems implicit in the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980, s 8(5), which 
provides that, where a broadcast contravenes s. 8(1) (restricting the 
reporting of committal proceedings, as described below);liability will rest
uporfany body corporate which transmits or provides the programme in 
which the report is broadcast and any persons having functions in 
relation to the programme corresponding to those of the editor of a 
newspaper or periodical'. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit'. , p. 202, and Miller, 
op.cit., p. 180, n 12.
3. See Miller, ibid.
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1
previously discussed above.). The principle of vicarious liability 
should be eschewed; and guilt,in every instance, should be determined 
on the basis of personal responsibility. There seems little merit, 
however, in repetition of what has previously been said in relation to 
responsibility for newspaper publication; and, accordingly, the position 
as regards all three of the major media - is instead summarised in 
diagrammatic form on the following page.
9.7.7 The degree of prejudice required for liability
It remains to consider the degree of potential prejudice required for 
conviction under the strict liability principle. It is plain that
liability under this rule depends on the objective likelihood of pre­
judice to pending proceedings resulting. But how great a risk of 
prejudice must be shown? In the first half of the 19th century, it is 
clear that even the small danger posed by a 'technical1 contempt was 
sufficient to found a conviction. Since then, however, '[a] more 
restrictive approach [has been] achieved [at common law] through dis­
tinguishing between 'technical' contempts and contempts which [are]
2 3
deserving of punishment'. Thus, in Hunt v Clarke, whilst Cotton, L.J.
acknowledged that l[i]t does technically become a contempt if pending a
cause, or before a cause even has begun, any observations are made or
published to the world which tend in any way to prejudice the parties
4
in the case', he (and the other members of the Court of Appeal) also 
emphasised that the contempt jurisdiction should not lightly be invoked,
1. See p. 810.
2. Miller, op.cit., p. 69.
3. (1889) 58 L.J. Q.B. 490.
4. Ibid., at 491-492.
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1
EXTENT OF LIABILITY FOR PREJUDICIAL PUBLICATIONS AND BROADCASTS
PRESS RADIO/TV
Reporter Secondary party in publi- Secondary party in pub- Reporter 
cation. Liability depends location. Liability
upon personal mens rea depends upon personal 
mens rea.
Editor Principal party in pub­
lication. Liability 
governed by strict 
liability rule
Proprietor If incorporated: liable 
for editor1s guilt under 
alter ego doctrine.
If unincorporated: se­
condary party in publi­
cation. Liability 
depends upon personal 
mens rea
Manager/ 
Director 
of Incor­
porated 
Proprietor
2
Printer
Secondary party in pub­
lication. Liability de­
pends upon personal 
mens rea
Secondary party in pub­
lication. Liability 
depends upon personal 
mens rea.
Principal party in Producer
publication. Liability 
governed by strict 
liability rule
If incorporated: liable Proprietor 
for producer's guilt 
under alter ego 
doctrine.
If unincorporated: secon­
dary party in publication. 
Liability depends upon 
personal mens rea
Secondary party in publi- Head of 
cation. Liability depends Broadcast- 
upon personal mens rea. ing
services.
Secondary party in pub­
lication. Liability 
depends upon personal i 
mens rea.
Sound Engin­
eer Camera­
man
Technician
Distri- Secondary party in pub-
butor^ lication. Liability
depends upon personal 
mens rea.
Secondary party in pub­
lication. Liability de­
pends upon personal 
mens rea.
Distributor
Principal party in pub­
lication. Liability go­
verned by strict liabi­
lity rule.
Interviewer 
(Unscripted 
programme)^
Principal party in pub: 
lication. Liability 
governed by strict lia­
bility rule.
'Interviewee 
(Unscripted 
programme)4
1. The position as here set out is, of course, the law as it should be -
rather than as it is at present acknowledged to be.
2. The position of the printer has, of course, previously been discussed
at p. 804 e_t seq.
3. The position of the distributor has previously been discussed at p.803.
(Continued)
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1
and that it should not be applied to a merely 'technical' contempt.
This, of course, raises the question of how contempts of this kind are 
to be distinguished from those indeed deserving of punishment.
The difficulty is perhaps best illustrated by posing the question:
'Is the creation of a remote risk of slight prejudice enough to give 
rise to liability?' Some solution lies, of course, in the principle 
de minimis non curat lex - but this by no means provides an answer 
to all the instances that may arise in practice. Judicial dicta 
provide some guidance as regards the first question and-'emphasise, 
in essence, that there must be a 'real risk' of prejudice.
2
Thus, for example, in Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler, Russell, J.
emphasised that 'a finding of contempt of court must be based on a
solid view of the likelihood of such interference and not on fanciful 
3
notions'. As regards the second question, however, (viz., the degree
of prejudice required) little guidance can be obtained from the courts.
It is significant, however, that the Phillimore Committee recommended
the following test: that liability for contempt should depend, in this
context, on whether 'the publication complained of creates a risk that
4
the course of justice will be seriously impeded or prejudiced'.
(Continued)
4. Where a programme is scripted, the responsibility of interviewer and 
interviewee remains the same but, in addition, the producer may 
be found liable on the basis that he, too, has primary responsibility 
for publication by virtue of his power to determine the final content 
of any pre-planned programme. This also, of course, (where the 
proprietor is incorporated) opens up the possibility of the proprietor 
being held liable under the alter ego doctrine; or (if the proprietor 
is unincorporated) means that he may be liable as a secondary party 
in publication, depending upon his own mens rea.
1. See Miller, supra.
2. [1960] 3 All E.R. 289.
3. Ibid., at 293.
4. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd 5794, 1974, para. 112, emphasis supplied.
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This indicates that substantial prejudice is required, but leaves open 
the possibility that even remote risk of such prejudice will give rise 
to liability. It has accordingly been submitted by Miller that 'the
1
word 'serious' should qualify both the degree and the risk of prejudice'; 
and it is interesting to note that this recommendation has been adopted 
in the'new Contempt of Court Act, 1981, which provides that:
'The strict liability rule applies only 
to a publication which creates a substantial 
risk that the course of justice in the 
proceedings in question will be seriously 
impeded or prejudiced'.
2
Such legislation of the United Kingdom is not, of course, operative 
in Nigeria: where the question remains to be determined in the light of 
common law principles. It is submitted, however, that the approach of 
the new English legislation is correct; and that its spirit (if not its 
exact words) should be followed should the matter arise for decision in 
a Nigerian court.
However, the utility of adopting this definition of the degree of prejudice
required depends,in large measure, on the interpretation placed on the
words 'substantial' and 'serious'. In this regard, it is somewhat
disturbing to note the attitude evinced by the House of Lords, in
3
Attorney-General v English, in deciding whether an article warning of
the prevalence of "mercy-killing" of malformed babies was likely to
prejudice the trial (then in progress) of an eminent consultant for
4
causing the death of a newborn mongoloid child. In applying the test
li Op.cit., p. 70.
2. s. 2(3), Contempt of Court Act, 1981, emphasis supplied.
3. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 278 (H.L.(E*)).
4. The facts of the case have previously been further described at p. 772.
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of 'substantial risk' laid down by the new Act, the Lords ruled that
'[i]n combination ... the two words [are] intended to exclude a risk
1
that is only remote'. This dictum is most disturbing: for it creates
a clear inference that anything which carries a risk which is more than
' remote' satisfies the first "leg" of the conditions prescribed. It
must - of course - still be shown (in terms of the section) that the
risk carried is one of 'serious' prejudice or impediment; and, although
2
the House was content to let this word, bear its ordinary meaning, 
the overall effect of the interpretation adopted by their Lordships 
must surely be to increase the danger of 'technical' contempts falling 
afoul. of the law. This aspect of the judgment accordingly creates a 
disturbing precedent for the future: and points a direction which should 
not be followed in Nigeria.
It is therefore submitted that, whilst Nigeria would be well advised
to adopt the statutory formula contained in s 2(2) of the Contempt of
Court Act 1981, she should also ensure that the words are given their
full weight: and should not allow the requirement of a 'substantial'
risk of serious prejudice to be diluted in the manner evidenced by the
3
House of Lords m  Attorney-General v English.
9.7.8. The relevance of prejudice to proceedings in fact resulting
A further concomitant of the 'strict liability' principle is that the 
actual occurence of prejudice to pending proceedings is irrelevant to 
liability. Guilt is governed by the objective likelihood of prejudice
1. Attorney-General v English, supra, at 286, emphasis supplied.
2. Ibid., at 286. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "serious" 
as: 'weighty, important, grave; (of quantity or degree) considerable*.
3. Supra.
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resulting: and not by whether this occurs in fact. The point has been
1
pithily summarised in Re B. (J.A.) (An Infant), by Cross, J., as 
follows:
'The mere fact that no harm has been done
in th[e] particular case is neither here
nor there1.
2
9.8. The Period During Which the >Sub Judice Restriction Applies
By contrast with the rules applicable in other branches of contempt, 
the sub judice restriction on publication applies only at certain times:
viz., when particular proceedings are either in actual progress (as in
3 4 5
Attorney-General v English ) or are "pending" (as in Re Onagoruwa )
for only during this period can there be any danger of prejudice to the 
fair hearing of the proceedings resulting. Thus, if proceedings are 
prospective only in the distant future, or have already terminated, 
there is no reason to prohibit publication; and the restriction on publi­
cation accordingly applies only during the period when the matter in 
question is under judicial consideration: in other words, is sub judice.^
1. [1965] Ch. 1112.
2. Ibid., at 1123.
3. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 278, (H.L.(Ei)). Here, publication occurred during trial.
4. The meaning of 'pending' is discussed below.
5. Suit No FCA/E/117/79, supra. Here the article was published two 
days before the start of the hearing.
6. Hence, of course, the name given to the rule. As indicated above,
different considerations apply in other branches of the law of contempt.
Thus, 'scandalising' the’.court constitutes contempt at any time, 
irrespective of whether the comment is made in relation to particular 
proceedings. Likewise, misreporting court proceedings, or refusing
to answer questions in court, is a contempt ipso facto, and the time 
at which it is done is irrelevant to liability.
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Whilst the principle that the sub judice prohibition applies only during 
a limited period is thus clear, considerable controversy surrounds the 
question as to when precisely restriction should begin and end. As 
regards the correct commencement point (a particularly difficult question), 
it must always be remembered that the aim of the rule is to prevent pre­
judice to fair trial. Hence, as soon as a risk of prejudice arises, the 
rule - in principle - ought to come into operation. But how can it be 
know when such prejudice is likely? Once some objectively ascertainable 
step is taken (such as the arrest of a suspect or the issue of a writ), 
it is, of course, to be expected that proceedings will commence at some 
future time; and restrictions on reporting may thereupon seem appropriate 
in the interests of ensuring a fair trial. But it must also be acknow­
ledged that a barrage of adverse publicity could be equally prejudicial
to the fair trial of a man who has not yet been arrested, but is taken
1
into custody some time later. It must also be remembered that civil
proceedings may take years to come to court (as the 'thalidomide' case
graphically demonstrates), and - in such event - the need for restriction
seems highly questionable. This raises the question whether factors
such as 'arrest' or 'the issue of a writ' are either sufficient or
appropriate for setting the sub judice rule in motion. The difficulty
has been compounded in recent years by the enormous growth of mass
communications with their vast potential to influence public opinion:
2
and since this is largely a phenomenon of the post-war period, it is 
not altogether surprising that the common law is still struggling to 
resolve the conundrum.
This difficult issue must now be examined; and, as different considera­
tions apply to criminal and civil proceedings, it is accordingly
1. The example of the "Yorkshire Ripper", in the United Kingdom, clearly 
illustrates the danger.
2. That is, from 1945.
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proposed to canvass each in turn and to suggest some ways in which the 
problem may be resolved.
9.8.1. Commencement of the sub judice rule in relation to criminal 
proceedings
During the nineteenth century, there was little discussion in judicial 
decisions of the appropriate commencement point for the sub judice 
rule. The cases show a gradually increasing awareness of the need for
the rule in 'pending' proceedings, as well as those in actual progress.
1 2 
The most important early case is that of the St James Evening Post
(1742), in which Lord Hardwicke pointed out that: '"There may also be
a contempt of this Court in prejudicing mankind against persons before
3
the cause is finally heard"'. Further developments are summarised by 
4
Borrie and Lowe as follows:
'Throughout the nineteenth century the 
question of the timing of publications 
was never really considered. However, 
even though it was not necessary to the 
decision, the judges often used the for­
mula that there would be a contempt where 
there were words published or acts done • 
which prejudiced "pending" proceedings'.
5
1. This assessment of the importance of this case is that of Borrie 
& Lowe, op.cit., p. 130.
2. (1742), 2 Atk. 469; 26 E.R. 683.
3. See Borrie & Lowe, supra, pp. 130-131.
4. Ibid., p. 131.
5. Ibid.
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9.8.1.1. The "pending" principle.
The meaning of 'pending' was slowly defined; and the concept was also
1
considerably widened by three decisions of particular significance.
2
These were Parke, ex parte Dougal (which established that the sub
judice restriction applies where an accused has been remanded in
3
custody but has not yet been committed for trial) ; Davies, ex parte 
4
Hunter (which indicated that it also applies where an accused has been
remanded in custody but has not yet been charged with the crime in
5
respect of which proceedings are ultimately instituted); ; and 
Clarke, ex parte Crippen^ (which held that 'criminal proceedings [are]
7
certainly pending from the time when a suspect [is] under a warrant'). 
Although there is no clear English authority, it seems - both on
Q
principle and in the light of Australian precedent - that the same
should apply where an accused has been arrested without a warrant.
Dicta in the Crippen case suggest that proceedings may also be 'pending'
9
from the time of issue of a warrant - or even, possibly - on 'the
1. See Miller, op.cit., p. 73.
2. [1903] 2 K.B. 432.
3. See Miller, ibid., p. 74.
4. [1906] 1 K.B. 32.
5. See Miller, ibid.
6. (1910) 103 L.T. 636.
7. Miller, ibid.
8. James v Robinson, (1963) 109 C.L.R. 593, discussed further below.
9. Thus, Pickford, J ., for example, stated obiter that: 'There is
ample authority for holding that the prosecution has begun at 
the time, at any rate, when the warrant is issued'. See Clarke, 
ex parte,Crippen, (1910) 103 L.T. 636 at 640. See also the other 
dicta cited by Miller, op.cit., pp. 74-75.
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swearing of an information upon which no further steps ha[ve] been 
1
taken1. Likewise, it is possible (though there is no judicial authority
in this regard) that proceedings may be 'pending' where a suspect is
merely 'helping the police with their enquiries' or is still being
2
pursued by the police, and has not yet been apprehended.
9.8.1.2. The 'imminence' principle
It has come increasingly to be realised, however, that the 'pending' 
principle may not afford sufficient protection against prejudice to 
fair trial. In an age of wide-spread and instantaneous mass communi­
cations, it is quite possible for a barrage of adverse publicity to 
create a climate of prejudice against the perpetrator of a particularly
heinous crime (such as a multiple murder or brutal rape), long before
3
any suspect is arrested. Hence, it has been suggested that the test 
should be widened: and that the sub judice restriction should begin to 
bite as soon as proceedings are 'imminent'. Authority for the imminence 
principle at common law is somewhat sketchy, however, as indicated 
below.
9.8.1.3. Authority for the 'imminence' principle.
4
In Nigeria, the case of R v Ojukoko is clear (if possibly inadvertent) 
authority for the 'imminence' test. Here, it may be recalled, the
1. Clarke, ex parte Crippen, at 641, per Lord Coleridge.
2. See Miller, supra, p. 75.
3. Cases in the United States where this has occurred are examined 
further below. In the United Kingdom, the case of the "Yorkshire 
Ripper" (as noted above) clearly illustrates the risk.
4. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60, discussed at p.769 above, where the facts of 
the case are given in more detail.
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articles found to constitute contempt were published shortly after the 
discovery of the theft from Government House, and before any suspect 
had been arrested. It is clear, however, that Tew, J. was satisfied 
that the sub judice rule was-already in operation: and this could only 
have been on the basis of the 'imminence' principle. Unfortunately, 
however, Tew, J. paid no particular attention to this issue in the 
course of his short three-page judgment; and it may well be that he 
simply overlooked the importance of the 'pending' principle at common 
law. Be that as it may, the judgment is undeniably sound in principle: 
for there is no particular magic in the fact of arrest so as to render 
prejudicial publicity beforehand innocuous, and the same coverage 
thereafter fraught with danger.
Apart from this decision, it is difficult to find clear authority for
the 'imminence' principle at common law. Such authority as exists
appears to be limited to the following:
(i) It is noteworthy that s 11(1) of the Administration of Justice
Act 1960 - which was introduced to provide a defence against 'uninten­
tional' contempt, as further explained below (and which has now been 
repealed and replaced by s.3 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981),
applied to publications connected with any proceedings 'pending or 
2
imminent'. Accordingly, in the Northern Ireland decision in
3
Beaverbrook Newspaper Ltd. - which is, not, of course, binding in 
English law - the Daily Express was found to be in contempt of court
1. This is, of course, on the assumption that adverse publicity can 
prejudice fair trial. Whether this is in fact so (especially where 
trial is not by jury)is canvassed further below.
2. See s 11(1), Administration of Justice Act, 1960, emphasis supplied
3. R v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., [1962] N.I.L.R. 15.
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for publishing the previous criminal record of one Robert McGladdery,
(who was described as the 'No 1 suspect' in relation to a recent murder)
at a time when McGladdery was under constant surveillance, with police
1
officers guarding both the front and rear of his house. The clear 
inference from this decision is that the court accepted - on the basis 
of the wording of s 11 - that the sub judice restriction indeed applies 
to 'imminent' proceedings. Since this decision is not binding on the
English courts, however, the significance of the section remains contro-
2 3versial.. Commentators have pointed out that the legislation was
intended to do no more than fill a gap in the available defences for
contempt; and that it should not therefore be construed as having
effected a major change in other aspects of the law. This consideration
is itself ambiguous, however. It may thus imply that no substantial
change to the 'pending' principle was effected by the enactment of the
legislation (notwithstanding its use of the word •,imminent') .
Alternatively, it may be taken as 'furnish[ing]strong evidence that
Parliament [in fact] assumed that in using the word "imminent" it was
4
describing the then existing law"'.
5
(ii) A dictum of the Court of Appeal in Savundra's case is also of 
considerable importance in this regard. Savundra appealed against his 
conviction for fraud on the basis that his trial had been prejudiced 
by a television interview conducted by David Frost shortly before his 
(Savundra*s) arrest. Commenting on this interview, Salmon, L.J. stated:
1. See, Miller, op.cit., p. 77.
2. The provision no longer forms part of English statutory law; but
insofar as it may be taken to reflect the common law, it remains
of some importance.
3. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 136; Miller op.cit., p. 77, citing 
Professor Goodhart in (1964) 80 L.Q.R. 166.
4. Goodhart, ibid., p. 168. (Cited by Miller, supra).
5. R v Savundranayagan and Walker, [1968] 3 All E.R. 439.
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'It must not be supposed that proceedings 
to commit for contempt of court can be 
instituted only in respect of matters 
published after proceedings have actually 
begun. No-one should imagine that he is 
safe from committal for contempt of 
court if, knowing or having good reason 
to believe that criminal proceedings are 
imminent, he chooses to publish matters 
calculated to prejudice a fair trial1.
1
This dictum is by no means conclusive, however, for - as Borrie and Lowe
point out - 'powerful though this statement is, it can only be regarded
as obiter since the case concerned an appeal by Savundra against convic-
2
tion and not [proceedings for] contempt against David Frost'.
/ • x 3(111) In the Scottish decision of Stirling v Associated Newspapers,
the Scottish Daily Mail was found guilty of contempt for publishing
certain information regarding a person who 'had been detained by the
English police in connection with a double murder in Edinburgh ...
4
[but had not yet] been charged or arrested'. The case is of doubtful
authority in common law, however, not only because of its Scottish ori-
5
gin, but also because it suggests that the sub judice rule begins to
1. Ibid., at 441.
2. Borrie & Lowe, supra, p. 137.
3. [1960] S.L.T. 5.
4. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 137. There appears to be some doubt as 
to whether he had, in fact, been arrested. See, Miller, op.cit., 
p. 76. If this was indeed the case, or if a warrant had in fact 
been issued, then the decision would, in any event, fall within the 
ambit of the 'pending' principle.
5. See the dictum of Lord Clyde (supra, at 8), to the effect that 'once
a crime has been suspected and once the criminal authorities are
investigating it, they and they alone have the duty of carrying
out that investigation'.
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operate 'as soon as criminal investigations [are] in progress and this 
is certainly not the law in England1.^
(iv) The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the
2
Law of Contempt as it affects Tribunals of Inquiry, published in 1969, 
also provides some support for the imminence rule (albeit in a different 
context from court proceedings) by stating that:
'Although there have been differences of 
opinion expressed on this subject the 
better view seems to be that as far as 
criminal proceedings are concerned the 
law of contempt bites when such proceed­
ings are imminent'.
3
9.8.1.4. The 'imminence' principle rejected under common law.
Against the authorities described above must be weighed the only decision
in which the common law on this question has been fully and directly
4
canvassed. This is the Australian case of James v Robinson, in
which High Court rejected the 'imminence' principle and held that the
sub judice restriction applies only when proceedings are'pending'.
In this case, a gunman - who had shot two people in Perth - made his
escape from the scene of the crime and then 'became the subject of a
massive manhunt, the police concentrating their search in a nearby 
5
pine plantation'. During this period and before his capture and 
arrest, an article was published in a newspaper identifying the gunman
1. Miller, op.cit., p. 76.
2. Cmnd 4078. The Committee was here concerned with ascertaining the
rule in court proceedings, to decide. ,if ftshould govern tribunals as well.
3. Ibid., para. 22, p. 9.
4. (1963) 109 C.L.R. 593.
5. Borrie & Lowe, supra, p. 138.
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by name; and proceedings for contempt were instituted.
The only ground on which the sub judice rule could be said to have been 
infringed - in the circumstances - was that the publication was preju­
dicial to proceedings which were 'imminent1. The question whether the 
rule applies in these circumstances (or only where proceedings are in 
progress or pending) thus arose directly for decision - by contrast
with the cases earlier discussed where judicial statements have either
1 2 
been obiter or based upon assumption rather than close analysis.
The decision is accordingly of considerable importance - especially
in view of the respect usually accorded to the judgments of the High
Court of Australia. The court's conclusion, however, was that the
sub judice restriction does not apply to 'imminent' proceedings; and
this - both in principle and on the particular facts - is open to
serious criticism.
The decision in James v Robinson has been comprehensively reviewed by 
3
Borrie and Lowe, whose criticism can perhaps be reduced to two major 
points:
(i) the Australian court assumed (to a greater extent than is warranted)
that the turn-of-the century English cases earlier discussed
established conclusively the proposition that 'the offence of
4
contempt could not arise unless proceedings were "pending"'.
1. As in Savundra's case supra, and - arguably - in Stirling v 
Associated Newspapers, supra, (depending on whether the accused
had in fact already been arrested or, at least, on whether a warrant 
had previously been issued for his arrest).
2. As in the Beaverbrook case, supra.
3. Opvcit., pp. 130-142.
4. Borrie & Lowe, ibid., p. 140.
-839-
(ii) it overlooked the underlying rationale for the sub judice
restriction - which is to ensure fair trial - and over-emphasised 
the anomaly that the 1 imminence1 principle may lead to the prohi­
bition of publication even though - in the end - no suspect is
1
ever brought to trial.
9.8.1.5. The difficulties in applying the 'imminence1 principle
The principal difficulties in applying the 'imminence' principle are 
two-fold: and relate, first, to the uncertainty of what is meant by 
'imminent'; and, secondly, to the extent to which account must be 
taken of the knowledge of hindsight.
(i) Attempts to define the meaning of 'imminent' succeed mainly in
illustrating the difficulty of doing so. Thus, for example, during the
House of Lords debate on the Administration of Justice Bill in 1960
Viscount Kilmuir, L.C. stated that: 'Proceedings may be imminent for
example, when no one has yet been charged with a crime but an arrest
2
is hourly expected'. In Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., Shiel, J.
suggested that the word means 'impending' or 'threatening'; and, pointed
3
out that this is 'indeed [its] standard dictionary definition'. A 
further dictum from debates in the House of Lords (that of Sir Elwyn Jones, 
speaking as Attorney-General) suggests that the test will be satisfied 
where '[a] newspaper ought reasonably to have been aware of the likelihood
1. This difficulty in the application of the 'imminence' principle is 
further discussed below.
2. Hansard, H.L. Deb. vol. 222, col. 252, 24 March 1960, emphasis supplied.
3. Miller, op.cit., p. 81.
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1
of a very early arrest'. The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee
on the Law of Contempt As It Affects Tribunals of Inquiry emphasises
the difficulty of defining 'imminent' but concludes that: 'There are
cases, however, in which it is obvious that a certain individual is on
the point of being arrested on a serious criminal charge - perhaps in
24 hours, perhaps in seven or eight days; it is impossible to lay down 
2
a precise scale'. In Savundra's case, Salmon, L.J. - referring to
the David Frost interview - indicated that 'it must surely [have been]
obvious to everyone [then] that [Savundra] was about to be arrested 
3
and tried'. -
All these tests emphasise that proceedings (in the form of an arrest
at least) must be foreseable in the reasonably near future. At the
other end of the scale, therefore, is the suggestion of Lord Clyde in
the Scottish case of Stirling v Associated Newspapers that the sub
judice rule may come into operation as soon as 'a crime has been sus-
4
pected and ... the criminal authorities are investigating it1.
5
Miller dismisses this case as being 'of little value in ascertaining 
the position in English law'^ - but Borrie and Lowe are considerably 
more circumspect and believe that 'Lord Clyde's statement cannot be
1. Hansard, H.C. Deb. Vol. 776, col. 1728, 31 January 1969.
2. Cmnd. 4078, 1969, para. 22.
3. R v Savundranayagan and Walker, [1968] 3 All E.R. 439 at 441.
4. [1960] S.L.T. 5 at 8.
5. Op.cit.
6. Ibid., p. 76.
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summarily dismissed'. If this view should prevail, the test of 
1 imminence' would be wide indeed.
(ii) The difficulty of defining 'imminent' is compounded by the ques­
tion whether (and at what point in time) account should be taken of'.the
2
knowledge of hindsight. Savundra's case, for one, clearly demonstrates
this difficulty. It may be recalled that Lord Salmon, L.C. expressed
the view that it must have been 'obvious' (at the time of the television
interview) that Savundra was about to be arrested. In fact, 'several
3
months elapsed before an arrest was carried out'. Should the wisdom 
of hindsight therefore be taken into account in determining liability 
for contempt?
It is interesting to note that this difficulty was one of the main
reasons for the rejection by the Australian High Court in James v 
4
Robinson of the suggested test of imminence. In the court's view:
'If a publication is to constitute contempt 
at all it must be a contempt at the time 
it is made ... [and] [i]t would be an 
astonishing state of affairs if a person 
responsible for a publication were to be 
held guilty or not guilty according as 
proceedings should or should not be com­
menced thereafter'.
5
1. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 139.
2. As Miller, op.cit., p. 81, points out: 'The suspect may succeed 
in avoiding capture by whatever means, as is currently the case 
with Lord Lucan; or the investigating authorities may take months
to assimilate sufficient evidence to warrant a decision to prosecute, 
as in the Poulson case'.
3. Miller, ibid.
4. (1963), 109, C.L.R. 593.
5. Ibid., at 607.
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1
A practical solution to the problem is, however, suggested by Milldr 
who proposes that - although the likely imminence of proceedings at 
the time of publication should remain the principal criterion in deter­
mining liability - it should also be possible to take knowledge of 
subsequent events into account. In his view:
' [l]t is clear that if subsequent unforeseen 
developments create an element of prejudice 
which was not intrinsically likely or 
intended at the time of publication no 
liability will be incurred. Equally, 
however, ... D [will] not be liable when 
he publishes material prejudicial to the 
ultimate fair trial of P where P's arrest 
[is] apparently imminent, although not so 
as a matter of reality'.
2
In illustration of his proposition, Miller posits the following two 
situations:
(i) the suspect, contrary to all expectations, is not in fact w  at
the time of publication - in the hide-out which the police have
surrounded;
(ii) the suspect is present in the hide-out at the time, but - contrary
to all expectation - manages to escape and remains at large for a
number of months.
Taking an objective view in each instance (based upon reality rather 
than subjective perception), proceedings - at the time of publication 
(when the suspect is thought to be or is in fact surrounded by the police) 
- are not imminent at all in situation (i) but are ;so in situation
(ii). If Miller's suggestion is adopted, it follows that there should 
be no liability for contempt in either instance. Unfortunately, however,
1. Op.cit.
2. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
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Miller's own reasoning becomes somewhat obscure at this point; and
his final submission suggests that he is not prepared to follow his
own suggestion to its logical conclusion. Thus Miller further states
that '[al contempt might be committed though the proceedings were
ultimately dropped, or if the suspect died before trial or, indeed, if,
1
having escaped, he was never subsequently caught'. Yet this is surely
a classic illustration of the situation which Miller begins by saying
should not attract liability for contempt - that is, where '[D] publishes '
material prejudicial to the ultimate fair trial of P where P's arrest
2
was apparently imminent, though not so as a matter of reality'.
It is submitted, accordingly, that the true solution lies in Miller's 
initial proposition; which must, however, be taken to its logical end. 
Hence, the test of 'imminence' (if adopted at all) should be applied 
with reference not only to the circumstances known (or believed) to 
exist at the time of publication - but also with due account of subsequent 
events.
9.8.1.6. The test of 'imminence' rejected by the Phillimore Committee
The test of 'imminence' was rejected by the Phillimore Committee,
primarily on the grounds of its uncertainty and difficulty of application;
and also because there is frequently a considerable delay between
arrest and trial, so that prejudicial matter published before arrest
will be likely to have faded from memory before the matter comes to 
3
court. There is considerable force in these contentions, though the
1. Miller, ibid p. 82.
2. Ibid., and see also the previous quotation of this submission above.
3. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd. 5794, paras. 115-132, especially at
para. 122.
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Committee possibly exaggerated the difficulties of applying the
imminence test^ and failed to take adequate account of the "Yorkshire
Ripper" type of situation, in which public outrage may act as a spur
to memory for a considerable period of time. Be that as it may,
the Committee1s recommendation was that the sub judice rule should begin \
to operate in England and Wales from the time when [a] suspected man
2
is charged or a summons served1.
9.8.1.7. Commencement of the sub judice rule in criminal proceedings 
under the new Act.
Under the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, the recommendations of the
Phillimore Committee have been given statutory effect, and the sub judice
rule, in relation to criminal proceedings, now begins to operate (in
3
England and Wales) either on arrest without warrant or on the service
4
of an indictment or other document specifying the charge. At such
point, in the terminology of the new legislation, the proceedings become
5 6'active' and any 'publication' which creates a 'substantial risk' of
7
'serious' 'prejudice or impediment' to their fair trial is punishable 
as contempt.
1. See the discussion above, as to the way in which the 'knowledge of 
hindsight difficulty1can be overcome.
2. See the Phillimore Report, supra, para. 123.
3. Para. 4(a), Schedule I, read with ss 2(3) and (4), Contempt of Court 
Act, 1981.
4. Para. 4(d), ibid.
5. See s. 2(3), Contempt of Court Act, ibid.
6. See s. 2(1), ibid., where 'publication' is defined.
7. See s. 2(2), ibid.
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9.8.1.8. The test to be applied in Nigeria.
At common law, the test generally accepted is the 'pending' principle,
1
as emphasised in James v Robinson. Nigerian authority, as provided 
2
by R v Ojukoko, clearly supports the 'imminence' test. In strict
principle - arid accepting the premise underlying the sub judice rule,
that prejudicial publicity may jeopardise fair trial, - there is clearly
much to be said for the 'imminence' criterion. Moreover, the alternate
tests (under either the common law or the new Contempt of Court Act)
are instrinsically arbitrary - as graphically demonstrated by the facts
3
of James v Robinson. However, given the difficulties attendant upon
the 'imminence' test, coupled with the paramount concern that freedom
of the media should not be unduly restricted, the 'pending' test of
common law - as further clarified by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 -
has considerable:practical advantage. Accordingly, should the point
arise for decision in Nigeria again, it is submitted that it should 
4
at minimum - follow the lead provided by the Contempt of Court Act 
in this regard, rather than the authority of R v Ojukoko.
9.8.2. The commencement of the sub judice rule in civil proceedings.
The difficulty of determining the appropriate commencement point for 
the operation of the sub judice rule in relation to civil proceedings
1. (1963) 109 C.L.R. 593.
2. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60.
3. (1963) 109 C.L.R. 593, described above.
4. It is submitted that considerable additional reform of the law is
required, as further discussed in due course.
5. Supra.
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is equally acute. The scale of the problem is graphically demonstrated
1
by Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., in which - it may be
recalled - the sub judice rule had been in operation for some ten years
at the point when the Sunday Times began its series: with little
2
prospect, moreover, of the matter ever coming to court at all. The
problems in relation to civil litigation are thus exacerbated by the slow
pace of proceedings; and are compounded by the possibility of a writ
being aimed at 'gagging' the media rather than seeking redress through
the courts. Furthermore, the difficulties involved in the 'pending'
3
and 'imminence' tests are equally - if not more - severe.
9.8.2.1. The 'pending* principle.
4
It is clear that the sub judice restriction on publication begins to 
operate as soon as civil proceedings are 'pending' - which means as
soon as a writ is issued or some other formal step (such as the presen-
5 6
tation of a petition for winding up) is taken. It is also clear
that civil proceedings are not 'pending' prior to such formal step.
7
Both principles are illustrated by the case of Re Crown Bank, where 
a series of articles was published in the Star newspaper before the pre­
sentation of a petition for the winding up of the bank; and one further 
article followed soon after the presentation of such petition. The
1. [1973] 1 Q.B. 710; [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
2. The reluctance of both sides to bring the matter to trial has pre­
viously been described, at p. 780.
3. This is because of the greater uncertainty as to when civil proceedings
are about to begin, as further explained below.
4. Miller, op.cit., 85; Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 148.
5. Ibid., particularly Miller.
6. Ibid., particularly Miller.
7. (1890) 44 Ch. D. 649.
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latter article was held contemptuous, whilst the former series attracted 
no such liability: the court's approach being summarised in the following 
dictum of North, J.:
'So far, however, as the earlier paragraphs 
published before the petition was presented 
are concerned, their publication might be 
the subject of an action for libel, but 
could be no contempt of Court'.
1
9.8.2.2. The test of 'imminence* and the difficulties in its application
As in the context of criminal proceedings, there is row considerable 
controversy as to whether the sub judice rule in civil proceedings may 
indeed begin to bite at an earlier stage - when proceedings are merely 
r imminent'.
In principle, there seems no reason why the same rule should not apply 
to civil as to criminal proceedings. The underlying rationale for the 
restriction is the need to avoid potential prejudice to fair trial; 
and it is clear that the determination of the issues in civil pro­
ceedings may equally be prejudiced by publicity immediately before the 
issue of a writ as by publication immediately thereafter.
Authority, however, for the 'imminence' test in civil proceedings is
2
far from clear in English common law. The Crown Bank case, above, 
suggests that the sub judice restriction does not apply when civil 
proceedings are merely 'imminent'. So too does the decision in Re
1. Ibid., at 651.
2. (1890), 44 Ch.D. 649.
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1
Cornish, Staff v Gill; but it must also be remembered that 'in each
case, little consideration was given to the issue and [that, morevoer,!
2
both cases were decided before the important case or R v Parke1, 
discussed above, in which Wills, J. emphasised that '[i]t is possible
very dffectually to poison the fountain of justice before it begins
3 4
to flow'. Moreover, in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers, Ltd.,
Lord Reid pointed out that: 'There is no magic in the issue of a
writ or in a charge being made against an accused person. Comment on
a case which is imminent may be as objectionable as comment after it
has b e g u n I n  similar vein, Lord Diplock stated: 'To constitute a
contempt of court that attracts the summary remedy, the conduct complained
of must relate to some specific case in which litigation in a court
6
of law is actually proceeding or is known to be imminent*. It must
also be acknowledged, however, that 'neither of the above [two] state-
7
ments was made with the present point directly in mind': though Miller
nevertheless submits that 'both may come to be regarded as persuasive
0
authority if the problem is squarely posed in a future case'.
1. (1892), 9 T.L.R. 196.
2. [1903] 2 K.B. 432.
3. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 148.
4. [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
5. Ibid., at 301.
6. Ibid., at 308, emphasised supplied.
7. Miller, op.cit., p. 86.
8. Ibid.
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Assuming the 'imminence' test does come to be accepted, the meaning of 
'imminent' must be defined: and this poses problems even more acute 
than in the context of criminal proceedings. As Miller points out,
'[i]n the latter case, the police may intimate that an early arrest 
is expected, whereas in [civil proceedings] there may be no warning that 
a writ is to be issued or an equivalent step taken'.*
The interests of certainty may therefore demand that the sub judice
rule should come into operation only on the taking of some formal step,
such as the issue of a writ. But then the further problem arises as
to whether the completion of so simple a formality (requiring little
2
time and only a nominal fee ) should be allowed to have the effect of
stifling all further comment in the media on the basis that civil pro-
3
ceedings are now 'pending' - even though it may, in fact, be years 
before the matter comes to trial. This problem has been identified as 
that of the 'gagging writ': and the appropriate response of the law 
to this difficulty remains controversial and subject to considerable 
conflicting authority.
9.8.2.3. The problem of the 'gagging' writ.
The problem is, in fact, only one of the many difficulties facing the
media in embarking on 'investigative' journalism. A newspaper may 
have spent considerable time and effort investigating a scandal of 
legitimate public concern: from Watergate-type activities to suspected
1. Miller, op.cit., p. 86.
2. It is also, of course, essential that it should remain simple and 
cheap to secure the issue of a writ - or the general public will 
be deterred to an even greater extent than at present (through the 
cost of proceedings) from turning to the courts for redress.
3. See Miller, ibid., p. 145; and see again the facts of the 'thalidomide' 
case, discussed above.
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police corruption; from fraudulent dealing in 'antiques' to the 'fixing'
of racing results. When it comes to publishing its findings, however,
the newspaper will be faced with a number of legal hurdles: including
the possibility of proceedings for defamation being instituted against
it; and the risk that the police are concurrently investigating the
same activity so that publication may give rise to contempt in the light
of 'imminent' criminal proceedings. As Miller points out, '[a] further
and even more immediate problem will arise if the newspaper publishes
one of a series of projected articles and this is followed by the issue
of a writ for libel'.* The plaintiff in such proceedings may be a
rogue, taking calculated advantage of the sub judice rule to curtail
further exposure of his activities - and may have no genuine intention
of ever bringing the matter to trial in open court. Alternatively,
he may legitimately be aggrieved: and may require the protection of the
law of contempt to ensure that there is no prejudice to the fair hearing
of his claim for defamation. The attempt to distinguish one situation
from the other and to reconcile the conflicting interests involved -
described by Phillimore, J. as: 'the right of free speech and the public
advantage that a knave should be exposed, and the right of an individual
2
suitor to have his case fairly tried' - poses complex challenges to 
legal principle.
There are considerable judical dicta to the effect that a 'gagging 
writ' will not be allowed to stifle further publication: but there is 
still no authoritative pronouncement on the question. The strongest 
such dictum is probably that of Salmon, L.J., in Thomson v Times
1. Miller, ibid.
2. This was in the case of Blumenfeld,ex parte Tupper, (1912), 28 T.L.R. 
308 discussed by Miller, op.cit., p. 147.
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Newspapers Ltd., as follows:
'It is a widely held fallacy that the issue 
of a writ automatically stifles further 
comment. There is no authority that I know 
of to support the view that further comment 
would amount to contempt of court. Once 
a newspaper has justified, and there is some 
prima facie support for the justification, 
the plaintiff cannot obtain an interlocutory 
injunction to restrain the defendant^ from 
repeating the matters complained of.
In these circumstances it is obviously wrong 
to suppose that they could be committing a 
contempt by doing so. It seems to me equally 
obvious that no other newspaper that repeats 
the same sort of criticism is committing a 
contempt of court'.
3
He also qualified these remarks, however, by emphasising that he was
not 'expressing any final view, because the point [was] not before
4
th[e] court for decision'.
Salmon, L.J.'s obiter dictum is, however, further buttressed by observa­
tions made by Lord Denning, J.R., in Wallersteiner v Moir^ to the
0
effect that it is 'a complete misconception' to suppose that the issue 
of a writ puts a stop to discussion in the press or in public. Warming 
to this theme, Lord Denning emphasised that discussion cannot be 
stopped by the 'magic words' or 'abracadabra' of sub judice. He
1. [1969] 3 All E.R. 648 at 651.
2. See Miller, supra, pp. 145-146, citing the authority of Bonnard v
Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch. 269 and Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 Q.B. 349.
3. See the doubts as to the correctness of this contention expressed
by Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 94.
4. Thomson v Times Newspapers Ltd., supra, at 651.
5. 11974] 3 All E.R. 217.
6. Ibid., at 231..
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stressed that '[f]air comment does not prejudice a fair trial1 and
concluded: 'The law says - and says emphatically -r.that the issue of a
writ is not to be used as a muzzle to prevent discussion.... Matters
of public interest should be, and are, open to discussion, notwith-
1
standing the issue of a writ'.
Unfortunately, however, the force of this statement of principle is
diluted to some extent by the following passage in Lord Denning's
judgment in which - turning to the facts of the particular case (that
Dr Wallersteiner had attempted to prevent discussion of company
affairs at company meetings by invoking the sub judice rule) - the
Master of the Rolls pointed out that discussion of company concerns
by shareholders could not, in any event, prejudice court proceedings:
for the simple reason that neither judge nor jury were likely to read
2
- or remember - reports of such discussions. Lord Denning's earlier 
comments on the 'effect of 'gagging writs' in general must therefore 
be viewed as obiter dicta.
A further important statement of the relevant principle is to be found
3
in the case of R v Blumenfeld, ex parte Tupper in which Phillimore, J. 
pointed out:
'... [T]o say that a newspaper was to be 
restrained from expressing its opinion on 
a man who bulked large in the public eye, 
from the issue of the writ to the trial 
of the action, the date of which must be 
to a considerable extent rest in the 
plaintiff's hands, would be a very grave 
restriction of the freedom of the Press,
1. ibid.
2. Ibid., at 232. This is perhaps an oversimplification of Lord Denning's 
observations but it is submitted that it encapsulates their core.
3. (1912), 28 T.L.R. 308.
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likely in many cases to be fraught with 
danger'.
1
Phillimore, J. also recognised, however, the potential prejudice to
fair trial in comments published shortly before the matter came to court;
and stated that publications made 'on the eve of the trial' would be
2
subject to the laws of contempt. The reason for this is two-fold.
(i) memory of such publications is likely to be fresh at the time of
trial and may therefore be prejudicial;
(ii) 'once the date of trial is fixed the genuineness of the writ [can]
3
no longer be in doubt'.
Assuming that the principle has indeed become established that 'a
gagging writ ought to have no effect' - as stated by Lord Reid in
4
Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd. - the practical difficulty
remains of determining whether a particular writ is genuine or has been
issued for ulterior motives. If there has been considerable delay in
5
the propagation of proceedings, as in Fox, ex parte Mosley (where 
three years had elapsed since delivery of the defendants' plea without 
any further steps being taken by the plaintiff to bring the matter to 
trial^ ) it is comparatively easy to conclude that the institution of 
proceedings is simply a device to stifle further comment. But, as Miller
1. Ibid., at 311.
2. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 93.
3. Ibid., p . 92.
4. [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)), at 301.
5. The Times, 17 February 1966.
6. See Miller, op.cit., pp. 147-148.
points out, 'the fact remains that there is no way in which a newspaper
1
or television company can identify a 'gagging writ' in advance1.
Further difficulties are, firstly, that only the defendants in the
proceedings can apply to have them dismissed for want of prosecution -
so that other media that may wish to comment must wait for them to do
so; and, secondly, that although assurances against prosecution for
contempt may be sought from the Attorney-General, this will not preclude
2
'the "rogue" himself from instituting contempt proceedings'. Further
difficulties have also been revealed by past proceedings, but examina-
3
tion of these lies outside the scope of this study.
9.8.2.4. The recommendation of the Phillimore Committee
The Phillimore Committee attempted to deal with both the problem of the
'gagging' writ and:the need for certainty in the law, by recommending
that the sub judice rule should begin to operate from the time a case
4
is set down for trial. However, this test may still go further than
necessary to protect fair trial, especially where (as in London and
certainly also in Nigeria) there is often a considerable delay between
this point in time and the commencement of proceedings in court. It is
5
accordingly noteworthy that one member of the Committee disagreed on 
this issue and recommended, instead, 'the establishment of a sub judice 
list of cases coming up for trial within one or two weeks'.^ Lord Denning
1. Ibid., p. 149, emphasis supplied.
2. Ibid.
3. For further detail of these, see Borrie & Lowe, supra, pp. 90-96.
4. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd 5794, paras 124-132, especially para 127.
5. This was Robin Day.
6. See the dissenting note, at pp. 98-100 of the Report, especially at para
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(who gave evidence to the Committee regarding the delay between set down
and trial) himself recommenddd that the sub judice rule should begin
1
to operate 'when the case comes into the term's list for hearing'.
9.8.2.5.. The commencement of the sub judice rule in civil proceedings 
under the new Act
The recommendations of the Phillimore Committee have again been given 
statutory force under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which provides 
that the sub judice rule begins to operate (in the context of civil 
proceedings) 'from the time when arrangements for the hearing are made 
or, if no such arrangements are previously made, from the time the 
hearing begins'.^
9.8 .2 .6 . The test to be applied in Nigeria
In Nigeria, authority as to the test to be applied is somewhat limited.
3
In Re Onagoruwa, the hearing was due to commence in two days' time, 
so that either the 'pending' test of common law or the statutory test 
now provided by the new United Kingdom legislation would - in the 
circumstances - have been met, Furthermore,the judgment - understandably - 
throws no light on whether the 'imminence' principle is recognised in 
Nigeria; nor does it advert to the problem of the 'gagging' writ.
1. See para 3 of the dissenting note, supra.
2. s. 2(3) read with s 2(4) and para. 12, Schedule I, Contempt of Court Act. 
This effectively means when the case is set down for trial; or
the date for hearing is fixed.
3. Suit No. FCA/E/117/79.
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However, it is clear that the common law principles discussed above
(with all their attendant difficulties) apply equally, within Nigeria; and
it is accordingly submitted that Nigeria should abandon the 'pending'
principle of common law in favour ( not merely of the present United
Kingdom statutory rule) but, rather, of the recommendation proposed by
one member of the Phillimore Committee: that the sub judice rule should
begin to operate only when a matter is due for hearing within the next
1
week or fortnight. A more wide-ranging restriction is not justified 
in the interests of fair trial - especially since jury trial does not 
apply at all in civil litigation in Nigeria - and imposes too great 
a restriction on media freedom.
9.8.3. Termination of the sub judice rule in criminal and civil
proceedings.
Thus far, discussion has been confined to the appropriate commencement 
point for the sub judice restriction. Problems also surrounded the 
correct termination stage; and - although these are of considerably 
lesser magnitude - brief examination of these is now required. Again, 
for the sake of clarity and ease of reference, a distinction is drawn 
between criminal and civil proceedings: and each of these is discussed 
in turn.
9.8. .1. Termination of the sub judice rule in criminal proceedings.
A criminal case remains sub judice during the period when it is open 
to the accused to appeal against conviction or sentence or, in the
1. See p. 854.
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event of an appeal being lodged, until it has been heard and determined.
1
W/here a re-trial seems likely (because the jury has failed to agree 
upon a ) or has been ordered on the basis of fresh evidence
3 4
being available or because of a mis-trial warranting a venire de novo, 
the proceedings remain sub judice until such re-trial (including any 
appeal therefrom) has been finally determined. However, there appears 
less likelihood of contempt proceedings being either taken or 
succeeding in relation to publications after the initial verdict has 
been given but before any appeal has either been determined or become 
prescribed: for it is recognised that appeal judges are gener^ 
ally immune - in determining legal issues - from the adverse pressures 
of public opinion.^
9.8.3.2. Termination of the sub judice rule in civil proceedings.
As regards civil proceedings, the same rules should, in principle, 
be equally applicable. There is, however, certain authority at common 
law to the effect that the sub judice restriction terminates as soon 
as judgment at first instance has been given - even though an appeal 
may still be lodged - but becomes operative again once notice of appeal
1. See Miller, op.cit., p. 84; Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 147; Halsbury's Laws, 
op cit, Vol. 9, para. 14.
2. This possibility is mentioned for the sake of completeness, but is 
unlikely to ■ apply in Nigeria where trial by jury is extremely rare.
3. Miller, ibid.
5. Borrie & Lowe, ibid., p. 147. It is significant to note that in both 
of the two leading authorities for the continued operation of the 
sub judice rule pending appeal - Delbert-Evans v Davies and Watson 
[1945] 2 All E.R. 167 and Duffy, ex parte Nash [1960] 2 Q.B. 188 - 
the court's conclusion was that 'no contempt had been committed because 
the possibility of prejudice was remote or non-existent'. See Miller, 
supra. Hence, Borrie & Lowe's conclusion is that the "extension" of 
the sub judice rule recognised by these cases does not in practice 
impose additional restrictions on publication.
4. Ibid.
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1
has been given. However, the cases which indicate this were decided
in the nineteenth century - 'well before the modern English authorities
establishing that criminal proceedings remained sub judice at least
during the period when it is open to an accused to appeal; [and] [t]here
2
is no reason why a different rule should apply in civil proceedings'.
3 4
Accordingly, it is submitted by both Miller and Borrie and Lowe
that civil proceedings remain sub judice until any appeal has finally
been determined or until the time for lodging an appeal has expired.
Likewise, the sub judice restriction remains in force where a re-trial
5
appears likely, or has been ordered.
9.8.3.3. The Phillimore Committee proposals and the Contempt of Court 
Act 1981.
The Phillimore Committee recommended that criminal proceedings
should remain subject to the sub judice rule until 'the trial has been
6concluded and sentence passed'. As regards civil proceedings, it
proposed that restrictions should cease to apply once the hearing at
7
first instance had been concluded. Both proposals are reflected in the new Act.
1. Metzler v Gonod (1874) 30 L.T. 264; Dallas v Ledger, (1888) 4 T.L.R. 432.
2. See Miller, supra, p. 86.
3. Ibid., p. 87.
4. See Borrie & Lowe, supra, p. 151.
5. See also Halsbury's Laws, op cit, para 22.
6. Miller, supra , p. 84, citing the Phillimore Report, Cmnd 579 4, 1974. 
para. 132.
7. Ibid.
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The rules provided by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 are somewhat complex. 
In brief outline, they provide that criminal proceedings cease to be 
'active' (so as to be subject to the sub judice rule) when the proceed­
ings are concluded (by aquittal, verdict, discontinuance or operation
1 2 of law ) ; or when an accused is declared unfit to plead or to be tried;
or on the expiry of twelve months from the issue of a warrant unless
3
s suspect has been arrested within that period. Civil proceedings
cease to be 'active' when the 'proceedings are disposed of or discon-
4
tinued or withdrawn'.
9.8.3.4. The test to be applied in Nigeria.
In Nigeria, the termination of the sub judice rule in both criminal and 
civil proceedings is still governed by the common law, with all the 
uncertainties described above. It is accordingly submitted that 
Nigerian law should follow the lead provided by the United Kingdom 
legislature in this regard. Accordingly, similar time-limits should 
be introduced: as these would not only have the merit of certainty; but 
would also serve to narrow the restriction on media freedom posed by 
the sub judice rule in its common law ambit.
1. Para. 5 (a)(b) and (c), Schedule I, read witn ss 2(3) and 2(4), 
Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
2. Para. 10, ibid.
3. Para. 11, ibid. This clearly represents an attempt to deal with
the "Lord Lucan" type of situation in which a warrant is issued
and the suspect then succeeds in eluding arrest for a considerable 
period.
4. Para. 12, ibid.
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9.9. The Defences to Liability for Contempt Under the Sub Judice Rule.
Having thus examined the types of publication prohibited by the rule, 
the principles under which liability is determined, and the period 
during which restrictions apply, it now remains to consider the defences 
- if any - upon which an alleged contemnor may rely.
9.9.1. Failure to make out a prima facie case.
It is plain that if one of the essential ingredients for liability is
not established, the alleged contemnor is entitled to discharge. Thus,
if the comment is too general to amount to prejudgment (as in Akinrinsola
v Attorney-General of Anambra Stat^l) ; or the accused is not responsible
2
for. publication (as in McLeod v St. Aubyn and, more arguably, in R v 
Ojukokc?) ; or if the sub judice rule has not yet come into operation 
(as might have been argued in R v Ojukoko^) , then - clearly - the 
alleged contemnor is not even prima facie liable and must be acquitted.
9.9.2. Absence of intent to prejudice fair trial.
It is abundantly clear, from the discussion of the 'strict liability' 
principle above, that absence of intent to prejudice fair trial constitutes
1. ( 1980) 2 N.C.R. 17.
2., [1899], A .C . 549 (P.C.) Here, the accused - who had lent his copy
of a newspaper to the local library - was acquitted as he did not 
'intend to publish'.
3. (1926) 7 N.L.R. 60. Here, the printers were discharged: on the basis
that they had been joined in the proceedings only 'as a matter of form'
4., Supra. Proceedings were not yet 'pending', as generally ■ required 
under the common law.
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no defence at common law. Thus, a publication based on honest mistake,
2
absence of knowledge that proceedings are pending or genuine desire to
3
serve the public interest will constitute contempt if its objective
effect is (potentially) to prejudice fair trial. Moreover, at common
4 5
law, printers and distributors of such material are prima facie
liable, and have no defence on which to rely.
In the United Kingdom, the harshness of the common law rule was high-
6 V
lighted by the decisions in Odhams Press, Ltd. and the Griffiths case.
The Odhams judgment (in which publishers who had no reason to suspect
g
that proceedings were already pending were convicted of contempt )
seemed more than unduly onerous - particularly in the absence of any
central registry for the issue of writs or warrants; and it accordingly
9
prompted the following observation from Glanville Williams:
1. See the Evening Standard case, [1954] 1 Q.B. 578.
2. See*Odhams Press*, [1957] 1 Q.B. 73 above.
3. See Littler v Thompson, (1839) 2 Beav. 129; 48 E.R. 1129, above;
and Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
4. See cases cited at p. 804 et seq.
5. See R v Griffiths, ex parte Attorney-General [1957] 2 Q.B. 192.
6. [1957]1 Q.B. 73.
7. Supra-.
8. See p. 802.
9. Criminal. Law: The General Part, 2nd ed., 1961, p 247,
(cited by Lowe & Lowe, op.cit., p. 185).
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'1 [T]he offence of contempt of court should 
[in Odham's case] have been renamed un­
avoidable inadvertence of court. [The] 
effect [of the case] was ... to make the 
displeasure of the judges as unavoidable and 
unpredictable as an Act of God'.
1
The decision in Griffiths1 case was also criticised as harsh in the
extreme, for W.H. Smith and Co. (at the time of the decision) dealt in
over 300 foreign publications at Victoria Station alone; so that an
attempt to exercise greater control would have created great difficulty
- and the obligation to do so (implicit in Griffiths1 case) would have
acted as a major disincentive against further foreign imports (even of
magazines as reputable as Newsweek): with unfortunate consequences for
2
freddom of expression in the United Kingdom.
It was primarily to stem this tide of criticism that s 11 of the 
Administration of Justice Act, 1960 was introduced. This provision has 
now been repealed and replaced by s 3 of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981 (which is in substantially similar terms) and provides:
's 3(1) A person is not guilty of contempt of court under the
strict liability rule as the publisher of any matter to which 
that rule applies if at the time of publication (having taken all 
reasonable care) he does not know and has no reason to suspect 
that relevant proceedings are active.
(2) A person is not guilty of contempt of court under the strict 
liability rule as the distributor of a publication containing
1. Ibid.
2. See the report of Justice in 1959, entitled Contempt of Court to the 
effect, inter alia, that the Griffiths' decision 'imposes a real hard­
ship on distributors of news, and a disincentive, contrary to the 
public interest, to the import into England and Wales of news and 
views, however reputable, from abroad'. (See p. 10).
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any such matter if at the time of distribution (having 
taken all reasonable care) he does not know that it contains
such matter and has no reason to suspect that it is likely
to do so.
(3) The burden of proof of any fact tending to establish a
defence afforded by this section to any person lies upon 
1
that person1.
Subsection (1) is clearly designed to cater for the Odhams Press type 
of case, and subsection (2) for the Griffiths1 situation. As for 
subsection (3), it places a heavy burden of proof upon the accused; 
and it is submitted that it would have been far preferable if the legis­
lation had made it clear that the onus rested on the prosecution to 
prove the relevant knowledge under either (1) or (2), as an essential 
element in liability. Although, as commentators have pointed out, the
standard of proof required of the accused is no more than proof 1'on
2a balance of probabilities', this is cold comfort: and can do little 
 ^ in practice - to alleviate the burden.
The legislation is open to criticism in other ways as well, and it is
doubtful whether it goes far enough in providing protection against
the rigours of 'strict liability'. The scope of the defences provided
by s 3 is extremely limited; and neither would avail the accused in a
3
situation similar to that in Evening Standard case (where an erroneous 
report of court proceedings was published through a reporter's honest
1. s 3, Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
2. See Miller, op.cit., p. 165 and Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 187.
3. R v Evening Standard Co. Ltd., ex parte Attorney-General, [1954],
1 Q.B. 578.
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mistake) ? or in the Thomson Newspapers Ltd.,* type of situation (where
the editor of the Sunday Times fully appreciated that proceedings against
Malik were in progress, but did not realise that the article in question
2
contained prejudicial material ). Furthermore, the value of the defences
in practical terms depends upon the strictness with which the test of
'reasonable care' is applied. As pointed out by Glanville Williams, if
this test demands that a newspaper editor must 'make diligent search
and enquiry to find whether ... proceedings have been started or are 
3
imminent' - a-difficult task given the absence of any central register
for the issue of warrants, noting of committals and so forth - and that
a distributor of foreign publications 'is still under a duty to scan
4
them for obnoxious matter', then the legislation does little to cure
the mischief in the law. Certainly, it seems that s 3 would not have
5
availed Odhams Press in the particular circumstances, where proceedings
had already progressed to the committal stage, and it would have been
extremely difficult to prove the exercise of reasonable care. It is
also uncertain whether the sub-section would have assisted David Frost,
assuming he had been charged with contempt (following the Savundra
£
interview on television ) even though it appeared that he had been informed
1. Thomson Newspapers Ltd., ex parte Attorney-General. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1.
2. The article described Malik (charged with an offence under the Race 
Relation Act, 1965^ as a 'brothel keeper, procurer and
property racketeer. It was considered a 'serious' contempt,
because 'a jury is not entitled to know anything of [a] prisoner's 
bad character, if he has a bad character'. (Ibid., at 4). It appeared 
that the editor had no idea of 'the highly derogatory remarks ' 
included in the article by the journalist who had prepared it; and 
who, apparently, had overlooked the risk that the words might be 
prejudicial to Malik's trial (of which both he, and the editor, were 
fully aware). The editor was not punished, therefore but the proprie­
tors of the newspaper were nevertheless fined £5,000.
3. Op.cit., p. 250.
4. Ibid.
5. See p. 802.
6. See p. 835.
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by the Board of Trade and the Fraud Squad (whom he had contacted before 
the interview) that proceedings were not then contemplated.* It is 
submitted that such degree of care as displayed by David Frost ought to be
acknowledged as sufficient to satisfy the test laid down by the legis­
lature .
Deficient in many respects as this provision accordingly is, it never­
theless represents a considerable advance over the common law rule.
It is therefore most disturbing that, in Nigeria, no such reform of the 
law has yet been effected. Instead, the 'strict liability' principle 
continues to apply in its full rigour; and the dangers this poses to 
media freedom are considerable. It is accordingly submitted that Nigeria 
would be well advised to follow the United Kingdom example in intro­
ducing similar amending legislation. However, the statutory provision 
thus introduced should make it clear that the onus lies on the state 
- in keeping with general principles of criminal liability - to prove 
the relevant knowledge or lack of reasonable care on the part of the 
accused. Furthermore, the test of what is 'reasonable' should not be 
set inordinately high.
This reform is suggested as a minimum measure: for it is also submitted
that the strict liability rule should be abolished altogether - in which
event these defences would clearly become largely unnecessary. This
more radical solution is examined further below; and - for present
purposes - may it accordingly suffice to emphasise that something
must be done (as has already been achieved in certain parts of Nigeria
2,
as regards the tort of defamation ) to ameliorate the position of the 
"innocent" publisher and "innocent" distributor.
1. This was maintained by David Frost in a letter to The Times - see 
The Times, 18 July 1968.
2. See the section on the Law of Civil Defamation, at p. 516 and p. 524. 
The defence of 'innocent publication' applies only within the southern 
states, as previously explained in Chapter Six.
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In the United Kingdom, the Phillimore Committee considered the possibility 
of abolishing the strict liability rule, but ultimately decided against 
this. Its reasons were, briefly, as follows:
'A liability which rested only on proof 
of intent or actual foresight would favour 
the reckless at the expense of the careful.
[Moreover], [m]ost publishing is a com­
mercial enterprise undertaken for profit, 
and the power of the printed or broadcast 
word is such that the administration of 
justice would not be adequately protected 
without a rule which requires great care 
to be taken to ensure that offending 
material is not published'.^
There is clearly certain force in these considerations; butit is open 
to considerable question whether the problem is as acute as the Committee 
apparently believed. The Committee's view is heavily premised on the 
dangers of trial - in the face of a barrage of sensational and highly 
prejudicial media publicity - by a panel of untrained and inexperienced 
jurors. However, the same risks do not arise where trial is conducted 
by judicial officers alone (as is the norm in Nigeria), whose training 
and experience fits them to focus only on legally admissible evidence.
In such circumstances, there accordingly seems no adequate reason for 
departing from the fundamental principle of criminal law that actus reus 
must be accompanied by mens rea to give rise to liability. Furthermore, 
it should also be remembered that freedom of expression in Nigeria 
is guaranteed by the Constitution; and it is doubtful (as further 
explained in due course) whether the imposition of strict liability is 
consistent with this fundamental right.
1. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd 5794, 1974, para. 74.
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If this suggestion seems too radical, however, then consideration must
at least - be given to the need for some more general defence, to
cater for the type of situation which arose in Attorney General v Times 
1
Newspapers Ltd., and in relation to which none of the defences described
2 3above (as presently recognised in law.) would, in principle, have
availed the accused.
9.9.3. The defence of overriding public interest in full discussion
4
In Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., the defendants force­
fully contended that there was, in the particular circumstances of the 
thalidomide tragedy, an overriding public interest in full discussion of 
the issues raised by the children's plight and that this should be 
recognised as exonerating them from any liability for contempt. In 
the Divisional Court and House of Lords, the contention was swiftly 
rejected; whilst the Court of Appeal and European Court of 
took a very different view. These conflicting judicial viewpoints 
accordingly merit some examination.
9.9.3.1. Rejection of a 'public interest* defence!
5
In Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., the Divisional Court
1. [1973] 1 Q.B. 710; [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
2. If the defence of absence of mens rea were to be accepted, as
advocated above, the matter would, of course, assume a different 
complexion.
3. On the facts of the case, it is arguable that the draft article 
neither prejudged the issues, nor brought undue pressure to bear on 
Distillers,,as indeed held by the European Court of Justice (contrary 
to the view of the House of Lords).
4. [1973] 1 Q.B. 710; [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
5. [1973] l.Q.B. 710.
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was quick to reject the defence contention that, in the circumstances,
the 'right of the public to be informed on the grave and weighty issues 
1
of the day1 outweighed the public interest against potential inter­
ference in proceedings. The court emphasised that 'English authorities
2
... do not require the court to balance competing interests, but [do] 
require that a comment which raises a serious risk of interference with 
legal proceedings should be withheld until those proceedings are deter­
mined ' . ^
This viewpoint was echoed in the House of Lords by Lord Simon of Glaisdale,
who stressed that 'the paramount interest pendente lite is that the
4
legal proceedings should progress without interference'. Hence - 
during this period - no defence of public interest could prevail.
Other of the Law Lords were prepared to give a somewhat freer rein to
the defence of public interest, but nevertheless emphasised that it
must be kept within firm bounds. Thus, three of their Lordships took
pains to stress that discussion of a general nature regarding questions
of wide public interest is not to be restrained simply because it
5
raises factors which form the background to pending litigation.
1. [1973] 1 Q.B. 710 at 725.
2. In this regard, the Divisional Court appears to have gone even 
further than the House of Lords, which recognised that the competing 
interests in full discussion of important issues and in the proper 
administration of justice were called into play by the proceedings; 
and had to be balanced against each other in order to reach a 
solution.
3. Supra, at 726.
4. Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., 11974] A.C. 273 at 320.
5. Ibid., per Lord Morris, at 306; Lord Diplock at 313; and Lord Cross 
at 323-324.
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Accordingly, to cite the judgment of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, the
Sunday Times could quite lawfully have reviewed the principles for
assessment of damages, the delays endemic in the judicial process and
the need for strict liability to be imposed on drug manufacturers and
distributors; and could also have called attention to the plight of
the thalidomide children and launched a 4 temperate and reasoned appeal1
to Distillers to acknowledge a greater degree of moral responsibility.
In addition, the Lords emphasised that, where discussion of a matter
of general interest is already in progress when proceedings commence,
further discussion is not to be inhibited merely because it carries an
incidental and unintended risk that the particular proceedings may be 
2
affected thereby. Neither principle served to exonerate the Sunday
Times in the particular circumstances, however, as the draft article
3
went beyond general discussion to prejudgment of specific issues;
4
and was also deliberately intended to put pressure on Distillers.
9.9.3 .2. The defence of 'public interest1 supported
It is interesting to note that a different view of the importance 
of 'public interest', under common law, was taken by the Court of Appeal 
in the 'thalidomide' case. Here, Lord Denning M.R. emphasised that 
'[t]here may be cases where the subject matter is such that the public 
interest [in discussion of questions of national concern]
1. Ibid., at 307.
2. See ibid, at 294-295, per Lord Reid, and at 321, per Lord Simon.
3. See p.i 783 - 784.
4. The intention of the editor of the newspaper to put pressure on
Distiller's was frankly acknowledged in his affidavit, described
at p. 787 above. See also the discussion of the 'pressure' principle 
above.
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counterbalances the private interests of the parties [in fair trial]';
and that '[i]n such cases, the public interest prevails [and] [f]air
1
comment is to be allowed'. In addition, Scarman, L.J. pointed out
that the issue of the writs was 'only a minor feature in a situation
which deeply disturbfed] the nation, and in which the public ha[d]
2
a very great interest in freedom of discussion'.
The European Court stressed the importance of freedom of
expression as 'one of the essential foundations of a democratic society';
4
and pointed out that 'the courts cannot operate in a vacuum', divorced
from social reality and the pressing problems of the times. Furthermore,
whilst the courts are clearly the appropriate fora for the settlement
of disputes, 'this does not mean that there can be no prior discussion
of disputes elsewhere, be it in specialised journals, in the general
5
press or amongst the public at large'.
The European Court also emphasised the importance of the media, and
declared that 'it is incumbent upon [them] to impart information and
ideas concerning matters that come before the courts just as in other
areas of public interest'.^ It pointed out that 'the public ... has
7
a [corresponding] right to receiver such information, particularly
1. Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 710 at 739.
2. Ibid., at 746.
3. Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government, [1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 245, at
para. 64.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
-871-
when the matter in question raises 'fundamental issues concerning pro­
tection against and compensation for injuries resulting from scientific 
1
developments'. Moreover, it was artificial (as the House of Lords 
had attempted) to separate discussion of 'wider issues' from the ques­
tion of Distillers' negligence, for ' [t]he question where responsibility
for a tragedy of this kind actually lies [was] also a matter of public
. 2interest'.
9.9.3.3. The present status of 'public interest' at common law.
Persuasive as is the reasoning of the European Court on the importance 
of uninhibited discussion of matters of vital public concern, it must 
be remembered that the judgment of the European Court is not an 
authoritative pronouncement of the common law. As the Court itself 
emphasised, its function was not to balance the competing interests 
recognised by the common law, (freedom of discussion vis-a-vis the proper 
administration of justice), but rather to determine whether the United 
Kingdom was in breach of her obligations under Article 10 of the 
European Convention. This task accordingly required the interpreta­
tion of 'a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a
3
number of exceptions which must be narrowly construed'; and which
could only be justified if they corresponded to a 'pressing social 
4
need'. The judgment - though an important authority on the meaning of 
Article 10 of the European Convention - is thus (in the context of
1. Ibid., para. 66.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., para. 64.
4. Ibid., para. 59.
-872-
the common law) no more than persuasive.
The authoritative pronouncement of common law is accordingly that
contained in the judgment of the House of Lords. This has considerable
significance for the unwritten law of contempt in Nigeria, especially
in the light of the widely accepted view that House of Lords' decisions
1
on common law are still binding on Nigerian courts. The Nigerian
guarantee of freedom of expression may, of course, provide a basis for
rejecting the authority of the Lords in) this regard: and this possibility
2
is. further discussed in due course. Suffice it therefore, for the
present, to note that at common law (as interpreted in Attorney-
General v Times Newspapers Ltd . . ) / public interest in discussion of
matters which form the background to pending proceedings takes second
place to the protection of the proper administration of justice. Only
at the conclusion of the proceedings does the balance shift, so as to
4
give the public interest in full discussion overriding priority.
Two exceptions to this general rule are recognised: but these allow no
more than discussion confined to general comment, or the continuation
of debate already in progress (subject - in the latter case - to the
proviso that any resultant risk of prejudice to fair trial must be no : more
5
than an incidental and unintended by-product of the continued debate .
9.9.3.4. The need for reform of the common law in this regard.
The need for reform of the common law in this respect - following the
1. See the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, at p. 161 et seq.
2. See p. 892 et seq.
3. [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
4. See ibid., at 319, per Lord Simon, as discussed above.
5. See ibid., at 295, per Lord Reid, and 321, per Lord Simon, discussed
further at p. 873, where the authority relied on by their Lordships -
Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd - is further examined.
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Lords1 decision in the 'thalidomide' case - was examined in the United
1
Kingdom by the Phillimore Committee on Contempt. Unfortunately, how­
ever, the Committee rejected the need for the introduction of a general 
defence based upon overriding public interest in disclosure. The 
Committee 'recognised that in particular cases it could be argued that
[the] public interest in publication outweighed that in ensuring a fair 
2
trial'. Nevertheless, the Committee rejected the proposed defence on 
the basis that it would introduce too great an element of uncertainty 
into the law. All that the Committee was prepared to concede was that 
an existing public debate should not necessarily be halted by the incep­
tion of proceedings and that 'discussion might continue even if it 
might as an incidental but not intended by-product cause a risk of
3
prejudice to a person who happen[ed] to be a litigant at the time'.
This exception is, of course, derived from the judgment of the House
4
of Lords in the 'thalidomide' case and is, in turn, taken from the
5
Australian case of Ex parte Bread Manufacturers, Ltd., where a New 
South Wales court held that 'newspaper criticism of a company's activi­
ties in fixing the price of bread might legitimately continue notwith­
standing an intervening libel and conspiracy action brought by a third 
party against the company'.^ The logic underlying this concession is, 
as Miller points out, difficult to comprehend: for there seems no good 
reason' 'why interference with the administration of justice [should] 
be more or less justifiable according to whether it [is] prompted by
1. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd 5794, 1974, para. 145.
2. Arlidge & Eady, op.cit., p. 94.
3. Ibid. See also the Phillimore Report, supra, para 142.
4. Per Lord Reid at 297 and per Lord Simon at 321.
5. (1937)37 S .R. (N.S .W.,) 242 at 249 especially.
6. Miller, op.cit., p. 152.
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a particular event which later gave trise to proceedings, or whether it
had already begun at a general level before the occurrence of that 
1
event'. It would accordingly have made more sense (and resulted 
in fairer law overall) if both the House - and, hence, the Phillimore 
Committee - had relied instead on the more general principle enunciated 
by the New South Wales court of which this particular rule is only a 
part. The broader statement proceeded as follows:
'But the administration of justice, 
important though it undoubtedly is, is 
not the only matter in which the public 
is vitally interested; and if in the course 
of the ventilation of a question of 
public concern matter is published which 
may prejudice a party in the conduct of 
a law suit, it does not follow that a 
contempt has been committed. The case 
may be one in which as between competing 
matters of public interest the possibility 
of prejudice to a.litigant may be required 
to yield to other and superior considerations'.
2
Thus dictum clearly acknowledges the absurdity of limiting legitimate 
discussion to that which - fortuitously - has preceded the inception of 
proceedings. It is submitted that there is sound sense in this view: 
and that it is therefore greatly to be preferred to the Phillimore 
Committee proposals.
A further difficulty in the Committee's recommendation lies in the fact 
that it restricts further discussion to tijat which has an incidental and 
unintended side-effect of prejudicing pending proceedings. It accordingly 
fails entirely to provide for the kind of situation in issue in the 
'thalidomide' case: where the editor deliberately set out to influence 
Distillers and to induce the company to offer a more generous settlement
1. Ibid.
2. Ex parte Bread Manufacturers, Ltd., supra, at 249.
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1
to the victims of the drug. Yet the editor was convinced that he was
2doing no moral wrong thereby: that, on the contrary, his moral respon­
sibility lay in trying to assist the children to the maximum extent. Should 
it'not, therefore, be recognised that, in appropriate circumstances - 
such as those pertaining in the thalidomide case - there is indeed an 
overriding public interest in full discussion: and, indeed, even in the 
exertion of pressure to do the "right" thing, albeit this is not required 
by the strict letter of the law?
In this regard, it is worth speculating as to what the probable conse­
quences of allowing full discussion of the 'thalidomide1 case would 
have been.
If the Sunday Times had been permitted to publish its draft article,
as planned, this may perhaps have led to widespread public indignation
3
against Distillers. It is unlikely, however, to have affected the outcome
of the proceedings in actual trial. The legal obstacles to the chilld-
4
ren's claims, as discussed above, were considerable; and no judge 
could have ignored these because of general public sentiment that 
Distillers should be held liable. The medical and scientific experts 
whose testimony would have dominated the proceedings would have been 
governed, in giving their evidence, not by media reports, but by their 
own sense of professional competence and integrity. Hence, the outcome 
of any trial - notwithstanding the pressure exerted by the media and 
the force of public opinion - would most likely have been that the
1. See the discussion of the editor's intention above, and in the note 
below.
2. In para. 26 of his affidavit, Mr Evans stated: 'I admit that my purpose
in seeking to publish the draft article is to try to persuade Distillers 
to take a fresh look at their moral responsibilities, but I submit
that this persuasion is in no way improper'.See Attorney-General v 
Times Newspapers Ltd., (D.C.) [1973] 1 Q.B. 710 at 721.
3. It.is by no means certain that the draft article would have produced 
this effect for it was well balanced in its presentation and concluded
(Continued)
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the company was not liable in damages to the thalidomide victims. This 
conclusion may well have sparked a public outcry: but this would have 
been directed - not against the judge or judges who applied the law and 
come to the decision it demanded - but against the law itself. 
Accordingly, this would not have brought the administration of justice 
into disrespect in any meaningful sense. The result might well have 
been public demand for a change in the law - possibly in the direction 
of imposing strict liability on drug manufacturers or distributors, or 
of introducing a system of compulsory insurance to ensure adequate 
payment of compensation to future victims of similar misfortune. But 
would this have been undesirable?
The result may be said to be "trial by newspaper" and "law amendment 
through the media", but what do these emotive phrases really signify? 
Full reporting is likely to enhance public understanding of the com­
plexities of both the judicial and the legislative process; and it 
must also be remembered, as emphasised by Lord Cross in the House of 
Lords, that the public has a vital interest in hearing 'unhampered
debate on whether the law, procedure and institutions which it ha[s]
1ordained have operated satisfactorily or call for modification'.
The inhibiting effect of the present rule on investigative journalism 
must also be acknowledged. The media have played a vital role in the 
past in exposing government corruption or inefficiency, and in bringing,
Continued:
by emphasising that there is no 'neat set' of answers.
4. See p. 780.
1. Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 at 320.
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fraudulent business practices to light - to name but a few examples.
This investigative role should be encouraged: not hindered by the rules of 
contempt. Moreover, as Miller points out, 1 discussion of matters of gen­
uine international concern, such as Watergate or the massacre at My 
Lai cannot sensibly be required to be suspended once a libel action
4
[or other proceeding] has been [instituted]1 •
It is submitted, moreover, that the problem of uncertainty is not so great 
a difficulty as the Phillimore Committee considered it to be. In this
regard, it is worth noting the recent submission of the Law Commission
in the context of breach of confidence: for the points made by the Commis­
sion regarding the application of a general defence of public interest
may be applied mutatis mutandis to the law of contempt. The Law 
Commission stated:
"The public interest is a developing concept which 
changes with the social attitudes of the times:
many things are regarded as being in the public
interest today which would not have been so re­
garded in the last century, or even twenty years 
ago.... If this fact is recognised, it seems to
us that the only prudent course to follow is to
frame the defence in terms which are flexible 
enough to enable each case to be judged on its 
own merits1.
2
If the courts can be entrusted with the delicate task of balancing 
competing interests within this sphere of the law, there seems no 
reason why they should not equally be given such discretion in relation to
1. Miller, op cit, pp 153-154.
Miller also suggests other (more prosaic) examples which are, however, 
equally important. Thus the public interest in allowing a newspaper 
to publish a photograph of a dangerous criminal on the run (without 
risking conviction for contempt) should be acknowledged. So too 
should the public interest in exposure by the media of "crooks" out 
to make a quick buck at public expense. Thus, Miller quotes the 
example of the Sunday Times which, 'in August 1969, ... reported 
that a certain Raymond Groome who was promising a high rate of 
return from a £100 company ... had recently been sentenced to two 
years" imprisonment on charges of fraud". See,generally. Miller, p 153.
2. Law Commission, Breach of Confidence, Working Paper No 58, 1974, para 93.
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contempt. Much will, of course, depend on particular circumstances; 
and there will inevitably be grey areas in which it is extremely diffi­
cult to prefer one interest above another. Yet this is a difficulty 
which faces the law in a number of spheres - which may even be considered 
endemic in the attempt to regulate the conflicting forces within society 
through legal principle. And it should not be allowed to obscure the 
fact that there will also be a great number of instances in which -
providing the courts remain in touch with the pulse of modern society -
it will be relatively easy to predict where the overriding public interest 
lies. The thalidomide case, itself, clearly illustrates this point.
9.9.3.5. The limited 'public interest1 "defence" in the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981.
The recommendations of the Phillimore Committee have been implemented 
in the United Kingdom in the limited "defence" of "public interest' 
now provided by the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Thus, s 5 states:
'A publication made as or as part of a
discussion in good faith of public affairs
or other matters of general public interest is
not to be treated as a contempt of court 
under the strict liability rule if the 
risk of impediment or prejudice to particular 
legal proceedings is merely incidental to the
discussion!..1
The ambit and meaning of this provision have already been examined by
2
the House of Lords in Attorney-General v English, in which (it may 
be recalled) a newspaper article published on the third day of the 
trial of an eminent paediatrician consultant for the murder of a
1. s 5, Contempt of Court Act 1981.
2. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 278, (H.L.(E.)).
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mongo lo id baby was found to create 'a substantial risk of serious
prejudice' to the proceedings because of its assertion that 'it was a
common practice among paediatricians to ltt severely ... handicapped
1
new born babies die'. The question which then arose was whether the 
article constituted a contempt, in the light of s 5 above.
The Divisional Court ruled that it did, as the above assertion was
'unnecessary' to the main theme of the article (which was to support
the candidacy of one Mrs Carr, standing in a Parliamentary by-election
2
on an independent 'pro-life' platform ); and amounted to personal 
'accusation', which could not be taken as 'merely incidental' to general 
discussion, within the meaning of s 5.
On appeal, the House of Lords disagreed, however. It stressed its
disapproval of the test applied by the lower court; and emphasised that
the appropriate criterion is 'whether the risk [of prejudice] created
... is no more than an incidental consequence of expounding [the]
3
main theme [of the discussion]. The article dealt with two questions
of clear public concern: Mrs Carr's candidature as a pro-life candidate,
and the wider issue of the moral justification of mercy killing -
4
especially of newly born, handicapped babies. It was a central plank 
in Mrs Carr's platform that the killing of such babies was wide-spread 
and ought to be stopped; and, hence, 'an article supporting [her] 
candidature ... that contained no such assertion would depict her as 
tilting at imaginary windmills'.^ The article accordingly satisfied
1. Ibid., at 297, per Lord Diplock.
2. See p. 772 above, where the facts of the case are more fully described.
3. Attorney-General v English, supra, at 287.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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the test propounded by the Lords, and did not constitute contempt.
The new provision, as amply demonstrated by this decision, goes some
distance towards remedying the present deficiency in the common law.
It is particularly important in that - according to the House of Lords -
it throws the burden upon the state to show that the publication in
question falls outside the ambit of the section, failing which it is
1
not to be considered a contempt. Accordingly, the new provision is 
not strictly a defence (which the alleged contemnor would have to 
substantiate) but is rather an essential factor in determining prima 
facie liability in the first instance. Notwithstanding these positive
features, however, the new provision also has a number of limitations.
2
Thus as Lowe points out:
'Great care should be taken in interpreting
s 5. It does not in the name of public
interest give a carte blanche to discuss
the particular facts of "active" proceedings.
That would be to confuse it with the defence 
of "public interest" which Phillimore did 
not recommend and which is not in the Act.
In fact s 5 may be considered no more than 
a statutory formulation of the defence 
accepted in the thalidomide case that dis­
cussions of public affairs cannot be stifled 
by supervening litigation.... Whether s 5 
also covers discussion of issues raised by 
"active" proceedings is more debatable (would 
the risk of prejudice be merely "incidental"?).'^
1. See ibid., at 286. The House of Lords thus disagreed with the 
Divisional Court on the issue of onus as well; and pointed out that 
the section stands on an equal footing with s. 2(2) and likewise 
states what publications shall not amount to contempt (despite 
their tendency to interfere with the course of justice in particular 
legal proceedings).
2. N.V. Lowe: 'The Contempt of Court Act 1981: The Strict Liability 
Rule', (1981) 131 New Law Journal, pp. 1167-1170.
3. Ibid., at 1169.
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A further difficulty inherent in the wording of s 5 is the requirement
of 'good faith'. As pointed out by Lowe, the statute provides no indi-
1cation as to whether the test is objective or subjective; and '[t]he
great fear is that the defence will [accordingly] hang on the whim and
2
caprice of the judge trying the case'. Again, no guidance on this
point is to be gleaned from the proceedings in Attorney-General v
English, for it was not disputed by the Attorney-General that the
3
article had been published otherwise than in good faith; and all that
was said in this regard(by the Divisional Court) was that this was 'an
issue which undoubtedly in some circumstances could be of vital 
4
importance'. It is submitted that the test must be acknowledged as 
subjective: for otherwise the provision will lose much of its force 
and practical importance.
Moreover, there is a further limitation to the ambit of the section,
5
as emphasised by the House of Lords in Attorney-General v English.
Their Lordships stressed that the article in question was the very
'antithesis' of that in issue in the 'thalidomide' case, 'where the
whole purpose ... was to put pressure upon [Distillers] in the lawful
6
conduct of their defence'. The conclusion seems inescapable that the
new provision would provide no assistance should a matter similar to
7
that in issue in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd come before
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Attorney-General v English, supra, at 967 (D.C.) and 287 (H.L.(E.)).
4. Ibid., at 967.
5. Supra.
6. Ibid., at 288.
7. [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L.(E.)).
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the English courts again. Yet there may be clear moral justification 
for certain kinds of social pressure, as was undoubtedly the case in 
the 'thalidomide' proceedings. It seems totally unacceptable that a 
person in the position of the Sunday Times1 editor - who considered it 
his duty to come to the assistance of the thalidomide victims - should 
come under threat of conviction for contempt for so doing; and the law 
thus stands in imperative need of reform to ensure that guilt can no 
longer arise in such circumstances.
9.9.3.6. The position in Nigerian Law
1
In the case of R v Ojukoko, Tew, J. considered that the 'essence'
of contempt lies in 'conduct calculated to produce, so to speak, an
atmosphere of prejudice in the midst of which the proceedings must go 
2
on'. This seems to indicate that, if an equivalent of the
'thalidomide' proceedings were to come before the Nigerian courts,
newspaper articles of the kind in issue in Attorney-General v Times 
3
Newspapers Ltd., would be held to constitute contempt. Moreover, it 
is plain that (at common law) no defence of 'public interest' obtains; 
and (to avoid liability for contempt) discussion must be confined 
to the narrow limits prescribed by the House of Lords, as previously 
described.^
1. ;(1926) 7 N.L.R. 60.
2. Ibid.
3. Supra.
4. See p. 873.
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Moreover, the new "defence"^ provided by the Contempt of Court Act 
1981 which (despite its limitations) represents a marked improvement 
over the common law - forms no part of Nigerian law. Yet the need 
for reform of the common law is no less imperative in Nigeria than in 
England itself (for all the reasons previously described; and which 
will not be reiterated here) .
It therefore remains to consider what reforms should be introduced in 
Nigeria, in the light not only of these factors but also of the consti­
tutional guarantee of freedom of expression enshrined in s 36 of the
2
Nigerian Constitution. Before embarking on examination of this 
question, however, it is instructive to note the radically different 
approach adopted in the United States of America to the problem of 
sub judice publication.
9.10. The Contrasting Approach of the United States of America.
In two cases dating from the early years of the twentieth century, the 
United States' Supreme Court adopted an approach to publications pre­
judicial to pending proceedings which reflected the common law rules
previously discussed. Thus, in Patterson v State of Colo, ex rel.
3
Attorney-General, decided in 1907, the Supreme Court affirmed that 
publication of matter potentially prejudicial to pending proceedings 
constitutes contempt; and emphasised that comment and criticism should 
be postponed till after the conclusion of proceedings. As declared
1. S 5 is not truly a 'defence', as emphasised by the House of Lords 
in Attorney-General v English, supra, but is rather a constituent 
element in primary liability.
2. s 36^Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
3. 205 U.S. 454, 27 S. Ct. 556 (1907).
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by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jnr.:
'When a case is finished, courts are 
subject to the same criticism as other 
people, but the propriety and necessity 
of preventing interference with the course 
of justice by premature statement, argu­
ment or intimidation hardly can be 
denied'.
1
2
In 1918, in Toledo Newspaper Co v United States, the Supreme Court 
likewise, unheld the conviction for contempt of a newspaper which had
3
'commented freely on a case pending in court'. The Court did so on 
the objective basis of the article's 'reasonable tendency' to influence 
the outcome; and emphasised that the criterion for judging the offensive­
ness of a publication is '[n]ot the influence [in fact exerted] upon
the mind of the particular judge.... but the reasonable tendency of the
4
acts done to influence or bring about the baleful result'.
5
In 1941, however, in Bridges v California, the Supreme Court adopted 
a radically different approach. The proceedings concerned two different 
cases, combined under the Bridges title. In one, the Los Angeles Times 
had been convicted for contempt for 'warn[ing] a judge not to give pro­
bation to two convicts';^ and, in the other, 'labor leader Harry Bridges
had threatened to tie up the entire west coast with a longshoremans'
7
strike if a judge's ruling in a case were enforced'.
1. See Nelson and Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed., 1978,
New York, p. 344, emphasis supplied, citing the judgment at 463.
2. 247 U.S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560 (1918).
3. Nelson & Teeter, supra.
4. Toledo Newspaper Co v U.S., supra, at 421. It is interesting to note that
Justice Holmes, who supported the contempt finding in the 1907
proceedings, was of a different view in 1918. He placed considerable 
reliance on an early statute on contempt, passed by congress in 1831
(18 USC. c, 21 § 401.(1976)), which provided that 'punishment for
(Continued)
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The majority opinion of Mr Justice Black pointed out that the rules 
restricting publication of material relating to pending proceedings:
'...produce their restrictive results at 
the precise time when public interest in the 
matters discussed would naturally be at its 
height.... An endless series of moratoria on 
public discussion, even if each were very 
short, could hardly be dismissed as an insig­
nificant abridgement of freedom of expression.
And to assume that each would be short is 
to overlook the fact that the "pendency" of 
a case is frequently a matter of months or 
even years rather than days or weeks'.
1
Accordingly, rejecting the test of 'reasonable tendency' to prejudice 
proceedings, the Supreme Court formulated a markedly different criterion, 
based upon the question of:
'... whether the publication presented an 
immediate likelihood that justice would be 
thwarted - whether there [was] a "clear and 
present danger" that the publication would 
obstruct justice'.2
Continued
contempts does not extend to any cases "except the misbehavior of 
any person or persons in the presence of said courts, or so near 
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice"'. Justice 
Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, stressed that "'so near thereto" 
... means so near as actually to obstruct justice, and misbehavior 
means more than unfavorable comment or even disrespect'. (See 
Nelson & Teeter, supra, citing the judgment at 423).
5. 314 U.S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190 (1941).
6. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p. 345.
7. Ibid. The facts in both cases accordingly bear more upon contempt
through attempting to bring improper influence to bear on a judge 
rather than on contempt through poisoning the minds of jurors and 
thus precluding fair trial. However, the principles enunciated
by the court - that sub judice rules inhibit publication when public 
interest is at its height; and that 'a clear and present danger' 
to the proper administration of justice must be shown-are broad 
enough to cover all instances of contempt in the context of 
pending proceedings. For a further description of the principles 
thus laid down by the Court, see the text below.
1. Bridges v California, supra, at 268-^269.
2. Nelson & Teeter, supra,, p. 345.
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This extension of the 'clear and present danger' doctrine - originally
1
formulated in relation to sedition - constituted a watershed in the
Court's approach to sub judice publication. It was followed by another
decision in which prejudice to pending proceedings was also in issue
2
to some extent. This was Pennekamp v Florida, where the Miami Herald
was fined for contempt for alleging bias on the part of a particular
judge on the ground, inter alia, that this would undermine the adminis-
3
tration of justice in pending cases. Justice Reed, delivering the
unanimous opinion of the Court, acknowledged that some of the comments
published by the newspaper were 'directed at pending cases and, more-
4
over, were not even truthful'. He nevertheless declared:
''[I]n the borderline instances where it is
difficult to say upon which side of the
line the offense falls, we think the specific
freedom of public comment should weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases'.c b
The result of these decisions is that this branch of the law of contempt
has become virtually a deadletter in the United States. Nor - despite
6
the misgivings voiced by the Supreme Court m  Irvin v Dowd - has the 
Supreme Court abandoned this approach. The law of the United States 
thus stands in marked contrast to the common law of England and of 
Nigeria - where all the difficulties attendant upon the sub judice
1. This was in the case of Schenck v United States, 249 U.S: 47, 39
S. Ct. 247 (1919) , per Mr Justice Holmes, as previously discussed 
in Chapter Five above.
2. 328 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 1029 (1946), discussed in further detail in Chap­
ter Ten below, in relation to the U.S. approach to publications 
scandalising the court.
3. For the other grounds of the Florida court's decision, see p. 987.
4. Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 4th ed., 1982, p. 161.
5. Pennekamp v Florida, supra, at 347.
6. 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639 (1961), further discussed below.
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rule (as described in the preceding section) continue to bedevil the 
media and to curtail the public's right to be informed (at the time 
when interest is most acute) of questions of vital importance to 
society.
It must, however, be acknowledged that the virtual abolition in the
United States of the sub judice restriction has generated its own
1
difficulties. Thus, in Irvin v Dowd , the accused was indicted for one
of six murders which had been committed in short succession in the vicinity
2
of Evansville, Indiana . Shortly after his arrest, the police and pro­
secutor issued press releases 'asserting that "Mad Dog Irvin" had con-
3
fessed to all six murders' . A number of media reports, published
or broadcast before his trial, described Irvin as the 'confessed 
4
slayer of six' j and public hysteria against the accused ran so high
5
that his counsel was widely criticised for representing him at all •
Irvin's attorney, applied for a change of venue for the trial and this was 
granted - but the venue change was made only to a neighbouring county 
which had received equally prejudicial reports concerning "Mad 
Dog Irvin". A request for a further change of venue to an area
g
which 'had not received such widespread and inflammatory publicity* 
was denied on the ground that Indiana law permitted only one venue 
alteration. When the trial began, it did so with a jury that was
1. 366 U.S. 717, 81 S Ct 1639 (1961).
2. Two were committed in December 1954 and four in March 1955.
3. Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 261.
4. Ibid.
5. See ibid. 'The media, by way of excusing the attorney, noted
that he faced disbarment if he refused to represent the suspect*.
6. Nelson & Teeter, ibid.
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subs tanti ally biased against the accused . Irvin was found guilty and 
sentenced to death.
2
His appeal came ultimately (in 1961) before the Supreme Court, which
3
ruled unanimously that Irvin had not received a fair trial . Delivering 
his majority opinion, Mr Justice Clark stressed that:
'[Courts do not require that] the jurors 
be totally ignorant of the facts and 
issues involved .... It is sufficient 
if the juror can lay aside his impres­
sion or opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in 
court'.
4
In the particular circumstances, however, 'a barrage' of adverse pub­
licity had been unleashed against Irvin in the six months preceding his
trial? and it was clear that 'eight of the 12 jurors finally placed
5
in the jury box believed Irvin to be guilty' . One, for example, had 
declared that he 'could not ... give the defendant the benefit of the 
doubt that he is innocent'^. Accordingly, in circumstances where 
Irvin's life was at stake, it was not too much to require that he should 
'be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public
1. 430 prospective jurors were examined by prosecution and defence 
attorneys and it appeared that 370 (nearly 90 per cent) had formed 
some view - ranging from suspicion to certainty - on the accused's 
guilt. Irvin's attorney used up all of his 20 peremptory challenges 
and the trial proceeded - even though four of the jurors finally 
empanelled had stated that they believed Irvin to be guilty. See 
Nelson & Teeter, ibid.
2. Some delay resulted from the assertion that he had failed to exhaust 
state remedies. For details, see Nelson & Teeter, ibid., n 29.
3. A new trial was accordingly ordered, in which Irvin was again con­
victed - but this time sentenced only to life imprisonment. See
Nelson & Teeter, ibid, p 262.
4. Irvin v Dowd, supra, at 728.
5. Ibid., at 727.
6. Ibid., at 728. Another had acknowledged that he had somewhat fixed
opinions about Irvin's guilt; and one pointed to the difficulties
of forgetting what had been seen and heard through media reports.
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passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members 
admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his 
guilt1.1
Delivering a concurring opinion, Mr Justice Frankfurter denounced the
high. incidence of 'trial' by inflammatory media reports and warned
that legal restrictions might yet be imposed on the;media in order to
2
protect the constitutional right to a fair trial. To date, however,
3
this 'thinly veiled threat' has not been implemented; and the principle
4
established by Bridges v California continues to hold good.
The objection that unrestricted publicity may result in prejudice to
fair trial - as in Irvin's case - is, however, a serious one. The
right to fair trial is as important as the right 'to receive and impart
5
ideas and information without interference'; and the latter should not 
be secured at the expense of the former. Some solution to the dilemma 
must accordingly be found.
The difficulty stems mainly - as is clear from Irvin v Dowd - from the 
inability of lay jurors to exclude prejudicial media reports from their 
minds and to focus on the legally admissible evidence alone. Jury trial
1. Irvin v Dowd, supra at 728.
2. Justice Frankfurter emphasised that: 'This Court has not yet decided
that the fair administration of criminal justice must be subordinated 
to another safeguard of our constitutional system - freedom of the 
press, properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while 
convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result
because the minds of jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitu­
tionally protected in plying his trade'. ( Ibid., at 730. )
3. Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 263.
4. Supra.
5. This is, of course, the formula contained in the Nigerian, 
guarantee of freedom of expression.
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1
is, of course, rare in Nigeria (as previously explained) ; but, since 
it does occur, the difficulty cannot be ignored; and some solution to 
the problem must therefore be found. The particular circumstances of
Irvin's case suggest at least one possible via media. It is clear that
o
in this case (as also in Rideau v Louisiana,) , prejudice to fair trial 
could have been avoided by the simple expedient of allowing a change 
of venue to an area which had not been saturated with adverse publicity.
If this had been done, it would have been relatively simple to empanel
a jury that had not pre-judged the guilt of the accused.
It must, of course, be acknowledged that this solution may not always
be feasible. In a case of national concern, such as the assassinatioDS of John
and Robert Kennedy, media coverage will inevitably extend to every
corner of the country. In such cases, the answer may possibly (though
this is doubtful) lie in enjoining police and counsel not to disclose
prejudicial information to the media - as was, in fact, done in the
3
context of Robert Kennedy's assassination. Yet this 'solution' is open 
to two-fold objection. First, it cannot prevent publication of prejudicial
1. See p. 758.
2. 373 U.S. 723, 83 S. Ct. 1417 (1963). Here Rideau had been charged
with robbery, kidnapping and murder. The day after his arrest, a
movie (with soundtrack) was made of a 20^-minute "interview" between 
Rideau and the local sheriff who 'interrogated the prisoner and 
elicited admissions that Rideau had committed the bank robbery, the 
kidnapping and the murder': Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 263. The 
filmed interview was broadcast by a local TV station on three separate 
occasions and was estimated to have been seen by almost two-thirds
of the community. Rideau's attorneys sought a change of venue, 
but this was denied; and Rideau was tried and convicted (and sentenced 
to death). On appeal to the Supreme Court, certiorari was granted 
and a new trial ordered. Reasons given by the Court for so ordering 
included the fact that three of the 12 jurors had seen the film, as well 
as the 'kangaroo court' atmosphere which had been generated.
3. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, pp. 256-257. Thus, for example, the
Los Angeles Police Chief was very careful in answering media questions
after the arrest of Sirhan Bishara Sirhan and 'told reporters that 
even if Sirhan confessed, that news would not be released in order 
to avoid prejudicing the case'. The local mayor was not so scrupulous, 
however, and disclosed considerable prejudicial information, including 
an entry in a notebook of Sirhan's reading: "Kennedy has to be 
assassinated before June 5, 1968".
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information obtained from other sources.  ^ Secondly - and even more sig­
nificantly - it is in principle unacceptable: for what it entails is 
simply a ban on publication imposed at a different level, and hence 
is just as much a derogation from freedom of expression.
The only solution lies therefore in the removal of the factor which
provides the principal rationale for the sub judice restriction - the
injection into the judicial process of lay persons who lack the training
and experience required to exclude adverse media reports from their
minds and to focus on the legally admissible evidence alone. The jury
2
system should therefore be abolished; and the task of resolving 
conflicts within society through legal mechanisms should be entrusted 
to those who are properly equipped for this role. The conclusion is 
inescapable that this provides the only way in which adequate protection 
can be accorded both freedom of expression and the right to fair trial: 
both of which are equally important; and neither of which should be 
allowed to prevail over the other.
In summary, then, it is submitted that the United States' approach - 
which has resulted in the sub judice rule becoming a virtual deadletter - 
has considerable merit. The disadvantage to which it may give rise, 
through poisoning the minds of lay jurors (as illustrated by Irvin v
1. Thus, for example, (again in the Robert Kennedy instance), 'video­
taped television coverage of a pistol being wrestled away from 
Sirhan as Senator Kennedy lay dying on the hotel floor was rerun 
repeatedly by all three major television networks; and this would 
make the task of finding "unprejudiced" jurors incalculably difficult 
if not impossible. Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 257.
2. This solution may, of course, seem somewhat extreme in.the United 
States where jury trial is still the norm, but should present 
little difficulty in Nigeria where trial by jury is, in any event, 
applicable in Lagos State alone and then only on capital charges.
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Dowd), has little significance in Nigeria where trial by jury is - in 
any event - the exception; and could be totally eliminated through 
abolition of the jury system. The fact that the United States, with!.', 
its strong emphasis on jury trial, has nevertheless thought fit to impose 
strict limitations on the ambit of the sub judice rule in the interests 
of freedom of expression has considerable significance: and gives pause 
for thought as to the real need for the sub judice restriction. This 
factor should be borne in mind in assessing the one issue which remains 
to considered: the constitutionality of the sub judice rule in Nigerian 
law, and the reforms which should be introduced.
9.11. The Constitutionality of the Sub Judice Rule
It remains to consider both the constitutionality of the sub judice 
restriction on media freedom and the reforms of which the law stands 
in need. As regards the former, it will of course be recalled that the 
1979 Constitution guarantees the right to 'receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference'.^- This right is subject to dero­
gation through laws that are 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
2
society' for the purpose of 'maintaining the authority and independence 
3
of courts'. The constitutionality of the sub judice principle (which 
cuts prima facie across the guaranteed right but clearly does so to 
promote the purpose thus recognised) accordingly depends on whether the 
rule may be considered 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'.
1. s 36(1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
2. s 36(3), ibid.
3. s 36(3)(a), ibid.
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The answer to this question lies in both the extent of, and the justi­
fication for, the sub judice restriction. It needs little further 
emphasis (in the light of the preceding discussion) that the extent of 
the restriction is extremely wide. This is the inevitable result of 
the strict test of liability, the lengthy period during which full 
discussion is curtailed, and the lack of defences to liability provided 
by the common law. As for the justification underlying the restriction, 
this clearly has its greatest force and credibility where trial is to 
be conducted by jury. In Nigeria, however, jury trial is the exception; 
and hence the primary need for restriction falls almost completely away.
To the extent that jury trial is still applied (in Lagos State, 
on capital charges) it is submitted that it should be abolished in favour 
of trial by trained judicial officers alone. In this way, there can be 
no danger of freedom of the media being purchased at the expense of 
the right to fair trial.
Even accepting the continuation of the present limited incidence of trial 
by jury, it is submitted that the sub judice rule goes further than is 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society for the purpose of up­
holding the independence and authority of the courts. The imposition 
of strict liability cuts across accepted principles of criminal liability: 
and works especially harshly against all those who are no more than 
secondary parties in publication and who at present (as earlier explained) may 
be held liable notwithstanding their total absence of intent (direct 
or indirect) to prejudice the proper administration of justice.
Moreover, the absence of defences to such liability is totally unaccept­
able; as is the notion that all that is required for conviction is a 
risk of prejudice that is merely 'more than remote'.* Equally repugnant
1. See p. 828.
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is the curtailment of discussion of matters of vital public importance 
(such as the thalidomide tragedy), which deprive society of full 
debate on crucial issues at the very time when concern is at its 
height: and does so for reasons which do not stand up to strict 
scrutiny. How then can the rules be regarded as constitutional?
In answering'this question, it is important to recall the judgment of 
the European C o u r t R v g H s i n  Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government. 
Here, it will be remembered, the European Court ruled that the 
restriction placed on the publication by the Sunday Times of its draft 
article on the thalidomide issue constituted a violation of the United 
Kingdom's obligations under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Article 10 is couched in similar terms to the constitu­
tional guarantee of freedom of expression in Nigeria (and was, of course,
2
the model for the original Nigerian provision ) . One significant dif­
ference, however, is that derogation from freedom of expression is autho­
rised under Article 10 only through laws that are 'necessary' in a 
democratic society to promote the various interests recognised in the 
provision; whilst the Nigerian guarantee, by contrast, requires no more 
than that derogation should be 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society'. The difference is further emphasised by the interpretation
3
placed on the word 'necessary' by the European Court in the Sunday Times 
case: viz., that it connotes a 'pressing social need'; with the result 
that any restriction which does not meet this stringent test must be 
regarded as a violation of the treaty obligation.
1. [1979] 2. E.H.R.R. 245.
2. See the section of the Nigerian Bill of Rights, at p. 199.
3. Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government, supra, at para. 59.
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It will further be recalled that the European Court believed that the 
injunction against publication in the Sunday Times case did not correspond 
to a pressing social need; and that the restriction was accordingly 
unlawful. It reasons for so holding were, in brief, that the article 
did not put undue pressure on Distillers, that it was balanced in its 
treatment and did not therefore prejudge the issues, and that, in any 
event, there was a vital public interest in full discussion of the 
thalidomide tragedy and in the determination of where responsibility for 
it should lie.
It is tempting to speculate as to what the response of a Nigerian court 
would be if a similar matter were to arise before it for decision.
It is submitted that the Nigerian view would also be - notwithstanding 
the difference between 'necessary' and 'reasonably justifiable' - 
that the prohibition of publication would be an unwarranted restriction 
on freedom of the media, and that it could not be squared with the cons­
titutional guarantee of freedom of expression.
This raises considerable doubts as to the constitutionality of the 
sub judice rule; and it is submitted,for all the reasons previously 
given, that the law - in its present form - goes beyond the limits of 
what is 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'; and is pro 
tanto unconstitutional.
This raises the question of how the law should be changed to bring it 
into line with the constitutional guarantee. It is not proposed to 
repeat the detailed recommendations previously described. Suffice it 
therefore to state, in short:
(i) that of the four types of publication generally considered subject 
to sub judice restriction, a distinction should be drawn between publications
-896-
which may prejudice potential jurors (in the limited circumstances 
in which jury trial applies) or which may put undue pressure on a party 
to litigation, and those which tend to prejudge issues or to influence 
witnesses; and that the latter should only constitute contempt in 
extreme circumstances: in keeping with the doubts expressed above as 
to whether either type of publication is likely, in any real sense 
to influence the outcome of particular proceedings or to undermine the 
administration of justice in general.
(ii) that liability should depend upon mens rea in the form of intent 
(direct or indirect) to undermine the proper administration of justice; 
and that the onus should lie on the state to prove this as an essential 
element of the offence;
(iii), if the above suggestion is considered too radical, that the 
liability of secondary parties in publication (as identified above) 
should - at minimum - depend upon personal mens rea, rather than strict 
or vicarious liability.
(iv) that it should be recognised that only a publication which creates 
a 'substantial' risk of 'serious' impediment - in the form of a 'clear 
and present danger' to fair trial may be held to constitute a contempt;
(v) that, in the interests of certainty, cut-off points for the commence­
ment and termination of the restriction similar to those presently 
provided by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 should be introduced;
(vi) that defences equivalent to the United Kingdom statutory defences 
of 'innocent' publication and 'innocent' distribution should be enacted; 
with, however, the additional safeguard that the onus should lie upon 
the prosecution to prove the relevant knowledge on the part of the 
publisher or distributor;
(vii) that a general defence of overriding public interest in discussion 
should be introduced or, at minimum, an equivalent of the present
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s 5 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
Only if these changes are implemented, will the sub judice restriction
1
in Nigeria (at either common or statutory law) be 'reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society' so as to satisfy the guarantee of freedom of 
expression provided by the Constitution.
1. The relevant provisions of the Criminal and Penal Codes have largely 
been left out of account in this study. This is not only because 
they are seldom invoked; but also because they are so vague as to 
require considerable interpretation: which would inevitably be 
derived from common law principles. Moreover, it is explicit in the 
Penal Code provision (and implicit - given its common law background 
in the Criminal Code sub-section) that the statutory liability 
is also strict: and this, of course, is the principal objectionable 
feature of the common law (all other deficiencies flowing from this 
major flaw).
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C H A P T E R  T E N
SCANDALISING THE COURT
10.1. The Significance of .the Law of Scandalising the Court for 
Media Freedom
'Scandalising' the court is another type of contempt, and one which 
imposes wide-ranging restraint upon the media. The rule against scandal­
ising the court prohibits, in essence, personal vilification of judges 
or the judiciary, or the making of allegations of bias on their part. 
Reasoned criticism is said, in principle, to lie outside the ambit of
the offence: but whether this is so in practice is a matter of some 
1
doubt.
The rationale for the rule is the need to shield the judiciary from 
adverse comment which could have the effect of undermining public 
confidence in the proper administration of justice. The rule is founded 
on the ideology of judicial infallibility and impartiality, with special 
emphasis bn the latter, since this is a cornerstone of the adversarial 
common law system. However, since the ideology does not correspond 
with reality, the rule is commensurately suspect: and its effect, in 
practice, is clearly to prevent the publication by the media (amongst 
others) of comment and criticism on the manner of performance of the 
judicial role which might otherwise serve the valuable function of
1. See, for example, v Van Niekerk, [1970] 3 S.A. 655 T, a South 
African decision based on common law principles, which clearly 
shows how thin the dividing line is between lawful criticism and 
the offence of scandalising the court. This is further Idiscussed 
at p. 947.
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reminding society that the judiciary is as vulnerable to error as any 
other human institution.
The law is extremely wide-ranging in its ambit, encompassing all manner 
of abuse of judicial officers as well as any imputation of bias on 
their part. Its width is - in practice - exacerbated by the fact that 
it is subject to trial by the summary procedure, in which the very 
judicial officer aggrieved by adverse comment is given the role of 
arbiter. Moreover, the record of past cases (especially those from 
Commonwealth countries) clearly reveals what can only be described as 
judicial 'hyper-sensitivity' to criticism, manifested in the frequent 
imposition of heavy penalties for aspersions against the judiciary which 
seem hardly to merit such punishment. The result is to impose a res­
triction on publication which cuts both wide and deep: and which in­
evitably generates a considerable impetus to self-censorship on the 
part of the media.
1
In addition, liability for contempt under this head is strict; and is 
thus governed by an objective test of whether a publication is calcula­
ted to undermine respect for the judiciary, rather than by the subjective 
intent of the accused in this regard. Furthermore, the common law 
provides few defences against conviction; the most notable lacuna 
being perhaps the irrelevance of the truth of the allegations made. 
Although an equivalent of the defamation defence of 'fair comment' 
has been recognised by the common law, there is no equivalent of the 
statutory defences of unintentional publication or distribution which 
have been introduced in the civil law of defamation (in some parts of 
Nigeria at least). In addition, there is no general defence of public
1. This, of course, is similar to the rule relating to publications infring­
ing the 'sub judice' rule, as previously described.
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interest in publication; and the alleged contemnor's motives (no 
matter how altruistic) are largely irrelevant.*
In England - the sourqe of the rule against 'scandalising' the court -
the need for any criminal prohibition at all on such conduct has recently
2
been queried by the Phillimore Committee on Contempt of Court; and
it has been recommended that the common law offence be abolished, and
3
replaced by a new offence, chargeable on indictment only. In Nigeria,
however, as in other Commonwealth countries, the received rule continues
to operate in its full vigour: and the result is to impose a restriction
on freedom of the media which serves, in practice, to inhibit
to an inordinate degree the publication of criticism of the judicial
branch of government and to promote yet further the myth of judicial
impartiality. In this regard, it is salutary to recall the aphorism
"forewarned is forearmed"; and to query, accordingly, whether this
restriction on freedom of expression is indeed 'reasonably justifiable
4
in a democratic society'.
10.2. The Nigerian Sources of the Rule Against Scandalising the Court.
The sources of the Nigerian law of contempt in all its various aspects
5
have already been described; and, for present purposes, may it suffice to
1. The accused's good intentions may serve to mitigate punishment, but 
will not exonerate him from conviction.
2. The 'Phillimore Report; Cmnd 5794, 1974.
3. The Phillimore recommendations in this regard, not yet implemented 
in the United Kingdom, are further described at p. 979.
4. The constitutionality of the rule, in the light of the guarantee of 
of freedom of expression contained in s 36 of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, is examined further at p. 990.
5. See p. 699, et seq.
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note the provisions of the Codes relevant to 'scandalising' the court. 
Those in the Criminal Code are as follows:
(i) s 133(4), which prohibits 'any speech or writing ... calculated
to lower the authority of any person before whom [a judicial]
1
proceedings is being had or taken'; and
(ii) s 133(9),which likewise prohibits 'any other act of intentional
disrespect to any judicial proceeding or to any person before whom
2
such proceedings is being had or taken'.
The penalty prescribed for either offence is three months' imprisonment. 
The relevant provisions of the Penal Code are:
(i) s 155, which makes it an offence 'intentionally [to] offer any
insult ... to any public servant [whilst he] is sitting in any stage
3
of a judicial proceeding'; and
(ii) s 416, which makes it an offence to 'excite or attempt to excite
feelings of disaffection ... against the administration of justice
4
in Nigeria or any [state] thereof'.
The penalties prescribed for these offences are, respectively, imprison­
ment for up to six months (or fine of £20, or both); and imprisonment 
for up to seven years (or fine of unspecified amount or both).
However, as previously indicated, little reliance is placed in practice 
on these provisions; and the rules which count in general are those 
derived from English common law, which apply within Nigeria by virtue
1. s 133(4), Criminal Code, Cap 42.
2. s 133(9), ibid.
3. s 155, Penal Code, Cap 89
4. s 416, Penal Code (NorthernRegion) Federal Provisions Act, Act no. 25 
of 1960.
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\
of the reception process previously described.-
10.3. The Rationale for the Rule Against Scandalising the Court.
Publications which scandalise the court are seen1' as ththatening -r
2
not the fairness of trial of a particular litigant or accused - but 
the general administration of justice as a whole. They do so (it is 
alleged) by casting doubts upon the capacity of judicial officers to 
discharge the heavy onus of impartial decision-making entrusted to them 
by the legal system; and, thus, by undermining society's confidence in 
the machinery it has established for dispute - resolution.
The rationale underlying this branch of the law of contempt has been 
graphically summarised by Wilmct, in eighteenth-century proceedings;
and, even today, it is difficult to improve upon his archaic but 
evocative phraseology:
'The arraignment of the justice of the Judges, 
is arraigning the King's justice; it is an 
impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in 
his choice of his Judges, and excites in the 
minds of his people a general dissatisfaction
1. See the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, at p. 129, etseq.
2. For this reason, the timing of publication which is crucial under
the sub judice rules above, is irrelevant in this context. As 
regards scandalising the court, it does not matter whether the 
publication • is made before, after or during the pendency of proceedings. 
In the latter instance, however, where publication does occur 
pendente lite, this may be an additional ground for ruling that it
constitutes contempt, See G.J. Borrie and N.V. Lowe, The Law of
Contempt, London, 1973, p. 153.
3. This was in Almonds case, (1765) Wilm. 243; 97 E.R. 94. Here the 
defendant had published a pamphlet accusing Lord Mansfield, the 
Lord Chief Justice, of having acted 'officiously, arbitrarily, and 
illegally'. The judgment which Wilmot, J. prepared in the case was 
in fact never delivered, 'apparently because it was later discovered 
that the rule nisi to attach Almon had been misentitled 'The King v Wilkes 
and [Almon' counsel] 'as a man of honour' could not consent to
its amendment'. See C.J. Miller, Contempt of Court, London, 1976, 
p. 21. New proceedings were begun but were dropped following a 
change of government.
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wit h all judicial determinations, and 
indisposes their minds to obey them; 
and whenever men1s allegiance to the law 
is so fundamentally shaken, it is the 
most fatal and most dangerous obstruction 
of justice, and ... calls out for a more 
rapid and immediate redress than any 
other obstruction whatsoever.... To be 
impartial and to be universally 
thought so are both absolutely necessary 
for ... justice....1.^
Punishment of publications scandalising the court is accordingly con­
sidered imperative - not to protect individual judges in their personal 
2
capacities - but to uphold public confidence in, and respect for, the 
administration of justice as a whole.
10.4. No Time Limit to the Operation of the Rule
By contrast with the sub judice rule, which restricts publication only 
during the period when proceedings are pending or in progress (and, 
hence, are vulnerable to prejudice or interference), the rule against 
scandalising the court has continuous operation, unrelated to particular 
litigation. This is in keeping with the underlying purpose of .the 
rule, which is to safeguard public respect for the administration of 
justice.in general: for it is clear that such respect can be diminished 
at any time by comment which scandalises the court. The point has been
1. See ibid.
2. See, for example, the judgment of the Privy Council in McLeod v
St. Aubyn, [1899] A.C. 549 where Lord Morris, having described the 
'power summarily to commit for contempt of Court [as] necessary for 
the proper administration of justice', emphasised that 'It is not 
to be used for the vindication of the Judge as a person'; and that 
the judge who seeks personal redress must do so by bringing an 
action 'for libel or criminal information'.
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1
crisply stated in R v Onweugbuna and another, in which it was contended
by the defence that 1 it is not contempt of court to say this or that
about a judge or judicial officer unless there are pending proceedings,
or perhaps concluded proceedings, in relation to which the judge or
2
judicial officer is impugned'. The court had no hesitation in rejecting 
this argument. It acknowledged that the 'attack made must have a 
relation to the administration of justice by the courts, judge or 
magistrate attacked' but declared that 'it would be an absurd limitation 
of the law of contempt to say that there must be reference to a parti­
cular case tried, being tried or about to be tried. The mischief
punishable can be done as effectively by general attack as by attacks
3
upon conduct which concerns a particular case'.
10.5. The Types of Publication Subject to the Rule.
Publications which scandalise the court may be divided into two broad
categories - those which contain 'scurrilous abuse' of a judge; and
those which impugn his impartiality. A third category of publication. -
those which cast doubt upon the competence of a judge to perform his
duties, or the correctness in law of a particular decision - is, in
4
principle, not regarded as contempt.
1. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, reproduced by Chief Gani Fawehinmi, The Law
of Contempt in Nigeria (Case Book) , Surulere, 1980, pp. 243-248. The case
is further described below; but - in outline - the allegation in 
issue was that a particular judge had undertaken to impose especially 
severe penalties on supporters of a certain political party, if and 
when they appeared before him. It is thus clear that the comment 
was not made in relation to any particular case then pending or in 
progress before the courts.
2. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 247.
3. Ibid., pp. 247-248.
4. See p. 937 below.
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10.5.1. Scurrilous abuse of a judge or the judiciary in general.
Although this type of publication clearly constitutes a contempt under 
the common law which Nigeria has inherited from England, there are no 
reported Nigerian decisions illustrating or developing the basic common 
law principles. Guidance must accordingly be sought from English 
decisions to ascertain the type of publication which is likely to 
be considered a contempt of court under this head.
1
In 1900, in the leading case of R v Gray, the trial judge in obscene
libel proceedings warned the press against including (and thereby
publishing) the obscene material in issue in their reports of the trial.
Gray, the editor of the Birmingham Daily Argus, took umbrage at this
2
implied aspersion on press competence, and published an article, 
headed 'A Defender of Decency', containing the following passage:
'The terrors of Mr Justice Darling will not 
trouble the Birmingham reporters very much.
No newspaper can exist except upon its 
merits, a condition from which the Bench, 
happily for Mr Justice Darling, is exempt.
There is not a journalist in Birmingham who 
has anything to learn from the impudent 
little man in horse-hair, a microcosm of 
conceit and empty-headedness, who admonished 
the Press yesterday'. ^
In proceedings against Gray for contempt, Lord Russell, C.J. emphasised 
that the article went far beyond the bounds of legitimate
1. [1900] 2 Q.B. 36; and (1900) 82 L.T. 534, where the impugned article 
is reproduced in full.
2. The article was published on the following day, when Wells (the 
defendant in the obscene libel prosecution) had already been sentenced. 
The fact that the article was nevertheless found to constitute 
contempt illustrates the point, (discussed above) that the timing
of publication is irrelevant in this branch of the law of contempt.
3. See (1900) 82 L.T. 534.
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1
criticism and amounted to 'personal scurrilous abuse of a judge as a 
2
judge'. Gray, who had offered his apologies, was fined £100 and 
ordered to pay £25 costs.
3
In 1922, in Vidal's case, the accused - who was dissatisfied with the
outcome of a particular proceedings and who apparently believed that
4
the President of a Division of the High Court had been 'a party to a
5
conspiracy to suppress evidence' - paraded near the Law Courts carrying
a sandwich board inscribed as follows:
Is Judge Sir Henry Duke afraid to prosecute
me? I accuse him to be a traitor of his dhty
and of defrauding the course of justice for
the benefit of the Kissing Doctor'.^6
The Divisional Court considered this 'scurrilous abuse of the worst 
7
description'; and he was sentenced to four months' imprisonment - a
severe sentence which was exacerbated by his unrepentant attitude in
^  8 court.
1. This aspect of the judgment is considered further below, in the 
context, first, of whether criticism amounts to contempt; and secondly 
of whether defences based upon 'justification' and 'fair comment' 
should be introduced into Nigerian law.
2. R v Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 at 40.
3. The Times,,14 October 1922.
4. This was the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court
5. Miller, op.cit., p. 185.
6. Miller, ibid.„■
7. Ibid.
8. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 156.
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In R v Freeman,* in 1925, another dissatisfied litigant wrote to the 
2
presiding judge, accusing him of being 'a liar, a coward, [and] a
3
perjuror' and alleging that he had 'aided Lord Sheffield in a felony'.
It was held that these letters contained the 'grossest calumny and
vituperation'; and that they constituted 'as gross a contempt as had
4
lately been brought to the knowledge of the Court'.
A further illustration may be derived from.the Privy Council case of
5
McLeod v St Aubyn, where a local newspaper published a letter which 
cast severe aspersions upon the acting Chief Justice of St Vincent. It 
described him as '[a] briefless barrister, unendowed with much brain 
who religiously attended with his empty bag at the several Courts of 
London in the forlorn hope of picking up a case'; and who subsequently 
' [became] an assiduous hanger-on at the Colonial office' until such 
time as 'in an evil moment for St Vincent he was appointed a police 
magistrate'. It criticised his 'demeanour in the Magistrate's Court 
[as] [having] been anything but dignified' and accused him of having 
'indulged in offensive expressions to litigants before him, which were 
discreditable to one in his position'. Finally, warming to its theme, 
the letter depicted him as '[a] man of the Torquimada, type, narrow, 
bigoted, vain, vindictive and unscrupulous, [who] takes advantage of 
his position to vent his spleen upon those whom he hates...'.^
1. The Times, 18 November, 1925.
2. Roche, J .
3. Borrie & Lowe, supra.
4. Ibid.
5. [18991 A .C . 549.
6. See ibid.
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Surprisingly, it was not the editor or proprietor of the newspaper
who were charged with contempt, but an individual who had merely lent
1
his copy of the newspaper (unread) to the local library. The Privy
Council took the view that the accused had not intended to publish,
and so was not guilty of contempt. This aspect of the case has already
2
been discussed above; and what matters for present purposes is that
the content of the letter must, surely, be considered as scurrilously
3
abusive as the allegations in issue in R v Gray.
Also illuminating is the Privy Council decision in Re S .B . Sarbadhicary,
where a barrister - who had been interrupted by a judge in the course
of his argument in court - published an article in which he queried
whether the Chief Justice was 'qualified enough for the due discharge
of the routine of work' and described him, in heavily sarcastic terms,
as a 'wonderful [judge] who punishes an assailed and not an assailant
with miraculous readiness and activity' and who 'punishes not the
5
wrongdoer, but the wronged and thus ... upholds justice'.
The Privy Council had little difficulty in finding that the article
6
constituted a contempt.
1 . See p. 798 above, where this aspect of the case has already been 
described.
2. Ibid.
3. Supra, and see also Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 155.
4. ! (1906), 23 T.L.R. 180.
5. Ibid.
6. The case did not, in fact, involve a prosecution for contempt - but 
nevertheless has relevance for the law of contempt. 'The High Court of 
Allahabad had suspended the barrister from practice [following this 
publication] under its statutory power to do so for reasonable cause.... 
The Privy Council [considering that the article constituted a contempt] 
advised that the publication was sufficient cause to justify the 
suspension'. See A. Arlidge and E. Eady, The Law of Contempt,
London, 1982, p. 160.
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On the other hand, a further Privy Council decision - in Re Special
Reference from the Bahama Islands* - shows how difficult it may be to
predict what view the courts will take of particular allegations. Here
a local newspaper published a letter criticising the Chief Justice of
2
the islands for incompetence and for shirking . his work. The Privy
3
Council ruled that it was not a contempt on grounds which unfortunately, are 
from blear, as no reason for the Committee's conclusion is reflected in 
the report of the proceedings. Suffice it therefore to note that certain 
of the wording of the letter would certainly appear to have seen 
abusive: so that the case graphically demonstrates the difficulty 
of determining what amounts to scurrilous abuse.
The decisions discussed above are all more than half a century old. There 
is no modern English authority on publications constituting 'scurrilous 
abuse 1 and it is questionable to what extent reliance may still be 
placed - in 1983 - on precedents stemming mainly from the turn of the 
century. The dearth of authority may also indicate - not that 
publications inveighing against the judiciary have ceased - but that
1. [1893] A.C. 138.
2. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 158.
3. The Judicial Committee did, however, consider that it might ground 
an action for libel.
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judges have begun to take a more robust attitude to criticism.
More recent cases from other Commonwealth jurisdictions, however, 
reveal continued judicial sensitivity - amounting at times to 
what can only be described as"hyper-sensitivity'* - to the pub­
lication of such matter. It is to be hoped, therefore, that 
Nigerian courts will not be persuaded to follow these decisions.
The fear, however, is that in a society still beset by considerable
problems and tensions, Nigerian judges may also err on the side 
1
of overreaction.
The Commonwealth cases in question accordingly merit 
2
brief consideration. In the Australian case of R v Dunbabin, 
the Sydney Sun published an article accusing the High 
Court (which had allowed an illegal immigrant to remain in 
the country) of 'knocking holes' in Federal legislation
1. This postulates that judicial sensitivity is linked to, 
and reflects, the general level of public confidence in 
society and its organisation - including the administra­
tion of justice. An alternate hypothesis is that 
judicial sensitivity is simply one facet of a prevailing 
'Tory' ideology; and that it will accordingly continue 
for as long as that ideology holds sway. This supposition 
is discussed at p. 993 below.
2. No apology is tendered for the limited nature of this
review. The decisions of Commonwealth courts are per­
suasive only in Nigeria and it does not therefore seem 
justified, particularly given the constraints of space 
and time, to devote further attention to them.
3. (1935), 53 C.L.R. 434.
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and of handing down a decision which was 'to the horror of everybody 
except the Little Brothers of the Soviet and kindred intelligentsia'.
It continued with a rallying cry for 'some gallant champion to rid [the 
country] of this pestilent Court1 and concluded by suggesting that the 
High Court be given some real work, so that it would no longer have 
the time to 'argue for days on ... the precise difference between 
Tweedledum and Tweedle dee'.^
The article was held to constitute a contempt, on the ground that, its 
'effect and purpose ... was "to represent that the Court exercises its 
ingenuity in order to defeat legislation to which great public importance 
attaches". This, together with the suggestion that only the "Little 
Brothers of the Soviet" were pleased by the decision was held to have
2
the tendency to weaken ... [public] confidence ... in court decisions'. 
The decision seems unduly harsh, however/ for the article - even though 
mocking in tone and disrespectful to the point of insult - does not seem 
(objectively) to warrant being adjudged as 'scurrilous abuse'.
3
In Canada, in R v Western Printing and Publishing Ltd., the Western 
Star accused the Chief Justice and his colleagues (who had warned the 
media against publishing material relating to pending proceedings) of 
'intimidation of the most blatant variety (the shut-up-or-else type, 
that is)' in a manner which 'ha[d] a faint tinge of the iron-curtain to 
it' and from which it could only be assumed that 'the admonition was 
another move in the 'jump-on-the-press' campaign'. The article concluded
1. Ibid.
2. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 159.
3. (1954), 111,C.C.C. 122.
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by warning that 'The next step [would] be the seizure and shut down of 
all the Island's papers (except one) a la Juan Peron'.^*
2
This was found by the Newfoundland Supreme Court to constitute contempt. 
Again, the decision seems difficult to endorse; and reflects, it is 
submitted, what can only be termed excessive judicial sensitivity.
In more recent Canadian cases, it has been held 'scurrilous' and hence
contemptuous to 'sa[y] that a judicial decision was "silly" and could not
have been made by a sane judge; [to] cal[l] a court a "mockery of
justice"; [and to] writ[e] of a particular proceeding that "the whole
3
thing stinks from the word go". Furthermore, the New Brunswick Court
of Queen's Bench has even gone so far as to 'advanc[e] the extraordinary
4
assertion that criticism which was "ungentlemanly"' constituted a 
contempt. Again, it seems that these decisions go far beyond what is 
necessary to uphold public respect for, and confidence in, the adminis­
tration of justice; and it is urged that the Nigerian judiciary - should 
similar publications come before it for decision - should resolutely 
set its face against following these Commonwealth examples.
1. Ibid.
2. Walsh, C.J. came to this conclusion on the ground that the article 
exceeded "the bounds of temperate and fair criticism" because it 
"imputed improper motives to those taking part-in the administration 
of justice" and, in addition to its insulting words, "accuse[d] 
them of the assumption of dictatorial powers"'. Borrie & Lowe, 
op.cit., p. 164.
3. Robert Martin: 'Criticising the Judges', (1982) 28 Mc-Gill Law Journal
pp. 3-30, p. 15 . The decisions in question are Oullet v The Queen, 
[1976] C.A. 788, (1977) 72 D.L.R. (3d)95; R v Murphy (196*9)1 N.B.R. 
(2d) 297, (1969) 4 D.L.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.); and Re Landers, (1980)
31 N.B.R. (2d) 113 (Q.B.).
4. Martin, ibid., p. 16. The decision in question is Re Landers, 
supra.
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10.5,. 2. Publications imputing bias on the part of judges
Publications of this nature also constitute contempt because of their 
tendency to undermine public confidence in judicial officers as impartial 
and objective arbiters in dispute-resolution. A clear illustration of 
a publication alleged to constitute contempt on this basis is provided 
by the case of R v Jackson.^
Here, the accused was the editor and :proprietor of the Lagos Weekly
Record. Following the dismissal by the Acting Chief Justice of proceedings
2
brought by Eshugbayi Eleko, against the Officer Administering the Government
1. (1925)6 N.L.R. 49.
2. See Eshugbayi Eleko v Baddeley and another (1925) 6 N.L.R. 65.
Here the defendant, Baddeley, as Officer Administering the Government 
of Nigeria, had made an order under the Deposed Chiefs Removal 
Ordinance (Cap 78 of the Laws of Nigeria) requiring the plaintiff 
to leave the Colony and adjoining Provinces. The defendant, Thomas, 
was acting as Chief Secretary to the Government at the time the 
order was made, but had no hand in its issue. An application by 
Eshugbayi to the Supreme Court to have the order set aside was 
refused. On the same day, the plaintiff commenced the proceedings 
in question, asking for a declaration that the order was "of no 
effect and void" and also for an injunction. The Acting Attorney 
General moved the Court to stay or dismiss the action on the ground 
that it was frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of 
the Court.
The Divisional Court (per Webber, Acting C.J.) held that the 
action could not be maintained against the defendants personally, 
that it was oppressive and vexatious and that it must be dismissed.
In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasised that the second 
defendant had had no part whatever in the making of the Order; so 
that 'there [was] not the slightest cause uofaction disclosed against 
him on the writ' and the claim against him was clearly vexatious and 
oppressive and a gross abuse of the process of the Court.
As regards the first defendant, the court stressed that there was 
no ground for bringing suit against him in his personal capacity.
He had issued the Order in his official capacity, and there was 
nothing to indicate that he had acted ultra vires in doing so. 
Accordingly, there was no basis for his personal liability; and the 
plaintiff should instead have proceeded by Petition of Right.
(Continued)
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and the Chief Secretary, the accused, 'who was a strong protagonist of the 
cause of the plaintiff in that case' /  published two articles in his 
newspaper under the headings 'A Great Constitutional Issue' and 'The 
Dangers of the Judicial System of Nigeria'. In these, the accused ref­
erred to the Eshugbayi case and 'to other cases in which the Government
2
ha[d] been concerned' and alleged that 'the judges of this Court are
under the subjection of the Executive, and will not and dare not give
a decision unfavourable to the Government, and have been compelled to
invent plausible arguments in order to be able to record decisions
3
compatible with the wishes of the Executive1.
(Continued)
Furthermore, the decision to depose the plaintiff from his position 
of Native Chief and to ban him from the areas in which he had exercised 
his influence had 'already been adjudicated upon by a competent 
authority, namely the Governor' and the Court could not 'assume the 
functions of a Court of Appeal and reopen the whole inquiry with a 
view to ascertaining whether the Governor's decision' had been correct.
To do so might also compel disclosure of the views of the officers 
who had advised the Governor in making the decision, and this the 
Court was not prepared to sanction for fear of placing a 'serious 
impediment ... upon the frankness which ought to obtain among 
[administrative] staff', as stressed in Local Government Board v 
Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120 (H.L.(E.)), at 137.
It thus appears that the decision was correct in principle, though 
the last reason given by the court perhaps reflects an excessive 
determination not to intervene in executive decisions; whilst the 
fear expressed by the Court that the canvassing of the reasons for 
deposing Eshugbayi would undermine the effective operation of the 
public service does not seem justified. Accordingly, there may have 
been some kernel of truth in the allegation that the court had been 
'executive-minded' in its decision, as Jackson - as explained below - allegec
2. R v Jackson, supra, at 52.
3. Ibid.
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Combe, C.J. pointed out that this was the 'first occasion on which th[e] 
Court ha[d] been called upon to exercise its jurisdiction in a case of 
contempt of this n a t u r e ' a n d  accordingly considered it appropriate to 
canvass the English precedents which provide authority for the 'jurisdic­
tion vested in the Court to deal summarily with such contempt, [as well
as] ... the principles which should govern the decision of the Court in
,2
the exercise of that jurisdiction.
He accordingly referred to the judgment of Lord Morris in the Privy
3
Council in McLeod v St Aubyn and to thatof Lord Russell of Killowen,C.J. 
4
in R v Gray; and considered it 'unnecessary ... to refer to any other 
5
authorities'. In his view: 'There [was] no doubt that th[e] Court ha[d] 
the power to punish by summary process any person who publishes matter 
which is calculated to bring th[e] Court into contempt'.^
Combe, C.J. then proceeded to consider the content of the articles in 
7
issue and had no hesitation in concluding (as was, apparently, also
g
conceded by the defence) that the articles 'contain[ed][a] scandalous
reflection upon the integrity of th[e] Court and that [their] publication
9
... constitute[d] a gross contempt of Court'.
1. Ibid., at 50.
2. Ibid.
3. [1899] A.C. 549 at 561, per Lord Morris.
4. [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 at 40.
5. R v Jackson, supra at 52.
6. Ibid.
7. This is described at p. 914 above.
8. R v Jackson, supra,,at 52 where Combe, C.J. states: 'It has not been,
and it cannot be, denied that these articles contain scandalous
reflection upon ... this Court....'.
9. Ibid.
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Turning to the question whether the Law Officers of the Crown had acted 
properly in bringing the articles to the attention of the Court (as 
the learned judge had no doubt they had), Combe, C.J. then gave utterance 
to the following observations on the role of the law of contempt in a 
colonial context. The passage is somewhat lengthy but nevertheless 
merits reproduction in full:
'It may be that if similar articles 
referring to a Court in England were published 
in England, the Court would be satisfied to 
leave to public opinion such scandalous 
reflections on the integrity of the Court. 
Indeed, if I was satisfied that the articles 
in question were read only by the more intel­
ligent and advanced members of the communities 
of this Colony and Protectorate, I might be 
content to leave the matter to public opinion, 
being fully convinced that by such persons 
these reflections upon the integrity of 
the judges of this Court would be rejected 
with the contempt which they deserve, and 
that the articles would do more harm to the 
reputation of the editor and proprietor of 
the newspaper than to the administration of 
justice.
The conditions in this country are, however, 
very different to those in England, and in 
the smallerand more advanced Colonies. A 
large majority of the populations of this 
Colony and Protectorate consists of primitive 
people, who until the recent advent of the 
British Administration had, I fear, but little 
reason for trusting in the integrity of the 
Courts which adjudicated in their affairs.
It is, I think, generally recognised that one 
of the greatest blessings brought to this 
country by the British Administration is the 
establishment of an absolutely impartial 
judiciary, and I have every reason to believe 
that the inhabitants of this Colony and 
Protectorate have complete confidence in the 
British Courts which have been established, 
and rejoice in having Courts to which they 
can come with certain knowledge that justice 
will be administered without fear and without 
favour.
This man Thomas Horatius Jackson, using the 
paper of which he is the editor and proprietor 
as his instrument, has sought to persuade
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the public that no confidence can be placed 
in this Court since the Judges are afraid 
to give decisions which might not meet with 
the approval of the Executive. These wicked 
aspersions on the integrity of Judges of this 
Court must, through the medium of this newspaper, 
reach many of the less advanced members of 
the communities of the Colony and Protecto­
rate who cannot be expected to appraise at 
their true value statements made in the leading 
articles of that newspaper. Hence incalculable 
damage may be done by the publication of the 
articles which have given rise to these proceed­
ings. Indeed I cannot imagine any greater 
evil which could befall the people of this 
Colony and Protectorate than that Jackson 
should succeed in his efforts to render 
this Court contemptible in the eyes of the 
public.
Again, I have no hesitation in saying that, 
unless there are any matters which can be 
taken in consideration in mitigation of the 
punishment1 which must be imposed for this 
gross contempt of this Court, it would be my 
duty to commit Jackson to prison for a very 
considerable time1.
2
The judgment provides illuminating insight into the complacency and 
paternalism which underlies not only British colonial administration 
but also the entire concept of scandalising the court constituting a 
contempt. The inference is plain that the educated and sophisticated 
can be allowed to penetrate the myths of judicial infallibility and 
impartiality: but not so the remainder of society. The latter must 
be kept in awe of the courts; and must not be allowed to query whether 
they are, in fact, performing their role adequately, and meeting the 
responsibilities entrusted to them.
The court, moreover, seems to have taken an unduly harsh approach to 
the two articles, which - in view of the decision which prompted their
1. In the event the court was able to find certain mitigating factors - 
viz, that Jackson, had 'admitted his offence, humbly apologise[d] to 
the court and submitt[ed] himself to the merciful consideration of 
the court1. Ibid., at 55. Accordingly, the accused was sentenced 
to two months' imprisonment, and ordered to pay £25 in costs.
2. Ibid., at 52-53.
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publication, as described above"*" - may well have contained a kernel of 
truth. In the circumstances prevailing in Nigeria in those early days 
of colonial rule, it is difficult to believe that there was not some 
identity of interest between executive and judicial branches of the 
colonial government: and that this would not inevitably have undermined 
judicial independence to some extent. If that were indeed the case, 
public confidence in the general administration of justice would have 
been better served by allowing the publication of these allegations: 
as the first step in the taking of remedial action.
A further Nigerian decision on the offence of 'scandalising' the
2
court is that in R v Service Press Ltd.
The proceedings arose out of the publication in the Daily Service
2
of 4 November 1952 of an editorial headed '"Gentleman A.J. Sangster"',
which charged, inter alia, that he was in cahoots with the judiciary.
Mr Sangster (who was the Vice-President of the Ibadan branch of the 
3
N.C.N.C. ) was alleged, in the editorial, to have 'been heard to boast 
on several occasions of his close intimacy with white officials descend­
ing from the very top to the bottom, and even including Her Majesty's
4
High Court Judges'. It continued:
'Mr Sangster was audacious enough to predict 
the judgment in a recent famous case long 
before judgment was given and, surprisingly 
enough his prediction came true to the very
letter. In another famous case now in progress,
Mr Sangster has been intimidating witnesses 
and making free use of the judge's alleged 
mandate in a most scandalous and high-handed 
manner'. 5
1. See p. 913.
2. (1952) 20 N.L.R. 96, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 230-233.
3. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 230.
4. Ibid., p. 231. The N.C.N.C. was one of the three major political
parties at the time, as previously explained in the section on the 
history of Nigeria at p. 82.
5. Ibid.
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Two different aspects of the law of contempt were thus brought into issue: 
scandalising the court and interfering with proceedings in progress*
The former is the more important, however, as the court, in the end, 
preferred to make no ruling in relation to the latter (as further 
explained below).
The court drew attention to the word 'even' (in the first passage from
the editorial quoted above) and pointed out that this 'stress[ed]
the fact that High Court Judges, who might have been expected to stand
aloof from political machination, had not done so'.'*’ Referring to the
allegation that Mr Sangster had been 'audacious enough' to predict
the outcome of certain proceedings and that this prediction had come
true 'to the very letter', the court rejected the defence contention
that readers would understand this as meaning that Mr Sangster had 'got
2
hold of th[e] judgment through a typist or by some other means'.
On the contrary, the court doubted whether 'any person blessed with
normal understanding could fail to gather that the article meant that
Her Majesty's High Court Judges had been drawn into the so called
alliance [between 'the imperialist forces' and various 'shady charac-
. 3
ters in the N.C.N.C.' including Mr Sangster] to such an extent that
Mr Sangster was on such footing with the judges that he was able to
4
know beforehand what decisions a learned Judge was to give'.
The court had no doubt that the passage in question was 'to use the 
words of Wilmot, J., "designed to excite in the minds of the people
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. This was the first allegation contained in the article which 
then - warming to its theme - proceeded to make the further allegations 
which were specifically in issue.
4. Ibid.
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a great dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations"1 and that it 
thus constituted '"the most fatal and dangerous obstruction to justice, 
... [calling for] rapid and immediate redress'".'*’
The court accordingly further rejected the further defence submission
that where '"a case [is not] beyond reasonable doubt, the Courts will
and ought "to leave the Attorney-General to proceed by criminal 
2
information"'. This principle could not apply to the passage in
question. The court could not 'accept the suggestion that such words
3
were published for the public good'. In its view, 'they decidedly
had the reverse effect because their result could only be to destroy
the confidence of the public in the Courts and this [was] the greatest
4
disservice that [could] be done to the public'. It followed that
5
'the duty of th[e] Court '[was] to deal brevi manu with the offender'.
The court then turned to consider the concluding part of the offending 
passage, to the effect that Mr Sangster had been 'intimidating witnesses' 
and 'making free use of the Judge's alleged mandate in a most scandalous 
and high-handed manner'.^ This, in the court's opinion, 'appear[ed]
1. Ibid., at p. 232. This famous dictum of Wilmot, J. (contained in 
the judgment which he prepared in R v Almon) has previously been 
described in full at p. 902. The court adopted this passage because 
- though written very many years ago - its words were both eloquent
and seemed aptly to describe the likely effect of the offending article.
2. Ibid., p. 232, based upon the authority of R v Gray [1900] 2 Q.B.
32 at 40.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. It is arguable that this portion of the judgment is no longer 
good law, in the light of Deduwa v The State, [1975] 1 All N.L.R. 1, 
discussed at p 725 above. The correct interpretation of the Supreme 
Court judgment in Deduwa is a matter of some difficulty (as further 
discussed at p.726 above) but it does at least seem clear that in 
cases of contempt not in the face of the court - as here - the 
summary procedure may only be used if the facts are so notorious
(Continued)
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[prima facie] calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course
of justice'^" in those proceedings; but (as the court did not know what
particular case was referred to) it considered that would be fairer
and safer not to make [a] definite pronouncement that [the sentence]
2
constitute[d] a ... contempt of court1.
In conclusion, the court emphasised that the earlier part of the passage
3 4was 'a most mischievous and wicked contempt1 which 'aim[ed] at destroy-
5
ing the very foundations [of the] judicial system'. No apology or regret 
had been expressed; and the court accordingly considered it appropriate 
to impose a fine of £150 upon Service Press Ltd (plus costs of 25
m 6 guineas').
Continued...
as to be virtually incontestible; and then only provided all constitu­
tional safeguards of fair trial are observed.
It must, of course, also be remembered in this regard that the present 
case was decided before the incorporation of the guarantees of funda­
mental rights: so that it is not inappropriate that it should indeed have 
been affected thereby.
6 • Ibid.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p . 233.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. It would seem, however, that the court did not consider intention 
of particular importance. This emerges particularly clearly from
its statement (at p. 233) that 'Lack of intent does not render a 
contempt innocuous'. This was in relation to the alleged contempt 
of prejudicing pending proceedings, which is generally regarded as an 
offence of 'strict liability' - not dependent on mens rea, as dis­
cussed at p. 953. The remark was also obiter, so it is difficult 
to know how much significance to attach to it*
5„ Ibid.
6 . Ibid. The court further warned, however, that rsuch lenient treatment 
would not be repeated' and regretted that '[t]he contemnor being a 
limited Company, [it] could not have recourse to imprisonment'.
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Another important decision involving a publication 'scandalising' the
court is that of R v Onweugbuna and another.^  The proceedings arose out
of the publication in the Eastern Sentinel of 8 March 1957 of an article
headed: "'ACTION GROUP SECRET DOCUMENT TRAPPED. PLANS AGAINST ZIK AND
2
N.C.N.C. OUT. ANNIHILATION OF Z.N.V. SCHEMED"'. It stated that a
'"secret document"' (being a highly confidential letter written by an
organiser within the Action Group to a leader of the party) had been
'"captured"' in Aba by a political group known as the Zikist National
Vanguard; and it claimed that this letter '"revealed plans the Action
Group, with the help of certain persons in high office, [was] making ...
to see to the defeat of Zik and the N.C.N.C. in the forthcoming Eastern
elections, and the political annihilation of the Zikist National Vanguard"'.
The letter (which was reproduced in full) pointed to the advantages of
destroying the latter political group and opined that Aba township was 
4
its '"pivot"'. It proceeded:
'"If we can destroy them from there [ie, Aba] 
the party will die a natural death.
Incidentally, I have connected Mr M and he
has promised to give them maximum punishment.
In this regard please contact S.S. whom I am 
sure will set his men over them and nab them"'.
5
In proceedings for contempt brought by the Attorney-General of the 
Eastern Region against the editor and Associated Newspapers of Nigeria 
Ltd (the printers and publishers of the newspaper), the court had little 
hesitation in concluding that the inference from the article was that
Mr. M was one of the 'persons in high places' whose assistance had been
1. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp.243-248.
2. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 244.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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sough t by the Action Group in order to destroy their political rivals.
It was also quite clear from the terms of the letter that Mr. M was 
a person 'holding judicial office in Aba1;^  and the ordinary reader would
undoubtedly suppose that 'reference was being made either to the judge
2 3
[whose name began with M] or to one of the two Magistrates in Aba'.
The court continued:
'Now to say of a judge, or of a magistrate, 
that he has discussed with a political agent 
of a particular political party how he will 
deal with members of another political party if 
and when they are brought before him upon 
criminal charges, and to say that he has promised 
in advance to deal out the maximum punishment, 
is quite plainly to make a most appalling 
accusation. More than that, such a statement is 
perfectly calculated to shake the confidence of 
the public in the administration of justice, and 
to bring not only the person impugned into con­
tempt, but also the Court over which such person 
presides'.
4
5
The court approved the statement of Lord Russell, C.J. in R v Gray 
that '[a]ny act done or writing published calculated to ... lower [the] 
authority [of a judge] is a contempt of C o u r t a n d  further cited
1. Ibid., p. 245.
2. Ibid., p. 246. The court did not think it important that 'readers
[might] be baffled in their choice of courts, some thinking that the 
judge was meant, others thinking that one of the Magistrates was 
meant.... [for] once it is realised that it is not the offended 
dignity of a particular court, or of the persons who compose it, which 
is the subject of punishment, but the wrong done to the public in 
weakening the power of the courts to do justice and in sapping the 
belief of men in the impartiality of the courts which administer 
justice, it will be seen that it- matters not at all that there is
uncertainty as to which court is impugned, so it be certain that a
court is impugned'.
The court also considered that, since the Judge at Aba was the only one 
in the Region whose name began with M., 'a considerable section of 
the reading public would suppose that reference to the Judge in Aba 
was made'.
3. Ibid., at 245.
4. Ibid.
5. [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 discussed further at p. 905.
6. Ibid., at 40.
-924-
a number of passages from the judgment of Wills, J. in R v Davies^
which emphasise that - in the context of contempt through scandalising
the court - 1"the real offence is the wrong done to the public by
weakening the authority and influence of a tribunal which exists for
2
their good alone"1.
The court was at pains to emphasise, however, that the rule against
'scandalising' the court does not preclude 'reasoned and respectful cri-
3
ticism by the press and by private persons'. In the court's view,
'[e]ven ill-informed or wrong-headed criticism of a judicial decision is
4
not ... a contempt so it be honestly and respectfully made'. This
could not, however, assist the accused; for 'a statement to the effect
that this or that Judge or Magistrate ha[d] come to an infamous arrangement
with a politician of the sort suggested in th[e] article, [was] not
criticism of the kind just mentioned, [but] ... [was] quite clearly a
statement ... calculated to bring about just that mischief to which
5
Wills, J. [had] referred'.
Having rejected a number of other arguments raised by the defence,^ 
the court found the accused guilty of contempt and imposed a fine of
1. [1906] 1 K.B. 32.
2. Ibid.
3. Fawehinmi, supra, p. 245.
4. Ibid., p. 245.
5. Ibid.
6. These were that s 133 provided the sole method by which contempt 
could be punished in Nigeria (discussed at p. 703 ); that Associated 
Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd., being a corporation, could not be guilty 
of contempt as it was incapable of having the necessary 'guilty mind' 
(discussed at p. 963 ); and that contempt can only be committed
in relation to particular proceedings (discussed at p. 904 ).
The principal other defence relied upon was that the editor had 
acted in good faith and in the public interest; and this aspect of 
the case is considered further below.
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£75 (plus ElO.lOsOd costs) on the editor and a fine of £150 (plus 
the same sum in costs) upon Associated Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd.
The decision - apart from its welcome acknowledgement that honest, reasoned 
and respectful criticism does not amount to 'scandalising' the court*- - 
is profoundly disturbing . It was in the highest public interest that 
these secret plans of the N.C.N.C. should have been revealed; and it is 
most perturbing that the editor and publisher of the newspaper should have 
been thus penalised for so doing. The decision accordingly reveals
a number of shortcomings in the present law: and these are further ana­
lysed in due course.
There appear to be no further reported Nigerian decisions involving 
imputations of judicial bias published by the media. There are, however, 
a number of cases dealing with allegations of partiality made by parties 
to proceedings or their counsel. Certain of these decisions have pre­
viously been adverted to in the context of the principles governing the
2
exercise of the summary contempt jurisdiction; and, for present purposes,
it is instructive merely to note the nature of the allegations which have
3
been found prima facie to scandalise the court.
Thus, in Attorney-General of Western Nigeria v Oredein and others, in re 
4
Odumuyiwa, a party to certain proceedings before Mr Justice Oyemade 
applied for the hearing to be transferred to another court on the grounds 
of the political bias of the judge in question, who was alleged to have
1. See p.924 above. The legality of reasoned criticism is discussed 
further at p. 937 below.
2. See p. 719, et seq.
3. It will be recalled from the discussion above that conviction for 
contempt was set aside on appeal in certain of these cases on the 
grounds, inter alia, of failure to observe "due process".
4. Unreported, Charge No. J/19C/65, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., 
pp. 131-135 .
L
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expressed the determination on several occasions to acquit any person
who killed a member of the N.N.D.P. and who appeared before him on a
criminal charge1.* On the hearing of the application for transfer,
2
Mr Justice Oyemade found the applicants guilty of contempt and sentenced
3
them to six months' imprisonment.
4
In Deduwa and others v The State, proceedings for contempt arose, once 
again, out of an application (contained in a letter to the Registrar 
at Warri) for certain proceedings to be transferred to another court.
The grounds for this were said by the appellants (in their letter to the 
Registrar) to be the fact that the trial judge (Mr. Justice Atake) 
was an Itsekiri whereas the appellants (the defendants in civil proceed­
ings pending before him) were Urhobos. The appellants further pointed 
out that the Itsekiri Communal Land Trustees were party to the proceedings 
and that all thirteen other defendants were also Itsekiris. The 
appellants (being mindful of the punishment for contempt recently imposed 
by the same judge on two other litigants who had similarly requested a 
transfer of proceedings) couched their application in humble, not to say 
obsequious, terms; but did nevertheless assert that they 'honestly
believe[d] that there [was] a likelihood of bias on the part of the
5
judge if he trie [d] the case'.
On this letter being brought to the attention of Atake, J., he charged 
the applicants summarily with contempt, and - having conducted a rigorous
1. See Fawehinmi, ibid., pp. 131-132.
2. The applicants' counsel was also convicted on the principle enunciated 
by the Privy Council in Vidyasagarav R, [1963] 2 W.L.R. 1033 (P.C.)
See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 134.
3. Their counsel was sentenced to a fine of £25, or two months' imprisonment 
in default of payment.
4. [1975] 1 All N.L.R.1, reproduced by Fawehinmi, supra, pp. 170-179.
5. See Fawehinmi, op.cit., p. 170.
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examination of them'*’ - he indignantly refuted the suggestion that because
a 'judge ... belongs to one tribe or the other ... [this] means that
[he] lets himself (sic) to tribal considerations when adjudicating on
2
a matter before him1. He accordingly found the appellants guilty of
contempt and sentenced each to a fine of N 100, or six months' imprison-
3
ment with hard labour in default of payment.
4
In Aniweta v The State, counsel representing defendants in certain pro­
ceedings swore an affidavit alleging that the presiding judge - who had 
given judgment by default in his clients' favour - had subsequently 
altered his ruling to one in the plaintiffs' favour: having been bribed 
by the plaintiffs to do so. Counsel accordingly charged the judge in 
question (Mr Justice Obi-Okoye) with having 'grossly corrupted his office'. 
When this affidavit (copies of which counsel was alleged to have distri­
buted amongst the public in the vicinity of the Court) came to the 
attention of Obi-Okoye, J., he charged counsel summarily with contempt 
and (having explained the true circumstances behind the amendment of his 
judgment), sentenced him to 200 days' imprisonment for contempt.^
1. They were given the choice of remaining silent, speaking from the 
dock or going into the witness box; and all three chose the last 
possibility. They were then closely cross-examined by Atake, J.,
in a manner which the Supreme Court subsequently expressly disapproved, 
as previously noted at p. 725.
2. Fawehinmi, supra, p. 175.
3. Their appeal against conviction succeeded, as previously noted,
because of Atake, J.'s failure to observe constitutional guarantees 
of fair trial: especially the principle that an accused should not 
be compelled to give evidence against himself. See p.726.
4. Appeal No. FCA/E/47/78, reproduced by Fawehinmi, supra, pp. 98-116.
5. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p . 99.
6. Conviction was upheld on appeal, but sentence reduced to 120 days'
imprisonment as previously explained at p. 721.
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By contrast, in Agbachom v The State,^  the allegation (once more in
support of an application for transfer of proceedings to another court) was
that the trial judge had been paid (presumably by a party with an interest
2
in the proceedings) 'the sum of £488-15s being balance out of 700
3
guineas 'legal debt' ... out of trust fund'. The judge in question took
the view that this allegation would be understood as meaning that he had
'calandestinely while a judge collected the said sum ... and that [it
4
was] not in fact a debt owed to him'. He accordingly charged the appli­
cant with contempt, tried and convicted him summarily the following day, 
and sentenced him to a fine of £75 or three months' imprisonment. On 
appeal, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the passage was ambiguous 
and that contempt had therefore not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, 
as required in criminal proceedings. It emphasised that 'reading the 
paragraph in a normal, natural and balanced way ... [i]t [merely] 
stated a fact, which [was] not disputed, that money due under a legal 
debt was paid to the learned trial judge'.^ Accordingly, '[t]o impute 
immoral motives [on the applicant's part] as the learned trial judge 
[had done], [was] quite untenable';^ and the conviction was accordingly 
set aside.
Leaving aside these Nigerian examples of the type of imputation of bias 
held to constitute contempt, and focusing again on allegations of judicial 
partiality published by the media, it is interesting to note the further
1. [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 65-72.
2. This is not made clear in the report of the proceedings, but seems 
the only logical inference.
3. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 65.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 71.
6. Ibid.
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guidance (as to the type of publication regarded as scandalising the 
court) provided by a number of English cases.
Of these, the most important is the case of New Stateman (Editor),
1 2 
ex parte P.P.P. This arose out of libel proceedings, brought by the
editor of the Morning Post against Dr Marie Stopes/a strong advocate of
birth control at a time (1928) when this was still a highly controversial
question. Judgment had been given against her, and she had been ordered
to pay damages of £200. The New Stateman thereupon published an article
'suggesting that Mr Justice Avory, who had presided over the action,
had allowed his religious convictions as a Roman Catholic to prejudice
3
his summing up'. The article described the verdict in the libel pro­
ceedings as 'a substantial miscarriage of justice'; and - whilst dis­
claiming sympathy for Dr Stopes' work or aims - emphasised that 'pre­
judice against those aims ought not to be allowed to influence a Court 
of Justice in the manner in which they appeared to influence Mr Justice 
Avory in his summing up'. It concluded with the observation:
'The serious point in this case, however, is that 
individual owning to such views as those of 
Dr Stopes cannot apparently hope for a fair 
hearing in a Court presided over by Mr Justice 
Avory and there are so many Avory's.'
In proceedings for contempt subsequently instituted against the pub­
lisher, Lord Hewart, C.J. 'had no doubt that the article complained of 
did constitute a contempt. It imputed unfairness and lack of impartiality 
to a Judge in the discharge of his judicial duties. The gravamen of 
the offence was that by lowering his authority it interfered with the
1. (1928), 44 T.L.R. 301.
2. This was in Gwynne v Stopes. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 161, n 12.
3. Miller, op.cit., p. 186.
4. New Statesman (Editor), ex parte D.P.P., supra, at 301.
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performance of his judicial duties1."*"
2
Then, in 1930, in R v Wilkinson, the Daily Worker published an article
strongly criticising the sentences imposed by the courts on 1 serving
3
soldiers who committed crimes to get out of the army'. It alleged
that these reflected the 'violent oppression of the working classes
which [was] rapidly becoming the hall-mark of the policy of the Labour 
4
Government1. It continued: 'Rigby Swift, the Judge who sentenced 
Comrade Thomas, was the bewigged puppet and former Tory M.P. chosen to 
put Communist leaders away in 1926. The defending counsel, able as 
he was, could not do much in the face of strong class bias of the Judge 
and j ury'.^
This was described by Lord Hewart, C.J. as a 'gross and outrageous
contempt'^ which 'had the effect of bringing the judge into contempt
7
and lowering his authority'.
g
In 1931, in R v Colsey, the editor of the magazine Truth was found 
guilty of contempt for publishing the following facetious comment:
1. Ibid., at 303.
2. The Times, 16 July, 1930.
3. Arlidge & Eady , op.cit., p. 161.
4. The Times, supra.
5. Ibid.
6. Miller,op.cit., p. 186.
7. Borrie and Lowe, op.cit., p . ,156.
8. The Times, 9 May 1931.
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'Lord Justice Slesser who can hardly be 
altogether unbiased about legislation 
of this type maintained that really it 
was a very nice provisional order or as 
good a one as can be expected in this vale 
of tears'.
1
Underlying the reference to Lord Justice Slesser's alleged bias was the 
fact that he himself had steered the legislation in question through 
Parliament at a time (1924) when he had been Solicitor-General in the 
government of the day. The case was heard by Lord Hewart, C.J., who - 
again - had little hesitation in concluding that it constituted a 
contempt.
The decision in R v Colsey has been much criticised and seems to repre­
sent the high-water mark in the tide of judicial sensitivity in England. 
It is the last reported decision in England in which imputations of bias 
on the part of judges have been held to constitute contempt. The 
reason for this may, of course, be that publications of this kind have 
ceased, the media having learned the need for greater caution. The more 
probable explanation, however, especially in the light of the increased 
tolerance of strong language in English society in general, is that the
judiciary has become less "touchy" and more able to acknowledge the
3
legitimacy of criticism.
1. Ibid.
2. See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 156. In the words of Professor Goodhart, it 
'carr[ied] the doctrine of constructive contempt to its extreme
limits for the administration of justice can hardly have been seriously 
endangered by the Editor's mild but expensive humour'. See Goodhart, 
'Newspapers and Contempt of Court', (1934-35) 48 H.L.R. pp 885-910 # P 904.
3. This may, of course, be too sanguine a view, for it must also be 
acknowledged - as stated by Miller, op.cit., p. 187, - that 'it is 
known that the news media [in England] have been troubled in recent 
years by the possibility of committing a contempt by reporting (and 
thus publicising) accusations of political bias levelled by certain 
trade-union leaders and others at the National Industrial Relations 
Court'.
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Similar increased tolerance is not, however, to be espied in other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. Mention is again briefly made of some of 
the more glaring examples of judicial over-reaction to suggestions of 
bias - for the purpose, once more, of pointing the direction which (it 
is submitted) the Nigerian judiciary should not - in future - take.
A notable example of recent judicial hypersensitivity is provided by
the case of Chokolingo v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago.^  Here,
the editor and publisher of a newspaper called 'The Bomb1 were convicted
of scandalising the court for publishing a fictitious short story which
' purported to be an account by a servant recently dismissed from a
judge's household of the way in which the judge and his wife and, it
2
was suggested, his fellow judges habitually conducted themselves'.
3
It alleged 'bribery, corruption and fraud in the household'; and the
local Law Society was so incensed that it immediately instituted pro-
4
ceedings for contempt. Both defendants pleaded guilty before the High 
Court and were sentenced to 21 days' imprisonment and a fine of $500 
respectively.
5
In the New Zealand case of Attorney-General v Blundell, a newspaper 
reported a speech made by the President of the New Zealand Labour Party; 
and quoted him as saying (inter alia) that "he had never known the 
Supreme Court to give a decision in favour of the workers where it 
could possibly avoid it" and that "he agreed that they [the workers]
1. [1981] 1 All E.R. 244 (P.C.), The case has, of course, previously
been examined in greater detail in the section on contempt of court 
in general , at p 745 et seq.
2. Ibid., at 245.
3. Ibid., at 246.
4. Unfortunately, the report of the proceedings gives little indication
of whether the result would have been different if the defendants
had not acknowledged their guilt in this way.
5. [1942] N.Z.L.R. 287.
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would not get fair play from the Court of Arbitration".'*’ Myers, C.J.
held that these passages constituted contempt, being 'calculated to
depreciate the authority of both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Arbitration ... [and] to diminish the confidence of the public in the 
2
courts1. Whether:the article would have had such drastic consequences 
in reality seems open to considerable doubt.
In the early Australian case of Re Syme, ex parte Daily Telegraph
3
Newspaper Co. Ltd., the following passage was held to constitute 
contempt:
"Taking all three decisions together, 
we fear there is only one conclusion the 
public will come to and that is that the 
political bias of the Judge was not without 
an influence, consciously or unconsciously 
upon his decision".
4
However, the decision does not provide clear authority in this context,
for the ground on which the article was held contemptuous was that it
tended to prejudice pending proceedings (rather than that 'it impugned
5
the judge's impartiality').
In another Australian case, Re the Evening News,^  a newspaper of that 
name had published an article accusing a particular judge of bias.
The underlying circumstances were that the newspaper had been involved 
in three libel cases (presumably decided by the judge in question) 
which it had lost; and had then published (in relation to a fourth case)
1. Ibid., (cited by Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 163).
2. Ibid.
3. (1879), 5 V.L.R. L. 291.
4. Ibid., (cited by Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 162).
5. Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 162.
6. (1880) , 1 L.R. (N.S-W.) .211.
-934-
an article which contained the following offending passages:
"His Honor the Judge Windeyer has had 
another opportunity to show his utter want 
of judicial impartiality and from the bench 
he has delivered once more a bitter and 
one-sided advocate's speech....
Fortunately the gentlemen of the jury ... 
were men of some independence of character 
and they decided the case on its merit 
awarding comparatively small damages"1. 1
It was held that the article constituted a contempt.
In fairness to the Australian judiciary (and as evidence of an encourag 
ing liberalisation of attitude which other Commonwealth jurisdictions 
would do well to emulate), it must also be pointed out that the two 
decisions described above both date from before the turn of the century 
and that more recent Australian precedent reveals a far more robust 
attitude to allegations of partiality. The case in which this seems
2
particularly evident is Attorney-General for New South Wales v Mundey.
Here, the president of a trade union, who had caused damage to the goal 
posts on a rugby field in the course of protesting against a "Springbok 
rugby tour of Australia, was fined for this and bound over at Sydney 
quarter sessions. At the conclusion of his trial, the secretary of the 
same union was asked for his impression of the decision and replied:
'Well, I think it's a miscarriage of justice,... 
it showed that the judge himself was a racist 
judge. It shows you the extent to which racism 
exists within our society and it shows you what 
a tremendous problem we have, all Australians, 
to overcome this deeply ingrained racism....
1. Ibid. (cited by Borrie & Lowe, supra).
2. [1972] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 887 (N.S.W. §up Ct).
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I think the main purpose, the industrial action 
by the workers here this morning, the spontaneous 
action of workers walking off jobs, stopped 
the racist judge from sending these two! 
men to jail; that's the real position'.
This statement was broadcast, in edited form, by at least one television 
station as part of its evening news programme.
In proceedings for contempt, it was held by Hope, J.A. that the contempt
of scandalising the court had indeed been committed. The grounds for
this decision are, however, significant. It was not the allegation that
the judge was racially biased which constituted contempt, but 'the
suggestion that [he] had been overawed by the action of the workers
[in] congregating in the vicinity of the courtand that it was this alone
2
which had caused him to refrain from imposing a prison sentence'.
As stated by Miller, 'Hope, J.A.'s refusal to accept that the allegation 
that the judge was a 'racist judge' was itself a contempt in the circum­
stances of the case shows a robust and commendable attitude to this
3
branch of the law of contempt'.
Whether public confidence in the judiciary is so tenuous as to be under­
mined by the suggestion that a judge has been swayed by the actions of 
protesters is, however, a moot question - and suggests that Australian
4
courts still have some distance to go in overcoming hyper-sensitivity. 
Canadian decisions also reveal a high degree of judicial sensitivity.
1. Both the president and another man had been so fined and bound over.
2. Miller, op.cit., p. 187.
3. Ibid.
4. In this regard, however, the robust judgment of Griffith, C.J. in 
another Australian case, R v Nicholls, (1911) 12 C.L.R. 280, acknow­
ledging that criticism may be for the public benefit, should not be 
overlooked. This is discussed further at p. 944 below.
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Thus, in R v Murphy an article was published in a university newspaper
which described the author's personal experience in particular proceed­
ings and charged the court with having provided 'a mockery of justice1.
It alleged that the author 'along with any of the other defence witnesses, 
might well have testified to the bottle-throwing mob that on several 
occasions gathered outside'; and concluded as follows:
'The Courts in New Brunswick are simply the 
instruments of the corporate elite. Their 
duty is not so much to make just decisions 
as to make right decisions (i.e. decisions 
which will furthe perpetuate the elite which 
controls and rewards them). Court appoint­
ments are political appointments. Only the 
naive would reject the notion that an indi­
vidual becomes a justice or judge after he
proves his worth to the establishment'.
2
The New Brunswick Supreme Court held that the article constituted a
contempt: a decision which seems difficult to endorse, especially in
the light of the limited circulation of the newspaper: and one which
must, if anything, have tended to 'alienate [the] students even further,
3
and to reinforce the views which prompted the publication'.
4
In the case of Re Borowski, the Minister of Transport in one of the 
Provinces^ suggested in the course of an interview (which was taped 
and subsequently broadcast over the radio) that a recent decision of 
a local magistrate had been influenced by the fact that he (the 
magistrate) was 'a loyal Conservative and had been appointed by the
1. (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.).
2. Ibid , at 291.
3. Miller, op.cit., p. 188.
4. (1971) 19 D.L.R. (3d) 537 (Manitoba Q.B.).
5. Manitoba.
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Conservative Administration1.^ He was found guilty of contempt.
These and other Canadian decisions have elicited the observation that
1[c]ontempts of this nature are viewed with considerable disfavour by
the Canadian judiciary' and that the judges have evidenced 'extreme
2
sensitivity' on occasion. It is submitted that the same may be said
for other Commonwealth jurisdictions (as illustrated by the brief survey
3
above) and that the Nigerian judiciary - in this context as well 
should steadfastly refuse to follow their example.
4
10.6. The Legality of Reasoned Criticism
By contrast with the two categories of publication considered above, 
those which do no more than to offer temperate and reasoned criticism of 
judges and their decisions clearly do not constitute contempt. On 
the contrary, such publications fulfil a valuable function in society 
by preventing the abuse of judicial authority and by contributing to 
the growth and development of the law to fit the changing needs of modern 
times. Accordingly, they play a vital role in preserving and maintaining 
public confidence in the administration of justice in general.
A number of judicial dicta provide authority for the legality of 
reasoned criticism: but the most telling statement is perhaps that of
1. The Minister's actual words, in seeking to explain the decision, 
were: 'The fact that he is a loyal Conservative and had been appointed 
by the Conservative Administration can't be overlooked'. The Minister 
had also said: '[I]f that bastard hears the case I will see to it that 
he is defrocked and debarred'. As stated by Miller, op.cit., p. 187,
'[T]his latter threat was regarded by Nitikiman, J. as being 'un­
believably outrageous' in that it suggested to listeners that the 
judiciary was subject to dismissal at the pleasure of the executive'. 
It is difficult to determine, accordingly, to what extent the court's 
conclusion (that the Minister was guilty of contenpt) was based 
upon his allegation of judicial partiality - and to what extent it 
was in reaction to the latter 'outrage'.
2. Martin, op.cit., p. 16.
3. It has already been suggested, at p. 912 above, that the Nigerian
(Continued)
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Lord Atkin in Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, as follows
'But whether the authority and position of an 
individual judge, or the due administration of 
justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by 
any member of the public who exercises the 
ordinary right of criticising in good faith, 
in private or public the public act done in the 
seat of justice. The path of criticism is a 
public way: the wrong-headed are permitted to 
err therein: provided that members of the 
public abstain from imputing improper motives 
to those taking part in the administration 
of justice, and are genuinely exercising a 
right of criticism, and not acting in malice 
or attempting to impair the administration 
of justice, they are immune.2 Justice is not 
a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to 
suffer the scrutiny and the respectful even 
though outspoken comments of ordinary men1.
Also worthy of note is the assertion of Lord Russell, C.J., in R v Gray 
that:
'Judges and Courts are alike open to 
criticism, and if reasonable argument or 
expostulation is offered against any judicial 
act as contrary to law or public good, no 
Court could or would treat that as contempt 
of Court. The law ought not to be astute 
in such cases to criticise adversely what under 
such circumstances and with such an object, is 
published....'.
5
Continued
judiciary should not follow Commonwealth precedents relating to scurri­
lous abuse (of the kind described in the text at that and "die .preceding 
pages).
4. This heading - which seems particularly apt - is derived from 
Miller, op.cit., p. 188.
1. [1936] A.C. 322 (P.C.).
2. The caveat expressed by his Lordship in relation to 'imputing 
improper motives' raises a query as to whether 'reasoned criticism' 
in the form of an allegation of judicial bias may be considered 
lawful, within the bounds of this passage. This point is discussed 
further at p.944 et seq.
3. Ambard v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, supra, at 335.
4. 11900] 2 Q.B. 36.
5. Ibid., at 40.
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More recent, and even stronger, authority is to be found in the case 
of Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No.2)  ^where 
Lord Denning, M.R. affirmed:
'We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent 
it. For there is something far more important 
at stake. It is no less than freedom of 
speech itself. It is the right of every man, 
in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or 
over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even 
outspoken comment, on matters of public 
interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully 
with all that is done in a court of justice.
They can say that we are mistaken, and our 
decisions erroneous, whether they are subject 
to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those 
who criticise us will remember that, from the 
nature of our office, we cannot reply to their 
criticisms. We cannot enter into public 
controversy. Still less into political contro­
versy. We must rely on our conduct itself to 
be its own vindication'.
2
In the same case, Salmon, L.R. emphasised:
'It follows that no criticism, however vigorous, 
can amount to contempt of court, providing it 
keeps within the limits of reasonable courtesy 
and good faith'.
3
It is noteworthy that the Nigerian courts have also emphasised on a
number of occasions that reasoned criticism does not constitute contempt.
4
Thus, in Agbachom v The State, the Supreme Court stressed, echoing the
dictum of Lord Atkin in Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and
1. [1968] 2 Q.B. 150.
2. Ibid., at 155.
3. Ibid.
4. [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 65-72.
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1 2 
Tobago, that 'justice is not a cloistered virtue'; and that bona fide
3 4
criticism is legitimate. Likewise, in R v Onweugbuna and another,
the court was at pains to point out that the rule against scandalising
the court does not preclude 'reasoned and respectful criticism by the
press and by private persons'.^ It therefore emphasised that '[e]ven
ill-informed or wrong-headed criticism of a. judicial decision is not
. .. a contempt so it be honestly and respectfully made'.^ Further,
7
in Aniweta v The State, the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed that
.8genuine criticism' doesnot .amount to contempt.
The common thread running through all these dicta is that criticism is
legitimate provided it is reasonable, temperate and proffered in
good faith in constructive - rather than destructive - spirit. The
9
distinguishing criterion is perhaps best identified in Re Evening News 
where Sir James Martin, C.J. emphasised that:
1. [1936] A.C. 322 (P.C.).
2. Ibid., at 335.
3. See Fawelinmi, supra, p. 70.
4. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 243-248
5. See Fawehinimi, ibid., p. 245.
6. Ibid.
7. Appeal No FCA/E/47/78, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., 
pp. 98-116.
8. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 113; and see also p. 111.
9. (1880) 1 LvR. (N.S.W.) 211.
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1[Whilst] no immunity [may be claimed] from 
fair, even though it may be mistaken 
criticism ... there is a limit beyond which 
criticism ceases to be fair, and mistakes 
become pernicious; and there are modes of 
comment which show a desire to vilify 
rather than an attempt to correct1.
The words underlined suggest a sound theoretical basis for distinguish­
ing legitimate criticism from that which goes too far. The test also 
explains (in theory at least) why scurrilous abuse and imputations of
2
bias constitute contempt: for it seems reasonable to assume that both 
are prompted more by the wish to vilify than to correct. However, whilst 
the theoretical principle may appear clear, application of a theoretical 
model to practical reality is never easy - as the following cases serve 
to illustrate.
In R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No 2), 
the facts involved the publication in Punch magazine of an article, 
written by Mr Quintin Hogg, Q.C., M.P., which criticised the interpre­
tation placed upon gaming legislation by the courts - specially the Court 
of Appeal - and alleged that this had rendered the statutes unworkable 
in practice. The salient part of the article read as follows:
'The recent judgment of the Court of Appeal 
is a strange example of the blindness which 
sometimes descends on the best of judgments.
The legislation of 1960 and thereafter has 
been rendered virtually unworkable by the 
unrealistic, contradictory and, in the 
leading case, erroneous decisions of the 
Courts including the Court of Appeal. So
1. Ibid., emphasis supplied.
2. The matter is not so clear in the case of allegations of partiality, 
which may well be prompted by the desire to correct. Once more, 
therefore, imputations of bias call for further and more detailed 
consideration. See p. 944 etseq.
3. [1968] 2 Q.B. 150.
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what do they do? Apologise for the expense 
and trouble they have put the police to? Not 
a bit of it ... [They] blame Parliament 
for passing Acts which they have interpreted 
so strangely. Everyone, it seems, is out of 
step, except the courts....'.
1
A private prosecution for contempt was instituted; but the Court of 
Appeal had little difficulty in concluding that the article was not a con­
tempt. Its comments were outspoken, but they were proffered in good
2
faith and (adopting the test of Re the Evening News ) there was nothing
to indicate that their purpose was vilification of the courts rather
than an attempt to persuade them to "mend their ways" and to take heed
of 'the golden rule for judges in the matter of obiter dicta [that]
3
[s]ilence is always an option'.
4
In Aniweta v The State, decided by the Federal Court of Appeal in Nigeria 
in 1978, the appellant had alleged that a particular judge had 'grossly 
corrupted his office' by accepting a bribe of N2000 in return for revers­
ing a judgment he had given. His conviction for contempt was upheld 
by the appellate court (which did, however, reduce his sentence somewhat ] 
on the ground that the allegation was the 'most gruesome insult that 
ha[d] ever been directed personally against a Judge in the history of
r n 6thLe] country'; and that it stood in a totally different category from
1. Ibid., at 154.
2. (1880) 1 L„R. (N.S.W.) 211, discussed above.
3. R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn, (No.2),
supra,
4. Appeal No FCA/E/47/78, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 98-116.
5. His sentence was reduced from 200 days' imprisonment to 120. This
was on the basis that the contempt power is to be exercised as 
sparingly as possible, and that the sentence imposed at trial was 
'severe in the extreme'; Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 108.
6. Ibid., p. 111.
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1 genuine criticism',^" which - so the court took pains to stress - did 
not constitute contempt.
Likewise, in Attorney-General of Western Nigeria v Oredein and others,
2
in re Odumuyiwa, the allegation that a judge had expressed his deter­
mination to acquit any person who killed a member of a particular poli­
tical party was held contemptuous, there being no question of this cons­
tituting no more than 'genuine criticism'. Similarly, allegations that
a judge has undertaken to impose particularly severe penalties on poli-
3 4
tical opponents; or has been motivated by ethnic partisanship, have
been held prima facie to scandalise the court, going far beyond the
bounds of reasoned and constructive criticism.
5
While it may perhaps be accepted that the allegation in the Blackburn 
case described above was an example of criticism offered in constructive 
spirit, whilst the Nigerian cases above - by contrast - evidence criticism 
motivated more by the desire to vilify than to correct, there are a 
number of other decisions in which this yardstick appears to offer no 
guidance at all. Thus, for example, in the New Brunswick^ case involving 
allegations of judicial bias published in a student newspaper, to assert 
that publication was motivated by either desire seems somewhat strained. 
Moreover, other decisions present even more intractable problems in the
1. Ibid., p. 113. See also p. Ill, where Douglas, J.C.A. cites the 
dicta reproduced from Ambard v Attorney General for Trinidad and 
Tobago, supra, and R v Metropolitan Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn 
(No.2), supra.
2. Unreported, Charge No J/19C/65, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., 
pp.131-135.
3. See R v Onweugbuna and another, [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, discussed atp 922.
4. See Deduwa and Others v The State, [1975] 1 All N.L.R. 1, discussed 
at p. 926.
5. R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,ex parte Blackburn,(No.2),supra.
6. R v Murphy, (1969) 4 D.L.R. (3d) 289, discussed at p. 936.
attempted application of this criterion: for they seem clearly to 
evidence criticism proffered in order to correct; and yet have been 
held to constitute contempt. These cases'*' are discussed further 
below; but, before proceeding to examine them, it is salutary to note 
a very different approach to criticism (even in the form of imputation 
ofjudicial bias) taken by an Australian court in the early twentieth 
century and recently expressly approved by a commission of inquiry in 
the United Kingdom.
2
This is the case of R v Nicholls, in which Griffith, C.J. expressed
the following important dictum, now approved by the Report of the
Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of Contempt as it Affects
3
Tribunals of Inquiry:
‘I am not prepared to accede to the proposition 
that an imputation of want of impartiality 
to a Judge is necessarily a contempt of 
Court. On the contrary, I think that, if 
any Judge of this Court or of any other 
Court were to make a public utterance of such 
a character as to be likely to impair the 
confidence of the public, or of suitors or 
any class of suitors in the impartiality of 
the Court in any matter likely to be before 
it, any public comment on such an utterance, 
if it were fair comment, would, so far from 
being a contempt of Court, be for the public 
benefit, and would be entitled to similar 
protection to that which comment upon matters 
of public interest is entitled under the law 
of libelr.
4
1. These cases are Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago,
[1936] A.C. 322 (P.C.) and v Van Niekerk, [1970] 3 SA 655 (T)
2. (1911) 12 C.L.R. 280.
3. Cmnd. 4078, 1969, para 36.
4. Ibid., at 286. The further question of whether a defence of
'fair comment1 applies in the context of contempt is discussed 
further at p .973 below.
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It is submitted that this acknowledgement by Griffith, C.J. that 
reasoned, temperate and bona fide allegations of judicial bias may 
indeed serve the public good is valid and sound: and that it points 
the direction which Nigerian law should take. This suggestion has 
particular practical significance for - although no empirical study of 
this question appears to have been conducted - it seems fair to conclude 
from the brief sample of cases described above that the offence of 
scandalising the court most commonly takes the form of an imputation 
of judicial bias. Hence, the refusal to acknowledge the legality of 
reasoned criticism in this form imposes a restriction on freedom of 
expression which cuts especially deep. Moreover, it is also important - 
in the longer term interests of society - that the prevailing myth 
that judges stand serene, objective and impartial above the forces 
that beset more ordinary mortals, and untainted by the influences of 
education and upbringing should be exposed; and that the general public 
should appreciate that those to whom the process of dispute-resolution has 
been entrusted are not infallible. Only through allowing reasoned 
criticism in the form of imputations of judicial bias can the public 
be informed of the extent to which conscious and unconscious preferences 
and predelictions influence judicial decision: and only in this way can 
the judges themselves take measure of their human deficiencies and 
attempt to guard against them.
This is not, however, to decry the importance of the manner in which 
such imputations are made. Wild, heated and unsubstantiated allegations 
off judicial bias can serve no constructive purpose. But if the 
imputation is temperate and reasoned and proffered in good faith, it 
should not be held to constitute contempt of court.'*'
1. It is submitted that this approach is to be preferred to that of 
imposing a blanket rule that all imputations of bias constitute 
contempt, subject to defences such as justification' and 'fair 
comment', which are further discussed in due course.
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Two controversial decisions may serve to illustrate the practical im­
portance of the submission that - in appropriate circumstances - 
reasoned allegations of bias should be acknowledged as 'lawful criticism1.
These are the cases of Ambard v Attorney General for Trinidad and
1 2 Tobago and S_ v Van Niekerk.
In Ambard1s case, the appellant was the editor and part-proprietor of
a newspaper called the Port of Spain Gazette. Following the passing
of sentence (in quick succession) in two cases of attempted murder,
he published an article, headed 'The Human Element', in which he
criticised the comparitive severity and leniency of the sentences 
3
imposed. The article stressed that its purpose was not to 'confir[m]
popular opinion as to the inherent severity or leniency of individual
judges or magistrates', nor to allege that 'one judge [was] habitually
4
severe [and] another ... habitually lenient'. Instead, it sought to
draw attention to a fact which 'must often have occurred to readers
of the proceedings in [the Trinidad] criminal courts ... [viz.] how
greatly the personal or human element seems to come into play in
5
awarding punishment for offences'. It concluded by submitting that:
'[I]f some way could be devised for the 
greater equalisation of punishment with 
the crime committed, a great deal would 
have been achieved towards the removal 
of one frequent cause for criticism of
1. [1936] A.C. 322 (P.C.).
2. [1970] 3 S.A. 655 (T).
3. In the first case, the accused (who had attempted to shoot his
superior officer) was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. In
the second, the accused - who had brutally razor-slashed a pregnant 
woman - was sentenced to seven years.
4. Ambard v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, supra, at 331.
5. Ibid.
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the sentences passed in our various 
criminal courts'.
1
The appellant was charged with contempt, for 'bring[ing] the authority
2
and administration of the law into disrepute and disregard1; and was
3
convicted by an 'unduly sensitive Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago'.
He appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which J.
advised that the appeal should be allowed. Lord Atkin stressed (in
the well-known passage reproduced at p. 938 above) that 'Justice is not
4a cloistered virtue1 and - whilst avoiding comment on whether 'the
5
criticism of the sentences was [in fact] well founded' - proceeded to 
acknowledge that:
'The writer is ... perfectly justified in 
pointing out what is obvious, that sentences 
do vary in apparently similar circumstances 
with the habit of mind of the particular 
judge. It is quite inevitable. Some very 
conscientious judges have thought it their 
duty to visit particular crimes with exemplary 
sentences; others equally conscientious have 
thought it their duty to view the same crimes 
with leniency. If to say that the human 
element enters into the awarding of punishment 
be contempt of Court it is to be feared that 
few in or out of the profession would 
escape'.
6
This opinion of the Judicial Committee stands in marked contrast with the 
second case in question: S v Van Niekerk, which - although a South African
1. Ibid., at 333.
2. Ibid., at 334.
3. Miller, op.cit., p. 189.
4. Ambard v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago., suprau at 355.
5. Ibid., at 336.
6. Ibid.
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decision - is based on common law principles and is sufficiently important 
to merit some consideration. The accused\fas a senior lecturer in law at 
a South African university. He wrote an article, entitled 'Hanged by the 
neck until you are dead1, which was published in the South African Law 
Journal. The article dealt with the question of capital punishment, 
and was based upon replies received by the accused to a questionnaire 
sent by him to advocates practising in South Africa and Rhodesia (as 
it then was). Two of the questions asked were as follows:
'Do you consider, for whatever reason, that a non-European tried on 
a capital charge stands a better chance of being sentenced to 
death than a European?'; and, if so,
'Do you think that the differentiation shown to the different races
2
as regards the death penalty is conscious and deliberate?'
Commenting upon the replies received to these questions, the accused 
wrote:
'Whatever conclusion one may draw from the results 
of these two questions the fact which emerges 
undeniably is that a considerable number of 
replying advocates, almost 50 per cent in fact, 
believe that justice as regards capital punish­
ment is meted out on a differential basis to the 
different races, and that 41 per cent who so 
believe are also of the opinion that such dif­
ferentiation is 'conscious and deliberate'".
3
1. [1970] (3) S.A. 655 (T). The South African ,&aw of contempt is also
derived from English common law; and accordingly has persuasive 
authority in other common law jurisdictions. .
2. Ibid., at 656. The replies received were as follows:
(To Q.I.): Abolitionists, Yes 24; No 18; Only for certain crimes 22;
Uncertain 6.
Retentionists, Yes 10; No 46; Only for certain crimes 10; 
Uncertain 3.
Doubtfuls, Yes 5; No 3; Only for certain crimes 7;
Uncertain 3.
(To Q.2.): Abolitionists, Yes 18; No 14; Uncertain 14.
Retentionists, Yes 6; No 12; Uncertain 2.
Doubtfuls, Yes 8; No 2; Uncertain 2.
3. Ibid., at 656.
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He was charged with contempt of court.
In the resultant proceedings, Claassen, J. queried what the passage 
above would mean to its readers and came to the following conclusions
1[The words] could convey the idea that a large 
number of advocates believe that Judges in 
this country, and by implication all of them, 
do not mete out justice impartially as far as 
capital punishment is concerned, but they 
consciously and deliberately mete it out in 
a biased way and on a racial basis. It ... 
might [further] be concluded that the non- 
Europeans are consciously and deliberately dis­
criminated against and that a non-European is 
more likely to receive the death sentence than 
a European.... [On that] interpretation ... the 
Judges could no longer be treated with due 
respect for they then could no longer be uni­
versally thought of as being impartial....
[This] could possibly have constituted a gross 
imputation against the honour and impartiality 
of the Judges 1.
1
It is gratifying to note both that Claassen, J. was not entirely sure
2
that the article would constitute contempt; and also that the accused 
was ultimately acquitted on the grounds that he lacked the requisite
3
mens rea. The latter aspect of the judgment is discussed further below; 
and for present purposes the most important facet of the decision is 
the possibility it reveals of criticism which is eminently reasoned, 
temperate and bona fide (even though it also involves) imputations of 
partiality)being held to constitute contempt. The case is most disturb­
ing, not only because the criticism was put forward in responsible and 
measured terms and was published in a scholarly journal (rather than in
1. Ibid., at 658 - 659.
2. Note the use of the word 'possibly' in the passage cited. Claassen, J.
went on to state in consequence, that, it 'might have been contempt
of Court'; See 659, emphasis supplied.
3. See p. 955 below, in the section on Mens rea.
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the popular press); but also - and especially - because there is a 
widespread belief in South Africa (in legal circles at least) that 
there is indeed a racial bias in the imposition of the death penalty.
The result of the Van Niekerk proceedings, however, has been largely to 
muzzle the further voicing of such misgivings. Freedom of expression 
has suffered commensurately: and so too has the general administration 
of justice. In any society, especially one divided by racial or any 
other form of prejudice, the legal system can command the respect of all 
only if it accords equal treatment to all. If judicial bias precludes 
this, then judicial impartiality must somehow be secured: and the first 
step in the process is to expose what is being done, rather than to 
shroud it behind the myth of judicial objectivity.
Moreover, in addition to the particular difficulties posed by racial 
or ethnic prejudice, the public airing of allegations of judicial par­
tiality may be important for other reasons - as the facts of these two 
cases further illustrate. Both provide examples of the difficulties and 
arbitrary element in imposing sentence; and both accordingly touch on a 
further question of fundamental importance in the administration of 
justice: the problem of developing an adequate and effective system of 
sentencing.. Current debates on the function and purpose of punishment, 
and the appropriate margin of judicial discretion in sentencing, are 
still far from providing satisfactory solutions. Little progress can 
be made in this regard, however, whilst comment of the type in issue 
in both Ambard1s and Van Niekerk's cases runs the risk of being held to 
constitute contempt.
In conclusion, it remains therefore to reiterate that there is a vital 
public interest in allowing imputations of bias to be made against
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judges whenever circumstances so warrant: and to stress that - provided 
the criticism is reasoned and responsible - such allegations should not 
constitute contempt of court.
10.7. The Test of Liability for Scandalising the Court
The next important question for consideration is the test of liability 
for scandalising the court; and, particularly, the extent to which 
mens rea forms a constituent element of the offence. Assessment of the 
importance of mens rea raises two questions: first, as to whether mens 
rea is necessary for conviction at all; and, secondly, as to the type 
and extent of the intent (if any) that is required.
10.7.1. Mens rea as a constituent element of the offence at common law
The early case of Almon is significant for its insistence that mens rea 
is indeed a constituent element of the crime of scandalising the court.
Thus, Wilmot, J. emphasised, in his prepared judgment, that:
'It is the intention which, in all cases, 
constitutes the offence. "Actus non facit 
reum, nisi mens sit rea".... It would be a 
contradiction in terms to admit Courts to
have cognizance of the offence, and yet not
admit them to be the Judges of the only 
ingredient which makes it so'.
2
However, Wilmot, J. - in making this declaration - was not prin­
cipally concerned with the question whether mens rea is required 
for conviction. His objective was to counter the defence contention that
1. (1765) Wilm. 243; 97 E.R. 94.
2. Ibid.
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mens rea was an issue which had to be determined by a jury: rather than 
through the summary process which Wilmot, J. himself considered 
appropriate. It is accordingly difficult to determine how much 
weight can properly be attached to this seemingly clear statement of 
the importance of mens rea in the context of scandalising the court.
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that, having disposed of the 
defence argument for trial by jury, Wilmot, J. made no further attempt 
to analyse or to define the nature of the mens rea apparently required.
The importance of mens rea has previously been discussed in the context
of the sub judice rule. In this latter context it is clear (as now
1
confirmed by s 1 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981 ) that mens rea
is not a requirement; and that liability depends on whether a publication
is objectively likely to prejudice fair trial, irrespective of the
2
intention underlying its publication. It is submitted by Miller that
the same principle applies to contempt in the form of scandalising the
court: so that it is the objective effect of, rather than the subjective
motivation for, the publication which is the important factor. In his
3
view, this conclusion is supported by the 'balance of authority'; and
he cites as a particular example the case of New Statesman (Editor),
4
ex parte P.P.P. where 'Lord Hewart, C.J. seemingly accepted that the
defendant publisher had not intended to interfere with the performance 
of Avory, J.'s judicial duties when imputing religious bias to him [but] 
did not [apparently consider] ... [that this] prevent[ed] liability from 
being imposed [on him], together with an order to pay the costs of the
1. The significance of this provision in the context of scandalising 
court is further considered, at p. 956 below.
2. Op.cit., p. 191.
3. Miller, ibid.
4. (1928) 44 T.L.R. 301.
2
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proceedings 1 .
Recalling the facts of the various decisions described above, including
2 3 4
R v Jackson and Ft v Onweugbwa and another as well as R v Gray,
R v V i d a l , R  v Freeman,^  R v Wilkinson  ^ and R v Colsey^ - and bearing
in mind that the gravamen of the offence lies in interfering with the
proper administration of justice through lowering public respect for
the judiciary - it seems clear the intent to bring such consequence about
has certainly not been considered a necessary condition for conviction
in the past. The accused in each of these cases may indeed have had the
intent to expose particular judicial shortcomings (though in
Colsey1s case even that may be doubted): but that is very different from
an intent to undermine the administration of justice. Looking then to
these authorities alone, (and leaving out of account the Commonwealth
decisions previously described which, if anything, serve only to strengthen
the inference); it seems plain that mens rea is not a constituent element
of the offence at common law.
Some doubt as to this does, however, arise from the decision of the
9
Privy Council in jl v Perera. The appellant here was a member of the
1. Miller, supra.
2. (1925) 6 N.L.R. 49, discussed at p. 913 et seq.
3. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, discussed at p. 922 et seq.
4. [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, discussed at p. 905 et seq.
5. The Times, 14 October, 1922, discussed at p. 906.
6. , The Times, 18 November, 1925, discussed at p. 907.
7. The Times, 16 July, 1930, discussed at p. 930.
8. The Times, 9 May 1931, discussed at p. 930 - 931.
9. [1951] A.C. 482 (P.C.).
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House of Representatives in Ceylon and, as part of his public duties, 
made an inspection of a local prison, where he was given to understand 
that prisoners' appeals against conviction were frequently heard in their 
absence. Thinking this to be laid down by prison regulations, he recorded 
his criticism of it in the visitors' book in the following terms:
'The present practice of appeals of remand 
prisoners being heard in their absence is 
not healthy. When represented by Counsel 
or otherwise the prisoner should be present 
at the proceedings'.
1
In fact, the practice (as to the nature of which the appellant was also 
mistaken) had originated in an order of the former Chief Justice: and 
the appellant was accordingly charged with, and convicted of, contempt.
On appeal to the Privy Council, the Board recommended that the appeal
should be allowed. Unfortunately for present purposes, however, the
Board based its decision upon a number of different grounds, including
2
the fact that no publication had been effected; that no direct reference
3
had been made to the courts; that the accused had been mistaken in
4
believing that he was commenting on prison practice; and that 'his
5
criticism was honest criticism on a matter of public importance'.
The Board made no attempt to specify which ground it principally relied 
upon - nor did it deal expressly with the defence submission that 
' There must be an element of malice in order to constitute a contempt
1. Ibid., and at 487, where the full text of his entry is reproduced.
2. As stressed by Lord Radcliffe, ibid., at 488, the appellant had 
'made no public use of [the information], contenting himself with 
entering his comment in the appropriate instrument, the visitors' 
book, and writing to the responsible Minister'.
3. Ibid., at 488.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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1
of courts. Accordingly, no clear principle as to the requirement of 
mens rea emerges from the judgment. However, one of the grounds un­
doubtedly relied upon by their Lordships was the fact that the appellant's
criticism was 'honest' - meaning, presumably, that it was tendered in
2
good faith - and that it concerned 'a matter of public importance'.
To this extent, at least, therefore, the decision does suggest that 
mens rea is indeed an important element in the offence.
Support for the proposition that mens rea is required for liability is
3
also to be found in the case of S v Van Niekerk, discussed above. Being 
a decision of South African origin, it is, of course, persuasive only 
in Nigeria: but it is nevertheless noteworthy for its emphatic affirma­
tion of the need for mens rea. This was stated by Claassen, J. in the 
following terms:
'...[B]efore a conviction can result the 
act complained of must not only be wilful 
and calculated to bring into contempt but 
must also be made with the intention of 
bringing the Judges in their judicial 
capacity into contempt or of casting sus­
picion on the administration of justice'.
4
Turning to the type of intent (direct or indirect) required, and the 
manner of its proof, Claassen, J. proceeded to explain:
'For this type of intention it is 
sufficient if the accused subjectively 
foresaw the possibility of his act being 
in contempt of Court and he was reckless
1. Ibid., at 484.
2. See R v Perera, supra, at 488.
3. [1970] (3) S.A. 655 (T), previously described at p . 947 et seq.
4. Ibid., at 657.
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as to the result. This form of intention 
is known as dolus eventualis....
Subjective foresight, like any other 
factual issue, may be proved by inference. 
In . a criminal case this inference must be 
the only one which can reasonably be 
drawn1.
1
On the particular facts, the accused was found to have lacked the 
requisite mens rea; and the charge against him was accordingly 
dismissed.
Notwithstanding the views expressed in Perera's and Van Niekerk*s 
cases, however, the majority of decisions clearly support the 
proposition that mens rea is not an element of liability at common 
law.
The common law in the United Kingdom has been altered in this regard -
3
so Arlidge and Eady submit - by the introduction of the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981. This contention rests on a somewhat shaky
1. Ibid., at 657.
2. The court accepted the accused's evidence that he had no intent to 
reflect improperly on the Judges or on the administration of justice. 
Its reasons for doing so included the fact that he was a credible 
witness, albeit 'talkative, inclined to be pompous and somewhat 
foolish': see 659? that he had been 'genuinely shocked' at the 
suggestion that his article constituted a contempt; and that he
had thereupon taken 'all reasonable steps that were within his 
power to undo any adverse impression that might have been created'. 
These had included the insertion (in the second part of the article), 
of a disclaimer which emphasised, inter alia, that the courts do 
'consciously endeavour to avoid [the] intrusion [of the racial factor]' 
See 660, emphasis supplied.
3. Op.cit., p. 163.
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foundation; ^ but nevertheless serves to point the direction which 
Nigeria should now take to alleviate the harshness of the present 
strict liability principle. However, the mere assertion that mens rea 
should be acknowledged as a requirement for liability is not enough.
Some consideration must also be given to the type and extent of intention 
required.
10.7.2. The type and extent of mens rea required for liability
Assessment of the type and extent of mens rea required for liability for 
the offence of scandalising the court raises two important questions.
Is a direct or specific intent to interfere with the administration 
of justice required? Or is it sufficient that the accused must have 
appreciated the wider consequences of his conduct for the administra­
tion of justice, and was reckless as to whether these in fact 
2
resulted?
The cases discussed above provide singularly little guidance on this 
3
question. Some assistance may, however, be derived from a case 
involving contempt of a different nature - the persecution of a witness 
for giving evidence in particular proceedings. The decision in question
1. The authors' contention is premised on the principle of statutory 
interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. They point 
out that s 1 of the new Act defines the strict liability rule with reference 
to particular proceedings (then active) and submit that this implies 
that the strict liability rule applies only in such circumstances; 
and hence no longer governs other forms of contempt (such as scandal­
ising the court) which may be committed at any time and without 
reference to any particular litigation pending before the courts.
However, it is equally plausible that s 1 was plainly designed to 
regulate only one especially troublesome aspect of strict liability 
in the law of contempt (viz that relating to sub judice publication, 
brought into sharp focus by the thalidomide proceedings previously 
described) and that the Act therefore made no attempt to modify
(continued)
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\
is that of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Butterworth.
Here an individual named Greenlees had given evidence before the Restric­
tive Trade Practices Court in proceedings involving a trade union of 
which he was a member. Other members of the union thereupon sought to 
have him dismissed from his honorary posts within the union; and those
who, in doing so, had been 'motivated either predominantly or in part
2by a desire to punish him were held guilty of contempt. Some indication 
of the type of intent required for conviction is to be found in the 
following dictum of Donovan, L.J.:
(Continued)
the strict liability rule as it applies in other contexts, such as 
scandalising the court.
2. In the latter type of situation, the accused may be said to have 
dolus eventualis (as described in S v Van Niekerk, see p. 956 above)
or general intent. (The latter, in the words of Arlidge & Eady, 
requires 'a deliberate act committed with acknowledge of the relevant 
circumstances': See Arlidge & Eady, op.cit., at p. 80).
3. Except, of course, for S^ v Van Niekerk, which indicates that dolus eventualis 
or general intent is sufficient.
1. [1963] 1 Q.B. 696.
2. The judgment of Lord Denning, M.R. emphasises that, irrespective of 
R v Odhams Press Ltd., [1957] 1 Q.B. 73, 'the law requires a guilty 
mind in these cases of intimidation or victimisation of witnesses'.
See Butterworth's case, supra, at 722. The remaining question is 
the kind of guilty mind required. Lord Denning, M.R.'s judgment 
unfortunately provides little further guidance on this point, simply 
emphasising that dismissal from the posts in question for reasons 
unconnected with the earlier proceedings (for example, for incompe­
tence) clearly could not give rise to contempt. The underlying 
motivation to punish for having given testimony was therefore 
essential to liability - but his Lordship saw no reason to inquire 
into the precise balance of motivating factors at play (let alone to 
consider whether recklessness as to the further consequence of 
interference with the administration of justice was required). In 
his Lordship's view, it was sufficient if 'an actuating motive [which] 
influence[ed] the step taken' was that of punishment for giving 
evidence. See ibid., at 723.
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1[I]f the taking of such revenge was 
calculated to interfere with the 
administration of justice, then it will 
be no answer for the respondents to say 
that, while intending to punish Greenlees, 
still they had no intention of interfering 
with the administration of justice'.
1
It thus appears that - whilst some inquiry into intention was required 
in order to ascertain whether the motivation for the dismissal of the 
complainant was indeed to punish him for giving testimony in the earlier 
proceedings - further specific intent to interfere with the administration 
of justice was not necessary.
3
On the basis of this and other authorities, Arlidge & Eady accordingly 
conclude that 'contempt of court is a crime of general intent ... [so 
that] a contemnor would be guilty:
(i) if he desired to interfere with the due process of justice; or
(ii) if he did not desire such interference but must have realised it 
was highly probable; or
(iii) if he neither desired it nor realised it was highly probably, but
recognised it was a possibility and deliberately took the risk 
4
it might occur1.
No guidance as to whether this analysis is correct can be gleaned from 
the new Act which (being concerned principally with strict liability) 
is silent as to the requirements of mens rea. It is submitted that -
1. Ibid., at 726.
2. This is shown not only by the dictum cited here but by the general tenor 
of Donovan, L.J.'s judgment.
3. See Arlidge & Eady, op.cit., pp. 79-82.
4. Arlidge & Eady, ibid., p. 82. The authors also suggest that a contemnor 
could be guilty in a fourth situation - where he 'was heedless of a 
perfectly obvious risk'. It is submitted, however, that there is 
little practical difference between this and the second possibility, 
cited at (ii) above.
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although the cases undoubtedly support the wide-sweeping principles above - 
it should instead be recognised, on policy grounds, that mens rea in the
form of (i) above is needed (or, at the utmost, that (ii) may be
sufficient).
The recommendations of the Phillimore Committee^ in this regard are worthy
of note. The Committee proposed inter alia that 'matter imputing improper
or corrupt judicial conduct should only give rise to liability if
published with the intention of impairing confidence in the adminis-
2
tration of justice'. This recommendation has not, however, been imple­
mented in the Contempt of Court Act 1981: and cannot, therefore, be said 
to represent the existing law. It is submitted, however, that the 
proposal points the correct direction for the law of scandalising the 
court to take.
In summary, therefore, although the precedents examined above appear' clearly
to establish that mens rea is not a requirement for the crime of
scandalising the court at common law, it is submitted that Nigerian
3
law should follow the English statutory lead in asserting that mens rea 
is an element of liability; and that the intention necessary is the 
specific intent to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
1. Report of the [Phillimore]Committee on Contempt of Court, Cmnd 5794, 
1974.
2. Ibid., para. 164. The Committee's further recommendation are 
are discussed at p. 979 etseq.
3. Assuming, of course, that the Contempt of Court Act 1981 has indeed 
made mens rea a requirement for liability, as submitted by Arlidge 
& Eady, and discussed at p. 956 - 957, especially at p 957 n 1.
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10.8. Defences to a Charge of Scandalising the Court
Having examined the types of allegation regarded as scandalising the 
court and the test of liability for the offence, it remains to consider 
the defences which may be raised by an alleged contemnor against a 
charge of this nature.
10.8.1. Failure to make out a prima facie case
In keeping with general principles of criminal responsibility, an 
alleged contemnor is entitled to discharge if the surrounding circum­
stances are not such as to substantiate a prima facie case of scandalising
1
the court. An example of this is provided by Agbachom v The State.
2
Here, as previously explained, the Supreme Court of Nigeria set aside
a conviction for contempt on the ground that the allegation in question
(that a certain sum had been paid to a trial judge as 'legal debt1 out
of a 'trust fund') was inherently ambiguous. There were 'two equally
3
likely possibilities' as to the proper interpretation of the offending
statement; and this meant that contempt, 'an offence of a criminal 
4
character', had not been proved, as required, 'beyond reasonable
. 5doubt'.
1. [1970] 1 All N.L.R. 69, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 65-72.
2. See p. 928.
3. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 69.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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10.8.2. Absence of Mens Rea
As previously emphasised, mens rea is not a constituent element of
liability at common law; and it is accordingly no defence for the
alleged contemnor to establish that he had no intention of binging the
administration of justice into disrepute. It is not proposed to repeat
the earlier discussion of this principle and the need for its reform;
but the practical significance of the rule is perhaps underlined by
recalling, in brief outline, the facts of two Nigerian decisions involving
1
the 'scandalising' of the court by the media. In R v Service Press Ltd.,
the criticism contained in the newspaper article in issue was aimed
principally at 'Gentleman A.J. Sangster', then Vice-President of the
Ibadan branch of the N.C.N.C.; and the allegation that he was on terms
of 'close intimacy' with white officials, including 'Her Majesty's High 
2
Court Judges' was only one of a number of charges made against him.
The article was essentially a piece of political invective; and it
seems plain that intent to bring the administration of justice into
3
disrepute was far from its author's mind. The decision seems extremely 
harsh; and underlines the need for absence of mens rea to be recognised 
as a defence.
4
The second case of note in this regard is R v Onweugbuna and another
1. (1952), 20 N.L.R. 96, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 230-233.
2. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 231.
3. It could perhaps be argued that the accused had dolus eventualis
or general intent in that he should reasonably have anticipated the
adverse consequences of publication to the standing of the judiciary.
It is submitted, however, that the facts of this case graphically 
demonstrate why such general intent should not be recognised as 
sufficient for liability.
4. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, reproduced by Fawehinmi, ibid., pp. 243-248.
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in which, (it may be recalled), a letter detailing a secret conspiracy
to destroy the political group known as the Zikist National Vanguard
through, inter alia, the connivance of a particular judge 'who had pro-
1
mised to give [its supporters] maximum punishment' was found to constitute
contempt. It seems plain that the editor of the newspaper, into
whose hands this confidential document had fallen by accident, considered it
his duty to publish the letter, so as to inform the public of the
secret machinations against the party in question. It seems equally
clear that the last thing in his mind was any intent to undermine the
general administration of justice. Yet absence of mens rea was clearly
considered irrelevant by the court, which stressed that ' [i]f the
publication is made,... and the words are calculated to bring the court
2
into contempt, the wrong has been done'. The only defence contention
specifically based on the issue of mens rea was that the printer and
publisher of the newspaper, being a limited company, was not capable of
forming a guilty intention. This undoubtedly spurious (and commensurately
3
misconceived ) contention was swiftly rejected by the court. This 
aspect of the court's conclusion was undoubtedly correct. Yet the 
judgment as a whole leaves the uncomfortable impression of punishment 
being meted out to the fundamentally innocent: and, worse still, to 
persons who bona fide believed it their public duty to make the secret 
conspiracy known. Accordingly, the case also raises the question of
1. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 244.
2. See Fawehinmi, ibid.
3. Ibid. The court simply pointed out that 'it has repeatedly been 
held that a corporation is capable of forming a criminal intention'; 
and it cited as authority, inter alia, R v Service Press Ltd., 
supra, and R v Odhams Press Ltd., ex parte Attorney-General
[1956] 3 All E.R. 494. (The reliance place by the court on the 
latter case seems to come extent inappropriate: for the decision 
involved a publication infringing the sub judice rule).
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the need for some defence of overriding public interest or benefit in 
publication; and this is considered further in due course.
10.8.3. The defence of 'reasoned criticism'
Closely related to the defence of failure to make out a prima facie 
case (of which, indeed, it forms one particular facet) is the defence 
that the publication in issue constitutes no more than bona fide and 
reasoned criticism, and hence does not amount to scandalising the court 
at all. Various Nigerian decisions upholding the legality of such 
criticism have previously been noted; and suffice it therefore to recall
the view expressed by the court in one particular decision: Aniweta
1 2 
v The State. Here, it will be recalled, the allegation m  issue was
that a trial judge had accepted a bribe of N2000 in return for altering
his judgment in particular proceedings. On appeal from conviction for
3
contempt, the Federal Court of Appeal stressed that 'genuine criticism'
does not constitute contempt; but also emphasised, on the particular
facts, that the allegations in question 'had nothing to do with any 
4
criticism'. Instead, [t]hey were a brutal attack on the person of the
5
judge as a most corrupt person unfit to sit to hold his high office' 
and constituted the 'most gruesome insult that ha[d] ever been directed 
personally against a Judge in the history of th[e] country'.^
1. Appeal No FCA/E/47/78, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp.98-116.
2. See p. 927.
3. See Fawehinmi, supra, p. 113; and see also p. 111.
4. Ibid, p 113.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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In these particular circumstances, little criticism can be directed
against this conclusion. However, it should be noted that the outer
limits of 'reasoned criticism' are not entirely clear (as previously 
1
emphasised) and that the judiciary appears to have particular 
difficulty in accepting that an imputation of partiality may fall 
within this category.
10.8.4. The defence of public interest or benefit
Two of the decisions discussed above raise in stark terms the need
for a defence of overriding public interest or benefit in publication.
2
The first such case is R v Service Press Ltd.., in which it might legi­
timately have been contended that the public interest required that 
judicial conduct of the kind alleged (disclosure by a judge to a poli­
tical crony of his proposed verdict in proceedings) be brought into
3
the open. The second such decision is R v Onweugbuna and another, 
in which the argument for exonerating the defendants from liability on 
the basis of public interest in publication seems overwhelming. Here, 
it may be remembered, the editor and publishers of the Eastern 
Sentinel were convicted of contempt for publishing a letter detailing 
a secret plot to destroy a particular political party. The fact that 
this was to be achieved (according to the letter as published) through - 
inter alia - the assistance of a particular judge,was a minor aspect 
of the conspiracy revealed. It was contended on behalf of the accused 
that the "captured" letter was quite genuine; and that it had accordingly
1. See p. 944, et seq.
2. (19521) 20 N.L.R. 96, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit. , pp. 230-233.
3. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17, reproduced by Fawehinmi, op.cit., pp. 243-248.
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been published by the editor in good faith and in pursuance of what
1
he considered to be his duty1. This argument was given short shrift.
In the court's view, 'it [was] not easy to see how it [could] be the 
duty of a newspaper to publish confidential letters which have fallen
2
by "capture" into the hands of those for whom they were not intended';
nor did it accept that it was (or could have been considered to be)
the duty of the editor 'to present matters in this way, taking into
3
consideration that the courts were involved'.
It thus seems clear that the common law recognises no defence of over­
riding public interest in disclosure. This lacuna is most disturbing: 
for there is a vital need for a defence of this nature. Even if it could 
be accepted (as further discussed below) that the common law does recog­
nise the defences of justification and fair comment (by analogy with 
the law of defamation), it is more than probable that neither would have 
availed the accused in these particular circumstances. Both defences 
depend on proof of truth (to a greater or lesser extent^) ; and this 
would have been extremely difficult to provide, given the secret nature 
of the conspiracy. Thus, a defence of overriding public interest is 
the only one on which the defendants (under the present objective test 
of liability) could have relied.
Moreover, on the particular facts of the case, the court's total rejection 
of the defence contention that publication had been motivated by the
1. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p. 247.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. The defence of justification requires proof of the truth of the 
statements made. The defence of fair comment requires that the matters 
commented upon be true. A detailed analysis of the defences is provided 
in the section on the civil law of defamation, at p.486 and p 490, etseq.
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highest sense of public duty is disquieting in the extreme. If the 
N.C.N.C.* were truly engaged in such schemes, it was very much in the 
public interest that these should be revealed - even if this entailed 
adverse comment on one particular member of the judiciary. It is no
doubt true that public confidence in the judge in question was likely
to have been eroded by publication of the letter. Yet would this nece­
ssarily have undermined the proper administration of justice? One 
would imagine that quite the contrary would be true; and that the adminis­
tration of justice would be far better served - in the long term - 
by disclosure of such conduct on the part of individual judges. Far 
better that the allegation be made - and that it then be either vindi­
cated or refuted - than that the public be kept in total ignorance of 
matters of such vital importance.
It remains to consider whether any other defences are open to the alleged
contemnor; and the close analogy between criminal libel and scandalising
the court prompts inquiry as to whether some of the defences available 
to the former charge may not also be relied upon in relation to the 
latter. The defences which seem particularly apposite in this regard 
are, of course, those of 'justification' and 'fair comment'.
10.8.5. The defence of justification
The elements of justification have previously been examined in the context 
of the law of defamation. Suffice it therefore for present purposes 
to reiterate that the essence of the defence is the truth of the publication
1. For further information as to the-N.C.N.C.,'see the section on the 
History of Nigeria, at p. 77 above. As regards the possible truth 
of the allegation against them, it is worth recalling (as pointed 
out in the section on the civil law of defamation at p.548 above) that 
considerable concern has been expressed by commentators as to the 
abuses perpetrated from time to time by the N.C.N.C. and its political 
rivals, which reached their height in the large-scale rigging of 
the 1964 and 1965 elections.
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in issue.* Under the law of criminal (as opposed to civil) libel, a
further essential requirement is that the publication should be for
2
the public benefit.
Nigerian authorities provide no guidance as to whether justification 
constitutes a defence; and little consideration has been given to the 
availability of the defence in the English precedents described above. 
However, such authority as there is strongly suggests that 'justification' 
cannot be relied upon as a defence to a charge of scandalising the 
court. Thus, in Skipworth's^ case, Blackburn, J. rejected the defen­
dant's entreaty that the matter go before a jury, so as to give him an 
opportunity to prove the truth of his allegations; and did so on the 
basis that:
'The truth of it has nothing to do with the 
question. The question at present is, is 
he trying to interfere with the course of 
justice?'
4
It must, of course, be acknowledged that the case is not entirely in 
point since it concerned a publication which infringed the sub judice 
rule rather than one scandalising the court. It is submitted by 
Borrie and Lowe,^ however, that 'the same principle may ... apply 
to both .
1. See p. 486 above, and Miller, op.cit., p. 193.
2. See p. 622 above, and Miller, ibid.
3. Skipworth and Castro's Case, (1873) L.R. 9 Q.B. 230.
4. Ibid., at 234.
5. Op.cit.
6. Ibid., pp. 164-165. Cf Miller, op.cit., p. 193, n 3, who submits
that the case is hardly in point because the issues are fundamentally
different.
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1
Somewhat stronger authority is provided by Vidal1s case, where the 
accused expressly objected to the charge of contempt and urged that he 
should have been prosecuted for criminal libel - in which event, he 
would have relied upon justification as a defence. It seems, however, 
that '[t]he objection was waved aside, and there is no suggestion that 
the Divisional Court thought it possible for him to raise the defence 
in contempt proceedings'.2
In addition, it seems diear that justification was not a defence,at common
3
law, to a prosecution for criminal libel; and that it required specific
4introduction by statute. This casts grave doubts on the question whether
5
the defence could be available - without similar statutory intervention 
in the context of scandalising the court.
Furthermore, the fact that justification is not a defence to a charge
either of contempt of parliament (through publishing derogatory matter)^
7
or of publishing a seditious libel, strengthens the inference that 
it cannot be relied upon in relation to scandalising the court.
1. The Times, 14 October, 1922, previously discussed at p 906.
2. Miller, op.cit., p. 193.
3. See Miller, ibid., citing The Case De Libellis Famosis (1606)
5 Co Rep 125a; 77 E.R. 250 and Holdsworth, History of English 
Law, (2nd ed), Vol. VIII, p. 336, et seq.
4. See s 6, Libel Act 1843, (discussed at p.623 above).
5. This, of course, has not taken place - notwithstanding the 
Phillimore Committee recommendations discussed at p.979 below.
6. Miller, supra p. 193.
7. Miller, ibid., at n 3, But see also the discussion at p.414 above,
which suggests that, in Nigerian law at least, truth is not an
entirely irrelevant consideration on a charge of sedition.
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Commonwealth authority also suggests that the defence is not available
at common law. Thus, in the New Zealand case of Attorney-General v 
1
Blomfield, Williams, J. agreed that 'it should certainly be open 
to [an] accused [on a charge of scandalising the court] to bring for­
ward evidence in justification, and to show whether and how far his
2
imputations were justified'. His conclusion, however, was that:
'That has never been done and cannot be 
done in summary proceedings for contempt.
The Court does not sit to try the conduct 
of the Judge'.
3
It is interesting to note, however, that the Phillimore Committee has
4
recommended that a defence of 'justification' should be introduced.
The requirements of the defence would be first, that the matter in
issue is true; and, secondly, that its publication was for the public
benefit. The second requirement could only be met, however, if the
accused 'had previously taken steps to submit the evidence of corruption
5
or partiality to the Lord Chancellor'. Substantially the same recom­
mendation has also been made by the Law Commission,^ 'which agrees
7
that such a defence should be available'.
1 . (1914) 33 N.Z.L.R. 545.
2f See Miller, op.cit., p. 193.
3. Attorney-General v Blomfield, supra, at 563.
4. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd 5794, 1974, para. 166.
5. Ibid., para 166.
6. See the Law Commission Working Paper No. 62; 'Offences Relating to
the Administration of Justice', para 114.
7. Ibid.
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These proposals stand in marked contrast to earlier recommendations of
1
the Justice Committee, who - in their report Contempt of Court
submitted that such a defence should not be made available. Its
main ground for so concluding was its belief that the media were not
'appropriate organ[s]' for making any allegations against the
judiciary. It acknowledged that 'if someone wishes, in good faith,
to make a charge of partiality or corruption against a judge he ought
to have the opportunity of making it'? but believed that (instead of
using the press for this purpose) he should rather 'do so by letter
to the Lord Chancellor or his Member of Parliament' - and should be
2
permitted this right 'without fear of punishment' for contempt.
'The charges could then [in the Committee's view] be considered either
3
administratively or in the House of Commons or the House of Lords'.
Considerable difficulties lie in the way of the latter suggestion,
however. This is principally because of the rule of Parliamentary
procedure which permits questions regarding the conduct of particular
judges or of the judiciary in general to be raised only 'on a
substantive motion which admits of a vote and not during the normal
4
course of a debate'.
Miller submits that, on balance, the Phillimore (and Law Commission) 
recommendations provide the best solution. In his view, the principal 
argument against the proposals is the possibility that the defence
1. See p. 15 of the Report, published in 1959. See also the report
of the Justice sub-committee, The Judiciary, (1972), para. 88, (cited 
by Miller, op cit. ,.p, 193, n. 5).
2. See p. 15 of the Justice Report, supra.
3. Ibid.
4. Miller, op.cit., p. 194. In illustration, Miller describes the 
difficulties experienced during the House of Commons debate on the 
Industrial Relations Act in December 1969, which took place 'against 
a background of criticism which had been levelled at ... the 
President of the National Industrial Relations Court' and during 
the course of which the Speaker was obliged to intervene on a number 
of occasions to remind members that: 'Reflections on the judge's
character or motives cannot be made except on a motion' .______________
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'might be abused by someone intent on reopening the issue of liability
via the backdoor by imputing a lack of impartiality to the presiding 
1
judge'. Miller's submits - with cogency - however, that 'it is ...
2
doubtful whether this would occur frequently in practice'.
These recommendations have not yet been implemented in the United Kingdom,
however, for no provision for such a defence is to be found in the new
Contempt of Court Act 1981. It is submitted, however, that the proposal
3
for such a defence is sound - and that this reform (at minimum) should 
be put into effect in Nigerian law (without waiting for further English 
lead).
The effect of such a reform would largely be, however, to subsume within
one head both 'truth' and 'public benefit1; and it is questionable
therefore whether this is indeed the optimum solution. In a situation such
4
as that in R v Oweugbuna and another, it would be extremely difficult 
to prove the truth of the secret plans: and df the only defence available 
were a "joint" one of truth and public benefit, this would be of little 
assistance. It seems then that there is still a need for 'public 
benefit' in publication to rank as a separate and distinct defence: and 
this inevitably raises the question of whether the'public benefit1 
element should be added to the defence of 'truth'. The result is 
undoubtedly to increase the burden on the accused; and it is doubtful 
whether this is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of expression. Furthermore, the third "leg" of the Phillimore and
1. Miller, ibid., pp. 193-194.
2. Miller, ibid., at p. 194.
3. It is submitted that a number of further reforms are also required,
as indicated above and further examined below.
4. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17.
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Law Commission proposals - that recourse must first be had to the 
Lord Chancellor - may result in considerable practical difficulty, 
especially in a situation similar to that in R v Onweugbuna.* Should 
the editor and publishers of the newspaper- who may well have believed 
that there was considerable urgency in bringing the conspiracy to the 
attention of the nation - have been compelled to wait until they had 
first cleared it with some equivalent figure, such as the Chief Justice 
of Nigeria? The delay entailed may have been considerable; and, even 
more seriously, the requirement imposes a form of 'prior restraint' on 
publication; and it is questionable whether this, too, can be squared 
with the constitutional guarantee of free speech. Moreover, it imposes 
a heavy responsibility on the person charged with the duty: and the 
temptation may well be for such person (especially if he were himself 
a judicial officer) to err on the side of over-caution.
Accordingly, whilst it is apparent that implementation of the United 
Kingdom proposals would go some way to meet the present deficiencies 
in the law, it is submitted that the better approach would be recognise both 
'truth' and 'public benefit1 as distinct defences: and to allow each 
to stand on its own - without the need for any prior sanction for 
publication.
10.8.6. The defence of fair comment
The requirements for successful reliance on the defence of fair comment
2
in the law of defamation have previously bden analysed in full. In
3
essence, the publication must consist of comment (rather than allegation
1. Ibid.
2. See p. 490, et seq.
3. See Miller, op.cit., p. 194; and the discussion at p. 491.
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of fact) and the comment must be based upon facts which are true (or
1
published on a privileged occasion). The comment must also be 'fair'
- meaning that it must be proffered bona fide and honestly (but not
2
that it need be founded upon objectively reasonable grounds).
Nigerian precedents are silent as to the availability of an equivalent
defence to a charge of scandalising the court. In approaching this
question, it must of course be remembered that insofar as 'fair comment1
consists in 'reasoned criticism' it falls - in any event - outside the
ambit of the offence of scandalising the court. There is, however,
considerable doubt as to whether criticism in the form of an imputation
of .judicial bias is considered lawful at common law, as previously 
3
explained. Hence, where criticism takes this form (as is frequently 
4
the case ), the question whether prima facie liability can be avoided
through a defence of fair comment is of crucial importance. No judicial
decision in England or Nigeria appears to have faced this issue squarely:
but it nevertheless appears that there is considerable support for the
availability of such a defence. This is most clearly evident in the
Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of Contempt as
5
it Affects Tribunals of Inquiry; which seems to assume that the 
defence forms part of common law. It thus states:
1. See Miller, ibid., and the discussion at p. 492.
2. See Miller, ibid., and the discussion at p. 490.
3. See p. 944 et seq.
4. As pointed out in the discussion on the legality of reasoned criticism
above, it appears that allegations against judges or the judiciary 
take, in the great majority of cases, the form of an imputation of bias.
5. Cmnd 4078, 1969.
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1 In the most unlikely event, however, of 
there being just cause for challenging 
the integrity of a judge or a member of 
a Tribunal of Inquiry it could not be 
contempt of court to do so. Indeed it 
would be a public duty to bring the 
relevant facts to light'.
2
As authority, the Report cites the Australian case of R v Nicholls, 
where committal proceedings against the editor of The Mercury newspaper 
(for publication of an article allegedly imputing bias to a judge of 
the Arbitration Court) were dismissed by Griffith, C.J. who - in a 
strongly-worded statement worthy of reproduction in full - emphasised 
the important role such criticism may play. He stated:
'I am not prepared to accede to the proposition 
that an imputation of want of impartiality to a 
Judge is necessarily a contempt of Court. On the 
contrary, I think that, if any Judge of this Court 
or of any other Court were to make a public 
utterance of such character as to be likely to 
impair the confidence of the public, or of suitors 
or any class of suitors in the impartiality of the 
Court in any matter likely to brought before it, 
any public comment on such an utterance, if it were 
a fair comment, would, so far from being a 
contempt of Court, be for the public benefit, 
and would be entitled to similar protection to 
that which comment upon matters of public 
interest is entitled under the law of libel'._
This passage has been cited with approval in a number of subsequent
4
Australian decisions; and the availability of a defence akin to 'fair 
comment' seems clearly to have been recognised in that jurisdiction.
It is submitted that similar recognition should now be accorded the 
defence in Nigeria, to provide some shield against liability in a
1. Ibid., para. 36.
2. (1911) 12 C.L.R. 280.
3. Ibid., at 286. This dictum has, of course, previously been reproduced 
at p. 944, but is sufficiently significant to warrant quotation once 
more - especially in the light of the intervening discussion.
4. See Miller, op cit, p 195 and the authorities he cites at n 14.
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1 2 
situation similar to that in R v Jackson. Here, it may be recalled,
the accused had charged the judiciary with favouring the executive
in its decisions. A defence of fair comment may well - in the parti-
3
cular circumstances - have served to exonerate him from liability.
10.9. The Practical Need for Reform of the Law
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that there are a number 
of deficiencies in the common law of 'scandalising the court'; and 
the need for reform - in principle - is clearly evident. It remains 
to consider, however, whether such reform is indeed required in practice 
or whether the offence has fallen into desuetude to such an extent 
that this does not seem warranted.
In Nigeria, the cases directly involving the media are all somewhat
4
old decisions. This is particularly true of R v Jackson and R v
5
Service Press Ltd., decided in 1925 and 1952 respectively: whilst 
R v Onweugbuna and another^ was determined in 1958. Since then, there 
appear to have been no reported cases of contempt of this kind in 
which the media have been concerned: but allegations of judicial 
partiality made by litigants or their counsel have (as previously
1. (1925) 6 N.L.R. 49.
2. See p. 913 et seq.
3. The article was prompted by the decision of the Lagos High Court
in the Eshugbayi case. The truth of the facts commented on would
therefore have been relatively easy to establish: and it might also 
have been possible to show that the comment was 1 fair': in the 
sence that it was honest, even if not objectively reasonable.
4. (1925) 6 N.L.R. 49.
5. (1952) 20 N.L.R. 96.
6. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17.
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described) come before the courts on a number of occasions during the 
last decade.
In other Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as Canada and Australia,
there have also been a number of recent cases in which scandalising
the court by the media has been in issue. Far from the law having fallen
into desuetude in these countries, it seems to be alive and thriving:
and continuing to provide a vehicle for the expression of what has
previously (and justifiably) been described as judicial 'hyper-sentivivity'.
In England itself, however, the source of the relevant rules in these
countries, the law does appear to be falling into disuse. The last
3
prosecution for scandalising the court was that in R v Colsey,
decided in 1931. This may suggest either that the judges have become
more tolerant - or that the media have learned greater caution. Some
of the more outspoken criticisms in the English press (which have
been allowed to pass without prosecution) suggest that the former
may be the more accurate explanation. Thus, for example, the press
has strongly criticised the judiciary for imposing its own views of 
4 5
dress and morality upon litigants and has not minced its words on 
occasion in commenting on the sentences imposed by the courts. By 
way of illustration, the Daily Mirror, described the sentence imposed in a 
baby-snatching case in-the following terms :
1. See p. 925 et seq.
2. See p. 932 et seq.
3. The Times, 9 May 1931.
4. See The Guardian, 24 February 1970, for a 'hard-hitting article'
which accused a county court judge of 'unusual stuffiness and bad 
manners' for having 'ticked offr a woman for wearing a trouser 
suit to court: See Borrie & Lowe, op.cit., p. 157.
5. See also The Observer, 26 February 1967, in which the judiciary 
were reminded (following comments by a Divorce Commissioner to the 
pop singer Sandie Shaw that she was a 'spoilt child') that 'The 
Judges' bench is not a pulpit from which to pronounce on personal 
morality'. (See Miller, op.cit., p. 196).
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'Shocking. Atrocious. Unbelievable.
That is the reaction of most people 
to the 21-month jail sentence on 
Jacqueline Paddon, the girl with a 
history of mental disturbance, who ran 
off with a friend's baby'.^
Other examples (such as the recent strong criticisms of sentence in
2
rape cases) are not hard to find.
On the other hand, the explanation for the paucity of prosecution may
also be that the press has come to err on the side of over-caution, as
the following speech of Lord Gardiner (speaking as Lord Chancellor in 
a House of Lords debate) appears to indicate:
'The law is not in any doubt. It is a free
country. Anybody is entitled to express his
honest opinion about a sentence and about 
the way in which the judge has conducted 
a case, though it is desirable that it 
should not overstep the bounds of courtesy 
and should not be a virulent personal 
attack on a judge. But, subject to that, 
the administration of justice is not, as 
Lord Atkin once said, a cloistered virtue, 
and anybody is entitled to express his 
honest opinion about it. I have tried 
for about thirty years to persuade news­
papers that this is the law. They will 
not believe
With due respect to Lord Gardiner, however, his comments do seem to 
over-state the case. It is of course true that reasoned criticism is 
not punishable; but the dividing line between comment which is lawful 
and that which constitutes contempt is extremely thin, as the case
1. The Daily Mirror, 2 November 1972. (See Miller, ibid).
2. Miller, ibid., p. 196.
3. See Hansard, H.L. Deb. Vol. 274, cols. 1438 - 39, 25 May 1966,
cited by Miller, ibid., p. 196, n 6.
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1
of S v Van Niekerk graphically demonstrates. Moreover, the doubt
as to whether imputations of bias can ever constitute reasoned criticism
destroys the practical efficacy of much of Lord Gardiner's point that
'justice is not a cloistered virtue'. It is not safe to assume, under
the present common law, that the imputation of judicial bias attracts
no liability for contempt: nor ife it justified to infer - from the mere
fact that the law has only rarely been invoked in the past - that it
will not again be used in the future. The example of the prosecutions
recently brought in the United Kingdom for the "obsolete" crime of 
2
criminal libel demonstrates the danger beyond any doubt.
It follows, thus, that there is indeed a practical need for reform of 
the law of scandalising the court; and the question which this, of 
course, raises is the direction such reform should take. A number 
of specific suggestions have previously been made, but before examining 
these further it is instructive to note both the reform proposed by 
the Phillimore Committee in the United Kingdom in this regard: and 
the radically different approach to the entire problem adopted in 
the United States of America.
10.10. The Reform Proposed by the Phillimore Committee
The reform proposed by the Phillimore Committee in the United Kingdom 
is that this branch of the law of contempt should be abolished; and 
that it be replaced by a new and strictly defined criminal
1. [1970] 3 S.A. 655(T). Here, it may be recalled, the accused had
published, in the South African Law Journal the results of a survey 
of opinion amongst South African legal practitioners, which indicated 
their belief that imposition of the death penalty was affected to 
some degree by racial prejudice.
2. See p. 595 above.
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offence1, which should be triable only on indictment (rather than
2
through the summary process) and only at the instance of the Attorney- 
3
General. The hew offence would be constituted 'by the publication,
in whatever form,,of matter imputing improper or corrupt judicial
conduct with the intention of impairing confidence in the administration 
4
of justice'; and '[c]riticism, even if scurrilous, [w]ould only be
5
punishable if it fulfilled these two requirements'.
This proposal, particularly with its insistence that summary process 
be avoided, that the consent of the Attorney-General be required for 
prosecution and that the imputation be made with intent to impair 
confidence in the administration of justice is greatly to be welcomed. 
The latter requirement, in particular, is especially significant; and,
if adopted in Nigeria, would help to ensure^ that persons in the
. . 7postition of the accused in R v Onweugbuna and another could no
1. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd 5794, 1974, para. 164.
2. See ibid. This recommendation reflects the view of the Committee
(at para 163) that the urgency of the summary process is not normally 
required and that summary trial may also contravene the nemo judex 
in sua causa principle, even though 'the judge who was himself the 
subject of attack would not in practice sit to hear the case'. On
the other hand, the Committee did also consider that an imputation
made in facie curiae or which created a risk of serious prejudice
to particular pending proceedings could properly be dealt with 
summarily 'on that basis'.
3. See ibid. This recommendation applies to England and Wales.
Slightly different proposals are made for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland; but these lie outside the scope of this study.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Hard-and-fast prediction is never advisable; and much depends on 
the strictness with which the requisite intent is to be gauged. If 
indirect intent (based on reasonable foresight)! is sufficient for 
liability, and motive is considered irrelevant, the position may 
not, in fact, be much improved.
7. [1358] 2 E.N.L.R. 17.
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longer be found guilty of contempt. Whether it would assist a defen-
1
dant in the position of the accused in R v Jackson is, however, a matter
of considerably more doubt. 'Intent' must presumably be understood as
including 'indirect' intent, based on reasonable foresight of the
likelihood of the prohibited consequence resulting in fact;
and intent of this kind would be relatively easily established in the
circumstances of Jackson's case. It is accordingly all the more
unfortunate that the Committee made no attempt to clarify the present
uncertainty regarding the legality of reasoned criticism when this takes
the form of an imputation of judicial bias. Accordingly whether an allegation
of this 'nature would fall within the category of 'matter imputing improper or
2
corrupt judicial conduct' must remain a matter of some speculation.
Prima facie it would do so; and whether the fact that the imputation 
was temperate and based on legitimate grounds would make any difference 
to liability remains uncertain.
The Committee's reasons for concluding that the common law offence
of scandalising the court could not be abolished without replacing it
with a new statutory crime are interesting: but do not stand up to
close scrutiny. The Committee cited two reasons for introducing a
replacement offence: first, the fact that the law of defamation does
3
not provide appropriate or adequate redress; and, secondly, the
special position in which the judiciary is placed, which constrains
4
judges from 'tak[ing] action in reply to criticism' and gives them no
1. (1925) 6 N.L.R. 49.
2. This, as indicated above, is one of the crucial elements which must
be shown for liability under the proposed law.
3. See the Phillimore Report, supra, para. 162.
4. Ibid.
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1
proper forum for so doing, as enjoyed by other public figures.
As regards the first of these reasons, the Committee was particularly 
swayed by the fact that this branch of the common law 'is only inci-
2
dentally, if at all, concerned with the personal reputation of judges';
whilst, in addition, if an attack was made upon 'an unspecified group 
3
of judges', it might not be possible for it to found libel proceedings 
at all. It is submitted, however, that neither objection is valid.
Any attack on a judge's impartiality (to take but one example) is 
first and foremost a threat to his personal reputation; and only at 
second remove does it undermine respect for the judiciary as a whole and 
hence the proper administration of justice. It is, of course, tradi­
tionally asserted that the purpose of this branch of the law of contempt 
is not to facilitate personal vindication of a judge's good name but 
simply to uphold the machinery of justice: but it may be queried 
whether this is an appropriate approach (especially in the light of all 
the defects in the present law of scandalising the court). If the 
judge whose impartiality is impugned is able to clear his good name 
through proceedings for defamation, the general administration of 
justice will simultaneously be vindicated. The choice as to which 
avenue of redress to pursue (under either the law of libel or contempt) 
is essentially one of public policy, for the ultimate goal is the same. 
Faced with this election, there seems sound sense in leaving the 
judge impugned (as the primary object of attack) to protect 
his own reputation through the law of libel. Moreover, bearing in mind
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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the deficiencies in the law of scandalising the court as presently 
constituted ., this approach seems eminently more "fair" to the publisher, 
since it is only the law of defamation (unlike that of contempt) which 
gives the accused a reasonable opportunity of avoiding liability through 
defences such as justification and fair comment. On policy grounds, 
therefore, it is preferable that the individual judge be left to vindicate 
his own good name in proceedings brought under the ordinary law of 
defamation. As for the fear expressed by the Committee that an attack 
on an 'unspecified group' of judges would then escape punishment alto­
gether, this must surely be misconceived. The concept that a member of 
a 'class' may be defamed by innuendo is well-established: and the judiciary
in a given state would undoubtedly be a sufficiently well-defined and
2
established group to qualify as a 'class' for this purpose.
As regards the Committee's belief that '[jJudges feel constrained by
3
their position not to take action in reply to criticism', it is
submitted - in the first instance - that this is not borne out by the
facts, as Nigerian experience graphically demonstrates. The judges
4
who considered themselves unfairly attacked in R v Jackson, and in 
5 6Aniweta's , and Deduwa's cases - to name but three examples - felt 
little constraint in taking action against the alleged contemnors. It 
is submitted that it would, in fact, have been far more consonant with 
the dignity of their judicial office not to have invoked the summary 
process in these instances but rather to have sought redress through the
1 . See the discussion of class actions in the in the civil and criminal 
law of defamation at pp. 475 and 610. Although the matter is not 
altogether free from doubt, the balance of authority seems clearly 
to support the availability of such actions.
2. See the discussion of the attributes of.a 'class' at p. 674 above.
3. The Phillimore Report, supra, para 162.
4. (1925) 6 N.L.R. 49, discussed at p 913.
5. Aniweta v The State, Appeal No FCA/E/47/78, discussed at p . 927 above.
(continued)
-984-
measured procedures of the ordinary law of libel. Moreover, the mere 
assertion that judges have some special and particularly delicate 
position in society does not ring true. It is clearly one further 
aspect of the mystique which presently surrounds the judiciary and on 
which the law of scandalising the court is largely based. This further 
manifestation of the myth should not be allowed to continue; and it 
should instead by recognised that judges are.'.appointed to fulfill 
particular tasks within society; that they may do the job either well 
or badly (just as other individuals may in other occupations); and that 
the best interests of the community demand that their performance should 
indeed be subject to critical scrutiny: and that they should not be 
given any further protection against this than that afforded by the 
ordinary law of defamation.
One final point of criticism regarding the Committee's proposals remains
to be noted. This is the fact that the Committee gave singularly little
attention to the need for further defences against liability; and
confined itself to recommending that a defence of 'justification', as
1
previously discussed, should be introduced. In itself, however, such
2
a defence (even without the defects earlier described ) does not provide
sufficient protection against conviction. The defence of fair comment
is needed to provide a shield against liability in this branch of
3
law as in the sphere of defamation; and there is a crying need for 
the introduction of a further defence based on overriding public
- • J
(continued)
6. Deduwa and others v The State, [1975] 1 All N.L.R.l, discussed at p. 926.
1. See p. 970.
2. See p. 971 et seq.
3. See p. 975 - 976.
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ointerest in publication, as Onweugbuna1s case so clearly shows.
It is accordingly most unfortunate that the Committee made no attempt 
to deal with these lacunae in the present law; nor to indicate to 
what extent fair comment or public interest should be available as defences 
under the proposed new law.
In summary, then, it is submitted that the Committee has erred 
fundamentally in insisting that the common law offence should be replaced 
by a new statutory crime. Even if the Committee's premises are accepted, 
moreover,its proposal is nevertheless deficient in a number of concrete 
respects: particularly in its failure to clarify the type of intent 
required, the legality of reasoned criticism in the form of imputation 
of bias, and the availability of the defences of fair comment and public 
interest. The Committee's recomendations in this context have not, of 
course, yet been implemented in the United Kingdom (as the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981 contains no provision in this regard). It is submitted 
that Nigeria would do well to note the Committee's criticism of the 
common law, as well as its recommendation that the offence of scandalising 
the court should be abolished: but that, for the rest, Nigeria would be 
better advised to follow the contrasting approach of the United States 
of America which (without formal abolition of this branch of law) has 
nevertheless resulted in the crime of scandalising the court becoming 
a dead-letter in practice.
10.11. The Contrasting Approach of the United States.
In the nineteenth century, an attorney (Luke Lawless) who had accused 
a federal judge (Peck) of bias in the adjudication of certain land
1. See p. 965 et seq.
2. R v Onweugbuna and another, [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17.
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1
claims was cited by the judge for contempt, convicted and punished
2
through being suspended from practice for some eighteen months.
For a number of years thereafter, Lawless pressed continually for
3
Peck's impeachment; and, although the judge was ultimately exonerated,
'Congress wanted no more punishment of the press for criticism of 
4
federal judges' and it proceeded to pass legislation 'which said that
federal judges might punish only for that misbehavior which took place
"in the presence of the ... courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct
5
the administration of justice"'.
State courts, however, continued to punish for constructive contempt;
and, in two important decisions of the Supreme Court in the eariy
twentieth century, were upheld in so doing. The cases in question were
Patterson v State of Colo, ex rel Attorney General^ and Toledo Newspaper
7
Co v United States (previously discussed in the context of publications
Q
prejudicial to pending proceedings ) .
1. See Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed., New York 
1978, p. 30. Peck had financial interests in the land in question 
and Lawless proceeded to 'delineat[e] at length "some of the prin­
cipal errors"' of Peck's decision regarding it.
2. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid.
3. See ibid. Impeachment proceedings were commenced after some four
years and when the Senate finally voted, it 'exonerat[ed] Peck by 
the^narrowest of margins'.
4. Ibid.
5. 18 U.S.C. g . 21 Contempts, § 401 (1976). This law was first enacted in 1831
6. 205 U.S. 454, 27 S. Ct. 556 (1907).
7. 247 U.S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560 (1918).
8. See p. 884.
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The latter case is significant, however, for the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Holmes, who stressed that the words 'so near thereto' in the 
statute meant 'so near as actually to obstruct justice, and [that]
misbehavior mean[t] more than unfavorable comment or even dis-
1 2 
respect'. In 1941, the Supreme Court in Nye v United States,
agreed. It held that '"so near thereto" means physical proximity and
that punishment by summary contempt proceedings for published criticism 
3
is precluded'.
4
Then came Bridges v California, in which - it may be recalled -
the Supreme Court established the principle that publications relating
5
to pending proceedings may not be restricted unless there is a 'clear 
and present danger' that they may thwart the proper administration of 
justice. Building upon that foundation, the Court has since made it 
clear that criticism of the judiciary (which, under the common law, 
would be prohibited as 'scandalising' the court) cannot be restricted 
unless it can be shown that it 'immediately i m p e r i l s t h e  judicial 
process.
7
Thus, in Pennekamp v Florida, where the Miami Herald had published a 
cartoon and editorial 'designed to demonstrate that a Miami trial
1. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p. 345.
2. 313 U.S. 33, 61, S. Ct. 810 (1941).
3. Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 345.
4. 314 U.S. 252, .62 S. Ct. 190 (1941), discussed at p. 884.
5. Although both cases considered under the Bridges title involved
attempts to influence the outcome of particular proceedings in
progress, the principle established by the case was broad enough to 
extend beyond such circumstances.
6. See Craig v Harney, infra.
7. 328 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct 1029 (1946).
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judge had, by certain rulings, favored criminals and gambling establish- 
1
ments' and its publisher and associate editor had thereupon been fined
for contempt, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of
the lower court. Whilst the Florida court had emphasised that the
publication 'impugned the integrity of the trial court, had tended to
create public distrust for it, and had obstructed the fair and impartial
2 i 3
justice (sic) of pending cases, the Supreme Court stressed that the 
restriction violated freedom of speech and of the press and declared:
'Freedom of discussion should be given the 
widest range compatible with the essential 
requirement of the fair and orderly adminis­
tration of justice'.
4
The following year, this principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
(by a majority of 6:3) in Craig v Harney. Here, the publishers,^
of 'an intemperate and inaccurate attack on a lay judge who had directed
7
a verdict in a civil suit' had been found liable for contempt; but the judgment 
was reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. Whilst acknowledging that 
the 'news articles were by any standard an unfair report of what had
1. Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 4th ed., New York, 1982, p 161„
2. To this extent, the decision overlaps into another category of 
publication: those which tend to prejudice fair trial and are there­
fore restricted, at common law, under the sub judice rule. The 
approach of the Supreme Court to this aspect of contempt has already 
been considered at p. 886.
3. Abraham, supra.
4. Pennekamp v Florida, supra, at 347.
5.
6 .
7. Abraham, op.cit., p. 161.
331 U.S. 367, 67 S. Ct. 1249 (1947).
The actual publisher, as well as the editorial writer and news 
reporters were all considered responsible for publication.
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transpired' , the majority (through Mr Justice Douglas)! emphasised 
that:
'The vehemence of the language used is 
not alone the measure of the power to 
punish for contempt. The fires which 
it kindles must constitute an imminent, 
not merely a likely, threat to the ad­
ministration of justice. The danger must 
not be remote or even probable; it must 
immediately imperil1.
2
3 4Again, in Wood v Georgia (the most recent case on the issue ), the
Supreme Court (by majority of 5:2) reiterated this principle. The proK
ceedings arose out of a letter written by a sheriff in Bibb County,
Georgia, to the Bibb County grand jury, in which he voiced his severe
criticism of a judge of the Superior Court 'who had instructed the
5 6 
grand jury in racially charged, intemperate tones'. The majority
concluded that the sheriff could not be cited for contempt as his actions
'did not present a danger to the administration of justice that should
7
vitiate his freedom to express his opinions in the manner chosen'.
The common law crime of 'scandalising the court' has thus been rendered 
a dead-letter in the United States and ' [t]he rare contempt citation 
and conviction for publishing criticism of a court that occurs today
_1_. Craig v Harney, supra, at 374.
2. Ibid , at 376.
3. 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364 (1962).
4. See Abraham, supra.
5. Abraham, ibid., p. 162.
6. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Warren and the 
dissentients were Justices Harlan and Clark.
7. Wood v Georgia, supra, at 394.
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is invariably overruled on appeal1.
Given the difficulties caused by the rule against scandalising the court 
and the unacceptable derogation from freedom of expression it entails 
(as previously canvassed in the preceding section), there is thus 
considerable merit in the United States' approach: and it is submitted 
that the alternative it offers should be borne constantly in mind in 
examining the final question that remains for consideration: the consti­
tutionality of the Nigerian law of scandalising the court in the light 
of the guarantee of freedom of expression enshrined within the 1979 
Constitution.
10.12. The Constitutionality of the Law of Scandalising the Court
in Nigeria.
It will be recalled that s 36 of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria
guarantees the right to 'receive and impart ideas and information
2
without interference'. The right is not absolute, and is accordingly
subject to laws 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' for the
purpose, inter alia, of 'maintaining the authority and independence
3
of courts'. The law prohibiting scandalising of court cuts clearly 
across the substantive right to freedom of expression, but equally 
clearly has, as its purpose, the maintenance of the authority of the 
courts. It follows that the constitutionality of the law depends on
1. Nelson & Teeter, op.cit., p. 346.
2. s 36(1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
3. s 36(3)(a), ibid.
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whether it can be considered 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society' for the attainment of this objective.
It is submitted that this question is best answered first by recalling 
some of the more objectionable features of the law, as described above; 
and then by examining the rationale for the rule and attempting to 
assess whether this stands up to scrutiny or serves the best interests 
of society.
The various deficiencies in the law spring readily to mind. The first 
and foremost is the principle that liability for scandalising the court 
at dommon law is strict; and depends entirely upon the objective like­
lihood of damage to the standing of the judiciary rather than the sub­
jective intent to bring such consequence about.^ The unfortunate results
of this rule are graphically demonstrated by the case of R v Onweugbuna 
2
and another; and the point will not be further emphasised here. The 
second objectionable aspect of the law is the lack of defences which 
it presently provides. The only defence clearly recognised is the 
prosecution's failure to make out a prima facie case: including, accord­
ingly, its failure to show that the comment goes beyond reasoned - and 
lawful - criticism. Although there is some support for the availability
of the defence of fair comment, this has not yet been clearly accepted
3
by courts in either England or Nigeria. Other vital defences - 
principally justification and public benefit (which are of paramount 
importance in the face of the strict liability rule) - have yet to be
1. See the discussion of mens rea at p. 951 et seq.
2. [1958] 2 E.N.L.R. 17.
3. See p. 974 above.
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recognised at all.
The third major defect in the law lies in the doubt as to whether an
imputation of judicial bias can ever constitute 'reasoned criticism':
and hence be regarded as lawful comment. Decisions such as those in
S v Van Niekerk * and Ambard v Attorney-General of Trinidad 
2
and Tobago graphically demonstrate the need for this uncertainty to 
be removed: and for it to be acknowledged - beyond all doubt - 
that 'fair, temperate and reasoned criticism', offered in constructive 
spirit, can never constitute contempt. The development of the legal 
system as a whole require the widest possible discussion of all the 
problems encountered in the attempt to reconcile conflicting forces 
within society through the mechanism of law; for only through full 
disclosure and debate can the difficulties endemic in this process 
be recognised: and appropriate measures be taken to resolve them.
A further important question is whether the rationale for the rule 
provides sufficient justification for it. This issue is extremely comp­
lex; and raises profound questions as to the proper role of the judi­
ciary within society. Accordingly, full examination of the topic 
lies outside the scope of this study: but it is nevertheless instructive 
to note certain views recently expressed as to the foundation of the 
rule in Canadian society. Although these observations are specifically 
directed at the Canadian judiciary, which (it may be recalled?) has 
displayed considerable 'hyper-sensitivity' to criticism, they appear
1. [1970] 3 S.A. 655 (T).
2. [1936] A.C. 322 (P.C.).
3. See p. 911 et seq and p 935 et seq.
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to apply with equal force in other Commonwealth jurisdictions.
The contention which has thus been made is that the rule against 
scandalising the court is an off-shoot of a capitalist, individual- 
oriented ideology which, in the legal sphere, manifests itself in the 
notion of equality before the law; and which then requires that the 
judiciary be given primary responsibility for ensuring the maintenance 
of equal treatment. The only way this can be achieved is if the 
judiciary is seen by society to be applying the law equally to all 
persons. It thus becomes necessary for the judges to be intellectually 
and morally distanced from the community; and any comment 'which casts 
doubts on the ability, integrity or impartiality of the judiciary becomes 
by its nature subversive'.^
It needs little emphasis that there are major flaws in this approach
2
to the judiciary, as previously noted. The judiciary is as fallible
as any other human institution; and there is no magic in elevation to
the bench which enables an individual to discard attitudes long held
and beliefs deeply engrained. Equality before the law is indeed a
goal for which to strive: but it is not likely to be best attained
through upholding the myth of judicial impartiality and infallibility.
3
Far better that the 'protective convering' be removed; and that realis­
tic attempt be made to grapple with the problem.
In conclusion, it is accordingly submitted that the law against scandal­
ising the court cannot be accepted as reasonably justifiable in a
1. Martin, op.cit., p. 21. He submits that this also reflects a 'Tory 
view of the world1./ heavily premised upon respect for authority.
2. See p. 945, for example.
3. See Martin, supra.
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democratic society. This is,firstly, because its many objectionable 
features combine to impose an intolerable burden on the alleged contemnor; 
and, secondly, because its very underlying rationale is suspect, and 
hinders rather than promotes the best interests of society. It follows 
that this entire branch of law should be considered void for inconsistency 
with the guarantee of freedom of expression enshrined within the Nigerian 
Constitution; and that it should no longer be available to punish pub­
lication of criticism of the judiciary. Instead, if any.gtudge is per-
1
sonally attacked (as in R v Gray )it should be,left.to hinrto institute
proceedings for defamation to clear his good name and vindicate the
responsibility entrusted to him by society. Likewise, if an entire
2
bench is unjustifiably criticised (as, arguably, in R v Jackson or 
3
v Van Niekerk ), the possibility of all the judges thereby impugned 
bringing a class action for defamation should be acknowledged as pro­
viding adequate redress. There is no need, as recommended by the 
Phillimore Committee, for any residual offence to be introduced: 
especially when it is remembered that the law of defamation has both 
civil and criminal branches, so that criminal punishment for some
4
particularly heinous comment could (if necessary ) be secured under 
the existing law of defamation.
If this suggestion seems too radical, however, then - at minimum - 
reforms should be introduced into the law to remove its principal 
objectionable elements and to bring it into line (to this extent) with
1. [1900] 2.Q.B. 36, discussed at p. 905.
2. (1925) 6 N.L.R. 49, discussed at p. 913.
3. [1970] 3 S.A. 655(T), discussed at p. 947.
4. It needs little emphasis that such prosecution should be considered
necessary only in extreme circumstances.
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the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Thus, strict
liability should be replaced by a test based upon subjective intent
to undermine the proper administration of justice; the legality of
reasoned criticism (even in the form of imputation of bias) should
be acknowledged beyond all doubt; and the defences of public interest,
1
justification and fair comment should be introduced. Furthermore,
echoing the approach of the United States of America, it should be
2
recognised, as stressed by the Supreme Court in Wood v Georgia, 
that:
'Out-of-court publications regarding judicial 
proceedings are protected by the constitutional 
guaranty of freedom of ... [the] press 
unless a clear and present danger of 
substantive evils arising from the publication 
justifies an impairment of the constitutional 
right; [and even then] the substantive evil 
must be extremely serious and the degree of 
imminence extremely high before such utterances 
can be punished'. ^
1. It needs little emphasis that if the first two changes - especially 
the former - are introduced, the occasion for resorting to these 
defences will be much reduced. Nevertheless, their availability 
should be acknowledged in order to provide additional protection 
for freedom of expression.
2. 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, (1962).
3. See Wood v Georgia, 8 L ed 2d 569, at 570, para. 4, emphasis supplied.
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C H A P T E R  E L E V E N
CONTEMPT THROUGH 
REPORTING COURT PROCEEDINGS
11.1. The Significance of this Branch of Contempt for Media 
Freedom
This branch of the law of contempt prescribes certain require­
ments which must be met by the media in reporting on proceedings 
in court: failing which those responsible for publication may be 
found guilty of contempt of court. The law, accordingly, has 
great significance not only for the media and the right to free­
dom of expression, but also touches on one of the most vital 
of all safeguards of the rights of the citizen. This is the 
principle that justice should be administered in open court and 
that society in general should be informed of what has trans­
pired through media reports detailing the conduct and outcome of 
judicial proceedings. The secret proceedings of the Star Chamber 
have left behind a sinister spectre: and the right to the open 
administration of justice is now considered the most 'indispen­
sable* of rights - without which 'the subjects of any State can­
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1
not be said to enjoy a real freedom' „ It needs no emphasis, 
however, that the safeguard of individual liberty implicit in 
open trial has little real meaning in modern society unless the 
public at large is able to obtain information regarding judicial 
proceedings through media reports.* The media accordingly fulfill 
a vital social role in reporting court proceedings: and the ex­
tent to which they may be held liable for contempt of court for 
so doing is a matter of the utmost public concern.
The obligations of the media in regard to the reporting of pro­
ceedings vary depending on whether proceedings are conducted in 
public or private,. Private proceedings are, of course, funda­
mentally inconsistent with the vital principle of open trial; 
but it is nevertheless recognised that there are certain circum­
stances in which proceedings may properly be conducted outside 
the public view* Thus, for example, this may be appropriate in 
patent cases, where publicity would destroy the value of a patent 
and obviate the very purpose of bringing proceedings for its en­
forcement* Determining the instances in which proceedings may 
legitimately be held in private is not an easy matter, however,
1* Scott v Scott, [1913] A*C. 417 (H.L.(E.)), per Lord Shaw 
of Dumferline, citing the historian Hallam, who stated:
*Civil liberty in this kingdom has two direct guarantees; 
the open administration of justice according to known laws 
truly interpreted, and fair constructions of evidence; and 
the right of Parliament, without let or interruption, to 
inquire into, and obtain redress of* public grievances.
Of these, by far the first is the most indispensable; nor 
can the subjects of any State be reckoned to enjoy a real 
freedom, where this condition is not found both in its 
judicial institutions and in their constant exercise'.
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since the law reflects considerable uncertainty in this regard. 
Yet the issue is of great concern to the media, as proceedings 
conducted in private are subject to wide-ranging restrictions 
on reporting which do not apply to those held in public. To 
make matters yet more complex,, the ambit of reporting restric­
tions on private proceedings is also a matter of great uncer­
tainty; and the overall result is to present the media with 
considerable difficulty in drawing the dividing line between 
lawful and illegitimate reporting.
Where proceedings are conducted in public,, by contrast, the 
general rule is that the media are entitled to report them in 
full., subject to certain requirements and restrictions. Some 
of these are relatively easy to apply: for example, the rule 
that any report must be fair and accurate. Other restrictions, 
however, are bedevilled by considerable difficulty. Thus, 
much controversy surrounds the circumstances in which evidence 
given in open court may be withheld from publication (for 
example., to disguise the identity of a victim of blackmail who 
would not otherwise be willing to testify)* Furthermore, the 
extent to which reporting of proceedings may be ordered to be 
postponed (in order, for instance,, to prevent prejudice to re­
lated pending proceedings) is also a matter of considerable 
1
uncertainty . The result, once more, is to present the media
1. Cases in which both these particular problems have arisen 
are further discussed in due course.
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with grave difficulty in the discharge of its important role in 
the reporting of court proceedings.
In the United Kingdom - the source of origin of these rules - 
the uncertainty which still surrounds the common law in this 
context has recently been highlighted by a number of important 
decisions. An attempt at reform has been made in the new Contempt 
of Court Act 1981,. but this still leaves many difficulties un­
resolved* In Nigeria, however, no such attempt at reform of the 
law has yet been made; and the existing rules (both statutory 
and common law) continue (by their uncertainty and wide-ranging 
ambit) to inhibit the reporting of court proceedings to a con­
siderable extent; and thus to jeopardize both media freedom and 
the fundamental principle of open justice: so essential to the 
maintenance of individual liberty.
11.2. Sources of Nigerian Law Regarding Media Reporting of 
Court Proceedings
Nigerian law relevant to the reporting of court proceedings by 
the media is to be found firstly in the Constitution of the 
country, which proclaims the right to open trial and full re­
porting in criminal proceedings: but also recognises a number
1
of exceptions to this general rule * The right to open trial 
is further buttressed by the terms of the Criminal Procedure
1* See s 33 (4), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979, further discussed below.
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Acts (applicable in the southern and northern states respec­
tively) which confirm that criminal proceedings should, in 
general, be open to the public: subject, however, to further 
exceptions dependant upon the discretion of the presiding
judicial officer* As regards reporting requirements, the 
2
Criminal Code of the southern states contains two express 
3
provisions governing the reporting of public and private pro­
ceedings respectively? but no equivalent rules are to be found
4
in the Northern Penal Code •
Notwithstanding these, statutory provisions, however, the common 
law of England is also an important source of Nigerian law in 
this context* The reasons for this are two-fold* First, the 
Nigerian legislation described above is silent as regards a 
number of further issues (such as the principle of open trial 
in relation to civil litigation and the reporting of public and 
private proceedings in the northern stateshf and this lacuna 
is filled by the common law rules of contempt: which, of course, 
apply within the entire country as part of the body of English
1. Cap 43 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958),
applicable in the southern states? and Cap 30 (Laws of Northern 
Nigeria, 1963), applicable in the Nortlw The terms of both 
statutes - in this regard - are further discussed below.
2.. Cap 42 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958)
3. ss 133(4) and (5), ibid.
4. Cap 89 (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963).
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common law received into Nigeria through the general reception
1
process previously described . Secondly, in the southern states,
the inclusion of two express provisions in the Criminal Code on
the reporting of proceedings does not exclude the operation of
2
the common law: for, as earlier explained , section 6 of the 
Criminal Code Act preserves the power of courts of record in 
Nigeria to apply the unwritten rules of contempt; and this 
jurisdiction is, in fact, the one most frequently invoked in 
practice.
The rules which govern the reporting of proceedings conducted 
in public differ radically from the principles which apply to 
the publicising of proceedings held in private; and it is accor­
dingly proposed to deal separately - in due course - with each 
in turn* The antecedent issue, however, is when proceedings 
may properly be held in private in the first instance: and to 
understand this, it is first necessary to grasp the full im­
portance of the principle of open trial.
11.. 3. The Importance of Open Trial and Full Reporting by the 
Media
It is a fundamental principle of common law that proceedings,
in general, should be conducted in open court* In exceptional
3
circumstances (as further explained below ) proceedings may
1. See the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, above.
2. See p 703, et seq.
3. See p 1010 et seq.
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take place in private (either iri camera or in chambers ) ; but
the broad principle is clear: the public has a right to attend
judicial proceedings and the media have a right freely to report
such proceedings - this freedom resting on the principle that
'such publication is merely enlarging the area of the court and
2
communicating to all that which all had the right to know' .
The reason underlying the 'open court* principle has been 
graphically stated by Bentham, as follows:
"'In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil 
in every shape have full swing* Only in proportion as 
publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to 
judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity 
there is no justice .... Publicity is the keenest spur 
to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. 
It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial' .
This passage was cited - with full approval and endorsement -
4
by Lord Shaw of Dumferline in the leading case of Scott v Scott , 
in 1913.* Here, the House of Lords unanimously confirmed the 
principle that justice should be administered in open court and 
that the media should have the right to communicate the conduct 
and outcome of judicial proceedings to the public at large.
1* Proceedings in camera are conducted in court, but with
the press and public excluded,. Proceedings in chambers, 
as the term suggests,, are conducted outside the normal 
courtroom in the private chambers of the presiding judi­
cial officer. See C*J. Miller, Contempt of Court, London, 
1976, p 212.
2. MacDougall v Knight, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 194, at 200, per 
Lord Halsbury.
3. See Scott v Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L.(E.)), at 477, 
where this passage is cited by Lord Shaw of Dumferline.
4. Ibid.
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Derogations from this principle could be justified only in excep- 
1
tional cases j for 'publicity in the administration of justice
2
... is one of the surest guarantees of our liberties' and re­
strictions on such publicity constitute ’an attack upon the very
3
foundations of public and private security' .
The importance of open court proceedings has recently been re­
affirmed by the House of Lords in Attorney-General v Leveller 
4
Magazine Ltd , where Lord Diplock declared:
*As a general rule the English system of administering 
justice does require that it be done in public ....
If the way that courts behave cannot be hidden from the 
public ear and eye this provides a safeguard against 
judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy and maintains 
public confidence in the administration of justice.
The application of this principle of open justice has 
two aspects: as respects proceedings in the court it­
self it requires that they should be held in open court 
to which the press and public are admitted and that, in 
criminal cases at any rate, all evidence communicated 
to the court is communicated publicly. As respects 
the publication to a wider public of fair and accurate 
reports of proceedings that have taken place in court 
the principle reguires that nothing should be done to 
discourage this' .
Since then, the principle has again been emphasised by the 
House of Lords in Home Office v Harman^. Here, Lord Scarman -
1. The exceptions are discussed further below.
2. Scott v Scott, supra, at 476, per Lord Shaw.
3. Ibid.
4. Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd and others; 
Attorney-General v National Union of Journalists; 
Attorney-General v Peace News Ltd and others, [1979]
A.C. 440 (H.L. (E.)). This important decision is further 
discussed below.
5. Ibid, at 449 - 450
6. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 338 (H*L.(E.)), discussed further in 
Chapter Twelve below.
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referring to the passage from Bentham cited above - pointed 
out that :
' [wjhether or not judicial virtue needs such a spur, there 
is also another important public interest involved in jus­
tice done openly, namely, that the evidence and argument 
should be publicly known, so that society may judge for 
itself the quality of justice administered^in its name, 
and whether the law requires modification* .
He continued :
* [T]he common law by its recognition of the principle of 
open justice ensures that the public administration of 
justice will be subject to public scrutiny* Such scrutiny 
serves no purpose unless it is accompanied by the rights 
of free speech, i*e», the right publicly to report, to 
discuss, to comment, to criticise,, to impart and to re­
ceive ideas and information on the matters subjected to 
scrutiny* Justice is done in public so that it may be 
discussed and criticised in public* Moreover, trials 
will sometimes expose matters of public interest worthy 
of discussion other than the judicial task of do^ng jus­
tice between the parties in the particular case* .
More recently still., in R v Horsham JJ.», ex parte Farquharson 
3
and another , the sanctity of the principle has been reiterated 
by Lord Denning., M,R„ in characteristically graphic terms :
fIt is of the first importance that justice should be 
done openly in public: that anyone who wishes should be 
entitled to come into court and hear and see what takes
1.. Ibid, at 356.
2» Ibid. The latter point is graphically illustrated by the 
'thalidomide* litigation, discussed in Chapter Nine above.
Lord Scarman's dicta are notable for their acknowledgement 
of the wide-ranging importance of unrestricted reporting 
and discussion of issues raised in judicial proceedings.
It is accordingly., with respect, unfortunate that this 
passage forms part of what was a minority judgment. It is 
significant, however, that the importance of open trial 
and full publicity was also expressly acknowledged by Lord 
Diplock (at 344, ibid) and by Lord Roskill (at 363, ibid) - 
both part of the majority - so that it is clear that the 
re-affirmation of this principle forms part of the ratio 
of the House of Lords' decision.
3,. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.)
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place; and that any newspaper should be entitled to 
publish a fair and accurate report of the proceedings - 
without fear of a libel action or proceedings for con­
tempt of court* Even though the report may be most 
damaging to the reputation of individuals, even though 
it may expose wrongdoing in high places, even though it 
may be political dynamite., nevertheless it can be pub­
lished freely - ^o long as it is part of a fair and 
accurate report' .
11*4. The Rationale for Restricting Open Trial and Full Re­
porting in Certain Circumstances
In the light of the ringing affirmations of the importance of 
open trial described above, it may be queried whether there can 
ever be sufficient reason for conducting proceedings in private 
or restricting their reporting* It is nevertheless clearly 
recognised that this may indeed be appropriate in certain cir­
cumstances; and the reason for this has been graphically des-
4
scribed by Viscount Haldane, L*C. in Scott v Scott . Here,
his Lordship emphasised that the 'chief object of Courts of
5
justice must be to secure that justice is done' ; and he 
pointed out that :
'it may often be necessary, in order to attain this 
primary object, that the Court should exclude the pub­
lic . for it may well be that justice could not be 
done at all if it had to be done in public. As the 
paramount object must always be to do justice, the
1. This requirement is further discussed below.
2. The law of libel relating to the reporting of court procee­
dings has previously been discussed* In essence, fair and 
accurate reports enjoy qualified privilege at common law 
(provided proceedings are public) and may be absolutely 
privileged under statute in certain parts of Nigeria.
Some doubt attaches to whether reports of private pro­
ceedings are privileged at all* See Scott v Scott, 
infra, (note 4), at 452, per Lord Atkinson.
3. R v Horsham JJ*, supra, at 452.
4. [1913] A.C• 417 (H.L.(E.))
5. Ibid, at 437.
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general rule as to publicity, afte^ r all only a means 
to an end, must accordingly yield' .
The same practical limitation has also been acknowledged by
2
Lord Diplock in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd .
Here, his Lordship - having stressed the general principle of 
open justice in the emphatic terms described above - went on 
to state that:
'since the purpose of the general rule is to serve the ends 
of justice it may be necessary to depart from it where the 
nature or circumstances of the particular proceedings are 
such that the application of the general rule in its entirety 
would frustrate or render impracticable the administration 
of justice or would damage some other public interest for 
whose protection Parliament has made some statutory dero­
gation from the rule' .
The general principle of open trial - and the need for derogation 
from it in certain instances in order to serve the interests of 
justice - have thus both clearly been acknowledged. The ques­
tion which remains shrouded in. controversy, however, is the 
range of circumstance in which private proceedings may be 
appropriate: and it is to this contentious issue that considera­
tion must now be given.
11,.5. Open Justice and its Exceptions in Nigerian Law
The principle of open justice and the exceptions to it in Nigerian 
law are governed by both statute and common law; and both require 
separate consideration.
1. Ibid, at 437 - 438.
2. [1979 ] A.C. 440 (H.L. (E.)).
3. Ibid, at 450.
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11.5.1. Statutory regulation of the principle of open justice
Statutory regulation of the principle of open justice in Nigerian 
law is to be found principally in the Constitution of the country 
and in the guarantee it provides of the right to 'fair trial'. 
Thus, section 33 of the 1979 Constitution proclaims that :
1
'Whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence, he 
shall unless the charge is withdrawn be entitled to a fair 
hearing in public within a reasonable time by a court or 
tribunal :
Provided that -
(a) a court or such a tribunal may exclude from its 
proceedings persons other than the parties thereto or 
their legal practitioners in the interest of defence, 
public safety, public order, public morality, the 
welfare of persons who have not attained the age of 
18 years, the protection of the private lives of the 
parties to such extent as it may consider necessary 
by reason of special circumstances in which publicity 
would be contrary to the interests of justice;
(b) if in any proceedings before a court or such a 
tribunal a Minister of the Government of the Federa­
tion or a2Commissioner of the Government of a State 
satisfies the court or tribunal that it would not be
1. It is interesting to note that the constitutional guarantee 
is thus expressed to apply only to criminal proceedings, no 
mention at all being made of civil litigation. As regards 
the latter, the fundamental principle of common law requires 
that these, too, must be conducted in open court as a general 
rule (subject, however, to certain exceptions which are 
further described in due course).
2. This provision gives a clear discretion to the court to de­
cide whether disclosure would be inimical to the public in­
terest* Accordingly, it represents a marked departure from 
the previous rule, according to which a Minister (at Federal 
or State level) could certify - with conclusive effect - that 
certain matters ought not (in the interests of the state) to 
come to the knowledge of the public* See L.O. Adegbite, 
'Reports of Parliamentary and Judicial Proceedings', in T.O. 
Elias, (ed.), Nigerian Press Law, London and Lagos, 1969,
pp 87 - 108, p 99.
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in the public interest for any matter to be publicly dis­
closed, the court or tribunal shall make arrangements 
for evidence relating to that matter to be heard in pri­
vate and shall take such other action as may be necessary 
or expedient to prevent the disclosure of the matter' .
2
In addition, the Criminal. Procedure Act lays down a general
rule that 'the room or place in which any trial is to take place
under [its provisions] shall be an open court to which the public
generally may have access as far as it can conveniently contain 
3
them' .. This principle is, however, subject to certain excep­
tions,. which entitle the 'judge or magistrate presiding over 
such trial ..., in his discretion, to *.. exclude the public
at any stage of the hearing on the grounds of public policy,
- 4
decency or expedience'1 or 'where a person who in the opinion 
of the court has not attained the age of seventeen is called as 
witness in any proceedings in relation to an offence ... con­
trary to decency or morality to direct that all ,... persons
not ... directly concerned in the case, be excluded from the
5
court during the taking of the evidence of such person' .
It is noteworthy, however, that no such order excluding the 
public 'shall .... unless specifically stated ... authorise the 
exclusion of bona fide representatives of a newspaper or news
1. s 33(4), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979, emphasis supplied.
2.. Cap 43 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
3. s 203, ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. s 204, ibid.
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agency'^; and if such persons are expressly barred from the
court, the judge or magistrate must 'record the grounds upon
2
which such decision is made' .
3
Similar provisions are contained in the Criminal Procedure Code , 
applicable in the northern states* This provides that :
'The place in which any court is held for the pur­
pose of inquiring into or trying any offence shall 
be deemed to be an open court, to which the public 
generally may have access,^so far as the same can 
conveniently contain them' .
Again, the principle of 'open court' is not absolute: and a
court is empowered to order, 'if it thinks fit, at any stage of
any inquiry ... or trial ... that the public generally or any
particular person shall not have access to or be or remain in 
5
such place* , In terms of the Explanation to this subsection, 
this means that a court 'may exclude any witness from the court 
at any stage of the proceedings or may clear the court whilst a 
child or young person is giving evidence1^ . This Explanation 
does not, however, set the limits within which exclusion may 
validly be ordered? but, on the contrary, provides no more than 
a guide as to the circumstances in which this may be done. It
1. s 205(1), ibid.
2. s 205(2), ibid.
3. Cap 30 (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963).
4... s 225(1), ibid.
5. s 225 (2), ibid.
6. Explanation to s 225(2), ibid.
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should not therefore be seen as a limitation upon the very wide 
powers conferred on the court to exclude the public (in whole 
or part) whenever it 'thinks fit* to do so* It is interesting 
to note that these provisions make no express mention of press 
representatives; and it follows that no special privilege has 
been accorded them in the North.
The statutes are silent as to the principle of open justice in 
relation to civil proceedings,; and the circumstances in which 
the public and press may lawfully be excluded from the hearing 
of civil litigation is accordingly governed by common law 
principles.
11.5.2 The principle of open justice and its exceptions at 
common law
The general rule of open trial at common law is clearly estab­
lished, as is the further principle that private proceedings 
must be permitted in appropriate instances: and neither, accord­
ingly, warrants further examination* However, the practical 
application of the latter principle (and the attempt to define 
the circumstances in which proceedings may legitimately be held 
in private) are matters of considerable difficulty; and must 
now be considered.
The leading authority on the issue is the House of Lords' deci-
1
sion in Scott v Scott.* Here, a nullity suit had, at the in­
stance of the petitioner, Mrs Scott, been heard camera. In
1. [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L. (E.))
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order to vindicate her reputation (in the face of her ex-husband's 
accusations), Mrs Scott had subsequently sent copies of the short­
hand notes of the proceedings to, inter alia, his father and 
1
sister She was thereupon found guilty of contempt (for pub­
licising proceedings in. camera),; and her appeal came, in due 
course, before the House of Lords - which was unanimous in allow­
ing it* In the course of their judgments, the Lords enunciated a 
number of important principles regarding the circumstances in 
which proceedings may be held in private - as well as on the
further question of the extent to which publication may there- 
2
after be permitted .
As regards the first issue (the circumstances justifying pri­
vate proceedings), it should be noted - at the outset - that the 
House experienced considerable difficulty in formulating precise 
principles* As observed by Earl Loreburn., ' [i]t would require a
treatise to expound the law upon th[is] subjec[t], and it
3
would be a treatise without authority' .* Certain fundamental 
points do, nevertheless, clearly emerge from the judgment of 
the House.
The judgment thus acknowledges both the importance of open 
4
trial and the need for derogation from this principle in cer­
tain circumstances^* It also emphasises that derogation is 
permitted only within the narrowest bounds.; and thus acknowledges
1* Ibid, at 431
2* This issue is examined further in due course.
3.. Scott v Scott, supra, at 445.
4. See p . 1001 et seq.
5. See p 1040 et seq.
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that private proceedings may be allowed only in the following 
circumstances :
(i) in proceedings involving wards of court or 
the mentally disturbed where the judge represents 
the Crown as parens patriae and the proceedings 
may properly be regarded as intra familiam ;
(ii) in proceedings involving secret processes, 
such as alleged patent infringements, where pub­
licity would destroy the secre^ which the liti­
gation was designed to protect ; and
(iii) where the clearly of the cou^t is necessary 
to prevent ' [t]umult or disorder'' .
The House further considered that privacy might be desirable 
in cases involving indecency, but was satisfied that this was 
not the rule of common law and that legislation was necessary 
to effect this~\
The Lords further attempted to formulate some general prin­
ciple to govern the residue of cases in which proceedings might 
properly be held in private: but experienced grave difficulty 
in doing so* Viscount Haldane, L*C. pointed out that the 
recognised exceptions to the general rule (as described above)
1* The word ‘lunatics' in fact used by the court appears 
somewhat anachronistic today.
2. Scott v Scott, supra, at 483, per Lord Shaw of Dumferline. 
Lord Shaw was here particularly concerned with the circum­
stances in which publicity regarding private proceedings 
may legitimately be curtailed* This, strictly, is a sepa­
rate questiont and is discussed in due course below. How­
ever, the two issues are also inextricably linked: and 
the criteria governing both are fundamentally the same.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, at 445, per Earl Loreburn
5* Ibid,, at 485, per Lord Shaw; and at 447, per Earl Loreburn.
-1013-
'are themselves the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle
that the chief object of Courts of justice must be to secure
1
that justice is done1 .« He accordingly declared (in the
2
passage earlier cited ) that :
'It may often be necessary, in order to attain its 
primary object, that the Court should exclude the 
public .... [for] it may well be that justice could 
not be done at all if it had to be done in public.
As the paramount object must always be to do jus­
tice, the general rule as to publicity, after all^ 
only the means to an end, must accordingly yield' .
He also, however, took pains to emphasise that the burden of
4
proving that this was essential (not merely convenient ) lies
on the person seeking to displace the general rule, who must
*make up his case strictly... [and] must satisfy the Court
that by nothing short of the exclusion of the public can 
5
justice be done' .
Some disquiet at this notion was, however, expressed by the 
Earl of Halsbury, who declared that he wished 'to guard 
against the proposition that a judge may bring a case within 
the category of enforced secrecy because he thinks that jus­
tice cannot be done unless it is heard in s e c r e t ' His
1. Ibid, at 437.
2. See p 1005.
3. Supra , at 437 - 438.
4. Ibid, at 438.
5. Ibid.
6 . Ibid, at 442.
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main difficulty was that this principle was not 'a sufficient
1
exposition of the law' - and left too wide a margin of dis­
cretion to the individual trial judge* Accordingly, he 'hesi- 
tate[d ] to accede to the width of the language1 - even though 
he was prepared to accept that there might indeed be other 
cases in which privacy could legitimately be enjoined.
Earl Loreburn attempted a somewhat different formulation. Hav­
ing pointed out that it was ' impossible to enumerate or antici-
3
pate all possible contingencies' , he submitted that the prin­
ciple underlying the various recognised exceptions is that the 
public may legitimately be excluded if 'the due administration 
of justice would be rendered impracticable by their presence, 
whether because the case could not be effectively tried, or
the parties entitled to justice would be reasonably deterred
4
from seeking it at the hands of the Court' . He further sug­
gested (in the context of nullity proceedings, at least) that 
the power to order a hearing in camera 'ought to be liberally 
exercised, because justice [would] be frustrated or [would]
5
declin[e] if the Court [were] made a place of moral torture' .
Grave misgivings regarding this suggestion were, however, voiced
by Lord Shaw, who warned that ^this ground is very dangerous
g r o u n d ' H e  acknowledged that the publicity attendant upon
7
open trial may well deter fsensitive suitors' and 'witnesses
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, at 443.
3. Ibid, at 446
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. at 485
7. Ibid
-1015-
1
of delicate feeling1 from coming to court; but emphasised that
'the concession to these feelings would ..... tend to bring about
those very dangers to liberty in general,, and to society at
2
large, against which publicity tends to keep us secure' .
It is difficult to distill any clear principle from these con­
flicting dicta* It seems that the Lords were prepared to accept 
that the category of ^exceptional cases1 is not closed and that 
private hearing may be justified in circumstances other than 
the ones enumerated as well* But the guiding rule for deter­
mining the limits of such instances remains shrouded in uncer­
tainty; and little further guidance is provided by the recent 
.Lords’* decision in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd .
This, of course^ is not surprising - given the fact that this
4question was not squarely before the court * The clearest
statement of principle is provided by Lord Scarman, who -
having canvassed the conflicting dicta in Scott v Scott^ -
proceeded to affirm that a court may sit in private if the
due administration of justice would otherwise be endangered;
but that there must be 'material (not necessarily formally
adduced evidence) made known to the court which would justify
this conclusion*^* This, with respect, is no more precise
7
than the formulations earlier attempted in Scott v Scott ;
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3.. [1979] A .G. 440 (H.L.(E.)).
4. See p 1033 below, where the facts of the case are explained.
5. Supra* The dicta in question are,, of course, those cited 
above.
6. Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine, supra, at 471.
7. Supra.
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and it thus remains extremely difficult - in all but the clearly 
recognised categories of exception, - to determine when proceedings 
may properly be heard in private.
It is therefore fortunate that this problem is seldom encoun­
tered in Nigeria in practice* Thus* Adegbite points out that
1 [o]nly an insignificant percentage of judicial proceedings
1
held in [Nigeria] take place in_ camera' ; and that the prin­
ciple of open justice is generally applied. Whilst this is 
clearly to be welcomed, it also means that the Nigerian courts 
have had little opportunity to clarify the common law prin­
ciples governing this issue: and the matter is therefore likely 
to present considerable difficulty when it arises for considera­
tion.
Having thus analysed the circumstances in which the important 
safeguard of open trial may indeed be curtailed, it now remains 
to examine the issue which is of particular significance to the 
media: the extent to which they may report proceedings conducted 
either in public or private; and the obligations which rest upon 
them in this regard* Since public proceedings are undoubtedly 
the norm, it is proposed to begin this analysis by focusing on 
the rules relevant to the reporting of proceedings conducted 
in open court.
1.. Adegbite, op cit, p 100.
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11.6. Reporting Proceedings Conducted in Public
Nigerian law governing the reporting of court proceedings 
conducted in public is derived from both statute and common 
law; and both sets of rules require separate examination.
11.6.1. Legislation regarding the reporting of public 
proceedings
The only statutory provision in Nigerian law regarding the
reporting of judicial proceedings conducted in public is
1
section 133(4) of the Criminal Code , applicable in the 
southern states. This renders it an offence (punishable by 
three months' imprisonment), ' while a judicial proceeding is 
pending, |to] make use of any speech or writing, misrepresenting 
such proceeding'^.
The operation of this provision is illustrated by the case of
3
Oni v Attorney-General of the Federation and others . The pro­
ceedings arose out of the misreporting, by the Daily Express 
newspaper, of certain interlocutory proceedings before Mr
Justice Taylor in the Lagos High Court. The article in ques-
4
tion was headed "'Battle: Govt 'loses' round 1"' ; and it pro­
ceeded to describe - as if already authoritatively decided - a 
number of matters which were, in fact, still very much in issue
1. Cap 42, (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958)
2. s 133(4), ibid.
3. Suit No LD/739/70, reproduced by Chief Gani Fawehinmi,
The Law of Contempt in Nigeria, (Case Book), Surulere, 1980,
pp 213 - 215.
4. See Fawehinmi, ibid., p 213
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in the substantive proceedings .
In proceedings for contempt under s 133(4) of the Criminal Code,
Taylor, C.J. observed that 'th[e] statements [in the article]
were wholly false and could have gained birth [only] in the
fertile imagination of an ignorant,, cheap publicity seeking
2
and unintelligent reporter' . He rejected the Australian 
3
authority cited by counsel for the accused and referred with
approval to various English decisions indicating (inter alia)
4
that comments 'calculated to prejucide' pending proceedings 
are contempts, irrespective of whether 'any Contempt of court 
was i n t e n d e d ' I n  the view of the learned judge, the article -
1. Ibid., pp 213 and 214. For example, the article stated 
that Mr Justice Taylor had held that the Federal Executive 
Council was not vested with the power to make laws - 
whereas this was one of the main questions in dispute: 
and was still to be resolved at the trial of the proceed­
ings.
2. Ibid., p 214.
3. Ibid. Unfortunately, the Australian authority is not 
identified in the report, nor does Taylor, C.J. make 
altogether clear his reasons for rejecting it - apart 
from indicating that Australian precedents can be of 
little assistance in interpreting Nigerian legislation.
4. Ibid, citing In re Martindale, (1894) 3 Ch. 193, at 
200, per North, J.
5. Ibid., citing the same judgment of North, J at 201.
The relevance of these authorities is open to some 
question, as they are clearly concerned with publi­
cations which constitute contempt under the sub 
judice rule. S 133(4), however, speaks simply of 
'misrepresenting' pending proceedings; and does
not seem to require that the misrepresentation should 
have the effect of prejudicing particular proceed­
ings.
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1
with its various inaccuracies - clearly fell within the ambit 
2
of s 133(4) . In the light, however, of the apologies publi­
shed by the newspaper and the lack of experience of the
particular reporter, Taylor, C.J. was content merely to give
3
the accused 'a severe caution and reprimand1 - but emphasi- 
sized that he would not be so lenient if the offence were to 
be repeated.
11.6.2 Reporting public proceedings at common law
4
By virtue of section 6 of the Criminal Code Act , the Nigerian
courts are not confined to the contempt jurisdiction expressly
conferred on them by the Criminal Code, but may rely, instead,
5
upon the unwritten rules of common law . Furthermore, the 
Northern Penal Code contains no equivalent provisions regard­
ing the reporting of court proceedings (as earlier noted): and 
the matter is clearly governed by the common law alone through­
out the vast northern areas of the country. It follows that 
the common law requirements for the reporting of proceedings in 
open court have considerable significance in all parts of 
Nigeria; and that they accordingly merit careful examination.
11.6.2.1. The report must be fair and accurate 
Since the object of the rule conferring freedom to report pro­
ceedings in open court is to expand communication of what the
1. Ibid., where Taylor, C.J.in fact went so far as to state 
that 'not a single paragraph of the article bears relation 
to the truth'.
2. Ibid., where Taylor, C.J. confirms that the article 'is 
well within the definition of contempt as contained in our 
Criminal Code.
3. Ibid.
4. Cap 42, (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
5. See p 703, et seq.
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public has a right to know to a wider audience than the physi­
cal constraints of court premises permit, it is clearly 'most
important that the public should have correct reports of what
1
takes place in Court' .. A report need not, however, be accu­
rate in every last detail provided it is substantially correct 
in content and tone.
The point is well illustrated by R v Evening News, ex parte 
2
Hobbs , where the defendant newspaper was alleged to have mis- 
reported the Recorder's summing up to the jury. His actual 
words had been:
'"The evidence in the case is of an 
extraordinary character, and there 
can be no doubt, I should say - it 
is for you to judge - that Hobbs was 
a party to a gigantic fraud, as monu­
mental and impudent a fraud as has 
ever been perpetrated in the course 
of our law"'. ^
The newspaper's report was as follows:
"'There can be no doubt, I should say, 
that Hobbs was a party to a gigantic 
fraud. It was as monumental and as 
impudent a fraud as, perhaps, has ever 
been perpetrated in the course of 
our criminal history". These words 
were used by the Recorder ... in his 
charge to the^grand jury at the Old 
Bailey today' .
The report thus omitted the words underlined in the first of 
these passages: 'it is for you to decide'. However, since it
1. See Re Certain Newspapers, Duncan v Sparling, (1894) 10
T.L.R. 353, per Cave, J.
2. [1925] 2 K.B. 158.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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was clear that the Recorder had believed that the accused 
ought to be convicted (so that his direction was, in any 
event, highly improper), it followed that the report had not 
misrepresented the substance of his summing up. The 'fair 
and accurate1 requirement was accordingly satisfied.
On the other hand, as recently emphasised in the Australian
decision of Minister for Justice v West Australian Newspapers 
1
Ltd , general factual accuracy may not be enough, if the re­
port is 'unfair either in its mode of presentation or in 
stressing unfavourable aspects of the proceedings or in
accurately reporting some parts but omitting other parts of 
2
the proceedings' .
11.6.2.2. The report must be published contemporaneously 
with the proceedings 
Whilst it seems that this is not a requirement at common law, 
it is interesting to note that it has been given statutory force 
in the United Kingdom in the Contempt of Court Act, 1981. This 
provides protection (against conviction under the strict liablity
rule) to fair and accurate reports of legal proceedings which
3 4
are published 'contemporaneously* . It seems that this
1. [1970] W.A.R. 202.
2. Ibid., at 208, per Jackson, C.J. The facts, in brief, were
that a man had been charged with murder for shooting a Perth
shopkeeper and had been committed for trial on this charge 
as well as a number of others (including one involving the 
stealing of a rifle and ammunition). These various charges 
(plus convictions relating to the unlawful use of motor 
vehicles) were reported by the newspaper in a way which the 
Supreme Court held to be highly selective (through emphasis, 
in particular, on the theft of the rifle - which many readers 
would have linked with the murder charge). The article was 
therefore held to constitute a contempt.
3. See s 4(1), Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
4. See Halsbury's Statutes of England, 3rd ed., vol 51, p 501.
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requirement is to be construed fairly widely and that the word 
has substantially the same meaning as in the law of libel: where 
it has been held to require that the report be published as soon 
as reasonably possible, bearing in mind the opportunities for 
preparation and the time of going to press or making the broad­
cast^-.
11.6.2.3. The report must be made in good faith
Though the matter is not entirely free from doubt, it seems that
- at common law - the requirement of good faith is a separate
and substantive one, so that 'an objectively fair report would
not enjoy any immunity if its publication was in fact actuated
2
by malice or improper motive' .
In the United Kingdom, statutory recognition of the importance
of bona fides has been provided by the Contempt of Court Act,
1981, which provides similar protection to fair and accurate
3
reports which are published 'in good faith' .
11.6.2.4 The report should not be prejudicial to pending 
proceedings
Whether this constitutes a requirement at common law is open to 
some dispute. There is early authority that it is not: and 
that a fair, accurate and bona fide report of proceedings in
1. See ibid., and see also P. Lewis, (ed.), Gatley on Libel
and Slander, 8th ed., London, 1981, para 633.
2. C.J. Miller, Contempt of Court, London, 1976, p 121.
3. s 4(1), supra.
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open court may freely be published - irrespective of its pre-
l
judicial effect. Thus, for example, in Lewis v Levy (in 1858), 
Lord Campbell, C.J. declared:
2
'In Curry v Walter ... it was decided, 
about sixty years ago, that an action 
cannot be maintained for publishing a 
true account of the proceedings of a 
court of justice, however injurious 
such publication may ^e to the charac­
ter of an individual' .
On the other hand, it appears to be generally accepted that the
media should not report aspects of proceedings conducted in the
absence of the jury: for example, a "trial within a trial" to
4determine the admissibility of particular evidence , or the entry
5
of pleas of guilty in relation to particular criminal charges .
1. (1858) E.6. & E. 538; 120 E.R. 610.
2. (1796) 1 Bos. & P. 525.
3. Lewis v Levy, supra, at 557.
4. Thus, for example, it was stated by Lord Denning, M.R. in 
R v Horsham JJ, ex p Farguharson, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 430 at 
450 that: 'at common law, whenever the judge sends the jury 
out, he expressly or impliedly directs that there should
be no publication of what is said in their absence: such
as when a question arises at a trial as to whether a con­
fession is admissible or not- or whether evidence of simi­
lar facts can be given or not .... In such a case the 
judge sends the jury out and conducts a "trial within a 
trial" so as to decide the question. It is well under­
stood by the press that there must be no publication of 
what takes place at the "trial within the trial'".
If there should be premature publication, however, this 
would constitute contempt of court, as confirmed in 
Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd, supra, at 450, 
per Lord Diplock.
5. Thus, for example, in R v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal 
Ltd, ex p Attorney-General, (unreported but approved by 
the Lords in the Leveller case, supra, at 456 - 457 and 
466 - 467), publication of the fact that the defendant
at a trial had pleaded guilty to four counts in an indict­
ment during the course of her trial on the remaining 16 
counts was held to constitute contempt.
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The rationale for this restriction can only be that the report­
ing of these matters is likely to affects the minds of the 
jurors and thus to prejudice fair trial; and this well-recog­
nised limitation thus clearly indicates that potential preju­
dice may provide Legitimate grounds for suppressing fair and 
accurate reports of particular proceedings.
It seems also that postponement of publication may be ordered
where a full report is likely to prejudice other proceedings
1
which are pending. This is illustrated by R v Clement , where 
several men were charged with high treason (arising from the 
same circumstances) but were to be tried successively. '[b ]e- 
fore the trial of the first man, Abbott, C.J. in open court 
prohibited the publication of the proceedings on that or any
2
other day until the whole trial was brought to a conclusion' .
The Observer newspaper published a fair and accurate account
of the first three days' proceedings (in breach of this
3
order) and was held guilty of contempt ; and this was upheld
4
by the Court of King's Bench .
1. (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 218, approved by the House of Lords in 
Scott v Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 at 438 and 453.
2. This description of the proceedings is taken from the judg­
ment of Lord Denning, M.R. in R v Horsham JJ, supra, at 449.
3. The editor was fined £500.
4. Miller, op cit, p 118, submits, however, that the reason for 
this was not fear of prejudice to the accused in the sub­
sequent proceedings, 'but the creation of a situation in 
which witnesses in the later trials would be able to trim 
their evidence in the light of what they had read'; and he 
cites as authority the judgment of Bayley, J. (supra) at 
230. In Lord Denning, M.R.'s view (in the Horsham case, 
supra), the salient fact was that 'all the trials could be 
regarded as one proceeding and it was only an order post­
poning publication - and not prohibiting it altogether'.
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Similarly, in R v Poulson , where Poulson (during his examination- 
in-chief) 'had referred to his association with another man against 
whom separate proceedings in conjunction with Poulson himself 
were still outstanding, Waller, J. ... is reported as having 
said :
"I do not see myself how the press can 
properly report this evidence without 
running the risk of being in contempt 
of this other trial. When we are 
dealing with someone who is subject 
to another trial, things have been 
said here which might be highly pre­
judicial to that trial, and there­
fore must not be published"'.
2
There is some doubt, however, as to whether the courts have
power, at common law, to order such postponement, or whether
their authority is limited to issuing requests or directions
3
to the media which are of questionable legal force . Yet
4
some regulation does appear necessary - as illustrated by 
the case of one Albert Jones^ who, in 1960, was convicted on 
a charge of raping a girl guide and then charged within three
1. The Times, 4 January, 1974.
2. See Miller, op cit, p 118.
3. Thus, the Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court,
(’the Phillimore Report'), Cmnd 5794, 1974, recommended 
(in the context of R v Socialist Worker Printers and 
Publishers Ltd, ex p Attorney-General, [1975] Q.B. 637, dis­
cussed further below) that legislation be introduced to 
eliminate this uncertainty.
4. This, of course, is on the assumption that media publicity 
does, in fact, influence jurors - a point which is by no 
means certain. It is worth noting in this regard the obser­
vations of Lord Denning, M.R. in R v Horsham JJ, supra, at 
452, that 'at a trial judges are not influenced by what 
they may have read in the newspapers* Nor are the ordinary 
folk who sit on juries. They are good, sensible people.
They go by the evidence that is adduced before them and
not by what they may have read in the newspapers'.
5. His appeal against conviction on the subsequent charge 
of murder is reported sub, nom. Jones v Director of 
Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 635 (H.L. (E.)).
months with the murder of another girl. The original trial
had been widely publicised: so that, in fact, (as pointed out
by Professor Street) 'the risk of the jury being prejudiced
against Jones because of his preceding trial was much greater
than was the risk in many of the convictions for contempt....
Yet the conduct of ... the Press, and the broadcasting agencies
1
did not infringe the law of contempt' .
The problem, at common law, is particularly acute in relation
to committal proceedings:, where reports, though entirely accurate,
may produce an especially lopsided impression as a result of the
general practice whereby an accused reserves his defence until 
2
the trial itself . Concern at the danger of prejudice thus
engendered prompted Lord Ellenborough, C.J. in 1811 in the case 
3
of Fisher to declare :
'The publication of proceedings in 
courts of justice, where both sides 
are heard, and matters are finally 
determined, is salutary, and there­
fore it is permitted. The publica­
tion of these preliminary examina­
tions has a tendency to pervert the 
public mind, and to disturb the course 
of justice; and it is illegal'.
4
5
This view did not, however, prevail,. In 1865, Fitzgerald, J. 
in R v Gray^ - whilst acknowledging the risk of prejudice en­
tailed in full reporting of committal proceedings - thought
1. Harry Street, Freedom, the Individual and the Law, 3rd 
ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1972, p 166.
2. See Miller, op cit, p 113.
3. (1811) 2 Camp. 563; 170 E.R. 1253
4. Ibid., at 570.
5. See Miller, supra.
6. (1865) 10 Cox C.C. 184
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it was outweighed by larger considerations, and stated:
'It has been said, and said truly, 
that possibly in particular cases 
there may be inconvenience to indi­
viduals from the early publication 
of evidence or of statements with 
respect to matters that are subse­
quently to be tried more solemnly, 
but it has been well observed, too, 
that this inconvenience to indivi­
duals is infinitesimal in compari­
son to the great public advantage 
given by the publicity'.
1
Concern at the inadequacies of the common law in this regard -
and at the extent of the 'inconvenience to individuals' it was
prepared to countenance - came to a head in 1957, with the
trial for murder of Dr Adams.. At the committal proceedings,
the prosecution led evidence 'of earlier deaths which they
2
claimed were attributable to Dr Adams' They did not seek 
to adduce this highly damaging evidence at the trial but - 
in the meantime - the allegations had been widely publicised 
by the media in their reports of the committal proceedings.
1. Ibid. The same approach is also reflected in later cases. 
Thus* in R v Sanderson, 31 T.L.R. 447, Low, J. 'described 
as "an extremely undesirable practice" the publication by 
the press of references to an accused's previous convic­
tions given at the magistrates' courts in cases which 
were committed for trial [but] did not suggest that it 
was unlawful so to report',. Furthermore, in R v Armstrong, 
[1951] 2 All E.R. 219, Lynskey, J. - whilst pointing out 
that 'it is very undesirable that such information [i.e., 
relating to previous convictions] should be given' by the 
press, acknowledged that *th[e] court has no power to 
compel the press' in this regard. Both authorities were 
approved in the judgment of Ackner, L.J. in R v Horsham 
J.J., ex p. Farquharson, supra, at 459.
2. Miller, op cit, p 113.
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The dangers of "trial by newspaper" highlighted by these
events prompted the establishment of the Tucker Committee:
which, in 1958, recommended that 'severe restrictions be
1
placed upon the publication of committal proceedings' .
These proposals (after considerable delay) were finally
implemented in the United Kingdom in the Criminal Justice 
2
Act, 1967 ; and are now to be found in the Magistrates'
3
Courts Act of 1980 .
Similar legislative reforms have not, however, been imple­
mented in Nigeria as yet: and here the common law (with all 
its uncertainty and potential prejudice to fair trial) con­
tinues to apply.. It must, however, be noted that the problem 
is less acute in Nigeria than was the case in England, by
virtue of the practical consideration that jury trial is
4
extremely rare in the former (unlike the latter ); and the
risk of prejudice to fair trial through adverse media publi-
5
city is, of course, commensurately reduced ,. It is neverthe­
less worth giving brief consideration to the United Kingdom 
reforms, for the insight they provide into the way in which 
Nigeria might - in future - seek to eliminate any residual
1. See ibid., and see also the Report of the Departmental 
Committee on Proceedings before Examining Justices, ('the 
Tucker Report'), Cmnd. 479, 1958.
2. See s 3, Criminal Justice Act, 1967.
3. See s 8, Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980.
4. See the section on the sub judice rule at p 758 above,
where the difference in the incidence of jury trial
in Nigeria and England is further explained.
5. Where trial is by jury, there is inevitably a larger
risk of prejudice through adverse publicity than where
trial is conducted by trained and experienced judicial 
officers alone.
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difficulties. This particular amendment is only one of a 
number of different reforms effected in the United Kingdom, 
however; and examination of the matter is accordingly post­
poned until other difficulties of the common law - which 
have likewise been thought ripe for amendment in England it­
self - have been described.
11.6.2.5 Publication must not undermine the administration 
of justice in general
A further alleged requirement of the common law is that reports 
of proceedings in open court must not undermine the administra­
tion of justice in general. The extent to which such publication 
is prohibited is, however, an extremely difficult issue; and 
the problem is perhaps best approached in the light of two
recent English decisions - R v Socialist Worker, Printers and
1
Publishers Ltd and anor, ex parte Attorney-General and Attorney-
2
General v Leveller Magazine Ltd . Neither is entirely apposite
(since, in both, publication went beyond what was strictly a
3
'fair and accurate report1 of the proceedings ), but the guid­
ance they provide is nevertheless of considerable significance.
In R v Socialist Worker , proceedings for contempt arose out of 
the giving of a direction by a trial judge (in a prosecution for
1. [1975] 1 Q.B. 637 (D.C.)
2. [ 1979] A.C. 440 (H.L.(E.))
3. As further explained, the media reports in both instances 
went beyond merely quoting the pseudonyms given to witnesses 
in the course of trial and identified them by name. However, 
in the Leveller case, the Lords expressly confirmed that full 
reporting of all the evidence given by one such witness would 
not have constituted a contempt, even though this evidence was 
sufficient to reveal his identity. See the judgments of Lord 
Diplock, at 453, Viscount Dilhorne, at 455 (by implication) 
and Lord Russell, at 468, who stated: There can be no doubt
that the publication in toto of [his] deposition was permissible'.
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blackmail) that the two victims of the alleged blackmail (who
both give evidence for the state) should be referred to as Mr Y
and Mr Z, Before the end of the trial* an article appeared in
2
the Socialist Worker, headed "'Y, oh Lord, oh why ...'" , which 
purported to give the names, addresses and certain particulars 
of the victims. The Attorney-General accordingly applied for 
the committal - for contempt of court - of the author and pub­
lishers of the article.
Lord Widgery, C.J., delivering the judgment of the court, began 
by briefly describing the blackmail trial in which the direction 
for anonymity had been given,. The proceedings had been brought 
against one Janie Jones, who was charged (inter alia), with or­
ganising prostitution and with blackmailing 'Mr Y' and 'Mr Z'
on the basis that 'she would disclose their activities with
3
her girls unless suitable remuneration was provided' . When 
the trial began, there was some discussion between the judge 
and counsel as to whether the witnesses should have their names 
disclosed or should be allowed to write these down, so that 
they 'would not be communicated to the press and the public
1. There was no question, however, of the article being pre­
judicial to the outcome of the proceedings in hand, so as 
to constitute contempt under the sub judice rule. This 
was acknowledged not only by the Attorney-General in 
instituting the proceedings, but was also affirmed by 
Lord Widgery, C.J. (at 465), who considered it 'highly 
unlikely' that the jury in the Janie Jones case might 
have been affected by it.
2. R v Socialist Worker, supra, at 638.
3. Ibid., at 644.
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present in court . Counsel was apparently prepared to con­
cede that the latter procedure might legitimately be adopted; 
and Lord Widgery, C.J. clearly considered that he was right to 
have done so. His Lordship pointed out that :
'all of us concerned in the law know 
that for more years than any of us 
can remember it has been a common­
place in blackmail charges for the 
complainant to be allowed to give 
his evidence without disclosing his 
name. That is not out of any feel­
ings of tenderness towards the vic­
tim of the blackmail, a man or woman 
very often who deserves no such con­
sideration at all.. The reason why the 
courts in the past have so often used 
this device in this type of blackmail 
case where the complainant has some­
thing to hide, is because there is a 
keen public interest in getting black­
mailers convicted, and experience 
shows that grave difficulty may be 
suffered in getting complainants to 
come forward unless they are given 
this kind of protection'.
2
The trial judge then ruled that 'it would not be right for
the full names [of the blackmail victims] to be given and ...
3
that they ... should be referred to by letters' . As regards
the significance and ambit of this direction, Lord Widgery, C.J.
was clearly of the view that it prohibited mention of the
proper names of the witnesses within the court itself - but
was not'expressed to go beyond the four walls of the Central 
4
Criminal Court' .
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., at 645. This is somewhat inconsistent with his ul­
timate ruling that the defendants were guilty of contempt on 
the ground, inter alia, that they had flouted the trial 
judge's authority. Inconsistencies of this kind exacerbate 
the difficulty of assessing the precise content of the c 
common law rules.
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The motive underlying the publication of the article - though
1
perhaps not strictly relevant to the legal issues involved - 
is interesting. The writer's aim was to draw attention to the
absurdities of 'a system which allows the names of such witnesses
2 3
as these to be concealed' .. He further deposed that he was
not aware of any order prohibiting publication having been made
by the trial judge; and stated that, on the contrary, he had
understood the judge to have made a request in this regard,
which - on the basis of thirteen years of journalistic experi-
4
ence - he believed to have no legally binding effect •
Lord Widgery, C.J. - whilst recognising that a mere request or
invitation not to publish might well have no legal effect -
was quick to rejoin that 'what was done here by the judge
unquestionably was to give a direction and not merely an 
5
invitation' .. Without making any further attempt to analyse
the binding force of a 'direction', his Lordship then proceeded
to extract from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-
6General v Butterworth (involving the alleged victimisation of
7
a witness after the close of proceedings ) two principles which
1. Except, of course, to the extent to which it may be taken
into account in assessing mens rea - the importance of
which in determining liability is further examined below.
2. R v Socialist Worker, supra, at 645.
3. Ibid.
4. See ibid., at 646.
5. Ibid. Already, this seems inconsistent with his earlier
dictum, described above.
6. [1963] 1 Q.B. 696 (C.A.)
7. Here, one G had given evidence before the Restrictive Prac­
tices Court, and had expressed views contrary to those of
the union of which he was then branch treasurer. He was
thereupon called to answer for his conduct; and, failing
satisfactory reply, was stripped of his official positions 
within the union. This was held to constitute contempt 
because of its deterrent effect on future witnesses.
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he considered helpful to the present case. The first is that
conduct which amounts to 'a clear and deliberate affront to
the authority of the court' constitutes a contempt. The second
is that any act which 'pollutes the stream [of justice] today
1
so that tomorrow's litigant will find it poisoned' likewise
constitutes a contempt. In his Lordship's view, the present
article gave rise to a prima facie case of contempt on both
these grounds. It did so on the first because the publication
of the names of the two witnesses 'in defiance of the judge's
directions' was a 'blatant affront to the authority of the 
2
court' . It did so on the second ground as well because it
was 'quite evident that if witnesses in blackmail actions
[were] not adequately protected, this could affect the readi-
3
ness of others to come forward in other cases' ; and this 
would clearly poison the stream of justice for future liti­
gants. The respondents were thus clearly guilty of contempt:
4
and were fined £350 each,.
The second important decision in this context is Attorney- 
General v Leveller Magazine Ltd^, which arose out of the prose­
cution of three defendants for offences under the Official 
Secrets Acts* During the committal proceedings, the prosecu­
1. Attorney-General v Butterworth, supra, at 725, per Lord 
Donovan. Lord Widgery, C.J. was satisfied that these 
were the two grounds on which the case had been decided: 
and placed particular emphasis on the second.
2. R_ v Socialist Worker, supra, at 649.
3. Ibid, at 650.
4. The other members of the Court of Appeal concurred in 
this judgment. The decision is open to criticism in a 
number of respects - but principally as regards the 
first ground of contempt relied upon. Thus, the Court 
of Appeal gave insufficient consideration to the extent 
to which a judge may validly issue an order regarding 
publication which is indeed binding outside his court. 
This is further discussed below.
5. [1979] A.C. 440 (H.L.(E.))
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tion applied for (and obtained) permission for a particular 
witness - on grounds of national security - to be referred to 
simply as 'Colonel B' and for his full name to be written down 
and shown only to the court, the defendants and their counsel. 
During cross-examination, however, Colonel B gave the official 
name and number of his army unit and stated that his posting 
to it was recorded in a particular issue of 'Wire1 magazine, 
a service journal available to the general public,. He there­
by effectively disclosed his identity to anyone prepared to 
take the simple step of obtaining a copy of the relevant issue. 
No objection to the giving of this evidence was raised by 
either the prosecution or the court. The magazine Peace News 
published these two pieces of information about Cdlonel B 
thus 'elicited in open court' in November 1977 and subsequently 
disclosed his name as well* Two other magazines, The Leveller 
and Tie Journalist also published his name: and the Attorney- 
General sought the committal for contempt of those responsible 
for publication. The Divisional Court found the respondents 
guilty of contempt? and they appealed to the House of Lords, 
contending, inter alia, that the magistrates had no power to 
issue a ruling binding outside the four walls of their court - 
and pointing out that their motive in publishing had been simply 
to demonstrate the absurdity of restraining publication in such 
circumstances.
1
The House of Lords, in a long and complex judgment , in which
1. Full analysis of this decision lies, unfortunately, outside 
the scope of this study. Apart from a number of internal 
inconsistencies in the judgments, the most notable feature 
of the decision is the lack of certainty it betrays as to 
whether a court does indeed have the power to make a binding 
ruling regarding publication.
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five separate concurring opinions were delivered, held that
the appeal should be allowed. They did so on two main grounds:
first, that Colonel B had, in any event, effectively 'blown the
1
gaff' regarding his identity by his own evidence and, secondly,
that the certainty required for a criminal conviction was lack-
. 2 
ing .
From these two decisions (notwithstanding their occasional
3
inconsistencies and manifest uncertainties ), certain 
important principles of common law do clearly emerge, as 
explained below.
First, the courts do have power to curtail publication regard­
ing proceedings in open court where this is necessary for the 
proper administration of justice: either in relation to the 
particular proceedings or in the long term. This is confirmed
1. At to rney-Gene ra1 v Leveller Magazine Ltd, supra, at 453
(per Lord Diplock), at 456 (per Viscount Dilhorne) and at 
468 (per Lord Russell of Killowen).
2. Ibid, at 461 (per Lord Edmund-Davies) and at 474 (per 
Lord Scarman). Thus, Lord Scarman (for example) drew 
attention to the uncertainty regarding the nature of 
'ruling' issued by the magistrates and stated: 'If, 
upon its proper interpretation, the "ruling" was no more 
than an indication or request, publication would be no 
contempt' (at 473) . In the circumstances, however, he 
remained 'unsure as to the nature and object of the 
ruling' (ibid.). Accordingly, the Crown and the examin­
ing justices had failed to 'make clear what they were 
seeking to do or upon what grounds the court was being 
asked ... to act. That certainty which the criminal 
law requires before a man can be convicted of a criminal 
offence [was accordingly ] lacking'.
3. See, for example, Lord Seaman's doubts (in n 2 above) 
as to the effect of the ruling. His assertion that, in 
the absence of it having binding force, there would be 
no contempt is inconsistent with his earlier dictum (at 
471 - 472) that it is a 'misconception' to regard this 
kind of contempt 'as being an offence because it is the 
breach of a binding order'.
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in the judgment of Lord Widgery, C.J. in R v Socialist Worker
(being implicit in his finding that the publication constituted
a contempt because of its tendency to deter other blackmail
2
victims from coming forward to give evidence ) and in each of
3
the judgments of the House of Lords in the Leveller case .
4 5
Thus, despite differences in formulation -.and emphasis , the 
principle seems to be established beyond all doubt by these 
decisions.
Secondly, the fact that a court has issued a ruling against 
publication does not necessarily mean that disobedience of 
the ruling will constitute contempt* Something more than 
mere disobedience must be shownt and hence it must be estab-
1. [1975] 1 Q.B. 637 (D.C.).
2. Ibid, at 652.
3. See Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd, supra,
at 452 (per Lord Diplock), at 458 (per Viscount Dilhorne),
at 465 (per Lord Edmund-Davies), at 467 (per Lord Russell)
and at 471 (per Lord Scarman).
4. Thus, for example, Viscount Dilhorne (at 458, ibid.) be­
lieves that the power originates in the court's inherent 
jurisdiction to adopt its own rules of procedure; and 
merely suggests (through the examples he cites) that the 
power arises where this is necessary for the proper admin­
istration of justice.
5. Contrast, for example, Lord Russell's implicit confirma­
tion of the principle (at 467 and 468) with the detailed 
treatment of Lord Diplock (at 452) and with the requirement 
emphasised by Lord Scarman (at 473) that there must be 
material adduced to the court to prove the restriction 
necessary for the proper administration of justice: even 
though such 'material' need not amount to evidence in
the strict sense of the term.
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lished that publication is inimical to the proper administration 
1
of justice . Thus, the first principle described above - that 
restriction must be necessary for the proper administration of 
justice - is not merely one of a number of possible grounds for 
restricting publication, but provides (on the contrary) the 
sole legitimate justification for so doing.
2
Thirdly, although the issue of such a ruling is strictly 
irrelevant to the question whether publication can validly be 
curtailed, it may nevertheless be desireable in the interests
1, This is most clearly stated by Lord Edmund-Davies, at 464. 
However, it is also implicit in the fact that all of their 
Lordships either left open, or expressed doubts as to, the 
binding force of such rulings per se, but nevertheless 
clearly considered this ultimately irrelevant. See, thus, 
the judgment of Lord Widgery, C.J. in the Socialist Worker, 
supra, at 650, where his Lordship stated that the precise 
ambit of the trial court's ruling was irrelevant to the 
'real vice' of the publication - its deterrent effect on 
other potential witnesses in blackmail prosecutions. See 
also - in the Leveller case, supra - the judgment of Lord 
Diplock (at 451) where his Lordship left open the question 
of the court's power to issue a binding directive against 
publication* and that of Viscount Dilhorne (at 456) where 
he declares that the English courts have no such power.
See also the statement by Lord Russell (at 468) that
the crucial question is whether there has in fact been an 
improper interference with the administration of justice - 
not whether there has been disobedience of an order bind­
ing on the alleged contemnor. See also the judgment of 
Lord Seaman (at 471 - 472) where he too confirms that the 
essence of the offence is interference with the course of 
administration of justice.
It must, however, also be acknowledged that this is one of 
the most controversial issues canvassed in the various 
judgments; and that these reveal considerable uncertainty 
and inconsistency in this regard. It is not proposed to 
analyse these at greater length, however, as (it is sub­
mitted) the overall principle is nevertheless sufficiently 
clear.
2. That is, a ruling that-a witness should be identified by 
pseudonym alone, with the express (or implicit) concomi­
tant that his identity should not be disclosed in reports 
by the media of the proceedings.
As regards the effect of such rulings, see n 1 above.
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of certainty .
Fourthly, mens rea is not a relevant consideration, in the sense
that it need not be shown that those responsible for publication
intended thereby to undermine the proper administration of jus- 
2
tice m  any way . However, knowledge on the part of the publi­
sher of the "special treatment" accorded certain evidence (such
3
as permitting the use of a pseudonym) is apparently required .
1* See Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd, supra, at 
453 (per Lord Diplock), 465 (per Lord Edmund-Davies) and 
469 (per Lord Russell.
2. It was apparently accepted by the courts in both cases 
that the underlying motivation for publication was to 
draw attention to the absurdity of insisting on anony­
mity in such circumstances. As regards R v Socialist 
Worker, see p 1032 above? and, in the context of the 
Leveller decision, see the judgment at 448, where Lord 
Diplock points out that the motive allegedly under­
lying the publication was simply to 'ridicule the 
notion that national safety needed to be protected
by suppression of the colonel's name'.
This made no difference, however, to the publishers' 
liability for contempt. As stated by Lord Russell 
(at 468): 'Their motive [was] irrelevant to guilt 
if they intended to do that which amounted in law to 
interference with the due administration of justice'.
3. Thus, Lord Diplock(at 452), stressed the need for aware­
ness of such a ruling, stating that 'the doing of ... an 
act with knowledge of the ruling and of its purpose con­
stitutes contempt of court'. See also the judgment of 
Viscount Dilhorne (at 458), to the effect that 'a person 
who seeks (emphasis supplied) to frustrate what the court 
has done may well be guilty of contempt,' . See also the 
declaration by Lord Seaman (at 473) that a court order 
or ruling may be 'the foundation of contempt proceedings 
against any person who, with knowledge of the order, 
frustrates its purpose by publishing the evidence kept 
private'. (Emphasis again supplied). Lord Edmund-Davies 
goes further (at 466) to suggest that 'constructive know­
ledge' of such an order may be all that is necessary -
at least where the publisher is a large commercial con­
cern and should therefore have the means of establishing 
whether such an order has in fact been made.. He thus 
asserts that, where one is concerned 'not with improper 
publication by a private individual ... but with people 
controlling or connected with powerful organs of publicity 
who may be motivated mainly by the desire to boost sales 
... [ i] t is incumbent upon [the latter ] to ascertain what 
has happened in court. They have the means of doing this, 
and ... cannot be heard to complain that they were ignorant 
of what had taken place'.
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11.7. Reporting Proceedings Conducted in Private
It remains to examine the rules governing the reporting of 
proceedings conducted in private. The circumstances in which 
departure from the general principle of open justice is legi­
timate have previously been described; and will not be reiterated 
here. It may be recalled, however, that this issue is one of 
great complexity at common law; and it is accordingly somewhat 
disconcerting to note that the further question of the extent 
to which private proceedings may be reported is one of even 
greater difficulty.
In the southern states of Nigeria, the matter is governed - to
1
some extent - by section 133(5) of the Criminal Code . This 
provides, in succinct and emphatic terms, that ' [a]ny person 
who ... publishes a report of the evidence taken in any judi-
2
cial proceeding which has been directed to be held in private1 
shall be guilty of an offence and punishable by three months' 
imprisonment. The common law - with all its complexity - 
nevertheless continues to apply in the South by virtue of
3
section 6 of the Criminal Code Act which (it will be recalled ) 
preserves the power of courts of record to rely instead on the 
unwritten law of contempt.
4
The northern Penal Code ccontains no provision equivalent to s 
133(5); and in the northern states, therefore, the reporting of 
proceedings in camera is governed in_ toto by common law rules.
1. Cap 42 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
2. s 133(5), ibid.
3. See p 703, et seq.
4. Cap 89 (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963).
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Common law principles are accordingly of great significance in
this context: but the attempt to formulate their content is
1
fraught with difficulty. As Miller has pointed out, the gamut 
of opinion on the extent to which the common law prohibits 
the reporting of proceedings in private is wide indeed. 'At 
one extreme the view ha[ s] been expressed that since proceed­
ings in chambers [are] held in private:" n[o]report [even] as
2
to the facts or parties in particular cases may be published"' .
In addition, it has further been warned that newspaper articles
merely speculating as to the nature of evidence given in camera
3
may constitute contempt . On the other hand, however, m  
4
Scott v Scott , the House of Lords emphatically declared that 
'even if the High Court had had jurisdiction to hear [the] nul­
lity suit in camera ... the subsequent publicising of the pro-
5
ceedings would not have been a contempt' . However, the judg­
ments of their Lordships in the case also betray an uncertainty 
(as to the limits within which publicity may legitimately be 
restricted) equal if not greater to that displayed by them in
1. Op cit.
2. Ibid, p 212, citing Lord Hewart, C.J. in a Direction of 
27 May 1932. (See [1932] W.N. Misc. 185).
3. See Lord Widgery's statement (in The Times, 17 June 1971)
that the purpose of proceedings in camera is 'to prevent 
publicity being given to what happens in court' and that
it may be 'just as damaging for information of that kind
to leak out as it is to have the representatives of the
press present and taking their notes at the time'; and 
'even more serious if people can let themselves speculate 
as to what may or may not be going on in the courts during 
periods when they are in camera'. (Emphasis supplied). 
Accordingly, he 'wish[ed] to bring to the notice of the 
press that [such speculation] is irregular and a potential 
contempt of court'.
4. [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L. (E.))
5. Miller, supra, p 213
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relation to the antecedent question of when proceedings may
1
validly be held in private .
Thus, Earl Loreburn described the limits of the power 'to pre­
vent or punish disclosure of what has taken place in camera
2
after the hearing is over [as] almost an uncharted sea' . He
pointed out that 'an order for a hearing in camera of a trial
involving a secret process might be utterly illusory if the
3
evidence could be published afterwards with impunity' ; and was
accordingly convinced that '[tjhere must be some power to pre- 
4
vent that' .. Confining himself for the moment to 'cases of 
5
secret process' , it appeared that 'the jurisdiction to impose 
silence ... must be commensurate with the purpose for which 
the jurisdiction e x i s t s ' I n  the context of nullity or 
divorce cases, it '[might] well be that justice would be frus­
trated as much by the terror of publicity after trial as by
7
publicity at the hearing' . But his Lordship balked at the
notion that 'all subsequent publication [could therefore] be 
0
forbidden' - for this would result in an 'unwarrantable
1. See p 1011 et seq.
2. Scott v Scott, supra, at 447.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, at 448.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
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1
interference with the rights of the subject' . He was accord­
ingly satisfied that the courts do not possess the power to en­
join perpetual silence regarding proceedings in private; and
that ' [t]he jurisdiction must ... be limited to wilful and
2
malicious publications going beyond the necessary' .
Lord Atkinson concurred that a hearing in camera does not, 
ipso facto, impose an obligation to maintain perpetual secrecy 
regarding the proceedings. He acknowledged that reporting might 
legitimately be restricted in patent and analogous cases, where 
publication of the proceedings would defeat 'the whole object of
3
[the] suit' . Further than this, however, he was not prepared
to go - nor could he find any authority to support the proposi- 
4
tion . In his view, an order (that proceedings be held in pri­
vate) was 'spent when the case terminated, and had no further
5
operation beyond that date' ; for - if this were not the rule -
a 'rather injurious result might follow'^, and it would become
impossible to review 'the conduct and action of the judge at
the trial, his rulings, directions, or decisions on questions 
7
of fact or law' .
Lord Shaw of Dumferline expressed particular concern at the 
derogation from the rights of the citizen implicit in the notion
8
that perpetual silence might be imposed on proceedings in private .
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, at 450
4. Ibid, especially at 452
5. Ibid, at 453
6. Ibid, at 463
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid, especially at 476
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He emphasised that once '[j]ustice [had] been done [in public or 
private] and its task [was] ended ..., [t]o extend the powers of 
a judge so as to restrain or forbid a narrative of the proceed­
ings either by speech or by writing ... [would] be an unwarran-
1
table stretch of judicial authority' . Accordingly, he was pre­
pared to acknowledge only three exceptions to the general rule 
regarding the right to publish - and then to allow these excep­
tions to operate only for so long as was commensurate with the
2
object of the proceedings , Thus, reporting might legitimately
be restricted in relation to both wardship and 'lunacy' pro-
3
ceedings, which 'are truly private affairs' ; and as regards
inventions and other secret processes where publicity would
'destroy that very protection which the subject seeks at the 
4
Court's hands' . Even in these instances, however, his Lord­
ship was not prepared to accept that the restriction on report­
ing should last for ever. On the contrary, 'when respect has
been paid to the object of the suit, the rule of publicity may 
5
be resumed' ; and - in the context of trade secrets, for example - 
no proceedings for contempt of court should lie against 'a person 
for divulging what had happened in a litigation after the secrecy 
or confidentiality had been abandoned and the secrets had become 
public property'^.
1. Ibid, at 484.
2. Ibid, at 482 - 483.
3. Ibid, at 483.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. In the context of wardship and lunacy proceedings,
there was no principle which would 'entitle a Court to com­
pel a ward to remain silent for life in regard to judicial 
proceedings which occurred during his tutelage, nor a person 
who was temporarily insane - after he had fully recovered 
his sanity and his liberty - to remain perpetually silent 
with regard to judicial proceedings which occurred during 
the period of his incapacity*.
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It seems then (from the various dicta of the House of Lords in 
Scott v Scott) that the fact that proceedings are held in pri­
vate does not necessarily mean that they cannot be reported after 
their termination. There are three clearly recognised exceptions
to the general rule of publicity in terms of which reporting of 
1 2
wardship, lunacy and patent proceedings may be restricted for 
as long as this is necessary to prevent defeat of the object of 
the suit. As a general principle, however, the fact that pro­
ceedings have been conducted in private does not mean that they 
cannot thereafter be reported.
A measure of further guidance as to the common law rule in this
regard is also to be gleaned from the recent House of Lords'
3
decision in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd . Here,
4
Lord Edmund-Davies - having reviewed the relevant authorities
concluded that :
'what appears certain is that at common 
law the fact that a court sat wholly 
or partly in camera (and even where 
in such circumstances the court gave a 
direction prohibiting publication of 
information relating to what had been 
said or done behind closed doors) did 
not of itself and in every case nece­
ssarily mean that publication there­
after constituted contempt of court'.
1. This outmoded common law term is used - with due apology - 
because it is not only succinct but is also the term used 
by the Lords in this case.
2. The word 'patent' is here used as a shorthand expression 
for all proceedings of an analogous nature involving con­
fidential information.
3. [1979] A.C. 440 (H.L.(E.)).
4. Ibid, at 464 - 465. Those cited are Scott v Scott, supra, 
cf R v Davies, ex parte Delbert-Evans, [1945] K.B. 435 at 
446, and s 12 Administration of Justice Act, 1960. (This 
statute is further examined in due course).
5. Ibid, at 465.
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His Lordship proceeded to explain that :
' [f]or that to arise something more 
than disobedience of the court's direc­
tion needs to be established. That 
something more is that the publication 
must be of such a nature as to threaten 
the administration of justice either in 
the particular case in relation to which 
the prohibition was pronounced or in re­
lation to cases which may be brought in 
the future'.
1
It thus needs little emphasis that the common law in this regard 
is far from being either certain or clear* In the United King­
dom, an attempt has accordingly been made to reduce its complexi-
2
ties through legislation. Thus, section 12 of the Administration 
of Justice Act of 1960 now specifies various circumstances in 
which the reporting of proceedings held in camera will constitute 
contempt. This enactment, of course, forms no part of Nigerian 
law, but nevertheless merits some examination to show the nature 
of the changes which Nigeria might see fit to introduce. However, 
this innovation in English law is only one of three major reforms 
effected in the United Kingdom in the context of reporting court 
proceedings: and all three now warrant some consideration.
11*8. Reform of the Common Law in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, an attempt has been made to reform the 
common law in three important respects.. Thus, legislation has 
been introduced to regulate the reporting of committal proceed­
ings; to specify the basis on which reports of trial proceedings 
in open court may be postponed or restricted; and to clarify
1. Ibid.
2. There is considerable controversy as to whether the legis­
lation has indeed replaced the common law: or whether it is 
still necessary to refer to the common law (with all its 
uncertainties), as further explained in due course.
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the extent to which proceedings in private may be made public.
11.8.1. Reform of reporting of committal proceedings
It will be recalled that the common law is uncertain regarding
the question whether reports of committal proceedings may be
restricted in order to safeguard the ultimate fair trial of an
accused.. Concern at an apparent lacuna in the law prompted
the establishment of the Tucker Committee, whose recommendations
for 'severe restrictions' on the reporting of committal proceed- 
1
ings were finally implemented in the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, 
now replaced (as regards these provisions) by the Magistrates' 
Courts Act of 1980.
Section 6 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980 (the counterpart
of section 3 of the 1967 statute) renders it an offence (punish-
2
able by fine not exceeding £500 ) to 'publish ».. a written 
report, or to broadcast *.. a report, of any committal proceed­
ings ... containing any matter other than that permitted by 
3
subsection (4)' . Subsection (4) restricts the information
which may be published or broadcast to specified minimum details -
such as the names, addresses and occupations of the parties and
4
witnesses and the ages of the accused and witnesses ; the offence 
or offences ,.. with which the accused is or are charged'^; 'any
decision of the court to commit the accused or any of the accused
6for trial' ; and 'any arrangements as to bail on committal or
1. Report of the Departmental Committee on Proceedings before 
Examining Justices, ('the Tucker Report'), Cmnd 479, 1958, 
especially at paras 32 and 33.
2. s 8(5), Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980.
3. s 8(1), ibid.
4. s 8(4)(b), ibid.
5. s 8(4)(c), ibid.
6. s 8(4) (e) , ibid.
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adjournment' .
Ironically, this provision may give rise to further anomalies: 
as illustrated by proceedings (under the original section 3
2
of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 which is in identical terms 
with the new subsection (4)), involving the Eastbourne Herald 
newspaper, which had published a report of committal proceed­
ings in which it specified that the defendant (who was charged 
with unlawful sexual intercourse) had appeared in court 'bespec­
tacled and dressed in a dark suit' and that he had been 'married
3
at St Michael's Church on New Year's day' . The editor and
proprietors of the paper were found guilty of contravening the
4
statute and were fined a total of £200 .
It thus appears that the legislation prohibits the report of
any details other than those enumerated in subsection (4): and
does so 'quite irrespective of whether or not the details are
5
potentially prejudicial in nature' * The absurdity of this is 
emphasised by Miller^, who submits that it would have been 
preferable :
'to have enacted a simple provision 
whereby it [would ] no longer ... be 
a defence to the publisher of pre­
judicial matter to show that the 
publication was a fair and accurate 
report of committal proceedings'.
7
1. s 8(4)(h), ibid.
2. Some consequential amendment has been effected, but - in 
substance - the legislation remains the same.
3. See Miller, op cit, p 114.
4. Plus costs of £37*50. See Miller, ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid, emphasis supplied.
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This, clearly, would have the benefit of greater flexibility 
and - even more importantly - would strike at the heart of 
the matter by making it clear that the statutory derogation 
from the common law principle applies only to material which 
is prejudicial* Unfortunately, however, advantage was not 
taken of the opportunity provided by the replacement of the 
original section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act (by section 8 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980) to effect this reform.
The Criminal Justice Act 1967 provided one exception to the 
general restriction on the reporting of committal proceedings. 
Thus, under section 3(2), a magistrate's court was empowered 
to lift the reporting restrictions on the application of the 
defendant (or one of the defendants)* This provision was 
incorporated in recognition that 'in exceptional situations, 
a defendant .... might have an interest in the dissemination of 
news of his predicament [and] ... might have grounds to believe 
that amongst those who read the published accounts there would 
be some who could provide evidence favourable to him'*. The 
provision gave no discretion to the court, however, in deciding 
whether it should accede to the request (it being clear that 
the court was bound to do so as soon as the application was 
made): nor did it take into account the position of any co­
defendants of the applicant, who might wish the restrictions 
to continue in force. These deficiencies in the legislation 
were accordingly countered by the introduction (in the 
Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 1981) of a new discretionary
1. See R v Horsham J.J., ex parte Farquharson, [1982] 2
W.L.R. 430 (C.A.), at 454, per Shaw, L.J.
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power to weigh 'the interests of justice' in deciding whether
to grant such an application. This discretion arises only,
however, where the applicant is one of a number of accused -
and one or more of the latter object to the lifting of re-
1
strictions.. The new provision thus states :
'Where in the case of two or more 
accused one of them objects to the 
making o f . ^ a n order under subsection 
(2) above , the court shall make the 
order if, and only if, it is satis­
fied, after hearing the represen­
tations of the accused, that it is 
in the interests of justice to do 
so' .
3
The statute thus confers a wide-ranging discretion on the 
magistrates' courts, for it makes no attempt to specify the 
criteria which should be taken into account in deciding whether 
or not to order the lifting of restrictions.. It has been 
suggested that the justices may take into account only the
4
'interests of justice' as they affect the particular defendants ; 
but - prima facie - there is nothing to indicate conclusively 
that this is so: and it may well be legitimate for the courts 
to take into account far wider implications: such as the potential
1. This provision has been inserted as section 8(2A) of the
Magistrates' Courts Act., 1980 by virtue of sections 1(1) 
and (2), Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 1981 .
2. That is, an order for the lifting of reporting restrictions.
3. s 1(2), Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 1981. See n 1.
4. See R v Horsham J.J., supra, at 455, per Shaw, L.J. The
reason for this, in Shaw, L.J.'s view, is that - in terms 
of the provision - 'only [the defendants] are entitled to 
make representations to the court in this regard'. This 
may be so: but it would not seem to preclude the defendants 
asking the court to take into account wider implications of 
the kind mooted in the text (nor, indeed, to prevent the 
court from considering such factors, ex mero motu). Shaw, 
L.J.'s dictum was also obiter, as the order lifting restric­
tions in the case had, in any event, been made pursuant to 
the non-discretionary power originally conferred by the 
legislation.
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effect of lifting restrictions on the willingness of prosecution 
witnesses to come forward with their evidence in future cases.
11.8.2. Reform regarding postponement and restriction of 
reporting of trial proceedings in open court
1
It will be recalled from the discussion of the Clement and 
2
Poulson cases above, that some doubt attaches to the capacity 
of a court, at common law, to order the postponement of re­
porting of proceedings in open court. In addition, as graphi-
3 4
cally demonstrated by the Socialist Worker and Leveller deci­
sions, there is considerable controversy as to the power of a 
court to prohibit the reporting of specified items of evidence, 
such as the identity of a prosecution witness. An attempt has 
now been made - in the Contempt of Court Act, 1981 - to resolve 
these difficulties.
The first section of the Act of relevance in this regard is 
section 4(2), which provides :
'In any such proceedings [i.e., legal 
proceedings in open court] the court 
may, where it appears necessary for 
avoiding a substantial risk of pre­
judice to the administration of jus­
tice in those proceedings, or in any 
other proceedings pending or imminent, 
order that the publication of any 
report of the proceedings, or any
1. (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 218.
2. The Times, 4 January, 1974.
3. [1975] 1 Q.B. 637 (D.C.).
4. [1979] A.C. 440 (H.L. (E.)).
5. _Cf. s 2(2) of the Act which, in the context of the
sub judice rule, speaks of 'substantial' risk of 
'serious' prejudice.
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part of the proceedings, be 
postponed for such period as 
the court thinks necessary for 
that purpose'.
1
This provision - which appears clearly designed to cater
2
for situations such as those in the cases of Clement ■ and 
3
Poulson - does little more than reiterate the fundamental
common law principle that curtailment of full reporting may
be justified in the interests of the proper administration
of justice. It does, however, further specify that this
must appear 1 necessary* in order to avoid a Substantial'
risk of prejudice* Neither word is defined, but it seems
that 'substantial' must bear the same meaning as in section
2 (2) of the Act (previously discussed in the context of sub 
4
judice publication ) and that 'necessary' carries the same 
interpretation as ascribed to it by the European Court of HuLrvvPjv 
in the 'thalidomide' case^ and accordingly connotes 
a 'pressing social need'^.
The effect of section 4(2) has already been the subject of
judicial determination by the Court of Appeal:, and the views
of the court are accordingly canvassed in outline below, for
the further light they throw on the significance of this
statutory reform. The proceedings in question are R v Horsham
7
J.J., ex parte Farquharson , which arose out of the prosecution
1. s 4(2), Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
2. Supra.
3. Supra.
4. See p 828, above.
5. Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government, [1979]2 E.H.R.R.
245.
6. Ibid, para 59. See Halsbury's Statutes, op cit, Vol 51, p 501.
7. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.)
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of four defendants for offences involving the export (or 
attempted export) of arms and ammunition. One of the defen­
dants asked for the lifting of restrictions on the reporting 
of the committal proceedings - and this was duly ordered by 
the justices who (under section 8(2) of the Magistrates' Courts
Act, 1980, as then formulated) had no discretion to refuse the 
1
request . The Contempt of Court Act 1981 came into force on 
27 August 1981; and when the committal proceedings began in 
October of that year, the accused (who clearly no longer de­
sired full reporting) applied for an order postponing the re­
porting of the proceedings (under section 4(2) of the new Act) 
on the ground that 'the details of the case that were going to 
be aired in the committal were of a highly prejudicial nature 
and likely to inflame people's feelings because of the political
and social implications ... of the case, namely, the political
2
assassination side' . The justices accordingly made an order
'"prohibiting reporting of any part of the proceedings until
3
the commencement of any trial hearing"' . This provoked an
outcry from the press, who contended that it brought the day
4
of 'secret courts' so close as to be 'barely a step away' .
Local journalists, assisted by the National Union of Journalists, 
applied to the High Court to quash the magistrates' order. The 
High Court did so; and remitted the matter to the justices for 
re-consideration - but, in the meantime, prohibited further re­
porting of the case. The journalists thereupon appealed to the
1. See p 1048.
2. R v Horsham J.J., supra, at 445.
3. Ibid, emphasis supplied.
4. Ibid.
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Court of Appeal, and the Horsham Justices and Customs and Excise
Commissioners cross-appealed (challenging the order of the Divi- 
1
sional Court ).
The Court of Appeal was unanimous in ruling that both appeals
2
should be dismissed - but the reasons for so doing expressed 
by the three Appeal judges vary greatly and thus generate a 
judgment of considerable complexity. Full examination of the 
decision accordingly lies outside the scope of this study: and 
it is proposed to do no more than focus brief attention on some 
of the more important aspects of the decision.
First and foremost, it should be noted that the Court of Appeal 
3
was unanimous in ruling that the blanket prohibition on report­
ing imposed by the magistrates went too far; and in emphasising 
that an order for postponement should only be made when necessary 
and with due regard for the 'great importance of the public 
interest in having justice done in open court with the press
4
able to publish a fair and accurate report of what takes place' .
Secondly, the judgment provides little guidance as to the cir­
cumstances in which an order for postponement of reporting may 
legitimately be made. In the view of Lord Denning, M.R., this
may only be done in those instances in which a report would, at
5
common law, have constituted a contempt' . Accordingly, it
1. Ibid, at 443 - 444.
2. Ibid, at 453 (per Lord Denning, M.R.), 456 (per Shaw, L.J.)
and 465 (per Ackner, L.J.).
3. Ibid, (per Lord Denning, M.R. and Shaw, L.J.) and at 464 
(per Ackner, L.J.).
4. Ibid, at 453 (per Lord Denning, M.R.).
5. Ibid, at 449.
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could only be done to prevent prejudice to forthcoming related
1
proceedings (as in the Clement and Poulson cases ), or to
prevent the disclosure of evidence the admissibility of which
2
had been the subject of a "trial within a trial" . The impor­
tant difference introduced by the new provision, in Lord Den­
ning's view, was that it made it incumbent upon the courts to 
specify - by means of express orders - what should not be pub­
lished: failing which the media were free to report at will 
(though subject, of course, to the requirements of accuracy 
and good faith).
Whether the principle thus enunciated by Lord Denning, M.R.
forms part of the ratio of the decision is open to some doubt,
however, as Shaw, L.J. gave no consideration to this issue;
whilst Ackner, L.J. emphasised (contrary to Lord Denning's view)
that the legislature, in enacting section 4(2), could not have
3
intended 'to revive all the old uncertainties' of the common
law. He also drew attention to the fact that section 4(2) -
.4unlike section 11 - makes no reference to the court 'having 
5power' to order postponement; and accordingly indicated that 
there are no limitations derived from common law (as Lord 
Denning, M.R. believed) as to the circumstances in which an
1. See p 1024 and p 1025 for the facts of these cases.
2. This, of course, is the name given to the procedure where­
by the jury are excluded from court whilst the judge deter­
mines the admissibility of controversial evidence: often 
highly prejudicial to the accused. It is considered axio­
matic that the media should not publish what the court - 
for fear of possible prejudice - has thus taken pains to 
keep from the jury.
3. R v Horsham J.J., supra, at 463.
4. See p 1057, where this provision is further described.
5. See s 11, Contempt of Court Act, 1981, further discussed ibid.
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order for postponement of reporting may be made.
The third point of note is the disagreement reflected in the
judgment as to whether the breach of an order for postponement
automatically constitutes contempt. Shaw, L.J. and Ackner, L.J.
both clearly believed that - if this were not the position -
1
the new provision would be 'quite futile' . They accordingly
emphasised that the section had created a new head of contempt
of court, so that 'any journalist who published in contravention
of an order for postponement would be guilty of contempt under 
2
th[e] new rule' Lord Denning, however, was deeply disturbed 
at the notion that an order for postponement could be made by 
the court, at the joint request of the parties, with little 
consideration being given to the public interest in full report­
ing and without the media being afforded 'any notice of it or
3
any opportunity to be heard on it' . This, in his Lordship's
view, would constitute 'nothing less than a power, by consent
4
of the parties, to muzzle the press' . This Lord Denning was
not prepared to countenance; and he accordingly took pains to
stress that the breach of an order for postponement would not
5
ipso facto constitute contempt of court .
Valid as Lord Denning, M.R.'s misgivings seem , they clearly 
cannot prevail over the concurring views of the remaining mem­
bers of the Court of Appeal. It seems thus that breach of an
1. R v Horsham J.J., supra, at 456 (per Shaw, L.J.) and 462 
(per Ackner, L.J.).
2. Ibid, at 463, per Ackner, L.J.
3. Ibid, at 448, per Lord Denning, M.R.
4. Ibid.
5. See ibid.
6. It should, however, also be remembered that the court has
power to order postponement only where this is 'necessary'.
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order for postponement is indeed automatically a contempt; 
and that the amending legislation of the United Kingdom has 
accordingly introduced a power to inhibit the reporting of 
proceedings which is wide-ranging in ambit and which, most 
disturbingly, exercises its prohibitive effect at the precise 
point in time when public interest in the issues underlying 
the proceedings is at its height* The legislation would 
accordingly be far preferable if it incorporated an express 
obligation on the courts to invite representations from the 
media before ordering postponement; and if the courts had 
also been enjoined to give specific consideration not only 
to whether postponement is necessary but also to whether this 
factor is not outweighed by public interest in full publicity.
The final point which should be noted is that the Court of
Appeal was unanimous in finding that the new section applies
1
to proceedings at committal stage as well as at trial . This 
conclusion of the court is clearly correct on the wording 
of the section, but also underlines the wide ambit of the pro­
vision by making it clear that media reports may be restricted
2 '
under its terms from the very outset of litigation .
The second of the reforms introduced by the Contempt of Court 
Act, 1981 (in the context of reporting proceedings) must now be
1. R v Horsham J.J., supra, at 447 (per Lord Denning, M.R.),
456 (per Shaw, L.J.) and 457 (per Ackner, L.J.).
2. In practice, however, this is unlikely to have much impact
in the United Kingdom where committal proceedings, in any 
event, generally take place without any oral examination of 
evidence at all; and subject to rigid limitations on the 
facts which may be reported. An order for postpone­
ment under s 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981 could 
therefore only have relevance in relation to committal pro­
ceedings if one of the accused (as in the Horsham Justices 
case) had previously obtained an order lifting restrictions.
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examined. This is provided by section 11 which states :
1 In any case where a court (having 
power to do so) allows a name or 
other matter to be withheld from 
the public in proceedings before 
the court., the court may give 
such directions prohibiting the 
publication of that name or 
matter in connection with the 
proceedings as appear to the court 
to be necessary for the purpose 
for which it was so withheld'.
1
The meaning of this provision is, unfortunately, far from clear. 
The section is undoubtedly designed to implement the recommen­
dation of the House of Lords in the Leveller case that some 
form of 'warning' or 'ruling' should be given by the courts as 
to the implications (for media reporting) of the adoption of
devices such as the use of pseudonyms in the course of public 
2
proceedings „ The provision does little, however, to clarify
the circumstances in which such a ruling may validly be given:
3
except to indicate that the court must have 'power to do so' .
Whether the court enjoys such power in fact must presumably be
determined in accordance with the common law,. It follows that
no legislative attempt has been made to elucidate the somewhat
amorphous principles established in the Leveller and Socialist 
4
Worker decisions .. The United Kingdom Parliament has accordingly
1. s 11, Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
2. See Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd, [1979] A.C.
440 (H.L. (E.)) at 465, for example, where Lord Edmund-Davies 
declared that it would be helpful to the media if the courts 
were Tto draw express attention to any procedural decisions 
... implemented during the hearing, to explain that they were 
aimed at ensuring the due and fair administration of justice 
and to indicate that any [conduct] ... calculated to pre­
judice that aim [might constitute] ... contempt'.
3. See s 11, supra.
4. See p 1035, etseq.
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do ne little to implement the recommendation of the Phillimore
Committee that legislation should be introduced to provide for
the 1 specific circumstances in which a court shall be empowered
to prohibit, in the public interest, the publication of names
1
or of other matters arising at a trial' .
Two further points remain to be noted. First, it would seem
(following the approach of the majority of the Court of Appeal
2
in R v Horsham J.J., ex parte Farquharson ) that breach of an
order of prohibition issued by a court constitutes - ipso facto
a contempt of court. Secondly, the word 'necessary' in the
provision should be given the same meaning as in section 4(2)
3
above : so that any restriction on reporting must satisfy the
4
test of 'pressing social need' .
11.8.3. Reform of reporting of proceedings conducted in 
private
It will be recalled that there is considerable confusion
at common law (as graphically demonstrated by the judgments of
5
the House of Lords in Scott v Scott and Attorney-General v 
Leveller Magazine Ltd^) as to the extent to which proceedings 
conducted in private may be reported by the media. Hence, 
in the United Kingdom, an attempt has accordingly been made, 
as previously explained, to bring greater certainty into the
1. The Phillimore Report, Cmnd 5794, 1974, para 142, n 72.
2. [ 1982] 2 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.): and see also the discussion
at p 1055 above.
3. This is in accordance with the general principle of statu­
tory interpretation that words and phrases should be given 
the same meaning throughout an enactment.
4. See p 1051.
5. 0.913 ] A.C. 417 (H.L. (E.) ) .
6. 0.979 ] A.C. 440 (H.L. (E.)).
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law through the enactment of section 12 of the Administration 
of Justice Act of 1960. This provision thus specifies various 
circumstances in which the reporting of proceedings held in 
camera will constitute contempt. It begins, however, by affirm­
ing the general principle that '[t]he publication of information
relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall
1
not of itself be contempt of court' ? and then specifies five 
sets of exceptional circumstances where this will indeed be the
case. Thus, publication of information relating to court pro-
2 3
ceedings constitutes contempt where (in outline) wardship or
4
mental health are in issue, or where the court sits in private
5
’for reasons of national security' , or where the information 
relates to some secret process^, or :
’where the court (having power to do 
so) expressly prohibits the publica­
tion of all information relating to 
the proceedings or of information of 
the description which is published'.
7
Any order of court (consequent upon proceedings in private) may, 
however, be published - except where the court 'having power to
1. s 12(1), Administration of Justice Act, 1960.
2. The terms of s 12(1) seem clearly to indicate that publi­
cation of information of this nature will ipso facto con­
stitute contempt. However, s 12(4) of the Act throws 
considerable doubt on this interpretation by providing 
that no publication may constitute contempt under the 
Act unless it would also have done so at common law: and, 
at common law, as indicated in Scott v Scott, restrictions 
on publicity remain operative only so long as needed to 
serve the object of the suit - whereas no time limitations 
at all are contained within the legislation. This conun­
drum is considered further below.
3. s 12(1) (a), supra, which applies also to adoption, guardian­
ship, custody, maintenance or upbringing of an infant, or 
rights of access to an infant.
4. s 12(1) (b) , ibid, which applies to proceedings under Part
VIII Mental Health Act, 1959.
5. s 12(1)(c), ibid.
6. s 12(1)(d), ibid, which applies also to discoveries or
continued
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do so' expressly prohibits publication .
Section 12(4) then provides:
'Nothing in this section shall 
be construed as implying that 
any publication is punishable 
as contempt of court which would 
not be so punishable apart from 
this section'.
2
This proviso has thrown the proper meaning and ambit of section 
12 into considerable confusion: for it is subject to diametrically 
opposite interpretation. 'On one view it may be read as estab­
lishing that s. 12(1) - (3) contains, as it were, a complete 
and comprehensive code, and as saying that it is not permissible 
to imply that something further may constitute a contempt for 
which specific provision has not been made.. The other possible 
interpretation, however, is that s 12(4) means, rather, that 
the section is not to be taken as having extended the number
of occasions on which a contempt would be committed, but is to
3
be read subject to the existing law' .
Such judicial authority as exists suggests that the latter is
the correct interpretation* Thus, in In re F* (orse. A.)
4
(A Minor) (Publication of Information) , Lord Scarman declared:
'I think it likely that the subsection 
was enacted to ensure that no one 
would in future be found guilty of
inventions.
7. s 12(l)(e), ibid.
1. s 12 (2), ibid.
2. s 12(4), ibid.
3. Miller, opcit, pp 215 - 216, emphasis supplied.
4. (1977 ] Fam. 58.
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contempt who would not also 
under the pre-existing law have 
been found guilty. Certainly 
such a construction is consis­
tent with the law's basic con­
cern to protect freedom of speech 
and individual liberty1.
1
This interpretation was approved by Lord Edmund-Davies in
2
Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd ; and an anologous
interpretation was applied by Lord Denning, M.R. (in R v
3
Horsham J.J., ex parte Farquaharson ) to the similarly worded
4
section 6(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981,.
It seems then - despite the criticism of this interpretation 
voiced by those who fear the continued operation of the common 
law with all its uncertainties^ - that the section does not pro­
vide a code complete in itself determing when proceedings con­
ducted in private may lawfully be reported,. Instead, the common 
law continues to operate in a number of important respects. It 
thus determin es when publication may be prohibited in the 
residue of cases not covered by the four specified categories^
and also governs the circumstances in which publication of an
7
order of court may be curtailed .. Most important of all, 
however, the common law continues, in general, to determine 
whether the reporting of proceedings conducted in private con­
stitutes a contempt (irrespective of whether the proceedings
1. Ibid, at 86.
2. [1979] A.C. 440 (H.L.(E.)), at 465.
3. [1982] W.L.R. 430 (C.A.), at 449.
4. Ibid, where Lord Denning, M.R. accordingly concludes that 
an order for postponement (as previously discussed) may 
only be made where this could have been done at common law.
5. See, for example, Miller, op cit, p 216, who considers the alt­
ernate interpretation 'the more convenient'.
6. See s 12(1) (a) - (d) and s 12(1) (e), supra.
7. See s 12(2), ibid.
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in issue fall within one of the exceptional categories estab­
lished by section 12(1). Thus, for example, the reporting of
proceedings conducted in private by virtue of national security
1 2 
interests or because some secret process is in issue - though
clearly contrary to the legislation - does not automatically
constitute a contempt. For this result to follow, 'something 
3
more' must be established: and it must therefore be shown that 
publication is also a contempt at common law on the basis that 
it is prejudicial to the administration of justice, either in 
the particular case or in general.
The consequence of this interpretation is undoubtedly a greater
uncertainty in the law (in that it remains necessary to weigh
the likelihood of such prejudice resulting - rather than merely
4
to apply a simple formula ); but the overall result is undoubtedly
to make for flexibility, to uphold the principle of open justice
and to accord due recognition to the importance of freedom of 
5
expression . Hence, as long as the present United Kingdom 
statute retains its present wording, this interpretation is the 
one which clearly has the greater merit from the viewpoint of 
media freedom. However, it would also be possible to eliminate 
the major difficulties in the provision by altering its terms -
1. See s 12(1)(c), ibid.
2. See s 12(1)(d), ibid.
3. See Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd, supra, at 
440, per Lord Edmund-Davies.
4. On the alternative interpretation, all that would be nece­
ssary would be to show, for example, that the report in issue 
related to patent proceedings conducted in chambers - without 
considering factors such as the timing of the report and 
whether restriction was still necessary to preserve the 
effective administration of justice.
5. See again the dictum of Lord Scarman above, and note the 
absurdities which would otherwise result through (for 
example), the prohibition of a report on a secret process 
which had already entered the public domain.
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1
and this alternative is examined further below .
11.9. The Need for Similar Reform in Nigerian Law
Having thus briefly outlined the legislative reforms introduced 
in the United Kingdom in an attempt to overcome the difficulties 
presented by the common law in this context, it now remains to 
consider whether equivalent provisions should be introduced 
into Nigeria.
11.9.1. Reporting committal proceedings
In deciding whether it is appropriate to introduce restrictions 
on the reporting of committal proceedings similar to those now 
contained in section 8 of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1980, 
the first point which must be remembered is that trial by jury 
is very much the exception in Nigeria. Accordingly, there is 
considerably less need to guard against potential prejudice to 
fair trial, since it is well recognised that judicial officers 
(to whom the trial of proceedings is - in general - exclusively 
entrusted in Nigeria) are trained and equipped to focus their 
attention on the legally admissible evidence alone.
In the light of this important practical difference between the
two jurisdictions, it seems clear that there is no need for
blanket restriction on the reporting of committal proceedings
in Nigeria. The only provision which might be considered appro-
2
priate, therefore, is the flexible formula suggested by Miller : 
in terms of which a fair and accurate report of committal pro­
ceedings would only constitute contempt if it would clearly be 
prejudicial to the ultimate fair trial of an accused.
1. See p 1068.
2. See Miller, op cit, p 114, previously discussed at p 1047.
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11.9.2. Postponement and restriction of reporting of 
trial proceedings in open court
As regards the changes introduced by section 4(2) of the 
Contempt of Court Act, 1981 (authorising the postponement of 
reporting where 'necessary1 to preclude 'serious' prejudice), 
it is clear that this provision (as framed) may constitute a 
considerable threat to freedom of expression, particularly in 
view of the fear expressed by Lord Denning, M.R. that it may 
enable the parties to proceedings - by mutual consent - to place 
a muzzle on the press, irrespective of the public interest in 
full disclosure and discussion of the case,. If this interpre­
tation is correct, then the provision is totally objectionable: 
especially in Nigeria where (leaving aside for the present all 
question of the constitutionality of any reporting restriction) 
jury trial is, in any event, the exception; and where there is 
accordingly far less danger of prejudice to fair trial. It is
therefore submitted that - if an equivalent provision is to
1
be introduced into Nigeria at all - it should incorporate the 
following additional safeguards :
(i) 'necessary' should be defined with greater clarity
to ensure that it is interpreted as connoting a
2
'pressing social need' ;
(ii) the criterion for postponement should be 'a substantial 
risk of serious prejudice' (echoing the wording of 
section 2(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981,
1. It may be preferable for Nigeria to abandon the United King­
dom lead entirely; and to follow instead the example of
the United States of America, further explained in due course.
2. See p 1051.
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previously described in relation to the sub judice 
1
rule ) instead of the United Kingdom requirement 
which refers only to 'substantial risk';
(iii)the public interest in full publication should be ex­
pressed to be a factor which must always be taken into 
specific account:, and which should not lightly be out­
weighed by the alleged need for postponement (especially 
where trial is to be by trained judicial officer alone).
As regards the power to restrict publication of certain evidence
(now contained in section 11 of the United Kingdom Contempt of
Court Act, 1981), the merits of this provision must be gauged
in the light of the present Nigerian rule, contained in section
33(4)(b) of the Constitution, which empowers a court or tribunal
to make arrangements to guard against disclosure of certain
evidence whenever a Minister (of the Federal Government) or a
Commissioner (of a State Government) 'satisfies it ... that
it would not be in the public interest for any matter to be
2
publicly disclosed' * This contrasts sharply with section 11 
which (it may be recalled) entitles a court, where it has 
power to do so at common law, to prohibit the publication of 
certain evidence where this is 'necessary' for the purpose for 
for which it was kept secret during the course of the proceedings.
It is submitted that section 11 - with its insistence that pro­
hibition of publication must be necessary - is preferable to
1. See p 801, above.
2. s 33(4)(b) f  Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979, previously cited at p 1007, where the 
relevant provisions are reproduced in full.
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to the present Nigerian provision. The requirement (in terms
of section 33(4)(b)) that the court must be 'satisfied' that
publication would be contrary to the 'public interest' is
inherently vague: and no attempt is made to specify the criteria
which should govern the court in the exercise of its discretion.
However, section 11 is also gravely deficient in its failure
to clarify the circumstances in which prohibition may be ordered
and in the way it fudges this issue by the bland statement that
1
the court must have 'power' to do so.
On the other hand, however, it must also be acknowledged that 
disclosure of specified evidence may legitimately need to be
prohibited in certain circumstances; and, unless the courts
are accorded the power to order such restriction in appropriate 
instances, the temptation will be to opt for trial in camera 
instead. Such a consequence would be far more serious than 
restricting the reporting of specified evidence: for, as
2
emphasised by Lord Widgery, C.J. in the Socialist Worker case,
' [w ]hen one has an order for trial in
camera, all the public and all the 
press are evicted at one fell swoop 
and the entire supervision by the 
public is gone. Where one has a 
hearing which is open, but where 
the names of the witnesses are with­
held, virtually all the desirable 
features of having the public present 
are to be seen. The only thing which 
is kept from their knowledge is the 
name of the witness'.
3
1. See s 11, Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
2. R v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd, ex p . 
Attorney-General, [1975J Q.B. 637 (D.C.)
3. Ibid, at 652.
-1067-
There is sound sense in this; and it is accordingly submitted
1
that Nigeria would be well advised (at minimum ) to adopt a 
provision similar to that contained in section 11 of the 
Contempt of Court Act, 1981. It should be stressed, however, 
that restriction can only be ordered where necessary (in
2
the sense that there is a 'pressing social need' for prohibition )
and it should also be made clear that the court has power to
order non-disclosure only in those circumstances in which, under
3
the 1979 Constitution, it would be entitled to sit in camera .
As an additional safeguard, the court should also be enjoined 
to consider whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
the particular interest in the service of which suppression is 
allegedly required. In this way,, the interests to be taken 
into account in ordering restriction would be kept firmly 
before the courts: and the media would enjoy the advantage of 
certainty, in that it would be clear that an express order of 
court was required to effect prohibition (and that contempt 
could not be committed save through the breach of such an order). 
This would present at least something of an advance over the 
present broad statutory rule and uncertain common law position.
11..9.3. Reporting proceedings in private
It remains (under this head) to consider whether Nigeria should 
follow the United Kingdom lead as regards the reporting of pro­
ceedings conducted in private: and introduce a provision equiva-
1. Again, more radical reform may be more appropriate, as 
further discussed in due course.
2. See p 1051.
3. See s 33(4)(a), Constitution, supra, previously cited at 
p 1007.
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1
lent to section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960 .
It must be acknowledged that the provision has certain deficien­
cies, as emphasied above: particulary in the continuing uncer­
tainty as to whether the common law, with all its complexities, 
must still be taken into account* This difficulty would need 
to be eliminated if an equivalent provision were to be intro­
duced into Nigeria; and thus, at minimum, any such legislation 
adopted in Nigeria should make it clear that restriction on
2
reporting is legitimate only in the four instances specified
3
- and then only where this is necessary to protect the adminis­
tration of justice. It should thus be made clear that the 
statutory provision proposed would indeed constitute a code 
complete in itselft  covering in full the circumstances in 
which restriction on the reporting of proceedings in camera 
may be enjoined. It may be argued that this is too rigid a 
framework; and that there is a need for some residual dis­
cretion to be conferred upon the courts to cater for situations 
not falling within the four enumerated categories. There is 
undoubtedly certain merit in this contention; but it is submitted 
that it must be rejected because of the uncertainty it would 
generate and the temptation it would present to impose ever- 
widening restraints on publication: contrary not only to freedom 
of expression but also to the fundamental principle of open 
justice.
1. See p 1059 et seq.
2. These four categories cover, in essence, wardship, mental 
health, national security and patent proceedings.
3. 'Necessary' should bear its usual connotation of 'pressing 
social need'. This would also eliminate the difficulty, under 
the present United Kingdom provision, that reports of secret 
processes which had already entered the public domain might 
be held to constitute contempt.
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It is further submitted that a provision modelled on section
12 - but incorporating the modifications described above - would
represent a considerable.advance over the present Nigerian law.
In the northern states,, the reporting of proceedings in
camera is still governed ill toto by the common law, with all
its uncertainties, including the doubt as to whether any report
1
at all as to the facts or parties may lawfully be published
The statutory reform suggested would have the merit of certainty,
as well as that of making it clear that 'the publication of
information relating to proceedings before any court sitting
2
in private [is] not of itself ... contempt of court' .
In the southern states (where the reporting of proceedings is 
governed both by the common law - to which the same considerations 
mutatis mutandis apply - and by section 133(5) of the Criminal 
Code, with its blanket restriction on the reporting of any 
evidence so heard), the suggested reform would have the 
advantage of limiting the present prohibition: and of making 
it clear that restriction may only be imposed in specified and 
limited circumstances. Given the vital importance of open 
justice (to say nothing of freedom of expression), this would 
represent a very considerable improvement over the present 
position.
In summary, it is thus apparent that there is a certain degree 
of merit in the reforms which the United Kingdom has introduced; 
and that Nigerian law would be improved by adopting certain
1. See p 1040.
2. See s 12(1), Administration of Justice Act, 1960, emphasis
supplied.
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analogous provisions,, modified in the manner suggested above. 
However, it remains to examine the approach taken in the 
United States of America to media reports of court proceedings: 
for this is radically different, and may well represent a far 
preferable example to follow.
11.10. The Contrasting United States1 Approach
1
The case of Estes v Texas provides a convenient starting-
point for examination of the contrasting United States' approach.
2
Estes was a 'flamboyant Texas financier' , accused of large- 
scale swindling. At the two-day pre-trial hearing of the case, 
the court was packed with journalists (from both the print and 
electronic media) and technicians; and the room itself 'was 
turned into a snake-pit by the multiplicity of cameras, wires
3
[and] microphones' . The actual trial was conducted under
considerably greater control, the judge having ruled that
televising was permitted - except for 'live coverage of the
interrogation of prospective jurors or the testimony of 
4
witnesses' - but that the number of television cameras should 
be restricted to four^ and that these should be installed in a 
specially constructed booth at the back of the courtoom (in 
which-, however,, they in fact remained 'visible to all'^). Re­
strictions were also placed on the number of still photographers 
permitted in the courtroom.
1. 381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628 (1965).
2. Nelson and Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed.,
New York, 1978, p 267.
3. The New York Times, 9 June 1965, p 31c (cited by Abraham,
Freedom and the Court , 4th ed., New York, 1982, p 164).
4. Nelson & Teeter, supra.
5. One from each of the major networks (CBS, NBC and ABC) and
one from a local television station.
6. Nelson & Teetex, supra, p 268..
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Estes was convicted; and he appealed to the Supreme Court 
on the ground that he had been deprived - through excessive 
media coverage - of the right to fair trial guaranteed by the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court - by a majority of 5:4 - 
agreed. It should, however, be noted at the outset that Justice 
Harlan (who supplied the fifth assent in the majority opinion) 
'voted to overturn Estes' conviction because the case was one 
of "great notoriety" but ... reserved judgment on the tele­
vising of more routine cases'^.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr Justice Clark 
stressed that the 'public trial' guaranteed to an accused under 
the Sixth Amendment was intended to ensure fairness of treatment 
and to counter the oppression resulting from secret tribunals 
such as the Star Chamber.. However, 'televising and photograph­
ing criminal trials did not aid the courts' solemn purpose of
2
endeavoring to ascertain the truth' . On the contrary, the
3
televising of proceedings was likely to distract jurors , and
4
to undermine the confidence of witnesses in giving evidence ;
5
whilst the temptation it offered 'to play to the public audience' 
was capable of affecting all participants in the proceedings - 
including counsel and the judge himself^.
1. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 268.
2. Ibid, p 269.
3. See ibid. Jurors would be aware - not only of the 'tell­
tale red lights' of the cameras - but also of the fact 
that the proceedings were being broadcast to a vast and 
unseen audience.
4. See ibid. Justice Clark pointed out that some witnesses 
might be 'demoralized and frightened, others ... cocky 
and given to overstatement' and that 'memories might 
falter, as with anyone speaking publicly'. See Estes v 
Texas, supra, at 547.
5. Ibid, at 549.
6. See ibid.
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1
Chief Justice Warren concurred , emphasising that televising
2
has 'an inevitable impact on all ... trial participants' , and 
detracts from the dignity of court proceedings, thus lessening 
their reliability. It is also fundamentally discriminatory,
3
since only certain defendants are subjected to its intrusion..
Justice Harlan agreed, in the particular circumstances, that
Estes' right to a fair trial had been infringed* but stressed
(as previously noted) that the case was one of especial notor- 
4
iety and should not be seen as generating a more general rule.
He also pointed out that further technological developments in
the field of television might some day call for a re-appraisal
5
of its effect on fair trial .
Justice Stewart, dissenting, emphasised that the presence of
television and still photographers at the trial itself had been
regulated at the judge's order; and was thus 'unable to find'^
that this had detracted from the fairness of the proceedings.
He also expressed grave concern at the majority opinions: which
he considered 'disturbingly alien to the First and Fourteenth
Amendments1 guarantees against federal or state interference
7
with the free communication of information and ideas' .
0
Two of the other dissenting justices - Justices White and
1. He was joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg in his 
concurring opinion.
2. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 270.
3. See ibid.
4. See ibid, p 268.
5. See Estes v Texas, supra, at 595 - 596.
6. Ibid, at 601-602.
7. Ibid, at 614.
8. The four dissentients were Stewart, White, Black and 
Brennan.
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Brennan - further declared that a flat ban against tele-
1
vising trials was premature ; whilst Justice Brennan also took 
pains to stress that 'the Estes decision was "not blanket con­
stitutional prohibition against the televising of state crimi- 
2
nal trials"' .
3
Another case of great significance is that of Sheppard v Maxwell .
Dr Sheppard, an osteopath in Bay Village, Ohio, had been charged
4
with 'the bludgeon-murder of his pregnant wife' . His trial
5
was preceded by a barrage of adverse publicity ; and the pro­
ceedings themselves were characterised by a 'carnival atmos­
phere'^ in which, inter alia, '[r]eporters moving in and out 
of the courtroom during times when the court was in session
caused so much confusion that it was difficult for witnesses
7
and lawyers to be heard despite a loudspeaker system' . In 
addition, the press were positioned 'inside the lawyer's rail 
so close to the bench that it was in effect impossible for 
defense attorneys to consult with either their client or the 
judge without being overheard,* When the jurors viewed the 
scene of the murder at Dr Sheppard's home, a [press repre­
sentative] was included in the group, while other reporters 
hovered overhead in a press helicopter .... Jurors were photo-
g
graphed and interviewed by the news media as were witnesses' .
1. See Estes v Texas, supra, at 615.
2. See ibid, at 617.
3. 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966).
4. This emotive description is that of Abraham, op cit, p 164.
5. See Nelson & Teeter, op cit, pp 273 - 276, for a full account.
6. Sheppard v Maxwell, supra, at 358, per Mr Justice Clark.
7. Nelson & Teeter, supra, 276 - 277.
8. Abraham, supra, p 165.
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1
Sheppard was convicted, but was ultimately granted a re-trial
(in which he was acquitted) at the instance of the Supreme Court.
In delivering the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Clark
emphasised the 'importance of the news media to the proper ad-
2
ministration of justice' ; and - whilst disapproving of the
3
conduct of the media in the case in many respects - stressed 
that responsibility for ensuring fair trial lay primarily with 
the presiding judge. Thus, the judge 'should have adopted
4
stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen'
and should also have limited the number of reporters in the
courtroom 'at the first sign that their presence would disrupt 
5
the trial' . In addition, he 'should have insulated the jurors 
and witnesses from the news media, and "should have made some 
effort to control the release of leads, information and gossip 
to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for 
both sides'1'^ .
In the face of growing public concern at the need to ensure 
fair trial, the American Bar Association in 1968 approved 
'Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press', recommended 
by an Advisory Committee headed by Massachusetts Supreme Court
1. Sheppard was convicted in December 1954 and remained in 
jail until 1964 'when a federal district judge in Dayton 
.... released him [on the basis] ... that prejudicial pub­
licity had denied him a fair trial. Two years later the 
Supreme Court affirmed that action by a vote of 8:1, giving 
Ohio authorities a choice of retrying him or of dismissing 
the case against him'. Abraham, ibid, p 164. (The lone 
dissentient was Justice Black who, unfortunately, did not 
express his reasons for disagreeing with the majority).
2. Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 278.
3. See ibid. The authors state that 'deep disapproval' of
the media was implicit in many of Justice Clark's other
statements, but that he also made it clear that the media
had not been the only culprits.
4. Sheppard v Maxwell, supra, at 358.
5. Ibid.
6. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 279, citing the judgment, ibid, at 549.
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Justice Paul C. Reardon, and subsequently known as the 'Reardon 
1
Report' . This was greeted by vociferous protest from the media
and the 'resultant uproar ... was at least in part instrumental
in the adoption of a new set of rules by The Judical Conference
2
of the United States* . These principles - known as the 
3
'Kaufman Rules' - are less restrictive than those contained in 
the Reardon Report and 'do not attempt to define any standards
4
for the news media ... beyond the confines of the courtroom' .
In addition, in a number of states, 'a press-bar rapprochement 
occurred, leading to [the] construction, by joint committees 
of press and bar, of guidelines for the coverage of criminal 
trials'
However, 'the basic dilemma of drawing lines between the right
to a fair trial and that of freedom of the press remain[ed]
and surfaced again in 1976 in Nebraska Press Association v 
7
Stuart , in which the validity of a 'gag order' - restricting 
the publicising of trial proceedings - was challenged. This 
issue was of great practical import for, in the decade since 
1966, the issue of such orders had become ever more prevalent 
and at least 174 restrictive orders had been issued by courts
1. See Nelson & Teeter, ibid, p 283.
2. Abraham, op cit, p 166.
3. See ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 284. For examples of such 
guidelines, see ibid, pp 284 - 288; and see also the 
'Statement of policy' regarding the release of infor­
mation by Justice Department officials at pp 288 - 291.
6. Abraham, supra.
7. 427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976)
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against the news media .
2
Nebraska Press Association v Stuart arose out of a 'nightmarish
3
Nebraska case involv[ing] the murder of six members of one family' ,
in which necrophilia was also alleged* A suspect was arrested
the following day and, shortly thereafter, at the joint request
of the prosecution and defence, the Lincoln County Court 'granted
a sweeping order prohibiting the release or publication of any
4
"testimony given or evidence adduced ..."' in relation to the
crime. The Nebraska Press Association intervened and asked
Judge Hugh Stuart to set aside the order. The judge did so,
but substituted it by his own restrictive order, which pro-
5
hibited reporting on five subjects . The ambit of the limi­
tation was further reduced by the Nebraska Supreme Court; but 
restrictions nevertheless remained in force^ - and the Press
Association accordingly appealed to the Supreme Court: which
7
unanimously reversed the judgment of the lower court .
Chief Justice Burger emphasised that any 'prior restraint' 
against publication carries a 'heavy presumption' against its
Q
constitutional validity' . This presumption could only be 
rebutted by showing that the 'gravity of the evil, discounted 
by its improbability' rendered the particular invasion of free
1. See Jack C Landau, 'The Challenge of the Communications 
Media', (1976) 62 American Bar Association Journal, pp 55 - 59.
2. Supra.
3. Nelson & Teeter,op cit, p 296.
4. Ibid.
5. See ibid, p 297, for details of these.
6. See ibid, for details. The Nebraska Supreme Court also 
sent the case back to District Judge Hugh Stuart for re­
consideration of whether pre-trial hearings (previously 
open, though subject to the reporting restrictions) should 
be closed to the press and public.
continued
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1
speech 'necessary to avoid the danger' . Whilst Judge Stuart
had clearly had grounds for thinking that there would be massive
pre-trial publicity which might endanger fair trial, this did
2
not justify the restriction order,, as no alternatives to prior
3
restraint had been attempted by the Nebraska court . Chief 
Justice Burger concluded by 'reaffirm[ing] that the guarantees 
of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition under 
all circumstances, but [that] the barriers to prior restraint 
remain high and the presumption against its use continues intact'
It is noteworthy,moreover, that a number of the concurring 
opinions in the case go so far as to suggest that the prohibi­
tion against prior restraint in this context is indeed abso- 
5
lute . Thus, for example, Justice White expressed 'grave doubt 
... [as to] whether orders ... such as were entered in th[e] 
case would ever be justifiable'^.
In keeping with the spirit of the Stuart decision (which was
7
hailed as a major victory by the media ), the American Bar
  .........continued
7. See ibid, pp 297 and 299.
8. Nebraska Press Association v Stuart, supra, at 558.
1. Ibid, at 562.
2. See ibid, at 563-^ 4. Thus, no attempt had been made to change
the venue for the trial, or to postpone it to allow the
public furore to subside. Moreover, it remained possible 
to guard against prejudice amongst the jury by screening 
out those who had formed fixed views on the accused's guilt 
and by ensuring the jury's proper 'sequestration' during 
the trial.
3. See ibid.
4„ Ibid r at 570.
5. See Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 299
6. Nebraska Press Association v Stuart, supra, at 570.
7. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 299 who further point out
continued
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Association adopted a new set of guidelines prohibiting the
exclusion of the press from court proceedings or the issue of
restrictions on reporting, unless it could be shown that publi-
1
city would 'create a clear and present danger' to fair trial .
2
Then, however, came Gannett Co v DePasquale Here, two defen­
dants charged with second-degree murder, robbery and grand 
larceny, sought and obtained an order excluding the press and 
public from a pre-trial hearing. The New York Supreme Court 
vacated the closure order, but it was reinstated by the state's 
Court of Appeals, and application was made to the Supreme Court 
for relief.
In a highly controversial and complex judgment, the Supreme
Court - by a majority of 5:4 - upheld the suppression order.
The controlling plurality opinion was written by Justice 
3
Stewart , who asserted that 'members of the public have no
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
4
to attend criminal trials' and that the accused's entitlement 
to public trial does not guarantee access to the public and
............. continued
that not all shared this enthusiasm, fearing that the deci­
sion would result in widespread closure of the courts to 
the media: a fear which proved justified to some extent.
1. See Abraham, op cit, p 167.
2. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
3. Others on the majority side were Burger, Powell, Rehnquist
and Stevens.
4. Gannett Co v DePasquale, supra, at 391.
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media . There was some doubt, however, in this multi-divided*
judgment as to whether this applied simply to pre-trial hearing
2 3
or to all stages of proceedings . The dissentients , by contrast
'saw a clear-cut right of press access in the Sixth Amendment -
4
except in "highly unusual circumstances ... not present here"' ;
and were adamant that this applied equally to pre-trial and
5
trial stages of a criminal case .
The decision was followed by a further spate of closure orders^; 
and it was not long before further recourse was had to the
7
Supreme Court. Thus, in 1980, in Richmond Newspapers v Virginia 
the Court was again faced with the question of the legality of 
an order excluding the public and press from court - this time
in the context of trial proceedings. The decision of the Court -
8 9by majority of 7:1 , with one absention - marks a watershed
1. See Abraham, op cit, p 168, who submits that the majority 
were agreed on this point, which must therefore be seen 
as the ratio.
2. See Abraham, ibid, for some indication of the uncertainty 
evinced in the judgment.
3. These were Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun.
4. See Abraham, supra, p 168, citing Gannett Co v DePasquale, 
supra, at 448.
5. Abraham, ibid.
6. Some 200 state and local judges attempted to bar the press 
from their courts in the interim between this case and the 
Richmond decision, described below. See Abraham, ibid.
7. 488 U.S. 555 (1980)
8. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
9. Justice Powell, a native of Virginia, abstained.
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1
victory for freedom of communication . The Court ruled that, in
the absence of "'an overriding interest to the contrary", the
2
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public' . The
controlling opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, 'emphasi-
3
sed that the public and the press have a constitutional right
4
to witness criminal trials' ; and that justice must not only
be done but must also be seen to be done: a result 'that can
5
best be provided by allowing people to observe it' .
More recently still, the Supreme Court has handed down yet an­
other decision with important ramifications for freedom of the 
media. Following the Estes^ case, television coverage of trials 
was severely circumscribed; but - with the passage of time - 
an increasing number of states came to permit some form of
coverage by the news media, through agreement between the
7
judiciary, the bar and the press . In 1981, in Chandler v
g
Florida , this was sanctioned by the Supreme Court which, in 
9
an 8:0 ruling , held that - notwithstanding objections by a 
defendant - 'states may permit the news media to televise, i.e., 
to photograph and broadcast, criminal trials; [and] that con-
1. See Abraham, op cit, p 168.
2. Ibid.
3. This was 'implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment
for freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly' and in
the Ninth Amendment's grant to 'the people' of 'certain 
rights' not specifically enumerated elsewhere. See ibid, 
citing Richmond Newspapers v Virginina, supra.
4. Abraham, ibid.
5. Richmond Newspapers v Virginia, supra, at 572.
6. Estes v Texas, 381 U.S. 532, discussed above.
7. See the 1977 Freedom of Information Report of the Associ­
ated Press Managing Editors Association, entitled "Cameras 
in the Courtroom: How To Get 'Em There", cited by Nelson & 
Teeter, op cit, p 272.
8. 449 U.S. 560 (1981)
9. Justice Stevens did not participate.
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trolled televising (in Florida one camera and one cameraman)
[does] not necessarily jeopardize the constitutional guarantee 
1
to a fair trial' .
In summary, thus, the approach of the United States could not
be more different from that of the United Kingdom, nor of
Nigeria* The distinction in attitude is clearly evident from
the above discussion, but is perhaps epitomised by two further
features of their contrasting approaches. In the United Kingdom,
it is regarded as axiomatic that the media should not report
matters deliberately kept from the purview of jurors - through
2
the holding of a ‘trial within a trial', as earlier explained..
3
In the United States, however, it has been held that an order
of court restricting the reporting of such material is uncon- 
4
stitutional . The difference in approach is also especially
apparent in the contrast between the recent Supreme Court
decision confirming the legality of controlled televising of 
5
trial proceedings , and the recent enactment in the United King­
dom of an express prohibition on the use of tape-recorders -
1. Abraham, op cit, p 164, n 57. Abraham further points out 
that Chandler dealt only with a state trial, but submits 
that 'the extension of its gravamen to the federal sphere 
[is] a distinct possibility'.
2. See 1054 above. Today, this would presumably require an 
express order under s 4(2), Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
3. This was by the Washington Supreme Court in State ex rel. 
Superior Court of Snohomish County v Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d.
69 483 P. 2d 608, cert, denied 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
4. The judge in this instance had ordered reporters to confine 
reports to those events which took place iri front of the 
jury, Sperry and a colleague ignored the order and published 
evidence heard whilst the jury was outside the courtroom.
The Washington Supreme Court upheld them in so doing, and 
declared that the prohibition violated 'the reporters' con­
stitutional right to report to the public what happened in 
open trial'.. See Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 292.
5. See Chandler v Florida, supra.
-1082-
- let alone television cameras - in court .
The approach of the United States is not without its dangers -
2 3
as demonstrated by the Estes and Sheppard cases. These plainly 
show the need for freedom of the media to be coupled with res­
ponsibility. It does not follow, however, that responsibility 
must be ensured through blanket restrictions on the publicising 
of proceedings of the kind imposed by the common law. The 
Estes and Sheppard cases are both extreme examples of 'licence' -
i.e., of freedom without responsibility - and though they are
4
not the only instances in which this may have occurred , there 
seems no reason (in principle) why adequate standards of respon­
sibility may not be set and maintained through cooperation be-
5
tween media and legal associations and the adoption of suitable 
guidelines^. Subject to this safeguard, it is submitted that 
the United States' approach - in its firm adherence to open 
trial and freedom of the media - has considerable merit; and
1. See s 9, Contempt of Court Act, 1981. This makes it clear
that taperecorders (other than for the purpose of com­
piling official transcripts) may not be brought into court 
save by leave of the presiding judge: who has absolute 
discretion as to whether such leave should be granted at 
all; and (if so) as to the conditions to which it should 
be made subject.
2. Estes v Texas, 381 U»S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628 (1965).
3. Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966).
4. See Nelson & Teeter, op cit, pp 256 - 258 (describing the 
publicity surrounding the Kennedy assassinations) and
p 265 (describing the 'Lindbergh case' concerning the 
trial for kidnap and murder - of a 19-month old baby - 
of Bruno Richard Hauptmann).
5* Such as the American Bar Association.
6. See p 1075 above, where reference is made to the increasing
incidence in the United States of such agreements; and 
see again the examples of guidelines prepared in the past, 
as cited by Nelson & Teeter, supra, pp 284 - 291.
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that it should be borne strongly in mind in considering the 
last remaining question: the constitutionality of the present 
Nigerian law; and the reforms of which it stands in need.
11.11 The Constitutionality of Present Restraints on 
Reporting of Proceedings
The constitutionality of restrictions on reporting by the
media of court proceedings (conducted either in public or
private) is not altogether easy to assess. It will, of course,
be recalled that the right to 'receive and impart ideas and in-
1
formation without interference' is guaranteed by section 36 
of the Constitution and that any restriction which cuts across 
this right is prima facie unconstitutional,. It will also be 
recalled, however, that the right guaranteed by section 36 is 
not absolute; and that it is subject to derogation through 
laws that are 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' 
in order to promote certain recognised interests. The diffi­
culty, as regards this branch of the law of contempt, is to 
find a constitutionally recognised interest which the various 
restrictions on reporting may be said to serve. It is of course 
true that section 36(3)(a) authorises derogation from freedom of
expression for the purpose of 'maintaining the authority and
2
independence of courtsr ; but it may also be argued that restric­
tions on the reporting of proceedings are not aimed at promoting 
either the 'authority' of the courts or their 'independence':
1. s 36(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
2. s 36(3) (a) , ibid.
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but, rather, are designed to preserve the proper administration
of justice - an interest which is not, of course, recognised
by the Constitution in so many words. Thus, taking the Poulson
2
case, for example, it might be contended that the 'order' for 
postponement of reporting was not designed to uphold either 
the authority of the court or its independence: but rather to 
prevent prejudice to the fair trial of an accused in related 
proceedings.
This difficulty may, however, be counted by two considerations.
First, (as in the context of the sub judice rule) a restriction
on reporting of this nature is designed to uphold the authority
of the judge (in the related proceedings): and to ensure that
his decision-making role is neither usurped by others nor
rendered subject to external influence. Secondly, due regard
must also be paid to the derogations authorised by section 41
of the Constitution.. Thus, in a situation like the Poulson
case, it is strongly arguable that restriction was intended
to promote 'the rights ... of others', within the meaning of 
3
section 41(1)(b) .
It seems thus that restrictions on the reporting by the media 
of court proceedings do indeed fall within the ambit of the 
interests recognised by the Constitution as authorising dero­
gation from free expressionj and the crucial question which
1. The Times, 4 January, 1974, described at p. 1025.
2. Some doubt surrounds the question whether the trial judge 
in the case went so far as to order a restriction on 
reporting. See p 1025, where the judge's direction is reproduced.
3. See s 41(1) (b), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979.
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then arises for consideration is whether the restrictions are 
'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' for the pur­
pose of promoting those interests.
This question is not altogether easy to answer: and the diffi­
culty is compounded by the variety of rules in issue. It is 
submitted that certain restrictions quite clearly cannot be 
accepted as 'reasonably justifiable'.. These include the blanket 
prohibition on the reporting of evidence heard in private imposed
by section 133(5) of the Criminal Code as well as the alleged
1
common law rule - described above - that no mention may be 
made of even the facts or parties involved in proceedings 
which are heard in camera. On the other hand, however, 
certain aspects of Nigerian law - for example,, the prohibition 
against 'misreporting' in section 133(4) of the Criminal Code 
or the common law rule that reports must be fair, accurate and 
bona fide - are clearly 'reasonably justifiable': and are, 
indeed, vitally important safeguards.
The range of rules thus applicable within the context of re­
porting court proceedings makes it difficult to assess their 
constitutionality in general terms. At the risk of over-simpli­
fication, it is apparent that the principal objectionable feature 
of restrictions on reporting lies in the uncertainty and ambivalence 
of the common law: and the tendency which this inevitably generates 
to err on the side of over-caution and exercise self-censorship 
to an extent which may not, in reality, be required by the law.
1. See p 1040.
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It is accordingly submitted that, in order to bring Nigerian 
law into line with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression, those reforms (modelled on United Kingdom legis­
lation) as have been outlined above should - at minimum - be 
introduced.
However, account must also be taken of the radically different 
approach of the United States of America to the problem of re­
porting court proceedings. It is submitted that there is 
considerable merit in this approach, for it views any prior 
restraint against publication with considerable suspicion and 
tolerates restriction only where necessary to avert a clear and 
present danger. The optimum solution may therefore be to 
adopt a combination of the United Kingdom and United States' 
approaches: in which the circumstances in which reporting may 
be restricted at all would be clearly stated and due emphasis 
would be placed on the requirements that restriction be 'nece­
ssary' and that the public interest in disclosure be taken into 
express account,. The latter requirement may, however, be bolstered 
to positive effect by emphasising the 'clear and present danger' 
test effectively applied in the United States and by enjoining 
the courts to consider whether any other means of averting the 
threatened risk can be found. Moreover, (in the context of pre­
judicial publicity) it must always be remembered that jury trial 
is the exception in Nigeria: and that there is commensurately 
less danger of adverse publicity affecting the outcome of pro­
ceedings. In addition, it must be remembered that there is not 
only intrinsic merit in the aphorism that justice must not only 
be done but must also 'be seen to be done'; but. that the tele­
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vising of court proceedings may also serve a vitally important 
function of educating the public as to the role of the courts 
in dispute resolution and in encouraging their utilisation for 
this purpose. Accordingly, the potential benefits of controlled 
television coverage should be acknowledged: and any blanket 
prohibition of such coverage should be eschewed. At the 
same time, precautions against possible abuse by the media of 
the freedom thus accorded should be taken - through the adop­
tion of 'guidelines' governing the conduct of the media and 
their relations with bench and bar, in a manner similar to that 
increasingly applied in the United States.
Such reform may seem radical indeed: but it must always be remem­
bered that restrictions on the reporting of proceedings infringe 
both free expression and open justice - one of the most vital of 
all safeguards of individual liberty - and that they should 
therefore not lightly be imposed.
One final point requires some examination. It is, of course, 
inappropriate to question the 'constitutionality' of the 
provisions governing the circumstances in which trial in 
camera may be ordered or the disclosure of specified evidence 
may be prohibited. These provisions are contained - it will 
be recalled^- - in section 33(4) of the 1979 Constitution and 
clearly cannot be challenged for constitutional invalidity.
It may, however, be queried whether the sweeping terms of 
section 33(4) are such as to serve the best interests of
1. See p 1007.
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society; and it is accordingly submitted that the subsection 
should be amended to make it clear that a trial in camera must 
be justified not only by interests such as public order,
1
morality, safety and so forth, but must also be 'necessary'
in order to avert a clear and present danger. It must always
be remembered that 'publicity is the very soul of justice' and
that '[o]nly in proportion as publicity has place can any of
2
the checks applicable to judicial injustice operate' . As
regards the prohibition of disclosure of specified evidence,
the provision should again be amended to make it clear that
the court must not only be 'satisftied] ... that it would not
be in the public interest for any matter to be publicly dis- 
3
closed' , but also that it must be shown that restriction is 
needed to guard against a clear and present danger. Restric­
tion of this kind is clearly far less dangerous than secret 
trial; but it, too, should not lightly be accepted lest it 
lead to a gradual erosion of the open administration of justice.
1. This should be given its "usual" meaning, in terms of which 
it connotes a pressing social need.
2. Scott v Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 (H.L. (E.)), at 477, citing 
the graphic warning of Bentham.
3. See s 33(4) (b), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979.
-1089-
C H A P T E R  T W E L V E
JOURNALISTS1 REFUSAL 
TO DISCLOSE THEIR SOURCES
12.1. The Significance of this Branch of Law for Media 
Freedom
Under this branch of law, the refusal of a witness to answer
relevant and necessary questions (without lawful excuse for 
1
so doing ) is punishable as a contempt of court. The rule 
is based upon the principle that the proper administration of 
justice requires that all relevant evidence be placed before 
the court; and the common law is accordingly exceedingly chary 
of recognising any exception to the obligation placed on 
witnesses to answer all necessary questions. Detailed examina­
tion of the grounds upon which a witness may lav/fully refuse
to answer a relevant question lies outside the scope of this 
2 3
study . In general , however, refusal is justified only if the
4
answer may tend to incriminate the witness , or if the evidence 
5
is privileged . Limited categories of privileged communication
1. See text and notes below.
2. For further, though somewhat brief treatment, see C.J. Miller, 
Contempt of Court, London, 1976, pp 56 - 62; G.J. Borrie and 
N.V. Lowe, The Law of Contempt, London, 1973, pp 28 - 31;
and A. Arlidge and D. Eady, The Law of Contempt, London, 1982, 
pp 199 - 203.
3. These grounds are not, of course, the only ones on which a 
witness may lawfully refuse to answer a question (see Re 
Working Men's Mutual Society, (1882), 21 Ch. D. 831); but 
they are, in practice, the ones most frequently invoked.
4. See John Huxley Buzzard, Richard May and M.N. Howard (eds.), 
Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed., London, 1982, para 15-16 et seq.
5. See ibid, Chapter 15; and see also Sir Rupert Cross, Evidence, 
London, 1979, Chapter XI.
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have been acknowledged on the basis of overriding public 
interest; and it is accordingly accepted, for example, that 
privilege attaches to communications between lawyer and client . 
Privilege has always been denied, however, in other professional 
relationships involving the communication of confidential infor­
mation (such as those between doctor and patient, confessor and 
2
penitent ). Privilege has likewise been refused to confidential 
communications between the journalist and his source of infor­
mation; and the result is that any journalist who is called 
upon to testify regarding an investigation he has conducted in 
the course of his professional duties is guilty of contempt of 
court if he refuses to answer. Journalists may therefore be 
compelled to disclose the identity of their sources: and this 
poses an incalculable threat to freedom of expression. The 
fear of future identification is likely to deter many a poten­
tial 'source' from approaching the media with his information; 
and the result of compelling disclosure, accordingly, is that 
'the press's sources of information [may] dry up and the public
[may] be deprived of being informed of many matters of great 
3
public importance' .
The practical significance and truth of this dictum could not 
be more graphically demonstrated than by reference to the Water­
gate affair in the United States, which led ultimately to the 
resignation of President Nixon., If reporters on the Washington 
Post and New York Times had been compelled to disclose the
1. See Attorney-General v Mulholland; Attorney-General v Foster,
[1963] 2 Q.B. 477, further discussed at p 1111 et seq.
2. See ibid.
3. British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd, [1980]
3 W.L.R. 774 at 836, per Lord Scarman.
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identity of their source , code-named "Deep Throat", it is 
doubtful whether much of the information disclosed through their 
investigations would ever have come to public light. In the 
graphic words of Lord Denning, M.R., approved by Lord Scarman 
in the House of Lords, the journalist's obligation to disclose 
his sources to avoid conviction for contempt carries with it 
the threat that ' [w]rongdoing would not be disclosed ... and 
that [ m]isdeeds in the corridors of power ... would never be 
made known'^.
From the viewpoint of society, therefore, the immunity of
journalists from the duty to disclose their souces is of the
utmost importance and is an essential pre-condition for
investigative journalism and the free flow of information.
From the viewpoint of the individual journalist, moreover, the
immunity is also of fundamental importance: for it is a canon
of journalistic professional ethics that sources should never
be disclosed. The obligation to do so imposed by the law of
contempt accordingly places the journalist in an invidious
position; and many reporters have suffered imprisonment for
3
contempt rather than betray their professional integrity .
The rule which thus impales the individual journalist on the
1. The proceedings in which immunity from disclosure was 
accorded these journalists - in the exceptional circum­
stances in issue - is further discussed below.
2. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 804, per 
Lord Salmon, approving this dictum of Lord Denning, M.R. 
in the earlier proceedings in the Court of Appeal.
3. See, for example, Attorney-General v Mulholland, supra, 
and New York Times Co v New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), 
discussed further at p 1153.
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sharp horns of an insoluble dilemma as to where his duty lies 
thus clearly has an immediate and deep personal significance 
for all those involved in reporting for the media.
In the United Kingdom - the source of origin of the common
law of contempt in this context - the practical significance
of the rule has recently been highlighted by a controversial
1
decision of the House of Lords ; and by the enactment of the 
Contempt of Court Act, 1981 - which ameliorates the rigour 
of the common law in this regard to an appreciable extent.
In Nigeria itself, the common law continues in principle to 
apply; although certain recent decisions of the Lagos State 
High Court evidence a welcome refusal to abide by the common 
law rule in the light of the constitutional guarantee of free­
dom of expression. These decisions by no means eliminate all 
difficulties, however, and it is accordingly imperative to 
examine the common law in some detail in order to assess the 
extent of the threat which it poses to freedom of the media.
12.2. Nigerian Sources of Law in this Regard
The Nigerian law as regards this aspect of contempt is to be 
found firstly in the body of English common law which applies
throughout the country by virtue of the general reception pro-
2 3
cess previously described . In addition , the Criminal and
Penal Codes both contain provisions relevant to this topic.
1. This, of course, is in British Steel v Granada Television, 
supra, further discussed in due course.
2. See the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, in Chapter 
Two above.
3. The relationship between the common law and the provisions 
of the Codes has earlier been described in Chapter Eight.
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Thus, section 133(2) of the Criminal Code provides that '[a]ny
person who ... having been sworn or affirmed [as a witness in
proceedings] refuses without lawful excuse to answer a question
... is guilty of a simple offence and liable to imprisonment for 
1
three months' . Furthermore, section 142 of the Penal Code
renders it an offence, punishable by imprisonment for up to six
months or by fine of up to £20 or both, for any person 'being
legally bound to answer questions put to him on any subject by
any public servant in the exercise of the lawful powers of such 
2
public servant' to refuse to answer such a question.
In general, however, and in the light of the fact that it is 
the unwritten contempt jurisdiction which is most frequently 
invoked in practice, it is clearly the common law (with its 
unlimited penalties) which is the most important source of 
Nigerian law in this context.
Unfortunately, however, Nigerian precedents on the ambit of 
the common law rule obliging journalists to disclose their 
sources are minimal. Certain recent decisions (of the High 
Court of Lagos State) ruling against the constitutionality 
of the obligation are of great importance and are further 
analysed in some depth in due course. To understand the 
nature and extent of the common law obligation, it is first 
necessary, however, to have regard to English authorities.
The common law in this context has recently been clarified 
by an important decision of the House of Lords - British
1. s 133(2), Criminal Code, Cap 42 (Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958).
2. s 142, Penal Code, Cap 89, (Laws of Northern Nigeria, 
1963).
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1
Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd - and no proper 
insight into the common law can be obtained without reference 
to this judgment. Accordingly, no apology is made for the fact 
that a considerable portion of the discussion which follows is 
centred around English authorities in general (and the vital 
Granada decision in particular). This is imperative not only 
in order to understand the common law but also because it pro­
vides a background which is essential bo full appreciation of
2
the Nigerian cases concerning the constitutionality of the law .
In addition, it should always be remembered that there is con­
siderable cogency in the view that the Nigerian courts are
still bound by decisions of the House of Lords interpreting 
3
the common law ; and this, of course, gives an added measure 
of significance to the Granada decision.
The first point which should be noting in examining the common 
law is that - although the law's refusal to extend testimonial 
privilege to journalists has recently been emphasised in the 
Granada case - there is nevertheless a considerable volume of 
common law authority which may be interpreted as affording 
some measure of support for such journalistic immunity. These 
authorities are accordingly worth canvassing in outline in order 
to place the rejection of the privilege in appropriate perspective.
1. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L. (E.)).
2. Thus, in what is perhaps the most important of the Nigerian 
cases in this context, Adikwu and others v Federal House of 
Representatives of the National Assembly and others, [1982] 3 
N.C.L.R. 394, the court refers in large measure to the 
Granada decision: and it would not be possible to appre­
ciate the significance of the Nigerian court's view of the 
case, nor of the value of the Nigerian decision as a pre­
cedent, without having (in the first instance) a sound 
grasp of Granada.
3. See the section on the Sources of Nigerian Law, at p 161 et seq.
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12.3. Support for Testimonial Privilege for Journalists at 
Common Law
The common law reflects certain limited support for the prin­
ciple that journalists should not be compelled to disclose 
their sources of information. This support is to be found 
primarily in the judgments of Lord Denning, M.R. (in the Court
of Appeal) and Lord Salmon (in the House of Lords) in British
1
Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd ; and - to a lesser 
extent - in the so-called 'newspaper rule' and in the paucity 
of cases in which journalists have, in fact, been compelled to 
disclose their sources in the past. Each category of support 
now merits some examination.
12.3.1. The judgment of Lord Denning, M.R. in Granada
It needs no further emphasis that the Granada decision is of 
great importance in this study: and it is accordingly appro­
priate to set out the facts of the decision at the outset.
In brief, an employee of the Corporation ('B.S.C.'), who
was apparently motivated by a keen sense of indignation and 
2
injustice , "leaked" some 250 confidential documents to 
Granada Television ('Granada'), so as to let the public know 
that the steel strike then current could not be blamed entirely 
on trades union' intransigence but had at least in part been 
caused by mismanagement coupled with government intervention 
(notwithstanding public disclaimers - by both management and
1. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L. (E.)).
2. Ibid, at 798, per Lord Denning, M.R.
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government - to the contrary). Granada promised this 'source' 
that it would not reveal his identity.
The television company decided to utilize some 27 of these
confidential documents ('the Steel Papers') in a programme (to
be broadcast on 4 February 1980, as part of its World in Action
series) on the national steel strike and its causes. It informed
B.S.C. of its intention to do so on the day before the broadcast
and invited B.S.C. (through its Chairman) to take part in the
programme. The invitation was accepted, and the Chairman
answered a number of questions based upon the Papers in the
course of the broadcast. B.S.C. made no attempt to obtain an
1
injunction precluding its transmission .
The following day, however, B.S.C. sought undertakings against
further use of the documents and for their return from Granada.
2
The Steel Papers were subsequently returned to B.S.C. - but 
in a 'mutilated' state: all markings which could have identified 
the person from whom Granada had obtained them having been re­
moved. B.S.C. thereupon applied for an order compelling Granada 
to disclose the names of those who had supplied them with the 
Steel Papers.
In the court a quo, Sir Robert Megarry, V.C. ruled in favour 
of granting the order sought. On appeal against this ruling,
1. Granada subsequently conceded that if such an injunction 
had been sought, the broadcast would have been stopped. 
This concession was most unfortunate: for it not only 
elicited general disapproval by the courts of its con­
duct but also obscured consideration of the important 
question of the public interest in the disclosure of 
B.S.C.'s 'parlous' condition (further described below).
2. This was after Oliver, J. (on 6 February) had granted an 
ex parte injunction against further publication.
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the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision; and 
Lord Denning, M.R. concurred in this conclusion. His judgment 
is nevertheless notable, however, for the degree of support 
it evinces for the general principle that journalists should 
not be compelled to disclose their sources.
Lord Denning thus emphasised that 'the court has never ... 
compelled a newspaper to disclose the name of its informant 
... [except] in ... Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster 
... where on balance the public interest in compelling dis­
closure outweighed the public interest in protecting the sources 
2
of information' . He further declared that English (and some
3United States' authorities ) indicated that the courts were
'reaching towards the principle [that] [t]he public has a
right of access to information which is of public concern ...
[and that] [i]n support of this right ..., the newspapers should
not in general be compelled to disclose their sources of infor- 
4
mation' . On the other hand, however, he also took pains to 
stress that this principle is not absolute? and that the journa­
list has no privilege in_ law which entitles him to refuse dis­
closure. The courts accordingly have power to order disclosure 
in appropriate circumstances: and the criterion for determining 
whether such order should indeed be made lies (in Lord Denning's
1. [1963] 2 Q.B. 477, further discussed in due course. The
vital public interests allegedly in issue were those of 
national security.
2. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 803.
3. The important United States' authorities on this question
are further canvassed in due course. Those cited by Lord
Denning, M.R. were Garland v Torre, Baker v F & F
Investment, Democratic National Committee v McCord, and 
Branzburg v Hayes (all of which are fully cited below).
4. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 805.
-1098-
view) in the degree of responsibility displayed by the media:
1
so that, 'if a newspaper should act irresponsibly, ... it for-
2
feits its claim to protect its sources of information' . On
the facts of the case (as further explained in due course),
Lord Denning, M.R. believed that Granada had failed to exercise
3
the requisite responsibility ; and that it had accordingly 
forfeited its claim to the immunity it would otherwise have 
enjoyed.
12.3.2. The judgment of Lord Salmon in the Granada case
Whilst Lord Denning, M.R. thus evidences clear support for a general 
principle of source immunity (subject, however, to the obliga­
tion to act responsibly), the judgment of Lord Salmon in the 
Granada case, by contrast, contains no such caveat: and is a 
trenchant affirmation of the importance of source immunity 
and its vital role in ensuring a free flow of information to 
society.
Lord Salmon's judgment thus opens with the ringing declara­
tion that 'a free press is one of the pillars of freedom in ...
4
any ... democratic society' .„ It then continues:
'A free press reports matters of 
general public importance, and 
cannot, in law, be under any obli­
gation, save in exceptional circum-
1. Lord Denning, M.R. subsequently (at 805, ibid) made it clear 
that his observations applied equally to television (and thus, 
presumably, would extend also to radio).
2. Ibid.
3. The need for responsibility is considered further at p 1128 et s
4. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 836.
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stances, to disclose the iden­
tity of the persons who supply it 
with the information appearing in 
its reports.
It has been accepted for over 100 
years that if this immunity did 
not exist, the press's sources 
of information would dry up and 
the public would be deprived of 
being informed of many matters 
of great public importance: this 
should not be allowed to happen 
in any free country1.
1
Turning to the relevant authorities, Lord Salmon acknowledged
2
that the 'newspaper rule' had always been applied, in the past,
in the context of libel proceedings, but submitted that this
was purely fortuitous and that there was no reason, in principle,
3
why the rule should be so limited,. He cited with approval that 
portion of the judgment of Lord Denning, M.R. in the earlier 
Court of Appeal proceedings which emphasises that 'newspapers 
should not in general be compelled to disclose their sources
4
of information' , because - if this were not so - '[t]heir 
sources would dry up, [w]rongdoing would not be disclosed ...
5
and [m] isdeeds in the corridors of power ... would never be 
made k n o w n ' H e  also stressed, as further explained in due 
course, that the only cases in which the media had been compelled 
to disclose their sources in the past were those in which vital
1. Ibid, at 836.
2. The significance of the 'newspaper rule' is further discussed 
in the following sub-section,of this study.
3. See British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 839 - 840; 
and see also p 1105, below.
4. Ibid, at 804 (per Lord Denning, M.R.) and at 840 (per Lord 
Salmon).
5. Ibid, at 840. Lord Salmon further stated that he would 
add to 'misdeeds', 'serious faults and mistakes'.
6. Ibid.
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interests of national security were at stake ; and declared in 
categoric terms :
'The immunity of the press to reveal 1 
its sources of information save in 
exceptional circumstances is in the 
public interest, and has been so 
accepted by the courts for so long 
that ... it is wrong now to sweep 
this immunity away'.
3
In his view, there were 'no circumstances in th[e] case which 
have ever before deprived or should ever deprive the press of 
[this] immunity; and he concluded by warning :
'The freedom of the press depends 
upon this immunity. Were it to dis­
appear so would the sources from 
which its information is obtained; 
and the public would be deprived 
of much of the information to which 
the public of a free nation is en­
titled' .
4
This judgment of Lord Salmon represents the high water mark of 
support for the principle that journalists - at common law - 
cannot in general be compelled to disclose their sources of 
information. It is, however, a dissenting view - no matter 
how emphatically declared - and cannot prevail over the clear 
conclusion of the majority to the opposite effect^. It should,
1. These were Attorney-General v Clough, [1963] 1 Q.B. 773 and
Attorney-General v Mulholland/Foster, [1963] 2 Q.B. 447,
further discussed below.
2. In Lord Salmon's view, only national security has been recog­
nised to date as giving rise to such 'exceptional circum­
stances'; though his Lordship was prepared to acknowledge 
that 'national security would not necessarily always be 
the only special circumstances (sic)'. See British Steel
v Granada Television, supra, at 846.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. See p 1114 et seq.
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however, also be noted that although this judgment (and that 
of Lord Denning) comprise the clearest express judicial support 
for source immunity, implicit support for the principle may 
also be gleaned from two other features of common law: the 
'newspaper rule' and the paucity of past precedent compelling 
disclosure.
12.3.3. The significance of the 'newspaper rule*
A measure of implicit support for the existence of a testi­
monial privilege for journalists at common law is to be found
in the so-called 'newspaper rule'. This principle (which evolved
1
through a number of different decisions ) provides that 'in 
libel actions against newspapers, interrogatories directed
2
at discovering the source of information are not permitted' .
This was acknowledged as 'an exception to the rule requiring 
a defendant to disclose the source of his information[in defama-
3
tion proceedings]where he pleads either privilege or fair comment' .
The reasons for the exception are not entirely clear ; and dif-
5
ferent grounds have been emphasised on various occasions . In
1. See Parnell v Walter (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 441; Elliott v 
Garrett [l902] 1 K.B. 870; Plymouth Mutual Co-operative 
and Industrial Society Ltd v Traders' Publishing Asso­
ciation Ltd [1906] 1 K.B. 403; Adams v Fisher (1914) 30
T.L.R. 288; Lyle-Samuel v Odhams Ltd [1920] 1 K.B. 135;
and South Suburban Co-operative Society Ltd v Orum [1937]
2 K.B. 690.
2. See British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 830, 
per Viscount Dilhorne.
3. See Lyle-Samuel v Odhams Ltd, supra, per Bankes, L.J.
4. See, for example, Lyle-Samuel, ibid, at 144 (per Scrutton,
L.J.) and South Suburban Co-operative Society Ltd v Orum, 
supra, at 703 (per Scott, L.J.).
5. Thus, 'it has sometimes been held that the name of the in­
formant was irrelevant: see Parnell v Walter [supra] ... 
and Adams v Fisher j~ supra] ' . (See British Steel v Granada
continued ..................
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essence, however, the rule is founded on policy considerations,
described - in the Australian case of McGuiness v Attorney-
1
General of Victoria - as follows :
'The foundation of the rule is the 
special position of those publishing 
and conducting newspapers, who accept 
responsibility for and are liable in 
respect of the matters contained in 
their journals, and the desirability 
of protecting those who contribute 
to their columns from the consequen­
ces of unnecessary disclosure of 
their identity'.
2
In 1949, however, the principle ceased to apply to newspapers
alone, as the Rules of the Supreme Court (implementing a
3
recommendation of the Porter Committee on Defamation ) were
changed to introduce a general prohibition on 'interrogatories
as to a defendant's sources of information or grounds of belief
in all actions for libel and slander where fair comment or
4
publication on a privileged occasion [are] pleaded' . The 
reason for this change was that the Committee believed that 
'such interrogatories added considerably to the cost of liti­
gation, imposed considerable hardship on a defendant and were 
seldom of any practical value"*. The rule thus ceased to give 
special protection to newspapers alone: and this has greatly
Television, supra, at 848, per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton). 
In Adam v Fisher, supra, Buckley, L.J. further explained 
that there were two possible reasons for the rule: first, 
that the object of such interrogatories might be to obtain
the name of the informant in order to sue him, and that was 
improper; and, secondly, that disclosure of the informant's 
identity was not in the public interest.
1. (1940) 63 C.L.R. 73
2. Ibid, at 104, per Dixon, J.
3. Cmd. 7536, 1948, at para. 182.
4. See British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 831, per
Viscount Dilhorne.
5. See ibid.
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exacerbated the controversy surrounding its significance in 
the context of more general source immunity.
It has been contended on a number of occasions that the 
evolution of the newspaper rule - though initially confined to 
specific defences in defamation proceedings - reflected a 
'development which, in reason and logic, should not stop at 
discovery, but should supply a general justification for with­
holding the names of contributors and the sources of informa-
2
tion at all stages of any legal proceeding' . This argument,
3
however, was forcefully rejected in the McGuiness case, in 
which Dixon, J. emphatically declared that :
'[t]he answer is that it is not a 
rule of evidence but a practice 
of refusing in an action of libel 
against the publisher, etc., of a 
newspaper to compel discovery of 
the name of his informants. It 
'rests not on a principle of privi­
lege but on the limitations of dis­
covery' '.
4
The argument that the newspaper rule has generated a general
privilege against source-disclosure by the media has since been
equally firmly rejected by the English courts. Thus, for
5
example, in Attorney-General v Clough , Lord Parker, C.J.
1. See, in particular, McGuiness v Attorney-General of 
Victoria, supra, and British Steel v Granada Television, 
supra. Both are further discussed below.
2. McGuiness v Attorney-General of Victoria, supra, at 104 - 
105, emphasis supplied.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, emphasis again supplied.
5. [1963] 1 Q.B. 773, further discussed below.
-1104-
emphasis ed that ' the principle had been applied only in inter­
locutory matters, in which the court's primary concern is with 
the extent of proper disclosure and in which it accordingly has
commensurately wide-ranging discretion to exclude or admit
1
particular evidence' . This could therefore, in his Lordship's
view, have 'no bearing on the obligation to disclose at trial
2 3
itself' . Furthermore , in British Steel Corporation v Granada
4
Television Ltd , the possibility of any extension of the news­
paper rule was emphatically denied by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Lord Fraser's reasoning proceeded on five grounds :
(i) the rule applied only to libel actions and could not be 
extended to other types of proceedings^;
(ii) the rule applied only at the interlocutory stage;
(iii)since 1949, the rule had applied to all defendants in 
defamation proceedings and not merely to newspapers;
(iv) the limits of the rule were uncertain (in that there 
was doubt, for example, as to whether it applied to 
freelance journalists or the writer of a libellous 
letter 'to the editor' subsequently published by a 
newspaper) and his Lordship was 'reluctant to support a
1. Ibid, at 790.
2. Ibid.
3. See also, for example, Attorney-General v Mulholland and 
Foster, [1963] 2 Q.B. 477 (C.A.), at 490, where Lord Denning, 
M.R. emphasised that the rule was based purely on practical 
considerations, rather than any point of principle.
4. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L.(E.))
5. He was supported in this regard by Lord Wilberforce (at
825, ibid), Viscount Dilhorne (at 833, ibid) and Lord 
Russell of Killowen (at 854, ibid).
6. Lord Fraser thus refused to follow recent New Zealand
authority (further examined below) to the effect that
the rule is of general application and applies in all
manner of proceedings.
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rule whose boundaries [were] so ill defined' ;
(v) the rule was subject to a number of exceptions - the
extent of which was uncertain - and it was accordingly 
difficult to ascertain whether any such limitation was 
properly applicable^.
The only one of their Lordships prepared to acknowledge that
the newspaper rule does indeed have a broad-ranging ambit was
Lord Salmon (the sole dissentient in the Granada proceedings
3
as a whole). He conceded that 'the long line of cases recited
by ... Lord Fraser ... which laid down "the newspaper rule"
that the press cannot be obliged to disclose its source of in-
4
formation on discovery were all cases of libel1 . In his
Lordship's view, however, this had no particular significance
and stemmed simply from the fact that 'the vast majority of
the litigation in which the press has ever been concerned
5
consists of libel actions' . He stressed that there was no
imaginable reason 'why the newspaper rule should be confined to
[such p r o c e e d i n g s ] a n d  cited with approval the following
important passage from the New Zealand case of Broadcasting
7
Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd
1. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 849.
2. See ibid, at 850.
3. See the authorities cited at pllOl n 1, above: most of
which were expressly mentioned by Lord Fraser, at 848 - 
849, ibid.
4. Ibid, at 839.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, emphasis supplied.
7. [1980] 1 N.Z.L.R. 163.
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(which involved a claim for slander of goods in addition to a 
claim for defamation) :
'Does the newspaper rule apply 
to the one cause of action as 
well as to the other? The ans­
wer is to be found, in my opinion, 
upon the general purpose of the 
rule, based as it is on public 
interest rather than the private 
purposes of the news media. And 
I do not think there can be any 
reason of public policy or of 
logic or of fairness for draw­
ing a distinction. The rule 
itself is not really concerned 
with the form of litigation 
but with supporting a proper 
flow of information for use by 
the news media'.
1
Lord Salmon expressly endorsed this view, declaring his agree­
ment with the New Zealand judge that '"this newspaper rule" is
2
not confined to libel or any other form of action' . He accord­
ingly concluded that :
'in an action against the press for 
discovery, the plaintiff cannot 
and never could obtain, and never 
has obtained, from the defendant 
his source of information'.
3
Lord Salmon stood alone in this view, however, and the judgment 
of the Lords as a whole makes it clear that the newspaper 
rule has only limited significance: and that it has not given 
rise to a more general and wide-ranging testimonial privilege 
for journalists.
1. Ibid, at 166 - 167, per Wodehouse, J.
2. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 840.
3. Ibid.
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12.3.4 The significance of the paucity of precedent 
compelling disclosure
It has been contended that the paucity of precedents in which 
the media have been compelled to disclose their sources of in­
formation has considerable significance; and that it provides 
evidence of a general opinio juris that such disclosure should 
not be ordered. Thus, in the Granada case, the television 
company emphasised that there had been many leaks of confiden­
tial information to the press in the past: and that there was a 
remarkable dearth of authority demonstrating the media being 
ordered to disclose the sources of such 'leaks'. Granada con­
tended that this could be explained only on the basis that the
1
law was against compelling such disclosure .
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton acknowledged the cogency of this
argument,, but nevertheless had little hesitation in rejecting
it. He pointed out that there were many reasons which could
plausibly account for the absence of orders for disclosure:
quite apart from the opinio juris urged by Granada. Thus,
where the 'leak' was high-placed in government, for example,
disclosure might have led 'to scandal and publicity more
2
damaging than the leak' . In illustration, he cited events
in 1797, when a leak to the press was thought by Canning (then
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to have been
3
made by the king himself .
1. Ibid, at 850.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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In other instances, the reason for non-disclosure might well
(in his Lordship's view) have lain in the fact that the 'iden-
1
tity of the informant was not material for the action' : in
the sense that appropriate relief could be obtained without
2
this information. Thus, in Abernethy v Hutchinson , in which 
the Lancet had published certain lectures delivered by a pro­
fessor of medicine to his students (clearly 'leaked' to the 
journal by one of the latter), whilst it was true that the 
court had merely prohibited further publication without making 
any order for the disclosure of the identity of the informant 
(and had even indicated that it had no right to compel such 
disclosure), this was readily understandable - according to 
Lord Fraser - on the basis that the question '[d]id not appear
to have been argued; and [that], in any event, ... the identity
3
of the informant was [not] material for the action' . Substan­
tially the same explanation could be put forward (in his Lord-
4
ship's view) in relation to the case of Prince Albert v Strange , 
where the defendants had sought to publish certain etchings - by 
the plaintiff and Queen Victoria - which had been obtained in 
breach of confidence. The court had granted an injunction 
against publication, but had made no order for the 'discovery 
of the name of the person who had handed over the etchings to 
the defendants'^. Again, according to Lord Fraser, the fact
1. Ibid.
2. 1 H. & Tw. 28
3. See again British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 
850.
4. 1 H. & Tw. 1
5. British Steel v Granada Television, supra.
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that the plaintiff had not sought such an order did not mean 
that he was not entitled to such relief in law: but simply 
that it was not necessary for his primary aim of preventing 
publication. Lord Fraser accordingly concluded that 'the 
absence of precedents for the use of discovery for this pur­
pose against the press, ... whilst certainly striking, [could]
be readily explained otherwise than on the ground that discovery
1
was not available as a remedy' .
This view of these decisions was endorsed by Lord Wilberforce,
who agreed that disclosure of the identity of the 'leak' was
not ordered in either of these cases because it was not material
to the plaintiffs - whose principal concern (in each instance)
2
had been to preclude further (or initial) publication .
Lord Salmon, however, took a radically different view of the 
paucity of precedent for the enforced disclosure by the media 
of their sources of information. He stressed that 'the only
3
two cases in which the press ha[d] ever been ordered by [the]
4
courts to name its source of information' were those arising
5
out of the Vassall inquiry ; and emphasised that this departure 
from the norm could be readily explained by the fact that dis­
closure had there been ordered 'to protect the security of the 
state'^ .
1. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 850.
2. See ibid, at 824 - 825.
3. It may be queried whether Lord Salmon was entirely correct
in citing this figure. It appears to overlook the claim
for immunity which arose before the Parnell Commission in 
1888 (C. 5891) and which was 'flatly rejected by Sir James 
Hannen sitting with two other judges'. See ibid, at 822, 
per Lord Wilberforce, and at 831 (per Viscount Dilhorne).
4. Ibid, at 841.
5. These cases are further discussed at p 1111 et seq.
6. British Steel v Granada Corporation, supra.
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No twithstanding Lord Salmon's forceful dissent on this point, 
it seems clear that - at common law - no particular significance 
can be attached to the absence of practical instances of the 
press being ordered to divulge its sources of information. It 
may nevertheless be queried whether the majority of the Law 
Lords were correct in explaining the Abernethy and Strange cases 
on the basis they did; and whether the view of Lord Salmon - that 
disclosure was not ordered because the law did not entitle the 
plaintiffs to such relief - is not the more correct. There is 
undoubtedly a certain air of unreality about the majority's 
assertion that the plaintiffs, in these cases, would not have 
been interested in knowing the identity of the 'leaks'.
Thus, in the Abernethy case - to take the first example - it 
seems difficult to accept that the aggrieved physician would 
not have wanted to know the name of the student who had so be­
trayed his confidence; and the trial court's ruling that it did 
not have power to order disclosure should not be so lightly dis­
missed as Lord Fraser suggests. Likewise, in the Strange 
decision, the prohibition of publication would doubtless have 
served the plaintiff's main aim - but again it seems passing 
strange that Prince Albert should not have sought to ascertain 
the identity of the culprit (unless, of course, he had been ad­
vised that the law did not entitle him to this information).
The majority judgment of the House of Lords in the Granada 
case is accordingly open to certain criticism. It must never­
theless be clearly acknowledged that its view - that no signi­
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ficance can be attached to the paucity of precedent - stands 
at present as the authoritative pronouncement of the common law 
in this regard.
12.4. Testimonial Privilege for Journalists Rejected at 
Common Law
Notwithstanding the limited support for source immunity evinced 
in the preceding section, the balance of authority is clearly 
to the opposite effect; and the existence of a testimonial privi­
lege for journalists has been firmly rejected at common law.
It is thus apparent that at common law the media may claim no
1
privilege against disclosure of their sources - as emphasised
by both the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Mulholland 
2
and Foster and by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in
3
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd .
The case of Attorney-General v Mulholland/Foster 'arose out of 
the conviction of an Admiralty clerk, William Vassal, on
4
charges of communicating secret information to the Russians' . 
Considerable publicity surrounded these proceedings: and it 
was suggested that Vassall's mode and style of living ought to 
have alerted the security services to the risk he presented. 
Considerable public disquiet was thereby aroused, and the Home 
Secretary accordingly set up a tribunal of inquiry (under the
1. It must always be remembered that this is subject to the
proviso that the identity of the source is relevant and
necessary, as further discussed at p 1126 etseq.
2. Attorney-General v Mulholland; Attorney-General v Foster, 
[1963] 2 Q.B. 477 (C.A.). Also relevant in this regard is 
the decision of the Divisional Court in Attorney-General v 
Clough, [1963] 1 Q.B. 773, briefly described in due course.
3. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L.(E.)).
4. Miller, op cit, p 58.
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chairmanship of Lord Radcliffe) to inquire, inter alia, into
'any allegations which reflected upon the honour and integrity
of persons who, as ministers, naval officers or civil servants
were concerned in the case, and into any neglect of duty by
persons who were responsible for Vassall's conduct and his
1
employment on security work' .
In the course of its inquiry, the tribunal called upon several 
journalists to disclose the sources on which they had relied 
for particular allegations. Mulholland - who had written, 
inter alia, that 'it was the sponsorship of two high-ranking
officials which led to Vassall avoiding the strictest part of
3
the Admiralty's security vetting' - refused to do so, as
did Foster, who had alleged that 'V. was known to have bought
4
women's clothing in the West End' . The chairman of the tri-
1. Ibid.
2. Another of the journalists called upon to testify was Des­
mond Clough, of the Daily Sketch, who had written an arti­
cle asserting that 'Vassall's spying led to Russian trawler 
spying fleets turning up with uncanny accuracy in the pre­
cise area of the secret N.A.T.O. sea exercise''. (Attorney- 
General v Clough, [1963] 1 Q.B. 773, at 776). Clough 
refused to identify his source for this allegation (on
the ground that he would not only be breaking trust in so 
doing, but would also jeopardise his own career and that 
of other defence correspondents, who would find it diffi­
cult to obtain further 'off-the-record' information from 
Whitehall). He was convicted of contempt: on the basis 
that journalists have no testimonial privilege in law; 
and that there was nothing in the particular circumstances 
to justify the exercise of judicial discretion against 
compelling disclosure, especially as the tribunal had 
considered the information of some importance in the inter­
ests of national security. He was sentenced to imprison­
ment for six months: a penalty which graphically illus­
trates the harshness of the common law rule.
3. Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster, supra, at 477 -
478.
4. Ibid, at 478.
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bunal certified that the questions were relevant and necessary; 
and proceedings for contempt were instituted against the journa­
lists. Both were convicted; and they were sentenced to six and
1
three months' imprisonment respectively .
On appeal, Lord Denning, M.R. agreed that the questions were
2
relevant and necessary . He rejected the contention that 'a
journalist has a privilege by law entitling him to refuse to
3
give his sources of information' , and emphasised that '[t]he
only profession ... which is given a privilege from disclosing
4
information to a court of law is the legal profession' .
5
He discounted the relevance of the 'newspaper rule' ; and, 
having briefly canvassed the few authorities^ on the question 
of source immunity for the press, had no hesitation in con­
cluding that :
'There is no privilege known to the 
law by which a journalist can refuse 
to answer a question which is relevant 
to the inquiry and is one which, in 
the opinion of the judge, it is proper 
for him to be asked'.
7
g
Donovan, L.J. agreed - subject only to the caveat that judicial
9
discretion should not be 'tied hand and foot' and a judge obliged to
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, at 488 and 489.
3. Ibid, at 489.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, at 490; and see also p 1101 etseq.
6. Those cited were the 'Parnell' case, The Times, 20 February,
1889; the Irish case of O'Brennan v Tully (1935) 69 Ir. L.T. 
115; and the Australian case of McGuiness v Attorney-General 
of Victoria, (1940) 63 C.L.R. 73.
7. Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster, supra, at 491.
8. Ibid, at 492,
9. Ibid.
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to punish as contempt any refusal to answer a question which
is technically admissible but where 'more harm than good [might]
1
result from compelling a disclosure' .
Dankwerts, L.J. also concurred, emphasising that he thought
2
the law was 'perfectly clear' on the point of journalistic 
privilege.
3
In British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd (the
4
facts of which have previously been described ), it will be
recalled that Sir Robert Megarry, V.C. (in the court a quo)
5
ruled in favour of granting the order sought ; and that this
6was upheld on appeal by Granada to the Court of Appeal . On
further appeal to the House of Lords, the majority again ruled
7
in favour of ordering disclosure. Three of the Law Lords 
expressly and emphatically rejected the existence of any testi­
monial privilege for journalists; whilst the fourth believed
g
disclosure essential in the circumstances . Only Lord Salmon 
(as explained above)’ took a different view: and asserted that 
the media are indeed entitled to source immunity.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, at 492. Note that the sentences imposed by the trial 
judge were also confirmed on appeal.
3. [1980 ] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L.(E.)).
4. See p 1095.
5. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 796.
6. Ibid, at 775.
7. These were Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord
Fraser of Tullybelton.
8. See the judgment of Lord Russell of Killowen, further briefly
described below.
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The strongest statement of principle against testimonial privi­
lege for journalists is to be found in the judgment of Lord Wil­
berforce, who emphatically declared that :
1 the media have no immunity based 
on public interest which protects 
them from the obligation to dis­
close in a court of law their
sources of information, where such
disclosure is necessary in the
interests of justice'.
1
2
He further emphasised that all past authorities are 'firmly
3
against [such] immunity' ; and that, to reverse them, would
'place journalists (how defined?) in a favoured and unique pos­
ition as compared with ... other recipients of confidential in­
formation and ... assimilate them to the police in relation to 
4
informers' - a departure from the status quo which his Lordship
5
saw no reason to justify .
Viscount Dilhorne agreed, pointing out that it was clear from 
the authorities that :
'[s]ave in respect of the adminis­
tration of interrogatories in libel 
and slander actions, newspapers have 
never been held to enjoy the privi­
lege of not being compellable to
1. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 822.
2. Ibid, at 822 - 823. These are the Parnell Commission case, 
the cases arising out of the Vassall inquiry, and McGuiness 
Attorney-General of Victoria. He was satisfied that the 
Mulholland and Foster cases were not simply the outcome of 
the exceptional security interests at stake (as had been con 
tended by Granada) and that dicta in the Court of Appeal sup 
porting immunity had to be read 'in the light of their deci­
sion, on the whole matter, that disclosure should be ordered
3. Ibid, at 823.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
-1116-
disclose the sources of their in­
formation. Every time that that 
claim has been put forward it has 
been rejected. [And] [ s] ince 1949 
newspapers no longer receive any 
special treatment with regard to 
interrogatories'.
1
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton further rejected the existence of 
any rule entitling the media to immunity from source disclosure 
as of right. He emphasised that 'the final decision on whether 
confidential information discloses such iniquity as to justify
2
its publication must be made by the courts and not by the press' .
Lord Russell of Killowen expressed his agreement with all 
these judgments; but also took pains to stress that his conclu­
sion was based in part on the particular circumstances of the 
case - especially the wrong which had been done to B.S.C., the 
fact that B.S.C. would otherwise have no effective remedy and
the danger that the concession of source immunity in this
3
instance 'would encourage the doing of injustice' .
In the light of these clear statements of principle, the dis­
senting voice of Lord Salmon - forceful and cogent though it 
may be - cannot be taken as representative of the common law 
in any way. The rule that journalists enjoy no special testi­
monial privilege as of right is thus clear: and it remains
1. Ibid, at 833» See also the discussion of the 'newspaper rule', above.
2. Ibid, at 852, emphasis supplied. The significance of the
disclosure of iniquity is further discussed in due course.
3. Ibid, at 854.
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only to examine the exceptions and quasi-exceptions to it which 
the Law Lords seemed willing to acknowledge.
12.5. "Exceptions" to the Disclosure Obligation at Common Law
The judgments in British Steel Corporation v Granada Television 
1
Ltd do recognise that, at common law, there are certain excep­
tions and quasi-exceptions to the general obligation resting 
upon journalists to disclose their sources of information. Thus, 
it has been acknowledged that different considerations may apply 
to the exposure of misconduct and iniquity; and that (in other 
circumstances) the public interest in the free flow of informa­
tion may possibly be sufficiently strong as to outweigh the 
public interest in the proper administfcation of justice. More­
over, the latter interest has its own limitations: and, accord­
ingly, may legitimately require only the disclosure of informa­
tion which is necessary for the proper determination of the 
proceedings. At the same time, it has also been stressed that - 
in order to qualify for the benefit of these "exceptions" - the 
media must themselves act 'responsibly' throughout. These 
ramifications of the general principle are further examined in 
turn below.
12.5.1. Possible source immunity for the exposure of misconduct
In the Court of Appeal proceedings in British Steel Corporation 
v Granada Television Ltd, it was emphasised by Templeman, L.J.
1. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L. (E.))
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that "the court will strive to uphold the immunity of the
1
media against discovery' : provided, however, that the media
2
do not mis-use the information they have obtained . He also 
indicated that even 'mis-use' is not the end of the matter, 
however, for 'if there is an overwhelming reason to justify 
publication ... the media may be allowed both to publish the
3
information and [to] conceal the source' . It is, of course, 
strongly arguable - though the point was not expressly canvas sed 
by Templeman, L.J. - that the exposure of misconduct would pro­
vide such an 'overwhelming reason' for publication: and that 
this dictum accordingly demonstrates implicit support for source 
immunity in such circumstances.
The issue was further examined (also in the Court of Appeal) by 
Watkin, L.J. who believed that the journalist's claim to 
immunity should be governed by the following principles :
(i) if he commits a crime to obtain information then - even
4
if the object of publication is to 'expose iniquity' - 
he has no immunity;
(ii) if he commits a civil wrong by using confidential infor-
5
mation known to have been obtained in breach of contract
1. Ibid, at 811.
2. This aspect of the judgment is clearly relevant to the 
further question of the media's obligation to maintain
'responsibility' and is further examined at p 1128 et seq.
3. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 811.
4. Ibid, at 814.
5. In referring to 'breach of contract', Watkin- t L.J. was
clearly influenced by the facts of the Granada case and 
the 'mole's' breach of his contractual duty (arising 
from his employment) to B.S.C. It is submitted, however, 
that the principle is capable of wider formulation, and 
that 'breach of contract' should be read as extending to 
any breach of the duty of confidentiality, irrespective 
of its origin: whether contractual or otherwise.
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in order to expose a person 'against whom no iniquity is
alleged'^", he has no immunity;
(iii)if he commits a civil wrong 'for the purpose of exposing
... iniquity which, in the public interest, should be re-
2
vealed, his claim to press immunity should be granted' .
In the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce - whilst not prepared 
to accede to the more general principle that the exposure of 
misconduct entitles the media to maintain source secrecy - was 
at least willing to acknowledge that 'in cases where miscon­
duct exists, publication may legitimately be made even if dis-
3
closure involves a breach of confidence' . Accordingly, if 
B.S.C.'s actions could be viewed in this light, then publica­
tion of the Steel Papers would have been justified, notwithstand­
ing the fact that they had been obtained through a breach of 
confidence owed to the Corporation by its employee. In the 
particular circumstances, however, Lord Wilberforce was adamant
4
that B.S.C.'s conduct, at worst, amounted only to 'mismanagement' 
so that this pre-condition for lawful publication was not met.
The significance of this dictum of Lord Wilberforce is accordingly 
somewhat difficult to assess. It is clearly obiter; and - more­
over - is not directly addressed to the question whether the 
media may claim a testimonial privilege where it has brought
1. British Steel v Granada Television, supra.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, at 822. This statement is clearly concerned with 
the antecedent question of whether publication - in the 
first instance - is lawful. It may nevertheless have 
some significance in the context of source immunity, as 
further explained in the text below. It should also be 
recalled, as previously noted, that Granada had conceded 
that it had no right to publish - a concession it was 
compelled to make as a result of its reliance (in the 
alternative)on the privilege against self-incrimination: 
but which badly obscured this important issue.
4. Ibid.
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misconduct to public attention. Nevertheless, the judgment
does also acknowledge that different considerations apply to
the exposure of misconduct: and it may be possible to extrapolate
from this a measure of support for the exception so clearly
1
recognised by Watkin, L.J,.
Viscount Dilhorne also indicated that the exposure of ini­
quity may justify the publication of information obtained
2
through breach of confidentiality ; and the same analysis of 
the significance of this may be applied mutatis mutandis to 
his view.
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton went somewhat further. He pointed
out that Granada had conceded that publication of the Steel
3
Papers could have been prevented by injunction and that
1 [t ]he scope of the iniquity rule [ was] not [therefore] in 
4
issue' . However, he also took pains to stress that ' [i ]f 
[the Steel Papers ] had [revealed 'criminal conduct or anything
5
that could be described as iniquity' on the part of B.S.C. ] its 
disclosure would have been justified and not wrongful'^. This, 
of course, is substantially the same point as previously made 
by Lord Wilberforce and Viscount Dilhorne: that misconduct 
would have justified publication notwithstanding the 'mole's' 
breach of confidence to B.S.C. However, he then went on to
1. See p 1119 above.
2. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 829.
3. This unfortunate concession has previously been noted. One 
further aspect of it is that it enabled the majority to focus 
on the 'mole's' breach of confidence as the major issue: and 
thus explains, to some extent, how no fewer than three of the 
Law Lords were able to assert that the case had nothing to
do with freedom of the press. See ibid, at 821, 829 and 853.
4. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 852.
5. Ibid, at 851.
6. Ibid.
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assert that 'the existence of the [iniquity] rule should pro­
tect the press from being ordered to disclose the identity of
their source in any case where the behaviour of the source has 
1
been justified' . The qualification that the source's conduct 
must be 'justified' is somewhat ambiguous; and no further attempt 
is made in the judgment to elucidate it. Subject to this caveat 
(the practical significance of which is difficult to gauge),
Lord Fraser's dictum does appear to acknowledge that exposure 
of iniquity may generate immunity from the obligation generally 
resting upon the press to disclose its sources of information.
Lord Salmon agreed that the media have no obligation to disclose
their sources in instances in which they have succeeded in
exposing misconduct and iniquity. However, (in keeping with 
2
his general view ), he further stressed that 'it is a fallacy
[to consider] that the press's immunity from revealing its
sources of information is confined to cases in which-the. press
publishes information that a plaintiff has been "guilty of
crime or fraud or misconduct which ought to be laid bare in the 
3
public interest"' . He did not believe that B.S.C. had been 
guilty of any of the latter - but nevertheless thought that 
there was 'much else, even more important in all the circum­
stances, which called aloud to be revealed in the public in-
4 5
terest' ; and which it became Granada's 'moral duty' to reveal.
1. Ibid, at 852.
2. See p 1098 above.
3. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 843.
4. Ibid. Lord Salmon cites, by way of illustration, 'example
after example of failure to meet targets because of mechani­
cal breakdown and design faults'; the 'lateness and inaccu­
racy of export documentation ... which [was] costing ... 
the Corporation ... almost certainly millions of pounds'; 
plus 'errors of estimation up to £200 million'.
5. Ibid.
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The judgments in the Granada case thus evidence considerable 
support for the view that the exposure of iniquity does indeed 
entitle the media to source immunity. Unfortunately, however, 
by far the clearest statement to this effect is that of Watkin,
L.J. in the Court of Appeal - whilst the Law Lords themselves 
were considerably more circumspect (with the notable exception, 
of course, of Lord Salmon). Definitive pronouncement on whether 
this has been recognised as an exception to the general rule 
requiring disclosure is accordingly somewhat hazardous: but it 
is undoubtedly strongly arguable.
12.5.2. Possible source immunity for disclosure in the public 
interest
The judgments in the Granada decision - notwithstanding their 
1
general rejection of any right to source immunity on the part 
of the media - are nevertheless notable for the emphasis placed 
on the public interest in a free flow of information: and in 
their recognition that this depends to large extent on source 
immunity.
Thus, Watkin, L.J. (in the Court of Appeal), stressed the
vital role played by journalists generally in maintaing 'a free
2
and well informed society' ; and emphasised that 'legal constraints 
[should not be] needlessly placed upon [their] activities ...
1. This, of course, is subject to the notable exception of
Lord Salmon and (to a lesser extent) of Lord Denning and Watkin, L.J
2. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 814.
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[and that] [ s] ources [should not] be inhibited from passing
1
on what they believe the public ought to know' - for, if this
were to occur, 'it would react intolerably against the public 
2
interest' .
In the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce indicated that disclo-
3
sure should not lightly be ordered ; and stressed that the court,
in exercising its discretion in this regard, should remember
' [t]here is a public interest in the free flow of information,
4
the strength of which will vary from case to case' . This, it
need not be emphasised, is hardly a ringing declaration of the
fundamental importance of a free flow of information: but it
does at least show an awareness of the need for this; and
hence may be taken to imply that - in different circumstances
5
(particularly where no 'grievous wrong' of the kind suffered 
by B.S.C. was in issue) - the public interest in disclosure may 
possibly have dictated a different conclusion.
Likewise, Viscount Dilhorne conceded that there is indeed a 
'public interest in the free flow of information to the press'^,
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, at 826. Lord Wilberforce took pains to emphasise 
both judicial respect for journalistic confidence and the 
general importance of source immunity. He also stressed 
the exceptional facts of the particular proceedings, and 
declared that, in order to obtain a ruling compelling dis­
closure, the plaintiff would have to satisfy the court 
that he 'has a real grievance ... which he ought to be 
allowed to pursue and Iwhich ] outweigh [s]whatever public 
interest there may be in preserving the confidence'.
4. Ibid, at 827.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, at 829.
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which might be 'restricted, if not stopped, if the identity
1
of the [mole] ... [was] disclosed' : but thought that this, in
the particular circumstances, could not outweigh the equally
well recognised 'public interest in the preservation of pri-
2
vacy and confidentiality' .
The public interest in the free flow of information (though, 
in his Lordship's view, superceded in the particular circum­
stances by the need to preserve confidentiality within a busi­
ness organisation) was also emphasised by Lord Fraser of Tully- 
2
belton : whilst Lord Russell of Killowen likewise pointed to
the danger of the 'public interest in the free flow of infor- 
3
mation' being impaired through disclosure of media sources
4
(but thought that the 'gross wrong' done to B.S.C. necessi­
tated an order for disclosure in the instant case).
Lord Salmon's entire judgment is an emphatic affirmation of 
both the general principle of source immunity and of the vital 
public interest in the publication of the Steel Papers in the 
particular circumstances. Thus, in addition to the inefficiency 
and mismanagement earlier described^, Lord Salmon stressed that 
B.S.C. was in a 'parlous'^ condition - having incurred vast losses 
(the brunt of which fell on the taxpayer) and failing, despite
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, at 853.
3. Ibid, at 854.
4. Ibid.
5. See p. 1121, n. 4.
6. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 836.
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mass ive loans for investment, to match the performance and
1
output of its competitors . It followed that Granada (in his
view) had been right to consider that 'if any of [the Steel]
[P.]apers exposed the faults and mistakes which were causing
the immense losses made by B.S.C., it would be Granada's
public duty to disclose the contents of those papers to the 
2
public' . He further emphasised that '[t]he freedom of the
3
press depends on this immunity' : and that, '[w]ere it to 
disappear, so would the sources from which its information is
4
obtained' ; with the result that 'the public [would then] be 
deprived of much of the information to which the public of a 
free nation is entitled'"*. In short, in Lord Salmon's view, 
source immunity is in any circumstances an important safeguard 
of the public's right to be informed of the grave and weighty 
issues of the day. In the particular instance, a free flow of 
information to society was especially essential, for only in 
this way could the 'parlous' condition of B.S.C. be revealed 
and measures implemented to improve the position'^.
Lord Salmon stands alone in this viewpoint amongst the Law 
Lords. It is nevertheless noteworthy, however, that the re­
mainder of the House laid considerable emphasis on the impor-
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, at 837.
3. Ibid, at 846.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. See ibid, at 843. It is interesting to note that Lord 
Salmon was the only one of the Law Lords to advert to the 
fact that the broadcast may have had a salutary effect on 
B.S.C. His Lordship thus pointed out that - since the 
broadcast - 'much ha[d] been done to put B.S.C. on the 
road to recovery'.
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tance of a free flow of information to society via the media.
Thus, whilst clearly not prepared to concede that this conferred
a right to source immunity on the media, the Law Lords have
indeed indicated that it is an important consideration: and one
which should always be taken into account by the courts in
exercising their discretion as to whether to exonerate the
media from the obligation to disclose their sources. Hence,
it may be inferred that - in different circumstances, untainted
1
by any element of wrongdoing - the public interest in publi­
cation may well tip the balance in favour of according the 
media the source immunity on which the free flow of information 
to society so largely depends.
12.5.3. No obligation to disclose unnecessary information
It is not, perhaps, entirely apposite to examine - within the 
head of "exceptions" - the absence of any obligation to disclose 
information which is not necessary to the proceedings in question. 
The need for the information requested is a pre-condition to 
the obligation to disclose arising in the first instance: so 
that the absence of such need should not, strictly, be viewed 
as constituting an exception to an obligation already in force.
1. The wrong done to B.S.C. is a theme which constantly
recurs in the majority judgments: and there is accordingly 
considerable perspicacity in the comment (by Andrew Nicol, 
'British Steel Corporation v Granada: Naming Moles' [1980] 
Public Law, pp 163 - 168, p 165) that 'a striking feature of the 
case is its echo of the schoolboy's contempt for.the 
sneak'. It seems clear that this factor played a large 
part in the Lords' decision and that - without it - 
the outcome might possibly have been different.
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The practical outcome is, however, essentially the same: and 
the media (in circumstances where the information is not 
relevant or would make no difference to the outcome of proceed­
ings) have no obligation to disclose their sources.
The point has recently been graphically demonstrated by the
1
case of Attorney-General v Lundin . The defendant was a journa­
list who - following certain investigations conducted by him - 
published an article in Private Eye which resulted in the prose­
cution of a police sergeant under the Prevention of Corruption 
Act of 1906. During the course of this trial, the defendant 
refused to reveal his source of information (regarding a docu­
ment of particular importance for the prosecution) on the basis
that this 'would have been a breach of confidence and contrary
2
to his professional ethics as a journalist' . It so transpired,
however, that none of the prosecution witnesses was able to
provide any evidence of substance, so that the prosecution's
case was clearly tenuous in the extreme: and it was apparent
that 'revelation of the source of information could not have
3
assisted the Crown' . It was thus clear (by the time the defen­
dant was ordered, and refused, to answer the question) that 'his 
revealing of his source could not have served any purpose and
would have been rendered useless by the absence of other related
4
and essential evidence' . Accordingly, the court (in proceedings
1. The Times, 20 February, 1982.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Arlidge & Eady, op cit, p 202.
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for contempt instituted by the Attorney-General against the de­
fendant) - whilst emphasising that journalists have no right to 
immunity from disclosure of sources - concluded that, in the 
particular circumstances, no contempt had been committed. The 
answer to the question could serve no useful purpose: and the 
question was therefore unnecessary (even though relevant) - and 
the journalist was under no duty to answer it.
12.5.4. The need for responsibility on the part of the media
A further ramification of the common law obligation of source
disclosure and its possible exceptions emerges with particular
force through the various judgments in British Steel Corporation v
1
Granada Television Ltd . This is the duty of the media to act 
responsibly in their collection and dissemination of information: 
failing which they cannot expect judicial discretion to be exer­
cised in favour of granting source immunity.
The point was stressed with particular force by Lord Denning,
M.R. in the Court of Appeal. It may be recalled that Lord
Denning would have been prepared to grant Granada the immunity 
2
it sought - had it not been for its irresponsible behaviour: 
manifested (in Lord Denning's view) in its failure to give 
B.S.C. more warning of its intention to publish the Steel 
Papers, in the bullying tactics employed by it in interviewing 
the Chairman of B.S.C. in the course of the broadcast and -
1. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L. (E.)).
2. See p 1098 above.
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in particular - in its 'disgraceful mutilation' of the papers .
The need for responsibility on the part of the media as a
pre-condition to a successful claim for immunity was also
stressed by the House of Lords. Thus, the majority took pains
to emphasise the wrong done to B.S.C. and the fact that Granada
was party to that wrong: at least to the extent of its knowledge
that the Steel Papers had been obtained in breach of the 'mole's'
3
duty of confidence to his employer . Only Lord Salmon took a
different view - on the facts of the case - of Granada's alleged
irresponsibility. He thus expressly disapproved Lord Denning,
4
M.R.'s assessment of the facts in this regard , but - unfortu­
nately - made no further comment on whether he agreed with 
Lord Denning that the most important criterion for determining
1. It may be recalled that Granada had removed all marks from 
the Papers(which might have served to identify the 'mole') 
before returning them to B.S.C.
2. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 805. Essen­
tially the same view was also expressed by Watkin, L.J., 
who went so far as to state that ' b[y]their act of muti­
lation alone Granada [was] ... disentitled to immunity'. 
See ibid, at 816.
3. See ibid, at 827 (per Lord Wilberforce); and see also
the judgment of Viscount Dilhorne (at 835 - 836) who
described 'the person who took the documents and gave 
them to Granada ... [as] clearly a wrongdoer, if not a 
thief' - and emphasised that Granada could 'scarcely 
claim' to have been innocent, for they 'must have known 
that the taker of the documents had no right to give 
them to them'. This, in Viscount Dilhorne's view, was 
one of the principal reasons for refusing immunity: for, 
to hold otherwise, would 'constitute a charter for wrong­
doers' - and this he was not prepared to countenance.
4. See ibid, at 842. Thus, Lord Salmon did not think it 'of
any real importance' that Granada left it so late to tell 
B.S.C. of its intention to broadcast excerpts from the 
Papers, nor that they gave B.S.C.'s Chairman no oppor­
tunity to see the script before the broadcast. He also 
disagreed that 'the conduct of the interview ... [had 
been] deplorable' (for bullying B.S.C.'s Chairman) and 
opined, on the contrary, that the latter had been fairly 
treated. He also rejected the view that the mutilation 
of the Papers had been 'disgraceful' - pointing out (at 
839) that it had been essential to maintain the anonymity 
of the source, as promised to him.
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whether judicial discretion should be exercised in favour of
source immunity lies in the degree of responsibility displayed 
1
by the media .
To summarize, then, the further ramifications of the media's 
obligation to disclose their sources of information, it is 
apparent that the exposure of misconduct or iniquity may entitle 
the media to immunity; and (though this is considerably less 
certain) that strong public interest in publication may also 
have this result. It is further clear that - for the disclo­
sure obligation to arise in the first instance - the information 
must be relevant and necessary to the proper determination of 
the proceedings. In addition, it is apparent that the media 
must act responsibly, failing which they will forfeit any claim 
to immunity they may otherwise have enjoyed.
12.6. The Need for Reform of the Common Law
The need for reform of the common law is a matter of considerable 
controversy: and strong arguments may be put forward on both 
sides. These accordingly merit brief examination: and it is 
proposed to begin by focusing on the arguments in favour of the 
need for reform.
1. Cf Allan C Hutchinson, 'Moles and Steel Papers', (1981)
44 Modern Law Review, pp 320 - 327, p 323, who asserts 
that Lord Salmon agreed with Lord Denning, M.R. that 'res­
ponsibility' is essential to source immunity. Lord Salmon 
made no such express affirmation; and his examination of 
the extent of Granada's 'irresponsibility' on the facts 
reveals at most an implict acceptance of the need for 
responsibility.
As regards the alleged need for responsibility, it should 
also be noted that Watkin, L.J. was satisfied that the 
commission of a civil wrong (though not a crime) for the 
purpose of exposing iniquity which needs to be revealed in 
the public interest does not jeopardise a claim to source 
immunity - and such conduct is surely the antithesis of 
'responsible' behaviour. See British Steel v cyanada Tele­
vision, supra, at 814.
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12.6.1. Arguments in favour of the need for reform
There are three principal arguments in favour of reforming the 
law so as to accord source immunity to the media. The first 
lies in the crucial importance of investigative journalism and 
a free flow of information to society. The second derives 
from the dependence of effective investigative journalism on 
the maintenance of source immunity. And the third is to be 
found in the invidious position in which the journalist is other­
wise placed.
12.6.1.1. The importance of investigative journalism and 
a free flow of information to society
The importance of investigative journalism and a free flow of
information to society are, firstly, graphically demonstrated
by the Granada decision itself. The 'parlous' condition of
B.S.C. has been noted on a number of occasions in the course
of the preceding discussion: and it is not proposed to reiterate
the point at any length. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising
1
that the Corporation was losing staggering sums of money , that
2
even larger amounts were being poured into it , that the Steel 
Papers revealed inefficiency which was totally inexcusable and
1. See ibid, at 836, where Lord Salmon pointed out that B.S.C. 
had lost £700 million in 1979 and was expected to lose a 
further £450 million in 1980.
2. See ibid. The sums so lost were then being lent to B.S.C. 
interest-free by the nation's taxpayers, as well as further 
sums (totalling £3 billion) for the provision of new 
plant and equipment.
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1
and highly costly , that the problem had been exacerbated to
2
some extent by government intervention (notwithstanding public
disclaimers of such involvement) and that the broadcast appeared
to have had considerable beneficial impact - and had clearly
contributed to the measures thereafter taken to 'put B.S.C.
3
on the road to recovery'„. It therefore needs no further 
emphasis that the public interest in the publication of the 
Steel Papers was vital and real.
Looking beyond B.S.C. itself and the public concern with its 
affairs, it is clear that investigative journalism - in more 
general terms - plays a role of vital importance in society.
The 'classic' example of the importance of such reporting is, 
of course, provided by the Watergate affair in the United States, 
where revelations (by reporters of the Washington Post and New
York Times) regarding the "break-in" at Democratic Party
offices led to the exposure of wide-ranging corruption and abuse
of office; and culminated, ultimately, in the resignation of
4
Richard Nixon from the Presidency -. Without investigative jour-
1. See ibid, at 843. Particularly disturbing, perhaps, of the 
various examples of this cited by Lord Salmon is the 'late­
ness and inaccuracy of export documentation', which was 
costing the Corporation millions of pounds. There could 
be no excuse for this.
2. In this regard, it is somewhat disturbing to note Lord 
Wilberforce's grudging concession that there may 'perhaps' 
have been a public interest in informing the public of the 
government's attitude towards settling the strike. (See 
ibid, at 827). Any involvement by government in the matter 
would seem to be of the utmost public concern: raising, as
it does, fundamental questions as to the benefits of nationa­
lisation of key industries.
3. See ibid, at 843, per Lord Salmon.
4. Other examples spring readily to mind: including press investigation 
and exposure of corruption in the Gomwalk and Tarka affairs in 
Nigeria, described at p 293 above; and the 'Muldergate' affair
in South Africa in which revelations by the press of secret 
funding of pro-government propaganda played an important part 
in the resignation of Prime Minister Vorster.
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nalism, it is clear - as warned by Lords Denning and Shaw in
the Granada case - that '[w]rongdoing [may] not be disclosed
... [and] [m]isdeeds in the corridors of power - in companies
2
or in government departments - [may] never be made known' .
Other judgments in the Granada decision are admittedly more
grudging in their recognition of the importance of investi- 
3
gative journalism ; but this should not be allowed to obscure
4
the reality, acknowledged (despite certain misgivings ) by 
Sir Robert Megarry, V.C. that '[the] activities [of the media] in 
[the] field [of investigative journalism] are in the main bene­
ficial to the public'^.
12.6.1.2. The dependence of investigative journalism and 
a free flow of information on source immunity
Investigative journalism is thus clearly important to society; 
and it is equally apparent that its efficacy depends, in consi­
derable measure, on the journalistic ethic of source secrecy: to 
which the law of contempt accords such scant regard. Thus, in 
the Granada case itself, it is clear that the 'mole' - highly 
motivated as he was to bring the mismanagement of B.S.C. to 
public attention - nevertheless set great store by Granada's
1. With the growth in power and influence of multinational 
corporations, abuse of power in the corridors of companies 
is pf no mean concern to society at large.
2. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 840.
3. See ibid, at 821, where Lord Wilberforce acknowledges that 
' [i]nvestigatory journalism ... in some cases may bring 
benefits to the public'.
4. See ibid, at 793, where Megarry, V.C. submits that inves­
tigative journalism is not always beneficial, as it may 
be groundlessly defamatory, or have the effect of preju­
dicing fair trial.
5. Ibid.
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undertaking to maintain confidentiality; and may well have 
decided against handing over the Steel Papers to the television 
company without the security of that assurance. Again, in the 
'classic' example of Watergate, it is common knowledge that 
journalists from the Washington Post relied for their infor­
mation to a considerable extent on the mysterious 'Deep Throat'; 
and it is reasonable to infer that he would not have been pre­
pared to divulge his knowledge without the guarantee that his 
identity would remain a secret. It must of course be acknow-1 
ledged that it is extremely difficult to determine, empirically, 
the importance of 'source secrecy' in maintaining the flow of 
information to the media. How can the number of potential 'moles'
deterred from approaching the media as a result of the Granada
1
decision be quantified? However, as Nicol points out, ' [r]e-
search in the United States suggests that journalists themselves
2
place a very high value on respecting confidentiality' ; and,
in logic and principle, there is undeniable cogency in Lord
Salmon's assertion that, without journalistic immunity, 'the
press's sources of information would dry up and the public would
be deprived of being informed of many matters of great public 
3
importance' .
1. See Nicol, op cit, p 167, citing Blasi, 'The Newsman's
Privilege: An Empirical Study', (1971-72) 70 Mich. L.R. pp 229-84,271
2. Ibid.
3. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 836.
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12.6.1.3. The invidious position in which the journalist 
is otherwise placed
Without source immunity, the position of the individual journa­
list who has conducted an investigation in the course of his 
professional duties and is then called upon to testify regard­
ing his sources is invidious indeed. It must always be remem­
bered that it is a fundamental tenet of his professional ethics 
that he should never reveal his source. To demand that he should 
do so is therefore to place him in an intolerable dilemma: and 
many journalists have suffered imprisonment rather than betray
such confidence. The words of Desmond Clough - called upon
1
to testify during the course of the Vassall inquiry - are
2
salutary to recall in this regard. His refusal to reveal 
his source stemmed from three factors: that he would be break­
ing trust in naming his Whitehall confidante, that his profes­
sional career as a defence correspondent would be ruined if 
he supplied this information as no further 'off-the-record' 
tips would come his way, and that he would also thereby jeo­
pardise the careers of all other defence correspondents who 
would likewise find their own sources 'drying-up'. Leaving 
aside all question of the loss to society if this were to occur 
and focusing on the purely personal level alone, it is totally 
unacceptable that the law should place any individual on the 
horns of such a dilemma. It may be countered that the journa­
list is not alone in this: and that doctor, priest and banker
1. See p 1111.
2. See p 1112, n 2.
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may find themselves facing the same difficulty. This, of course, 
is true: but it does not render the position of the journalist 
any the less invidious. In addition, the problem is likely to 
be faced more often - in practice - by journalists (particularly 
those involved in investigative work) whose daily lives revolve 
around the collection of information which (by definition) : 
touches on issues of importance to society and which may well 
become the subject of proceedings. The journalist is accordingly 
peculiarly vulnerable to the demand that he should disclose 
confidential information - and it is therefore appropriate that 
he should be given a special protection.
12.6.2. Arguments against the need for reform of the common law
Against the arguments in favour of reform are posed a number of 
counter-contentions: that the recognition of journalistic privi­
lege would open the flood-gates to similar claims, that it 
may encourage the breach of duties of confidentiality, as in 
the Granada case, that the proper administration of justice is 
an overriding public interest, and that the difficulty of 
defining the category of persons entitled to such privilege 
is intractable. Each of these objections accordingly merits 
brief further consideration.
12.6.2.1. Reform would open the flood-gates
It is contended that reform of the law cannot be effected in 
relation to the media alone; and that the extension of a testi­
monial privilege to journalists would open the flood-gates to 
a myriad similar claims from other professions, in which the 
maintenance of confidentiality likewise has considerable impor-
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tance. Prominent amongst such contenders would, of course, be 
the medical and banking professions as well as the clergy.
However, given the importance of investigative journalism and
the extent to which its efficacy depends upon source secrecy,
it should be acknowledged that the need for confidentiality
between the journalist and his source stands in an entirely
different category from that between doctor and patient, priest
and pentitent, banker and customer. The latter relationships
clearly thrive best in an atmosphere of confidentiality: but
it is more readily acceptable that society (within these spheres)
may require the breach of that trust in order to serve larger
1
and more pressing interests . It is a mistake, however, to 
equate the interaction between the journalist and his source 
with the other confidential relationships listed above. There 
is a vital difference in the roles performed by the media and 
the members of these other professions. There is, of course, 
an important public interest in respecting the confidences of 
the bank customer, the penitent or the patient - but this is 
of a totally different order from the public interest in main­
taining the secrecy of media sources. Investigative journalism 
has an importance which is unique: and its claim to source im­
munity should accordingly be recognised (not only as irresistible)
1. Even this may be open to doubt, as evidenced (for example) 
by the strong opposition recently voiced in the United 
Kingdom to proposed legislation which would give the police 
wide powers of obtaining access to information and would 
accordingly undermine the confidential relationship between 
the clergy and those .who, in confidence, seek their aid.
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but also as standing in a class of its own: so that extension of 
immunity would not necessarily open the flood-gates to similar 
claims. '
12.6.2.2. Reform would encourage breach of duties of con­
fidentiality
It may also be contended that recognition of immunity may en­
courage the breach of confidentiality (such as occurred in the 
Granada case itself): and that this is not to be tolerated. It
is submitted, however, that breach of confidentiality must always 
be weighed against the public interest in disclosure - and that 
the latter may be more important in certain situations. It 
must also be acknowledged that, in many instances, it is only 
those with 'inside' knowledge (through employment or membership 
of a particular organisation) who are able to provide the 
information on which investigative journalism depends. Inevitably, 
such an employee or member will owe an obligation to the organi­
sation not to disclose its inner workings to the outside world.
But if its inner processes call for disclosure in the larger 
public interest, the fact that this will involve a breach of 
confidentiality should be recognised as a 'necessary evil': and
should certainly not constitute grounds (as indicated by the
1
Law Lords and by Lord Denning in Granada ) for depriving the 
media of any claim to source secrecy.
1. See p 1128 et seq.
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It must, of course, also be acknowledged that breach of con­
fidentiality is a serious matter; and there is a real public 
interest in maintaining relationships of trust in organisations 
of all kinds. It is a sufficient safeguard, however, to limit 
source immunity in the face of breach of confidence to those
instances in which the public interest in disclosure is clear:
1
where (to cite the words of Lord Wilberforce ), the information 
is not only of interest to the public but is also in the public 
interest to make known. This distinction - admittedly difficult 
to define in the abstract in categoric terms - should not pre­
sent insuperable difficulties in practice: as the experience
2
of the courts in relation to the defence of 'fair comment' in 
defamation proceedings clearly demonstrates.
Furthermore, the importance of maintaining confidentiality must
also be weighed against the declaration, in Annesley v (Earl)
3
Anglesea , that ' no private obligations can dispense with that 
universal one which lies on every member of the society to dis­
cover every design which may be formed ... to destroy the public
4
welfare' . The force of this contention is undeniable: and any 
person who finds himself privy to such secret design should not 
be compelled - through alleged duty of confidentiality - to
1. British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 821.
2. See Chapter Six above, where the elements of this defence
in the civil law of defamation are described. It will be 
recalled that one requirement of the defence is that the 
comment should be put forward 'in the public interest'.
The courts accordingly have considerable experience in 
applying this amorphous concept to the facts of particular 
cases: and have not encountered intractable difficulty in 
distinguishing between the two types of information des­
cribed in the text above.
3. (1743) L.R. 5 Q.B. 317.
4. Ibid.
-1140-
keep his own counsel. His overriding obligation is clearly 
to inform society of the risk it faces: and any breach of 
confidentiality this entails should be recognised as being of 
comparatively minor significance.
12.6.2.3. Reform would undermine the proper administration 
of justice
Another major argument against reform of the present law lies 
in the contention that the due administration of justice 
demands that all relevant and admissible evidence be placed 
before the courts in their task of dispute-resolution.and up­
holding the laws of society. There is undoubted merit in this 
consideration; but it must nevertheless be acknowledged that 
the public interest in the proper administration of justice 
is not the only important factor at play. There is also a 
vital public interest in maintaining a free flow of information: 
and it is submitted that - to the extent that the proper adminis­
tration of justice may suffer through allowing journalistic im­
munity - this must (in general) be acknowledged as the lesser 
of two evils. There may, of course, be exceptional circum-
1
stances (for example, where vital security interests are clearly 
at stake), in which disclosure may have to be ordered. In such 
instances, however, the extent of disclosure required should be 
limited to that which is indeed necessary to avert the threatened
1. It must, however, be remembered that the interests of state 
security have a tendency to escalate: and that a firm check 
must be kept on this. Thus, for example, in situations 
such as those in issue in the Clough, Mulholland and Foster 
cases, the interests of state security should not be con­
sidered sufficiently compelling to warrant an order for 
disclosure. This is particularly so in the case of Clough, 
where there was evidence that Russian trawler fleets regularly 
turned up in the area of N.A.T.O. sea exercises quite inde­
pendently of any aid from Vassall's spying.
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evil; and should also be restricted to information which cannot 
be obtained through any other means. Moreover, further safe­
guards should be applied: such as the hearing of evidence in 
camera, or the prohibition of its reporting by the media - 
for although these restraints on media freedom are not lightly 
to be tolerated, they may nevertheless - in such circumstances - 
be appropriate in order to help preclude the 'drying-up1 of 
media sources in the future.
12.6.2.4. Reform is impracticable because of difficulties of 
definition
A further major obstacle alleged to lie in the way of reform 
is the difficulty of defining the category of persons to whom 
testimonial privilege should be accorded. Thus, in the Granada 
case itself, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton considered this diffi­
culty one of the major reasons for refusing the 'newspaper rule' 
a wider ambit. He thus cited, with approval, the misgivings
also expressed in this context by the United States' Supreme
2
Court in Branzburg v Hayes , in the following terms:
'The informative function asserted 
by representatives of the organised 
press in the present cases is also 
performed by lecturers, political 
pollsters, novelists, academic re­
searchers, and dramatists. Almost 
any author may quite accurately 
assert that he is contributing to 
the flow of information to the pub­
lic, that he relies on confidential
1. See p 1101 et seq., especially at p 1104.
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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sources of information, and that 
these sources will be silenced 
if he is forced to make disclo­
sures before a grand jury'.
1
A similar concern was also voiced by Sir Robert Megarry, V.C.
(in the court a quo in the Granada case), who queried whether 
the alleged immunity applied also to 'free-lance journalists 
or ... television reporters', or 'to an author gathering material 
for a book', or to 'a crank or busybody preparing a pamphlet' - 
or even to 'manufacturers or advertising agents engaged in 
market research'^.
It is submitted, however, that these concerns have been placed 
too high in these passages, and that the difficulty of drawing 
an appropriate line is not insuperable, as demonstrated by the 
'shield laws' of the United States of America. Thus, for exam­
ple, the 'shield' legislation of Alabama State confers immunity 
on any person 'engaged in, connected with or employed on any
newspaper (or radio broadcasting station or television station)
3
while engaged in a news gathering capacity' . This is undoubted­
ly a practical compromise, and one which reflects the reality 
that - although it may be artificial in principle to distinguish 
between journalists and other writers - there is in practice 
an important difference in the roles which they perform and the 
audiences they reach. There is, accordingly, sound sense in 
reducing the difficulties of defining who is entitled to immunity
1. Ibid, at 705, cited by Lord Fraser in British Steel v 
Granada Television, supra, at 849.
2. British Steel v Granada Television, ibid, at 786.
3. Ala. Code, Tit 7, Para 370, 1960.
A further possible solution is provided by the United Kingdom 
Contempt of Court Act, 1981, discussed at p. 1144 below.
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by adopting the kind of test described above. Moreover, the 
definition does not appear to have generated particular diffi­
culties in its practical application: though this is clearly a
1
possibility that cannot entirely be discounted . No law, 
however, can attempt effectively to regulate every conceivable 
variation in factual circumstance: and it seems far preferable 
to adopt this kind of test than to reject reform altogether 
because of difficulties of definition.
In summary, it is accordingly submitted that the arguments 
against reform of the law do not stand up to close scrutiny - 
in that the difficulties on which they are founded are capable 
of appropriate resolution. By contrast, the advantages of 
conferring source immunity are clear and compelling: and it 
is accordingly submitted that the rule compelling disclosure 
is now ripe for reform.
This, in turn, raises the further question of the direction 
such reform should take; and, in this regard, some attention 
must now be directed to the recent change in the law introduced 
in the United Kingdom in the Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
1. This possibility is graphically demonstrated by recent reve­
lations regarding possible abuse in President Reagon's pre­
paration for his important'television' debate with President 
Carter - which have been made in a book recently published 
rather than through the media. (The media are now, however, 
playing a highly significant role in pressing for full in­
vestigation of the allegations: and it is noteworthy that 
the F.B.I. has now launched 'an inquiry into how President 
Reagon's election campaign aides got President Carter's 
briefing papers for their crucial television debate in 
October 1980'. See The Times, 1 July 1983.
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12.7. Reform Effected in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the need for reform of the common law 
in this context has been acknowledged: and an attempt has been 
made to redress its deficiencies through the Contempt of Court 
Act, 1981. This now, in section 10, provides :
'No court may require a person to 
disclose, nor is any person guilty 
of contempt of court for refusing 
to disclose, the source of infor­
mation contained in a publication 
for which he is responsible, unless 
it be established to the satisfac­
tion of the court that disclosure 
is necessary in the interests of 
justice or national security or 
for the prevention of disorder or 
crime'.
1
The key criterion is thus that disclosure must be necessary (in
the furtherance of certain interests, as further discussed below)
To some extent, therefore, the section does no more than give
statutory effect to a well-established common law rule that a
witness need not answer a question which is unnecessary to the
ultimate resolution of the proceedings - as recently confirmed
2
in the case of Attorney-General v Lundin . The new provision
is significant, however, in that it makes clear that a witness
who refuses to answer a question relating to 'the source of
information contained in a publication for which he is respon- 
3
sible' is not automatically to be considered in contempt of 
court. This should be contrasted with 'the rule governing other 
types of court order, where it has long been established that
1. s 10, Contempt of Court Act, 1981.
2. The Times, 20 February, 1982, previously discussed at p 1127
3. See s 10, supra.
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the order must be implicitly obeyed unless and until it is duly
1
set aside or discharged' . Instead, section 10 makes it clear
that the question must first be shown to be necessary. This
2
must be established 'to the satisfaction of the court' ; and
it seems clear that the onus of so doing lies 'upon the person
3
requiring the answer' .
The section appears to widen, however, the grounds upon which 
disclosure may legitimately be considered necessary. It may be 
recalled that (in Lord Salmon's view, at least), the only cir­
cumstances in which it had previously been acknowledged that
disclosure of a journalist's sources could validly be ordered
4
were those involving public security . Section 10 now provides
that disclosure may be necessary, in addition, 'in the interests
5
of justice ... or for the prevention of disorder or crime' .
This list is interesting. First, the reference to the interests 
of 'justice' seems tautologous, since it has always been a funda­
mental principle that it is the public interest in the proper 
administration of justice which may require the disclosure by 
journalists of their sources. Secondly, the references to 'dis­
order' and 'crime' are extremely broad - especially the former: 
and may well prove, in practice, to be unduly restrictive of 
the journalist's "entitlement" (if such it may be termed under 
section 10) to maintain the secrecy of his sources.
1. Arlidge & Eady, bp cit, p 202.
2. See s 10, supra.
3. Arlidge & Eady, supra, p 203.
4. See British Steel v Granada Television, supra, at 846; 
and see also the discussion of this aspect of his 
judgment at pllOO.
5. See s 10, supra.
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In Nigeria, no such attempt at reform has yet been made, and 
here the common law - in principle - continues to hold sway. 
Important rulings against the constitutionality of the common 
law have recently been made by the High Court of Lagos State, 
and these are further discussed in due course. Greatly as 
these decisions are to be welcomed, they do not, however, elim­
inate all difficulties, as further explained below. Hence, it 
may still be appropriate to effect reform of the law through 
legislation. If this course is adopted, then section 10 of the 
United Kingdom Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides one example 
which Nigeria may decide to follow. It is submitted, however, 
that it would be preferable to adopt 'shield laws' similar to 
those enacted in the United States of America. The United 
States' approach accordingly now merits some examination: both 
as a useful background to further discussion of the constitu­
tionality of the common law rule in Nigeria; and for the insight 
it provides into additional ways in which the problem of source 
immunity for the media may be tackled.
12.8. The Contrasting Approach of the United States of America
The contrasting approach of the United States is evident not 
1
so much in the common law (under which the Supreme Court has, 
on a number of occasions, ruled that journalists are not entitled
1. There are, however, certain decisions in which the courts
have exonerated journalists from disclosure of their sources, 
as explained below.
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to testimonial privilege against disclosure of their sources) - 
but, rather, in the 'shield laws' which have been adopted by a
1
number of states in order to protect journalists in this regard .
The first important decision on the common law in this context
2
is that in Garland v Torre . Here, Marie Torre - a columnist for
the New York Herald Tribune - refused to name the source of a
statement alleged to be defamatory of the actress Judy Garland.
Ms Torre's conviction for contempt was upheld on appeal on the
ground that the public interest in the fair administration of
justice prevailed, in these circumstances, over her claim to
3
privilege under the First Amendment . Her application to the
4
Supreme Court for certiorari was denied .
Likewise, in 1968, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
case of State v Buchanan^. Here, Annette Buchanan described
(in a college newspaper) the use of marijuana by students; and
was asked to name her sources to a grand jury investigating
drug use. On refusing to do so, she was convicted of contempt
6and this was confirmed on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court .
In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time on whether 
the First Amendment protects journalists against disclosure of
1. Some 26 states in the United States 'now have "shield laws" 
which to varying degrees confer a legislative immunity'.
See Nicol, opcit, p 167, citing Robert Sack, Libel, Slander 
and Related Problems, (1980), App. V.
2. 259 F 2d 545 (2d Circ. 1958)
3. See Nelson & Teeter, Law of Mass Communications, 3rd ed.,
New York, 1978, p 327.
4. 358 U.S. 910, 79 S. Ct. 237 (1958).
5. 392 U.S. 905, 88 S. Ct. 2055 (1968).
6. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 315.
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their sources. This was in the case of Branzburg v Hayes , in­
volving proceedings against three journalists who had refused 
to testify before grand juries. Branzburg, a reporter for the 
Louisville Courier-Journal, had described the process of making 
hashish from marijuana (which he had been shown by two people) 
and refused to identify his sources to a grand jury. Pappas, 
a television reporter from New Bedford, refused to describe to 
a grand jury his visit to Black Panther headquarters, and Cald­
well, a reporter for the New York Times in San Francisco, 'who
2
had covered Black Panther activities regularly for some years'
refused to appear before a grand jury at all. The lower courts
3
found that qualified privilege attached to Caldwell , but that 
4 5
neither Branzburg nor Pappas were entitled to protection. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, it ruled (by a majority of 5:4) 
that the Branzburg and Pappas decisions should stand and that 
the ruling in Caldwell's favour should be reversed^.
1. 408 U.S. 665, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972).
2. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 327.
3. Thus, 'the federal district court of California and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the First Amend­
ment provided a qualified privilege to newsmen and that
it applied to Caldwell'. (Nelson & Teeter, ibid, pp 327 -
328).. The latter court accepted Caldwell's contention
that he would lose the confidence of the Black Panther 
movement if he so much as entered the grand jury chambers: 
and that society would be the loser if this transpired.
See Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 
1970) ; Caldwell v U ^ .  434 F. 2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) .
4. The Kentucky Court of Appeal refused Branzburg protection 
under either Kentucky's shield law (as further explained 
below) or the approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in relation to Caldwell. See Branzburg v Pound, 
461 S.W. 2d 345 (Ky. 1971).
5. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected any 
First Amendment privilege; and there was no shield law to 
apply. See In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E. 2d 297
(1971).
6. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 328.
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The majority pointed out that journalists enjoy no special sta-
1
tus designed to facilitate news gathering in other respects ;
and emphasised that testimonial privilege for journalists had
always been denied in the past because of the overriding public
interest in securing as much information from witnesses in
2
grand jury or trial proceedings as possible .. The majority was
3
not prepared to extend the categories of recognised privilege : 
for it was not convinced that 'there would be a significant 
constriction of the flow of news to the public if the Court re­
affirm [ed] the prior common law and constitutional rule regard-
4
ing the testimonial obligations of newsmen' .
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Powell took pains
to stress, however, that this did not mean that 'newsmen ...
are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering
5
of news or in safe-guarding their sources' . He thus asserted 
that 'the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances 
where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection'^.
1. This was in refutation of the argument that the news-gathering 
process requires special protection under the First Amendment 
to preclude sources from 'drying up'. The majority stressed 
that the media have no right of special access to informa­
tion, as evidenced - for example - by their regular exclusion 
from grand jury proceedings and the meetings of executive 
bodies. Hence, they could not claim to be entitled to special 
treatment in this regard.
2. It stressed that 'the First Amendment claim to privilege 
had been turned down uniformly in earlier cases'. Nelson 
& Teeter, op cit, p 328.
3. It pointed out that 'the only constitutional privilege for 
unofficial witnesses is the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, and ... declined to create another'. Nelson 
& Teeter, ibid, pp 328 - 329, citing the judgment at 689 - 690.
4. Branzburg v Hayes, supra, at 693. The court further stressed 
that this was supported by the lessons of history, which showed 
that 'the press had operated and thrived without common law or 
constitutional privilege since the beginning of the nation'. 
Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 329.
5. Branzburg v Hayes, supra, at 709.
6. Ibid, at 710.
-1150-
Justice Douglas, dissenting, declared that journalists enjoy
complete immunity from testifying under the First Amendment and
1
have 'an absolute right not to appear before a grand jury' . 
Justice Stewart, also dissenting - and writing for himself and 
two others - was not prepared to go so far. In his view, journa­
lists are entitled to qualified privilege and could only be 
compelled to testify if it was shown that 'the information
sought [was] clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject
2
of governmental inquiry and that ... there [was] not any
means of obtaining the information less destructive of First
3
Amendment liberties' .
Notwithstanding the majority view, however, all clearly was
not lost from the standpoint of the media. Thus, in Baker v
4
F & F Investment Co , a journalist who had revealed racial dis­
crimination in the practice of certain landlords and speculators 
was asked by civil rights proponents to identify one of his 
sources - which he refused to do. The U.S. Court of Appeals
upheld his claim to immunity, pointing out that other avenues
5
of disclosure had not been pursued and that First Amendment
rights cannot be infringed without some 'compelling' or 'para-
6
mount' state interest which had not been shown. It further
1. Ibid, at 712.
2. This should be read in the light of his earlier statement 
that the state would have to show 'a substantial relation 
between the information sought and a subject of overriding 
and compelling state interest'. Ibid, at 740.
3. Branzburg v Hayes, supra, at 740.
4. 470 F. 2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 966, 
93 S. Ct. 2147 (1973).
5. This clearly reflects the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Stewart in Branzburg, as described above.
6. This too clearly reflects the 'qualified privilege' (de­
feasible only on certain conditions) approach of Justice 
Stewart, ibid.
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declared :
'there are circumstances, .^t the 
very least in civil cases , in 
which the public interest in non­
disclosure of a journalist's con­
fidential source outweighs the 
public and private interest in 
compelled testimony'.
2
Building on this foundation - and emphasising the exceptional
importance of the issues at stake - the Columbian District
3
Court in Democratic National Committee v McCord quashed
subpoenas requiring reporters and management of the New York
4
Times and Washington Post (amongst others ) to appear before 
5
the Committee and to produce all documents in their possession 
relating to the Watergate break-in. Judge Richey emphasised 
that the proceedings were civil (as opposed to criminal); that 
the Committee had not shown that it had exhausted or even ap­
proached alternate avenues of information•and that the cases 
in question were 'of staggering moment: " ... unprecedented 
in the annals of legal history"' Emphasising that what was
in issue was the 'very integrity of the judicial and executive
7
branches of ... Government' , he declared :
1. The court thus emphasised, both here and in other passages,
that the Branzburg decision had involved refusal to testify
in criminal proceedings, and that the balance of interest 
was different in civil litigation. See Nelson & Teeter,
op cit, p 332.
2. Baker v F & F Investment Co, supra, at 783.
3. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
4. Also subpoenad were the equivalent staff of the Washington-
Star-News and the magazine, Time.
5. This was the Committee for the Re-election of the President, 
which was party to a number of civil actions arising out of 
the break-in at the Watergate offices of the Democratic 
National Committee.
6. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 332, citing the judgment of the 
court at 1397.
7. Ibid.
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' [t]he court stands convinced that 
if it allows the discouragement 
of investigative reporting into 
the highest levels of Government 
no amount of legal theorizing could 
allay the public suspicions en­
gendered by its actions'.
1
Accordingly, seeing a 'chilling effect in the enforcement of
the subpoenas upon the flow of information about Watergate to
2
the press and thus to the public' , he ordered that they should 
be quashed.
Another of the qualifications expressed in the Branzburg case
has also since resulted in a journalist being exonerated from
3
disclosure. Thus, in Morgan v State , where a journalist had 
refused to disclose the source of a story regarding criticism 
of a chief of police (and had been sentenced to 90 days' im­
prisonment for- contempt) , the Florida Supreme Court overruled 
the lower court on the ground that the demand for information 
fell within the category of ' [o]fficial harassment of the press
undertaken not for the purposes of law enforcement, but to dis-
4
rupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources' : and 
hence could not be justified.
On the other hand - and notwithstanding these authorities - it 
must also be acknowledged that the Supreme Court has recently 
re-affirmed the Branzburg principle in two important decisions.
1. Democratic National Committee v McCord, supra, at 1397.
2. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 332.
3. 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976)
4. Ibid, at 955, citing the authority of 'the Branzburg plur­
ality opinion'. The court was also satisfied that the in­
formation was not required for any compelling or legitimate 
reason, but had - on the contrary - been requested simply
so that the authorities could silence the source'.
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1
The first was Tribune Publ. Co v Caldero , in which the Court
further confirmed that the requirement of disclosure may indeed
2
apply in appropriate civil cases . The second was New York
3
Times Co v New Jersy , in which the Supreme Court denied certi­
orari in relation to Myron Farber, a reporter for the New York 
Times, who had refused to surrender certain notes concerning a 
multiple-murder: and had been convicted of contempt (for which 
he served 40 days' imprisonment).
But if the protection provided by the common law - as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Branzburg and its successors - is less
than adequate, it must also be acknowledged that considerable
efforts have been made in the United States to rectify the matter
by legislation. Thus, the majority of states have adopted
'shield laws' which confer either an absolute or a qualified
testimonial privilege upon those involved in the media. An
example of a statute granting absolute privilege is that of
4
Alabama (adopted as early as 1935 ) which states :
'No person engaged in, connected 
with, or employed on any news 
paper (or radio broadcasting 
station or television station) 
while engaged in a news gather­
ing capacity shall be compelled 
to disclose, in any legal pro­
ceeding or trial, before any 
court or before a grand jury
1. 434 U.S. 930, 98 S Ct 418 (1977).
2. See Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 4th ed., New York
1982, p 170.
3. 439 U.S. 997 (1978); and In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A. 2d 330.
4. See Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 334.
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of any court, or before the 
presiding officer of any tri­
bunal or his agent or agents, 
or before any committee of 
the legislature, or elsewhere, 
the sources of any information 
procured or obtained by him and 
published in the newspaper (or 
broadcast by any broadcasting 
station or televised by any 
television station) on which 
he is engaged, connected with 
or employed'.
1
An example of a qualified 'shield law' is that of Illinois: 
which states that any person wishing to obtain information 
from a reporter must apply for an order removing the privi­
lege which the statute generally confers on journalists employed 
by the media. The application must state 'the specific in­
formation sought, its relevancy to the proceedings, and a
specific public interest which would be adversely affected
2
if the information sought were not disclosed' . . In addition, 
the court must also be satisfied that 'all other available 
sources of information ha [ve] been exhausted and that disclo­
sure of the information is essential to the protection of
3
the public interest involved' .
Important as these provisions are, it must, however, also be 
acknowledged that - in practice - they have not always afforded 
the protection they appear prima facie to offer. Thus, for 
example, in the Branzburg case itself, Branzburg had attempted
1. Ala. Code, Tit 7, para 370, 1960.
2. Nelson & Teeter, op cit, p 335.
3. Ibid.
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to rely on Kentucky's shield law which protects newspaper 
employees, amongst others, from disclosing their sources of 
information. The Kentucky court held, however, that the journa­
list himself was the 'source' of the article describing the 
manufacture of hashish; and that the statute did not exonerate
him from the duty of identifying those whom he had observed 
1
breaking the law . In New Jersey, the state's shield law 
provided equally little protection to a journalist who re­
fused to reveal the identity of a man who (he reported) had 
attempted to bribe a local housing authority official. The 
New Jersey court ruled that, since the reporter had disclosed 
the name of the latter in his story, he had (under another 
state evidence rule) waived his privilege in respect of the
remainder of the information. He was found guilty of contempt
2
and served 21 days in jail . Even more disturbing is the view
expressed by a Californian appeals court in Farr v Superior
3
Court of California that California's shield law could not
restrict the '"inherent power" of courts to regulate judicial
proceedings without interference from other government branches'
The court thus held that Farr (a reporter for the Los Angeles
Herald Examiner and later the Los Angeles Times) could not be
accorded immunity from disclosure as this would amount to an
interference by the legislative branch with the judiciary's
power to control its own affairs; and would accordingly under-
5
mine the principle of separation of powers .
1. See Branzburg v Pound, 461 S.W. 2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
2. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A: 84A-21 (Supp. 1970); and see
Nelson & Teeter, opcit, pp 335 - 336.
3. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348, (1971).
4. Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 336.
5. Ibid. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court: 409 U.S.
(1972).
4
101
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1
The picture is not entirely gloomy, however. In In re Taylor , 
for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave an extended 
interpretation to Pennsylvania's shield legislation (in favour 
of media freedom) and held that - although the statute was ex­
pressed to protect newsmen from revealing their sources of in­
formation - it also gave them immunity against disclosure of 
the information itself. Thus, in appealing against their con­
viction for contempt for refusing to produce documents to a 
grand jury investigating corruption in city government, the 
manager and editor of the Philadelphia Bulletin argued that the 
word 'source' in the statute must mean 'documents’ as well as 
'personal informants'. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed; 
and stressed that the legislature, in enacting the law, had 
'declared the gathering of news and protection of the source
of news as of greater importance to the public interest than
2
the disclosure of the alleged crime or criminal' .
In summary, then, it seems that the lead provided by the 
United States is less clear in this than in other spheres of 
law relating to the media. To date, the Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to extend testimonial privilege to journa­
lists; whilst lower courts, on occasion, have adopted a dis­
turbingly narrow view of the protection -provided by shield 
legislation. Lower courts have also, however, been quick to 
seize upon the qualifications expressed by the Supreme Court
1. 412 Pa 32, 193 A. 2d 181 (1963).
2. See Nelson & Teeter, supra, p 338.
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in the Branzburg case to accord reporters immunity from disclo­
sure in a number of instances. These latter decisions - especi-
1
ally that relating to the Watergate break-in - are of great 
significance; but the most important innovation in the United 
States has undoubtedly been the enactment of shield legislation 
conferring absolute or qualified privilege upon reporters. The 
United States has thus evidenced a different approach to source 
immunity of considerable intrinsic merit: and one which Nigeria 
would do well to bear in mind. It is of course true that if 
the courts in Nigeria continue to follow the approach that it 
is unconstitutional (by virtue of the guarantee of freedom of 
expression in section 36) to require journalists to disclose 
their sources, then legislation of this kind will not be nece­
ssary. However, if the courts should falter in this approach 
(whether because they consider themselves bound by the decision 
of the House of Lords in Granada, or for any other reason) it 
would be as well to remember that the approach of the United 
States - in legislation especially (if not in case-law) - again 
provides a lead well worth the following.
12.9. The Constitutionality of Journalists' Duty to Disclose 
their Sources
It remains to consider the constitutionality of the obligation
resting upon journalists at common law to disclose their sources
2
of information in court proceedings. It should be noted at the
1. See again Democratic National Committee v McCord, 356 F.
1394 (D.D.C:. .1973) , discussed at p 1151 above.
2. The same obligation applies also in other types of inquiry
such as those conducted by tribunals or legislative committees. 
The term 'court' proceedings has been used throughout for con­
venience : but should not be regarded as limiting the ambit of 
the obligation to answer relevant and necessary questions -
whether in the courge of judicial, quasi-judicial or legislative 
enquiries.
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outset that there is wide-spread recognition of the reality (ack­
nowledged even by the majority of the Law Lords in British Steel
1
Corporation v Granada Television Ltd ) that source immunity plays
a vital part in facilitating investigative journalism and in en-
2
suring a free flow of information to society . It is therefore 
a moot question whether the duty of disclosure at common law 
can be reconciled with section 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 
which states, in broad and emphatic terms :
'Every person shall be entitled 
to freedom of expression, including 
freedom to hold opinions and to re­
ceive and impart ideas and infor­
mation without interference *.
3
The impact of this guarantee on the alleged obligation of journa­
lists to disclose the identity of their sources has recently
been considered in a number of Nigerian cases. The first of
4
these is Momoh v The Senate of the National Assembly and others , 
decided by the High Court of Lagos State in 1980.
The applicant in the proceedings was the editor of the Daily 
Times newspaper, which (on 4 February, 1980) had published - 
as part of its Grapevine column - the following allegation :
"'MPs, SENATORS AND CARDS (sic)
There are so many of these floating
around these days in utter disregard
for the decorum which attaches to 
important offices for MPs or Sena-
1. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L. (E.)).
2. See p 1123 et seq.
3. s 36(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979, emphasis supplied.
4. (1981) 1 N.C.L.R. 105.
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tors. A few of these people 
bring a bad name to their col­
leagues by barging into the offin 
ces of permanent secretaries, com­
pany directors, chairmen or minis­
ters, and insisting that because 
they are Senators or MPs they 
should be given contracts. Those 
who do this are advised to stop'.
1
The Senate was so incensed by this that it passed a resolution
on the following day, whereby it 'invited' the editor to attend
its proceedings in order to 'give all details of such impropriety
2
known to him and his staff' and to 'substantiate the allegations 
3
made' in the column.
The editor thereupon sought an order to quash this resolution 
on the ground that it constituted an infringement of section 36(1) 
of the Constitution and its guarantee of the right to 'impart 
... information without interference!^.
Ademola-Johnson, Ag. C.J., delivering the judgment of the High 
Court, emphasised the wide ranging jurisdiction conferred on 
the courts to secure enforcement of the constitutional guaran­
tees^ as well as the more general power of the courts 'to hear and
1. Ibid, at 108.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, at 107. The application was brought under Order 2
Rule 1(1), Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules,
1979, leave to bring the proceedings having been obtained
as required. See the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights, 
at p 182.
5. See s 36(1), supra.
6. Momoh v The Senate, supra, at 111, where the learned judge
cites the terms of s. 42, Constitution, supra, also described 
in the section on the Nigerian Bill of Rights, at p 180 et seq.
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detennine any civil proceedings in which the existence or ex-
1
tent of a legal right ... is in issue' . He further stressed
that the Senate had acted ultra vires its powers under the
2
Constitution in summoning the editor to appear before it - 
as the only provisions under which it might have purported 
to act relate only to inquiries in the exercise of its law­
making powers: and such powers were clearly not in issue in 
3
the instant case . He further rejected the suggestion that the 
legislature has 'absolute' control over its internal proceed­
ings (and that its actions cannot, therefore, be questioned
4
m  any court of law ), pointing out that this principle was 
derived from the Westminster system of government and there­
fore no longer applied under Nigeria's new 'presidential'
constitution: which not only clearly separates governmental
5
power between the three different braches of government and 
provides that each should be supreme within its own sphere^ -
1. Ibid, at 112, citing s 236, Constitution, supra. The court 
appears to have given equal weight to both these provisions 
in finding its jurisdiction prima facie confirmed. It is 
submitted, however, that the court erred in placing equal 
reliance on both provisions, since they are clearly designed 
to cater for fundamentally different situations. Thus,
s 236 is meant to provide for 'ordinary' civil and crimi­
nal proceedings; whilst s 42 clearly gives jurisdiction in 
circumstances such as these (where fundamental rights are 
in issue) - and obviates any need to look beyond its terms 
for an appropriate basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.
2. Ibid, at 113.
3. Ibid, at 112. The only sections under which the Senate 
could have acted were ss 82 and 83, Constitution, supra, 
the precise ambit of which is further examined below. For 
present purposes, the important point is that both were 
clearly irrelevant on the particular facts - as apparently 
conceded by counsel for the Senate.
4. Ibid, at 114.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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but also charges the courts with responsibility for ensuring
that no arm of government attempts to overstep the limits of 
1
its authority .
Having thus disposed of the principal objections to the court's 
assumption of jurisdiction, Ademola-Johnson, Ag. C.J. turned 
to the substantive question of whether a journalist's obli­
gation to disclose his sources constitutes an 'interference' 
with freedom of expression, within the meaning of section 36(1). 
He began by emphasising that :
' [i]t is a matter of common know­
ledge that those who express their 
opinions, or impart ideas and infor­
mation through the medium of a news­
paper or any other medium for the 
dissemination of^infomnation enj^y 
by customary law and convention
1. Ibid, at 115, where Ademola-Johnson, Ag C.J. stressed that 
if any branch of government were to exceed its powers or 
act in contravention of the Constitution, it 'would be the 
duty of the judiciary to put it in check at the instance 
of any aggrieved party'.
As regards the argument that the Senate's internal proceed­
ings are not subject to judicial review, the court acknow­
ledged that this general principle had been confirmed in 
Obi v Waziri, [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 371, but clearly thought 
this irrelevant in the light of Nigeria's new Constitution.
It is submitted that the court was correct in rejecting the 
argument that its jurisdiction was excluded by virtue of this 
principle, but that its reasoning for so doing was miscon­
ceived. The division of powers under the Westminster system 
may be unwritten, but it is nevertheless clear that the 
functions and powers conferred on each branch of government 
are limited: and that the courts do have power to prevent 
ultra vires action. This is subject, however, to certain 
limitations, such as that relating to the absolute control 
by Parliament over its own internal proceedings - an issue 
which does not touch upon the division of power between the 
branches and therefore may legitimately be regarded as falling 
outside the purview of the courts: under either constitutional 
system. The more correct basis for rejecting the contention is 
(it is submitted) that the matter was not - on the facts - one 
of mere internal regulation of proceedings.
2. Ibid, at 113. Unfortunately, this submission is not further 
explained: and it seems highly unlikely that such a point 
would have been regulated in any way by customary law.
3. Ibid. For further comment on the meaning of this, see below.
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a degree of confidentiality' ?
and he then buttressed this by posing the question :
1[h] ow else is a disseminator of 
information to operate if those 
who supply him with such infor­
mation are not assured of protec­
tion from identification and/or 
disclosure?'
2
He pointed out that the applicant's refusal to attend the Senate
or to answer questions relating to his sources of information
would undoubtedly have resulted in action being taken against
him to force disclosure? and this, in his view, would clearly
3
have constituted 'an interference1 with his right under section 
4
36(1) .
He stressed that there could be no doubt 'in anybody's mind,
that the 49 wisemen who formulated the Constitution of the Country
were conscious of the unsavory consequences attendant on any
attempt to deafen the public by preventing or hindering the
5
free flow of information, news and/or ideas from them' and
1. Ibid. The meaning of 'convention' is also not explained. It 
is tempting to assume that the court had the common law in 
mind in making these references. If this is so, it is un­
fortunate that it cited no authority to support this, nor 
attempted to distinguish the decisions described in the pre­
ceding sections, especially the Granada case, which clearly 
confirm that no_ journalistic privilege exists at common
law.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, at 113. Note the court's explanation that 'interfer­
ence' means 'break in (upon other person's affairs) without 
right or invitation, meddle, hinder or prevent'? and its 
assertion that a 'more appropriate definition would appear 
to be one relating to hinder or prevent'.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, at 113 - 114.
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concluded with the following declaration :
'Without straining words it appears 
clear that any attempt to force a 
person as the applicant who dis­
seminates information through the 
medium of a newspaper to disclose 
the source of information apparent­
ly given in confidence is an inter­
ference with 'the freedom of expres­
sion without interference' granted 
by Section 36(1)'.
1
Accordingly, the court would undoubtedly have granted the order 
sought, if this had still been necessary. It was not, in fact, 
needed, however, as the Senate had earlier rescinded its resolu­
tion. The court took pains to emphasise, however, that the 
view expressed by the Senate in so doing - that ' [the rescision] 
was an act of magnanimous goodwill towards the mass media' and
in no way detracted from its own competence to proceed as it
2
had originally intended - was 'erroneous and misleading' .
In conclusion, the court refused to grant the Senate's request
3
that the matter be referred to the Federal Court of Appeal , on
4
the ground that it is 'a condition precedent' to the making 
of such reference that there should be 'a substantial question 
of law'~* at stake; and that this criterion was not satisfied 
in the circumstances. It is interesting to note in this regard 
the definition of 'substantive question of law' adopted by the
1. Ibid, at 114.
2. Ibid, at 115.
3. Ibid, at 116. See also the description of the structure
of the Nigerian courts in Chapter Two.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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court. This was derived from an Indian case which lays down 
the following criteria of assessment :
(i) whether the question is of general public importance;
(ii) whether it substantially and directly affects the rights 
of the parties; and
2
(111)whether it is an open question or is not free from diffi-
3
culty or calls for discussion of alternate views .
It is implicit, therefore, in the court's conclusion that no 
'substantial question of law' was raised by the application that 
it considered it well settled that a journalist is not obliged 
to disclose his sources of information; and that to impose such 
a burden on him would constitute an interference with the free­
dom to 'impart ideas and information' guaranteed by section 36(1) 
of the Constitution. Much as this view is to be supported and 
endorsed, it is unfortunate (from the viewpoint of the value of 
the decision as a precedent) that the court did not acknowledge 
that there is indeed considerable controversy surrounding the 
issue at common law (as graphically demonstrated by the Granada 
case); and that it did not examine the conflicting authorities 
and come to a more fully reasoned and better documented conclu­
sion.
1. Chunilal v Mehta V.C.B. & Co Ltd, [1962] A.I.R. 29 S.C. 1318. 
The court also referred with approval to the Nigerian decision 
of Gamioba and others v Esezi 11 and others, [1969] All N.L.R. 
584, which defined a 'substantial question of law' as one 'in 
which arguments in favour of more than one interpretation might 
reasonably be adduced ... and one capable of being formu­
lated with precision'.
2. See Chunilal v Mehta, supra, where an 'open' question is 
defined as one 'not finally settled by this court or by the 
Privy Council or by the Federal Court'. Translated into the 
terms of the Nigerian court structure, this would mean a 
question not finally determined by the Privy Council (to 
the extent its decisions are binding), the Supreme Court or 
other appellate courts described in the section on the 
Nigerian courts in Chapter Two.
continued ....................
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In the light of this lacuna, it is not altogether easy to evalu­
ate the significance of the decision. On the one hand, the court 
was quite clear and emphatic in its declaration that disclosure 
of media sources would cut across freedom of expression as guar­
anteed by the Constitution. On the other hand, howver, it is 
also clear that this statement was strictly no more than an 
obiter dictum: for the court had previously found the resolution 
(which had, in any event, already been rescinded by the Senate) 
to be ultra vires the powers of the upper house. It must, 
however, also be remembered that section 42 of the Constitution 
gives the court the power to issue any order or declaration (in 
relation to alleged contravention of the guaranteed rights) as 
it thinks fit. Thus, the court was fully within its competence 
in making a substantive declaration of law in this context - 
even though this was not necessary for the resolution of the 
problem at hand. The more weighty difficulty in the assessment 
of the decision's value as a precedent lies accordingly in the 
paucity of its reasoning; and, in particular, in its failure 
to take account of relevant common law authorities. Moreover, 
an appeal against this decision (which is simply that of the
1
Lagos High Court) has been taken to the Federal Court of Appeal ,
where the question of jurisdiction was considered of paramount 
2
importance . No report of these proceedings is yet to hand, however, 
and this of course renders it even more difficult to formulate an
continued:
3. See ibid. A question of law is not substantial if it simply 
involves the application of well settled general principles or 
is one in which the plea raised is 'palpably absurd'.
1. Leave to appeal must, presumably, have been obtained from the 
Federal Court of Appeal itself.
2. This was relayed to the writer in the course of an interview 
with Chief Alhaji Alade Odunewu, former Editor-in-Chief of the 
Daily Times, in London, on 23 December, 1982.
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appropriate evaluation of the case,.
The next Nigerian decision in this context does, however, pro­
vide a far more comprehensive analysis and review of the rele­
vant principles and authorities. This is the case of Adikwu v
Federal House of Representatives of the National Assembly and 
2
others , decided also by the High Court of Lagos State, in 
February 1982.
The applicants were the editor, publishers (and journalists in 
the employ) of the Sunday Punch newspaper which, in its edition 
of 5 April 1981, published an article captioned 'Fraud: Legis­
lators Claim Salaries for Fictitious Staff'. It then proceeded
to allege that 90 per cent of legislators (all of whom are en-
3
titled to employ a number of personal assistants at varying 
salary scales) chose instead to draw the salaries which should 
have been paid to such staff by submitting fictitious names to 
the Clerk of the National Assembly. The article continued :
'Some legislators who requested anoni- 
mity (sic) and who abhor the persis­
tence of this fraud have said that 
this practice was made possible by a 
resolution of the House which enables 
the Legislators to operate accounts on 
behalf of their personal staff'.
4
1. Reports of Nigerian decisions are sometimes slow in reach­
ing London, unfortunately, and this seems to have occurred 
in this particular instance.
2. (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 394.
3. Thus, each legislator was entitled to eight personal aides 
in total (including legislative aides, confidential secre­
taries, field officers, office clerks and messengers.
4. Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, supra, at 399.
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Following publication of this report, the House of Representa­
tives on 7 April 1981 directed its House Committee to investi-
1
gate these allegations . The Committee wrote to the editor (and 
2
other applicants ) requesting that he appear before it on 9
April and bring all relevant facts at his disposal which would
3
assist the Committee in its investigation . Following the edi­
tor's failure to comply with this request, the Committee wrote 
to him again, urging him to attend its proceedings the next day 
and emphasising the importance of his co-operation. Instead,
the editor instituted the present proceedings in which he sought
4
various forms of relief , amounting - in essence - to confirma­
tion of two principles :
(i) that any alleged obligation resting upon newsmen 'to
appear and testify before a Legislative investigating
committee abridges the freedom of speech and press guar-
5
anteed under Section 36 of the Constitution ; and
(ii) that newsmen enjoy 'an absolute privilege against 
official interrogation in all circumstances'^.
1. Ibid, at 400.
2. Ibid, at 397. The editor (in his affidavit to the court)
explained that three other journalists on the paper had 
also been 'invited' by the respondents to appear at diverse 
dates before the National Assembly, in connection with the 
publication of 5 April. For convenience' sake, further 
reference is confined to the editor's application alone, 
but it should be remembered that similar applications were 
also brought by the publishers and other journalists thus 
summoned to appear.
3. Ibid, at 399.
4. Ibid, at 396 - 397, where the various declarations and
orders sought are set out in full.
5. Ibid, at 396.
6. Ibid. It seems thus that the applicants were seeking specific 
confirmation not only of source immunity in relation to the 
legislature and its committees, but also of a more general 
principle that the mediaare never obliged to disclose such 
information, irrespective of the forum in question.
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In support of his application, the editor deposed that the in­
formation underlying the publication had reached the applicants 
untinged by any dishonesty or criminal conduct and without in­
fringement of the respondents' rights; that the information had 
not been solicited and that no money had been paid for it; and
that the 'source' who had supplied it had 'volunteered ... it
1
with a keen sense of informing the public' and had been pro-
2
mised by the applicants that his identity would not be disclosed .
The first substantive question dealt with by the court concerned 
the extent of the investigative powers conferred on the House of 
Representatives by sections 82 and 83 of the Constitution. Sec­
tion 82 gives each House of the National Assembly the power to
3
institute investigations ; but specifies that this authority 
may be exercised only for the following two purposes :
(i) to enable it to make new laws or expose defects in 
existing laws; and
(ii) to enable it 'to expose corruption ... or waste in [inter
alia] the disbursement or administration of funds appropri- 
4
ated' .
1. Ibid, at 398.
2. Ibid. There is a marked similarity between the factors 
thus relied upon and those considered significant by the 
House of Lords in determining the merits of Granada's
claim to immunity. It is not altogether clear from the
report to what extent the court was influenced in its 
decision by these particular factual circumstances, but 
it is interesting to note that the court described this 
affidavit (submitted as an afterthought) as a 'better' 
one than the first (which had done little more than out­
line the facts and allege that the obligation to disclose
sources would contravene the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of expression).
3. See s 82(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979.
4. See s 82(2)(b), ibid.
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Section 83 confers on each House wide powers needed to conduct
investigations for these purposes; and provides, inter alia,
1
that either House (or a Committee appointed by it ) may 'summon 
any person in Nigeria to give evidence at any place or to pro­
duce any document ... under his control, and to examine him as 
2
a witness' .
The court was satisfied, on the facts, that the investigation 
ordered by the House of Representatives into the allegations of 
fraud contained in the Sunday Punch article was designed to 'ex­
pose corruption ... in the disbursement of [public] ... funds'
and therefore fell within the ambit of the powers of investiga-
3
tion conferred on it by the Constitution . It also stressed
the importance of such investigative powers in ennabling a leqis
4
lature to perform its functions wisely and effectively ; and
emphasised that ' [i]t is unquestionably the duty of all citizens
to cooperate with an august body like the National Assembly in
an effort to obtain facts which are needed for intelligent legis 
5
lative action' . However, it also took pains to underline the 
fact that section 82 is prefaced by the words '[s]ubject to the 
provisions of this Constitution^ : and, accordingly, that the
1. Adikwu v Federal House of Respresentatives, supra, at 402.
2. See s 83(1) (c), Constitution, supra, cited ibid, at 403.
3. See Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, ibid, at
407, and see also s 82(2) (b), Constitution, ibid.
4. Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, ibid.
5. Ibid. It seems clear from the overall context that the
court intended this to extend to facts which are needed
'for the exposure of misuse of public funds'.
6. Ibid, at 408.and see also s 82(1), Constitution, supra.
It is submitted that these words (though not expressly 
included within s 83) must also govern the exercise of 
the powers conferred by the latter section to facilitate 
the investigation authorised by s 82.
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investigative powers of the legislature may be exercised only
with due regard to all such provisions, especially the guaran-
1
tees of fundamental rights contained in Chapter IV . These,
of course, include the guarantee of freedom of expression, pro-
2
vided by section 36,.
The court then turned to consider one of the leading United 
States' precedents on the alleged" testimonial privilege of 
journalists against disclosure of their sources. This is the 
case of Branzburg v Hayes"*, in which the Supreme Court, by a 
majority of 6:3, rejected a claim for source immunity made by 
a journalist who (it may be recalled) had investigated and
1. Ibid. Balogun, J. also stressed (at 413) that '[i]t would 
be wrong for a court simply to assume that every legislative 
investigation is justified by a public need which over 
balances any protected rights'. In illustration of this,
he pointed to the absurdities which would result if approp­
riate checks on legislative investigations were not main­
tained. Thus, an investigative body, probing (for example)
irregularities in election procedure with a view to amend­
ing the Electoral Act, should not be allowed to demand that
the secretary or leader of a registered political party 
should produce its register of members. Nor should any 
private citizen be asked to disclose what political party 
he had voted for. Examples of such 'none permissible usage 
of Legislative power of investigation could be multiplied' - 
and this showed clearly that the powers of any such inves­
tigating committee could not be regarded as limitless: and 
should always be exercised in conformity with the Constitution.
2. See ibid, at 401.
3. Ibid, at 408. It is submitted that this reference to United
States' precedent is particulary significant; and shows
that Nigerian courts (no doubt under the influence of the 
1979 Washington-style constitution) are beginning to seek 
guidance to an increasing extent from the judgments of the 
United States' Supreme Court. It is, of course, a major 
premise of this dissertation that this trend is to be encour­
aged to the full: and this point is further discussed in due 
course.
4. Ibid. Other leading United States' decisions have, of course, 
previously been discussed.
5. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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reported on the production of hashish from marijuana and refused 
(before a grand jury) to disclose the identities of the indivi­
duals he had observed engaged in this process). The majority
Opinion of the court emphasised that the media enjoy no special
1
privilege in a number of respects and pointed out that ' [a]t
common law courts [have] consistently refused to recognise the
exercise of any privilege authorising a newsman to refuse to
2
reveal confidential information to a grand jury1 . It accord­
ingly declined to 'grant newsmen a testimony privilege that
3
other citizens do not enjoy' .
Strong dissents from this Opinion were expressed by three 
members of the Court. Justice Stewart observed ('convincingly', 
in the view of the Nigerian court, as further explained below) 
that :
'" [t]he court's crabbed view of the 
First Amendment reflect [ed] a dis­
turbing insensitivity to the criti­
cal role of an independent press in 
our society"'.
4
It continued :
'"Not only will this decision impair 
performance of the press's constitu­
tionally protected function, but it 
will, I am convinced, in the long
1. For example, the publisher of a newspaper has 'no special 
privilege to invade the rights and liabilities of others 
(sic)' and 'the First Amendment does not guarantee the press 
a constitutional right of special access to information not 
available to the public generally'. See Adikwu v Federal 
House of Representatives, supra, at 408, citing the majority 
opinion in Branzburg v Hayes, supra.
2. See ibid, citing Branzburg, ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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run, h a m  rather than help the
administration of justice"
1
He further stressed - in words with which Balogun, J. strongly
2
identified himself and which therefore merit reproduction in 
full - the importance of ennabling the media to maintain con­
fidentiality in relation to their sources :
"'The reporter's constitutional 
right to a confidential relation­
ship with his source stems from 
the broad societal interest in a 
full and free flow of information 
to the public .... As power and 
public aggregations of power 
burgeon in size and the pres­
sures of conformity necessarily 
mount, there is obviously a con­
tinuing need for an independent 
press to disseminate a robust 
variety of information and opin­
ion. .. . A corollary to the right 
to publish must be the right to 
gather news. This right implies, 
in turn, a right to a confiden­
tial relationship between a re­
porter and his source. This 
follows as a matter of simple 
logic once three factual pre­
dicates are recognised: (1) 
newsmen require information 
to gather news; (2) confiden­
tiality is essential to the 
creation and maintenance of a 
news-gathering relationship 
with informants; and (3) the 
existence of an unbridled sub­
poena power will either deter 
sources from divulging infor­
mation or deter reporters from 
gathering and publishing infor­
mation" '.
3
1. Ibid.
2. See ibid, at 410, where Mr Justice Balogun asserts that
he 'take[s] the stand of those who dissented in that [i.e., 
the Branzburg] case1.
3. Ibid, at 409 - 410, citing Branzburg v Hayes, supra.
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Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent (also cited with appro-
1
val by the Nigerian court ) warned in addition of the dangers 
of ever more pervasive government power and stressed that the 
people would be the victims once 'the fences of the law and
r 2tradition that has protected the press [were] broken down' .
The dissenting views in the case of Branzburg v Hayes are 
particularly significant because of their adoption, by Balogun,'iJ., 
as reflecting the approach which should be taken by Nigerian 
law in this regard. The learned judge stressed that he did 
so 'only after a passionate deliberation of the principles in­
volved, and having regard to the specific language of the
3
American Constitution there in question and the provisions of
Chapter IV ... of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
4Nigeria 1979' . Apropos the latter, Balogun, J. emphasised 
that section 36 of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees the 
right 'to express and communicate ('to impart ideas and infor­
mation ') without interference* : and sub j ect only to the limi­
tations and exceptions expressly incorporated within it^. 
Accordingly, the powers of investigation conferred upon the 
House of Representatives did not permit it (or any committee 
established by it)'to require a newsman to disclose his source
of information, except in grave and exceptional circumstances,
7
e.g. the security of the State' - which did not arise in the
1. See ibid, at 410.
2. Ibid, citing Branzburg v Hayes, supra.
3. This reference, of course, is to the First Amendment, with 
its emphatic declaration that 'Congress shall make no law 
abridging the ... freedom of the press'.
4. Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, supra, at 410.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, at 411. These exceptions have, of course, been described
in full on the section on the Nigerian Guarantee of Freedom of
Expression in Chapter Two.
continued .....................
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present case .
Balogun, J. then acknowledged that a contrary conclusion (in 
2
relation to court proceedings) had recently been reached by
the House of Lords in the United Kingdom in British Steel
3
Corporation v Granada Television Ltd . However, he clearly dis-
4
agreed with the majority judgment and preferred to endorse the
5dissenting view of Lord Salmon . He cited with approval the 
judgment of the latter: especially his Lordship's emphasis that 
the media's immunity from disclosure of their sources has long
been recognised - except in extraordinary circumstances (such
6 7
as those in the Clough and Mulholland cases in which national
security was at stake); and that such immunity is essential to
a free press and the continued flow of important information to
the public^.
Quoting the words of Lord Denning, M.R. in the Court of Appeal
9
m  the Granada case (which had also been approved by Lord Salmon )
7. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. Although Balogun, J. stressed that the Granada case 
had dealt with the application of the rule in court, there 
seems no reason, in principle, for distinguishing between 
such proceedings and those before a legislative investiga­
tory committee (or other tribunal).
3. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 774 (H.L. (E.)).
4. See Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, supra, at 411, 
where Balogun, J. described the majority judgment in Granada 
as 'distressing'.
5. See ibid, at 412, where the court expresses its 'respectful 
agreement' with Lord Salmon's view.
6. Attorney-General v Clough, [1963] 1 Q.B. 773.
7. Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster, [1963] 2 Q.B. 477.
8. See Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, supra, at 412.
Balogun, J, also agreed with Lord Salmon that the 'newspaper 
rule' is not confined to libel alone, but confers a more wide- 
ranging immunity.
9. See p 1099, above.
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Balogun, J. emphasised the importance of source immunity to in­
vestigative journalism (which, in his view, had proved itself 
invaluable in exposing abuse and injustice) and declared that, 
without a testimonial privilege for journalists :
'"Wrongdoing would not be disclosed.
Charlatans would not be exposed. Un­
fairness would go unremedied. Misdeeds 
... in the corridors of power ... would 
never be made known to the public"'.
1
He accordingly concluded that :
'The purpose of Section 36 of the Con­
stitution is not to erect the press 
into a privileged institution, but it 
is to protect all persons, (including 
the press) to write and print as they 
will and to gather news for such publi­
cation without interference .... If a 
newspaper or its editor or reporter can 
in normal circumstances be required by 
the courts or a Legislative committee 
or other body or tribunal to disclose 
the sources of information of an arti­
cle published that would be tantamount 
to probing, censoring or interfering 
with press freedom. This would be con­
trary to Section 36 of the Constitution 
which guarantees to every person (includ­
ing the press) freedom of expression, 
including freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart ideas and infor­
mation without interference. The courts 
must not be insensitive to these protec­
ted rights'.
2
Having disposed of the respondents' objection that the appli-
3
cation had been premature , Balogun, J. concluded that, although
1. See Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, supra, at 412,
quoting Lord Denning, M.R. in Granada, supra, at 840.
2. Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, supra, at 412.
3. Ibid, at 416. Balogun, J. thus asserted that the citizen's
right of action under s 42, Constitution, supra, is 'ripe 
once there is a likelihood of a contravention of such right'. 
The respondents' argument to the contrary had been based, in 
essence, on the United States' doctrine of 'non-direct inter­
vention by the courts's according to which the United States 
courts are enjoined not to intervene in any legislative in­
continued ...............
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'every person, including editors and reporters may be summoned 
to appear before an investigating committee of the National As­
sembly, ... such a probe cannot ... require an editor or reporter
1
to disclose the source of the article . He accordingly issued a
2
number of declarations, the most important of which confirmed
the principle that 'the press cannot be compelled, save in ex-
3
ceptional circumstances to reveal its sources of information ,
and that no such exceptional factors were in issue in the pre- 
4
sent case . To lend yet further force to this, he issued, in 
addition, '[a]n order of perpetual injunction, restraining the 
House of Representatives or a Committee thereof from ... requir­
ing all or any of the applicants to produce any document or other
thing in his possession which [would] disclose the source of 
5
the publication' in question.
vestigation (at the instance of a witness summoned to appear 
before such investigative body) - on the grounds that the 
investigation is unconstitutional, illegal or otherwise in­
valid - until the witness has first been placed in contempt 
by the investigating body and is being prosecuted for such 
contempt. Irrespective of the binding force of this doctrine 
in the United States (which had not yet been confirmed by the 
Supreme Court), the principle could have no application in 
Nigeria, in Balogun, J's view, by virtue of the express terms 
of s 42, Constitution, which entitles any person who alleges 
that any fundamental guarantee has been or is likely to be 
contravened in relation to him to apply to the appropriate 
State High Court for relief. Balogun, J. emphasised that, 
useful though doctrines and constitutional interpretations 
derived from other countries may be, they cannot prevail over
the clear wording of a local enactment (particularly the national
constitution); and cited Adegbenro v Akintola and another, [1962]
1 All N.L.R. 465 at 479 and Attorney-General of Bendel State v 
Attorney-General of the Federation and 22 others,(1981) 10 S.C.
1, at 111 - 112. For full discussion of the doctrine of non- 
direct intervention, see Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, 
supra, at 413 - 416.
1. Ibid, at 416.
2. Ibid, at 418. The court's further four declarations are not
particularly significant. They are set out in full at 418.
3. Ibid.
4. In Balogun, J.'s view, the present circumstances were neither 
'grave nor exceptional, and therefore [did] not fall within the 
permissible limitations ... provided for under Chapter IV'. (At 411).
5. Ibid, at 418.
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The significance of this decision cannot be over-emphasised. Al­
though given only at the State High Court level, it is nevertheless 
a decision of the Lagos Court, which has traditionally enjoyed 
particular esteem. More importantly, it clearly shows an awareness 
of the common law rule rejecting a testimonial privilege for journa­
lists (as reflected in the Granada case): and a determination to 
move away from this rule in favour of an approach which confirms 
the vital importance of investigative journalism and seeks to en­
sure the continued free flow of information which this requires - 
and which is of such crucial significance to society. In marked 
contrast to the earlier decision of the Lagos High Court in the 
Momoh  ^ case, the judgment in Adikwu refers to both the leading
common law authorities against 'source immunity' for journalists 
2 3
(the Branzburg and Granada decisions) and deliberately rejects 
the majority judgments in these in favour of the dissenting views 
expressed in each. Moreover, the court emphasises once again 
the importance of the constitutional guarantees (especially that 
relating to freedom of expression); and reaffirms its determina­
tion to provide a bulwark against any erosion of those guarantees.
If any criticism is to be made of the judgment, it is perhaps
4
that it fails to specify the type of circumstance which might 
be special enough to warrant an order for disclosure; nor to in­
dicate the procedure to be adopted in such an event (such as the 
giving of such evidence in camera or the making of an order barring
1. Momoh v Senate of the National Assembly, (1981) 1 N.C.L.R. 105.
2. Branzburg v Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
3. British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd, [1980] 3
W.L.R. 774 (H.L.(E.)).
4. See Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, supra, at 411,
where Balogun, J. indicated that the circumstances must be 
'grave and exceptional' before disclosure may be ordered: 
but gave no indication of what criteria should be applied
in weighing their gravity.
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1
the reporting of such evidence ). This shortcoming - and the 
resultant uncertainty it leaves in the law - are illustrated to 
some extent by the last of the recent trilogy of Nigerian deci­
sions on the testimonial privilege of journalists.
In Oyegbemi and others v Attorney-General of the Federation and 
2
others , the three applicants were the editor, a senior reporter 
and the publishers and printers of the Daily Sketch newspaper.
The proceedings arose out of the publication, in that newspaper, 
on 5 March 1981, of an article captioned 'Armed Robbers Kill Two 
Persons', which described a daylight attack (by a gang numbering 
about 20, armed with axes and cutlasses), in which a man and wo­
man had been killed. Following this report, the editor was ques­
tioned by the police: and refused to disclose the source of his 
information. The following day he was arrested and charged with
publication of a false report (under section 516 (sic) of the 
3
Criminal Code ) and with publication of a report likely to cause
fear and alarm to the public (under section 21(1) of the Newspapers Law 
4of Lagos State ). The second applicant was charged under s 51.,of the 
Criminal Code (relating to sedition); and also refused to name his sources
The applicants sought various declarations from the court, which 
5
may be summarised as follows :
1. Though such restrictions are not lightly to be sanctioned, they 
may (as previously be explained) be appropriate in such circum­
stances to help preclude the drying-up of sources.
2. (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 895.
3. Cap 31 (Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973). This cannot be
correct, however, as s 516 is concerned with conspiracy to com­
mit felony. It is possible that the reference intended is to
s 59, which governs the publication of false news with intent 
to cause fear or alarm to the public.
4. Cap 86 (Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 1973). Since both
charges arose out of the same facts, this evidences a disturb­
ing 'splitting of charges'.
5. For further details, see Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, supra, at 898.
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(i) a declaration that, in their capacity as journalists , they 
could not be compelled to disclose their sources of infor­
mation ; and
(ii) a declaration that any person charged with the commission 
of a crime is entitled to remain silent under the pro­
visions of section 33 of the Constitution, especially sub-
2
sections (6) and (11),.
Having disposed of the respondents' preliminary objection that 
the applicants could not be pemitted to pre-empt the criminal 
proceedings pending against them by bringing this civil appli­
cation - an objection which the court considered unfounded as
the civil proceedings could not affect the outcome of the pro- 
3
secutions - Balogun, J. turned next to the question of police
4
powers and police questioning . He emphasised the rights of a 
person arrested or detained under section 32 of the Constitution
and pointed out that these were buttressed by the 'separate and
6distinct' rights conferred on a person 'charged with a criminal
1. The third applicant could not, of course, apply as a journa­
list and accordingly instead sought this confirmation in its 
capacity as publisher and printer of the newspaper.
2. s 33 guarantees the right to fair trial, as earlier described 
in Chapter Eight. Whilst these provisions are of great impor­
tance in general, they do seem particularly relevant to any 
right of a journalist to maintain silence regarding his sources.
3. The respondents' argument was founded principally upon the 
authority of Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Attorney-General, [1980]
1 All E.R. 866 (H.L. (E.)), especially at 875, where Viscount 
Dilhorne stated that 'the administration of justice would be­
come chaotic if, after the start of a prosecution, declara­
tions of innocence could be obtained from a civil court'. 
Balogun, J. was satisfied, however, that the facts in the 
Imperial Tobacco case were clearly distinguishable and that 
the applicants were not seeking declarations of innocence in 
regard to the criminal charges. He also doubted whether the 
alleged principle was applicable in Nigeria, having regard to 
s 42 of the Constitution and the special protection given to 
Fundamental Rights. Without ruling conclusively on the point, 
the court thought it unlikely that a defendant in criminal pro­
ceedings would have to wait until the conclusion of those pro­
continued ..............
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offence' by section 33 of the Constitution. He accordingly re-
1
jected 'the astonishing submissions' by counsel for the respon­
dents that the individual's rights cease to apply on his deten-
2
tion for interrogation and emphasised that the manner in which
police investigations may be conducted is governed by the 1979
3
Constitution, the Judges' Rules and the law of evidence - and 
that '[t]he police must keep within the law they enforce'^. He 
stressed that the provisions of sections 32 and 33 of the Consti­
tution 'are intended to secure all ... including the criminal, 
from improper police conduct and from prosecutorial (sic) short­
cuts with the law'^; and concluded that the 'Fundamental Rights 
of a person who is arrested, detained or ... accused ... are 
g r e a t a n d  that he 'can never be compelled under [the] supreme 
law [of] the 1979 Constitution to ... make any statement against
ceedings before being allowed to apply for redress in re­
lation to some infringement of the Fundamental Rights guar­
anteed him by the Constitution.
4. Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, supra, at 908.
5. Ibid, at 902. The provisions of s 32, Constitution, are 
described here in some detail. The rights conferred by 
the section on a detainee include the right to be informed 
in writing within 24 hours (and in a language he understands) 
of the facts and ground of his arrest, the right to be brought 
before a court within a reasonable time, and the right to 
compensation and public apology if the detention is unlawful. 
Particularly important in the present context is s 32(2), 
which gives a person who is arrested or detained the right
'to remain silent or avoid answering any question until after 
consultation with a Legal Practitioner ... of his choice'.
6. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, at 908.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, at 912.
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his will'*.
Balogun, J. then turned to 'the last but most important issue in 
2
th[e] case1 - that relating to freedom of expression and the
press. He affirmed that the matter was governed by section 36
of the Constitution and by the principles he had earlier enunci-
3
ated in Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives . Quoting
extensively from his judgment in the Adikwu case, he emphasised
the importance of the press as 'one of the pillars of freedom
4
in ... any ... democratic society' ; and stressed that the press
could not be required to disclose its sources 'except in grave
and exceptional circumstances which are justifiable under the
5
constitutional limitations' on the freedom of expression guaran­
teed by section 36. He confirmed that he stood by all these 
declarations in his earlier judgment; and that nothing in the 
powerful submissions of counsel for the respondents had led him 
to any modification of his views^. In particular, he rejected 
the contention that 'on the particular facts of th[e] case, 'pub­
lic order' would justify a requirement that the first and second
applicants (as persons charged with criminal offences ... sfttould]
7
disclose their source of information' ; and, whilst acknowledging
Q
the eminence of the presiding judge in McGuiness v Attorney-Gen- 
9
eral of Victoria (who had held that journalistic privilege was
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, at 908.
3. (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 394.
4. Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, supra, at 910, citing Adikwu, 
supra, at 417.
5. Ibid, at 909 - 910, citing Adikwu, ibid.
6. Ibid, at 910.
7. Ibid. This is a particularly significant aspect of his judg­
ment. If every journalist who refused to disclose his sources 
and was then charged with some offence (as in this case) could 
be said to have brought 'public order' under threat - so that
continued .................
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1
limited to the newspaper rule ), he preferred to base his judg­
ment firmly upon 1 the particular language of the 1979 Constitu- 
2
tion' .
He accordingly declared :
'It seems to me to be beyond doubt 
that by and under the provisions of 
the 1979 Constitution ... particularly 
s 36 ..., no person or authority (not 
even a Court of Law) in Nigeria may re­
quire any individual, editor, reporter 
or other publisher of a newspaper to 
disclose his source of information of 
any matter published by that individual 
or other person or publisher, and the 
individual, editor, reporte^ or publisher 
of a newspaper [who refuses ] to disclose 
his source of information ... cannot be 
guilty of contempt of court for refusing 
to disclose, ... unless it is established 
to the satisfaction of the court that dis­
closure is necessary in the interest of 
justice, national security, public safety, 
public order, public morality , welfare of 
persons or for the purpose of prevention 
of disorder or crime'.
7
a ruling for disclosure could then legitimately be made - 
little substance would be left in any principle of source 
immunity.
8. This was Dixon, J. - later Chief Justice of Australia.
9. (1940) 63 C.L.R. 73.
1. See ibid, at 102 and the earlier discussion of the case at p 1103
2. Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, supra, at 911.
3. Ibid. The emphasis on 'newspaper' is supplied by the court 
and is continued through this passage. This is somewhat dis­
concerting, for it may be read as suggesting that source im­
munity cannot be claimed by the other media. The more likely 
interpretation, from the overall context, however, is that 
Balogun, J. was simply intent on distinguishing the press 
from the 'ordinary citizen' who does not fulfill the same 
vital role in society.
4. It seems from the general sense of this passage that the 
omission of these words is an oversight or misprint.
5. Unfortunately, the court does not clarify on whom the onus lies 
in this regard. It is submitted that the burden of proof should 
(in the interests of media freedom) be placed on the person
who seeks disclosure.
6. These categories of exception are clearly derived from s 41(1)(a)
continued .............
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He continued :
'There can be no doubt that if the 
press ... publishes any information 
which the Police upon investigation 
thinks is false to the knowledge of 
the publisher, and the Police arrest, 
detain or charge the publisher in that 
connection, the Police have power in 
the course of their investigation ... 
on complying with all the constitu­
tional and statutory provisions in 
force for the protection of an accused 
person or a person under arrest or de­
tention, to require (or, to use ... 
more appropriate language, 'to request 
upon caution1 ) that the publisher shall 
make a voluntary statement ... and 
disclose the source of his information. 
But the Police cannot compel him to 
do so'.
2
He concluded :
'It seems to me that when a newspaper 
has investigated a matter of general 
public interest or concern (such as it 
ought to make known to the public) the 
publication of an article upon the 
matter is so much in the public in-
of the 1979 Constitution, previously described, inter alia, 
in the section on Nigeria's guarantee of freedom of express­
ion in Chapter Two above.
7. Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, supra, at 911. The remaining 
categories - welfare of persons and prevention of disorder 
or crime - are not, of course, reflected in either ss 36 or 
41 of the Constitution; and it is therefore difficult to 
reconcile the court's reference to them with its next sen­
tence that 'unless the case falls within the permissible 
limitation of Fundamental Right of freedom of speech, of 
expression and freedom of the press provided for under the 
provisions of the 1979 Constitution as a whole', disclosure 
cannot be considered necessary. The status of these latter 
categories of exception is therefore somewhat doubtful.
It is further submitted, as further emphasised below, that 
the list here provided is too wide (especially by virtue of 
the last two categories) and that there is a real danger 
that all these exceptions may drain away the substance of 
the 'source immunity' rule, leaving it an empty husk.
1. Ibid, at 912, emphasis supplied.
2. Ibid, emphasis again supplied.
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terest that the newspaper ought2not 
to be restrained or 1 interfered' with 
by any person or authority, solely on 
the ground that the information in the 
article originated in confidence or for 
any other reason not justifiable under 
the constitutional limitation on right 
to freedom of expression and the press 
provided for under Subsection (3) o^ i
Section 36 of the 1979 Constitution .
Nor should a newspaper be compelled 
(except in grave and exceptional circum­
stances, justifiable under the constitu­
tional limitations on freedom of express­
ion) to disclose the source of the in­
formation. The editor and reporter can 
rely on the constitutional shield of 
confidentiality'.
4
The court accordingly declared^ that the press - save in excep­
tional circumstances, as described above - cannot be compelled 
to disclose its sources; that no such circumstances had been 
shown; and that a person who is arrested and detained has a 
'constitutional right to remain silent or avoid answering any 
question, until after consultation with a Legal Practitioner or 
any other person of his own choice^. It concluded by granting
1. Ibid, at 913. The emphasis here is again supplied by the 
court, as earlier discussed.
2. Ibid. Again the emphasis is as supplied by the court. Here, 
however, the reason seems readily discernible.
3. Ibid. This is an interesting apparent oversight by the court.
S 36(3) makes no provision for derogation from freedom of 
expression in the interests of public order, security, morality 
and so forth, all of which are now provided by s 41(1). It is
a moot question therefore whether the court intended to limit
the circumstances in which disclosure may be ordered in the 
manner this sentence suggests. It seems that the answer must 
be in the negative, however, especially in the light of the 
passage quoted above.
4. Ibid. The authority for this 'constitutional shield' as
relied on by the court is further examined below.
5. Ibid, at 913 - 914. The full text of the various declarations 
is here set out. The first two do little more than reiterate 
the terms of ss 36(1) and (2) and are accordingly omitted from 
the summary in the text which follows.
6. See ibid, at 913.
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a perpetual injunction restraining the respondents not only 
from requiring the applicants to disclose their sources of infor­
mation for the article in question, but also from demanding such
disclosure in relation to any other articles published by them
1
in their capacity as journalists - for so long as sections 32,
33 and 36 of the 1979 Constitution remained in force in their 
2
present terms .
The decision is greatly to be welcomed for the emphasis it places 
on media freedom as a bastion of democracy; for its recognition 
of the importance of a free flow of information to journalists; 
and for its robust declaration that those involved in the media
are not - in principle - to be compelled to disclose their sour-
3 4
ces . However, as previously noted , the wide range of circum­
stances in which disclosure - according to the court - may 
nevertheless be found necessary (and the inclusion - within that 
range - of concepts as broad as the 'welfare of people' and the 
'prevention of crime or disorder') strongly suggests that 
the substance of the rule entitling the media to source immunity 
may be so eroded by all the derogations thus permitted as to 
leave it of little practical efficacy.
A further criticism of a more technical nature (which could,
1. Ibid, at 914. Again, as regards the third applicant (the 
publisher and printer of the newspaper) this must presumably 
be read as meaning any article published by it in its capacity 
as such.
2. Ibid.
3. Other aspects of the judgment - particularly its warning 
against the abuse of police powers, and its emphasis (at 912) 
that the courts will always stand ready to defend the rights
of the citizen - are equally important but do not fall directly 
within the ambit of this study.
4. See p  1182 n 7, above.
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however, assume importance in future cases) relates to the 
authority relied upon by the court for the source immunity prin­
ciple. In general, the court did no more than to declare that 
immunity from disclosure is derived from the freedom to impart 
ideas and information without interference which is guaranteed 
by section 36. No objection can be raised to this - except,
possibly, as to the wide meaning of 'interference' which it im-
1 2 
plies . However, in one particular passage of the judgment
where Balogun, J. cites with approval his earlier judgment in 
3
Adikwu's case - the court proceeds to identify the constitu­
tional authority for the 'shield of confidentiality' conferred 
on journalists: and describes this as section 36(3) (a) of the
4
1979 Constitution . Yet this subsection relates to the deroga­
tions from freedom of expression which may be authorised under
5
laws 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society' . How 
then can it provide a foundation for one aspect (i.e., media 
immunity from source disclosure) of a more general positive 
right (to freedom of expression and the communication of infor­
mation without interference)?
To understand the significance of this, it is perhaps necessary 
to set out the subsection in full; and to emphasise its place in
1. 'Interference' prima facie connotes some more direct action: 
such as censorship or a ban on circulation. However, it 
does not seem to be stretching the meaning of the word too 
far to say that it may also extend to the situation in issue - 
for ordering a journalist to disclose his source may clearly 
inhibit further 'leaks'; and thus 'interfere' with his right 
both to receive and to impart information.
2. See Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, supra, at 910.
3. Adikwu v Federal House of Representatives, (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 
394.
4. See Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, supra.
5. See the section on the guarantee of freedom of expression, in 
Chapter Two above.
the scheme of constitutional protection. The subsection thus
provides :
'Nothing in this Section i.e., s 36 
shall invalidate any law that is 
reasonably justifiable in a democra­
tic society -
(a) for the purpose of preventing 
the disclosure of information re­
ceived in confidence...'.
1
The provision must also be seen in its proper context - namely,
the fact that it is included after subsections (1) and (2) of
section 36 (which declare the substantive rights to freedom
2
of expression and to own, establish and operate any medium
3
for the dissemination of information) .
It is clear, therefore, that the subsection is intended to 
authorise a restriction on freedom of expression, where infor­
mation (which should otherwise be capable of being communicated 
without interference, in terms of subsection (1)), has been re­
ceived in confidence. It is in no way intended to provide a
4
'constitutional shield of confidentiality' entitling journa­
lists to refuse to break their confidential relationships with 
their sources of information by disclosing the identity of the 
latter. Hence, the court's reliance on the subsection in this 
context is clearly erroneous.
1. See s 36(3) (a), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979.
2. This, of course, is subject to Presidential authority as 
regards the broadcast media, as previously explained in 
Chapter Four.
3. See the general discussion of the Nigerian guarantee of 
freedom of expression in Chapter Two.
4. Note the reference to this in Oyegbemi v Attorney-General, 
supra, at 910 and 913.
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This must, inevitably, raise some question as to the value of 
the decision as a precedent for future cases. It is submitted, 
however, that the main ground relied upon by the court - that 
disclosure of sources would constitute an interference with 
freedom of expression, within the meaning of section 36(1) - 
is sufficiently clear and cogent to override this somewhat tech­
nical criticism; and that the decision accordingly has conside­
rable significance in establishing the rule in Nigerian law 
that the media cannot be compelled to disclose their sources 
of information: except in grave and exceptional circumstances.
It must, however, be emphasised that - in order to counter 
the more substantive criticism described above - a narrow in­
terpretation of what constitutes 'grave and exceptional circum­
stances' must be adopted if the rule is to retain any practical 
efficacy.
1
One final observation must be reiterated . The three Nigerian
cases discussed above are all decisions of the High Court of
Lagos State which (highly esteemed though it may be) is by no
means the highest court in the land. Above it stand both the
Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria - and
it is a moot question whether these courts (if called upon to
do so) would come to a conclusion contrary to the ruling of the
House of Lords in the Granada case - especially in the light of
the view expressed by a number of commentators on Nigerian law
that decisions of the House of Lords, on principles of common
2
law, are still binding in Nigeria . In addition, there is a
1. See p 1165 (regarding the Momoh case) and p 1177 (regarding Adikwu).
2. See p 161 et seq.
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considerable body of authority in the United States (including,
of course, the decision of the Supreme Court in Branzburg v 
1
Hayes ) against the recognition of a special media immunity 
from source disclosure; and it is significant that the majority 
of states in that country have considered legislation necessary 
to provide such immunity: and this despite a guarantee of freedom 
of the press which is far wider (and cast in infinitely more 
compelling terms) than the Nigerian guarantee.
The difficulties in the way of following the lead of the Lagos
High Court must therefore be acknowledged as considerable. It
is nevertheless submitted, however, that the Nigerian guarantee
2
of freedom of expression does indeed provide a sufficient basis 
for finding the common law rule unconstitutional. The free 
flow of information to society is so important and source im­
munity so crucial in maintaining this that the rule requiring 
disclosure should not be acknowledged as 'reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society'. Hence, it should be acknowledged that 
the common law rule in this context is indeed void for inconsis­
tency with the right to 'receive and impart ideas and informa­
tion without interference', guaranteed by section 36 of the 
Nigerian Constitution.
This, in turn, raises the question of the form the law should 
take instead. It is submitted that the United Kingdom legisla-
1. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2. It is submitted that the United States' guarantee is also 
sufficient to invalidate the common law rule: and that 
this would, indeed, have occurred if the commitment to 
media freedom had been stronger in Branzburg and its 
successors.
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tion (clearly premised on a continuing obligation of disclosure 
except in the circumstances mooted by the provision) is not 
appropriate in Nigeria: and that the courts should instead 
follow the United States principle (established, of course, 
through the shield legislation of certain states, rather than 
under the common law) that journalists enjoy an absolute privi­
lege against disclosure of their sources. Only if this is 
acknowledged as the appropriate principle will the role of 
investigative journalism be safeguarded; a free flow of infor­
mation to society encouraged; and individual journalists them­
selves be lifted from .the horns of the dilemma as to duty in 
which the common law has previously placed them.
Last (but by no means least) , it remains to pay tribute to 
the Lagos High Court for the stand it has taken in favour of 
individual liberty and freedom of the media.. It must also be 
emphasised that its approach is much to be welcomed - and clearly 
points the direction which all Nigerian courts should take in 
future cases: not only in this context but.also in other spheres of com­
mon law touching on media freedom. For it is one of the princi­
pal recommendations of this dissertation that Nigeria should 
move away from English precedents on the common law: and it is 
accordingly most encouraging to note Balogun, J.'s rejection 
of the majority judgment of the House of Lords in the Granada 
case in favour of Lord Salmon's dissenting view. It is also a 
major premise of this thesis that the approach of the United 
States of America to the interpretation of the common law in 
the context of media freedom provides an example which Nigeria 
would do well to follow. Accordingly, it is all the more
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welcome to note the Lagos High Court not only deriving guidance
from United States' precedents - but also (in this instance)
rejecting the narrow approach taken by the majority in Branzburg
v Hayes which (it is submitted) is out of keeping with the
Supreme Court's general f i m  commitment to the value of free
speech and press - and following instead the dissenting opinions
in the case, in which the importance of these freedoms is accorded
due weight. The significance of this shift towards the United
States' approach is examined further below: and, for the present,
(before leaving the topic of contempt of court in the context
of media freedom) it remains to note that the rules which have
been discussed in this and the preceding three chapters are by
1
means the only aspect of this 'Protean' branch of law which 
may affect the media.
12.10. The Significance of other Aspects of the Law of 
Contempt for Media Freedom
Within the general context of contempt of court, this study
has focused on those rules of obvious significance for the
media - the principles governing sub judice publication; the
offence of scandalising the court; the limits within which
court proceedings may be published; and the obligation of
journalists to disclose their sources. Yet the law of contempt
2
has many other aspects, as previously explained - and it
1. Thus, as may be recalled from the opening passages of 
Chapter Eight, 'contempt of court has been described as 
"the Proteus of the legal world, assuming an almost infi­
nite diversity of forms'". See p 695.
2. See p 696 et seq.
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should always be remembered that rules with little prima facie
significance for media freedom may nevertheless affect it to
considerable extent. The recent United Kingdom case of Home 
1
Office v Harman graphically illustrates the point.
Here, the appellant was a solicitor who had acted for the 
plaintiff in proceedings against the Home Office arising out 
of his treatment in prison in an experimental 'control unit'. 
During the course of these proceedings, the appellant had 
obtained discovery (from the Home Office) of some 2,800 docu­
ments, approximately 800 of which she had selected and prepared 
for use at the trial. In the course of counsel's opening speech 
for the plaintiff, all or 'all material parts' of these 800 
papers were read out in open court, including six documents 
for which the Home Office had attempted to claim immunity from 
discovery (on the basis of public interest) and which were ul­
timately ruled to be inadmissible. A few days after the hearing, 
the appellant allowed a journalist (who was a feature writer 
for the Guardian newspaper) to have access to the documents 
which had been read out, including the confidential papers, for 
the purpose of writing a newspaper article which (when published) 
was highly critical of Home Office ministers and civil servants. 
The appellant had accorded the journalist access to the documents 
on the basis of a well-known and common practice whereby 'counsel 
in civil litigation ... allow reporters who have been present 
at the hearing to have a sight of copies of any documents dis­
1. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 338 (H.L. (E.)).
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closed by either party that are in that counsel's possession,
and have been read out in court, so that the reporter may
check the accuracy of the report of the proceedings that he 
1
is preparing' . The Home Office contended, however, that the 
appellant had thereby been guilty of contempt of court: on the 
ground that she had breached her implied undertaking to the 
court not to use the documents obtained on discovery for any 
purpose other than that of the particular proceedings. The 
trial court found her guilty of contempt, but imposed no penalty 
(in view of the fact that she had believed her conduct justified 
by the common practice described above). Her conviction never­
theless had important implications for media freedom: and she 
appealed to the Court of Appeal (which confirmed the trial 
court's decision) and thence to the House of Lords. Their 
Lordships, by a majority of 5:3, agreed that her conduct constitu­
ted a contempt.
In the view of the majority, the appellant - as a solicitor and
officer of the court - in obtaining discovery of documents in
the course of litigation, gave an implied undertaking to the
court not to use the documents 'for any purpose other than the
2
proper conduct of the action' ; and the fact that the documents 
had been read out in open court did not bring that implied 
undertaking to an end. Hence, breach of the undertaking (by
1. Ibid, at 345.
2. Ibid, at 339.
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showing the documents to the journalist) constituted a civil
1
contempt. The minority , by contrast, emphasised that once
the documents had been read out in open court, they had entered
2
into 'the public domain' and that '.[o]nce they had become
public knowledge, freedom of comment concerning them enure[d]
3
to the public at large' . Accordingly, there could be no 
reason 'why the undertaking given when they were confidential
4
should continue to apply to them' . Even if the undertaking
had continued in force (which the minority did not accept), this
'could not have prevailed to prevent their publication to the 
5
world at large' , once they had been read out aloud - without 
restriction^ - in open court?.
1. The dissenting minority comprised Lord Scarman and Lord 
Simon of Glaisdale.
2. Ibid, at 353, per Lord Scarman (who delivered the dissent­
ing judgment).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, at 360.
6. Thus, the court had given no indication that the documents
(including those ruled inadmissible) were not to be reported
by the media. Cf R v Socialist Worker, Printers and Publishers, 
Ltd, [1975] 1 Q.B. 637 (D.C.) and Attorney-General v Leveller 
Magazine Ltd, [1979] A.C. 440 (H.L.(E.)}.
7. Home Office v Harman, supra. Lord Scarman further emphasised 
(at 357 - 358, ibid) that, under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European 
Court in The Sunday Times v United Kingdom Government,
[1979] 2 E.H.R.R. 245, the United Kingdom had undertaken to 
uphold the right to freedom of expression: and that this 
right could only be circumscribed by rules which are necessary 
in a democratic society to secure certain interests, includ­
ing the prevention of the disclosure of information received 
in confidence. Once the documents had been read out in open 
court, it could hardly be argued that there was 'a pressing 
social need to exclude the litigant and his solicitor from 
the right available to everyone else to treat as public 
knowledge- documents which have been produced and made part 
and parcel of public legal proceedings'.
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It is not proposed to examine the judgment in detail, for the
decision turned primarily on the rules pertaining to discovery
and the extent of a solicitor's implied undertaking to the
1
court in such circumstances . The case clearly demonstrates, 
however, that aspects of the law of contempt with little appa­
rent importance for the media may nevertheless assume conside­
rable significance for press freedom. The practical outcome 
of the decision is to cast grave doubt on the legality of the 
common practice (described above) whereby journalists are able 
to obtain from counsel a sight of documents which have been 
read out in open court: yet this practice is undoubtedly of 
great assistance to the media in fulfilling their important 
role of reporting court proceedings. It is true that the 
majority gave the assurance that the use of documents by 
journalists for the purpose of checking the accuracy of their
reports would not be held to constitute contempt, under the
2
de minimis principle ; but it must also be noted that the
limits of this concept are not easy to define: as the majority
3 4
acknowledged - but then appeared to brush aside .
The further - and yet more disturbing inference from the deci­
sion - is that a journalist in the position of the Guardian's
1. For a full account of the decision, see Arlidge and Eady,
op cit, pp 245 - 251.
2. See Home Office v Harman, supra, at 348, where Lord Dip- 
stressed that it would always be open to the court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, to dismiss a motion for contempt 
brought in such circumstances. This may be so: but it is 
hardly a satisfactory solution in principle.
3. See ibid, at 367, where Lord Roskill acknowledged that 'there
may be cases where the line is difficult to draw'.
4. See ibid, at 350, where Lord Keith of Kinkel suggests that
'if there should be any reason to doubt whether the party
who had disclosed the documents under discovery or his
legal advisers would approve of its being shown to the
journalist, it should not ... be done without such approval'. 
Such a proposal - with respect - is hardly practical; and 
entails a serious impediment to freedom of the media.
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feature writer cannot safely obtain sight of documents read out 
in open court from either counsel or solicitors, but must in­
stead wait until 'transcripts of mechanically recorded speeches
[in proceedings] are obtainable from the official shorthand- 
1
writers' . This is not only expensive but also time-consuming: 
and may therefore preclude publication of matters of great 
public interest (as the Home Office use of 'control units' and 
other aspects of its policies and procedures undoubtedly was) 
until after the concern sparked by particular litigation has 
died. In such circumstances, freedom of the media must undoubted­
ly suffer. Moreover, the situation thus engendered is highly 
anomalous - as the majority was compelled to concede. The 
majority thus acknowledged that if a transcript of the proceed­
ings had already been available at the time the appellant made 
her bundle of documents available to the journalist, there 
would have been little difference in content between the two 
sets of documents. It would clearly have been quite legitimate 
for the journalist to have consulted the official transcript - 
yet it was contempt of court for the appellant to show him the 
selfsame material. The majority considered this anomaly of minor 
significance compared with the appellant's implied undertaking 
to the court. Lord Scarman, by contrast, was unable to accept 
the notion of 'a guilty left hand' (giving the journalist the 
documents obtained on discovery) and 'an innocent right hand' 
(giving him the notional transcript). In his view, '[r]ights
and duties in the field of fundamental freedoms [could] not
2
depend upon such distinctions' .
1. Ibid, at 367.
2. Ibid, at
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In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the minority judgment
is clearly more in line with the views of the Law Commission
in its recent report on Breach of Confidence. It did not
believe that 'civil liability for breach of confidence should
persist after the information to which the relevant obligation
of confidence relates has been published in open court'. In-t
stead, the Commission stressed that 'everyone ought to be able
to rely, so far as any civil liability for breach of confidence
is concerned, on the fact that the information in question has
1
been published in open court' (always provided, of course, that 
it had been so published both orally and without restriction on 
its further publication). There is sound sense in this recommen­
dation: and it is to be hoped that this approach (similar to 
that of the minority in the Harman case) which would be followed 
in Nigeria should a similar case of alleged contempt of court 
arise for adjudication.
It is accordingly submitted that whenever the "Protean" law of 
contempt threatens some aspect of media freedom in this kind 
of indirect way, the Nigerian courts should be fully alive to 
the danger to freedom of expression which this represents; 
and should only allow any interference with publication where 
this can be shown - echoing the general approach of the United 
States' Supreme Court - to be necessary to avert a clear and 
present danger. Only if Nigerian courts maintain sensitivity
1. Ibid, at 354 - 355, per Lord Scarman, citing the Report of 
the Law Commission.
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to the importance of freedom of expression and an awareness 
of the myriad ways in which it may be placed at risk can the 
constitutional guarantee of the right to 'receive and impart 
ideas and information without interference' attain true meaning 
and real practical significance.
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C O. N C L U S I O N
It remains to draw together the threads of this study into a 
more integrated whole. It has begun by examining the value of 
freedom of the media and what this concept signifies in develop­
ing and developed nations alike; has sought to introduce Nigeria 
as a country and to provide some insight into her history, legal 
system, bill of rights and guarantee of freedom of expression; 
has attempted to provide an overview of media freedom under laws 
of pre- and post-colonial origin; and has endeavoured to analyse 
in some depth the more important legal restraints on media free­
dom: viz., licensing and regulation of the media, the law of 
sedition, defamation in both its civil and criminal aspects, and 
contempt of court in the four main areas in which it impinges 
on media freedom.
As previously explained, the laws selected for special study have 
been chosen because they are clearly part of Nigeria's colonial 
heritage: in that they are derived (in the main) from legislation 
of pre-independence origin or have their source in the common law 
of England which applies throughout Nigeria by virtue of the 
latter's colonial past. These laws have particular significance: 
for they have not only been introduced into Nigeria from the 
United Kingdom but have also become part (in the same or sub­
stantially similar terms) of the law in the great majority of 
Britain's one-time dependencies. The populations of these 
countries (now mainly independent members of the Commonwealth) 
number one thousand million - one quarter of the world's entire
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1
populace . The colonial process has thus taken the common law 
of England far beyond the small island of its birth, and has 
spread it far and wide across the globe. Yet this same common 
law is a product of centuries of piece-meal and haphazard deve­
lopment, in which (by contrast with civil law systems) little 
thought has been directed to the appropriate principles which 
ought to govern human society, and attention has been focused 
on the gradual expansion of case law to cater for the demands 
of changing times.
This process may have been adequate for the needs of pre-indus­
trial society, but the post-industrial age - particularly the 
twentieth century - has been a period of rapid transition, un­
precedented in the history of mankind: and the common law is 
still struggling to loose the grip of the past and rise to 
meet the challenge of the future. Many of its principles are, 
of course, fundamentally sound and stand in no need of reform, 
being fully capable of meeting and accomodating the changing 
conditions of the times. But other aspects of the common law 
seem out of step with modern thinking and (within the sphere 
of media freedom at least) to be premised upon an undue and 
revential awe for the authority of government in all its branches 
(legislative, executive and judicial). Hence the broadly framed 
law of sedition which (in Britain's ex-colonies has been given 
an even wider ambit through elimination of the requirement of 
incitement to violence); hence the law of criminal defamation, 
with its various presumptions against an accused, which - on many
1. The Times, 8 October, 1981.
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occasions in the past - has been used to punish criticism of 
the executive and its policies; hence the offence of scandalising 
the court, which penalises the imputation of bias (that most 
common of human failings) on the part of the judiciary.
In many other respects, the common law appears equally in need 
of radical re-thinking. Why should the plaintiff in civil defa­
mation be excused the burden of substantiating crucial elements 
of his claim - contrary to the general rule which applies in 
other branches of tort? Is the premise underlying the sub judice 
rule - that jurors, parties, witnesses (and other participants 
in pending proceedings) will be unduly influenced by comment on 
the litigation - substantiated in reality? Is the uncertainty 
surrounding the reporting of judicial proceedings by the media 
to be further tolerated? And is it truly necessary to ban tape- 
recorders and television cameras from courtrooms - particularly 
in societies where illiteracy is still high and the open admin­
istration of justice can have little meaning unless it can either 
be heard or (literally) be seen to be done? Will society not 
ultimately be much the poorer for demanding that journalists dis­
close their sources - thereby disrupting the free flow of infor­
mation to the larger community?
The defects of the common law rules within the sphere of media 
freedom extend far beyond those highlighted above. They have, 
of course, been identified at some length in the course of this 
study: and it is not proposed to reiterate any detailed analysis 
here. Suffice it to submit that the case for reform has been 
sufficiently well proven: and that the most important question
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which remains is to determine the direction such reform should 
take. Again, detailed recommendations in this regard have been 
made at a number of points in this study: and there would be 
little utility in attempting to summarize them here. One note­
worthy feature which emerges time and again, however, is the 
marked contrast between the "traditional" common law approach 
and the manner in which the law has been interpreted in the 
United States of America. From intrinsically the same material, 
a fundamentally different set of rules has been moulded: and the 
law has been transformed to give (in principle if not always in 
practice) a firm and clear commitment to media freedom - and to 
the notion that debate and discussion on matters of public interest 
should be robust, wide-open and uninhibited. The experience of 
the United States thus provides an important lead for other com­
mon law jurisdictions; and sets a practical and living example of 
the diametrically different direction the common law is capable 
of taking.
The United States' lead is thus well worth the following: and it 
appears that the time is now appropriate for Nigeria to take this 
step. Nigeria has already looked to the United States for guidance 
and has thus adopted a 'Washington'-style constitution which may 
well prove more suited to her needs than the 'Whitehall' model 
under which she attained her independence. It is accordingly 
fitting that Nigeria should now seek further guidance from United 
States' case law as well (particularly the decisions of its re­
nowned Supreme Court); and should build upon this foundation to 
redress the present deficiencies of the common law she has inheri­
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ted. It is heartening to note that this process has already begun, 
as evidenced by the recent decisions of the Lagos High Court in 
the context of journalists' duty to disclose their sources: and 
it is submitted that this trend should be continued and accelera­
ted. If Nigeria adopts the course suggested, then she may again 
(as when she introduced her Bill of Rights in 1959) provide a 
lead to other new nations of the Commonwealth, faced with essen­
tially similar difficulties under the common law they, too, have 
inherited from the United Kingdom. The implications for one- 
quarter of the world's population may ultimately be profound.
It now remains to acknowledge certain of the lacunae of this study 
itself. It may be objected that too much prominence has been 
given to the rights of the media: and too little to their res­
ponsibilities. To some extent, such criticism is valid: for res­
ponsibility is crucial and freedom of the media without such ■ 
sense of duty and commitment to society may prove destructive 
rather than beneficial: especially given the powerful influence 
of mass communications in the modern world. It is submitted, 
however, that such duty and commitment cannot be attained within 
a framework of laws which constrain and restrict the media, but 
can only be developed through the adoption of voluntary codes 
of conduct aimed at fostering a deep-rooted pride in the proper 
performance of the vital functions of the media. Responsibility 
is best engendered in an atmosphere of freedom: for only where 
there is choice can responsibility have real meaning. Hence, 
the necessary sense of responsibility should be promoted through 
the establishment of autonomous and independent media councils
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(free from all control by government) to set and maintain stan­
dards of reporting; to guard against excessive intrusion into 
privacy; to discourage sensationalism and 'cheque-book' journa­
lism; to formulate suitable principles (by consensus with bench 
and bar) for reporting court proceedings and commenting on 
cases (so as to strike an appropriate balance between free press 
and fair trial); to encourage full coverage of events and issues 
of national and international importance; to promote the can­
vassing in equal measure of opposing views on such matters; 
to utilize the potential of the media for education and develop­
ment (within a context of free choice rather than adherence to 
autocratic governmental ruling); and to generate a profound 
commitment to the principle that the role of the media is prim­
arily to inform: and to do so - at all times - in an objective 
and impartial manner.
Little apology is thus tendered for the omission from this study 
of detailed analysis of how this should be achieved: for this 
dissertation is primarily concerned with the laws which presently 
regulate and control the media: and it needs no further emphasis 
that legal restrictions and restraints are not appropriate vehicles 
for the promotion of responsibility. This lies outside the 
proper ambit of the law: except, of course, to the extent that 
legal rules should provide a framework of freedom in which true 
responsibility may be fostered, rather than its semblance coerced.
Further, it remains to acknowledge that this study has made no 
attempt to deal with two further problems of great and increasing
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magnitude in the context of media freedom. These are the problems 
of maintaining privacy in an increasingly intrusive society; and of 
attempting to ensure - in the face of mounting dangers to peace and 
increasing development of technologies which will shake the very 
foundations of present society - greater public access to sensitive 
information presently regarded by governments as their sole and legi­
timate prerogative. These lacunae are greatly regretted: but the con­
straints of time and space have militated against an attempt to cover 
all aspects of media freedom; and - given the need for selection - it 
has seemed more important to focus on those laws which have particu­
lar impact on media freedom in Nigeria today.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the most pervasive control 
over the media in Nigeria at present stems from the current large- 
scale ownership of the print media; and the exclusive government 
monopoly over the vital electronic media (which alone have the 
capacity to reach the illiterate majority)• It has previously 
been recommended that the constitutional requirement for Presidential 
authority for the establishment of such electronic media should 
be amended to facilitate the acquisition of the requisite licence.
Yet even if this change is implemented, however, the reality will 
remain that legal principle cannot alter economic constraints: 
and it must accordingly be acknowledged that the cost of estab­
lishing such broadcasting services may well render this imprac­
ticable. Even within the context of the print media, it must 
be recognised that the cost of newsprint and the difficulty of 
obtaining adequate supplies may effectively exclude any real 
alternative to government ownership for many years. Governments 
in Nigeria (at federal and state level) should therefore be all
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the more willing to accept and acknowledge that their primary 
duty is to the people of Nigeria, that they should not abuse 
their position of power in relation to the media, that instead 
their commitment in the interests of the country as a whole 
should be to the promotion of vigorous debate which should 
indeed be robust, wide-open and unrestricted by laws of the 
kind described in this study. It may be argued that the majority 
of Nigerians are not ready for such freedom: but such fundamen­
tally derogatory and paternalistic sentiment should not be 
allowed to prevail. Government of the people, by the people 
and for the people remains the only effective safeguard against 
tyranny and corruption; and the information so crucial to such 
decision-making should be made freely available to the people 
so as to enable them to exercise their human faculties of choice - 
and to realise their full potential for rational and intuitive 
self-development.
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